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0.1:100  Sources of Law and Guidance 
 
0.1:101  Professional Code 
The rules of professional conduct governing lawyers in Ohio are found in the Ohio Rules of 
Professional Conduct (OHRPC). The OHRPC is modeled on the ABA Model Rules, although it 
varies from the Model Rules in a number of respects. These differences are discussed in the Model 
Rule Comparison sections pertaining to each Rule. Unusual aspects of the OHRPC are discussed in 
section 0.1:104. 
Like the Model Rules, the OHRPC contains rules and comments thereto, together with Preamble, 
Scope, and Terminology (Rule 1.0) sections. 
Court opinions construing these rules arise (and, under the former Ohio Code of Professional 
Responsibility (OHCPR), have arisen) not only in disciplinary cases, but in other contexts as well, 
such as malpractice, contempt, disqualification, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Only Ohio 
Supreme Court opinions rendered in disciplinary cases provide authoritative interpretations of the 
OHRPC (and the former OHCPR). Nevertheless, opinions rendered in other contexts, while not 
directly on point, often provide important insights into the likely interpretation of the disciplinary 
provisions. 
Ethics opinions applying the OHRPC (and the former OHCPR) to prospective or hypothetical 
situations are rendered by the Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, the Ohio 
State Bar Association, and numerous local bar associations. It is important to recognize that none of 
these opinions are binding; they are all advisory in nature. Nevertheless, an ethics opinion may be 
persuasive in determining the interests to be protected by the disciplinary rule at issue. See, e.g., 
Insituform of N. Am., Inc. v. Midwest Pipeliners, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 622 (S.D. Ohio 1991). Of the 
various ethics opinions available, those of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
probably deserve the greatest weight, given that they are issued under authority expressly granted by 
the Ohio Supreme Court in Gov Bar R V 2(C). 
  
0.1:102  “Other” Law and Moral Obligation 
In addition to the OHRPC, professional conduct of lawyers in Ohio is governed by the Ohio 
Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar (Gov Bar R), including the Oath of Office 
attorneys take upon admission to the bar, Gov Bar R I 8(A), and various provisions of the Ohio 
Revised Code (ORC), particularly ORC 4705.01 (prohibitions regarding practice of law). The 
Governing Bar Rules are described in section 0.2:210. 
To provide additional ethical guidance for lawyers in Ohio, in 1992 the Ohio Supreme Court 
established the Supreme Court Commission on Professionalism to address professionalism concerns. 
See Gov Bar R XV. In response to the Commission’s work, the Court issued a Statement on 
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Professionalism and adopted two documents: A Lawyer’s Creed and A Lawyer’s Aspirational 
Ideals. See Gov Bar R App V. In December 2007, the Court announced a publication entitled 
“Professional Ideals for Ohio Lawyers and Judges,” which contains the materials found in Appendix 
V, together with a document issued by the Court on September 20, 2007, entitled “Statement 
Regarding Provision of Pro Bono Legal Services by Ohio Lawyers.” These documents are not 
intended to set additional disciplinary standards, but rather provide guidelines to promote 
professionalism in the bench and bar. Mandatory continuing legal education (CLE) related to 
professionalism, along with instruction on the OHRPC and substance abuse, is required of every 
Ohio lawyer authorized to practice. See Gov Bar R X 3(A)(1). 
Against the background of this “place-based,” comprehensive self-regulatory system in Ohio (and 
every other state), the future might hold something very different. In his article on a 2013 conference 
held at the Miller-Becker Center for Professional Responsibility, Brian F. Toohey, What I Heard at 
the Symposium on Ethics 20/20 and Uncertain Times, Cleve. Metro. Bar J, June 2013, at 33, the 
author reports that the possible changes seen in the crystal ball (“admittedly imperfect”) of some of 
the panelists included the possibility of uniform federal regulation of lawyers and the relaxation of 
unauthorized practice rules to encourage the extension of a sort of “limited licensing” system that will 
enable those unable to afford “real lawyers” to obtain assistance with their routine legal problems. 
  
0.1:103  Background of Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct 
The Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court on July 1, 2006, 
effective February 1, 2007.  The OHRPC is applicable in all disciplinary matters involving conduct 
occurring on or after the effective date.  OHRPC Form of Citation, Effective Date, Application (b).  
For overviews of Ohio’s adoption of the Rules, see John Mueller, Frank Quirk & Eugene P. 
Whetzel, New Ethics Rules: What Lawyers Need to Know, Ohio Law., Nov./Dec. 2006, at 8 
(part I), and Ohio Law. Jan./Feb. 2007, at 12 (part II); Deborah A. Coleman, The New Ohio 
Ethics Rules, Clev. B.J., Oct. 2006, at 8. 
The Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted effective October 5, 1970, and not the Rules, 
will continue to apply in all disciplinary matters involving conduct that occurred on or before January 
31, 2007. OHRPC Form of Citation, Effective Date, Application (b).  For a history of attorney 
regulation in Ohio from the 1700s to the early 1980s, see Thomas R. Swisher, Professional 
Responsibility in Ohio (1981). 
As might be expected, there have been instances in which conduct violative of a disciplinary rule 
occurs both before and after the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct. E.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 119 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008 Ohio 3836, 894 N.E.2d 31 (violation 
of DR 1-102(A)(5), (6), 9-102(A) & 9-102(B)(3) and Rule 8.4(d), (h), 1.15(a) & 1.15(a)(2)-(3)). As 
the Freeman court makes clear, however, such a “listing of the former and the current rule constitutes 
only one rule violation.” Id. at n. 1. 
  
7
Ohio Legal Ethics Introduction 
 
0.1:104  Unusual Aspects of the Ohio Ethics Rules 
Other than MR 3.2 (Expediting Litigation), 6.3 (Membership in Legal Services Organization), 6.4 
(Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests), and 7.6 (Political Contributions to Obtain Legal 
Engagements or Appointments by Judges), which were not adopted, and MR 6.1 (Voluntary Pro 
Bono Publico Service), on which action was deferred, the OHRPC largely tracks the ABA Model 
Rules. Where it does not, the changes often reflect a retention of the substance of the analogous 
OHCPR provision. These differences are set forth below: 
Ohio Rule 1.4(c), like former OH DR 1-104, requires notification to clients when a lawyer does not 
maintain malpractice insurance of at least $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in the aggregate. 
See section 1.4:500. 
Ohio Rule 1.5(f), like former OH DR 2-107(B), provides that fee-division disputes between lawyers 
not in the same firm are to be resolved by mediation or arbitration provided by a local bar association 
or, if that is unsuccessful, the Ohio State Bar Association. See section 1.5:250. 
Ohio Rule 1.8(c), like former OH DR 5-101(A)(2)-(3), prohibits lawyer involvement in the 
preparation, drafting, or execution of a will, codicil, inter vivos trust, or other instrument for a client if 
the instrument bestows any gift to the lawyer, his firm, or anyone in his firm or family, unless the 
recipient is related to the client. See section 1.8:400. 
Ohio Rule 1.10(d), unlike MR 1.10, provides for screening in certain situations to cure imputed 
disqualification of other members of a law firm. The provision is adapted from Kala v. Aluminum 
Smelting & Refining Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998). See section 1.10:300.  See also 
Marc L. Swartzbaugh, Where Does Ohio Stand on Screening as a Means of Avoiding Imputed 
Disqualification?, Clev. B.J., Dec. 2006, at 10. 
Ohio Rule 1.13 recommends, but does not require, that a lawyer report to higher (or highest) 
authority within the organization before making disclosure permitted by Rule 1.6(b) or required by 
Rule 1.6(c). See Rule 1.13 cmt. [6]. MR 1.13(c), (d), and (e) have been deleted from the Ohio Rule; 
Ohio Rule 1.13(c) states that the discretion or duty of a lawyer to reveal information outside the 
organization is governed by Rule 1.6(b) and (c). See section 1.13:300. 
Ohio Rule 1.17 provides for sale of a law practice, but utilizes the language of former OH DR 2-111, 
adopted in 2003, rather than the Model Rules template, MR 1.17. See section 1.17:300. 
Ohio Rule 1.18 deletes MR cmt. [5], which permits a lawyer to agree with prospective clients, on 
informed consent, that information disclosed would not prevent the lawyer’s representation of a 
different client in the matter and/or to the lawyer’s use of information received from the prospective 
client. See section 1.18:200. 
Ohio Rules 7.1 through 7.5, governing solicitation and advertising, diverge in a number of respects 
from the Model Rules. This is particularly so of Ohio Rule 7.3 (“Direct Contact with Prospective 
Clients”), which includes much of the material in former OH DR 2-101(F). See sections 
7.1:100-7.5:500. 
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Ohio Rule 8.4(g), like former OH DR 1-102(B), treats as a disciplinary offense a lawyer’s engaging, 
in a professional capacity, in conduct involving discrimination prohibited by law. See section 
8.4:800. 
Ohio Rule 8.4(h) continues the fitness-to-practice provision of former OH DR 1-102(A)(6). See 
section 8.4:1000. 
Finally, in a number of instances, Ohio uses the term “illegal” instead of “criminal” as used in the 
Model Rules.  See Ohio Rules 1.2(d), 1.6(b)(3), 1.16(b)(2), 4.1(b), and 8.4(b), and sections 1.2:600, 
1.6:340, 1.16:320, 4.1:300, and 8.4:300, respectively.  See also Brian F. Toohey, Ohio Goes Its 
Own Way on Misconduct Prohibition and Disclosure Obligations, Clev BJ, Mar. 2007, at 12. 
0.2:200  Forms of Lawyer Regulation in Ohio 
  
0.2:210  Judicial Regulation 
In a series of cases from 1909 to 1958, the Ohio Supreme Court developed a theory of inherent 
authority to justify the primacy of the judiciary in the regulation of attorney conduct in Ohio. See  In 
re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492, 89 N.E. 39 (1909); In re McBride, 164 Ohio St. 419, 132 N.E.2d 
113 (1956); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Pleasant, 167 Ohio St. 325, 148 N.E.2d 493 (1958); 
Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 151 N.E.2d 17 (1958). The import of 
these cases can be summarized as follows: The power to regulate lawyer admission to practice, 
conduct and discipline lies in the inherent authority of the judiciary. While the legislature may act in 
these areas, it can do so only as an aid to the judiciary, not in derogation of it. 
In 1968, the Ohio Constitution was amended to explicitly recognize the Court’s role. Under these 
amendments the Ohio Supreme Court is granted original jurisdiction over “[a]dmission to the practice 
of law, the discipline of persons so admitted and all other matters relating to the practice of law.” OH 
Const art IV, §  2(B)(1)(g). OH Const art IV, §  5(B) requires the Court to “make rules governing 
the admission to the practice of law and discipline of persons so admitted.” The express authority to 
regulate the practice of law also includes the concomitant responsibility to control the unauthorized 
practice of law. See Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Jackson, 121 Ohio St.3d 33, 2009 Ohio 309, 901 
N.E.2d 792. Implicit authority is provided to assess attorney registration fees to be used in regulating 
the practice of law.  Calhoun v. Supreme Court, 61 Ohio App.2d 1, 399 N.E.2d 559 (Franklin 
1978). For a case forcefully reiterating the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction in all such matters, 
see Shimko v. Lobe, 103 Ohio St.3d 59, 2004 Ohio 4202, 813 N.E.2d 669 (“it has been 
methodically and firmly established that the power and responsibility to admit and discipline persons 
admitted to the practice of law, to promulgate and enforce professional standards and rules of conduct, 
and to otherwise broadly regulate, control, and define the procedure and practice of law in Ohio rests 
inherently, originally, and exclusively in the Supreme Court of Ohio.” Id. at para. 15). See also In re 
Estate of Robertson, 159 Ohio App.3d 297, 2004 Ohio 6509, 823 N.E.2d 904 (Mahoning) 
(probate court had no authority to impose 10% reduction in attorney-fee award as sanction for 
violation of DR 9-102).  (In one disciplinary case, Disciplinary Counsel v. Scacchetti, 114 Ohio 
St.3d 36, 2007 Ohio 2713, 867 N.E.2d 830, the Supreme Court referred to action taken by a common 
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pleas court in an underlying criminal prosecution against respondent.  In granting 
respondent/defendant’s motion for treatment in lieu of conviction, the trial court imposed, inter alia, 
an order that Scacchetti change his registration status to inactive for a two-year period, and the 
“Supreme Court Attorney Registration Section has changed respondent’s status to inactive.”  Id. at 
para. 7.  Such an order seems arguably at odds with the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction in 
such matters.) 
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority, the Court not only has adopted rules and codes of conduct to 
govern both lawyers and judges, but also has promulgated the Supreme Court Rules for the 
Government of the Bar of Ohio (Gov Bar R). The seventeen substantive Governing Bar Rules 
address the following topics: 
 Rule I [Gov Bar R I]- Admission to the Practice of Law (see section 8.1:200) 
 Rule II [Gov Bar R II] - Limited Practice by a Legal Intern (see sections 5.5:210 and 
8.1:200) 
 Rule III [Gov Bar R III] - Practice of Law - Firm Organization; Name; Ethics; Financial 
Responsibility 
 Rule IV [Gov Bar R IV] - Professional Responsibility (see sections 0.2:240 and 8.2:200) 
 Rule V [Gov Bar R V] - Disciplinary Procedure (see section 0.2:240) 
 Rule VI [Gov Bar R VI] - Registration of Attorneys (see section 5.5:220) 
 Rule VII [Gov Bar R VII] - Unauthorized Practice of Law (see section 5.5:200) 
 Rule VIII [Gov Bar R VIII] - Client’s Security Fund (see section 1.15:120) 
 Rule IX [Gov Bar R IX] - Temporary Certification for Practice in Legal Services, Public 
Defender, and Law School Programs (see sections 5.5:210 and 8.1:200) 
 Rule X [Gov Bar R X] - Attorney Continuing Legal Education (see section 1.1:200) 
 Rule XI [Gov Bar R XI] - Limited Practice of Law by Foreign Legal Consultants (see 
sections 5.5:210 and 8.1:200) 
 Rule XII [Gov Bar R XII] - Rules Advisory Committee 
 Rule XIII [Gov Bar R XIII] - Funds for Dispute Resolution Programs 
 Rule XIV [Gov Bar R XIV] - Certification of Attorneys as Specialists (see section 7.4:200) 
 Rule XV [Gov Bar R XV] - Supreme Court Commission on Professionalism (see section 
0.1:102) 
10
Ohio Legal Ethics Introduction 
 
 Rule XVI [Gov Bar R XVI] - Supreme Court Committee for Lawyer Referral and 
Information Services (see section 7.3:500) 
 Rule XVII [Gov Bar R XVII] - Commission on Legal Education Opportunity 
An overview of some of these rules is provided in Mark D. Thompson, The Hidden Rules of 
Practice, Clev. Metro. B.J. April 2012, at 28. 
In light of both its inherent authority and constitutional mandate, the Ohio Supreme Court has 
jealously guarded its authority to regulate the bar from intrusion by the legislature.  Hecht v. Levin, 
66 Ohio St.3d 458, 613 N.E.2d 585 (1993), involved a statutory provision providing limited, rather 
than absolute, privilege for comments made in professional disciplinary proceedings; the Court 
construed the provision as applying to the disciplinary proceedings of other professionals, but not 
lawyers. Any other interpretation, the Court argued, would be unconstitutional as an invalid intrusion 
on the Court’s authority. In Smith v. Kates, 46 Ohio St.2d 263, 348 N.E.2d 320 (1976), the Court, 
finding that it has the exclusive and absolute authority to structure the disciplinary process, declared 
unconstitutional a statute that purported to authorize the filing of original actions in the courts for the 
suspension, disbarment, or removal of attorneys and judges for ethical violations. While the Supreme 
Court has in the past found unconstitutional legislative authorization of lay representation in 
proceedings where such representation constitutes the practice of law, e.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Picklo, 96 Ohio St.3d 195, 2002 Ohio 3995, 772 N.E.2d 1187 (finding legislative authorization for 
landlord’s agents to prosecute forcible entry and detainer actions an infringement on the Court’s 
exclusive jurisdiction to define the practice of law), more recent decisions have upheld limited 
statutory exceptions to the general rule so long as the layperson is not authorized to engage in 
activities reserved exclusively for lawyers, such as cross examination, legal argument, and the like. 
E.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Pearlman, 106 Ohio St.3d 136, 2005 Ohio 4107, 832 N.E.2d 1193. 
See further discussion in section 5.5:210 at “Constitutionality of legislation empowering nonlawyers 
to practice law in certain limited circumstances.” 
Inasmuch as the power to regulate the legal profession lies in the Ohio Supreme Court, lower courts in 
Ohio have no direct role in the disciplinary process. The process established by the Supreme Court for 
the discipline of lawyers is exclusive and must be followed.  Smith v. Kates, 46 Ohio St.2d 263, 348 
N.E.2d 230 (1976). Furthermore, while lower courts have the authority to promulgate local rules, 
they cannot use that authority to establish enforceable standards of conduct for lawyers appearing 
before them that are analogous to the disciplinary rules. See Melling v. Stralka, 12 Ohio St.3d 105, 
465 N.E.2d 857 (1984). Nor can lower courts disqualify particular lawyers from appearing before 
them as a general matter, rather than on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., State ex rel. Buck v. Maloney, 
102 Ohio St.3d 250, 2004 Ohio 2590, 809 N.E.2d 20 (writ of prohibition granted to prevent judge 
from barring appellant from practicing in probate court); Catholic Soc. Servs. v. Howard, 106 Ohio 
App.3d 615, 666 N.E.2d 658 (Cuyahoga 1995). Cf. In re Karasek, 119 Ohio App.3d 615, 695 
N.E.2d 1209 (Montgomery 1997). But see the trial court order described in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Scacchetti, discussed this section supra, requiring respondent/defendant to change his registration 
status from active to inactive. 
The lower courts do play an indirect role in the disciplinary process, however, by regulating the 
conduct of lawyers appearing before them through the contempt power, disqualification for conflicts, 
and the like. See Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 31 Ohio St.3d 256, 510 N.E.2d 379 (1987) (lower 
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court consideration of the former OHCPR in deciding a motion to disqualify does not infringe on the 
exclusive authority of the Ohio Supreme Court to discipline, but is instead preventing a potential 
disciplinary violation in the proper exercise of the trial court’s inherent authority to regulate practice 
before it and to protect the integrity of its proceedings). The lower courts also play an indirect role 
where lawyer conduct is questioned through actions in tort (such as malpractice suits), contract (such 
as fee disputes), or in the criminal setting in claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, all 
Ohio judges have a duty to cooperate in a variety of ways in the disciplinary process. See Ohio Code 
of Judicial Conduct (OH CJC) Rule 2.16(A); Gov Bar R V 4(G). (Following the ABA adoption of 
revisions to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct in February 2007, a Task Force was appointed by the 
Chief Justice to review the Ohio Code. The revised Ohio CJC became effective on March 1, 2009.) 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s actions, in promulgating and enforcing the former OHCPR, have been 
found to qualify for state-action immunity from challenge under the Sherman Act as an unreasonable 
restraint of trade. See Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n, 983 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1993); see 
also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
0.2:220  Bar Organizations 
There are more than one hundred voluntary bar associations in Ohio. The first was the Franklin 
County Bar Association, formed in 1869. The Ohio State Bar Association was formed in 1880. Most 
of the bar associations in Ohio are county bar associations, although some larger cities, such as Akron, 
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton and Toledo, have their own bar associations. There also are 
specialty bar associations, such as the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers Association and the Ohio 
Municipal Attorneys Association. A number of minority bar associations are active in the state, as 
well, such as the Asian American Bar, the Black Lawyers Association, the John Mercer Langston Bar 
Association, the Norman S. Minor Bar Association, and the Ohio Hispanic Association. A complete 
list can be found in volume 1 of the Ohio Legal Directory, published annually by the Ohio State Bar 
Association. 
The bar associations play a number of roles that relate to the regulation of lawyers in Ohio. Most are 
active in sponsoring continuing legal education programs, which help lawyers comply with their 
mandatory CLE obligations. 
A few provide advice on ethical issues. Among those local bar associations which issue non-binding 
ethics opinions are the Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Toledo bar associations. The Ohio State Bar 
Association issues opinions as well. None of these opinions, however, are as influential as those 
issued by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, since those opinions are issued 
under authority expressly granted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Gov Bar R V 2(C). 
The local bar associations also play a role in the disciplinary process. At the admissions stage, the 
Ohio Supreme Court utilizes the local bar associations to appoint admissions committees that 
investigate and report on the character, fitness, and moral qualifications of applicants for admission to 
the practice of law in Ohio. See Gov Bar R I 11. Local bar associations are authorized to form 
unauthorized-practice-of-law committees to investigate and report on unauthorized-practice-of-law 
activities, including the prosecution of complaints before the Board of Commissioners on the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law. See Gov Bar R VII 4-5. Upon meeting appropriate standards, the 
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Ohio State Bar Association and local bar associations can establish certified grievance committees, 
which are authorized to investigate and prosecute allegations of misconduct or mental illness by Ohio 
judges or attorneys, as well as to adopt procedures for handling matters of client dissatisfaction that 
do not rise to the level of disciplinary violations. See Gov Bar R V 3(C). 
The bar associations, particularly the Ohio State Bar Association, have also played an important role 
in suggesting changes in the disciplinary system to the Ohio Supreme Court. See, e.g., Supreme 
Court Action on Bell Comm’n Recommendations 1997 & 1998, 82 Ohio St.3d 1423 (1998). 
  
0.2:230  Disciplinary Agency 
This description of the disciplinary bodies in Ohio is excerpted and adapted from the work of Ruth 
Bope Dangel in Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional 
Responsibility §§  10.2-10.5 (1996). 
Disciplinary bodies - In general: The Supreme Court carries out its duties with the assistance of three 
disciplinary bodies: the Disciplinary Counsel, the certified grievance committees of state and local 
bar associations, and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline. The Disciplinary 
Counsel and the certified grievance committees are the investigatory and prosecutorial arms of the 
process. The Board is the adjudicatory and administrative arm of the process. The Supreme Court is 
the final authority in all disciplinary matters. These actors are immune from suit for monetary 
damages for official acts taken in carrying out the disciplinary process. See Berger v. Cuyahoga 
County Bar Ass’n, 983 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. 
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982). 
Problems concerning the unauthorized practice of law are the province of the Board of 
Commissioners on the Unauthorized Practice of Law. See Gov Bar R VII. Their work is described in 
section 5.5:210. 
Disciplinary bodies - Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline: The Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court consists of twenty-eight 
members, including seventeen attorneys admitted to the practice of law in Ohio, seven active or 
retired judges, and four nonattorneys. See Gov Bar R V 1(A). The Board members are appointed by 
the Court to serve three-year terms or to fill vacancies. See Gov Bar R V 1(C)-(D). Each year, the 
Board elects an attorney or judge as chair and vice-chair, and meets in Columbus, Ohio at least six 
times during the year. See Gov Bar R V 1(E)-(F). 
The Board’s jurisdiction under Gov Bar R V is broad. Grievances involving alleged misconduct by 
justices, judges, or attorneys, proceedings regarding mental illness, disciplinary proceedings, and 
reinstatement proceedings are brought, conducted, and disposed of in accordance with Gov Bar R V. 
See Gov Bar R V 2(A). 
The Board has power to receive evidence, preserve the record, make findings, and submit 
recommendations to the Supreme Court regarding: (1) complaints of misconduct alleged to have been 
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committed by any judge, attorney, or person suspended or on probation from the practice of law; (2) 
complaints regarding mental illness of any judge or attorney; (3) petitions for reinstatement; and (4) 
conduct by a judge or attorney affecting a disciplinary proceeding where the acts constitute a 
contempt of the Supreme Court or a breach of the Rules for the Government of the Bar and the 
conduct did not take place in the presence of the Court, whether by willful disobedience of an order or 
judgment of the Court or Board, by interference with an officer of the Court in the prosecution of a 
duty, or otherwise. See Gov Bar R V 2(B). 
The Board also issues informal, nonbinding, advisory opinions in response to prospective or 
hypothetical questions regarding the application of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of 
the Bar, the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Judiciary, the Ohio Rules of Professional 
Conduct [as it did formerly with respect to the Code of Professional Responsibility], the Code of 
Judicial Conduct, or the Attorney’s Oath of Office. See Gov Bar R V 2(C). Although the opinions 
are nonbinding, they may be persuasive. See, e.g., Am. Laundry Mach. v. Okamoto (In re 
Disqualification of Ney), 74 Ohio St.3d 1271, 74 N.E.2d 1367 (1995); Insituform of N. Am., Inc. 
v. Midwest Pipeliners, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 622 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
Disciplinary bodies - Disciplinary Counsel: The Disciplinary Counsel investigates allegations of 
misconduct by judges or attorneys, and allegations of mental illness affecting judges or attorneys, and 
initiates complaints as a result of its investigations. See Gov Bar R V 3(B). The Office of the 
Disciplinary Counsel is headed by the Disciplinary Counsel, who is an attorney appointed by the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline with the approval of the Supreme Court. The 
appointment is for a four-year term with removal by the Supreme Court for just cause only. See Gov 
Bar R V 3(B)(1). The Disciplinary Counsel appoints attorneys to serve as assistant disciplinary 
counsel. See Gov Bar R V 3(B)(2). Disciplinary Counsel also certifies bar counsel designated by 
certified grievance committees. Gov Bar R V 3(B). Funds for the operation of the Office of the 
Disciplinary Counsel are provided by the Attorney Registration Fund. See Gov Bar R V 3(D). 
Disciplinary bodies - Certified grievance committees: Certified grievance committees of state and 
local bar associations are certified by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline to 
investigate allegations of misconduct by judges or attorneys and allegations of mental illness of 
judges and attorneys, and to initiate complaints as a result of the investigations. See Gov Bar R V 
3(C). There can be no more than one certified grievance committee per county. Gov Bar R V 3(C)(1) 
If multiple bar associations establish a joint certified grievance committee, membership on the 
committee shall be in proportion to the number of attorneys employed in the geographic area served 
by each bar association. Id. There are thirty-three certified grievance committees across the state. The 
certified grievance committees are as follows: 
Akron Bar Association 
Allen County Bar Association 
Ashtabula County Bar Association 
Belmont County Bar Association 
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Butler County Bar Association 
Cincinnati Bar Association 
Clermont County Bar Association 
Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association 
Columbiana County Bar Association 
Columbus Bar Association 
Darke County Bar Association 
Dayton Bar Association 
Erie-Huron Joint Certified Grievance Committee 
Findlay/Hancock County Bar Association 
Geauga County Bar Association 
Greene County Bar Association 
Lake County Bar Association 
Lorain County Bar Association 
Mahoning County Bar Association 
Medina County Bar Association 
Miami County Bar Association 
Muskingum County Bar Association 
Northwestern Ohio Bar Association 
Ohio State Bar Association 
Portage County Bar Association 
Portsmouth Bar and Law Library Association 
Richland County Bar Association 
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Stark County Bar Association 
Toledo Bar Association 
Trumbull County Bar Association 
Warren County Bar Association 
Wayne County Bar Association 
Wood County Bar Association 
To obtain and retain certification, each committee must maintain specific standards. Each committee 
must consist of no fewer than fifteen members, must meet at least every third month, must maintain a 
full-time office staffed by a minimum of one full-time employee, must designate bar counsel, 
certified by Disciplinary Counsel, to supervise the receipt, investigation and prosecution of 
grievances, must maintain permanent files and records, must be sufficiently funded by the bar 
association to perform its duties, must establish written procedures, and must file written procedures 
and quarterly reports with the Board. See Gov Bar R V 3(C)(1). The Board may decertify a 
committee that fails to maintain the minimum standards. See Gov Bar R V 3(C)(5). 
The majority of the certified grievance committee members are attorneys admitted to the practice of 
law in Ohio, but, as of January 1, 2000, at least three members, or ten percent of the committee, 
whichever is greater, must be nonattorneys. See Gov Bar R V 3(C)(1)(a). Attorneys with “inactive” 
or “retired” registration status may serve as attorney members of certified grievance committees of 
bar associations provided they perform the same or similar functions as the lay members of the 
committee. See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-4, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 17 (Feb. 14, 1992). All committee members are volunteers. 
The attorney members are often engaged in the private practice of law during their term on the 
committee. An attorney member may not privately represent another attorney in a disciplinary matter 
being investigated or prosecuted by the certified grievance committee on which the attorney serves. 
An attorney member may privately represent an attorney being investigated or prosecuted by a 
certified grievance committee of a different bar association or by the Disciplinary Counsel. See Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-6, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (Aug. 13, 
1993). 
In December 2009, The Task Force to Review the Ohio Disciplinary System issued its Report and 
Recommendations. See 83 Ohio State Bar Ass’n Rep. No. 7, Feb. 15, 2010, at xix. The Task Force 
recommended a restructuring of the present system, pursuant to which the number of certified 
grievance committees would be reduced from 33 to nine. However, the Supreme Court voted to revise 
the Gov Bar R V amendments proposed by the Task Force and published the revised proposed 
amendments for public comment. Pursuant to the revision by the Court, “language providing for the 
elimination of certain certified grievance committees has been deleted . . . .” See 84 Ohio State Bar 
Rep. No. 27, July 4, 2011, at xxxvii. This language was in fact deleted in the amendments as adopted, 
effective January 1, 2012. See 84 Ohio State Bar Rep. No. 41, Oct. 10, 2011, at xxxiv. 
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0.2:240  Disciplinary Process 
This description of the disciplinary process in Ohio is excerpted and adapted from the work of Ruth 
Bope Dangel in Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional 
Responsibility §§  10.1, 10.6-10.43 (1996). 
Disciplinary process - An overview: Ohio lawyers are subject to discipline if they are ultimately 
found, by clear and convincing evidence, to have violated any provision of the oath of office taken 
upon admission to the practice of law in this state, the Code of Professional Responsibility (for 
conduct occurring prior to February 1, 2007), the Rules of Professional Conduct (for conduct 
occurring on or after February 1, 2007), the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Rules for the Government 
of the Bar, or the terms of an order imposing probation or a suspension from the practice of law. See 
Gov Bar R V 6(A)(1). Special provisions allow for interim suspensions for a felony conviction or 
default under a child support order, interim remedial suspensions, mental illness suspensions and 
reciprocal discipline. See Gov Bar R V 5, 5a, 7, 11(F). 
Gov Bar R V sets forth Ohio’s disciplinary procedure. The Rule regulates disciplinary matters from 
the first filing of a grievance, through investigation and prosecution, to imposition, if any, of 
sanctions. Disciplinary proceedings may be instituted only in accordance with Gov Bar R V. See 
Smith v. Kates, 46 Ohio St.2d 263, 348 N.E.2d 320 (1976). Once the disciplinary process has begun, 
invocation of the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), usually will forestall 
successful recourse to federal court to enjoin the process before completion. See Berger v. 
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n, 983 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1993); O’Neill v. Battisti, 472 F.2d 789 (6th 
Cir. 1972) (issuing mandamus to prevent federal district judge from interfering in Ohio Supreme 
Court disciplinary proceeding against state court judge); see also Middlesex County Ethics Comm. 
v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982). An attorney’s filing for bankruptcy does not 
warrant an automatic stay of the disciplinary proceeding under § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, but 
rather falls under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2000), which provides that bankruptcy does not stay a 
proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory powers. See Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n v. Dalton, 124 Ohio St.3d 514, 2010 Ohio 619, 924 N.E.2d 821 (applying § 362(b)(4) in 
unauthorized-practice-of-law proceeding). 
The procedure for a disciplinary action can be broken down into six basic steps: (1) the grievance; (2) 
the investigation; (3) the complaint; (4) the panel hearing; (5) the Board recommendation; and (6) the 
Supreme Court order. The process and its procedures are intended to be as summary as possible. See 
Gov Bar R V 11(D). The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and the Ohio Rules of Evidence are followed 
whenever practicable, unless a specific provision of the rule or procedures and guidelines issued by 
the Board provide otherwise. See Gov Bar R V 11(A); Board of Commissioners on Grievances 
and Discipline Procedural Regulation (BCGD Proc Reg) 3(A). 
Overall, Gov Bar R V is to be construed liberally for the protection of the public, the courts, and the 
legal profession. See Gov Bar R V 11(D). Only prejudicial irregularities or errors resulting in a 
miscarriage of justice warrant invalidation of a proceeding conducted under the Rule. See id. 
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Disciplinary proceedings are neither civil nor criminal, but are instituted to safeguard the courts and 
to protect the public from misconduct by those licensed to practice law. See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Heilan, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 2008 Ohio 91, 880 N.E.2d 467, at para. 32. But cf.  In re Ruffalo, 391 
U.S. 961 (1968) (describing the lawyer disciplinary process as quasi-criminal). Nevertheless, it is 
clear that some level of procedural due process must be afforded. In the language of the Court in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Character, 129 Ohio St.3d 60, 2011 Ohio 2902, 950 N.E.2d 177, at para. 
76: 
We have held that due process requirements in attorney discipline 
proceedings have been satisfied when the respondent is afforded a 
hearing, the right to issue subpoenas and depose witnesses, and an 
opportunity for preparation to explain the circumstances surrounding 
his actions. 
“The purpose of disciplinary actions is to protect the public interest and to ensure that members of the 
bar are competent to practice a profession imbued with the public trust.” Fred Siegel Co., LPA v. 
Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St.3d 171, 178, 707 N.E.2d 853, 859 (1999). The focus is not to provide 
redress to individuals injured by an attorney’s conduct; that is the province of the substantive law. 
Because of the difference in focus, a violation of a disciplinary rule need not, in itself, create a private 
cause of action. See Fred Siegel Co., 85 Ohio St.3d 171, 707 N.E.2d 853 (violation of disciplinary 
rules does not automatically create cause of action in tort). 
Disciplinary proceedings - Private and public stages: The disciplinary process has both private and 
public stages. All deliberations, proceedings, and documents relating to review and investigation of a 
grievance are private unless the respondent makes a written request that the information be made 
public or voluntarily waives the privacy of the proceedings. See Gov Bar R V 11(E)(1)(a)-(b). See 
Everage v. Elk, 159 Ohio App.3d 220, 2004 Ohio 6186, 823 N.E.2d 516 (reversing in malpractice 
case trial court order to produce documents relating to uncertified grievances; applying Gov Bar R V 
11(E)). The respondent’s right to privacy and confidentiality provided by Gov Bar R V is not waived 
by furnishing the grievant with the respondent’s reply to the grievance. See Gov Bar R V 11(E)(3). 
In Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 98-2, 1998 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 
(Apr. 3, 1998) the Board opined that public revelation by the grievant, if an attorney, that a grievance 
has been filed would violate the rule, although discussion of the underlying facts apparently would 
not. The Supreme Court cited and quoted Op. 98-2 with approval in Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 
127 Ohio St.3d 436, 2010 Ohio 6241, 940 N.E.2d 952, where the respondent in an affidavit of 
disqualification filed against a judge included the fact that he had filed grievances against the judge 
and thereby violated Gov Bar R V 11(E); attorneys have an “obligation to maintain the privacy of a 
disciplinary grievance prior to the certification of a complaint by a probable-cause panel.” Id. at para. 
14. 
Before taking office, all members and employees of the Board, all members of any certified grievance 
committee, the disciplinary counsel, and all employees of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel swear or 
affirm that they will protect the privacy of the proceedings and documents and the confidentiality of 
the deliberations relating thereto. See Gov Bar R V 11(E)(4). (The respondent in Pullins supra 
argued that since he was not required to take this oath of confidentiality, the 11(E) privacy provisions 
were not applicable to him; the Supreme Court was, needless to say, not persuaded.) There are 
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recognized exceptions, however. A member of a certified grievance committee may share 
information about an attorney’s addiction or substance abuse with members of recognized assistance 
committees. See Gov Bar R V 11(E)(1)(c); see also Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 90-19, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (Aug. 17, 1990). Where appropriate, information 
may be shared with the Board of Commissioners of the Clients’ Security Fund. See Gov Bar R V 
4(F). Members of a certified grievance committee have a duty to inform law enforcement officials of 
an attorney’s criminal activity when the evidence is uncovered during an investigation. Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 86-001, 1987 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 29 (May 5, 
1987). If subpoenaed, a member of a certified grievance committee must appear before a county 
grand jury and testify.  In re Klausmeyer, 24 Ohio St.2d 143, 265 N.E.2d 275 (1970). 
Once a complaint is certified to the Board by a probable cause panel, the formal complaint and all 
subsequent proceedings in connection with the formal complaint are public. All deliberations remain 
confidential (Everage supra at para. 98) however, and the ultimate recommendations of the Board 
are private until filed with the Supreme Court of Ohio. See Gov Bar R V 11(E)(2)(a)-(b); see also 
Gov Bar R V 11(E)(2)(c)(i)-(ii) (defining the terms “private” and “confidential”). 
Disciplinary proceedings - Duty to cooperate: Any justice, judge, or attorney may be called on to 
assist in an investigation or to testify in a hearing before the Board or a panel, including mediation and 
ADR proceedings, as to any matter that he or she would not be bound to claim as privileged as an 
attorney. See Gov Bar R V 4(G). A justice, judge, or attorney shall not neglect or refuse to assist or 
testify in an investigation or hearing. Id.; Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct (OH CJC) Rule 2.16(A). 
If any person subpoenaed as a witness neglects or refuses to obey a subpoena, to attend, to be sworn or 
to affirm, or to answer any proper question, the failure is considered a contempt of the Supreme Court 
and may be punished accordingly. See Gov Bar R V 11(C). 
An attorney who is the subject of an investigation may be disciplined for failure to cooperate with the 
investigation, even when the underlying disciplinary complaints are dismissed. E.g., Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n v. James, 109 Ohio St.3d 310, 2006 Ohio 2424, 847 N.E.2d 438. If other violations are found, 
failure to cooperate can be treated as a separate violation, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Peden, 118 
Ohio St.3d 244, 2008 Ohio 2237, 887 N.E.2d 1183, or as an aggravating factor in deciding on an 
appropriate sanction, e.g., Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Wootton, 110 Ohio St.3d 179, 2006 Ohio 
4094, 852 N.E.2d 175, or both. E.g., Akron Bar Ass’n v. Catanzarite, 119 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008 
Ohio 4063, 893 N.E.2d 835 (Catanzarite was not your ordinary mine-run failure to cooperate case; 
rather, the respondent there took the offensive: “[t]hrough the pretense of a sham grievance, 
respondent plainly aimed to intimidate relator’s counsel and derail the disciplinary proceeding.” Id. 
at para. 25.). If the attorney attempts to conceal his wrongdoing in order to mislead those in the 
disciplinary process, additional sanctions will be levied.  Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Derivan, 81 
Ohio St.3d 300, 691 N.E.2d 256 (1998) (lawyer who created false document in attempt to exonerate 
himself from charges that he negligently failed to file client’s claim within statute of limitations given 
six-month suspension rather than public reprimand recommended by Board). 
Disciplinary proceedings - Subpoena power: Subpoenas may be issued in accordance with the 
requirements of BCGD Proc Reg 7 to cause testimony to be taken under oath in disciplinary 
investigations and proceedings. A motion to quash the subpoena also may be filed. Id. For an 
extensive discussion of the breadth and limits of the subpoena power in an analogous setting, see 
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Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Adjustment Serv. Corp., 89 Ohio St.3d 385, 732 N.E.2d 362 (2000) 
(addressing subpoena power of the Board of Commissioners on the Unauthorized Practice of Law). 
Filing a grievance: The first step in the disciplinary process is the timely filing of a grievance. 
Disciplinary proceedings are not subject to general statutes of limitations. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Young, 89 Ohio St.3d 306, 315, 731 N.E.2d 631, 639 (2000). As a consequence, past conduct of 
some vintage may still form the basis of a grievance. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Talbert, 71 Ohio St.3d 438, 644 N.E.2d 310 (1994) (fourteen-year old claim considered in 
disciplinary proceeding). Nevertheless, there is some indication in the case law that delay in filing a 
grievance may, at some point, lead to such a delayed consideration of charges as to undercut 
fundamental fairness. See Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mallin, 86 Ohio St.3d 310, 715 N.E.2d 122 
(1999) (finding it prejudicial to prosecute lawyer nine years after original grievance filed and nearly 
twelve years after underlying events occurred). Accord Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Sacher, 8 Ohio 
St.3d 49, 457 N.E.2d 815 (1983); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Teaford, 6 Ohio St.2d 253, 217 N.E.2d 
872 (1966). Moreover, the Court held in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lawlor, 92 Ohio St.3d 
406, 407, 750 N.E.2d 1107, 1109 (2001), that although the lawyer’s conduct (felony conviction for 
conversion of funds of corporation of which he was treasurer) “would alone warrant disbarment” and 
there was no evidence that his right to a fair hearing was violated, a four-year delay in bringing a 
disciplinary action based on the felony conviction caused the Supreme Court to “believe that some 
mitigation of the penalty is appropriate because of the delay.” As a result, the Court accepted the 
Board’s recommendation of indefinite suspension, with no reinstatement possible until respondent 
has made full restitution to the corporation. 
In Ohio, a grievance may be filed with and investigated by either the Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
or a certified grievance committee of a bar association. See Gov Bar R V 3(B)-(C). For an action 
filed with a certified grievance committee, the committee should have in place a method to notify the 
grievant of the option to file a complaint with the Disciplinary Counsel. Gov Bar R V 3(C)(1)(f). 
Further, a certified grievance committee does not have the authority to investigate grievances filed 
against attorneys who are members of the committee. Gov Bar R V 3(C). On occasion, individuals 
will direct their grievances to the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, rather than 
to an investigatory body. These grievances are redirected either to a certified grievance committee or 
to the Disciplinary Counsel. See Gov Bar R V 4(A). 
Those who file grievances need not fear retaliation in a defamation action. Statements made by an 
individual in the course of an attorney disciplinary proceeding, including a complaint filed with a 
grievance committee, are granted an absolute privilege against civil liability, as long as the statement 
bears some reasonable relation to the proceeding.  Hecht v. Levin, 66 Ohio St.3d 458, 613 N.E.2d 
585 (1993). Pursuit of a defamation action by an attorney under these circumstances may itself 
warrant discipline.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Elsass, 86 Ohio St.3d 195, N.E.2d 421 (1999). 
There is no express requirement in Gov Bar R V that a grievance be made in writing. Nevertheless, it 
is generally the policy of the investigatory bodies to require a grievance to be submitted in writing. 
Upon the filing of a written grievance, the investigation begins. 
Notice to the attorney: Gov Bar R V 4(I)(2) provides that no investigation should be completed or 
complaint filed without first giving the attorney notice of each allegation of wrongdoing and a chance 
to respond. Service is to be made either personally or by certified mail. See BCGD Proc Reg 4. If the 
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attorney cannot be found, service may be made on the Clerk of the Supreme Court who serves as the 
attorney’s agent for service of process. See Gov Bar R V 11(B). An attorney registered for active 
status is required under Gov Bar R VI 1(D) to keep his or her current residence and office address on 
file with the Office of Attorney Registration and CLE. Failure by the attorney to do so, necessitating 
service on the Clerk of the Court, waives any complaint about the lack of actual notice. See Toledo 
Bar Ass’n v. Wood, 32 Ohio St.3d 166, 441 N.E.2d 570 (1987). Such a regime has been found to 
comport with procedural due process.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Gross, 2 Ohio St.3d 5, 512 N.E.2d 
671 (1982). (Inactive lawyers, while not obligated to file the biennial certificate of registration, must 
still keep his or her current address[es] on file with the Attorney Registration and CLE Office.  See 
Gov Bar R VI 2(B).) 
Investigation - Authority to investigate: Grievances can be filed with either the Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel or a certified grievance committee. The body that receives it is initially responsible for its 
investigation. See Gov Bar R V 4(C). A certified grievance committee may, if needed, request 
assistance from the Disciplinary Counsel when a matter is sufficiently serious and complex to require 
assistance. In such instances, the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel will investigate the matter and 
report the results to the committee requesting assistance. See Gov Bar R V 4(B). If a certified 
grievance committee has a conflict of interest in investigating an attorney, the investigation will be 
referred to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. If the Office of Disciplinary Counsel has a conflict of 
interest in investigating an attorney, the investigation will be referred to an appropriate certified 
grievance committee. 
Investigation - Time frame: Investigations proceed along a specified time frame. An investigation is 
to be concluded within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the grievance, and a decision as to the 
disposition of the grievance made within thirty days after the conclusion of the investigation. Gov 
Bar R V 4(D). 
Extensions of time to complete an investigation may be granted by the Secretary of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline for good cause upon written request of the investigative 
body. See Gov Bar R V 4(D)(1). When an extension is granted, the investigation is to be completed 
within 150 days from the date of receipt of the grievance. See id. Gov Bar R V 4(D)(1) expressly 
permits extensions of time in grievances involving fee disputes, when the parties voluntarily agree to 
enter an alternative dispute resolution process sponsored by a bar association. Additional extensions 
beyond 150 days may be granted by the chair or Secretary of the Board in the event of pending 
litigation, appeals, unusually complex investigations including the investigation of multiple 
grievances, time delays in obtaining evidence or testimony of witnesses, or for other good cause 
shown. See Gov Bar R V 4(D)(2). 
When an investigation is not concluded within the 150-day extension or within the good cause 
extension of that time, the Secretary may refer the matter either to the Disciplinary Counsel or to a 
geographically appropriate certified grievance committee. Upon such referral, the investigation is to 
be completed within sixty days. See id. 
No investigation shall be extended beyond one year from the date of the filing of the grievance. See id. 
Investigations extending beyond one year from the date of filing are deemed prima facie evidence of 
unreasonable delay. See Gov Bar R V 4(D)(3). The time limits are not jurisdictional, however, and 
no grievance shall be dismissed unless there has been unreasonable delay and the rights of the 
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attorney to a fair hearing have been violated. Id. Disciplinary Counsel v. Stafford, 131 Ohio St.3d 
385, 2012 Ohio 909, 965 N.E.2d 971, at para. 61; see Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 113 Ohio 
St.3d 344, 2007 Ohio 2074, 865 N.E.2d 873. Time limits are not analogous to a speedy trial statute or 
a statute of limitations, but instead are intended to protect the public from further misconduct that may 
occur during a prolonged investigation. See Sacher supra. In Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mallin, 86 
Ohio St.3d 310, 715 N.E.2d 122 (1999), the Court found a nine-year delay between the filing of the 
grievance and the filing of the complaint with the Board to be unreasonable and prejudicial where the 
memories of witnesses had grown stale and certain court records were no longer readily available. 
Compare Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Conese, 96 Ohio St.3d 458, 2002 Ohio 4797, 776 
N.E.2d 13 (investigation took one year and eight months, which is prima facie evidence of 
unreasonable delay under Gov Bar R V 4(D)(3), but Court found that respondent was not prejudiced: 
“respondent’s inability to explain his actions resulted not from the passage of time but from his failure 
to maintain the required records of his client’s funds.” Id. at para. 10.). Accord Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Johnson supra (respondent’s arguments based on investigation extending more than one 
year from date of filing of grievance rejected; “none of the time limits set forth in the rule are 
jurisdictional, and the rule requires prejudice in addition to unreasonable delay for dismissal.  We see 
no prejudice to respondent’s defense.” Id. at para. 78.). Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder supra 
(investigation lasted longer than one year but “record contains no evidence of prejudice to 
respondent’s right to be heard,” 112 Ohio St.3d 90, 858 N.E.2d 356, at para. 11; respondent’s offer 
to resign from practice rejected and permanent disbarment imposed instead). See also Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Schwartz, 98 Ohio St.3d 438, 2003 Ohio 1635, 786 N.E.2d 866, where two of the 
grievances stemmed from conduct more than 30 years old. Perhaps the Court did not feel it necessary 
to speak to the delay because of the egregiousness of respondent’s conduct with respect to multiple 
clients and because the misconduct pertaining to the two earlier incidents continued into the years 
1999 and 2001 respectively. Respondent was disbarred for, inter alia, “knowingly convert[ing] client 
funds,” id. at para. 15. 
Investigation - Outside experts; procedural questions: The services of an independent investigator, 
auditor, examiner, assessor, or other expert may be used in an investigation. See Gov Bar R V 4(E). 
Procedural questions that arise during an investigation may be directed in writing to the Board by the 
chair of a certified grievance committee, the president of a bar association, or the Disciplinary 
Counsel. Upon receipt, the Board’s chair and its Secretary consult and direct a response to the inquiry. 
See Gov Bar R V 4(H). 
Investigation - Determination upon completion: When the investigation is completed, the 
investigating body determines whether to file a complaint with the Board. A determination not to file 
a complaint indicates that a complaint is not warranted and that the grievance will be dismissed. See 
Gov Bar R V 4(I)(4). Both the grievant and the judge or attorney are given written notice of the intent 
not to file a complaint, along with a brief statement of the reasons that a complaint was not filed with 
the Board. See id. A copy of the grievance also will be sent to the judge or attorney upon request. Id. 
If a certified grievance committee dismisses the grievance, the grievant may file a written request for 
review with the Secretary of the Board within fourteen days after being notified of the dismissal. See 
Gov Bar R V 4(I)(5). The Secretary refers these requests to the Disciplinary Counsel who, within 
thirty days, conducts a review, makes a decision, and notifies the grievant of that decision. The 
Secretary may extend this time period if good cause is shown. If the Disciplinary Counsel overturns 
the certified grievance committee’s decision to dismiss the grievance, it will handle any further 
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proceedings. If the Disciplinary Counsel affirms the dismissal of the grievance, no further review or 
appeal is available to the grievant. See id. 
A determination to file a complaint indicates that the investigatory body finds probable cause to 
believe that the misconduct occurred or that a condition of mental illness exists. See Gov Bar R V 
4(C). A certified grievance committee makes its determination by a majority vote of a quorum of the 
committee. See Gov Bar R V 4(I)(3). 
Complaint - Filing a complaint by a relator: A “complaint” is a “formal written allegation of 
misconduct or mental illness” filed by a relator against a respondent. Gov Bar R V 4(I)(1). The 
relator is either a certified grievance committee or the Disciplinary Counsel, depending on which 
investigated the grievance. The respondent is the attorney or judge who is the subject of the grievance 
and the investigation. 
All complaints must be filed with the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline. Each complaint must have attached sufficient investigatory materials to demonstrate 
probable cause and shall include an affidavit from relator documenting contacts or attempts to contact 
the respondent prior to filing the complaint as well as any response filed on behalf of the respondent. 
See Gov Bar R V 4(I)(6). The complaint must allege the specific misconduct and specify the Rule 
alleged to have been violated. See BCGD Proc Reg 1. Upon filing the complaint with the Board, the 
relator must forward copies of the complaint to the Disciplinary Counsel, the Certified Grievance 
Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association, the local bar association, and any certified grievance 
committee serving the county or counties where the respondent resides, where the respondent 
maintains an office, and where the complaint arose. See Gov Bar R V 4(I)(8). 
Complaint – Probable cause determination by a board panel: In response to the relator’s filing of the 
complaint, the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline assigns the 
complaint, with its investigatory attachments, to a probable cause panel of the Board. A probable 
cause panel is comprised of three Board members chosen by the Chair of the Board. Both attorney 
and nonattorney members of the Board serve on probable cause panels, but only an attorney or a judge, 
chosen by the chair of the Board, may serve as chair of the panel. See Gov Bar R V 6(D)(1). 
A probable cause panel makes an independent decision as to whether probable cause exists for the 
filing of a complaint. See id. “Probable cause” means that there is “substantial, credible evidence” 
that misconduct has been committed. Gov Bar R V 6(A)(2). Misconduct is defined as 
any violation by a justice, judge, or an attorney of any provision of the 
oath of office taken upon admission to the practice of law in this state 
or any violation of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct [or, with 
respect to conduct occurring prior to February 1, 2007, the Code of 
Professional Responsibility] or the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
disobedience of these rules or of the terms of an order imposing 
probation or a suspension from the practice of law, or the commission 
or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. 
Gov Bar R V 6(A)(1) (bracketed material added). 
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A probable cause panel either finds probable cause and issues an order certifying the complaint to the 
Board, or determines there is no probable cause and issues an order dismissing the complaint. See 
Gov Bar R V 6(D)(1). The relator and the respondent are notified of the determination by certified 
mail. 
When a panel dismisses a complaint, the relator has seven days after receipt of the decision to file a 
written appeal of the dismissal with the Secretary of the Board. The appeal then goes before the full 
Board. The Board makes an independent determination as to whether probable cause exists, then 
issues an order either to certify or dismiss the complaint. The relator may not appeal a dismissal by the 
Board. See Gov Bar R V 6(D)(2). 
Complaint - Formal complaint: Once a complaint is certified by a probable cause panel of the Board, 
it is considered a “formal complaint.” A relator may amend a formal complaint prior to a hearing 
without presenting the additional counts to a probable cause panel. See Board of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-18, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (Aug. 17, 1990). The 
formal complaint is to be served on the respondent by certified mail along with notice of the time 
requirements for response. See Gov Bar R V 6(E). Note that in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Dougherty, 
99 Ohio St.3d 147, 2003 Ohio 2672, 789 N.E.2d 621, the Court held the relator to the OH Civ R 9(B) 
duty to plead fraud with particularity and found its allegations insufficient in that regard. 
Complaint - Answer to formal complaint: Six copies of the answer must be filed with the Board 
within twenty days after the mailing of the notice, and a copy of the answer must be served on the 
relator’s attorney of record. See Gov Bar R V 6(E). Both steps must be complied with to avoid a 
possible default. See Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Mulbach, 83 Ohio St.3d 224, 699 N.E.2d 459 
(1998). The Secretary of the Board may grant an extension of time for filing an answer upon good 
cause shown. Gov Bar R V 6(E). The respondent may also file any motion appropriate under Rule 12 
of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure [OH Civ R 12]. See BCGD Proc Reg 2(A). 
Complaint - Amendment: The relator may amend the original complaint. Amendments made within 
thirty days of the scheduled hearing date will be allowed only upon a showing of good cause, as 
determined by the chair of the hearing panel. BCGD Proc Reg 9(D). See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 2008 Ohio 91, 880 N.E.2d 467, finding good cause for amendment of 
the complaint within thirty days. In Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Dougherty, 99 Ohio St.3d 147, 2003 
Ohio 2672, 789 N.E.2d 621, the Supreme Court held that OH Civ R 15(A), which requires that 
motions to amend be “freely” given “when justice so requires,” was applicable to a relator’s 
amendment request that was made during the scheduled hearing. Given that “the parties mutually 
misunderstood what charges were truly at issue in this case,” id. at para. 16, the cause was remanded 
for further proceedings, including provision for relator’s amendment of its complaint. 
Complaint - Voluntary dismissal: The relator may voluntarily dismiss a complaint only upon 
permission of the chair of the hearing panel. BCGD Proc Reg 9(D). The motion for voluntary 
dismissal must be accompanied by a memorandum in support. Id. The panel also may request the 
filing of supporting affidavits, documents, and depositions and may conduct a hearing on the matter, 
which could include the taking of testimony and the production of documents. Id. 
Hearing - Appointment of hearing panel: After the answer is filed or the time for filing an answer has 
elapsed, the Secretary of the Board appoints a hearing panel. A hearing panel consists of three 
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members of the Board, chosen by lot from members who did not serve on the probable cause panel. 
The Secretary designates one member who is an attorney or judge to serve as panel chair. The panel 
chair rules on all motions and interlocutory matters. No ruling by a panel chair may be appealed prior 
to entry of the final order. None of the hearing panel members may be a resident of the appellate 
district from which the complaint originated, and only one nonattorney member may serve on a 
hearing panel. A majority of a panel constitutes a quorum. See Gov Bar R V 6(D)(3). A hearing panel 
chair may request the chair of the Board to appoint a master commissioner to assume case 
management responsibilities occurring between the appointment of the hearing panel and the formal 
hearing. See BCGD Proc Reg 8. 
Hearing - Default; interim default suspension: An attorney who fails to file an answer to a complaint 
has no right to a hearing on the charges.  Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Billson, 56 Ohio St.3d 89, 564 
N.E.2d 432 (1990). Thus, if a respondent does not file an answer on or before the answer date or any 
extension thereof, pursuant to amendments to the default provisions effective August 1, 2012 the 
Board secretary shall provide relator and respondent with written notice of intent to certify 
respondent’s default to the Supreme Court. The certification shall be filed 30 days after the notice of 
intent to certify, unless respondent files an answer prior to the expiration of the 30-day period, and 
shall include a copy of the formal complaint and a certificate that the complaint has been served, 
either on the respondent or, in accordance with Gov Bar R V 11(B), on the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court, Gov Bar R V 6a(A).  
Upon receipt, the Court shall order respondent to show cause why an interim default suspension 
should not be entered. Upon receipt of a response or expiration of time for objections, the Court may 
enter an order it considers appropriate, including an order immediately suspending the respondent 
from practice. V 6a(B)(1). A case illustrating the Court’s exercise of its interim-default-suspension 
powers under Gov Bar R V 6a(B)(1) is Disciplinary Counsel v. Clinard, 136 Ohio St. 3d 1201, 
2013 Ohio 2263, 990 N.E.2d 607. If relator determines that respondent owes restitution to clients or 
third parties, Rule 6a(B)(2) outlines the procedures for filing with the Court a notice of restitution 
owed.  
Within 180 days of such an interim default judgment suspension, the respondent may move for leave 
to answer the complaint pending before the Board, with the answer attached, and may include a 
request that the interim default suspension be terminated for good cause shown. Upon receipt of the 
motion and any response from the relator, the Court may grant the motion; if so, the matter is 
remanded to the Board for further proceedings. Any such remand shall indicate whether the interim 
default suspension remains in place while proceedings are pending or is terminated for good cause 
shown. V 6a(C). 
Also within 180 days of an interim default judgment suspension, the relator can move the Court to 
have the case remanded to the Board for the purpose of seeking disbarment. If so remanded for default 
proceedings under V 6a(F), the order shall indicate that the interim default suspension remains in 
place. Rule V 6a(D).  
In the absence of a timely motion to answer per 6a(C) or a timely motion to initiate disbarment 
proceedings under 6a(D), the Court shall order respondent to show cause why the interim default 
suspension should not be converted into an indefinite suspension. If a notice of restitution owed has 
been filed by relator pursuant to 6a(B)(2), the order shall also direct respondent to show cause why 
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restitution should not be paid. After a response or expiration of time for objections, the Court may 
enter an order it considers appropriate, including an order converting the interim default suspension 
into an indefinite suspension and ordering payment of restitution. V 6a(E)(1). Rule 6a(E)(2) specifies 
that further proceedings to terminate the indefinite suspension and reinstate respondent shall be 
conducted pursuant to Rule V 10, except that no petition for reinstatement may be filed less than two 
years following entry of the interim default judgment suspension entered under 6a(B)(1). 
No later than 30 days after a section (D) remand order, the relator may file a motion for default with 
the Board, after making reasonable efforts to contact respondent. This motion must contain 
(1) relator’s affidavit (bar counsel or other appropriate representative) 
documenting efforts made to contact respondent and the result thereof; 
(2) sworn or certified documentary evidence in support of the 
allegations of wrongdoing; 
(3) relator’s recommendation of disbarment, based on the misconduct 
alleged and precedent; 
(4) a statement of any known aggravating or mitigating factors; and 
(5) a certificate of service of the motion on the respondent at the last 
address on the Supreme Court records and any other address known to 
relator. 
Rule V 6a(F)(1)(a)-(e). 
The motion for default shall be referred by the secretary to a judge or attorney member of the Board or 
to a master commissioner for ruling on the motion. If granted, a certified report for review by the 
Board is prepared by the adjudicator. After review, the Board shall file a certified report in accordance 
with V 6(K), which report shall find 
(1) that relator failed to establish the allegations of the complaint by 
clear and convincing evidence and recommending dismissal and that 
the Court terminate the interim default judgment suspension; or 
(2) that there is clear and convincing evidence of misconduct and that 
respondent be indefinitely suspended or disbarred. 
V 6a(F)(2)(a)(i)-(iii). 
Finally, if the Court grants respondent’s motion for leave to answer pursuant to 6a(C), the Board chair 
shall set aside a default entry and order a panel hearing. V 6a(F)(2)(b). 
If the relator does not follow these procedural steps, a finding of violation will be rejected. See 
Lorain County Bar Ass’n v. Robinson, 121 Ohio St.3d 24, 2009 Ohio 262, 901 N.E.2d 783 (no 
“sworn or certified documentary prima facie evidence” in support of violations of Rule 8.1 and Gov 
Bar R V 4(G), as required on motion for default); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Weaver, 102 Ohio St.3d 
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264, 2004 Ohio 2683, 809 N.E.2d 1113 (rejecting findings of violations asserted in Counts II and IV 
“because relator did not move for default on these counts or submit evidence to substantiate them,” id. 
at para. 5). If the affidavits filed in support “are photocopies, not the original, signed and notarized 
documents,” they do not meet the “sworn or certified” requirement of Gov Bar R V 6(F)(1)(b) (now 
6a(F)(1)(b))and will not be considered. Disciplinary Counsel v. Noel, 126 Ohio St.3d 56, 2010 
Ohio 2714, 930 N.E.2d 312, at para. 5. And, if there are documents submitted with a supporting 
affidavit on motion for default, the affidavit must state that those documents are either true copies or 
reproductions of the originals; otherwise the violation premised on such evidence will be rejected for 
failure to meet the V 6(F)(1)(b) “sworn or certified standard.” E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Scacchetti, 131 Ohio St.3d 165, 2012 Ohio 223, 962 N.E.2d 786, at n.2 (rejecting for this reason 
Board’s finding of violation of Rule 1.15(a)).  
In Northwestern Ohio Bar Ass’n v. Lauber, 104 Ohio St.3d 121, 2004 Ohio 6237, 818 N.E.2d 
687, the Court remanded for further proceedings because the affidavit submitted by the investigator in 
support of the allegations in the motion for default was deficient -- “this summary, conclusory, and 
hearsay-filled affidavit [was not] of sufficient weight or probative force to constitute the ‘[s]worn or 
certified documentary prima facie evidence’ that Gov. Bar R. V(6)(F)(1)(b) requires to sustain a 
motion for default.” Id. at para. 3. In a case decided the same day as Lauber, a number of counts 
were not cited by the relator in its motion for default or substantiated with the proof required by Gov 
Bar R V 6(F)(1)(b). Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Parker, 104 Ohio St.3d 117, 2004 Ohio 6236, 818 
N.E.2d 684. The findings of violation were therefore rejected as they were in Weaver. A number of 
other findings, however, were accepted, based on the investigator’s affidavits, which the Court found 
substantiated the findings of violation. Justice Lundberg Stratton, dissenting, found no meaningful 
distinction between these findings, accepted in Parker, and those found wanting in Lauber: 
they contain summary, conclusory assessments of misconduct based 
solely on conversations with the four grievants and are not based on 
personal knowledge. Such affidavits are not sufficient to sustain a 
motion for default judgment under Gov. Bar R. V(6)(F)(1)(b). [citing 
Lauber]. 
Id. at para. 11. According to Justice Lundberg Stratton, 
[i]n both cases, the relator’s evidence consisted entirely of an 
investigator’s affidavit or affidavits containing hearsay and conclusory 
statements. It is inconsistent for us to remand Lauber . . . , while 
summarily accepting the board’s findings in Parker that are based upon 
the same kind of evidence. I believe that we should also remand Parker 
and require the board to support its findings by sworn or certified 
documentary evidence. 
Id. at para. 14. See Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Sebree, 104 Ohio St.3d 448, 2004 Ohio 6560, 820 N.E.2d 
318, where the Court advised in “affirm[ing] today the principle established in Lauber” that “[l]ocal 
bar associations appearing as relators in disciplinary hearings should therefore provide affidavits 
executed by the grievants themselves in moving for default. Where the grievant is unavailable, an 
affidavit executed by an investigator may suffice, but the affidavit must delineate why the grievant’s 
sworn statement is unattainable in addition to reciting the investigator’s own knowledge of the 
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alleged misconduct.” Id. at para. 9 (emphasis added). See Columbiana County Bar Ass’n v. 
Luther, 133 Ohio St.3d 135, 2012 Ohio 4196, 976 N.E.2d 873 (motion for default; dismissing 
charges based only on “hearsay-filled affidavit from bar association grievance committee member”; 
Sebree cited in support); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. McNally, 109 Ohio St.3d 560, 2006 Ohio 3258, 
849 N.E.2d 1022 (since relator unable to locate grievants and obtain affidavits from them, Board, 
citing Sebree, found evidence insufficient regarding count in question; unclear whether relator filed 
its own affidavit or not).  
The respondent in Disciplinary Counsel v. Character 129 Ohio St.3d 60, 2011 Ohio 2902, 950 
N.E.2d 177, seized on the Sebree rule and argued that “this court must dismiss allegations of 
misconduct that are not supported by sworn or certified documentary prima facie evidence from the 
grievants themselves.” Id. at para. 14. The Court was not persuaded: 
 This case differs from Newman, Sebree, and Wilson [all default 
proceedings] in that respondent appeared and aggressively defended 
herself against the allegations of misconduct. She entered into a 
number of factual stipulations with regard to this count and testified 
about her conduct in this matter, and the parties submitted a total of 129 
joint exhibits, several of which relate to this count. Although the client 
involved in this count did not testify or submit an affidavit describing 
her interaction with respondent, the record does contain clear and 
convincing evidence to support the board’s findings of fact and 
conclusions that respondent has violated DR1-102(A)(6), 1-104(A) 
through (C), 2-102(B) and (C), and 9-102(A), (A)(2), and (E). 
Id. at para. 17 (bracketed material added). 
 
As indicated above, the Rules for the Government of the Bar dealing with default and providing for a 
new “interim default suspension” procedure were amended in 2012, effective August 1. Despite these 
changes, the “sworn or certified documentary prima facie evidence” rule remains in full force and 
effect, and we suspect that the various new procedural aspects will have to be carefully followed, just 
as the Court did not countenance failure to follow the previously existing procedures under old V 
6(F). 
Hearing - Time guidelines: BCGD Proc Reg 9 sets forth time guidelines for the hearing process. 
Failure to follow them, however, is not ground for dismissal of the complaint. BCGD Proc Reg 9(C). 
A pre-hearing conference is to be held within sixty days of the assignment date of the hearing panel. 
BCGD Proc Reg 9(A)(1). The hearing date should be no more than one hundred fifty days following 
the date of assignment. Id. The panel’s report, in a non-expedited case, should be filed with the full 
Board “within forty days of the filing of the transcript for consideration at the next regularly 
scheduled meeting of the Board.” BCGD Proc Reg 9(B)(1). This latter date may be extended by the 
Board Secretary, at the request of the panel chair, upon a showing of good cause, but the panel’s 
report should in any event be submitted at least seven days prior to the full Board meeting at which it 
is to be considered. BCGD Proc Reg 9(B)(1) & (2). 
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Hearing - The process: If a respondent files an answer to a certified complaint, the panel chair sets a 
time and location for a formal hearing on the complaint. See Gov Bar R V 6(F). Pre-hearing 
instructions are provided to each interested party to the proceeding.  
Within sixty days of the hearing panel’s appointment, the panel chair conducts a pre-hearing 
conference, which may be by telephone if the chair so chooses. BCGD Proc Reg 9(A)(1). The 
regulation lists objectives to be pursued at the conference, among them: (1) simplification of the 
issues; (2) amendment of the pleadings; (3) establishment of discovery deadlines; (4) identification of 
anticipated witnesses and the exchange of reports prepared by anticipated expert witnesses; (5) 
identification and exchange of anticipated exhibits; (6) stipulations; and (7) setting a final hearing 
date. Id. 
If the relator and the respondent stipulate to the facts, the panel chair or a panel member may either 
cancel a hearing and deem the matter submitted in writing or order a hearing to be held with counsel 
and respondent present. BCGD Proc Reg 3(C). The hearing panel and the Board are not bound by a 
joint recommendation of sanction by the relator and respondent. BCGD Proc Reg 3(D). 
BCGD Proc Reg 11 (“Consent to Discipline”) was adopted by the Supreme Court effective May 1, 
2001. Pursuant thereto, the respondent can enter into a stipulation with the relator in which he or she 
admits the alleged misconduct and in which a sanction is agreed upon. “Sanction” is defined so as to 
exclude indefinite suspension and disbarment, BCGD Proc Reg 11(A)(2); thus, the regulation has no 
applicability to cases and/or stipulations involving these sanctions. If the agreement is accepted by the 
panel (or master commissioner) and the Board, the agreement forms the basis for the Board’s certified 
report to the Supreme Court. BCGD Proc Reg 11(C) & (D). If either the panel or the Board rejects 
the agreement, the case shall be set for hearing and the agreement is of no further force and effect. 
BCGD Proc Reg 11(C)-(E). Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Hunt, 127 Ohio St.3d 390, 2010 Ohio 6148, 939 
N.E.2d 1247 (rejection by panel); see Disciplinary Counsel v. Robertson, 113 Ohio St.3d 360, 
2007 Ohio 2075, 865 N.E.2d 886 (two-year suspension stipulated, presumably under BCGDB Proc 
Reg 11 but not expressly so stated; Board recommended indefinite suspension, which Supreme Court 
adopted; interestingly, relator argued before Court that indefinite suspension was appropriate, even 
though it had previously stipulated to two-year suspension). And, the sanction can end up being less 
than that specified in the consent-to-discipline agreement. See Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. 
Zaffiro, 127 Ohio St.3d 5, 2010 Ohio 4830, 935 N.E.2d 836 (six-months’ stayed suspension agreed 
to; public reprimand imposed, since agreed sanction was premised on violations alleged in counts that 
were subsequently dismissed by panel). If the Court rejects a section 11 sanction, the matter is 
returned to the Board for hearing pursuant to Gov Bar R V 8(D). E.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Russell, 110 Ohio St.3d 1429, 2006 Ohio 3902, 852 N.E.2d 180; see Disciplinary Counsel v. 
O’Malley, 126 Ohio St.3d 443, 2010 Ohio 3802, 935 N.E.2d 5 (consent-to-discipline sanction of   
12 months rejected by Court; case sent back for hearing where same sanction was recommended by 
Board; sanction again rejected and two-year suspension imposed by Court). 
Examples of use of the consent-to-discipline procedure include Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Schmalz, 
123 Ohio St.3d 130, 2009 Ohio 4159, 914 N.E.2d 1024, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Taft, 112 
Ohio St.3d 155, 2006 Ohio 6525, 858 N.E.2d 414. For a case in which the respondent attempted 
unsuccessfully to invoke the “spirit” of BCGD Proc Reg 11, even though he conceded it was not yet 
in place at the time his stipulation was entered into, see Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Selnick, 94 Ohio 
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St.3d 1, 759 N.E.2d 764 (2001) (panel, Board, and Supreme Court rejected stipulated sanction of 
indefinite suspension; permanent disbarment imposed; respondent’s attempt to rely on BCGD Proc 
Reg 11 in a case involving stipulation of indefinite suspension was “totally misplaced.”  Id. at 9, 759 
N.E.2d at 771.). See Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002 Ohio 2490, 769 
N.E.2d 816 (following Selnick; stipulation of indefinite suspension not within scope of BCGD Proc 
Reg 11). But see Lorain County Bar Ass’n v. Fernandez, 99 Ohio St.3d 426, 2003 Ohio 4078, 793 
N.E.2d 434, where the parties agreed under the consent-to-discipline provision that an existing 
indefinite suspension be continued. As in Selnick and Dixon, the respondent was disbarred, but 
without any comment by the Court about the seeming inapplicability of BCGD Proc Reg 11. 
The consent-to-discipline procedure was invoked in In re Complaint Against Resnick, 108 Ohio 
St.3d 160, 2005 Ohio 6800, 842 N.E.2d 31. Justice Resnick had been arrested for driving under the 
influence and was charged with violation of OH CJC Canon 2 (entitled “A judge shall respect and 
comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”). [Now CJC Rules 1.1 and 1.2.] In the 
consent-to-discipline agreement the parties stipulated to the facts, the violation, and agreed that the 
recommended sanction should be a public reprimand, subject to the acceptance of the Court. The 
Court accepted the agreement without further hearing. The Resnick case also highlights the 
procedural mechanism applicable when a Supreme Court justice is so charged. All of the members of 
the Court are disqualified, and the case is heard by the Chief Justice of the Courts of Appeals and the 
presiding judge of each of the twelve courts of appeals, sitting as the Supreme Court. Gov Jud R II 4. 
A panel of three presiding judges of the courts of appeals appointed by the Chief Justice of the Courts 
of Appeals decides whether there is sufficient cause to warrant further investigation. Gov Jud R II 
2(B)(2) & (3)(a). In the Resnick case, based on the investigation by a special investigator appointed 
by the Chief Justice of the Courts of Appeals pursuant to Gov Jud R II 2(B)(3)(a), the investigator, 
as relator, filed a formal complaint, which resulted in the disposition set forth above. All of the judges 
concurred in the result, but two wrote separately. Judge Fain noted in his concurrence the media 
accounts of Justice Resnick’s arrest, including 
references to statements she reportedly made to the arresting officer, 
while still under the influence, that might be construed as an attempt to 
persuade the officer to release her because of her high judicial office. 
While such statements could certainly constitute an aggravating 
circumstance, they are not part of the record before us. 
Id. at para. 11. Inasmuch as the court could not consider matters not of record, “[t]here are no 
aggravating factors of record in the case before us,” id. at para. 20, and thus “a public reprimand is 
the appropriate disciplinary sanction.” Id. at para. 21. Judge Slaby, concurring as to judgment only, 
would have preferred a “full, open hearing on this matter,” given that “there may be some unanswered 
questions as to how the investigator came to the conclusions and recommendations that he presented 
to the panel. Id. at para. 23. 
Panel hearings are recorded by a court reporter provided by the Board, and a copy of the transcript is 
filed with the Secretary of the Board. See Gov Bar R V 6(F). 
Respondent attorneys often exercise the opportunity to appear at the hearing, but there is no absolute 
right to do so. An incarcerated respondent, for example, is not entitled as a matter of right to appear at 
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a disciplinary hearing. Rather, the primary means of securing the testimony of an incarcerated 
attorney is by deposition. See  In re Colburn, 30 Ohio St.3d 141, 507 N.E.2d 1138 (1987). (Cf. 
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 114 Ohio St.3d 108, 2007 Ohio 3253, 868 N.E.2d 973, where the case 
was submitted on the briefs because of the unavailability of respondent’s counsel at the hearing 
before the Supreme Court.  Justice Lundberg Stratton, dissenting on the ground that the denial of 
respondent’s motion for a continuance, based on severe winter weather conditions making it 
impossible for counsel to be present, violated respondent’s due process rights.) 
In numerous cases, respondents have raised evidentiary objections to the conduct of the proceedings, 
usually to no avail. The Ohio Supreme Court has held it permissible for the Board to consider 
disciplinary proceedings from other jurisdictions against the respondent in determining the 
respondent’s fitness to practice law in Ohio. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Geron, 32 Ohio 
St.3d 134, 512 N.E.2d 954 (1987). Final court orders may also be considered as evidence, and the 
respondent’s right to collaterally attack them can be limited. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Manogg, 74 Ohio St.3d 213, 658 N.E.2d 257 (1996). Criminal convictions clearly can be considered 
as evidence in a disciplinary proceeding.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kraft, 5 Ohio St.3d 197, 
449 N.E.2d 1303 (1983). The Court also has concluded that polygraph results need not be considered 
as a matter of course by the Board. See Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Westmeyer, 58 Ohio St.3d 38, 567 
N.E.2d 1016 (1991). 
While often represented by counsel in disciplinary proceedings, respondents are not entitled as a 
matter of right to have counsel appointed to represent them.  Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Illman, 45 
Ohio St.2d 159, 342 N.E.2d 688 (1976). 
Hearing - Continuances: Either the relator or the respondent may request a continuance of a panel 
hearing date. The panel chair may grant the request for good cause shown. See Gov Bar R V 6(F). 
County, municipal, and common pleas courts shall grant a motion for a continuance of a trial or a 
hearing when a party, counsel, or a witness under subpoena is scheduled to appear on the same date at 
a hearing before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline as a member of the Board, 
as a party, as counsel, or as a witness under subpoena for the hearing. See Rule of Superintendence 
for the Courts of Ohio (OH Sup R) 41(B)(2)(a). 
Hearing - Panel determination and recommendation: At the end of the evidence, the hearing panel 
may, by unanimous vote, decide to dismiss a complaint or a count in a complaint if the evidence is 
insufficient to support the alleged misconduct. Gov Bar R V 6(G). See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Jackson, 127 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010 Ohio 5709, 938 N.E.2d 1021 (noting panel’s dismissal of six 
alleged violations, per V 6(H)). To do so, the chair must give written notice of the dismissal to the 
Board, the respondent, all counsel of record, the Disciplinary Counsel, the certified grievance 
committee, and the local bar association of the county or counties in which the respondent resides and 
maintains an office, the county from which the complaint arose, and to the Ohio State Bar Association. 
Id. In the alternative, the panel may refer the findings of fact and recommendation for dismissal to the 
full Board for review and action. See Gov Bar R V 6(H). As the Supreme Court stated in Cuyahoga 
County Bar Ass’n v. Marosan, 109 Ohio St.3d 439, 2006 Ohio 2876, 848 N.E.2d 837, when a 
unanimous panel chooses to follow the V 6(H) (now (G)) route, “it may dismiss the count without 
referring it to the board or this court for review. . . . We do not review such dismissals.” Id. at para. 
13. Accord Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Maybaum, 112 Ohio St.3d 93, 2006 Ohio 6507, 858 
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N.E.2d 359, at para. 3. Following Marosan in Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 113 Ohio St.3d 
344, 2007 Ohio 2074, 865 N.E.2d 873, the Court rejected relator’s “hypertechnical reading” that 
Gov Bar R V 6(H) (now (G)) “allows the panel to dismiss only a count of misconduct or the entire 
complaint, not individual violations,” id. at para. 80).  
In contrast, when “the panel recommended [per Gov Bar R V 6(I) (now (H))] dismissal of all charges 
except the violation of DR 1-104 to the board, and the board certified that entire recommendation to 
us, [t]he recommendation to dismiss DR 5-105, therefore, is ready for our final determination.” 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ross, 107 Ohio St.3d 354, 2006 Ohio 5, 839 N.E.2d 918, at para. 17 
(emphasis in original; bracketed material added). 
These GBR provisions (prior to the amendments effective August 1, 2012) were examined in some 
detail in Disciplinary Counsel v. Doellman, 127 Ohio St.3d 411, 2010 Ohio 5990, 940 N.E.2d 928, 
where one issue was whether the Court could review relator’s objections to the recommended 
dismissal of certain charges. In finding that review was permissible, the Court distinguished between 
the old V 6(H) route, where there is no Board or Court review, and the old V 6(I) procedure, where 
there is. In the case at bar, the panel recommended dismissal under old 6(I). The Board (which could 
have dismissed pursuant to old 6(K) (now (J)) by giving notice to the same individuals and bodies as 
are listed in old 6(H)) adopted the panel’s recommendation of dismissal. Because neither the panel 
nor the Board followed the dismissal regimen and merely recommended dismissal, the Court could 
consider relator’s objections to same. 
If the hearing panel determines that the relator has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that a 
respondent is guilty of misconduct and that a sanction is merited, the panel files a certified report of 
the proceeding and the findings of facts and recommendations with the Secretary of the Board. See 
Gov Bar R V 6(J); Akron Bar Assn’ v. Catanzarite, 119 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008 Ohio 4063, 893 
N.E.2d 835 (applying clear-and-convincing-evidence standard). The certified report includes the 
transcript and an itemized statement of the actual and necessary expenses incurred in connection with 
the proceedings. See Gov Bar R V 6(I). 
Hearing - Board determination and recommendation: The panel chair presents the certified report to 
the Board at a regularly scheduled meeting. The Board reviews and deliberates on the panel’s findings 
of facts and recommended sanction. The Board has several choices: (1) it may dismiss the complaint 
or a count of the complaint; (2) it may refer the matter back to the hearing panel for further hearing; (3) 
it may order a further hearing before the Board; or (4) it may make a finding of misconduct and 
recommend a sanction based on the panel’s findings and recommendations. See Gov Bar R V 6(J). 
The Board’s procedural regulations seem to allow the Board to make any finding of misconduct 
warranted by the evidence, even if the violation was not alleged in the complaint. See BCGD Proc 
Reg 1(A) (“The panel and Board shall not be limited to the citation to the disciplinary rule(s) [in the 
complaint] in finding violations based on all the evidence.”). The Board relied on this language in 
approving the panel’s conclusion that respondent violated rules not charged in Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Simicek, 83 Ohio St.3d 320, 322, 699 N.E.2d 933, 934 (1998), but the Ohio Supreme 
Court rejected this practice as a violation of the procedural due process right to fair notice “[t]o the 
extent that this regulation authorizes the addition of misconduct charges after the record is closed.” Id. 
Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Brien, 120 Ohio St.3d 334, 2008 Ohio 6198, 899 N.E.2d 125 
(misconduct not charged cannot be adjudicated, id. at fn. 1, following Farmer, cited infra); 
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Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Farmer, 111 Ohio St.3d 137, 2006 Ohio 5342, 855 N.E.2d 462 (following 
Simicek). This is the prescribed result, even as to those uncharged violations found to have been 
proven by clear and convincing evidence. See Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Malynn, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 377, 2012 Ohio 1293, 965 N.E.2d 299, at n.2. Without citing Simicek or alluding to due 
process concerns, the Court reached the same result in rejecting uncharged violations in Cincinnati 
Bar Ass’n v. Deaton, 102 Ohio St.3d 19, 2004 Ohio 1587, 806 N.E.2d 503, relying instead on its 
“independent review and final authority in disciplinary cases.” Id. at n.2. Accord Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Rothermel, 112 Ohio St.3d 443, 2007 Ohio 258, 860 N.E.2d 754 (following Deaton). See 
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Judge, 96 Ohio St.3d 467, 2002 Ohio 4741, 776 N.E.2d 21 
(applying Simicek to prohibit sanctioning respondent for uncharged violations found by master 
commissioner and Board in proceeding in which respondent had defaulted and there were no 
voluntarily stipulated facts or violations). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoff, 124 Ohio St.3d 269, 
2010 Ohio 136, 921 N.E.2d 636, at n.3. A further variation occurs when the relator moves for default 
pursuant to Gov Bar R V 6(F) on some but not all counts in a proceeding in which the respondent 
does not answer. In Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Pommeranz, 102 Ohio St.3d 26, 2004 Ohio 1586, 806 
N.E.2d 509, the Supreme Court had such a situation and concluded as follows: 
Relator did not move for default on these counts and presented no 
evidence to substantiate them. We reject these findings [of misconduct 
found by the master commissioner and the board] pursuant to our 
independent review and final authority in disciplinary cases. [citing 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Reid, 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 708 N.E.2d 193 
(1999) (syllabus one)] 
Id. at n.1. See also Toledo Bar Ass’n v. DiLabbio, 101 Ohio St.3d 147, 2004 Ohio 338, 803 
N.E.2d 389, where the panel “noted that it had no authority to consider respondent’s apparent 
violation of DR 9-102(A) . . . because relator did not charge this in the complaint.” Id. at para. 5.  
But where the action proceeds on stipulated facts and violations in lieu of hearing, which the 
respondent waives, the Court has found it permissible to sanction a lawyer for stipulated violations, 
even though uncharged.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson, 86 Ohio St.3d 104, 712 
N.E.2d 122 (1999). Cf. Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Farkas, 94 Ohio St.3d 419, 763 N.E.2d 1158 (2002) 
(uncharged violation may be considered where parties stipulated at hearing that the additional matter 
could be added). Compare Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Van Sickle, 128 Ohio St.3d 376, 2011 Ohio 774, 
944 N.E.2d 677 (stipulated facts and violations, but hearing held; panel dismissed stipulated 
violations of Rules of Professional Conduct for conduct occurring after February 1, 2007 because not 
charged in complaint), with Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Hauck, 129 Ohio St.3d 209, 2011 Ohio 3281, 
951 N.E.2d 83, at n.1 (citing Jackson, the Court concluded that the uncharged violation in Hauck 
could be considered where the parties had stipulated to both the facts and the violation, and the 
respondent had received a hearing as well).  
It is not clear from the opinion where Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Hayes, 118 Ohio St.3d 336, 2008 
Ohio 2466, 889 N.E.2d 109, fits in. According to the Court, the parties in Hayes stipulated to the 
facts and violations, but (in contrast to the waiver of hearing stressed in Jackson) the panel “held a 
hearing on the complaint and considered the joint stipulations of the parties.” Id. at para. 2. In 
addition to the Board’s findings of misconduct, the Court, “based on the stipulated facts, . . . also 
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conclude[d] that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) with respect to Count IV,” id. at para. 27, a 
violation to which the respondent did not stipulate. Although the decision does not indicate whether 
DR 1-102(A)(4) was charged in the complaint, bar counsel for the relator has advised us that 
1-102(A)(4) was charged, but then not pursued when the stipulations were entered into. As a result, 
Hayes seems to fit within the Simicek line of cases, but it would have been helpful if the 1-102(A)(4) 
charge had been disclosed in the opinion. Consistent with this reading of Hayes (that a violation was 
in fact charged), in Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Millonig, 84 Ohio St.3d 403, 704 N.E.2d 568 (1999), the 
Court held that once an attorney is charged with misconduct at the initial stages of the grievance 
process, this provides notice and opportunity to defend; as a consequence, even if the charges are 
subsequently withdrawn, that does not preclude revival of the withdrawn charges and a finding of 
violation based thereon. Accord Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holda, 125 Ohio St.3d 140, 2010 Ohio 1469, 
926 N.E.2d 626 (1.16(d) charge withdrawn before panel, but based on respondent’s admission at 
hearing, panel found violation of 1.16(d)). The same result follows when a charged violation is found 
not proven by the panel or the Board, but the Supreme Court concludes otherwise. See Cuyahoga 
County Bar Ass’n v. Drain, 120 Ohio St.3d 288, 2008 Ohio 6141, 898 N.E.2d 580 (DR 
7-101(A)(3) violation found by Court, after panel and Board had found otherwise. In the same case, 
the Court reinstated the panel’s finding of violations of 6-101(A)(2) and (3)). (For an instance in 
which the Board found no violation of particular disciplinary rules, despite the parties’ stipulation that 
those rules had been violated, see Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Schoonover, 105 Ohio St.3d 472, 
2005 Ohio 2816, 828 N.E.2d 1007.) 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Atkin, 84 Ohio St.3d 383, 704 N.E.2d 244 (1999), presents a 
further interesting wrinkle on the uncharged-violation point. Atkin had been convicted of numerous 
federal charges arising out of his falsely representing to a client that he could bribe a federal judge. 
For reasons unknown, the disciplinary complaint against Atkin did not charge him with violation of 
former OH DR 9-101(C) (a lawyer shall not state or imply that he can improperly influence a 
tribunal). The panel found that he had violated the disciplinary rules for which he had been charged 
(former OH DR 1-102(A)(3) & (4) and 7-102(A)(7)). The Board adopted these findings and 
conclusions, as well as the recommendation that Atkin be permanently disbarred. After agreeing with 
the findings and conclusions of the Board and its recommendation that respondent be permanently 
disbarred, the Supreme Court in dicta focused entirely on the violation of OH DR 9-101(C). In all 
likelihood, this uncharged violation was not seen by the Court as implicating due-process concerns 
(which were not mentioned) because of a combination of factors: (1) the discussion was added by the 
Court, not the Board, and thus did not involve BCGD Proc Reg 1(A), (2) the sanction of disbarment 
was the same, with or without the additional violation (but see Judge, 96 Ohio St.3d 467, 2002 Ohio 
4741, 776 N.E.2d 21 supra, where the Court invoked due process to negate the uncharged violation, 
even though the penalty remained the same), and (3) perhaps most important, respondent could not be 
said to have had no notice of the violation, since the supposed bribery scheme was at the core of his 
obstruction of justice federal criminal trial and conviction, which was affirmed on appeal. See United 
States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1217-19 (6th Cir. 1997). The Atkin case is also discussed at section 
8.4:600. 
While an uncharged violation cannot serve as a ground for discipline, it can be used as an aggravating 
factor in considering the appropriate sanction.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Farmer, 111 Ohio St.3d 
137, 2006 Ohio 5342, 855 N.E.2d 462 (uncharged attempts to mislead disciplinary authorities could 
not be basis of disciplinary rule violation because of due process, but the attempt to deceive 
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disciplinary authorities during disciplinary proceedings was an aggravating factor; “[t]hese 
falsehoods certainly exacerbate the misconduct committed in this case,” id. at para. 49). And cf. 
Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Rohrkaste, 111 Ohio St.3d 224, 2006 Ohio 5487, 855 N.E.2d 868, where the 
Court noted that “respondent admitted the aggravating effect of his failure to comply with [uncharged 
DR 1-104 – obligation to maintain malpractice insurance and to disclose to clients when not so 
maintained].”  Id. at para. 8.  
The seemingly clear waters of Farmer – holding that uncharged violations can be considered in 
aggravation – were muddied considerably by the Court’s decision in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Sigalov, 133 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012 Ohio 3868, 975 N.E.2d 926, where the respondent was disbarred 
for numerous violations over a five-year period. Not only was Farmer not cited by the Court in 
Sigalov, but the decision itself seems somewhat inscrutable at several points. In a nutshell, the panel 
and Board found that respondent had violated Rule 8.4(c) by (1) telling his client that he had not 
received notice of a June 26, 2007 hearing date when in fact he had, and (2) by telling relator and the 
panel that he had notified the client of the hearing when in fact he had not. In support of his case, 
respondent produced at his disciplinary hearing a June 12, 2007 letter purporting to notify the client of 
the June 26, 2007 hearing. Relator recalled Sigalov and presented evidence that the letter, on 
letterhead not produced by respondent’s printing company until two months after June 12, was a 
fabrication. The panel expressly noted that the 8.4(c) violation was based on conduct other than the 
fabrication of the letter, which fabrication was not charged in the complaint. 
The issue is framed in the Court’s opinion as follows: 
As noted above, the panel declined to find that Sigalov’s fabrication of 
the letter violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) on the basis that the complaint 
had not provided notice of such a violation. But in recommending a 
sanction, the panel cited fabrication of evidence as a “significant” 
aggravating factor that “greatly exacerbate[s]” Sigalov’s conduct. 
Sigalov contends that the panel’s reliance on evidence of fabrication, 
which was introduced upon reopening after relator had rested its case, 
denied him his due process rights. Relator counters that it was proper to 
use that evidence to assess Sigalov’s credibility and to determine the 
appropriate sanction. 
Id. at para. 40. 
In the end, the Court decided that Sigalov’s due process notice argument “has merit” insofar as 
directed toward the finding of violation of 8.4(c) that was based on respondent’s misrepresentations 
to relator and the panel, because “[a]dditional charges of misconduct . . . cannot be premised on an 
attorney misleading disciplinary authorities during the investigation or proceedings unless the 
complaint makes such an allegation,” id. at para. 46, citing Simicek, and the “complaint did not 
charge Sigalov with dishonest statements to the panel.” Id. at para. 47. 
The confusion seems to be compounded where the Court gets to relator’s argument that the 
fabrication evidence could in any event properly be used to impeach Sigalov and to determine the 
appropriate sanction. Here, the Court states that since (irrespective of the fabrication evidence) there 
is clear and convincing evidence of violation of 8.4(c) by his misconduct toward his client,  
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we need not address the constitutionality of the panel’s distinction 
between bringing a new charge against Sigalov and using Sigalov’s 
attempts to conceal his misconduct to impeach his credibility. 
Id. at para. 48. But what of relator’s assertion that the fabrication could be considered in aggravation? 
Perhaps the Court’s failure to explicitly discuss the constitutionality of its use as an aggravating factor 
was inadvertent or perhaps was thought to be covered by the language quoted above; in any event, the 
Court proceeded to agree with the Board and panel that one of the aggravating factors was “the 
submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary 
process,” and makes specific reference to falsification of “documents in a cover-up effort during the 
disciplinary proceeding” as one of the aggravating factors “greatly outweigh[ing] those in mitigation.” 
Id. at paras. 80, 91. Despite these difficulties, this end result regarding use of uncharged conduct as 
an aggravating factor seems consistent with Farmer; it nevertheless would have been helpful if the 
similarity of this aspect of the Farmer case to that before the Court had been acknowledged and that 
case cited as precedent here. 
In recommending a sanction, the Board has several choices that vary in severity: (1) disbarment; (2) 
suspension for an indefinite period; (3) suspension for a definite period of time from six months to 
two years, subject to a stay in whole or in part; (4) conditional probation in conjunction with 
suspension under subsection 3; or (5) public reprimand. See Gov Bar R V 6(B). 
The Board will consider all relevant factors, Ohio Supreme Court precedent, and the following 
aggravating and mitigating factors, in deciding upon the recommended sanction. BCGD Proc Reg 
10(B):  
(1) Aggravation.  The following shall not control the Board’s discretion, but may be 
considered in favor of recommending a more severe sanction: 
(a) prior disciplinary offenses; 
(b) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) a pattern of misconduct; 
(d) multiple offenses; 
(e) lack of cooperation in the disciplinary process; 
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the 
disciplinary process; 
(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; 
(h) vulnerability of and resulting harm to victims of the misconduct; 
(i) failure to make restitution. 
 
(2) Mitigation.  The following shall not control the Board’s discretion, but may be considered 
in favor of recommending a less severe sanction: 
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(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; 
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; 
(d) full and free disclosure to disciplinary Board or cooperative attitude toward 
proceedings; 
(e) character or reputation; 
(f) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(g) chemical dependency or mental disability when there has been all of the following: 
(i) A diagnosis of a chemical dependency or mental disability by a qualified 
health care professional or alcohol/substance abuse counselor; 
(ii) A determination that the chemical dependency or mental disability contributed 
to cause the misconduct; 
(iii) In the event of chemical dependency, a certification of successful completion 
of an approved treatment program or in the event of mental disability, a 
sustained period of successful treatment; 
(iv) A prognosis from a qualified health care professional or alcohol/substance 
abuse counselor that the attorney will be able to return to competent, ethical 
professional practice under specified conditions. 
(h) other interim rehabilitation. 
BCGD Proc Reg 10(B)(1) & (2).(The reader might wonder (as did one of the authors) why two 
seemingly duplicative aggravating factors – pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses, 1(c) and (d) 
– exist. The Court attempts to shed a little light on this in Disciplinary Counsel v. Doellman, 127 
Ohio St.3d 411, 2010 Ohio 5990, 940 N.E.2d 928, where the relator argued that two different types 
of IOLTA violations formed a “pattern.” But in the Court’s view, while they constituted multiple 
offenses, they did not form a pattern because “the counts [I and III] involve separate and independent 
violations, not a pattern as relator suggests.” Id. at para. 47 (bracketed material added). The Court 
cited a case in which no pattern of misconduct was found because the acts “did not constitute a 
‘salient’ pattern.” Id. (A pattern is a pattern is a pattern.) We believe that what the Court is trying to 
say here is that multiple offenses will not form a pattern unless they are repetitive or at least similar in 
nature. Thus, a pattern was found by the Court in Doellman with respect to a third count of 
misconduct (Count II), regarding respondent’s “accepting and depositing 38 checks totaling 
$2,764.46 from bank debtors over ten months and expending these funds instead of turning them over 
to the bank or escrowing them.” Id. at para. 48. Accord Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 132 Ohio St.3d 
63, 2012 Ohio 1880, 969 N.E.2d 239,  at para. 15 (pattern present: “Miller . . . lied to courts in both 
the garnishment inquiry and at the bankruptcy hearing.”). Similarly, two rapes or two robberies would 
constitute both multiple offenses and a pattern, whereas a bank robbery and a rape would constitute 
multiple offenses but would not be a pattern. Of course, the area in between these two extremes can be 
very gray. This murkiness certainly contributes to the difficulty the Court has in articulating the 
distinction.) 
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Does this difficulty exist because any distinction is illusory? One might so argue, given the Court’s 
language in Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Wagner, 137 Ohio St.3d 545, 2013 Ohio 5087, 1 
N.E.3d 398. In considering the appropriate sanction to impose on Wagner, the Court stated as 
follows: 
 The panel found only one aggravating factor, that Wagner 
committed multiple offenses and a pattern of misconduct because he 
prepared settlement statements in at least four different transactions 
after realizing that the transactions were suspect. BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(d). 
Id. at para. 11 (emphasis added). There was no mention by the Court of BCGD Proc.Reg. 
(10)(B)(1)(c) or explanation of why it was not added to the aggravation count. 
Further confounding the distinction, if any, is Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Evans, 137 Ohio St.3d 441, 
2013 Ohio 4992, 999 N.E.2d 674, where, again, only one aggravating factor was identified (multiple 
offenses), even though the multiple offense consisted of the respondent judge “filing an entry in 63 
pending cases mentioning the possible disciplinary investigation into Bright’s conduct.” Id. at para. 
15. Bright was a public defender whose entire case load consisted of 64 cases pending before Judge 
Evans, the only Common Pleas Judge in the county, about whom Bright had filed a motion in one of 
those cases asking the judge to accept a plea agreement; the judge, taking offense at certain of 
Bright’s language in his motion, sua sponte removed him as counsel and had him removed as counsel 
in Bright’s 63 other cases. This sounds suspiciously like a “pattern,” as well as multiple offenses, to 
us. 
Akron Bar Ass’n v. Groner, 131 Ohio St.3d 194, 2012 Ohio 222 963 N.E.2d 149, raises yet 
another question regarding the meaning of “multiple offenses.” In Groner, the respondent filed a 
pleading in probate court that contained false information. Based on this single act, she was found to 
have violated a number of rules of professional conduct. The panel and Board found that she had 
committed multiple offenses, and the Court gave no indication that it disagreed. Given the one act of 
misconduct, apparently the multiple offenses aggravating factor does not require multiple “acts,” but 
can be satisfied by the violation of more than one ethics rule (even though violation of more than one 
rule has not raised this aggravating factor in other cases (see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon, 
128 Ohio St.3d 359, 2011 Ohio 627, 944 N.E.2d 660)).  
Indeed, in Groner all of the aggravating factors seem close calls on the facts given. Groner was found 
to have “exhibited a selfish motive, committed multiple offenses, has refused to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of her conduct, and has caused resulting harm to the victim.” Id. at para. 21. The 
salient facts were that Groner was hired by an out-of-state client to oppose the appointment of the 
client’s sister as fiduciary of their mother’s estate in probate court. Under a same-day deadline for 
filing her opposition, Groner obtained information from the internet that someone from New 
Philadelphia, Ohio with a full name identical to the sister’s had filed for bankruptcy and had a felony 
record. A government website confirmed the bankruptcy. Without otherwise verifying that the 
information in the report dealt with her client’s sister, Groner proceeded to prepare and file her 
objections, which contained the bankruptcy/felony allegations, prior to the filing deadline at day’s 
end. 
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Groner admitted that she was panicked that day and did not spend 
sufficient time reviewing the record, but she testified that, at the time, 
she believed that the allegations in the multipage report pertained to her 
client’s sister . . . . 
*   *   *   * 
 [W]ithin a few days of filing the objections, after conversations 
with opposing counsel and her client, she began to suspect that the 
information she had submitted about Fowler was not correct. Groner 
subsequently filed a motion for mediation in which she amended the 
objections to remove most of the allegations made about Fowler. 
Id. at paras. 7, 11. 
 
From these facts one would have thought that some explanation might have been provided to 
demonstrate how Groner “had refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct” and 
“exhibited a selfish motive.” As for causing harm to the victim, the “victim testified that it made 
relations with her siblings more uncomfortable, but that she already had a strained relationship with 
them.” Id. at para. 23. (Groner received a six-month stayed suspension, despite relator’s 
recommendation of a public reprimand.) Other troublesome aspects of this troublesome decision are 
discussed at sections 3.3:200 and 4.1:200 infra. 
Note that some aggravating factors can be more aggravating than others. In Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Summers, 131 Ohio St.3d 464, 2012 Ohio 1144, 967 N.E.2d 183, the Court emphasized that 
“respondent’s continued misconduct throughout the disciplinary proceedings [he was 
“condescending to disciplinary counsel, . . . only grudgingly cooperated with the disciplinary 
process, . . . show[ed] ‘an attitude of righteous indignation,’ and . . . his testimony was laced with ‘lies 
and evasiveness,’” id. at para. 41] is a significant aggravating factor that must be weighed heavily.” 
Id. at para. 47. Note as well that if the cooperation in the disciplinary proceeding is given only 
“grudgingly,” that cooperation becomes an aggravating factor, rather than a mitigating one – at least 
when the grudging cooperation comes “with an air of righteous indignation.” See id. at para. 34. 
When, in a case involving serious violations, the aggravating factors are present in abundance and 
there are no or few mitigating factors, the result, not surprisingly, is often disbarment or indefinite 
suspension. E.g., Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Freeman, 135 Ohio St.3d 263, 2013 Ohio 736, 
985 N.E.2d 1275 (seven of the nine aggravating factors present; no mitigating factors; Board’s 
recommendation of disbarment imposed by Court); Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Williamson, 117 
Ohio St.3d 399, 2008 Ohio 1196, 884 N.E.2d 55 (“[n]o mitigating evidence dissuades us from 
imposing the recommended indefinite suspension,” id. at para. 10, given multiple aggravating 
factors, including attempting to mislead relator (BCGD Proc Reg 10(B)(1)(f)) and altering date of 
letter purporting to terminate his professional relationship with his client). Compare Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Gideon, 104 Ohio St.3d 418, 2004 Ohio 6587, 819 N.E.2d 1103, where significant 
mitigating factors under BCGD Proc Reg 10(B)(2) were present, resulting in a sanction of a stayed 
two-year suspension on compliance with conditions recommended by the Board and imposed by the 
Court. Another instance in which the “mitigating factors far outweighed the aggravating factors” was 
Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Gerren, 110 Ohio St.3d 297, 2006 Ohio 4482, 853 N.E.2d 302, at para. 19; 
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as a result, the Board accepted the stipulated sanction of 18 months with the last six months stayed. 
See also Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Zena, 137 Ohio St.3d 456, 2013 Ohio 4585, 1 N.E.3d 
323, where “overwhelming evidence” of respondent’s honesty and integrity (testimony by four 
judges and 49 good character letters), id. at para. 21, resulted in a one-year fully stayed suspension, 
despite the parties’ previous stipulation to a two-year suspension, all stayed). For a case balancing 
significant mitigating and aggravating factors, resulting in a two-year suspension with one year 
conditionally stayed, see Allen County Bar Ass’n v. Linnon, 104 Ohio St.3d 189, 2004 Ohio 6386, 
819 N.E.2d 210. 
The pattern-of-misconduct aggravating factor is not necessarily limited to conduct presently before 
the Court.  Thus in Disciplinary Counsel v. Novak, 112 Ohio St.3d 163, 2006 Ohio 6527, 858 
N.E.2d 421, the respondent had been disciplined once before for neglect and dishonesty.  Since the 
case at bar also involved neglect and dishonesty concerning a client, the Board found that respondent 
“had thereby engaged in a pattern of misconduct,” id. at para. 11.  But see Dayton Bar Ass’n v. 
Andrews, 105 Ohio St.3d 453, 2005 Ohio 2696, 828 N.E.2d 630 (prior suspension for, inter alia, 
neglecting cases of four bankruptcy clients; despite finding of violation of one count of professional 
neglect in case at bar, Board found that respondent “had not committed a pattern of misconduct,” id. 
at para. 13). 
Upon adopting findings of fact and a recommendation for sanction, the Board files a final certified 
report of its proceedings with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The report includes the transcript of the 
hearing testimony and an itemized statement of actual and necessary expenses incurred in the 
proceeding. The Board also notifies the respondent and all counsel of record, enclosing a copy of the 
Board’s report and the statement of the expenses. See Gov Bar R V 6(K).  Aggravating and 
mitigating factors are further discussed this section infra at “Supreme Court order – Sanctions for 
misconduct.” 
Supreme Court order - Order to show cause: On receipt of the Board’s certified report, the Supreme 
Court issues an order to the respondent to show cause why the Board’s report should not be confirmed 
and a disciplinary order entered. The show cause order is served by the Clerk of the Supreme Court on 
the respondent and all counsel of record personally or by certified mail. See Gov Bar R V 8(A). 
Filing objections at the Supreme Court show-cause stage and asking for remand in order to submit 
evidence usually will fall on deaf ears – the respondent’s obligation is to present such evidence at the 
hearing stage and if he/she does not, the Court will ignore such objections, except in the most 
extraordinary circumstances. E.g., Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Stephan, 108 Ohio St.3d 327, 2006 Ohio 
1063, 843 N.E.2d 771. Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Lentes, 120 Ohio St.3d 431, 2008 Ohio 
6355, 900 N.E.2d 167. One such extraordinary circumstance occurred in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
McShane, 121 Ohio St.3d 169, 2009 Ohio 746, 902 N.E.2d 980, where the respondent had 
defaulted in failing to answer relator’s complaint and was given an indefinite suspension by the 
master commissioner. This sanction was adopted by the Board. But on appeal to the Supreme Court, 
respondent’s proffer of “compelling evidence of a mental disability,” id. at para. 3, in explanation of 
his failure to answer and in mitigation, made in his response to the Court’s order to show cause and 
his motion for remand to the Board, resulted in the Board’s and the Court’s approval of a two-year 
stayed suspension. Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Eynon, 135 Ohio St.3d 274, 2013 Ohio 953, 
985 N.E.2d 1285 (remand for consideration of mental disability mitigating evidence; one-year fully 
stayed suspension imposed in lieu of original two-year suspension with 12 months stayed). Similarly, 
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in Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 131 Ohio St.3d 372, 2012 Ohio 1284, 965 N.E.2d 294, after 
the Board had initially recommended a two-year suspension with six months stayed, the Court 
approved the lesser sanction of two years with 18 months stayed based on mental illness mitigating 
evidence offered on remand. 
Within twenty days after the issuance of an order to show cause, the respondent or the relator may file 
objections to the findings or recommendations of the Board, to the entry of a disciplinary order, or to 
the confirmation of the Board’s report. A brief must accompany the objection, and there must be 
proof of service of copies on the Secretary of the Board and all counsel of record. See Gov Bar R V 
8(B). Answer briefs and proof of service must be filed within fifteen days after the objection and 
briefs are filed. See Gov Bar R V 8(C). 
In Trumbull County Bar Ass’n v. Ohlin, 133 Ohio St.3d 241, 2012 Ohio 4565, 977 N.E.2d 640, a 
case in which, after the Board recommended disbarment, a remand was ordered to consider mental 
health evidence in mitigation, the Court repeated the rule that such remands will be granted only in 
the “most exceptional circumstances” but then acknowledged that since 
deciding Portman [Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Portman, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 518, 2009 Ohio 1705, 905 N.E.2d 1203], we have granted 
motions to remand for the introduction and consideration of mitigating 
evidence in a small, but growing number of cases [citing five cases 
decided since 2010]. 
*    *    * 
We remanded each of these cases but limited the scope of the board’s 
review to consideration of mitigation evidence. 
Id. at paras. 7, 8. The Court followed suit in Ohlin, ordering remand for mitigation purposes but 
rejecting respondent’s request to present exculpatory evidence. Accord Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n 
v. Pryatel, 135 Ohio St.3d 410, 2013 Ohio 1537, 988 N.E.2d 541 (limiting board review on remand 
to consideration of mitigation evidence; respondent had sought remand broader in scope). The Ohlin 
Court, “[b]ased on the specific circumstances of this case,” found respondent’s own affidavit 
sufficient to satisfy the exceptional circumstances test (depression resulting from termination of his 
marriage and relocation of his family elsewhere, which interfered with his ability to practice). Further 
limiting the precedential value of the decision, the Court emphasized that: 
 However, when asking this court to consider remanding a 
disciplinary action for a respondent to provide mitigating evidence of a 
diagnosis of mental disability, a statement from a mental health 
treatment professional should be provided, setting forth, at a minimum, 
the respondent’s diagnosis and treatment regimen. 
Id. at para. 11. 
Supreme Court order - Final disciplinary order: If objections are filed, the Supreme Court holds a 
hearing. After the hearing on the objections, or if no objections are filed, the Supreme Court enters 
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such order as it finds proper. Gov Bar R V 8(D). As stated in In re Complaint Against Harper, 77 
Ohio St.3d 211, 215, 673 N.E.2d 1253, 1258 (1996), 
the Supreme Court, not the board, “makes the ultimate conclusion, both 
as to the facts and as to the action, if any, that should be taken.” 
(quoting from Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St.2d 214, 220, 291 N.E.2d 477, 482 
(1972)). The Court asserted its authority in this regard in no uncertain terms in Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Furth, 93 Ohio St.3d 173, 754 N.E.2d 219 (2001), where numerous violations, found not 
proved by the panel and the Board, were reinstated by the Supreme Court, and respondent was 
permanently disbarred. Accord Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Gruttadaurio, 136 Ohio St.3d 283, 
2013 Ohio 3662, 995 N.E.2d 190 (rejecting recommendation of panel and Board that certain 
disciplinary rules not violated; indefinite suspension imposed); Disciplinary Counsel v. McCord, 
121 Ohio St.3d 497, 2009 Ohio 1517, 905 N.E.2d 1182 (same). Of course, application of the same 
principle can produce the opposite result, as in Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Reid, 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 
708 N.E.2d 193 (1999), where a number of violations by respondent judge, as found by Board, were 
determined by the Court not to be supported by clear and convincing evidence as required. Accord 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, 123 Ohio St.3d 298, 2009 Ohio 5286, 915 N.E.2d 1224 (Board 
finding of violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) against part-time prosecutor not supported by clear and 
convincing evidence; cause dismissed). In so deciding, the Court once again emphasized that it makes 
the final determination in disciplinary cases and that it “is not bound by the Board of Commissioners 
on Grievances and Discipline’s findings of fact or conclusions of law,” citing Harper, Heitzler, and 
Furth). This corrective power has been exercised even where the parties stipulate to and the panel 
and Board find a violation, if the evidence demonstrates otherwise. See Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n 
v. Freeman, 128 Ohio St.3d 416, 2011 Ohio 1447, 945 N.E.2d 515 (dismissing charge of violation 
of Rule 7.3(c)(3)). 
Nevertheless, the Court also has indicated that the findings of fact and the recommendations of the 
Board will generally be followed, unless they are manifestly against the weight of the evidence. See 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Fennell, 63 Ohio St.2d 113, 406 N.E.2d 1129 (1980). The Court likewise 
typically defers to the witness credibility determinations by the hearing panel. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n 
v. Powers, 119 Ohio St.3d 473, 2008 Ohio 4785, 895 N.E.2d 172, at para. 21 (“our usual practice”), 
“‘unless the record weighs heavily against those determinations.’“ Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Pfundstein, 128 Ohio St.3d 61, 2010 Ohio 6150, 941 N.E.2d 1180, at para. 19 (finding record not 
to weigh heavily against Board’s credibility determinations and therefore accepting its findings on 
existence of mitigating factors). Nor does the “usual practice” control in circumstances such as those 
presented in Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly, 121 Ohio St.3d 39, 2009 Ohio 317, 901 N.E.2d 798: 
“Inasmuch as no witness’s testimony, including that of respondent, has been challenged as unreliable, 
cases in which we have deferred to a panel’s credibility determinations do not apply.” Id. at para. 10. 
In making its determination, the Court relies on the record made below and, absent exceptional 
circumstances, will not consider new evidence attached to a brief or presented in oral argument. 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Sterner, 77 Ohio St.3d 164, 672 N.E.2d 633 (1996); see Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson, 81 Ohio St.3d 308, 691 N.E.2d 262 (1998). Should the 
evidentiary record from the Board be found wanting, the Court can remand the matter to the Board for 
further proceedings. See Jackson supra.  
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A disciplinary order is effective on the date the order is announced by the Court unless the order 
indicates otherwise. Gov Bar R V 8(D). An order usually provides for reimbursement of costs and 
expenses incurred by the Board or the panels. Id. 
Supreme Court order - Notice and publication: The Clerk of the Supreme Court mails certified copies 
of the Court’s entry to counsel of record, to the Board, to respondent, to the Disciplinary Counsel, to 
the certified grievance committee and the local bar association of the county or counties in which the 
respondent resides and maintains an office and in which the complaint arose, to the Ohio State Bar 
Association, to the administrative judge of the court of common pleas for each county in which the 
respondent resides or maintains an office, and to the presiding judges of the United States District 
Courts in Ohio, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Gov Bar R V 8(D)(1). 
The Reporter for the Ohio Supreme Court is obligated to publish every disciplinary order in the Ohio 
Official Reports, the Ohio State Bar Association Report, and in a publication, if any, of the local bar 
association. Gov Bar R V 8(D)(2). The publication includes the citation of the case. Id. To inform the 
public, a notice is published in a local newspaper with the largest general circulation in the county or 
counties designated by the Board. The notice appears in the form of a paid legal advertisement and is 
published three times within thirty days following the Court’s order. The publication fees are assessed 
against the respondent as part of costs. Id. (Every once in a great while, the Reporter’s obligation to 
publish in the Ohio Official Reports is honored in the breach. In Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. 
Wilsman, 9 Ohio St.3d 5, 457 N.E.2d 824 (1984), the respondent received an indefinite suspension. 
He subsequently moved to have the suspension reduced to one year, which motion was granted by 4-3 
order of the Supreme Court. This action was never officially reported, and the only evidence of its 
occurrence that we know of is found in 58 Ohio St. B. Ass’n Rep. 1201 (July 29, 1985).) There was 
no majority opinion; Chief Justice Celebrezze filed an angry dissent. 
Supreme Court order - Sanctions for misconduct: When a disciplinary proceeding is brought under 
Gov Bar R V, the sanctions the Court may impose are: disbarment from the practice of law; 
suspension from the practice of law for an indefinite period of time; suspension for a period of six 
months to two years, subject to a stay in whole or part and with or without probation; or public 
reprimand. See Gov Bar R V 6(B). In appropriate cases, the Court may also order the respondent to 
make restitution. (With respect to the sanction of indefinite suspension, Akron Bar Ass’n v. 
Chandler, 62 Ohio St.3d 471, 584 N.E.2d 677 (1992), addressed “an assumption among the bench 
and bar of Ohio that the sanction of indefinite suspension means a suspension for two years.” Id. at 
473, 584 N.E.2d at 678. In disabusing the bench and bar of this erroneous assumption, the Supreme 
Court made clear that, although two years is the earliest time at which an indefinitely suspended 
lawyer may petition for reinstatement, “[a]n indefinite suspension is just that: indefinite. . . . [It] 
carries with it no assurance of reinstatement in two years, five years, ten years or indeed at any time.” 
Id.). 
Sanctions may be imposed on inactive or retired attorneys, as well as those on active status.  See 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Rose, 114 Ohio St. 3d 177, 2007 Ohio 3606, 870 N.E.2d 1168 (six-month 
suspension for practicing while inactive; suspension to take effect if and when respondent regains 
active status); Disciplinary Counsel v. Taft, 112 Ohio St.3d 155, 2006 Ohio 6525, 858 N.E.2d 414 
(inactive; public reprimand); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Greenberg, 112 Ohio St.3d 138, 2006 Ohio 
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6519, 858 N.E.2d 400 (retired; 18-month suspension to commence if respondent returns to active 
status). With Rose, compare Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Kizer, 123 Ohio St.3d 188, 2009 Ohio 4763, 
915 N.E.2d 314, where the 18-month suspension imposed on respondent was to commence on the 
date on which she took inactive status – the Rose case was not cited; and Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Maguire, 131 Ohio St.3d 412, 2012 Ohio 1298, 965 N.E.2d 996, where the Court imposed a 
one-year sanction on an inactive attorney but did not address the commencement date issue at all. As 
to the Greenburg decision and attorneys who retire, note that the rules have changed; see Gov Bar R 
VI 6(A), discussed this section below at “Special disciplinary provisions - Retirement or resignation 
from the practice of law.” (For a case in which the Court sanctioned a non-Ohio lawyer admitted pro 
hac vice in a number of Ohio courts by enjoining him from appearing pro hac vice in Ohio for two 
years, see Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 4541, 894 N.E.2d 
1210.) 
The Court may adopt the Board’s recommended sanction, but ultimately the decision is the Court’s. 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Shaw, 110 Ohio St.3d 122, 2006 Ohio 3821, 851 N.E.2d 487 (exercising 
“our authority in disciplinary cases to independently determine the appropriate sanction,” id. at para. 
33). Sometime the penalty is increased, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Powers, 119 Ohio St.3d 473, 
2008 Ohio 4785, 895 N.E.2d 172 (rejecting indefinite suspension recommended by panel and Board; 
“egregious violations” (fraudulent scheme resulting in guilty pleas to two federal felony charges) 
warranted disbarment); Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. Wagner, 117 Ohio St.3d 456, 2008 Ohio 1200, 
884 N.E.2d 1053 (rejecting special master’s and Board’s recommendation of indefinite suspension 
and imposing disbarment; multiple aggravating factors, no mitigating factors, prior disciplinary 
record); Disciplinary Counsel v. Lord, 111 Ohio St.3d 131, 2006 Ohio 5341, 855 N.E.2d 457 
(respondent’s “many ethical missteps, coupled with the misleading half-truths he has offered to 
clients, courts, and fellow lawyers,” id. at para. 29, caused Court not to adopt recommended 
two-year suspension with one year stayed but to impose indefinite suspension instead). Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Ulinski, 106 Ohio St.3d 53, 2005 Ohio 3673, 831 N.E.2d 425 (conviction of conspiracy 
to commit federal securities, mail, and wire fraud, resulting in losses to clients and other customers of 
more than $100,000. Based on significant mitigating evidence, the panel and Board recommended 
indefinite suspension. The Court, however, emphasizing the “devastating” financial injury and 
“financial havoc” caused by respondent’s misdeeds, imposed “our most rigorous sanction,” 
disbarment. Id. at paras. 23, 24.); Office of Disciplinary Council v. Furth, 93 Ohio St.3d 173, 754 
N.E.2d 219 (2001) (“blatant disregard” for important professional rules; “the record compels a 
reevaluation of the sanction recommended by the board”; recommended two-year suspension 
changed to permanent disbarment.  Id. at 186, 187, 754 N.E.2d at 232.). And sometimes it is 
lessened, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Rothermel, 104 Ohio St.3d 413, 2004 Ohio 6559, 819 
N.E.2d 1099 (Board’s recommendation of disbarment for serious transgressions reduced by Court to 
indefinite suspension; Court concluded that respondent “may in the future regain the moral compass 
necessary to competently and ethically practice law, which distinguishes this case from any in which 
we have ordered disbarment.” Id. at para. 21. This proved to be wishful thinking; Rothermeil was 
disbarred for further violations in 112 Ohio St.3d 443, 2007 Ohio 258, 860 N.E.2d 754.). Accord 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Milless, 96 Ohio St.3d 74, 2002 Ohio 3455, 771 N.E.2d 845, at para. 5 
(because of traumatic events occurring at time of “isolated instance” of misconduct in otherwise 
distinguished legal career, Court mitigated recommended penalty of indefinite suspension to one-year 
suspension with entire year stayed). 
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When imposing a sanction, the Court considers (1) the duty violated, (2) the lawyer’s mental state, (3) 
the actual injury caused, and (4) whether mitigating and/or aggravating factors exist.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Beeler, 105 Ohio St.3d 188, 2005 Ohio 1143, 824 N.E.2d 78, at para. 25 (“In seeking to 
bring uniformity to the process of sanctioning attorneys, this court turned to the four-step 
methodology of the American Bar Association standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Brown (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 316, 720 N.E.2d 525.”). Accord Stark County 
Bar Ass’n v. Ake, 111 Ohio St.3d 266, 2006 Ohio 5704, 855 N.E.2d 1206 (invoking, in addition to 
the ABA list, sanctions imposed in similar cases, see below). The Court has also looked to the ABA 
standards (2005 version) with respect to when disbarment is appropriate. See Toledo Bar Ass’n v. 
Cook, 114 Ohio St.3d 108, 2007 Ohio 3253, 868 N.E.2d 973, at para. 41 (citing ABA Standards 
4.31(a) and 5.11(b)).  
In other decisions, the Court has added a fifth parameter -- the sanctions imposed in similar cases, e.g., 
in addition to Ake supra, Akron Bar Ass’n v. Catanzarite, 119 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008 Ohio 4063, 
893 N.E.2d 835; Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Church, 114 Ohio St.3d 41, 2007 Ohio 2744, 867 N.E.2d 
834; Disciplinary Counsel v. Young, 113 Ohio St.3d 36, 2007 Ohio 975, 862 N.E.2d 504; or, as it 
alternatively has been put, “applicable precedent.”  E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. McCord, 121 
Ohio St.3d 497, 2009 Ohio 1517, 905 N.E.2d 1182.  
While these are the primary factors considered, the Court may look to additional factors as well. In 
one 2006 decision, the Court said that it would consider respondent’s “background” and the 
aggravating/mitigating factors.  Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Maybaum, 112 Ohio St.3d 93, 
2006 Ohio  6507, 858 N.E.2d 359, at para. 8.  In a more recent case, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Redfield, 116 Ohio St.3d 262, 2007 Ohio 6039, 878 N.E.2d 10, the Court made clear that it was not 
limited to the aggravating/mitigating factors specified in BCGD Proc Reg 10(B) and “may take into 
account ‘all relevant factors’ in determining the sanction to impose. BCGD Rule 10(B).” Redfield at 
para. 20 (setting forth, inter alia, respondent’s knowing violations of his duty to protect his client’s 
interests, to comply with registration requirements, and to comply with court child-support orders, id. 
at para. 21). This point was further emphasized in Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St.3d 
68, 2012 Ohio 5337, 979 N.E.2d 1263, where the Court found respondent’s position as the chief 
law-enforcement officer of the state, the attorney general, when he committed his misdemeanor 
misconduct to be the most damaging aggravating factor. See id. at paras. 15, 19, 21-23, 28. The 
Court made specific reference to the “all relevant factors” language of BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B) in 
treating respondent’s position as attorney general at the time of his misconduct as an aggravating 
factor. Id. at para. 21. See also Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Snyder, 136 Ohio St.3d 320, 2013 
Ohio 3688, 995 N.E.2d 222, where one of the aggravating factors was respondent’s failure to register 
with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel his employment of a “disqualified” attorney (he had resigned 
with disciplinary action pending); that failure violated Gov Bar R V 8(G)(3). 
Of the many mitigating and aggravating factors considered (see BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(1) & (2), 
set forth in this section supra at “Hearing - Board determination and recommendation”), two are 
mentioned in Gov Bar R V. Prior disciplinary offenses may justify an increase in the degree of 
discipline imposed for subsequent misconduct. See Gov Bar R V 6(C). (In this regard, while the 
Court has expressly stated that prior disciplinary record includes failure to comply with 
attorney-registration requirements, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Larkin, 128 Ohio St.3d 368, 2011 
Ohio 762, 944 N.E.2d 669, it has also made clear that an interim felony suspension relating to the 
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charges under consideration does not constitute a prior disciplinary offense. Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Cantrell, 130 Ohio St.3d 46, 2011 Ohio 4554, 955 N.E.2d 950 (rejecting the Board’s contrary 
conclusion).) Nor can prior CLE noncompliance be considered for sanction purposes. See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Houser, 110 Ohio St.3d 203, 2006 Ohio 4246, 852 N.E.2d 724, discussed 
near the end of this subsection. 
Cooperation with the disciplinary process is required of all attorneys, including the respondent. See 
Gov Bar R V 4(G). Fulfillment of that obligation is a mitigating factor. BCGD Proc Reg 
10(B)(2)(d), see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Gideon, 104 Ohio St. 3d 418, 2004 Ohio 6587, 819 
N.E.2d 1103, at para. 8 (“extremely cooperative”), whereas failure to cooperate is an aggravating 
factor. BCGD Proc Reg 10(B)(1)(e). E.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson, 98 Ohio 
St.3d 181, 2002 Ohio 7088, 781 N.E.2d 212, at para. 11 (respondent’s conduct during disciplinary 
process was “the perfect example of how not to behave”). Note that “some cooperation” may not be 
enough, particularly if that cooperation gives way “to avoidance and denial.” Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Longino, 128 Ohio St.3d 426, 2011 Ohio 1524, 945 N.E.2d 1040, at paras. 31, 34. 
For a case in which “[n]one of the mitigating factors and all of the aggravating factors listed in BCGD 
Proc. Reg 10(B) [were] present,” see Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Jurczenko, 114 Ohio St.3d 
229, 2007 Ohio 3675. 871 N.E.2d 564, at para. 35 (disbarment imposed). Accord Cleveland Metro. 
Bar Ass’n v. Mishler, 127 Ohio St.3d 336, 2010 Ohio 5987, 939 N.E.2d 852. 
As is true regarding the sanction to be imposed, the Court, as might be expected, also has the last word 
on whether aggravating/mitigating factors do or do not exist in any given case. See, e.g., Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Simon, 128 Ohio St.3d 359, 2011 Ohio 627, 944 N.E.2d 660 (“Neither the parties nor 
the board has identified any aggravating factors weighing in favor of greater sanctions, but we find 
that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of misconduct.” Id. at para. 8.) Accord Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Simon-Seymour, 131 Ohio St.3d 161, 2012 Ohio 114, 962 N.E.2d 309 (the aggravating 
factors found by Court but not by Board; Court nevertheless approved recommended 
consent-to-discipline sanction of two years with six months stayed, even though respondent violated 
ten different disciplinary rules including “misappropriation of . . . estate funds endur[ing] for years”). 
There are instances in which obvious aggravating factors seem to go unnoticed. Thus in Toledo Bar 
Ass’n v. Sousher, 112 Ohio St.3d 533, 2007 Ohio 611, 861 N.E.2d 536, the Court stated that 
“[r]elator did not identify, and the board did not find, evidence of aggravating factors warranting 
severity.”  Id. at para. 32.  This was said in the face of respondent’s stipulated violation of multiple 
disciplinary rules in 14 separate courts, including passing bad checks and pleading guilty to two 
charges of forgery and one of identity theft.  Apparently relator and the Board (and the Court) chose to 
ignore the multiple-offense and pattern-of misconduct aggravating factors.  (The focus of the Court  
with respect to sanctions was directed at the “considerable mitigating effect” of respondent’s 
seemingly successful battle with alcohol and prescription-drug dependency.)  Id. at para. 30. In 
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. King, 109 Ohio St.3d 95, 2006 Ohio 1932, 846 N.E.2d 37, the 
respondent was under a prior indefinite suspension when charged with and found to have engaged in 
additional misconduct. In imposing a sanction, the Court noted that the Board had found as 
aggravating factors respondent’s lack of cooperation in the disciplinary process and failure to make 
restitution, BCGD Prac Reg 10(B)(1)(e) & (i). No mention was made of BCGD Proc Reg 
10(B)(1)(a), prior disciplinary offenses, even though the prior offense was acknowledged by the 
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Court when it changed the sanction from indefinite suspension to run concurrently with the prior 
suspension, as recommended by the Board, to indefinite suspension to run consecutively to the earlier 
suspension. A blatant disregard of the prior-offenses element occurred in Erie-Huron Counties 
Joint Certified Grievance Comm. v. Huber, 108 Ohio St.3d 338, 2006 Ohio 1066, 843 N.E.2d 
781. There was a long list of aggravating factors cited by the Board, but the list did not include prior 
disciplinary offenses, even though Huber had been disciplined twice before. Indeed, the majority 
quoted the Board’s citations of “respondent’s 50 years of legal practice as a mitigating factor.” Id. at 
para. 13. The Board nevertheless recommended an indefinite suspension. The Court, however, 
concluded that “a more lenient sanction” was appropriate because of “his long career in the legal 
profession,” id. at para. 15, never mentioning that during this “long career” he had twice been 
disciplined before. Dissenting, Chief Justice Moyer reasoned that the Board’s recommended 
indefinite suspension should have been imposed and had this to say about the majority’s reliance on 
respondent’s “long career”: 
The only reason cited by the majority for making an exception to our 
consistent sanctions for those attorneys who have engaged in conduct 
[neglect, misrepresentation to clients, failure to cooperate] similar to 
that of respondents (sic) is that he has a “long career in the legal 
profession.” That is a new standard. I can only hope that this is the sole 
case in which it will be applied as the reason for such leniency. 
Id. at para. 21.  In contrast to the King and Huber cases, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Jones, 112 
Ohio St.3d 46, 2006 Ohio 6367, 857 N.E.2d 1221, decided the same year, where the “prior 
disciplinary record” aggravating factor was found “[a]pparently because of respondent’s license 
suspension for failure to register.”  Id. at para. 20. 
Two cases decided the same day – December 22, 2010 – can be read as underscoring the importance 
of cooperation in the disciplinary process. In both cases, there were multiple violations involving 
multiple clients. In each case, respondent violated Rules 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.5(a), 1.16(d), (e), 8.1(b), 
8.4(d), 8.4(h). In Disciplinary Counsel v. Henry, 127 Ohio St.3d 398, 2010 Ohio 6206, 939 
N.E.2d 1255, the respondent was permanently disbarred. In Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Gresley, 
127 Ohio St.3d 430, 2010 Ohio 6208, 940 N.E.2d 945, the respondent received a two-year 
suspension with the last six months stayed on conditions, even though, in addition to the laundry list 
of violations listed above, Gresley also violated 1.4(a)(4), 1.15 and 8.4(e).  Also, the Court noted that 
Gresley had accepted fees but failed to perform the agreed legal work – a factor for which, according 
to the Court in Henry, the “presumptive sanction is disbarment” because it is “‘tantamount to theft of 
the fee . . . .’“ Henry, 2010 Ohio 6206, at para. 33. One possible basis for reconciling these two 
strikingly different and simultaneous sanction determinations is, despite his initial failure to 
cooperate in the investigation, Gresley’s “eventual cooperation in the disciplinary process through his 
stipulation of facts and misconduct,” Gresley, 2010 Ohio 6208, at para. 26, while Henry ignored the 
whole process. (Both the aggravating and the mitigating factors favored Gresley, but the difference 
was small.) 
Most disciplinary cases are decided per curiam without any syllabus stating the sanction to be applied 
in such cases. An exception occurred in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Greene, 74 Ohio St.3d 
13, 655 N.E.2d 1299 (1995). In Greene, Chief Justice Moyer, writing for a 4-3 majority, concluded 
47
Ohio Legal Ethics Introduction 
 
that the case presented the Court “with an opportunity to state a clear test that should be consistently 
applied in all cases where an officer of the court intentionally misrepresents a crucial fact to the court 
in order to effect a desired result to benefit a party.”  Id. at 15, 655 N.E.2d at 1301. (The respondent, 
an assistant county prosecutor, had lied to the court concerning the facts involved in a traffic charge 
case in order to obtain a dismissal of the charges.) As a result, the Court issued a syllabus stating that 
in such circumstances “the lawyer will be suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate 
period of time.” (Here, one year, with ten months stayed on conditions.) Dissenting, Justice Resnick 
argued that syllabus law is inappropriate in disciplinary cases, each of which should be decided on its 
particular facts. “[I]t certainly should not be this court’s place to announce in advance the sanction 
which will automatically be forthcoming from this court when a particular set of circumstances 
occurs.”  Id. at 18, 655 N.E.2d 1302. (A review of citing references to the Greene decision indicates 
that only two subsequent Supreme Court disciplinary cases have cited to the Greene syllabus 
language, although a few others have quoted comparable language from the opinion.) With respect to 
another noteworthy syllabus-rule disciplinary case, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 
74 Ohio St.3d 87, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995) (violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) – deceit, fraud, 
misrepresentation, etc., – will result in an actual suspension), the Fowerbaugh syllabus, is often, but 
not always, followed. See discussion in section 8.4:400 at “In general.” 
Although in most instances each case is decided upon it own facts, disciplinary case law does provide 
some guidance as to how the Court views certain types of misconduct and responds to aggravating 
and mitigating factors in determining sanctions. Not surprisingly, when the aggravating factors 
overwhelm any mitigation evidence, the penalty will be more severe. E.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Dadisman, 109 Ohio St.3d 82, 2006 Ohio 1929, 846 N.E.2d 26, at para. 39 (disbarment; “the 
multiplicity of offenses, the resulting harm caused to multiple clients, and respondent’s lack of 
cooperation in the disciplinary process all show that he is a danger to the public and is not fit to remain 
in the legal profession”). The opposite is true when mitigating factors predominate, as in Columbus 
Bar Ass’n v. Micciulla, 106 Ohio St.3d 19, 2005 Ohio 3470, 830 N.E.2d 332 (even though multiple 
offenses and pattern of misconduct, one-year stayed suspension imposed, given persuasive force of 
numerous mitigating factors, including being “very active in providing pro bono legal services to the 
homeless and the poor, . . . unselfishly devot[ing] many hours to these clients,”  id. at para. 23). 
Another decision in which the pro bono service of the respondent carried substantial weight in 
reducing the Board’s recommended sanction of 18 months with 12 months stayed to 18 months, all 
stayed, is Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Berk, 132 Ohio St.3d 82, 2012 Ohio 2167, 969 N.E.2d 
256. See id at paras. 24-28. For additional case law on the impact of aggravating/mitigating factors, 
see Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 
10.27 (1996). 
Since the death of former Chief Justice Moyer, there has been a marked decrease in dissenting 
opinions in disciplinary cases. (Moyer often thought the sanction imposed too lenient.) An exception 
to this trend is Disciplinary Counsel v. Talikka, 135 Ohio St.3d 323, 2013 Ohio 1012, 986 N.E.2d 
954, a case in which the justices had sharply different opinions about the appropriate sanction and 
which resulted in a 79-paragraph dissent by Chief Justice O’Conner; she was joined by Justices 
Lanzinger and French. 
The Talikka case is interesting and unusual in a number of respects. For example, the parties 
stipulated to the facts and misconduct and to an agreed two-year suspension with the second year 
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stayed on conditions. The Board, however, recommended an indefinite suspension. On appeal, both 
Talikka and Disciplinary Counsel objected to the sanction. 
The reason for the Board’s recommended increase was “the extensive nature of the misconduct and 
the harm caused to the eight affected clients . . . .” Id. at para. 4. Indeed Talikka conceded that he 
violated twelve different Rules of Professional Conduct, resulting in 38 separate violations. Among 
the violations, there were five violations of Rule 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation). The Court nevertheless rejected the Board’s indefinite suspension 
recommendations and adopted the sanction stipulated to by the parties and adopted by the panel – a 
two-year suspension with the second year stayed on condition that respondent make restitution to 
injured clients. 
This rather mild penalty drew the stinging dissent on sanctions from Chief Justice O’Connor. 
Describing the sanction imposed by the majority as “wholly inadequate,” the Chief Justice, in 
presenting a detailed catalog of Talikka’s violations, argued that an indefinite suspension would 
better fit the offense(s). For example, in the first count respondent accepted a $15,000 flat fee (which 
he improperly placed in his business operating account) to appeal a child-custody case for the client. 
He filed a notice of appeal, but failed to file an appellate brief. As a result, the court of appeals 
dismissed the appeal sua sponte. Respondent did not advise his client that her appeal had been 
dismissed. Not surprisingly, the client terminated Talikka and asked for most of her money back. 
Talikka returned no money until a court ordered him to do so. The check was drawn on respondent’s 
IOLTA account at First Merit Bank. “However, Topazio’s funds were not in Talikka’s First Merit 
IOLTA account. The funds in the First Merit account belonged to other clients.” Id. at para. 29. 
There are seven other counts reviewed by Chief Justice O’Connor in similar detail; they do not arouse 
much sympathy for the respondent.  
As for the five letters from judges attesting to Talikka’s good character and given significant weight 
by the majority, Chief Justice O’Connor “would afford very limited weight to these attestations” 
because “we cannot ignore that these accolades to Talikka’s honesty, professionalism, and zealous 
advocacy are not borne out in these eight cases and in fact may be outdated.” Id. at para. 100. 
The Chief Justice closed her dissent with the following words: 
It is baffling that despite the loss of tens of thousands of dollars 
belonging to his clients, repeated neglect of clients’ cases, and repeated 
incidents showing disrespect to clients and the oath Talikka took as an 
attorney, the majority fails to impose [an indefinite suspension] in this 
case. I must therefore dissent. 
Id. at para. 101. 
Numerous decisions involve mental-health concerns considered in mitigation. See BCGD Proc Reg 
10(B)(2)(g). On occasion, “compelling evidence of a mental disability” submitted in explanation of a 
respondent’s prior failure to answer relator’s complaint and in mitigation will cause the Court to grant 
a motion for remand and further proceedings on the appropriate sanction. This was the result in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. McShane, 121 Ohio St.3d 169, 2009 Ohio 746, 902 N.E.2d 980, where a 
recommended indefinite suspension was reduced by the Board on remand to a two-year stayed 
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suspension on conditions, based on the mitigating evidence of major depressive disorder, which 
resulted in a “paralysis of will” rendering respondent unable to act in the cases of two of his clients. 
The Supreme Court adopted the Board’s recommendation. Accord Butler County Bar Ass’n v. 
Portman, 121 Ohio St.3d 518, 2009 Ohio 1705, 905 N.E.2d 1203 (respondent’s motion to 
supplement record, filed after Board had submitted its report for Court review, granted by Court; on 
remand, initial recommended sanction of disbarment reduced to indefinite suspension based on 
supplemental mitigation evidence of mental disability and restitution; disability found to have made 
respondent initially powerless to respond and participate in disciplinary process). But McShane and 
Portman are the rare exceptions to the rule that supplements to the record, either before the Court or 
on remand to the Board, will be considered “only under the most exceptional circumstances.” 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Shaw, 126 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010 Ohio 4412, 935 N.E.2d 405 (motion for 
remand denied where respondent failed to appear at his first rehearing but was given a second chance 
to present his case; “[b]ecause he has had two opportunities to present mitigating evidence and has 
failed to demonstrate any exceptional circumstances warranting a remand, we will not grand 
respondent a third opportunity to present evidence in mitigation.” Id. at para. 21 (emphasis by the 
Court). 
An interesting discussion on clinical depression as a mitigating factor is found in Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Stidham, 87 Ohio St.3d 455, 721 N.E.2d 977 (2000). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Bowman, 110 Ohio St.3d 480, 2006 Ohio 4333, 854 N.E.2d 480 (“abhorrent” behavior, but 
sanction tempered because mental disability contributed to misconduct; two-year suspension; citing 
Stidham supra and Golden and Lowden infra); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Golden, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 230, 2002 Ohio 5934, 778 N.E.2d 564 (following Stidham; despite misconduct permeating 
practice, which would ordinarily call for disbarment, respondent’s misconduct resulted directly from 
clinical depression; Court willing to see if problem can be overcome with treatment; indefinite 
suspension imposed). Another mental-disability case involved a documented bipolar disorder that, in 
the Court’s words “did not merely impede his performance on his client’s behalf [resulting in multiple 
violations, including DR 1-102(A)(4)], it effectively prevented him from functioning at all in 
accordance with his professional oath. Because of this and respondent’s willingness to commit to 
treatment, we exercise lenience and tailor our sanction to help manage the disability while at the same 
time preserving the public’s trust in the legal profession,” Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Lowden, 105 Ohio 
St.3d 377, 2005 Ohio 2162, 826 N.E.2d 836, at para. 20 (stayed two-year suspension on condition 
that respondent continue his treatment and provide quarterly reports to relator about his progress 
during the suspension period). Accord Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Winkfield, 107 Ohio St.3d 360, 
2006 Ohio 6, 839 N.E.2d 924 (in situation where, because of “the seriousness of respondent’s mental 
disease and the professional and personal hardships it has caused,” only options were indefinite 
suspension or disbarment, “[w]e are thus persuaded to also give respondent the chance to prove 
himself in the future”; indefinite suspension imposed, id. at paras. 46, 56). The Lowden decision is 
noteworthy in another respect: it would appear that the Court, in a unanimous opinion and contrary to 
the earlier syllabus-rule cases such as Greene and Fowerbaugh, discussed above, has settled on the 
approach that “each case of professional misconduct must be decided on the unique facts and 
circumstances presented.” Id. at para. 19. 
The mental health mitigating factor is available, however, only if the respondent satisfies the 
conditions set forth in BCGD 10(B)(2)(g)(i-iv). Thus, even where the facts indicate that a mental 
disability might well be present, the failure to obtain the necessary diagnosis by a qualified mental 
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health professional precluded consideration of this mitigating factor in Disciplinary Counsel v. Noel, 
134 Ohio St.3d 157, 2012 Ohio 5456, 980 N.E.2d 1008 (respondent claimed stress and grief arising 
from discovering younger brother’s dead body but did not seek professional help). In contrast, the 
Court credited the opinion of a mental health professional in Disciplinary Counsel v. Hilburn, 133 
Ohio St.3d 1, 2012 Ohio 5528, 984 N.E.2d 940, even though presented by a certified nurse 
practitioner, rather than a doctor. At paras. 28-32 the Court explains the requisites of allowing such 
an opinion, looking particularly to ORC 4723.43(c) and its requirement of collaboration with a 
physician, which was satisfied in the Hilburn case. 
Note further that in accordance with BCGD 10(B)(2)(g)(iii), there must be “a sustained period of 
successful treatment.” Thus,  
[e]ven after [respondent] commenced treatment for her [gambling] 
addiction and other mental disorders, she continued to gamble and was 
not open or honest with her treating professionals about that 
gambling. . . . In the end, Williams plainly failed to sustain any period 
of successful treatment, and therefore her mental disorders cannot be 
considered as a mitigating factor under the board’s regulations, 
despite the testimony of three medical professionals presenting mental disorder mitigating evidence 
on her behalf.  Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 137 Ohio St.3d 112, 2013 Ohio 4006, 998 
N.E.2d 427, at para. 23. Nor can the (2)(g) mitigating factor be satisfied if there is no treatment for 
the condition, as where the respondent suffered from untreatable age-associated cognitive decline. 
Dayton Bar Ass’n v. O’Neal, 134 Ohio St.3d 361, 2012 Ohio 5634, 982 N.E.2d 692 (but condition 
considered mitigating under the “all relevant factors” language in BCGD 10(B)). Ironically, when it 
came to sanctions, O’Neal was given a two-year suspension with 18 months stayed and would be 
allowed reinstatement only if he submits evidence from a medical professional that he has completed 
a geriatric psychological assessment and is fit to return to the competent, ethical and professional 
practice.  This sets a high bar in respondent’s case, since the medical professional in the case at bar, a 
physician appointed by the panel to evaluate respondent, reported that respondent’s “cognitive 
impairment ‘likely’ impairs his ability to provide quality legal services.” Id. at para. 19. 
In some situations a link will exist between a recognized disability of an attorney and the misconduct 
that occurred. The presence of such a disability triggers Americans with Disabilities Act protections 
in some settings outside the disciplinary process, but the Act does not apply to limit the state’s 
authority to impose disciplinary sanctions for the misconduct.  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Komarek, 
84 Ohio St.3d 90, 702 N.E.2d 62 (1998) (ADA does not prevent the state from disbarring an attorney 
suffering from bipolar disorder). Nevertheless, as noted, the disability may be treated as a mitigating 
factor when considering the sanction to be imposed. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Zingarelli, 89 Ohio St.3d 210, 729 N.E.2d 1167 (2000) (panel and Board recommended permanent 
disbarment; Court noted that respondent’s bipolar disorder contributed to his misconduct and ordered 
indefinite suspension). 
BCGD Proc Reg 10(B)(2)(g) also deals with chemical dependency as a mitigating factor.  If drug 
and/or alcohol abuse is diagnosed by a health care professional; if it contributed to the misconduct; if 
treatment has been successful; and if there is a prognosis that the respondent will be able to return to 
the competent, ethical practice of law, these factors can be taken into account in mitigation.  Id. at 
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(g)(i)-(iv).  E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Friedman, 114 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007 Ohio 2477, 866 
N.E.2d 1076, at paras. 59-61 (“A two-year suspension with the final six months stayed will 
appropriately protect the public, provided that respondent continues his daily efforts at maintaining 
sobriety.”). 
While the great majority of disciplinary cases involve violation of disciplinary rules, sanctions can be 
imposed based solely on a failure to cooperate in the investigation. E.g., Cleveland Metro. Bar 
Ass’n v. Jaffe, 121 Ohio St.3d 260, 2009 Ohio 763, 903 N.E.2d 628 (only charge was violation of 
Gov Bar R V 4(G)). Another such case is Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. James, 109 Ohio St.3d 310, 2006 
Ohio 2424, 847 N.E.2d 438 (insufficient evidence of violation of disciplinary rules, but “utter lack of 
cooperation” violative of Gov Bar R V 4(G) called for one-year suspension). Compare Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Hofelich, 115 Ohio St.3d 14, 2007 Ohio 4269, 873 N.E.2d 821 (“pugnacious refusal to 
respond to relator’s inquiries”; but because respondent did answer complaint once filed and did 
participate in hearing, Court distinguished James and imposed only a six-month suspension). 
Obviously, if failure to cooperate can be a stand-alone violation, it can also be the basis (Cuyahoga 
County Bar Ass’n v. Poole, 120 Ohio St.3d 361, 2008 Ohio 6203, 899 N.E.2d 950) or a basis 
(Disciplinary Counsel v. Zigan, 118 Ohio St.3d 180, 2008 Ohio 1976, 887 N.E.2d 334) for a 
separate count of misconduct. (As previously mentioned, failure to cooperate is also an aggravating 
factor. BCGD Proc Reg 10(B)(1)(e)). For an instance in which failure to cooperate was invoked both 
as a disciplinary violation and as an aggravating factor, see Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Marosan, 
119 Ohio St.3d 113, 2008 Ohio 3882, 892 N.E.2d 447 (violation of Gov Bar V 4(G) and Rule 8.1). 
Compare Akron Bar Ass’n v. Fink, 131 Ohio St.3d 34, 2011 Ohio 6342, 959 N.E.2d 1045, 
involving violations of 8.4(d) and Gov BRV 4(G) for failure to cooperate (even though underlying 
grievance dismissed), but no aggravating factors found. DR 1-102(A)(5) & (6) have also been 
invoked with Gov Bar R V 4(G) for failure to cooperate, see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. 
McShane, 121 Ohio St.3d 169, 2009 Ohio 746, 902 N.E.2d 980, as under the Rules, have 8.4(d) & 
(h). See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabroff, 123 Ohio St.3d 182, 2009 Ohio 4205, 915 N.E.2d 
307. 
Violation of Governing Bar Rules other than that requiring cooperation in the investigation can also 
lead to sanction.  See Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Axner, 135 Ohio St.3d 241, 2013 Ohio 400, 
985 N.E.2d 1257 (failure to register with Office of Disciplinary Counsel when seeking to employ 
suspended attorney violated, inter alia, Gov Bar R V 8(G)); Disciplinary Counsel v. Proctor, 131 
Ohio St.3d 215, 2012 Ohio 684, 963 N.E.2d 806 (false and insulting remarks about judge violated 
not only Rules 3.5(a)(6) and 8.2(a), but also Gov Bar R IV 2 (requiring lawyers to maintain 
respectful attitude toward courts). Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabroff, supra (failure to inform court of 
suspension from practice violated Gov Bar R V 8(E); Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Spector, 121 
Ohio St.3d 271, 2009 Ohio 1155, 903 N.E.2d 637 (failure to update attorney registration records 
violated Gov Bar R VI 1(D); Disciplinary Counsel v. Houser, 110 Ohio St.3d 203, 2006 Ohio 
4246, 852 N.E.2d 724 (respondent sanctioned for violation of, inter alia, the biennial registration 
requirements of Gov Bar R VI 1(A)).   
The respondent in Houser also was charged with multiple violations of Gov Bar R X 3(A)(1) and 
(B)(1) (requiring an attorney to report 24 CLE credit hours biennially), for which she had been 
sanctioned previously.  The Court noted that violations of these two GBR provisions are treated 
differently in disciplinary proceedings brought pursuant to Gov Bar R V 8: 
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 We agree with the board that respondent violated the cited 
Disciplinary Rules and has a long history of failing to comply with our 
rules for attorney registration and CLE.  In determining the appropriate 
sanction for this misconduct, however, neither we nor the board may 
consider the facts that respondent was fined and suspended from 
practice for her violations of Gov.Bar R. X(3)(A)(1) and (B)(1) [CLE 
violations]. 
 Gov.Bar R. X(5)(C) specifically prohibits us from considering 
a sanction for respondent’s failure to comply with CLE requirements 
when we impose a sanction under Gov.Bar R. V(8).  In contrast, 
Gov.Bar R. VI, which addresses the registration of attorneys, does not 
contain a similar prohibition. 
Houser, at paras. 17-18 (failure to comply with GBR registration requirements considered, along 
with numerous other serious violations, in imposing disbarment). Query, however, whether the 
Court’s action in Disciplinary Counsel v. Alexander, 133 Ohio St.3d 232, 2012 Ohio 4575, 977 
N.E.2d 633, is consistent with Gov Bar R X 5(C). In Alexander, the Court noted, with no sign of 
disapproval, that the Board found two aggravating factors, one of which was that “he had not been in 
good standing with the Supreme Court of Ohio for failure to pay the penalty for noncompliance with 
CLE reporting requirements.” Id. at para. 9. This sounds an awful lot like considering a sanction 
imposed for violation of Gov Bar R X 5 CLE provisions in considering a sanction under Gov Bar R 
V 8 – which, pursuant to X 5(C), “shall not be considered.” 
If the Court enters an order sanctioning an attorney for misconduct, failure to comply with the order 
may result in a citation for contempt.  See, e.g., Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Jurczenko, 110 
Ohio St.3d 1449, 2006 Ohio 4000, 852 N.E.2d 195 (failure to comply with conditions of stay of 
second year of two-year suspension (see Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. Jurczenko, 106 Ohio St.3d 123, 
2005 Ohio 4101, 832 N.E.2d 720) resulted in contempt order revoking stay and incarceration for 
noncompliance, with jail term suspended on respondent’s compliance with conditions set by Court). 
In Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Jurczenko, 114 Ohio St.3d 229, 2007 Ohio 3675, 871 N.E.2d 
564, respondent was disbarred for his failure to comply with the prior order of suspension and for 
additional disciplinary violations. 
Disciplinary matters brought under Gov Bar R V can include proceedings against a justice of the 
Supreme Court or a judge (see Gov Jud R II and the Resnick case, which is discussed this section 
supra at “Hearing - The process”). (“Misconduct” under Gov Bar R V includes violation of the Code 
of Judicial Conduct, as well as the OHRPC. See Gov Bar R V 6(A)(1).) In addition, there is a special 
disciplinary mechanism applicable only to justices and judges set forth in Gov Jud R III. Pursuant 
thereto, a justice or judge can be removed or suspended for misdeeds of a generally more serious 
nature than those covered by Gov Bar R V. The bases for removal or suspension from office are 
listed in Gov Jud R III 1(B); section (B) incorporates by reference sanctionable conduct as provided 
in ORC 2701.12(A) (including “misconduct” involving moral turpitude or conviction of a crime 
involving moral turpitude) and then adds four more reasons triggering removal or suspension, 
including willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties and habitual intemperance. 
Retirement for disability (mental or physical) is covered by ORC 2701.12(B). The procedures 
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applicable in all such cases are set forth in Gov Jud R III and in ORC 2701.11. Anyone interested in 
the details of this curious and cumbersome mix of statute and Supreme Court rule should consult 
those provisions; they are treated also in Arthur F. Greenbaum, A Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio 
Code of Professional Responsibility §  10.42 (1996). 
Special disciplinary provisions - In general: In addition to the process outlined above, Gov Bar R V 
contains special disciplinary provisions for lawyers convicted of a felony or found in default under a 
child support order, lawyers who pose a threat of serious harm to the public, lawyers who fail to 
answer a formal disciplinary complaint, lawyers suffering from mental illness, and lawyers 
disciplined in a jurisdiction other than Ohio. See generally Arthur F. Greenbaum, Administrative 
and Interim Suspensions in the Lawyer Regulatory Process – A Preliminary Inquiry, 46 Akron 
L. Rev. ___ (2013). The rule also recognizes a role for alternative dispute resolution techniques to 
handle complaints that raise issues outside the purview of the OHRPC. Effective September 1, 2007, 
the procedure for retirement or resignation from practice was placed in Rule VI. See Gov Bar R VI 6 
and discussion of this section infra at “Special disciplinary provisions - Retirement or resignation 
from the practice of law.”. 
Special disciplinary provisions - Lawyers convicted of a felony or found in default under a child 
support order: Gov Bar R V 5 provides for interim suspensions for lawyers convicted of a felony or 
found in default under a child support order. The process is discussed in section 0.2:245, infra. 
Special disciplinary provisions - Interim remedial suspension: If the Disciplinary Counsel or an 
appropriate Certified Grievance Committee receives substantial, credible evidence that an attorney or 
judge has committed a disciplinary violation and poses a substantial threat of serious harm to the 
public, it may initiate procedures to secure an interim remedial suspension of the respondent. Gov 
Bar R V 5a(A). 
As a first step, the disciplinary authority must make a reasonable attempt to notify the respondent that 
a motion will be filed with the Ohio Supreme Court requesting an order for an interim remedial 
suspension. Gov Bar R V 5a(A)(1)(a). Next, the disciplinary authority will file a motion with the 
Court requesting such an order. The motion must include proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and should be accompanied by relevant evidence and a certificate of service. Gov Bar R V 
5a(A)(1)(b). The respondent may file a memorandum in opposition accompanied by rebuttal 
evidence. Gov Bar R V 5a(A)(2). 
If warranted, the Court will enter an immediate interim suspension or take such other action as it 
considers appropriate. Gov Bar R V 5a(B). For instances of application of the interim-suspension 
provision, see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Wickerham, 128 Ohio St.3d 1469, 2011 Ohio 2052, 
946 N.E.2d 229 (respondent subsequently found to have committed nearly 300 violations and was 
disbarred, 132 Ohio St.3d 205, 2012 Ohio 2580, 970 N.E.2d 932); Lorain County Bar Ass’n Legal 
Ethics & Grievance Comm. v. Hurst, 123 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2009 Ohio 5439, 914 N.E.2d 1059; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Lawson, 113 Ohio St.3d 1508, 2007 Ohio 2333, 866 N.E.2d 508. Gov Bar 
R V 5a(B) also provides that, if requested, the Court may order such a suspension even before the 
memorandum in opposition is filed. 
If an order of interim remedial suspension is entered, the respondent may move for its modification or 
dissolution through a motion contending that the respondent no longer poses a serious threat of harm 
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to the public. Such motions may be made within thirty days of entrance of the order or at a later time 
with leave of the Court. Gov Bar R V 5a(C)(1). A motion requesting dissolution also can be made if 
180 days have passed since entrance of the order and a formal complaint has yet to be filed with the 
Board pertaining to the alleged misconduct upon which the interim suspension was predicated. Gov 
Bar R V 5a(C)(2). The disciplinary authority is to be served with the motion and is given ten days 
from the date of its filing to enter a response. 
For a case in which a lawyer under interim remedial suspension was found in contempt of the 
suspension order, for appearing and arguing a matter pending before an administrative agency after 
the suspension order had been entered, see Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Smith, 100 Ohio St.3d 278, 
2003 Ohio 5751, 798 N.E.2d 592. 
Special disciplinary provisions – Interim default suspension: Such suspensions are provided for in 
Gov Bar R V 6a; the process is discussed in section 0.2:240 at “Hearing – Default; interim default 
suspension,” supra. 
Special disciplinary provisions - Mental illness suspension: Gov Bar R V 7 sets forth process for the 
suspension of lawyers suffering from mental illness. The Court may order a mental illness suspension 
if there is a complaint or answer alleging mental illness, supported by a certified copy of a journal 
entry of an adjudication of mental illness under ORC 5122.01 or if a hearing panel or the Board, upon 
its own motion or on motion of either party, ordered a medical or psychiatric examination and the 
Board concludes there is evidence that the respondent suffers from a mental illness. A case illustrating 
the Board ordering such an examination and the resulting mental illness suspension is Cleveland 
Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Polke, 135 Ohio St.3d 121, 2012 Ohio 5852, 984 N.E.2d 1045. Polke was 
subsequently found to be no longer mentally ill, and therefore his suspension was terminated pursuant 
to Gov Bar R V 7(F). Accord Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lawrence, 137 Ohio St.3d 299, 2013 Ohio 
4735, 998 N.E.2d 1161. 
For an instance in which invocation of the examination on motion of the relator resulted in a report of 
no mental illness, but possible mental health problems likely to impede respondent’s ability to 
practice within acceptable standards, see Akron Bar Ass’n v. Catanzarite, 119 Ohio St.3d 313, 
2008 Ohio 4063, 893 N.E.2d 835. Respondent, however, denied any such disability and made no 
attempt to avail himself of the mental illness mitigating factor of BCGD Proc Reg 10(B)(2)(g). As 
noted by the Court, “Mental illness generally constitutes a condition more debilitating than a 
mental-disability diagnosis under BCGD Proc Reg 10(B)(2)(g).” Id. at n.2. Mental illness 
suspensions are applicable only when a respondent proves mental illness at the time of the 
disciplinary action. See, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Fettner, 8 Ohio St.3d 17, 455 N.E.2d 1288 
(1983).  
The purpose of this provision is to provide an expedited procedure to suspend an attorney whose 
mental illness renders the attorney unable to represent his or her clients properly. Such a suspension 
stands apart from any disciplinary violations that may have occurred; it cannot be raised as claim 
preclusion in defense of any subsequent disciplinary proceeding.  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Komarek, 
84 Ohio St.3d 90, 702 N.E.2d 62 (1998). Accord Lawrence supra; Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. 
McClain, 99 Ohio St.3d 248, 2003 Ohio 3394, 791 N.E.2d 411 (citing Komarek). Justice Lundberg 
Stratton entered a powerful dissent in McClain. See id. at paras. 14-29. For a case in which the same 
justice in dissent argued that the mental-illness suspension process should have been used, see 
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Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Maybaum, 112 Ohio St.3d 93, 2006 Ohio 6537, 858 N.E.2d 359, 
at para. 34. 
The Lawrence case reflects the somewhat draconian nature of the mental illness suspension as it 
relates to disciplinary proceedings; even if the misconduct occurred when suffering from or as a result 
of the mental illness, that is no defense. In Lawrence, respondent, as a result of an operation in 
August 2002, suffered a brain injury “that left her with significant cognitive deficits.” Id. at para. 2. 
With one exception, all of her acts of misconduct occurred after the operation but nevertheless were 
characterized by the Court as violations that “intentionally prejudiced or damaged more clients during 
the course of her representation.” Id. at para. 28 (emphasis supplied). She received a one-year 
suspension, after having served a seven-year mental illness suspension. One further, rather odd 
footnote to the Lawrence case: “While the panel found her competent to represent herself in the 
pending disciplinary matter, it ultimately determined that she is not presently competent to practice 
law.” Id. at para. 6. A few paragraphs later, the Supreme Court recited the panel’s conclusion that 
she was not competent to return to the practice as being based, at least in part, on its noting of “several 
missteps in her handling of her own disciplinary case,” id. at para. 25—a performance difficult to 
reconcile with the panel’s finding that she was competent to represent herself in the disciplinary 
proceeding. 
The Clerk of the Supreme Court mails copies of mental illness suspension orders just as in other 
disciplinary cases. The orders are not published, however, even though they are considered matters of 
public record. See Gov Bar R V 7(E). The suspension order may be terminated on the respondent’s 
application showing removal of the cause of the suspension. See Gov Bar R V 7(F). 
Disciplinary suspensions sometimes involve issues relating to mental illness of an attorney. Serious 
misconduct of an attorney with a mental illness may warrant a disciplinary suspension, rather than a 
mental illness suspension. See Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Cregan, 62 Ohio St.3d 444, 584 
N.E.2d 656 (1992). In some disciplinary proceedings, mental illness may be considered a mitigating 
factor in determining what sanction should be imposed, but is not intended to be used by a respondent 
to avoid punishment. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zingarelli, 89 Ohio St.3d 210, 729 
N.E.2d 1167 (2000). If psychiatric problems do not interfere with representation of clients, a 
disciplinary suspension, stayed with probation, may be ordered. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Pridemore, 28 Ohio St.3d 106, 502 N.E.2d 635 (1986). Alcoholism may be considered as a 
mitigating factor, but it is not considered a mental illness under the mental-illness provisions of Gov 
Bar R V 7. See Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Roest, 54 Ohio St.2d 95, 455 N.E.2d 1288 (1978). 
Mental illness as a mitigating factor in disciplinary proceedings is covered in BCGD Proc Reg 
10(B)(2)(g)(i)-(iv). Pursuant thereto, mental illness “may be considered in favor of recommending a 
less severe sanction,” where there has been (i) professional diagnosis of the lawyer’s condition, (ii) it 
has been determined that the condition contributed to the misconduct, (iii) there has been a sustained 
period of successful treatment, and (iv) there is a professional prognosis that the lawyer will be able to 
return to competent, ethical professional practice. In the Maybaum case, cited above, Justice 
Lundberg Stratton in dissent read the majority opinion as one in which the respondent’s mental illness 
was used in aggravation, not mitigation; the Court adopted the board’s recommendation to impose an 
indefinite suspension, rather than the two-year suspension with 18 months stayed recommended by 
the panel.  See 112 Ohio St.3d 93, at para. 33.  (For a case in which the Court rejected respondent’s 
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assertion of the mental illness mitigation factor, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007 Ohio 5251, 875 N.E.2d 935 (respondent’s medical evidence of attention-deficit 
disorder failed to explain respondent’s submission of false evidence – fabricating one or more letters 
to his client to cover up his neglect)). 
An interesting case involving the fourth prong of the mental illness mitigation factor is Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Ridenbaugh, 122 Ohio St.3d 583, 2009 Ohio 4091, 913 N.E.2d 443. In Ridenbaugh 
the respondent satisfied the first three conditions, but the Court was not persuaded that his experts 
provided clear and convincing evidence on the fourth aspect: that respondent “will be able to return to 
competent, ethical professional practice under specified conditions.” (Emphasis added.) In the 
Court’s view there was “too much equivocation in Dr. Levine’s optimism for respondent’s immediate 
future.” Id. at para. 33. Even though BCGD Proc. Reg 10(B)(2)(g)(iv) uses “will” in its formulation, 
the Court emphasized, more than once, that respondent had not made the case that he was “currently 
capable of returning to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law.” Id. (emphasis added). 
The point was reiterated when the Court quoted from Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 116 Ohio 
St.3d 64, 2007 Ohio 5635, 876 N.E.2d 556, at para. 84: 
“Evidence suggesting that the lawyer may be able to practice 
competently and in accordance with ethical and professional standards 
is not nearly enough. Our cases show that a lawyer whose diagnosed 
mental disability has contributed to his misconduct must provide 
competent proof that the disability symptoms are fully managed 
currently.” 
122 Ohio St.3d 583, at para. 38 (emphases in original, even though Ridenbaugh Court says 
“Emphasis added in part”). 
In Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Minamyer, 129 Ohio St.3d 433, 2011 Ohio 3642, 953 N.E.2d 315, 
after remand by the Court directing consideration of respondent’s mental health conditions arising 
from a service-related incident in the Indian Ocean in 2002, the panel “reluctantly” concluded that 
these conditions constituted a mitigating factor. Respondent was suspended for one year, all stayed on 
conditions. In contrast to the days of Chief Justice Moyer, who not infrequently provided a dissenting 
or concurring opinion of his own, Minamyer is one of the few disciplinary decisions in the past year 
or so in which the Court was something other than unanimous. Four justices agreed that the 
appropriate sanction was a stayed one-year suspension; three justices thought it should have been a 
two-year stayed suspension. And one of the justices in the majority, Lundberg Stratton, wrote a 
lengthy concurrence attempting to confront the reality of post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic 
brain injury and their impact on an affected respondent and the disciplinary proceedings in which they 
are involved. In her words, 
[t]his case is symbolic of the problem that many veterans face as they 
return from war with TBI/PTSD. 
*   *   *   * 
 I believe that the examining psychiatrist failed in his duty to 
adequately address the effects of respondent’s PTSD/TBI on his fitness 
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to practice law and that the board failed to understand and appreciate 
the effects of PTSD and TBI on respondent’s behavior and his ability to 
cope. 
*   *   *   * 
 
Rather than addressing how respondent’s health and mental-health 
diagnoses affected his practice of law, the hearing [on remand before 
the Board] seemed to focus more on the consternation of the panel and 
the relator regarding respondent’s initial lack of participation in the 
disciplinary process.  
Id. at paras. 28, 72, 54 (bracketed material added). In concurring in the sanction, including the 
“monitored-probation portion of the sanction” (limitation of his practice; following instructions of his 
treating professionals; and committing no further misconduct), Justice Lundberg Stratton expressed 
the “hope that the monitoring of his compliance is done with a full appreciation and understanding of 
his wounds of war.” Id. at para. 77. Justice Lundberg Stratton further elaborates on the mental health 
issue and Ohio’s response to it in Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton & Kristina L. Hawk, 
Attorney Discipline and Mental Health Issues: A View from the Bench, Clev. Metro. B.J., Nov. 
2011, at 30. 
Special disciplinary provisions - Reciprocal discipline: Discipline in another jurisdiction is the basis 
for reciprocal discipline in Ohio.  E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Glover, 116 Ohio St.3d 1202, 2007 
Ohio 6031, 876 N.E.2d 576 (permanent disbarment in Delaware; permanent disbarment imposed in 
Ohio). An attorney licensed in Ohio must notify the Disciplinary Counsel and the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court within thirty days after the issuance of a disciplinary order in another jurisdiction. 
Upon notification of the action, the Disciplinary Counsel must obtain a certified copy of the 
disciplinary order and file it with the Clerk. See Gov Bar R V 11(F)(1). 
The Court then issues a show-cause order directing the attorney to notify the Court, within twenty 
days of the service of the notice, of any reason why identical or comparable discipline would be 
unwarranted. See Gov Bar R V 11(F)(2). Within thirty days after service of the notice, the Court will 
impose identical or comparable discipline, unless the attorney proves by clear and convincing 
evidence that there was a lack of jurisdiction or fraud in the other disciplinary proceeding, or that the 
misconduct warrants substantially different discipline in Ohio. See Gov Bar R V 11(F)(4)(a). 
Without such proof, a final disciplinary order in another jurisdiction conclusively establishes the 
misconduct for an Ohio disciplinary proceeding. See Gov Bar R V 11(F)(5). 
Reciprocal discipline may be imposed even if the term of discipline imposed in the other jurisdiction 
has expired. See Gov Bar R V 11(F)(4)(b). But, if it has been stayed, any reciprocal discipline 
imposed in Ohio will be deferred until the stay expires. Gov Bar R V 11(F)(3). The filing in the 
United States Supreme Court of a petition for certiorari challenging the decision rendered in the initial 
forum does not trigger this provision.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Hine, 80 Ohio St.3d 448, 
687 N.E.2d 420 (1997). 
The Ohio Supreme Court may make its determination based on the pleadings filed, or may permit or 
require briefs or a hearing, or both. See Gov Bar R V 11(F)(7). The Court may enhance the sanction 
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if an attorney fails to self-report the action to the Disciplinary Counsel and the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court. Gov Bar R V 11(F)(6). See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Webster, 99 Ohio St.3d 92, 
2003 Ohio 2459, 789 N.E.2d 191, for a case in which Chief Justice Moyer, in a persuasive dissent, 
invoked Gov Bar R V 11(F)(6), among other reasons, in arguing that indefinite suspension, the 
sanction most comparable to Rhode Island’s “disbarment,” should be enhanced to permanent 
disbarment in Ohio. 
Note that for purposes of reciprocal discipline, “another jurisdiction” may include a federal court or 
other federal agency or department, as well as another state. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Porter, 97 Ohio St.3d 1221, 2002 Ohio 6774, 779 N.E.2d 1043 (public reprimand by the 
district court for the Northern District of Ohio); Disciplinary Counsel v. Knuth, 119 Ohio St.3d 
1201, 2008 Ohio 3810, 891 N.E.2d 343 (three-year suspension imposed by U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office). But see Disciplinary Counsel v. Lapine, 128 Ohio St.3d 87, 2010 Ohio 6151, 942 N.E.2d 
328 (SEC not a “jurisdiction” for purposes of reciprocal discipline under Gov Bar R V 11(F)).  This 
issue is more fully discussed in section 8.5:200. 
Note further that since GovBarR V 11(F) calls for the imposition of discipline that is “identical or 
comparable” to that imposed in the other jurisdiction, reciprocal discipline may consist of a sanction 
that is not available under the Ohio sanction scheme. E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Nicotera, 135 
Ohio St.3d 1233, 2013 Ohio 247, 985 N.E.2d 510 (respondent disbarred in New York; suspended in 
Ohio for seven years, with no reinstatement until respondent is reinstated in New York); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Lackrone, 119 Ohio St.3d 1207, 2008 Ohio 4567, 893 N.E.2d 505 (suspended until 
further order of the court in Tennessee; respondent suspended in Ohio until reinstated in Tennessee); 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Ankerman, 98 Ohio St.3d 1205, 2003 Ohio 503, 782 N.E.2d 
1161 (as result of three-year suspension in Connecticut, respondent suspended for three years in 
Ohio). See Disciplinary Counsel v. Barnes, 126 Ohio St.3d 1203, 2010 Ohio 3400, 930 N.E.2d 
321 (indefinite suspension; no petition for reinstatement until expiration of five years; although not 
spelled out in either the Ohio opinion or the Massachusetts summary disposition, this is in accordance 
with Massachusetts S.Jud.Ct. R. 4:01, §18(2)(b), which provides that lawyer indefinitely suspended 
cannot apply for reinstatement until three months prior to five years from effective date of order).  For 
additional discussion of reciprocal discipline, see section 8.5:200. 
Special disciplinary provisions - Alternative dispute resolution: Gov Bar R V 3(C) permits certified 
grievance committees to adopt and use mediation, office-practice monitoring, and other means of 
alternative dispute resolution developed by the Board to handle allegations of client dissatisfaction 
that do not constitute disciplinary violations. The mediators and ADR facilitators may not be 
members of or subject to the jurisdiction of the certified grievance committee. The certified grievance 
committees are to report the results of the alternative dispute procedures to the Board. See Gov Bar R 
V 3(C)(1)(g). 
Special disciplinary provisions – Retirement or resignation from the practice of law: Effective 
September 1, 2007, Gov Bar R VI 6 (renumbered VI 7 effective January 1, 2013) sets forth the 
procedures for both retirement (formerly in Gov Bar R VI 3) and resignation (formerly in Gov Bar R 
V 11(G)) from the practice of law in Ohio. (The age 65 requirement for retirement in former Gov Bar 
R VI 3 has been eliminated.) As an initial step the attorney must file a notarized affidavit containing 
some core information (e.g., attorney registration number, date of birth) and attesting that he or she 
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does want to retire or resign from practice and recognizes the consequences of doing so -- that the act 
is irrevocable and completely divests the individual of all rights and privileges accorded attorneys. 
Gov Bar R VI 7(A)(1).  
The big news here is that, in contrast to retirement under former Gov Bar Rule VI 3(A), pursuant to 
which the retired attorney could reapply for active status, retirement is now “irrevocable”; if a lawyer 
takes retired status under Gov Bar R VI 7(A), there is no going back.  (The amendment is briefly 
discussed in Eugene P. Whetzel, Change as a Constant: Review of the Judicial Code and Other 
Clarifications, Ohio Law., Sept./Oct. 2007, at 28).  This change renders moot the sanction in cases 
such as Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Greenberg, 112 Ohio St.3d 138, 2006 Ohio 6519, 858 N.E.2d 400, 
where the Court ordered an 18-month suspension to be imposed if and when the respondent, who had 
taken retired status, should choose to resume active status. (The Greenberg case is also discussed in 
section 8.3:200.) The attorney also must sign a written waiver allowing Disciplinary Counsel to 
review all records pertaining to any grievances filed against the attorney and to disclose any of that 
information, including information that otherwise would be private, in a report to the Ohio Supreme 
Court. Gov Bar R VI 7(A)(2). 
Upon receipt of these documents, the Office of Attorney Registration and CLE is to refer the matter to 
Disciplinary Counsel for review and recommendation that culminates in a written report, filed under 
seal, with the Attorney Registration Office. Disciplinary Counsel may recommend that the 
resignation be accepted, denied, or delayed. If the application is accepted, Disciplinary Counsel must 
also indicate whether the attorney should be designated as retired or as resigned with disciplinary 
action pending. If the recommendation is to delay or deny, the report is to set forth the reasons for the 
recommendation. Gov Bar R VI 7(B). 
The Office of Attorney Registration and CLE then shall either:  
(1) accept the application and designate the attorney as retired if the report so recommends; or, 
(2) if the report recommends acceptance with a designation of resigned with disciplinary action 
pending or if the report recommends denial or deferral of the application, the application and report 
are to be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
Gov Bar R VI 7(B)(1) & (2). 
The Supreme Court, upon receipt and consideration of an application filed pursuant to division (B)(2), 
shall enter such order as it deems appropriate.  An order accepting an application to resign shall 
indicate that the resignation is with disciplinary action pending.  Gov Bar R VI 7(C).  If the 
application to resign is not accepted, the appropriate sanction will be imposed if the offer to resign is 
an effort to evade sanction.  See Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 112 Ohio St.3d 90, 2006 Ohio 6506, 
858 N.E.2d 356 (respondent disbarred). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Lentes, 120 Ohio St.3d 
431, 2008 Ohio 6355, 900 N.E.2d 167, at para. 6: “This rule does not exist to allow lawyers to 
exhaust the participants and procedures of the disciplinary system in hope of ultimately evading the 
recommended sanction. Lawyers resorting to resignation during disciplinary proceedings should 
therefore resign at the beginning of the proceedings.” 
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This principle was invoked in Disciplinary Counsel v. Terbeek, 135 Ohio St.3d 458, 2013 Ohio 
1912, 989 N.E.2d 55, where the Court rejected respondent’s attempt to retire, because “Terbeek 
waited until his disciplinary proceedings were almost complete before tendering his application for 
resignation. At this late stage of the proceedings, the public will not benefit from his resignation. 
Therefore, we find that he has forfeited his opportunity to resign.” Id. at para. 18. Instead, he was 
permanently disbarred. 
Duties of a disciplined attorney: If an attorney is disbarred or suspended, the attorney must inform his 
clients, opposing counsel and tribunals before which he has actions pending of that fact. Certain steps 
also must be taken to protect the clients’ interests. See Gov Bar R V 8(E). Violation of this rule is 
ground for sanction. E.g., Trumbull County Bar Ass’n v. Braun, 133 Ohio St.3d 541, 2012 Ohio 
5136, 979 N.E.2d 326 (held in contempt for failure to comply with Gov Bar R V 8(E)(1)(d)(3), 
requiring respondent to file affidavit of compliance with suspension order); Cuyahoga County Bar 
Ass’n v. Freedman, 119 Ohio St.3d 571, 2008 Ohio 5220, 895 N.E.2d 837 (violation of order 
entered pursuant to Gov Bar R V(8)(E)(1)(c), directing respondent to refund unearned fees and 
return client files; conduct also violated DR 9-102(B)(4); six-month suspension imposed); 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Schwieterman, 115 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007 Ohio 4266, 873 N.E.2d 810 
(misconduct included failure to notify client of suspension in violation of Gov Bar R V 8(E)(1)(a); 
indefinite suspension). Where necessary, another attorney may be appointed to inventory the files and 
protect the clients’ interests if the disbarred or suspended attorney does not do so. See Gov Bar R V 
8(F). 
In addition to the obligations imposed by Gov Bar R V 8(E), a disciplined lawyer must comply with 
the Court’s order, if any, to pay costs. The failure to do so will prompt an order that respondent show 
cause why she had not complied. The failure to show cause will result in a contempt finding, 
revocation of any stays, and suspension until granted reinstatement by the Court, E.g., Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Lape, 135 Ohio St.3d 1302, 2013 Ohio 1533, 987 N.E.2d 693; Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Seibel, 135 Ohio St.3d 1305, 2013 Ohio 1531, 987 N.E.2d 695. Sometimes this process can proceed 
from bad to worst. In Disciplinary Counsel v. Fletcher, 135 Ohio St.3d 404, 2013 Ohio 1510, 987 
N.E.2d 678, the respondent was found in contempt for failure to pay costs. Although he later did pay 
the costs, he did not file an affidavit of compliance as required by the order, and he never filed an 
application for reinstatement. “Thus his suspension remains in effect.” Id. at para. 1.  Nevertheless 
he continued to represent two clients during this period and also commenced representation of a third 
client (without the required notifications of suspension to clients and opposing counsel). The result 
was permanent disbarment, the presumptive sanction for continuing to practice when under 
suspension. 
 
If the suspended lawyer seeks reinstatement and in the affidavit accompanying his application falsely 
states that he has discharged the obligations imposed upon him or her by the suspension order, such 
conduct violates Rule 3.3(a)(1). See Trumbull County Bar Ass’n v. Large, 134 Ohio St.3d 172, 
2012 Ohio 5482, 980 N.E.2d 1021. 
 
Can a suspended attorney collect fees for work done prior to the suspension? It would appear so, so 
long as the lawyer can demonstrate that the fees were in fact earned. The court so held in Elsass v. 
Peterman, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2214 (Franklin), in deciding a fee dispute between the two 
lawyer parties. The contract between the parties called for the defendant to pay to plaintiff (for whom 
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she was employed and who paid her a salary) 75% of the fees she brought in. Plaintiff was suspended 
on December 20, 1995; defendant continued the practice and collected $16,000 thereafter for work 
done prior to the suspension date. In holding that Elsass was entitled to 75% of the $16,000 earned 
prior to his suspension, the court found that “plaintiff could only be paid for work done during the 
time he had a valid license.” Id. at *3. The court stated further that 
 
plaintiff is legally entitled to seventy-five percent of defendant’s account receivables collected, 
following termination of their agreement, for services rendered prior to December 20, 
1995 . . . . Nor does plaintiff’s suspension ethically preclude his entitlement to fees collected 
for services rendered prior to December 20, 1995. Columbus Bar Ass’n Advisory Opinion 
89-002 (May 17, 1989), 89-002 (stating that “[a] lawyer may share fees with a suspended or 
disbarred lawyer if the fee-sharing agreement were made prior to the suspension or 
disbarment and the fee is divided on the basis of work performed prior to the suspension or 
disbarment.”) 
Id. at *9. And see Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Farmer, 111 Ohio St.3d 137, 2006 Ohio 5342, 855 
N.E.2d 560, where the Court suspended a lawyer for two years, with one year suspended on condition 
that he return to his former clients all but $1,000 of the fees paid to him for work done prior to his 
suspension (and his discharge by the client). Implicit in this conclusion is that the respondent was 
allowed to retain the $1,000 because it was earned, albeit in the matters in which respondent’s 
misconduct resulted in suspension. Note further that the Court used the quantum meruit analysis used 
in withdrawal or discharge cases; even though the issue whether the suspension should be an 
independent basis for denying respondent the right to the $1,000 was not specifically raised, the 
withdrawal/discharge analysis seems appropriate in the circumstance and the result the correct one. 
When the Court imposes a suspension from practice, the order may include a period for practice while 
under probation. Gov Bar R V 9 governs probationary procedures. 
Disbarment and voluntary retirement or resignation from the bar are permanent; the lawyer may never 
regain her license. See Gov Bar R VI 6(A). If a lawyer is suspended or is on inactive status, he or she 
may apply for reinstatement. If the lawyer received a suspension for a definite time period, from six 
months to two years, the lawyer may make a written application for reinstatement at the end of the 
period. A lawyer subject to an indefinite suspension must petition for reinstatement, but cannot do so 
until two years after entry of the order of indefinite suspension. Gov Bar R V 10 details the process, 
which is discussed in the following paragraphs. Moreover, a suspended lawyer must comply with the 
additional CLE requirements imposed by Gov Bar R X 3(G). See Frazier supra, at para. 48 (failure 
to do so considered in aggravation). 
Reinstatement - In general: After completing a suspension from the practice of law, an attorney may 
apply for reinstatement. There are two different reinstatement procedures. An application for 
reinstatement is typically used after a suspension for a definite time period of six months to two years. 
A more rigorous petition procedure is required for reinstatement after an indefinite suspension. 
Reinstatement - Application for reinstatement after suspension for definite time period or dissolution 
of interim remedial suspension: An application for reinstatement may be made on completion of a 
suspension ordered for a period of time from six months to two years or dissolution of a Rule V 5a 
interim remedial suspension. The suspended attorney must make a written application to the Clerk of 
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the Supreme Court of Ohio, accompanied by an affidavit indicating whether the respondent has any 
formal disciplinary proceedings pending, and whether he or she has complied with continuing legal 
education requirements. Gov Bar R V 10(A). The Supreme Court will order reinstatement if the 
respondent has paid all costs of the proceedings as ordered by the Court, complied with the terms of 
the suspension order, complied with the continuing legal education requirements, has no formal 
disciplinary proceedings pending, and has completed any term of probation or other sanction imposed 
as part of a sentence for conviction of a felony. The Clerk provides notice of the reinstatement to the 
person or organizations that received copies of the suspension order. Id. 
The Court addressed the interaction of federal and state law in the context of suspension for a definite 
time period in Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Gerren, 110 Ohio St.3d 297, 2006 Ohio 4482, 853 N.E.2d 302.  
In imposing the sanction of an 18-month suspension, with the last six months stayed on respondent’s 
payment of restitution, the Court held that if the debt upon which restitution is premised were to be 
discharged in bankruptcy, then the restitution condition would be inoperative, pursuant to 11 USC 
§ 525(a).  See 110 Ohio St.3d 297, at para. 23. For further discussion of the reinstatement/ 
restitution/bankruptcy discharge issue, see the discussion of Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Gay in the next 
subsection. 
Another aspect of reinstatement after a definite-term suspension was referred to in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Carlson, 111 Ohio St.3d 281, 2006 Ohio 5707, 855 N.E.2d 1218.  Carlson noted that a 
lawyer such as respondent, who had been suspended for a two-year term, could apply for 
reinstatement only if no formal disciplinary proceedings were pending at the time of the application. 
Id. at para. 13, citing Gov Bar R V 10(A)(4), now Gov Bar R V 10(A)(2)(d). 
Reinstatement - Petition for reinstatement after indefinite suspension: A Gov Bar R V10(C) petition 
for reinstatement by an attorney serving an indefinite suspension may not be filed until at least two 
years after either of the following: (1) the entry of the order suspending the attorney from the practice 
of law, but the two-year time period may include credit for time served under an interim suspension, 
or (2) the denial of a petition for reinstatement. Gov Bar R V 10(B). The contents of the petition must 
include, among other things, “[t]he facts upon which the petitioner relies to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that he or she possesses all the mental, educational, and moral qualifications that 
were required of an applicant for admission to the practice of law in Ohio at the time of his or her 
original admission and that he or she is now a proper person to be readmitted to the practice of law in 
Ohio, notwithstanding the previous disciplinary action.” Gov Bar R V 10(C)(5). 
Note that in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Lockhart, 95 Ohio St.3d 135, 2002 Ohio 1758, 766 N.E.2d 596, 
respondent’s petition for reinstatement was denied after she failed to notify the Court that, at the time 
she verified the petition stating that she possessed the requisite moral qualifications, she was under 
indictment for felony theft, a charge that resulted in a guilty plea to the lesser offense of petty theft. 
The lawyer in Lockhart had been suspended for two years, with one year stayed. As such, it would 
seem that the reinstatement application procedure of Gov Bar R V 10(A), not the 10(C) verified 
petition procedure for those under indefinite suspension, should have been applicable. Although the 
Court did not comment on this in Lockhart, there are instances in which the Court expressly directs 
that the more rigorous reinstatement procedure of Gov Bar R 10(C) be imposed “to ensure that 
respondent is not permitted to return to the practice of law prematurely,” even though the sanction 
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imposed was less than an indefinite suspension. E.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Greenberger, 113 
Ohio St.3d 162, 2007 Ohio 1255, 863 N.E.2d 167, at para. 6.  
Unless denied forthwith for insufficiency of form or substance, the clerk forwards the respondent’s 
petition for reinstatement to the secretary of the Board. A panel of the Board conducts a hearing to 
accept and report evidence regarding the rehabilitation of the petitioner, and his or her possession of 
the mental, educational, and moral qualifications required. Gov Bar R V 10(F), (G)(1). The 
petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence, to the satisfaction of the panel, that he or 
she has made appropriate restitution to persons harmed by the misconduct, that he or she possesses all 
the mental, educational, and moral qualifications that were required of an applicant for admission to 
the practice of law at the time of his or her original admission, that he or she has complied with the 
continuing legal education requirements, and that the petitioner is now a proper person to be 
readmitted to the practice of law in Ohio. Gov Bar R V 10(E). For a case granting a petition for 
reinstatement on conditions, in which a divided Court concluded that a restitution requirement cannot 
be enforced when the debt has been discharged in bankruptcy, previously imposed as a reinstatement 
condition when respondent was indefinitely suspended (68 Ohio St.3d 190, 625 N.E.2d 593 (1994)), 
see Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Gay, 94 Ohio St.3d 404, 763 N.E.2d 585 (2002). At issue in Gay was 
the impact of 11 USC § 525(a) on Gay’s petition for reinstatement, which had been conditioned upon 
his paying restitution. The Court concluded that the federal provision precluded enforcement of the 
restitution condition, inasmuch as Gay’s debts had been discharged in bankruptcy. Dissenting, Judge 
Lundberg Stratton argued that, given the other public interests (protection of the public; rehabilitation 
of the attorney) advanced by enforcing the restitution condition, a denial of reinstatement would not 
be “solely because” (as the statutory language requires) of Gay’s failure to pay a discharged debt. The 
issue was reprised in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Hales, 120 Ohio St.3d 340, 2008 Ohio 6201, 899 N.E.2d 
130, with Justice Lundberg Stratton once again asserting in solitary dissent that 11 USC 525(a) did 
not preclude the Court from including restitution as a condition of reinstatement in its suspension 
order, even though (unlike Gay) the debt had already been discharged in bankruptcy at the time the 
order was entered. See also Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Dawson, 124 Ohio St.3d 22, 2009 Ohio 
5959, 918 N.E.2d 519, where the Hales case was distinguished on the sanctions point in that, while 
the respondent in both cases filed for bankruptcy and thereby discharged debts to clients, Dawson, 
unlike Hales, “entered into the settlement with his clients in good faith and did not intend to discharge 
the obligation in bankruptcy.” Id. at para. 20. The Gay/Hales issue regarding the effect of 
bankruptcy on restitution as a condition of reinstatement was not revisited by Justice Lundberg 
Stratton or any other member of the Court; reinstatement conditions were not addressed. 
Reinstatement hearings are public. Interested persons, members of the bar, and the Disciplinary 
Counsel are permitted to appear before the hearing panel in support of or in opposition to the 
reinstatement. Gov Bar R V 10(G)(2). Usually the relator in the original disciplinary matter speaks 
for or against reinstatement. In matters relating to the petitioner’s qualifications that are sufficiently 
serious and complex, certified grievance committees may request the assistance of the Disciplinary 
Counsel. Gov Bar R V 10(G)(3). 
After the hearing, the panel makes its findings of fact and recommendations in a certified report 
presented to the Board. Gov Bar R V 10(G)(4). The Board may recommend the denial of a petition 
for reinstatement, in which case the petitioner has ten days from receipt of the notice to file with the 
Court objections and a brief in support of the objections. Gov Bar R V 10(G)(5). The Board may 
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instead recommend reinstatement, in which case objections and a brief supporting the objections may 
be filed with the Court within ten days by any person or organization entitled to receive copies of the 
disciplinary order, the bar association of the county in which the petitioner resides at the time of filing 
the petition, each county in which the petitioner proposes to maintain an office if reinstated, and the 
Ohio State Bar Association. Gov Bar R V 10(G)(6). In recommending reinstatement, the Board may 
suggest to the Court that reinstatement be conditioned on the petitioner taking and passing the bar 
examination. Gov Bar R V 10(G)(5). The Supreme Court enters the final order in all reinstatement 
matters. Gov Bar R V 10(G)(6). 
Reinstatement – From inactive to active status: As might be suspected, the reinstatement process here 
is much more informal and less rigorous than for a suspended lawyer. A lawyer desiring to return to 
active status can do so online by going to www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ASW, and following the 
instructions for changing registration status and paying the $350.00 fee. (Oddly, this process seems 
not to be set forth anywhere in the Rules for the Government of the Bar, or any other rules or 
regulations that we could find.) 
 
 
0.2:245  Mandatory Disbarment Upon Conviction of a Crime Involving Moral 
Turpitude 
Ohio disciplinary rules do not and have not contained any provision for mandatory disbarment upon 
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. 
Former OH DR 1-102(A)(3) subjected a lawyer to sanction for engaging in “illegal conduct 
involving moral turpitude.” Under the OHRPC, the “moral turpitude” language has been deleted; 
Ohio Rule 8.4(b) now prohibits instead the commission of “an illegal act that reflects adversely on 
the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness.” As explained in Comment [2], this represents a narrowing 
of the former “moral turpitude” scheme: 
 Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to 
practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful 
failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses 
carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in 
terms of offenses involving “moral turpitude.” That concept can be 
construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal 
morality such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no 
specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer 
is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be 
professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those 
characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, 
dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the 
administration of justice are in that category. 
Ohio Rule 8.4 cmt. [2]. See section 8.4:400. 
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Under Gov Bar R V 5(A)(1)(a)-(A)(3), if an Ohio attorney or judicial officer is convicted of a felony 
in Ohio, or its equivalent in another jurisdiction, whether by verdict or plea, a certified copy of the 
judgment entry of conviction received from any source by the Secretary of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline will be transmitted to the Ohio Supreme Court. Upon 
receipt, the Ohio Supreme Court may enter any order it considers appropriate with respect to the 
individual, usually immediate interim suspension, without having to go through the full disciplinary 
process. Gov Bar R V 5(A)(4). See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. McAuliffe, 121 Ohio St.3d 315, 
2009 Ohio 1151, 903 N.E.2d 1209, at para. 4; Disciplinary Counsel v. Goldblatt, 118 Ohio St.3d 
310, 2008 Ohio 2458, 888 N.E.2d 1091 at para. 1. (Note that despite the seemingly permissive 
language of Gov Bar R V 5(A)(4) (“may enter an order as it considers appropriate”), the Court in 
McAuliffe referred to the “automatic interim suspension for felony conviction” under V 5(A)(4).) 
This provision applies regardless of whether the conduct underlying the felony conviction constituted 
a crime of moral turpitude. If the conviction is reversed, the lawyer, if suspended, will be reinstated, 
but reinstatement does not require the termination of any pending disciplinary proceedings based 
upon the conduct. See Gov Bar R V 5(D)(2). Note that the interim felony conviction suspension does 
not constitute a prior disciplinary offense for the purpose of identifying mitigation/aggravation 
factors. Disciplinary Counsel v. Peterson, 135 Ohio St.3d 110, 2012 Ohio 5719, 984 N.E.2d 1035, 
at para. 16. 
This procedure also applies with respect to an attorney or judicial officer against whom a final, 
enforceable determination has been made that the individual is in default under a child-support order. 
Gov Bar R V 5(A)(1)(b). See, e.g., In re Harter, 137 Ohio St.3d ___, 2013 Ohio 5355, ___ N.E.2d 
___, for an example of the imposition of an interim suspension under this aspect of 5(A)(1). 
A case of first impression under the default-of-child-support aspect of Gov Bar R V 5(A) is 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Greer, 112 Ohio St.3d 124, 2006 Ohio 6516, 858 N.E.2d 388.  In Greer, 
respondent, who had been given an interim suspension for violation of Gov Bar R V 5(A)(1)(b), was 
then charged with violating DR 1-102(A)(6) for the same conduct – failure to comply with the 
child-support order.  The sanction imposed for this violation (coupled with failure to cooperate in the 
investigation) was a one-year suspension, with no credit for the time spent on interim suspension, and 
with reinstatement conditioned on compliance with all of the terms of the interim-suspension order.  
Justice Lundberg Stratton dissented with respect to the sanction.  She argued that the interim 
suspension on its own serves the intended purpose and that the added one year is counterproductive: 
“this added discipline accomplishes nothing and, in the long run, potentially harms the victims, the 
children, to whom child support is owed [by making it more difficult for the respondent to pay off the 
arrearages owing].” Id. at para. 25.  Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Curry, 112 Ohio St.3d 130, 
2006 Ohio 6517, 858 N.E.2d 392, with Justice Lundberg Stratton again dissenting for the same 
reasons.  (A further detail in Curry was that Disciplinary Counsel advised the Court that it had not 
previously imposed a disciplinary sanction upon a lawyer “solely” for failure to pay child support and 
lack of cooperation in the disciplinary investigation.  Id. at para. 18.  Note, however, that the Court 
has previously disciplined a lawyer for failure to cooperate standing alone.  See, e.g., Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n v. James, 109 Ohio St.3d 310, 2006 Ohio 2424, 847 N.E.2d 438 (one-year suspension; 
interestingly, the failure to cooperate was not only the misconduct sanctioned but also constituted an 
aggravating factor). 
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A more recent iteration in the child-support category is Disciplinary Counsel v. Redfield, 116 Ohio 
St.3d 262, 2007 Ohio 6039, 878 N.E.2d 10. In Redfield, a 4-3 decision, Justice Lundberg Stratton’s 
concerns in Curry and Greer were embraced by the majority, which, in imposing a two-year 
suspension, concluded that respondent, who was essentially homeless and existing at “‘bare 
subsistence level,’“ id. at para. 24, should be given credit for the time of his prior child-support 
interim suspension: 
“The differences in Respondent’s circumstances from those of [the 
respondents in] Curry and Greer are sufficient, however, to suggest 
that should Respondent ever pay his full arrearage, or reach a workable 
compromise to afford relief from the interim suspension, one or two 
additional years thereafter [would] defeat the coercive purpose for 
which the interim suspension was imposed initially.” 
Id. at para. 30 (quoting the panel and Board; bracketed material in original). A unanimous Court 
subsequently applied the Redfield rationale in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Heisler, 119 Ohio St.3d 573, 
2008 Ohio 5221, 895 N.E.2d 839 (“We afforded suspension credit [in Redfield] because the lawyer 
had already paid a significant price for his misconduct . . . . Respondent [Heisler] has been barred 
from practice since April 16, 2007, an equally significant price to pay for his default . . . . Id. at paras. 
12, 13). 
 
0.2:250  Sanctions in Judicial Proceedings 
See sections 3.1:300, 3.1:500, and 3.5:400. 
  
0.2:260  Criminal and Civil Liability 
See sections 3.1:400 and 8.4:300. 
  
0.2:270  Federal Courts and Agencies 
See section 0.2:280. 
  
0.2:280  Ethics Rules Applied in Federal Courts in Ohio 
Both federal district courts in Ohio and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth their policies on 
admission to practice and attorney discipline by local rule. These supplement any ethical rules 
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generally applicable in federal courts. For example, the bankruptcy code should be consulted for 
ethical standards codified there; those standards apply in all federal bankruptcy courts. 
In the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, admission to practice before the court 
is treated in Local Civ R 83.5, Local Cr R 57.5, and Local Bankr R 2090-1. Limited appearances 
by law students are authorized in Local Civ R 83.6 and Local Cr R 57.6. 
Lawyers admitted to practice before the court are bound by the OHRPC “so far as [those 
requirements] are not inconsistent with federal law.” Local Civ R 83.5(b); Local Cr R 57.5(b); 
Local Bankr R 2090-2(a) (incorporating by reference the applicable Local Civil Rules). For a 
discussion of how the former OHCPR was to be interpreted in this context, see United States v. 
Beiersdorf-Jobst, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 257 (N.D. Ohio 1997). 
Lawyer discipline is dealt with in Local Civ R 83.7, Local Cr R 57.7, and Local Bankr R 2090-2. 
Restrictions on the release of information by lawyers in criminal cases are contained in Local Cr R 
57.1. 
In the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Ohio admission to practice before the court is 
treated in Local Civ R 83.3, which governs both civil and criminal matters (see Local Cr R 1.2-1.3) 
and Local Bankr R 2090-1. Limited appearances by law students are allowed in the Southern District, 
subject to compliance with the requirements of Local Civ R 83.6. 
Lawyers admitted to practice before the Southern District are bound by the OHRPC unless otherwise 
provided by a specific local rule of the court. Model Federal Rule of Disciplinary Enforcement 
IV(B). Local Bankr R 2090-2(a) provides that the OHRPC applies to those practicing before that 
court, except “that service on a debtor as required by these Local Rules and the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure shall not be a violation of the [OHRPC] as an unauthorized contact with a 
represented person.”  
Lawyer discipline is dealt with in Local Civ R 83.3(h), which provides that lawyer conduct and its 
supervision is to be governed by the Model Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement (with the 
exception of Rules XI and XII), adopted by Order 81-1 of the court. Local Bankr R 2090-2(a) also 
adopts the Model Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, with some special exceptions set 
forth in Local Bankr R 2090-2(c). 
Restrictions on the release of information by lawyers in criminal cases are contained in Local Cr R 
57.1. 
In the Sixth Circuit, admission to practice before the court is governed by FRAP 46(a) and 6 Cir R 
46(a). 
Local Rule 46(c), addressing discipline of lawyers practicing before it, provides that lawyers 
appearing before the court are subject to sanction for conduct “violating the Canons of Ethics or the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, whichever applies . . . .”  
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But this seeming ambiguity has been resolved by the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Nat’l Union Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Atticor, 466 F.3d 456, 457-58 (6th Cir. 2006), which looks to the Model Rules “with regard 
to the ethical code of conduct that we demand from the attorneys who practice before us.” The court 
discussed the issue in some detail, as follows: 
 Previously, the ethics rules for attorneys practicing in our court 
were largely governed by our common-law precedent.  See, e.g., 
Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Dklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 
1988).  However, with the wide-spread acceptance of the American 
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, we now look 
to the codified Rules of Professional Conduct for guidance.  See, e.g., 
Duggins v. Steak ‘N Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828, 835 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(referring to and following the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct and Model Code of Professional Responsibility).  We 
conclude that applying these accepted rules will lead to greater 
uniformity and predictability with regard to the ethical code of conduct 
that we demand from the attorneys who practice before us. 
 
 Application of the Rules of Professional Conduct are 
particularly applicable to the present dispute involving Michigan-based 
law firms and attorneys, who, as members of the State Bar of Michigan, 
are subject to the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct. 
* * * 
 Accordingly, we exercise our authority to enforce the Rules of 
Professional Conduct with respect to counsel who appear before this 
court, and turn to the substance of the MRPC cited by National Union. 
466 F.3d at 457-58, 459 (footnotes omitted). 
On motion for rehearing, the court vacated in part its prior order, but not so as to affect the language 
quoted above. 472 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2007).  See further discussion of the Alticor decisions in 
section 1.10:300. 
  
0.3:300  Organization of This Library and the Model Rules 
The organization of this Treatise follows the Model Rules format, with adjustments as necessary to 
incorporate Ohio provisions that vary, by addition or deletion, from the Model Rules. 
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0.4:400  Abbreviations, References and Terminology 
  
0.4:410  “Belief” or “Believe” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(a) adopts the MR 1.0(a) definition verbatim. 
  
0.4:420  “Confirmed in Writing” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(b) is substantively identical to MR 1.0(b). 
  
0.4:430  “Firm” or “Law Firm” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(c) is similar to the MR 1.0(c), but contains the following variation: The Ohio Rule 
expressly includes lawyers in a private or public legal aid or public defender organization. 
  
0.4:440  “Fraud” 
In Ohio Rule 1.0(d), as in MR 1.9(d), fraud “denotes conduct that has an intent [instead of “purpose”] 
to deceive,” but deletes the Model Rule language “that is fraudulent under the substantive or 
procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction” and in its place incorporates the primary elements of 
common-law fraud established under Ohio law. See Ohio Rule 1.0(d)(1) & (2) & cmt. [5]. 
  
0.4:445  “Informed Consent” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(f) is identical to MR 1.0(e). See Ohio Rule 1.0 cmts. [6] & [7]. 
  
0.4:450  “Knowingly,” “Known,” or “Knows” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(g) is identical to MR 1.0(f). 
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0.4:460  “Partner” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(h) is identical to MR 1.0(g). 
  
0.4:470  “Reasonable” or “Reasonably” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(i) is identical to MR 1.0(h). 
  
0.4:480  “Reasonable Belief” or “Reasonably Believes” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(j) is identical to MR 1.0(i). 
  
0.4:485  “Reasonably Should Know” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(k) is identical to MR 1.0(j). 
0.4:487  “Screened” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(l) is identical to MR 1.0(k), with the exception of one instance of capitalization 
(“Rules”). See Ohio Rule 1.0 cmts. [8] & [9]. 
  
0.4:490  “Substantial” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(m) is similar to MR 1.0(l), but replaces the Model Rule language “a material matter of 
clear and weighty importance” with “a matter of real importance or great consequence.” See Ohio 
Rule 1.0 cmt. [11], which notes that the definition of “substantial” does not extend to “substantially” 
as used in the Rules there enumerated. 
  
0.4:495  “Tribunal” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(o) is identical to MR 1.0(m), except for minor differences in punctuation. 
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0.4:497  “Writing” or “Written” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(p) is identical to MR 1.0(n), except for minor differences in punctuation. 
  
0.4:500  Additional Definitions in Ohio 
Ohio Rule 1.0(e) defines “illegal,” a term not found in MR 1.0: “‘Illegal’ denotes criminal conduct 
or a violation of an applicable statute or administrative regulation.” 
In a number of places, the Ohio Rules use the term “illegal” instead of the Model Rules term 
“criminal.” See Ohio Rules 1.2(d), 1.6(b)(2), 1.16(e)(2), 4.1(b), and 8.4(b). The ramifications of this 
change for each of these rules are discussed in sections 1.2:600, 1.6:370, 1.16:320, 4.1:300, and 
8.4:300 below. In its Report of the Supreme Court of Ohio Task Force on Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“Report”), the Task Force states as follows with respect to this change: 
For example, a labor law lawyer who advises a client about whether 
proposed conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice under federal or 
state law usually advises about law that provides for civil sanctions but 
no criminal penalties. The Model Rule provisions on fraud [or criminal 
conduct] would not apply to such a lawyer because the lawyer would 
not be advising the client about either potentially criminal or fraudulent 
activity. The Task Force’s provisions apply to such a lawyer because 
the lawyer is advising the client about potentially illegal, but not 
criminal, activity. 
Taken together, these rules [i.e., the ones using “illegal instead of 
“criminal”] work together by encouraging lawyers to counsel clients to 
avoid illegal and fraudulent activities, requiring lawyers to extricate 
themselves from client representations when clients will not desist, and 
requiring lawyers to disclose client confidential information when 
necessary to avoid furthering a client’s illegal or fraudulent activity. 
Report at 12-13 (bracketed material added).  Apart from the illegal/criminal issue, the example cited 
by the Task Force seems a poor one.  The labor lawyer who advises a client on whether proposed 
client conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice is not “counsel[ing] a client to engage, or assist[ing] 
a client” in known illegal or fraudulent conduct, as is prohibited by Rule 1.2(d); rather she is doing 
what lawyers are supposed to do – providing basic advice about the law and its consequences.  Surely 
the “Task Force’s provisions [do not] apply to such a lawyer.”  As Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [9] makes 
plain, “[t]here is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable 
conduct and recommending the means by which an illegal act or fraud might be committed with 
impunity.” 
Ohio Rule 1.0(n) defines “Substantially related matter,” a term not found in MR 1.0 (although a 
comparable definition is found in MR 1.9 cmt. [3]). The term “denotes one that involves the same 
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transaction or legal dispute or one in which there is a substantial risk that confidential factual 
information that would normally have been obtained in the prior representation of a client would 
materially advance the position of another client in a subsequent matter.” 
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1.1:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.1 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.1 
 
1.1:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.1 is identical to the Model Rule. 
 
1.1:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.1: DR 6-101(A)(1) & (2). 
1.1:200  Disciplinary Standard of Competence 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.1 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.1 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 6.8-6.12, 6.15 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 31:201 
ALI-LGL § 16 
Wolfram § 5.1 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 6.8-6.12, 6.15 (1996). 
Competence in general: Ohio Rule 1.1 provides: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to 
a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.” Competence, thus, has four primary components. First 
and second, a lawyer must have, or acquire through study or association with another, the legal 
knowledge and skills needed to handle a particular representation. Third and fourth, the lawyer must 
handle the matter with adequate thoroughness and preparation. As a closely related point, the lawyer 
must be diligent and not neglect those matters entrusted to him or her.  See Ohio Rule 1.3. Neglect is 
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discussed in sections 1.3:200 - :300; adequate knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation are 
discussed in this section infra. 
The provision of competent representation should flow both from the lawyer’s sense of pride in his or 
her professional work and from an appreciation of the lawyer’s vital role in the legal process. This 
right to competent representation is a core duty owed to clients.  “In all professional functions a 
lawyer should be competent, prompt, diligent, and loyal.”  OHRPC Preamble:  A Lawyer’s 
Responsibilities [4].  As was stated in former OH EC 1-1: “A basic tenet of the professional 
responsibility of lawyers is that every person in our society should have ready access to the 
independent professional services of a lawyer of integrity and competence. Maintaining the integrity 
and improving the competence of the bar to meet the highest standards is the ethical responsibility of 
every lawyer.” 
Comment [5] further indicates that 
[t]he required attention and preparation are determined in part by what 
is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require 
more extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and 
consequence. 
Ohio Rule 1.1 cmt. [5]. Moreover, the circumstance can affect how much a lawyer may reasonably 
be expected to do. While the Ohio drafters chose to delete MR 1.1 cmt. [3] (dealing with 
emergencies), there can be no doubt that what a competent lawyer can do in a particular situation is 
influenced by the time the lawyer has to do it. Finally, while a lawyer cannot bargain away 
competence, the ability to limit the representation pursuant to Ohio Rule 1.2(c) can eliminate 
responsibility to handle for a client some aspects of a case that a competent lawyer would otherwise 
be expected to undertake. See section 1.2:510. 
The duty of competence applies regardless of the fee arrangement. Care must be taken to assure, in 
non pro-bono cases, that the fee structure is not so inadequate that the lawyer may be tempted to 
compromise this duty. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 97-7, 1997 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 2 (Dec. 5, 1997) (raising this concern under former OH DR 6-101 in relation to a 
proposed plan whereby a lawyer would do some or all of an insurer’s defense work for a fixed flat fee 
without regard to the degree of time or effort involved). 
Special competence problems also may arise from the medium through which the representation is 
provided. When representation is provided without any in-person contact, such as solely by telephone 
or over the Internet, the lawyer must assess whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, 
competent representation can be provided in this restrictive environment. See Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 99-9, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 10 (Dec. 2, 1999) (Internet 
advice); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-10, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 11 (Apr. 10, 1992) (telephone advice); Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 97-3 (Apr. 7, 
1997) (telephone advice). 
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Skill requirements - Acquisition: One aspect of competence is assuring that a lawyer has, or will 
acquire, the requisite skills to handle a matter. Ohio Rule 1.1 (mandatory duty of competence 
includes the “skill . . . reasonably necessary to the representation”); see id. cmt. [2] (discussing 
various skill factors). This is the minimum level of competence required, applicable to the occasional 
practitioner and the full-time generalist alike. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 100 (Sept. 5, 1973) (same 
standard of competence applies to occasional practitioner as to all practitioners). But, as is implicit in 
Ohio Rule 1.1, a more demanding standard will apply where a lawyer undertakes representation 
requiring specialized expertise. Inasmuch as “competent representation requires” whatever is 
“reasonably necessary to the representation,” it follows that in representation requiring specialized 
skills, the lawyer must have, or obtain, the “requisite level of competence” (cmt. [4]) “reasonably 
necessary to the representation.” 
As Comments [2] and [4] reflect, if a lawyer lacks the skills to handle a matter when it is first accepted, 
the lawyer may subsequently become competent by self-study or by association with one already 
competent in the field. Ohio Rule 1.1 cmts. [2] & [4] (“A lawyer can provide adequate representation 
in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided 
through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.” “A lawyer 
may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved through study and 
investigation . . . .”). 
Self-study, however, is a permissible option only when “such additional work would not result in 
unreasonable delay or expense to the client.” Ohio Rule 1.1 cmt. [4]. Cf. Ohio Rule 1.5(a) (lawyer 
cannot charge “clearly excessive fee”). See generally section 1.5:410. It is unreasonable for the client 
to be expected to pay a substantial price in time or money for a lawyer to acquire competence in a 
matter if other lawyers, already competent in the area, could handle it far more quickly or 
inexpensively. At a minimum, the client should be sufficiently informed so that the client can make a 
knowledgeable decision whether to accept the additional burdens in time or money to secure counsel 
of choice. See Ohio Rule 1.1 cmt. [5]; Ohio Rule 1.4(a)(2) & cmts. [3] & [5]. 
As noted, association with another attorney who already is competent in an area is a permissible way 
for a less experienced attorney to assure that competent counsel is provided, Ohio Rule 1.1 cmt. [2], 
but the client should be consulted as to any such arrangement. See Ohio Rule 1.1 cmt. [5]; Ohio 
Rule 1.4(a)(2) & cmts. [3] & [5]. In doing so, the lawyer should be certain that the client is 
comfortable with the lawyer being considered for affiliation and also understands any fee 
implications arising from the addition of another lawyer to the representation. (See also Ohio Rule 
1.5(e)(2) (written client consent required for fee division among lawyers from different firms). See 
section 1.5:800.) Caution must be exercised to assure that a good working relationship with 
co-counsel is maintained, however. If it is not, under the former OHCPR the affiliation has been 
found insufficient to meet the competence requirements of OH DR 6-101(A)(1).  Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Weber, 62 Ohio St.3d 222, 581 N.E.2d 519 (1991) (lawyer found to have violated OH DR 
6-101(A)(1) by mishandling estate where there was a breakdown in the lawyer’s relationship with the 
experienced probate attorney who had been assisting in the matter). See also Bar Ass’n of Greater 
Cleveland v. Shillman, 61 Ohio St.2d 364, 402 N.E.2d 514 (1980) (after experienced co-counsel 
died, respondent’s flawed estate administration, without having prior experience with estate of this 
complexity, violated OH DR 6-101(A)(1)). 
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An unusual variant on the problem was presented in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Snow, 72 Ohio St.3d 
409, 650 N.E.2d 858 (1995). There, the Court found that failure to associate with local counsel in an 
out-of-state federal court matter, where required to do so by local rule, violated OH DR 6-101(A)(1). 
In the only case of this kind of which we are aware decided under the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
the respondent in Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Brown-Daniels, 135 Ohio St.3d 278, 2013 Ohio 
955, 985 N.E.2d 1289, was found to have violated the competence standard of Rule 1.1 in part by 
“her association with Murphy – who had no bankruptcy experience – to handle her client’s 
bankruptcy matters following the revocation of her electronic-filing privileges.” Id. at para. 10. 
On a more general level, the comments to Ohio Rule 1.1 stress the need for lawyers to keep up with 
current legal developments and to participate in continuing legal education programs as a way to 
maintain competence. See Ohio Rule 1.1 cmt. [6]. See generally Gov Bar R X 3 (mandating 
continuing legal education for lawyers licensed to practice in Ohio) and the Continuing Legal 
Education Regulations (CLE Regs 100-1001) found at Gov Bar R App I. The latest version of GRB 
X 3-20 and the CLE Regulations was adopted on October 23, 2012, but is not effective until January 
1, 2014. (Note that in August 2012, the ABA amended MR 1.1 cmt. [6] by adding that the lawyer’s 
need to keep abreast of changes “includ[es] the benefits and risks associated with relevant 
technology”.) While it remains to be seen whether Ohio will follow suit in its Rules, the need for 
technical competence is already reflected in the case law. See Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. 
Gusley, 133 Ohio St.3d 534, 2012 Ohio 5012, 979 N.E.2d 319, where the respondent was found to 
have violated Rule 1.3 (not 1.1) for “his failure to register for the electronic-filing system of the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which resulted in respondent’s not 
receiving notices of filings in the client’s case and missing a filing deadline.” Id. at para. 1. 
Skill requirements - Disciplinary standards: Of the former OHCPR case law addressing lawyer skill 
requirements in the context of disciplinary actions, a number of the decisions that cited the OH DR 
6-101(A)(1) duty of competence did so along with other disciplinary rules, without delineating what 
aspect of the lawyer’s conduct reflected a lack of skill, rather than neglect or some other violation. See, 
e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 2008 Ohio 3340, 891 N.E.2d 749 
(failure to file response to summary judgment; failure to timely file appellate brief; failure to file 
wrongful death action within statute of limitations; in each instance, DR 6-101(A)(1)-(3) violated); 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Hayes, 118 Ohio St.3d 336, 2008 Ohio 2466, 889 N.E.2d 109 (failure to 
appear at appellate oral argument; failure to file Supreme Court appeal; violation of, inter alia, DR 
6-101(A)(1) & (3)); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Albrecht, 106 Ohio St.3d 301, 2005 Ohio 4984, 834 
N.E.2d 812 (failing to provide annual trust accountings, failing timely to file trust tax return, failing 
to file documents necessary to secure child support for client, all of which resulted in penalties and 
interest charges to the trust client and loss of 12 months of child-support payments for his client; DR 
6-101(A)(1), as well as 6-101(A)(3), and numerous other violations found); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Briggs, 89 Ohio St.3d 74, 728 N.E.2d 1049 (2000) (without elaboration, Court holds that 
respondent’s filing with Secretary of State, at insistence of beneficiary of trust for which respondent 
was trustee, of documents indicating that respondent was sole incorporator of and statutory agent for 
corporation in order to shield beneficiary’s assets from claims of creditors, and in engaging in 
self-dealing in trust funds, violated not only former OH DR 1-102(A)(4) but also 6-101(A)(1)); 
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Josselson, 43 Ohio St.3d 154, 539 N.E.2d 625 (1989). (Josselson 
is a strange case. The legal matter that respondent was found to have been not competent to handle 
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(and neglected) was, of all things, a slip-and-fall case. Rather than OH DR 6-101(A)(1), respondent’s 
actions in entering into a settlement that the client had rejected and then failing to advise the court of 
the rejection would appear more appropriately to have raised OH DR 7-101 and OH EC 7-7 concerns. 
See section 1.2:320.) See also Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Aldrich, 93 Ohio St.3d 625, 627, 758 N.E.2d 
180, 181 (2001), where respondent’s pattern of incompetence in numerous matters was held to have 
violated OH DR 1-102(A)(6) and “6-101(A) (failing to act competently)”; it is unclear whether the 
Court intended to cite subsection (A)(1) or, by citing the Rule generally, was indicating that 
respondent violated all three of its subsections. Another odd application of former DR 6-101(A)(1) 
occurred in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Moushey, 104 Ohio St. 3d 427, 2004 Ohio 6897, 819 N.E. 2d 
1112. There respondent converted to his own use checks from the client to be used to pay the client’s 
estimated taxes; in another count, respondent withdrew from the representation (the client’s tax 
returns had been selected for audit) but failed to return the client’s money. Without any explanation of 
how competence (as opposed to honesty) bore on this misconduct, the Court found 6-101(A)(1) 
violated. Because Moushey was found to have violated a myriad of disciplinary rules and was 
disbarred, perhaps the explanation of the competency violation got lost in the shuffle. 
A Rules decision finding a Rule 1.1 competence violation that seems more akin to lack of diligence 
and promptness under Rule 1.3 is Disciplinary Counsel v. Ford, 133 Ohio St.3d 105, 2012 Ohio 
3915, 976 N.E.2d 846. The respondent in Ford undertook to represent a prisoner and file a motion to 
vacate his sentence. The filing deadline was July 21, 2009, and when the prisoner was unable to make 
contact with Ford by July 20, he filed a pro se motion to vacate, which was stricken because it 
exceeded the allowable page limit. The prisoner, Moore, prepared a revised motion to vacate and sent 
a copy to respondent. The conforming motion had to be filed by October 19, 2009. Despite the fact 
that the docket showed that no revised motion had been previously filed, Ford did not file the revised 
motion. The result was dismissal of the action to vacate. All of this sounds more like gross neglect and 
sloth than lack of competence. 
Some cases did address the skill requirement more directly. Misconduct often arose in situations in 
which lawyers took on representation in areas in which they had little or no experience and failed to 
acquire the necessary knowledge to handle the matter competently or to associate themselves with 
another lawyer who had the needed expertise. E.g., Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Vivo, 135 Ohio 
St.3d 82, 2012 Ohio 5682, 984 N.E.2d 1010 (respondent admitted to client “that he was too 
inexperienced to pursue the medical-malpractice lawsuit that he filed on her behalf,” id. at para. 26, 
following the granting of defendant’s unopposed summary judgment motion); Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 49, 2009 Ohio 5960, 918 N.E.2d 992 (respondent “unaware that he could 
not collect fees from the client. Respondent did not research the issue of attorney fees for helping a 
client obtain PIP benefits or associate with a lawyer who was familiar with PIP,” id. at para. 21; it 
would appear that DR 6-101(A)(2) (preparation), as well as 6-101(A)(1), could have been invoked, 
but it was not); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Sawers, 121 Ohio St.3d 229, 2009 Ohio 778, 903 N.E.2d 309 
(respondent admitted she accepted employment (drafting trust documents) “for which she had 
insufficient knowledge and experience” id. at para. 6; she was unaware of adverse federal tax 
consequences for trusts she had created). Indeed, in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. France, 97 
Ohio St.3d 240, 2002 Ohio 5945, 778 N.E.2d 573, respondent testified that he had no clear idea how 
to determine the statute of limitations for his client’s medical malpractice case (which was dismissed 
on limitations grounds) and also conceded that he had little or no experience in handling criminal 
appeals such as the one that was dismissed because of his failure to prosecute. A more recent case of 
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this kind is Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Hales, 120 Ohio St.3d 340, 2008 Ohio 6201, 899 N.E.2d 130. 
Although all of the subdivisions of 6-101(A) were found to have been violated in Hales, it seems 
clear from the Court’s language that the primary focus was on (A)(1): “Respondent lacked the 
experience necessary to competently litigate [his client’s] medical-malpractice case and failed to 
obtain sufficient assistance from another lawyer who had this expertise.” Id. at para. 18. Similarly, in 
Akron Bar Ass’n v. Maher, 121 Ohio St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 356, 901 N.E.2d 803, the Court 
elaborated on respondent’s “neglect and professional incompetence” and “lack of expertise” in the 
following terms: 
He did not sufficiently investigate, comply with discovery requests, or 
look for a needed expert; nor did he seek competent assistance. He did 
not determine whether to join potentially liable defendants, and he then 
dismissed the complaint on false pretenses [to conceal his lack of 
preparation]. 
Id. at para. 29. (Respondent had previously run afoul of 6-101(A)(1) in Akron Bar Ass’n v. Maher, 
110 Ohio St.3d 346, 2006 Ohio 4575, 853 N.E.2d 660, where he “testified that he had little 
experience in personal injury, that both cases were difficult in terms of liability and damages, and that 
he consequently considered the cases of low priority [!?],” id. at para. 11. Accord Erie-Huron Joint 
Certified Grievance Comm. v. Huber, 108 Ohio St.3d 338, 2006 Ohio 1066, 843 N.E.2d 781 
(matter involved complex trust; “it was clear from respondent’s statements to relator that he rarely 
handled complex trust matters in his legal practice,” id. at para. 8; Warren County Bar Ass’n v. 
Marshall, 105 Ohio St.3d 59, 2004 Ohio 7011, 822 N.E.2d 355 (admission by respondent that he 
had no experience with personal injury cases and should have asked for assistance of another lawyer; 
further admitted to being unqualified to handle zoning case for another client; OH DR 6-101(A)(1) 
violated). The respondent in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Sims, 96 Ohio St.3d 465, 2002 Ohio 
4798, 776 N.E.2d 18, was found to have incompetently represented a disabled client, who had given 
respondent a power of attorney to manage her affairs. As a result, she was without money to buy even 
the basic necessities. Respondent confessed that he “had simply gotten ‘in over [his] head’ and just 
‘froze.’“ Id. at para. 8 (bracketed material by the Court). In Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Jackson, 78 
Ohio St.3d 463, 678 N.E.2d 920 (1997), respondent conceded “that he had not filed an Ohio estate 
tax return in the case [in which he was representing the fiduciary of the estate] because he did not 
know how to prepare or file one.”  Id. at 464, 678 N.E.2d at 921. And in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Tekulve, 66 Ohio St.3d 164, 610 N.E.2d 980 (1993), a lawyer was found to have violated the 
competence provision in mishandling the tax aspects of an estate matter, when he admitted he had 
never before handled an estate that required the filing of a federal estate tax return, and that if he had 
it to do over again, he would have obtained the assistance of another lawyer in doing so. One 
additional case that provides insight into the skill requirement, even though former OH DR 
6-101(A)(1) was neither charged nor cited, is Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Ginsberg, 78 Ohio 
St.3d 306, 677 N.E.2d 1184 (1997). In Ginsberg, the respondent found himself out of his depth in 
representing a new client and ended up being convicted of conspiracy to evade income taxes owed by 
a corporation controlled by the client. Imposing an indefinite suspension, the Court had these telling 
remarks regarding respondent’s competence (or lack thereof): 
We find a case where an attorney’s reach for a more sophisticated 
practice exceeded his grasp of the legal tools required to work 
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competently in the field. As a result, respondent did not try to nor was 
he able to understand the illegal or fraudulent actions which his clients 
were requesting. Our ethical considerations [see former OH EC 6-1 to 
6-4] indicate that an attorney should accept employment only in 
matters which he is or intends to become competent to handle. This 
situation demonstrates what may befall an attorney unable to perform 
the “due diligence” necessary to practice in a particular area of the law. 
Id. at 308, 677 N.E.2d at 1185-86 (bracketed material added). 
Yet another case study in lack of competence is provided by Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Hunt, 135 Ohio 
St.3d 386 2013 Ohio 1486, 987 N.E.2d 662. Although it is clear from the opinion that the 
respondent’s misconduct occurred only one year after he was admitted, the Court made no allowances 
in this respect and indefinitely suspended him for misrepresenting an injured mother and daughter in 
a three-vehicle accident case. Because he misunderstood the law concerning the liability of a minor 
driver, respondent sued the father of the minor causing the accident rather than the minor. He filed no 
response to either of the summary judgment motions filed by the two defendants. After both motions 
were granted and his clients’ case dismissed, he successfully got one of the judgments reopened but 
then failed to respond to the renewed motion in timely fashion, and it was reinstated. His attempt to 
reopen the judgment under Rule 60 also failed because he did not include a proper certificate of 
service. By the time the clients found out the case had been dismissed, the mother’s claims were 
barred by the statute of limitations. As these facts demonstrate, it is imperative that a beginning 
lawyer must, if necessary, as it was here, obtain assistance from a lawyer who is competent to handle 
the matter. Among other rules, Hunt violated DR 6-101(A)(1), (2) and (3) – lack of competence, 
inadequate preparation and neglect of an entrusted legal matter. 
In other instances, intervening factors, such as mental illness, undercut the lawyer’s ability to provide 
competent representation. See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Brown, 78 Ohio St.3d 345, 678 N.E.2d 513 
(1997), respondent in 1993 pursued a malicious prosecution and defamation claim on behalf of his 
client; the client was awarded $ 1.00 in damages because respondent provided no evidence of 
damages. According to respondent, in an affidavit filed in a Kentucky action, prior to July 1994 he 
was suffering from manic depression “and was not capable of performing as an attorney.”  Id. at 
345-46, 678 N.E.2d at 513. Alcohol was the intervening factor in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Wineman, 121 Ohio St.3d 614, 2009 Ohio 2005, 906 N.E.2d 1117 (violation of Rule 1.1), as was 
cocaine in Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoppel, 129 Ohio St.3d 53, 2011 Ohio 2672, 950 N.E.2d 171 
(same). 
While the OHCPR cases typically focused on lack of competence on purely legal issues, in certain 
areas providing the requisite skill required competently addressing financial issues as well. As the 
Court remarked in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Foster, 92 Ohio St.3d 411, 412, 750 N.E.2d 1112, 1113 
(2001), the Board member handling the proceeding found that respondent’s consistent mishandling of 
a number of bankruptcy cases “indicated that he was not competent to practice bankruptcy law.” The 
Supreme Court quoted with approval language from two of its earlier cases ( Dayton Bar Ass’n v. 
Andrews, 79 Ohio St.3d 109, 112, 679 N.E.2d 1093, 1095 (1997); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Flanagan, 77 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 674 N.E.2d 681, 683 (1997)) to the effect that 
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“the counseling of a client in financial matters . . . is a serious matter 
that deserves the attention of a qualified attorney.” If the attorney 
cannot or will not give this matter his necessary attention, or is not 
qualified to handle the matter he undertakes, he violates our 
Disciplinary Rules. 
92 Ohio St.3d at 413, 750 N.E.2d at 1113-14. 
Violation of the competency requirement can be proven in a variety of ways. Often the lawyer admits 
to insufficient performance. See France, Marshall, Jackson, Tekulve supra. At other times, 
testimony comes from outside sources. For example, in Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Timen, 62 Ohio St.2d 
357, 405 N.E.2d 1038 (1980), a lawyer was found to have lacked the requisite skill in handling a 
federal criminal case, based on the testimony of the federal district court judge who presided in the 
action. The judge testified:  
“An examination of the Record indicates to me that [counsel] lacked a 
fundamental knowledge of proper representation. The memoranda that 
were filed were meritless, they were supported by no authority, and the 
argument presented before me was substantially less than professional. 
There were repeated references to counsel’s lack of understanding and 
inability to respond to the motions, and the totality of his presentation 
at that omnibus hearing was far below the professional standard that is 
expected in the Federal Courts.” 
Id. at 358, 405 N.E.2d at 1038. 
In some instances, the problem arose in connection with the lawyer’s venturing into a jurisdiction or 
court in which he or she was not admitted, as in Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Brown, 130 Ohio St. 
147, 2011 Ohio 5198, 956 N.E.2d 296 (bankruptcy court; case discussed this section infra with 
decisions under Rule 1.1). Thus in Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Moore, 2 Ohio St.3d 11, 442 N.E.2d 71 
(1982), lack of competence was demonstrated where a lawyer accepted representation in a class 
action pending in a federal district court before which he was not admitted to practice; the class action 
was dismissed by the court “after determining that respondent was too inexperienced in class actions 
to provide adequate representation for his clients.”  Id. at 11, 442 N.E.2d at 71. See also Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kearns, 67 Ohio St.3d 77, 616 N.E.2d 194 (1993) (former OH DR 
6-101(A)(1) violated where lawyer filed suit in state in which he was not authorized to practice 
without seeking court permission to proceed there). This is not to suggest that a lawyer can never 
undertake representation in a case in a jurisdiction where the lawyer is not yet licensed. Such conduct 
is permitted as long as the lawyer is or can become competent in that area of the jurisdiction’s law, 
and takes appropriate steps to appear personally or through another in the foreign jurisdiction’s courts. 
Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 89-12 (Oct. 5, 1989) (involving Ohio lawyer’s handling of Michigan dog-bite 
case). 
From these cases, it appears that included among the skills a lawyer must possess to be considered 
competent is a basic understanding of the law and procedures relevant to the action at hand -- i.e., the 
“legal knowledge” that is “reasonably necessary to the representation,” in the language of Ohio Rule 
1.1. A more detailed iteration was provided by Professor Wolfram, in his treatise on legal ethics, in 
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which he defines the lawyer’s skills necessary to be competent as including: 
Knowledge - a competent lawyer possesses sufficient information 
about law and legal institutions to be able to deal effectively with many 
common legal problems that require additional research, and to assess 
the lawyer’s own ability to deal with a legal problem. 
Legal skills - a competent lawyer can effectively represent and 
sensitively communicate with a client in one or more of the common 
lawyer roles: analyzing a client’s problem in the light of available facts 
and law, advising, negotiating, litigating, mediating, investigating, 
researching, and planning. 
Office management - a competent lawyer has the intellectual, financial 
and managerial ability to organize, equip, and staff an office system 
that permits a lawyer to use knowledge and legal skills efficiently and 
effectively for clients. 
Character - a competent lawyer possesses strengths of character that 
lead the lawyer to be motivated to serve clients effectively, loyally and 
without undue regard to the distractions of other commitments, 
demands, and interests. 
Capability - a competent lawyer possesses physical and psychological 
well-being that permits a sustained level of effective practice. 
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  5.1, at 186 (1986). 
The first disciplinary case to take up Rule 1.1, which treats competence, thoroughness, and 
preparation, was Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 2008 Ohio 3340, 891 
N.E.2d 749. The Supreme Court found that the portion of respondent’s conduct occurring subsequent 
to February 1, 2007 violated this rule. As the Court stated: 
 A reasonably prudent and competent lawyer does not ignore a 
failed attempt to serve a complaint and summons for over four months. 
Nor does such a lawyer delay several more weeks after a court order 
directing him to perfect service. Finally, a reasonably prudent and 
competent lawyer conscientiously accounts for client funds and, at the 
end of the representation, retains only fees owed for his or her services. 
Id. at para. 47 (violation of Rule 1.3 as well as 1.1). In another count Lawson was found to have 
violated 1.1 “because he did not conscientiously prepare and thoroughly pursue his client’s defense” 
in a criminal case. Id. at para. 55. Other cases finding a violation of Rule 1.1 include Akron Bar 
Ass’n v. Carr, 135 Ohio St.3d 390, 2013 Ohio 1485, 987 N.E.2d 666 (having no federal tax 
litigation experience, respondent violated duty of competence in his representation of defendants in 
tax case by filing brief in opposition to government’s summary judgment motion without including 
any exhibits or supporting materials, despite existence of IRS reports showing clients owed less than 
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claimed; as district court opinion in underlying litigation stated, respondent’s “legal argument 
suffered from ‘one significant, fatal flaw: [h]e offered no evidence of any kind.’” Id. at para. 5); 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Brown, 130 Ohio St.3d 147, 2011 Ohio 5198, 956 N.E.2d 296 
(accepted representation of client needing legal assistance in bankruptcy matter, even though “he 
admitted that he has never been admitted in bankruptcy court, has no bankruptcy experience, does not 
have electronic-filing privileges for bankruptcy court, and was not aware that the filing fee for a 
bankruptcy petition is $300,” id. at para. 18); Disciplinary Counsel v. Folwell, 129 Ohio St.3d 297, 
2011 Ohio 3181, 951 N.E.2d 775 (1.1 violated where respondent “had not represented a minor in a 
personal-injury action before and did not know that an attorney for a minor cannot settle a minor’s 
claim without probate court approval,” id. at para. 5); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Allerding, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 382, 2009 Ohio 5589, 916 N.E.2d 808 (botching opening and closing of uncomplicated estate; 
violation of 1.1 and 1.3); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Kizer, 123 Ohio St.3d 188, 2009 Ohio 4763, 915 
N.E.2d 314 (pattern of neglecting legal matters to prejudice of clients’ interests; Rule 1.1 as well as 
1.3 violations stipulated to and found); Disciplinary Counsel v. Lentes, 120 Ohio St.3d 431, 2008 
Ohio 6355, 900 N.E.2d 167, at para. 13 (“Through his failure to represent Garretson with any 
semblance of professional competence and diligence, respondent also violated (1) Prof.Cond.R. 
1.1 … and (2) Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 . . . .”). 
The Court in Lawson supra found violations of Rule 1.1 because respondent “ignore[d] a failed 
attempt to serve a complaint and summons for four months,” “delay[ed] several more weeks after a 
court order directing him to perfect service,” and because “he did not conscientiously prepare and 
thoroughly pursue his client’s defense.” 2008 Ohio 3340, at paras. 47, 55. But in the 2010 case of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Nicks, 124 Ohio St.3d 460, 2010 Ohio 600, 923 N.E.2d 598, the emphasis 
appears to have shifted somewhat. Although respondent stipulated to two violations of 1.1, the Board 
found that his conduct did not transgress the rule in either instance, and the Supreme Court agreed. 
With respect to the first count, which included failure to file the client’s estate tax return and payment 
thereof, the Court wrote that the Board “also noted that this court has also stated that ‘competent 
representation’ means that ‘the lawyer must apply the knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation,’ (Emphasis added.),” citing Lentes supra. Id. 
at para. 13. [Although the Court’s opinion is ambiguous as to just who added the emphasis, the 
panel’s Conclusions of Law (adopted verbatim by the Board) make clear that it was the panel that 
added the emphasis to the Lentes quote.] Further, 
 [t]he board concluded that Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 focuses on whether 
a lawyer is competently prepared to handle a legal matter and found 
that respondent possessed the requisite experience to be regarded as 
competent to handle probate matters. Moreover, the board concluded 
that there was no evidence that any of the work completed by 
respondent . . . was not prepared in accordance with applicable legal 
standards. We agree . . . . 
Id. at para. 10. And as to the second Rule 1.1 count, “[t]he board stated that it was unable to conclude 
by clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 simply by his failure to 
timely file the required report of distribution.” Id. at para. 13. Apparently then, the Nicks rule is that 
a practitioner with the “requisite experience” in probate matters can meet the competent 
representation standard of Rule 1.1 even if he makes a mistake (at least one of omission), so long as 
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the work that he completes is done “in accordance with applicable legal standards,” which appears to 
be sufficient to meet the “must apply” requisite. (Respondent’s failures to file did transgress Rule 1.3, 
among other rules.) This assessment seems to be borne out by the following language from the 
Board’s recommendation as to Count I: 
Respondent failed to timely file the Ohio Estate Tax return, and to pay 
the tax due, even though he had obtained the executor’s signature on 
the returns, and a check for the tax due, within the time allowed for 
filing the return. There is no evidence, however, that the tax return was 
not prepared in accordance with applicable legal standards. Id. Also, 
although Respondent collected attorney fees without first obtaining 
court approval, he clearly knew that prior court approval was required. 
Therefore, the Panel is unable to conclude by clear and convincing 
evidence that Respondent engaged in misconduct in violation of Prof. 
Cond. R. 1.1 as alleged in Count I of the Complaint. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of the Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio in In Re: Complaint Against J. Michael 
Nicks, at p. 7 (Aug, 14, 2009) (emphasis added). 
Skill requirements - Malpractice and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standards: Some further, 
indirect, guidance concerning the skills that a lawyer must exercise in order to provide competent 
representation may be derived from those lawyer malpractice cases that turn on competence issues. 
See sections 1.1:320-:330. Cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel also can be looked to for 
analogous discussions of basic competency in the criminal setting, since violations are predicated in 
part on proof that the lawyer’s conduct in question fell below “an objective standard of reasonable 
representation.” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 137, 538 N.E.2d 373, 375 (1989) (syllabus 
two). See State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007 Ohio 4837, 873 N.E.2d 858 (in death-sentence 
murder case, failure to have court determine whether sole eye-witness and defendant were married 
and, if so, whether wife was testifying voluntarily against him, constituted ineffective assistance); 
State v. Shanklin, 185 Ohio App.3d 603, 2009 Ohio 6843, 925 N.E.2d 161 (Licking) (ineffective 
assistance in failing to object to hearsay testimony resulting “in the admission of inadmissible 
evidence establishing this essential fact [that the transaction in which appellant engaged was a 
‘sham’]”; id at para. 26). State v. Bolin, 128 Ohio App.3d 58, 63, 713 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 
(Cuyahoga 1998) (counsel’s allowing his client (who was incompetent to stand trial) to plead guilty, 
based on counsel’s misunderstanding that the standard for competence to enter a guilty plea had a 
lower threshold than the standard for competence to stand trial, when in fact the two standards are the 
same, was “unreasonable error” constituting ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Edwards, 
123 Ohio App.3d 43, 702 N.E.2d 1242 (1997) (failure to object to clearly improper expert testimony 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel). See also Awkwal v. Mitchell, 559 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 
2009) (lawyer for client convicted on two counts of aggravated murder, whose only defense was 
insanity, called expert who testified defendant was sane at time of crime, despite fact that counsel had 
a copy of expert’s report so stating prior to calling him); Girts v. Yanai, 501 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(ineffective assistance in failing to object to prosecutor’s improper and prejudicial closing argument 
comments on defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent); Fields v. Bagley, 275 F.3d 478, 
484 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of habeas relief for want of effective assistance on state’s appeal 
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from order granting motion to suppress: “Field’s counsel did not provide any assistance at all, let 
alone effective assistance”; court noted that in leaving his client with no representation on appeal 
counsel violated former OH EC 2-30 and OH EC 2-31). See sections 1.7:260 and :320 for discussion 
of cases dealing with ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims premised on conflict of interest. 
Admittedly, the malpractice analogy is inexact, for many cases recognize that conduct violative of the 
disciplinary rules is not malpractice per se, but only evidence of malpractice. See, e.g., Northwestern 
Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 61 Ohio App.3d 506, 573 N.E.2d 159 (Franklin 1989). Conversely, 
conduct that constitutes malpractice may not rise to the level of a disciplinary violation. See Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kay, 75 Ohio St.3d 397, 662 N.E.2d 351 (1996) (suggesting that while 
mere negligence would support a malpractice action, discipline requires something more). Cf. Collins 
v. Morgan, No. 68680, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5098 (Cuyahoga Nov. 16, 1995) (Disciplinary 
Counsel decision that conduct did not warrant disciplinary action did not act as res judicata bar to 
subsequent action for malpractice). Nevertheless, the malpractice cases do provide some insight in 
defining the level of competence that reasonably can be expected of lawyers in Ohio. 
The general standard of competence applied in malpractice actions in Ohio was summarized by the 
Sixth District Court of Appeals in Stoklosa v. McGill, No. L-91-028, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 728 
(Lucas Feb. 21, 1992) (affirming and adopting lower court decision as its own): 
[The lawyer’s duty to the client consists of] the obligation to exercise 
the knowledge, skill, and ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by 
members of the legal profession similarly situated. Furthermore, the 
attorney must be ordinarily and reasonably diligent, careful, and 
prudent in discharging the duty he/she has assumed. This “ordinary and 
reasonable” standard is to be distinguished from such higher levels of 
care as, e.g., perfect legal knowledge or highest degree of skill, in that 
the attorney is not held to such lofty standards. 
Id. at *8. (bracketed material added; citations omitted). Accord Palmer v. Westmeyer, 48 Ohio 
App.3d 296, 549 N.E.2d 1202 (Lucas 1988) (setting forth similar standard). 
The array of skills a lawyer must exercise in providing competent representation is wide and varied. 
Case law in the area, however, tends to focus on a subset of these skills, requiring proficiency, where 
applicable, in: (1) legal research, (2) factual investigation, (3) legal drafting, (4) counseling and 
advising clients, and (5) litigation skills. One must also have sufficient knowledge of the area in 
which the lawyer is practicing to take all measures reasonably necessary to protect the client’s 
interests.  The malpractice and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases discussing these aspects of 
competence are set forth in section 1.1:320. 
Thoroughness and preparation: Thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary under the 
circumstances of the case are part of the duty of competence. Ohio Rule 1.1. See id. cmt. [5] 
(competence “includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and 
use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners”). 
A case decided under the Rules that focuses on the thoroughness and preparation aspect of Rule 1.1 is 
Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Brown, 124 Ohio St.3d 221, 2009 Ohio 6424, 921 N.E.2d 220. In Brown, 
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respondent committed to establishing an irrevocable trust for his clients and then transferring real 
estate into it. Although he prepared the trust, he did not file the declaration of trust with the county 
recorder and did not complete the transfer of the trust property. “Because respondent failed to 
complete work as promised and then lost all contact with these clients, the board found the evidence 
clear and convincing that he had violated Prof. Cond. R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent 
representation with the thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary in the circumstances),” id. 
at para. 19, as well as Rules 1.3 and 8.4(d) and (h). 
Under the former OHCPR, in those instances where OH DR 6-101(A)(2) violations for lack of 
preparation were found, the cases usually involved neglect under OH DR 6-101(A)(3) as well, and 
typically no attempt was made to differentiate those aspects of the lawyer’s conduct that constituted 
lack of adequate preparation. See, e.g., Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Johnson, 123 Ohio St.3d 
65, 2009 Ohio 4178, 914 N.E.2d 180 (failure to file necessary documents in civil claim for lost or 
damaged property, resulting in court’s granting of unopposed summary judgment motion against 
client; Court did note that most of respondent’s practice was in criminal law); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Dice, 120 Ohio St.3d 455, 2008 Ohio 6787, 900 N.E.2d 189 (missed deadlines and failure to appear 
in federal criminal appeals; Sixth Circuit had to appoint new counsel in one of the cases); Columbus 
Bar Ass’n v. Gueli, 119 Ohio St.3d 434, 2008 Ohio 4786, 894 N.E.2d 1231 (mishandling estate; 
failure to conscientiously pursue medical malpractice claim); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lawson, 119 
Ohio St.3d 58, 2008 Ohio 3340, 891 N.E.2d 749 (failure to appear with client on arraignment date; 
abandoning appeal after filing notice of appeal); Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. Smith, 115 Ohio St.3d 95, 
2007 Ohio 4270, 873 N.E.2d 1224, (multiple instances of neglect and inadequate preparation, 
including erroneous advice that tax refunds need not be turned over to bankruptcy trustee and failure 
to complete paperwork required for any petition filed after changes in bankruptcy law effective in 
2005); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ginther, 98 Ohio St.3d 345, 2003 Ohio 1010, 785 N.E.2d 432 
(respondent missed filing deadline for brief on appeal from agency ruling; when agency stipulated to 
extension, he failed to file the extension and then failed to file response to agency’s summary 
judgment motion; violation of former OH DR 6-101(A)(2) & (A)(3)); Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Engel, 
93 Ohio St.3d 623, 758 N.E.2d 178 (2001) (mishandling of estate in manner more akin to neglect 
than lack of preparation, but violation of both OH DR 6-101(A)(2) & (A)(3) found); Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Braun, 90 Ohio St.3d 138, 735 N.E.2d 430 (2000) (failure to file action in 
the appropriate state court before statute of limitations ran, together with neglect of other 
representations, resulted in violations, inter alia, of OH DR 6-101(A)(2) & (A)(3). See also Toledo 
Bar Ass’n v. Hales, 120 Ohio St.3d 340, 2008 Ohio 6201, 899 N.E.2d 130 (violation of DR 
6-101(A), including (A)(2) and (A)(3), but, given respondent’s inexperience, primary breach would 
appear to have been that of (A)(1); see further discussion supra at “Skill requirements - Disciplinary 
standards.” 
There are exceptions, however. The following decisions deal with DR 6-101(A)(2) violations – not in 
conjunction with 6-101(A)(3) – and at least two of them discuss the preparation aspect in some detail. 
Thus, in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 4541, 894 N.E.2d 
1210, the three respondents, members of the Brooking law firm, agreed to represent customers of 
Foreclosure Solutions, a company “purportedly” in the business of helping homeowners avoid 
foreclosure, in the courts of Kentucky and, subsequently, in Ohio courts. The Foreclosure Solutions 
“plan” was to help the homeowner set up a savings account and allow the company to use the money 
in the account to renegotiate the loan with lenders. The Brooking law firm lawyers’ involvement in 
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this operation is described by the Court: 
 In following its typical procedure, the Brooking firm lawyers 
did not as a rule meet with the Foreclosure Solutions clients to 
determine their particular objectives or complete financial situation or 
to discover facts that could be defenses to foreclosure. . . . 
 In this way, [respondents] failed to determine what action, 
including filing bankruptcy immediately, was in any one particular 
client’s best interest. Respondents instead simply followed the 
Foreclosure Solutions “savings plan” strategy and allowed the 
foreclosure action to proceed until either a settlement could be 
negotiated with the lender or the court granted judgment in favor of the 
lender and ordered the property to be sold, with the lawyers filing 
routine pleadings and motions at critical stages to delay the process. 
Only when a sale was imminent did [respondents] advise the clients to 
consider another remedy by contacting a bankruptcy attorney. 
Id. at paras. 17-18. Although DR 6-101(A)(2) (and 7-101(A)(1)) “prohibited [respondents] from 
surrendering their professional judgment to Foreclosure Solutions,” id. at para. 23, their conduct 
failed to measure up, and the Court, (in language that fits comfortably with Rule 1.1 cmt. [5], quoted 
above) explains how the adequate preparation obligation was breached here: 
 Mullaney, Brooking, and Moeves failed to evaluate their clients’ 
situations and develop a strategy to meet their individualized needs, 
and instead stuck to Foreclosure Solutions’ single strategy to obtain 
relief. By not investigating and evaluating each client’s debts and 
assets and other potential resources in order to assess the 
opportunities presented by existing law, respondents were 
inadequately prepared to represent their clients and failed to seek the 
clients’ lawful objectives. We therefore find that respondents violated 
DR 6-101(A)(2) and 7-101(A)(1). 
Id. at para. 27 (emphasis added). 
The charge of violation of DR 6-101(A)(2) was also directly addressed by the Court in Columbus 
Bar Ass’n v. Farmer, 111 Ohio St.3d 137, 2006 Ohio 5342, 855 N.E.2d 462.  In Farmer, the panel 
and Board found a violation in that respondent failed properly to research the case before making 
promises to his clients.  In the words of the Court, 
Respondent swept the Martins up and strung them along, promising an 
improved brief and investigations to justify postconviction proceedings 
or a motion for new trial. . . . For making promises to Martin and his 
family before he could gauge the realistic possibilities, we find 
respondent in violation of DR 6-101(A)(2). 
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Id. at para. 28. As the Court aptly stated in Disciplinary Counsel v. Willard, 123 Ohio St.3d 15, 
2009 Ohio 3629, 913 N.E.2d 960, “[a]n attorney cannot be adequately prepared to represent clients if 
he was never bothered to contact them.” Id. at para. 17. This failure even to make contact with clients 
was also the basis for the 6-101(A)(2) violation in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Mangan, 123 Ohio St.3d 
250, 2009 Ohio 5287, 915 N.E.2d 651. 
The respondent in Disciplinary Counsel v. Ita, 117 Ohio St.3d 477, 2008 Ohio 1508, 884 N.E.2d 
1073, failed to investigate his personal injury client’s marital status (they were living apart and later 
divorced); as a result he filed an unauthorized claim for loss of consortium on behalf of his client’s 
wife and then as part of the settlement of the case voluntarily dismissed the claim with prejudice 
without the wife’s consent. His failure to confirm his client’s marital status or even to speak with the 
wife before filing suit violated DR 6-101(A)(2). Other examples include Dayton Bar Ass’n v. 
Timen, 62 Ohio St.2d 357, 405 N.E.2d 1038 (1980), where the lawyer diligently handled the 
representation, but did so with work that evidenced inadequate or improper preparation and 
inattention to detail. In Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Dann, 101 Ohio St.3d 266, 2004 Ohio 716, 
804 N.E.2d 428, respondent was publicly reprimanded for violation of OH DR 6-101(A)(2) for his 
error-filled representation of a client, including filing a motion to terminate a nonexistent spousal 
support order. See also Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Finneran, 80 Ohio St.3d 428, 687 N.E.2d 405 
(1997) (respondent, in numerous cases and to prejudice of his clients, persisted in erroneous view that 
ORC 2305.19 could be used in conjunction with OH Civ R 41 to enable case to be voluntarily 
dismissed and refiled infinite number of times. “Here, respondent either was not qualified to handle 
those cases or handled them without adequate preparation,”  id. at 431, 687 N.E.2d at 407, and 
thereby violated, inter alia, OH DR 6-101(A)(1) & (A)(2)); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Chandler, 72 
Ohio St.3d 84, 647 N.E.2d 781 (1995) (OH DR 6-101(A)(2) violation found where lawyer 
misconduct included failing to undertake discovery or other preparation before trial, and presenting 
no witnesses at trial in defense of a suit by a subcontractor against a builder). 
Two instances in which it would appear that a violation of DR 6-101(A)(2) should have been charged 
but was not are Akron Bar Ass’n v. Maher, 121 Ohio St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 356, 901 N.E.2d 803, 
and Columbus Bar Ass’n v. DeVillers, 116 Ohio St.3d 33, 2007 Ohio 5552, 876 N.E.2d 530. In 
Maher, the Court noted that “respondent failed without cause to fully investigate the negligence 
claim either before or after he filed the complaint. Moreover, other than obtaining a coroner’s report, 
respondent made no effort to enlist the expert testimony essential to winning the case.” And, when 
faced with a motion for summary judgment, “respondent was prepared neither to respond nor to go to 
trial if the court denied the motion. To conceal his lack of preparation, respondent voluntarily 
dismissed the Ward’s case . . . without telling his clients the real reason.” Id. at paras. 24-25. 
DeVillers involved a respondent who “failed to properly research the real estate title and did not 
realize that the property was not an estate asset, because it had passed to [the brother] upon [the 
sister’s] death, and “signed a release of the mortgage [on the property] without determining whether 
[the brother] had ever repaid the money he owed from the 1991 mortgage.”  Id. at paras. 4, 5 
(bracketed material added). 
Finally, in Allen County Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 92 Ohio St.3d 104, 748 N.E.2d 1101 (2001), 
respondent dismissed a criminal appeal on the day the appellate brief was due, and the adverse 
judgment against his client became final. Even though respondent had prior experience in criminal 
matters during his seventeen years of practice, he had never taken a criminal appeal. He also was 
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unaware that he could have filed an “Anders [Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)] brief.” 
The Court found that he had violated OH DR 6-101(A)(2) (inadequate preparation) but this seems to 
us to be more appropriately an OH 6-101(A)(1) (lack of competence) violation. See also Lorain 
County Bar Ass’n v. Kaderbek, 100 Ohio St.3d 295, 2003 Ohio 5754, 798 N.E.2d 607 (Court 
noted that respondent was “completely unprepared” to represent clients at first meeting of creditors, 
id. at para. 6; she was, however, not charged with violation of OH DR 6-101(A)(2)). 
Given the limited number of decisions focusing on the duty of preparation in the disciplinary context, 
the malpractice cases again may provide some insight. In litigation, for example, questions often arise 
concerning the adequacy of the factual investigation undertaken by the lawyer. As the cases reflect, 
where the alleged lack of investigation flows from a reasonable professional judgment, it is not 
actionable. See, e.g., Stoklosa v. McGill, No. L-91-028, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 728 (Lucas Feb. 
21, 1992) (limiting discovery to plaintiff and one employee of defendant in original action not 
actionable where that discovery suggested plaintiff had no case as matter of law and complainant 
could point to no information that further discovery would have uncovered); Belcher v. Dooley, No. 
10444, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 508 (Montgomery Feb. 16, 1988) (lawyer who in prosecuting a tort 
counterclaim for assault undertakes no discovery, believing he had sufficient information from his 
client and information from the opposing party contained in the pleadings and the police report of the 
incident, is not guilty of malpractice where the client fails to show information that should have been 
discovered but was not); Murphey, Young & Smith Co., L.P.A. v. Billman, Nos. 84AP-49, 84 
AP-198, 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 11643 (Franklin Nov. 20, 1984) (failure to interview certain 
witnesses is not malpractice but rather the exercise of trial strategy). 
This standard for factual investigations is well illustrated by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in 
Canady v. Shwartz, 62 Ohio App.3d 742, 577 N.E.2d 437 (Franklin 1989). In Canady, a plaintiff 
brought a malpractice action against an attorney who had defended him in a criminal action. The court 
found that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to withstand a summary judgment motion 
through an affidavit by his co-defendant in the criminal action, which affidavit stated that the 
co-defendant had been ready to testify that the plaintiff took no part in the criminal activity but was 
never contacted by the defense attorney, even though the co-defendant was subpoenaed and available 
to testify at plaintiff’s criminal trial. Based on this testimony, a jury could reasonably conclude that 
the lawyer breached his duty to investigate thoroughly the facts of the plaintiff’s criminal defense and 
to represent the client at trial. The court went on, however, “to stress that our decision in this case is 
not to be construed as imposing a duty on every attorney to interview every witness suggested by a 
criminal defendant.”  Id. at 747, 577 N.E.2d at 440. Indeed, the plaintiff in Canady would have 
needed expert testimony to support his claim of lack of preparation had the attorney presented a 
reasonable explanation for believing that the co-defendant was unreliable and therefore did not need 
to be consulted or called. As the court suggested: “For example, had defendant spoken with the 
co-defendant’s attorney or if defendant was familiar with the co-defendant’s reputation for reliable 
testimony or if the nature of the case against plaintiff was such that the co-defendant’s statement 
would be useless, such facts would require the testimony of an expert to demonstrate a breach of duty.” 
Id. On the facts before the court, however, the lawyer believed the witness was unreliable and 
declined even to speak with him without any articulated justification for the belief. 
Special problems arise where the lawyer’s lack of adequate preparation occurs in the context of trial. 
Proceeding to trial without adequate preparation would force the lawyer to breach his ethical duties 
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under Ohio Rule 1.1. On the other hand, the court has an interest in docket control and in protecting 
the rights of others in the litigation -- concerns that likely would be harmed should a continuance be 
granted. In a number of criminal cases decided while the OHCPR was in effect, defense lawyers, 
citing their OH DR 6-101(A)(2) duties, refused to proceed with their cases at trial and were held in 
contempt for failure to do so. To the extent a lawyer is unprepared through no fault of his own, a 
finding of contempt for failure to proceed is inappropriate. See, e.g., In re Sherlock, 37 Ohio App.3d 
204, 525 N.E.2d 512 (Montgomery 1987) (public defender who was led to believe that trial would 
be set far in future, but then was given only two-days notice before trial and could not reach client 
during that period to get information necessary to prepare case, should not be held in contempt for 
failing to proceed, since to proceed would have violated former OH DR 6-101(A)(2) and 7-101(A)(3) 
and afforded ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Gasen, 48 Ohio App.2d 191, 356 N.E.2d 
505 (Hamilton 1976) (public defenders, who although they had no connection with case entered the 
courtroom and were ordered by trial judge to defend criminal defendant when assigned counsel did 
not appear at hearing, and who had no opportunity to review case file or confer with defendant, 
properly refused to proceed, citing several ethical principles including their ethical obligation to be 
adequately prepared). As the Gasen court stated: “We hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law 
in refusing to recognize the appellants’ responsibilities under the Code of Professional Responsibility 
and conclude accordingly that the finding of contempt rendered below is contrary to law.”  Id. at 
195-96, 356 N.E.2d at 508. Accord State v. Jones, 2008 Ohio 6994, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5860 
(Portage) (reversing conviction of direct criminal contempt against public defender, four months out 
of law school, who refused to proceed with criminal case to which we had been appointed one day 
prior because of inability to prepare defense  in time allotted). 
If the lawyer is responsible for the lack of preparation, however, it will not constitute a defense.  State 
v. Christon, 68 Ohio App.3d 471, 589 N.E.2d 53 (Montgomery 1990) (former OH DR 6-101(A)(2) 
no defense to contempt citation where lawyers involved not adequately prepared solely due to their 
own inaction). As the Christon court explained: “We are not inclined to allow attorneys to place 
themselves in positions that are questionable under the Code of Professional Responsibility and then 
claim this very position immunizes them from contempt sanctions.”  Id. at 477, 589 N.E.2d at 57. 
Similarly, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a lawyer a continuance where the 
lawyer’s going forward arguably would violate OH DR 6-101(A)(2), if the lack of preparation was 
due to the attorney’s own inaction.  Bland v. Graves, 99 Ohio App.3d 123, 650 N.E.2d 117 
(Summit 1994). Cf. Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 9, 615 N.E.2d 617, 622 (1993) (“[A] 
judge’s denial of a continuance because of counsel’s unpreparedness is not an abuse of discretion if 
the unpreparedness was avoidable.”). 
An Ohio ineffective-assistance-of-counsel case focusing on lack of preparation concerns is State v. 
Blair, 171 Ohio App.3d 702, 2007 Ohio 2417, 872 N.E.2d 986 (Montgomery), where a public 
defender refused to defend his client on the ground that he was unprepared to proceed and that to do 
so would constitute ineffective assistance.  But, as in Christon, above, the court blamed the lawyer 
for the lack of preparation: 
[B]oth attorneys assigned by the Office of the Public Defender had 
done little or nothing in the month during which that office had been 
assigned to the case.  No motions were filed, no notice of alibi was filed, 
and no demand for a jury trial was filed.  Given the fact that defense 
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counsel admittedly did not prepare, and then sat silently by as Blair was 
convicted without any defense whatsoever, it can be presumed that 
appellant was prejudiced by defense counsel’s inaction . . . . 
Id. at para. 16. On the circumstances presented, the court’s reference to those rare circumstances in 
which “counsel has done nothing more in the preparation of the case than be a warm body,” id. at 
para. 13, seems appropriate. See also the Ohio federal case of Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482 
(6th Cir. 2003) (ineffective assistance of counsel; writ of habeas corpus granted unless defendant 
receives new penalty-phase trial within 180 days), where the court focused on counsel’s lack of 
preparation for the penalty phase:  
Counsel presented no meaningful evidence by way of mitigation as a 
result of the failure to investigate and prepare, not as a result of trial 
strategy after thorough research. It is not just that the defense presented 
on Hamblin’s behalf was ineffective; rather, Hamblin’s counsel did not 
present any meaningful mitigation evidence at the sentencing phase 
because he was not prepared due to his lack of knowledge and 
understanding of the sentencing phase of a capital case. This total lack 
of preparation, investigation and understanding of sentencing caused 
counsel’s deficient performance and extreme prejudice to Hamblin. 
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1.1:300  Malpractice Liability 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.1 
ORC 2305.11(A) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.1 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 6.11 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 301:101 
ALI-LGL §§ 48-54 
Wolfram § 5.6 
  
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 6.11 (1996). 
Requirements of prima facie case of malpractice: In Ohio, it makes no difference whether the claim 
arises out of representation by the attorney in a civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding or in a 
nonlitigation context; the elements of a malpractice claim in each are essentially the same. The 
articulation of those elements by the Ohio Supreme Court, in a case premised on alleged negligent 
representation in civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings, is as follows: 
To establish a cause of action for legal malpractice based on negligent 
representation, a plaintiff must show (1) that the attorney owed a duty 
or obligation to the plaintiff, (2) that there was a breach of that duty or 
obligation and that the attorney failed to conform to the standard 
required by law, and (3) that there is a causal connection between the 
conduct complained of and the resulting damage or loss. 
Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 421-22, 674 N.E.2d 1164, 1165-66 (1997) (syllabus), following 
Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989). Accord Jackson v. Greger, 110 
Ohio St.3d 488, 2006 Ohio 4698, 854 N.E.2d 487; Krahn (criminal representation; elements of 
proof for all malpractice claims, whether arising from criminal or civil representation, are the same -- 
a duty arising from the attorney-client relationship, breach of that duty, and damages proximately 
caused by the breach); Davis v. Montenery, 173 Ohio App.3d 740, 2007 Ohio 6221, 880 N.E.2d 
488 (Jefferson) (representation in real estate transfer); Hooks v. Ciccolini, 2002 Ohio 2322, 2002 
Ohio App. LEXIS 2344 (Summit) (criminal representation); see McInnis v. Hyatt Legal Clinics, 
10 Ohio St.3d 112, 461 N.E.2d 1295 (1984) (civil representation).  
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For cases discussing the requisites of formation of an attorney-client relationship, see section 1.2:210 
infra. The test set forth in Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. Hardiman, 100 Ohio St.3d 260, 2003 Ohio 5596, 
798 N.E.2d 369 (relationship can be created by implication “based on the conduct of the parties and 
the reasonable expectations of the person seeking representation,” id. at syllabus; written contract or 
fee payment not required) has been applied by a number of courts of appeals in the malpractice 
context, see, e.g., Neighbors v. Ellis, 2008 Ohio 2110, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1805 (Butler); 
Davis v. Montenery, 173 Ohio App.3d 740, 2007 Ohio 6221, 880 N.E.2d 488 (Jefferson), and, 
more recently, has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in New Destiny Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. 
Wheeler, 129 Ohio St. 3d 39, 2011 Ohio 2266, 950 N.E.2d 157 (strongly endorsing 
reasonable-expectation-of-putative-client test, citing, in addition to Hardiman, Hazard & Hodes, 
among others). 
In a 2009 decision, the Ohio Supreme Court underscored the importance of the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship in the malpractice context. One of the issues before the Court was whether 
a client could sue the lawyer’s firm directly for malpractice. On certified question from the Sixth 
Circuit, the Supreme Court’s answer was “No.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wuerth, 122 Ohio 
St.3d 594, 2009 Ohio 3601, 913 N.E.2d 939. In so deciding, the Court made clear that while 
attorneys can practice “through” firms or legal professional associations, it is the attorney “with 
whom clients have an attorney-client relationship,” id. at para. 18, because “only individuals may 
practice law in Ohio.” Id. at para. 16. Ergo, the lawyer’s firm “does not engage in the practice of law 
and therefore cannot directly commit legal malpractice.” Id. at syllabus one & para. 18. As a result 
of Wuerth, a plaintiff who sues only the firm for malpractice does so at his peril. Bohan v. Dennis C. 
Jackson Co., L.P.A., 188 Ohio App.3d 446, 2010 Ohio 3422, 935 N.E.2d 900 (Cuyahoga) 
(Wuerth retroactively applied in affirming Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal). 
The Wuerth Court went on to consider whether a firm may be vicariously liable for malpractice; it 
concluded that it may be, but “only when one or more of its principals or associates are liable for legal 
malpractice.” Id. at syllabus two. The vicarious liability issue was further explored in Illinois Nat’l 
Ins. Co. v. Wiles, Boyle, Burkholder & Bringardner Co., L.P.A., 158 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 2010 Ohio 
3231, 931 N.E.2d 215 (C.P. Franklin), aff’d, 2010 Ohio 5872, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 4938 
(Franklin). Company sued law firm for malpractice but named no individual attorneys in the firm.  
Following Wuerth, Judge Reece granted summary judgment to the firm and the court of appeals 
affirmed, since, in addition to its not being directly liable, the firm could not be held vicariously liable 
here because no claims were asserted against any lawyer in the firm and any such claims were now 
barred by the statute of limitations.  (The Company had argued that, so long as individual lawyers 
“could” be held liable, the individual need not be sued or actually found liable; given Wuerth, this 
was a non-starter).  
It likewise follows from Wuerth that, even if a lawyer in the firm is sued, that lawyer must be found 
liable for the vicarious liability of the firm to attach. Pierson v. Rion, 2010 Ohio 1793, 2010 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 1492 (Montgomery) (affirming summary judgment for defendants, lawyer and his firm, 
on legal malpractice claim). However, a determination in favor of the individual lawyer on the 
malpractice claim is not necessarily a prerequisite to a finding of no vicarious liability on the part of 
the firm. In Estate of Barney v. Manning, 2011 Ohio 480, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 403 
(Cuyahoga), the court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the law firm, even though 
there had not yet been resolution of the claim against the lawyer in question, because the firm knew 
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nothing of and did not ratify his misconduct, which related to his actions in his capacity as trustee of a 
trust that he had established prior to joining the firm, and that misconduct (squandering all funds in 
trust through investment in business he controlled) fell outside the scope of his employment with the 
firm. 
(In a recent article about the Wuerth decision, Joshua R. Cohen, Was It Wuerth It?, Clev Metro 
B.J., Nov. 2012, at 10, the author asserts that the concurring opinion of the late Chief Justice Moyer 
“validates theories of liability against attorneys that Ohio courts have previously shunned.” Id. That 
seems to us a bit of an overstatement. The one pertinent sentence in Moyer’s opinion states as follows: 
“our holding today does not foreclose the possibility that a law firm may be directly liable on a cause 
of action other than malpractice.” 122 Ohio St.3d 594, at para. 35. Mr. Cohen further asserts that “a 
majority of the Court joined in Chief Justice Moyer’s ‘concurrence.’” Id. at 10. The author so states 
without noting that the opinion is internally inconsistent on this point. At the end of the concurrence, 
four justices are listed as joining in Moyer’s opinion, but the line-up reported after the majority 
opinion indicates that only two justices concurred with the Chief Justice’s separate opinion.) 
Just as Wuerth emphasizes the “attorney” prerequisite in the relationship, New Destiny focuses on 
the “client” requirement. The appellate court had reversed summary judgment for the defendant 
lawyers because, in its view, there were issues of material fact as to whether an attorney-client 
relationship existed between the lawyers and the corporation in question. The Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed (with Justice Lanzinger concurring in judgment only). New Destiny 
Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Wheeler, 129 Ohio St.3d 39, 2011 Ohio 2266, 950 N.E.2d 157. The 
decision provides a template for determining the existence of the attorney-client relationship in 
corporate contexts. The Court first confirms that the intentions of the lawyer and the reasonable 
expectations and belief of the prospective client are paramount: if the putative client manifests such 
an intent and the lawyer either consents or fails to negate consent after the client has reasonably 
assumed that such a relationship had been established, it exists. In the corporate setting, a lawyer 
retained by a corporate entity, “represents the organization acting through its constituents.” Id. at 
para. 27 (citing Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13(a)). 
[B]ecause a corporate attorney represents the organization acting 
through its agents, [again citing to 1.13(a)] in order to form an 
attorney-client relationship with a corporation, the party hiring counsel 
on behalf of the corporation must necessarily have authority to do so 
and must reasonably believe that an attorney-client relationship has 
been established. 
Id. The party purporting to hire the corporation’s lawyers in this contest for control was the president 
of the company, but the board had placed him on a leave of absence, a leave that in November 2000 it 
had extended indefinitely. Thus, the “president,” who retained counsel in December 2000, lacked the 
authority to do so, and there was no evidence of any ratification by the board. As a result, there was no 
evidence of an attorney-client relationship, and the corporation therefore could not maintain an action 
for malpractice. 
Statute of limitations: ORC 2305.11(A)(1) provides that an action for legal malpractice must be 
commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues. See, e.g., Hibbett v. City of Cincinnati, 
4 Ohio App.3d 128, 446 N.E.2d 832 (Hamilton 1982) (applying one-year statute of limitations 
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where “gist” of action involved legal malpractice, regardless of attempts to label claims as ones for 
fraud, negligence not involving physical injury, and breach of contract, all of which have four-year or 
longer statutes of limitations); accord Grover v. Bartsch, 2006 Ohio 6115, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 
6086 (Montgomery) (one-year, not two-year, limitation applied because “the essential character of 
the infliction of emotional distress claims was defamation”); John Oleyar HR-10 Profit Sharing 
Plan & Trust v. Martin, Pergram & Browning Co., L.P.A., No. 01 AP-182, 2001 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5251, at *4 (Franklin Nov. 27, 2001) (“Regardless of whether claims of professional 
misconduct by an attorney are framed in terms of negligence or breach of contract, all such claims 
state a cause of action for legal malpractice” subject to one-year statute of limitations set forth in 
ORC 2305.11(A)). 
(Ohio at one time also had a legal malpractice six-year statute of repose, which ran from the date of 
the act or omission constituting the alleged malpractice, but that provision was subsequently held 
unconstitutional in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 
715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999).) 
While seemingly straightforward on its face, the statute of limitations presents several problems in 
application. First, one must determine when “the cause of action accrues” – the date from which the 
statute of limitations begins to run. Second, one must consider the impact of Ohio provisions 
pertaining to the tolling of claims and the “saving” of dismissed claims in computing the statute’s 
one-year limitation period. 
Accrual of claim: A cause of action for legal malpractice accrues, and the one-year statute of 
limitations commences to run, (1) when there is a cognizable event whereby the client discovers or 
should have discovered that his or her injury was related to the attorney’s act or non-act and the client 
is put on notice of a need to pursue possible remedies against the attorney, or (2) when the 
attorney-client relationship for that particular transaction or undertaking terminates, whichever 
occurs later. Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, 43 Ohio St.3d 54, 538 N.E.2d 398 (1989) 
(syllabus) (applying Omni-Food & Fashion, Inc. v. Smith, 38 Ohio St.3d 385, 528 N.E.2d 941 
(1988); dismissal of malpractice claim on limitations grounds affirmed). Of the many cases in accord, 
see, e.g., Hilario v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., 194 Ohio App.3d 157, 2011 Ohio 1742, 
955 N.E.2d 391 (Cuyahoga) (summary judgment for defendants on limitation grounds reversed), 
appeal not accepted for review, 129 Ohio St.3d 1474, 2011 Ohio 4751, 953 N.E.2d 842; Hamilton 
v. Kirby, 2007 Ohio 5901, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 5177 (Warren) (summary judgment on 
limitations grounds affirmed); Crystal v. Wilsman, 151 Ohio App.3d 512, 2003 Ohio 427, 784 
N.E.2d 764 (Cuyahoga) (summary judgment on limitations grounds reversed). See also FDIC v. 
Alexander, 78 F.3d 1103 (6th Cir. 1996), which contains an informative discussion of both prongs 
of the Zimmie rule. For a decision seizing on the Zimmie language that the cognizable event 
occurred at the time of an adverse trial court decision, when plaintiff was “appreciably and actually 
damaged,” (Zimmie, 43 Ohio St. 3d at 58), see Vassil v. Gross & Gross, LLC, 2011 Ohio 1920, 
2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 1662 (Cuyahoga) (former employer’s statement of intent to terminate 
malpractice plaintiff pursuant to provision in agreement did not constitute cognizable event “because 
[plaintiff] was not appreciably and actually damaged at that point,” id. at para. 5; cognizable event 
occurred at time of arbitrator’s decision that termination provision was enforceable). 
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Occasionally the representation-in-“that particular transaction” aspect of the Zimmie termination 
prong gets overlooked. In Walters v. Royer, 765 F.Supp.2d 1006 (N.D. Ohio 2011), the court used 
the fact that the client still considered the defendant to be his attorney on two patents other than the 
one at issue in the malpractice action to support denial of the lawyer’s motion for summary judgment, 
because reasonable minds could come to the conclusion either that the attorney-client relationship 
continued for purposes of the Zimmie rule, after the client filed a grievance against the lawyer, or that 
the grievance terminated the relationship.  
A number of Eighth District Court of Appeals decisions have elaborated on the definitive definition in 
Zimmie of the “cognizable event” or discovery prong as follows: “A ‘cognizable event’ is an event 
sufficient to alert a reasonable person that in the course of legal representation his attorney committed 
an improper act.” E.g., Chinese Merchs. Ass’n v. Chin, 159 Ohio App.3d 292, 2004 Ohio 6424, 
823 N.E.2d 900, at para. 7 (Cuyahoga). Moreover, “[i]n determining the cognizable event, ‘the 
focus should be on what the client was aware of and not an extrinsic judicial determination.’“ Chin, id. 
(quoting Vagianos v. Halpern, No. 76408, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5856 (Cuyahoga Dec. 14, 
2000)). As the Eighth District further explained in Vocaire v. Stafford & Stafford Co., LPA, 2011 
Ohio 4957, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4104 (Cuyahoga): 
In other words, a cause of action does not arise ‘until the plaintiff 
knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, that he 
or she has been injured’ by the defendant’s conduct . . . . ‘The rule 
entails a two-pronged test – i.e., actual knowledge that one has been 
injured but also that the injury was caused by the conduct of the 
defendant.’ 
Id. at para. 13 (quoting from Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. v. Airline Union’s Mtge. Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 
529, 2011 Ohio 1961, 947 N.E.2d 672, at para. 14). Compare Karaman v. Pickrel, Schaefer & 
Ebeling Co., 2008 Ohio 4139, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3498 (Montgomery), where, although 
acknowledging the “client” knowledge rule, the court’s focus is on the date when a lawyer, who 
subsequently represented plaintiffs in the malpractice action, had allegedly become aware of the 
cognizable event by virtue of statements made by another lawyer. Even if a lawyer’s knowledge can 
be imputed to the client in appropriate circumstances, one wonders how this can be so at a time when 
the lawyer had not yet entered into the representation. 
Cicchini v. Streza, 160 Ohio App.3d 189, 2005 Ohio 1492, 826 N.E.2d 379 (Stark), examined the 
cognizable-event issue in the context of alleged malpractice in the underlying action at the appellate 
level.  The malpractice plaintiff argued that his counsel had failed to advise him of the voting 
propensity of four Supreme Court justices, thereby preventing him from settling the underlying case 
prior to the Court’s adverse ruling.  In affirming the grant of summary judgment to the lawyer 
defendants in the malpractice case on statute-of-limitation grounds, the court of appeals held that the 
cognizable event occurred in 2000, when the Supreme Court reinstated a verdict of more than 
$1,000,000 against Cicchini; thus, as he admitted in deposition testimony, he learned of the 
“disposition or predisposition” of four of the seven justices no later than the date of the adverse 
Supreme Court ruling, which occurred more than one year prior to the filing of the malpractice claim 
in October 2002. 
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The Supreme Court spoke to the termination prong of the Zimmie test most recently in Smith v. 
Conley, 109 Ohio St.3d 141, 2006 Ohio 2035, 846 N.E.2d 509. In Conley, a former client sued a 
lawyer for malpractice. The lawyer filed for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, and 
the motion was granted. The court of appeals reversed; the Supreme Court, in turn reversing the court 
of appeals, held that the action had not been timely filed. 
The facts of the underlying action pertinent to the termination issue were as follows: Conley 
represented Smith in a criminal matter in which Smith, on August 21, 2002, was found guilty of 
passing bad checks. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Smith allegedly discovered exculpatory evidence 
and asked Conley to seek a new trial. Conley was not persuaded of the value of the new evidence, and, 
in an August 26, 2002 telephone conversation, Conley purported to terminate the relationship. He 
memorialized the termination-by-telephone conversation in two letters of August 26 and August 28. 
Conley filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on September 6, 2003. Smith filed his malpractice 
action on September 5, 2003, based on Conley’s conduct of the trial of his criminal matter, resulting 
in conviction. 
After stating the Zimmie test, the Court noted, as to the cognizable event aspect, that the date of 
conviction was the date Smith should have known of the injury allegedly caused by Conley. That date, 
August 21, 2002, was of course not within the one-year limitation period. The Court then turned to the 
termination prong. Smith argued that the date of withdrawal, pursuant to local court rule, was the 
determinative date. The Supreme Court, however, found that local court rules, which vary from court 
to court, “are administrative in nature – designed to facilitate case management. . . . They do not 
implicate constitutional rights. . . . For purposes of R.C. 2305.11, the termination of an attorney-client 
relationship is not controlled by local rules of court.” Id. at para. 9. Instead,  
Conley clearly informed Smith no later than August 28, 2002, that he 
no longer could represent him and would not file further actions on his 
behalf. The efficient administration of justice would not be served if 
the various local rules of court regarding attorney withdrawal 
determined the date of termination of the attorney-client relationship. 
Id. at para. 10. Smith’s malpractice claim was therefore untimely under both prongs of the Zimmie 
test. Justice Lundberg Stratton was the lone dissenter, arguing that the “bright line” provided by local 
court withdrawal rules is the preferable termination test. 
The Second District court of appeals distinguished Smith v. Conley in Daniel v. McKinney, 181 
Ohio App.3d 1, 2009 Ohio 690, 907 N.E.2d 787 (Montgomery), where the lawyer filed a motion to 
withdraw on April 4, 2006, and the plaintiff sent counsel a letter terminating the representation on 
April 7, 2006; the malpractice action was filed on April 5, 2007. The termination/motion to withdraw 
timing in Daniel was the reverse of that in Conley, where there had been “a communication between 
the parties, independent of the subsequently filed motion to withdraw, ‘purporting to terminate the 
attorney-client relationship.’“ Id. at para. 51. In contrast, in Daniel the motion to withdraw preceded 
the termination: “there is no independent communication between the parties purporting to terminate 
the attorney-client relationship until Daniel’s notice, file April 7, 2006, which unequivocally purports 
to terminate the relationship.” Id. The trial court’s dismissal on limitations grounds was therefore 
reversed.  
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Another termination case with a result different from Conley is Busacca v. Maguire & Schneider, 
LLP, 162 Ohio App.3d 689, 2005 Ohio 4215, 834 N.E.2d 856 (Trumbull). In Busacca, former 
clients brought a malpractice action against their lawyers. The trial court granted summary judgment 
for the lawyers, but the court of appeals reversed on the ground that genuine issues of fact existed with 
respect to the termination issue. The critical pieces of evidence were two letters written by the 
client(s), dated October 2000 and February 2001. If the former letter terminated the relationship, the 
malpractice action, filed on November 13, 2001, was out of time; if termination did not occur until the 
February 2001 letter, the action was timely. The October letter from the clients stated that they were 
hiring another attorney but also demanded a status report on the case. The February letter repeated the 
news that they were hiring another attorney, but in addition demanded that the file on the medical 
malpractice case be returned to them before their meeting with their new attorney. The court of 
appeals found that the October letter could be read either as a termination notice or a threat that if the 
requests in the letter were not complied with, they would hire a new attorney. Since there was a 
genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the October letter terminated the relationship, 
the court reversed the summary judgment for the lawyer-defendants and remanded for further 
proceedings. Accord R.E. Holland Excavating, Inc. v. Martin, Browne, Hull & Harper, P.L.L., 
162 Ohio App.3d 471, 2005 Ohio 3662, 833 N.E.2d 1273 (Clark). 
An interesting issue with respect to application of the termination aspect of the Zimmie test is raised 
by the court of appeals’ opinion in Trickett v. Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., 
L.P.A., No. 2000-P-0105, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4806 (Portage Oct. 26, 2001), holding that the 
statute of limitations had run on plaintiff’s claim because the claim was not filed until more than two 
years after the lawyers last provided service to him on the matter (a zoning dispute) on February 21, 
1996. (It was undisputed that discovery of the resulting damage or injury had occurred even earlier.) 
In so deciding, the court expressly declined to follow the rule set forth in Mobberly v. Hendricks, 98 
Ohio App. 3d 839, 649 N.E.2d 1247 (Medina 1994), to the effect that in determining when 
termination occurred, “the court must point to an affirmative act by either the attorney or the client 
that signals the end of the relationship.”  Id. at 843, 649 N.E.2d at 1249. While, in the words of the 
court, “there was no such affirmative act,” Trickett nevertheless held that 
given the absence of any legal remedies available to appellant with 
respect to his zoning appeal subsequent to February 21, 1996, and his 
lack of communication with appellees subsequent to that date, the 
attorney-client relationship between appellant and appellees for that 
particular transaction terminated on February 21, 1996. 
2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4806, at *3. Mobberly would appear to be the sounder of the two 
approaches, based on the court’s analysis that, while the client may terminate the relationship at any 
time, an attorney is not free to withdraw without notice to the client and, if required by applicable 
court rules, permission of the court, citing former OH DR 2-110(A).  98 Ohio App.3d at 843, 649 
N.E.2d at 1249. [But see, as to the effect of obtaining permission to withdraw pursuant to court rules, 
Smith v. Conley supra.] Trickett does not deal with this reasoning. Indeed, it could be argued that 
the facts in Trickett may have met the Mobberly affirmative act test in any event, in that the law firm 
had declined to represent plaintiff in the filing of civil rights claims against government officials 
based on their conduct arising during the zoning dispute. See 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4806, at *3.  
See also Blackwell v. Gorman, 142 Ohio Misc.2d 50, 2007 Ohio 3504, 870 N.E.2d 1238 (Franklin 
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C.P.) (law firm letter stating that our representation of you has concluded, sent well within the 
one-year statutory period; summary judgment on limitations grounds denied), and McGlothin v. 
Schad, 194 Ohio App.3d 669, 2011 Ohio 3011, 957 N.E.2d 810 (Warren) (examining the 
termination issue from both Mobberly and Trickett perspectives). 
A further wrinkle on the termination-of-employment issue is seen in the case of John Oleyar HR-10 
Profit Sharing Plan & Trust v. Martin, Pergram & Browning Co., L.P.A., No 01AP-182, 2001 
Ohio App. LEXIS 5251 (Franklin Nov. 27, 2001), where the court, citing Mobberly as authority 
(id. at *12), affirmed summary judgment for the defendant attorneys on statute of limitations grounds. 
The court concluded that the attorney-client relationship terminated no later than November 1995, 
when the lawyer had ceased serving in the capacity of attorney; suit was not filed until January 22, 
1999. (The court held that the cognizable event occurred prior to January 22, 1998.) Also, in late 1993 
or early 1994, the lawyer told the client to pick up his papers or they would be destroyed and the client 
made reference to receiving a “final bill” during 1994. The fact that the lawyer later attempted to 
contact the client to pass on some information about the matter “did not resuscitate the attorney-client 
relationship.” Id. Perhaps the “final bill” remark by the client and/or the pick-up 
papers-or-they-will-be-destroyed notice by the attorney satisfied the Mobberly test, but the court 
does not explicitly tie its citation to Mobberly to either of these two instances. 
Actions of either party that dissolve the “essential mutual confidence” between attorney and client 
can signal the termination of the attorney-client relationship, which actions can trigger the running of 
the statute of limitations. See Wozniak v. Tonidandel, 121 Ohio App.3d 221, 699 N.E.2d 555 
(Cuyahoga 1997) (attorney-client relationship can be terminated by letter from attorney to client, or, 
as in this case, where, after jury verdict, attorney told client his firm’s involvement in case was over). 
Since the question of when the attorney-client relationship terminates is one of fact, Omni-Food & 
Fashion, Inc. v. Smith, 38 Ohio St.3d 385, 528 N.E.2d 941 (1988), summary judgment on 
limitations grounds is not properly granted where there is conflicting evidence as to the termination 
date. Compare Sinsky v. Gatien, No. 19795, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3903 (Summit Aug. 30, 2000) 
(conflicting evidence as to date of termination; also, counsel continued to represent client after 
supposed termination date; summary judgment for defendant attorneys reversed), and Monastra v. 
D’Amore, 111 Ohio App.3d 296, 676 N.E.2d 132 (Cuyahoga 1996) (evidence that lawyer 
continued to act as client’s attorney on matter after client fired him; summary judgment for attorney 
reversed), with Williams-Pytlik v. Biviano, Nos. 97-T-0022, 97-T-0063, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 
3638 (Trumbull Aug. 7, 1998) (no evidence indicating relationship ended other than on date of 
client’s letter dismissing defendant as her lawyer, more than one year prior to date suit was brought; 
summary judgment on limitations grounds affirmed). Fact issues can likewise arise with respect to 
when the client discovered or should have discovered that his or her injury was related to the 
attorney’s malpractice. E.g., Vagianos v. Halpern, No. 76408, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5856 
(Cuyahoga Dec. 14, 2000) (summary judgment for defendants reversed). 
Continuous representation: It follows from the termination aspect of the Zimmie rule that a client’s 
malpractice claim does not accrue so long as the attorney continuously represents the client on the 
matter. See Feudo v. Pavlik, 55 Ohio App.3d 217, 563 N.E.2d 351 (Cuyahoga 1988) (lawyer 
defendants argued that claim accrued on March 28, 1985, when plaintiff allegedly should have 
discovered his injury and when attorney-client relationship allegedly terminated. Reversing trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants, appellate court held that malpractice claim was 
100
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.1 
  
not time-barred where defendant attorneys conceded that Pavlik continued to work on appeal of case 
and that his representation of plaintiff was “nominally continuous” until appeal was decided on 
August 12, 1985; malpractice action was filed within eight months of determination of appeal). 
Accord Kumar v. Higgins, 91 F. Supp.2d 119 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (summary judgment motion by 
defendant lawyers, based on Ohio statute of limitations, denied; even though plaintiff should have 
discovered the malpractice in 1995, the legal relationship continued until December 1998, and suit 
was brought within one year of that date). 
But “continuous representation” by the same law firm does not extend the accrual/termination date. 
Thus, in Fisk v. Rauser & Assocs. Legal Clinic Co., LLC, 2011 Ohio 5465, 2011 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 4485 (Franklin), appeal not allowed, 131 Ohio St.3d 1459, 2012 Ohio 648, 961 N.E.2d 
1137, plaintiffs sued their law firm and two of its attorneys. The malpractice, if any, was committed 
by Rauser attorney A. He ceased to represent plaintiff when he left the firm in July 2007 and was 
succeeded by Rauser attorney B. Suit was filed in May 2009. In affirming summary judgment for all 
defendants, the appellate court made clear that 
continuing representation of a client by a firm acting through several 
successive individual attorneys cannot extend the time to sue for 
alleged malpractice by any one of those individual attorneys. Id. at 
para. 19. 
This the court found to be a “logical corollary” of the Supreme Court’s Wuerth decision, holding that 
a law firm cannot be directly liable for malpractice and can be vicariously liable only if one of its 
attorneys is liable. Thus, 
the actual fact of organizational representation does not alter the fact 
that malpractice is committed by individual attorneys and the plaintiff 
must succeed in an action on its own merits against such an individual 
before proceeding to establish vicarious liability on the part of an 
employer or firm. 
Id. (The Wuerth decision is discussed in this section supra at “Requirements of prima facie case of 
malpractice.”) 
Tolling the statute of limitations - In general: Under Ohio law, the running of the statute of limitations 
will be tolled if (a) the person against whom a claim accrues is out of the state, see ORC 2305.15(A); 
(b) the person against whom a claim accrues is imprisoned, see ORC 2305.15(B); (c) the person in 
whose favor a claim accrues is (i) a minor or (ii) of unsound mind, see ORC 2305.16. (An earlier 
provision that extended tolling to incarcerated plaintiffs during the time of their incarceration was 
repealed by 143 Ohio Laws 581 (1990) (amendment to ORC 2305.16, effective 1-13-91).) 
Tolling the statute of limitations - Interpretive issues: One must be cautious in applying the provision 
tolling the statute of limitations if the person against whom the claim accrues is out of the state (ORC 
2305.15(A)), as both constitutional and statutory construction concerns cloud its application. In 
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwestco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988), the United States 
Supreme Court held that ORC 2305.15(A), as applied to a foreign corporation having no presence in 
Ohio, imposes an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Relying on Bendix, the Second 
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District Court of Appeals ruled in Gray v. Austin, 75 Ohio App.3d 96, 598 N.E.2d 893 
(Montgomery 1992), that ORC 2305.15(A) cannot constitutionally be applied to toll the running of 
the limitations period in a malpractice action in which the defendant attorney had moved out of state, 
at least where there is no allegation that the defendant had absconded or concealed himself to avoid 
service. 
A later decision by the Ohio Supreme Court, however, raises the question whether Gray v. Austin is 
still good law. In Johnson v. Rhodes, 89 Ohio St.3d 540, 733 N.E.2d 1132 (2000), the Court held 
that the tolling provisions of ORC 2305.15(A) apply and are not unconstitutional under Bendix 
where the defendants (presumably Ohio residents -- the opinion never expressly so states) took a 
ten-day vacation out of state and plaintiffs missed the two-year personal-injury limitation period by 
two days. As a result, the limitation period having been tolled for ten days, plaintiffs’ action was 
timely filed. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the unconstitutionality ruling in Bendix was limited 
to its facts -- i.e., an out-of state corporation having no agent for service within the state, thereby 
placing on such a foreign corporation a “‘greater burden . . . than it does on Ohio companies’ in 
violation of the Commerce Clause.”  Id. at 543, 733 N.E.2d at 1134. On the facts of Johnson, the 
Court held that 
[t]he application of R.C. 2305.15 against an individual, who 
temporarily leaves the state of Ohio for non-business reasons, does not 
constitute an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 
Id. (emphasis added). Accord Lisi v. Henkel, 175 Ohio App.3d 463, 2008 Ohio 816, 887 N.E.2d 
1209 (Lucas). How does Johnson impact on the Gray decision, a malpractice case in which the 
defendant attorney, an individual, had moved (i.e., left the jurisdiction permanently) for business 
reasons, to establish his law practice in the Virgin Islands? Only time will tell, but it would appear that 
Gray should survive, given that two of the three bases in Johnson for differentiating Bendix 
(temporary absence; non-business reasons) were not present in Gray. Such a result appears sound -- 
the interstate commerce result ought not depend on whether the defendant is an out-of-state 
corporation or an out-of-state individual. Indeed, the court in Tesar v. Hallas, 738 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. 
Ohio 1990) (following Bendix where individual had moved out of state), noted that such an 
individual is arguably penalized more by the tolling provision, since Ohio provides no mechanism 
whereby he or she can appoint an agent for service of process, as a foreign corporation can.  Id. at 
242-43. And both can be reached out of state by means of the long-arm statute and rule, ORC 
2307.382(A), OH Civ R 4.3(A). 
Post-Johnson court of appeals cases indicate that Gray should survive -- ORC 2305.15 is 
unconstitutional pursuant to the Bendix analysis when applied to individual nonresidents of Ohio; 
otherwise it “‘could perpetually subject the non-resident to potential liability.’“ Grover v. Bartsch, 
2006 Ohio 6115, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6086. at para. 40 (Montgomery) (defamation action; 
quoting Ruble v. Ream, infra); Ruble v. Ream, 2003 Ohio 5969, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 5290 
(Washington) (personal injury action against nonresident motorist). Compare Drumm v. Brekken, 
2005 Ohio 1428, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 1385 (Mercer) (tolling statute unconstitutional as applied 
to nonresident motorist who moved with his family to another state shortly after accident because 
father lost his job in Ohio; Johnson not cited), with Cramer v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 158 
Ohio App.3d 110, 2004 Ohio 3891, 814 N.E.2d 97 (Hamilton) (tolling statute found applicable, 
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following Johnson, to former Ohio resident who permanently left Ohio many years ago, but two of 
three concurring judges noted that argument “can certainly be made” that tolling as to nonresidents is 
unconstitutional; “in an appropriate case where this issue is raised and properly briefed, we must 
address whether the same reasoning [of Bendix as to nonresident corporations] applies to nonresident 
individuals,” id. at para. 33). 
Should the Ohio lawyer who must temporarily leave the state for business purposes, or who elects to 
do so for non-business purposes, be forced to forgo a portion of his or her 
malpractice-statute-of-limitations protection by doing so? Even if not a commerce clause violation, 
would it implicate the constitutionally protected right to travel (see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969))? In describing the history of the Johnson case, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that 
the trial court had held the tolling provision unconstitutional as unduly infringing on the 
constitutionally protected right to travel, but that the decision of the court of appeals affirming the 
trial court “rests on the position that R.C. 2305.15 imposes an impermissible burden on interstate 
commerce.” 89 Ohio St.3d at 541, 733 N.E.2d at 1133. There is no other reference to the 
right-to-travel theory in the opinion; perhaps the defendants abandoned it on appeal. 
(Application of the out-of-state tolling provision has produced some opinions that turn on the smallest 
of details. The question whether fractional days count as tolled days has been addressed in court of 
appeals cases not involving lawyers as parties. For a summary of the various options, see Wheating v. 
Jasman, No. L-02-1026, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3743 (Lucas July 19, 2002) (counting partial day 
as full day; counting total of actual time out of state; not counting partial days at all).) 
Statute not tolled: The statute of limitations is not tolled by filing a grievance with a local bar 
association, inasmuch as the plenary power to discipline attorneys, vested ultimately in the Ohio 
Supreme Court, does not include the power to modify any substantive right embodied in the statute of 
limitations applicable to a legal malpractice action brought in a court of common pleas.  Lewis v. 
Roselle, 63 Ohio App.3d 254, 578 N.E.2d 546 (Hamilton 1990). Nor is the statute of limitations 
tolled by the malpractice plaintiff’s having previously filed a declaratory judgment action on a related 
matter in probate court.  Knauber v. Smith & Schnacke, 42 Ohio App.3d 1, 536 N.E.2d 403 
(Hamilton 1987). Likewise, the malpractice statute of limitations is not tolled by pendency of a 
criminal appeal raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the same facts as the 
malpractice claim.  Tolliver v. McDonnell, 155 Ohio App.3d 10, 2003 Ohio 5390, 798 N.E.2d 
1176 (Cuyahoga) (Zimmie “cognizable event” test applied; plaintiff aware of alleged malpractice no 
later than date of his letter directing lawyer handling his criminal appeal to assert 
ineffective-assistance-of counsel claim). 
Equitable estoppel: In Fiorini, D.C., v. Speaker, 2002 Ohio 3541, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3634 
(Cuyahoga), plaintiff argued that defendants were equitably estopped from asserting the statute of 
limitations defense because they indicated an interest in settling the malpractice case as the 
limitations deadline drew near. The court of appeals rejected the argument and affirmed summary 
judgment for the lawyers on numerous grounds, including (1) failure to raise the issue in the trial 
court; (2) the lack of any misleading factual misrepresentation with respect to the statute; and (3) most 
tellingly, clear evidence in the record that plaintiff’s lawyer was well aware that the limitations 
deadline was approaching but nevertheless missed the filing date by two months. 
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Savings statute: ORC 2305.19(A) provides that, in an action commenced or attempted to be 
commenced, where a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon 
the merits (e.g., voluntary dismissal), the plaintiff may commence a new action within one year of that 
event, or within the statute of limitations period, whichever occurs later.  
An interesting application of the savings provision in the malpractice context arose in Ralich v. 
Lowrey, 2002 Ohio 3408, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3478 (Summit), where plaintiff sued lawyer A 
for malpractice. After voluntarily dismissing, plaintiff refiled his action within the one-year savings 
provision of ORC 2305.19, but also added attorney B as a party defendant. (Attorney B was allegedly 
vicariously liable as A’s law partner.) Summary judgment was granted to attorney B, and the court of 
appeals affirmed. Inasmuch as Supreme Court precedent holds that the savings clause applies only 
when the two actions are “substantially the same” and that this test is not met when the parties in the 
two actions are different, plaintiff’s action against B was unprotected by the savings statute and thus 
barred by the one-year malpractice statute of limitations. 
See also Tattletale Portable Alarm Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold LLP, 772 F.Supp.2d 
893 (S.D. Ohio 2011), denying the lawyer-defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the action as 
untimely, premised on the alleged inapplicability of ORC 2305.19(A). Defendant argued (seemingly 
ignoring the “or attempted to be commenced” statutory language) that an earlier state court action had 
not been properly commenced due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Looking to Ohio precedent, 
Judge Sargus concluded that involuntary dismissals for want of subject matter jurisdiction are failures 
otherwise than on the merits and that such actions are properly “commenced” for 2305.19 savings 
statute purposes.  
(But you can’t come back for a third bite – a dismissed action can be refiled within a year but a refiled 
action that is dismissed receives no second life from RC 2305.19 and must sink or swim based on the 
originally applicable one-year malpractice statute of limitations. Boggs v. Baum, 2011 Ohio 2489, 
2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2119 (Franklin) (ironically, in Boggs, the malpractice plaintiff was suing 
his former lawyer for missing the one-year savings clause period in a personal-injury action, and he 
suffered a similar fate at the hands of his lawyer in the malpractice action for failure to comply with 
the one-year limitations statute, after having previously exercised his one-time use of the savings 
clause). 
Survival of claim: A malpractice claim against the estate of a deceased attorney survives the 
attorney’s death pursuant to ORC 2305.21, inasmuch as it is a cause of action that survives at 
common law and it constitutes an injury to the plaintiff’s property interests.  Loveman v. Hamilton, 
66 Ohio St.2d 183, 420 N.E.2d 1007 (1981). The claim survives the death of the claimant as well. 
“[T]he statute [ORC 2305.21] applies equally to ‘the death of the person entitled or liable thereto.’ . . . 
The Loveman holding applies to mandate the survival of a legal malpractice claim after the death of 
the party entitled to assert the claim.” Hosfelt v. Miller, No. 97-JE-50, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 
5506, at *4 (Jefferson Nov. 22, 2000) (summary judgment for lawyer and firm with which he was 
associated reversed; lack of privity argument irrelevant; suit brought, not by beneficiary, but by 
administrator of estate of decedent against whom malpractice allegedly practiced). 
Ineffective assistance of counsel:  In the discussion that follows, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
decisions, as well as malpractice cases, are cited.  While the thrust of ineffective-assistance cases is of 
course different (the doctrine is invoked by criminal defendants asserting that they were deprived of 
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their Sixth Amendment rights), the lawyer conduct underlying both ineffective-assistance and 
malpractice claims typically raises competence issues -- i.e., did the lawyer conduct in question fall 
below “an objective standard of reasonable representation,” e.g., State v. Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22, 
2007 Ohio 4836, 873 N.E.2d 828, at para. 62; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 137, 538 
N.E.2d 373, 375 (1989) (syllabus two).  It is on this competency aspect that the 
ineffective-assistance cases are presented below.  In recognition of the similarity of the underlying 
issue of competency, a malpractice plaintiff who also had asserted an ineffective-assistance claim 
against the same lawyer for the same alleged misconduct has created a “cognizable event” for 
malpractice statute of limitation purposes under the first prong of the Zimmie test.  McGlothin v. 
Schad, 194 Ohio App.3d 669, 2011 Ohio 3011, 957 N.E.2d 810 (Warren).  See also discussion of 
these two analogous groups of cases in section 1.1:200 at “Skill requirements - Malpractice and 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standards.” 
Malpractice liability found or supported: Representative of modern Ohio Supreme Court cases 
supporting malpractice liability are the following: 
 LeRoy v. Allen, Yurasek & Merklin, 114 Ohio St.3d 323, 2007 Ohio 3608, 872 N.E.2d 
254 (allegations of “collusion” sufficient to withstand Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal under malice 
exception to Scholler/Simon rule (as to which see section 1.1:410 infra) in malpractice action 
brought by nonclient children against lawyers for their mother with respect to “orchestration” of 
execution of new will for the mother and transfer of all her stock in closely held corporation of which 
she was majority shareholder) (the LeRoy decision is further discussed in this section infra at 
“Malpractice liability not found,” and in sections 1.1:370, 1.1:410, and 1.13:520); 
 Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 674 N.E.2d 1164 (1997) (failure properly to disclose to 
clients all matters and legal consequences surrounding plea bargains entered into by clients in 
criminal matters and settlement arrangements agreed to by clients in various civil matters, as well as 
failing to protect clients’ interests in other underlying matters, supported claim of malpractice; 
affirmance of summary judgment for defendant attorneys reversed); 
 Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 68 Ohio St.3d 453, 628 N.E.2d 1335 (1994) (defendant 
attorneys, who represented limited partnership and general partner thereof, owed duty of due care to 
nonclient limited partners; summary judgment for defendants on limited partners’ malpractice claim 
reversed and case remanded for consideration of issues of breach of duty, causation, and damages) 
(for further discussion of the Arpadi case, see sections 1.1:410 and 1.1:440);  
 Elam v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 44 Ohio St.3d 175, 541 N.E.2d 616 (1989) (vested beneficiary 
of estate is in privity with fiduciary of estate, and fiduciary’s attorneys therefore not immune from 
malpractice liability in suit by nonclient beneficiary; summary judgment for defendant attorneys 
reversed) (for further discussion of the Elam case, see section 1.1:410);  
 Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989) (attorney failed to disclose 
plea bargain in criminal action and failed to appear before liquor commission to defend violation 
notice; reversal of summary judgment for defendant attorneys affirmed);  
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 McInnis v. Hyatt Legal Clinics, 10 Ohio St.3d 112, 461 N.E.2d 1295 (1984) (per curiam) 
(lawyer’s effecting publication in local newspaper of client’s pending divorce contrary to client’s 
specific instructions and after promising client in writing there would be no publication, instead of 
advising client that publication was required by law pursuant to ORC 3105.06, supported client’s 
claim for malpractice; reversal of directed verdict for defendant attorneys affirmed). 
See State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007 Ohio 4837, 873 N.E.2d 858 (failure to challenge 
competency to testify of defendant’s alleged wife, the main witness against him in aggravated murder 
case, constituted ineffective assistance); State v. Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303, 750 N.E.2d 148 (2001) 
(ineffective assistance of counsel; failure to present potentially dispositive statutory defense at trial 
and appellate levels required remand for new trial). Kole is also discussed at section 1.1:320. See also 
Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2007) (ineffective assistance at sentencing phase of trial 
for aggravated murder, where defendant was sentenced to death; failure to conduct even the most 
basic interviews, which would have revealed “highly relevant mitigating evidence,” id. at 712). 
Accord Van Hook v. Anderson, 560 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2009) (“last minute” investigations not 
begun until after completion of guilt phase deficient under “‘prevailing professional norms.’“ Id. at 
529, quoting Strickland). 
Court of appeals decisions supporting malpractice liability include Davis v. Montenery, 173 Ohio 
App.3d 740, 2007 Ohio 6221, 880 N.E.2d 488 (Jefferson) (summary judgment for lawyer reversed; 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether client-attorney relationship existed between plaintiff and 
lawyer defendant, and, if so, whether defendant breached resultant duty to plaintiff’s harm); Nalls v. 
Nystrom, 159 Ohio App.3d 200, 2004 Ohio 6230, 823 N.E.2d 500 (Montgomery) (summary 
judgment for lawyer reversed; alleged breach of professional duty in failing to pursue 
appeal/postconviction relief; whether representation included such obligation was disputed issue of 
fact); Montali v. Day, 2002 Ohio 2715, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 2812 (Cuyahoga) (summary 
judgment for lawyer reversed; elements of malpractice claim pleaded and supported by expert 
testimony; genuine issue of material fact exists); Brinkman v. Doughty, 140 Ohio App.3d 494, 748 
N.E.2d 116 (Clark 2000) (summary judgment for defendant lawyers reversed; for purposes of 
maintaining legal malpractice action, attorney-client relationship between lawyers and administrator 
of estate extended to statutory wrongful death beneficiaries, inasmuch as beneficiaries were in privity 
with administrator; Arpadi and Elam followed) (see further discussion of Brinkman at section 
1.1:400); Rumley v. Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, 129 Ohio App.3d 638, 718 N.E.2d 964 
(Franklin 1998) (reversing 12(B)(6) dismissal in favor of defendant law firm; complaint alleging 
firm’s abandonment of client sufficiently stated breach of duty and resulting damages); Huffer v. 
Cicero, 107 Ohio App.3d 65, 667 N.E.2d 1031 (Highland 1995) (attorney’s failure to disclose 
plea-bargain offer in criminal action; Krahn followed; additional damages proximately caused by the 
malpractice allowed on appeal); Harrell v. Crystal, 81 Ohio App.3d 515, 611 N.E.2d 908 
(Cuyahoga 1992) (attorney advised clients to invest in speculative tax shelters without properly 
investigating investments and individuals involved (one of whom was convicted felon), failed to 
request letter ruling from IRS to determine whether shelters were legal, and failed to advise clients on 
ways to avoid resultant IRS interest and penalties; judgment on jury verdict for plaintiffs affirmed); 
David v. Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Rock, L.P.A., 79 Ohio App.3d 786, 799, 607 N.E.2d 
1173, 1181 (Cuyahoga 1992) (“In this case, there was competent, credible evidence going to all 
elements of plaintiff’s cause of action for legal malpractice as she established that she had entered into 
an attorney-client relationship with defendant in her domestic relations action, that defendant 
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[attorney] then breached duties inherent to that relationship by subsequently agreeing to act as 
co-counsel for Dr. David [the defendant] in that same action, and that defendant’s conduct 
proximately caused plaintiff to incur damages.”); Williams v. Hyatt Legal Servs., No. 14235, 1990 
Ohio App. LEXIS 934 (Summit Mar. 14, 1990) (contrary to representations by attorney that she 
would file, and subsequently that she had filed, bankruptcy petition, attorney failed to do so and client 
lost her home to foreclosure; judgment on jury verdict for plaintiff affirmed). See State v. Blair, 171 
Ohio App.3d 702, 2007 Ohio 2417, 872 N.E.2d 986 (defense counsel did not prepare, then “sat 
silently by as Blair was convicted without any defense whatsoever”‘; “defense counsel did not satisfy 
even the most minimal standards of professional conduct.”  Id. at paras. 16, 22). 
In Estate of Holmes v. Ludeman, No. L-00-1294, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4501 (Lucas Oct. 5, 
2001), the question was raised whether lawyers associated with the primary defendant could be liable 
for his malpractice. The trial court had held that the association of lawyers was not a partnership and 
granted summary judgment for the “firm” and for the three lawyers associated with the primary 
defendant. Reversing, the court of appeals held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to 
whether the four attorneys were conducting business as a partnership in fact or as a partnership by 
estoppel. 
Malpractice liability not found: In addition to the many cases decided on the basis of the statute of 
limitations, malpractice defendants have prevailed on a variety of other grounds.   
In the Supreme Court, see New Destiny Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Wheeler, 128 Ohio St.3d 39, 2011 
Ohio 2266, 950 N.E.2d 157 (failure to establish one of the prerequisites to malpractice liability – 
existence of attorney-client relationship; court of appeals reversed and summary judgment for 
defendants reinstated); Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, 118 Ohio St.3d 226, 2008 Ohio 2012, 887 
N.E.2d 1167 (potential beneficiaries under will not in privity with testatrix and therefore had no 
standing to sue testatrix’s attorney, who drafted real estate contract deeding property to one of her 
sons, thereby allegedly reducing estate share of her other beneficiary-children; summary judgment 
affirmed) (for further discussion of the Shoemaker case, see section 1.1:410); LeRoy v. Allen, 
Yurasek & Merklin, 114 Ohio St.3d 323, 2007 Ohio 3608, 872 N.E.2d 254 (nonclient children not 
in privity with mother in malpractice suit against mother’s lawyers regarding private transaction 
transferring to another of all of mother’s stock in closely held corporation) (for further discussion of 
LeRoy, see this section supra at “Malpractice liability found or supported,” and sections 1.1:370, 
1.1:410, and 1.13:520); Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 512 N.E.2d 636 (1987) (potential 
beneficiary under will not in privity with testator and therefore has no standing to sue testator’s 
attorney, who drafted will, for malpractice; summary judgment for attorney reinstated) (for further 
discussion of the Simon case see section 1.1:410).  See State v. Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22, 2007 
Ohio 4836, 873 N.E.2d 828 (rejecting arguments that trial counsel in capital murder case rendered 
ineffective assistance during voir dire, at guilt phase, and at penalty phase). 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal was rejected in State v. Burke, 97 Ohio St.3d 
55, 2002 Ohio 5310, 776 N.E.2d 79 (“since the basis of Burke’s claim is counsel’s failure to raise 
certain issues on appeal, we note that appellate counsel need not raise every possible issue in order to 
render constitutionally effective assistance,” id. at para. 7). Accord State v. Mack, 101 Ohio St.3d 
397, 2004 Ohio 1526, 805 N.E.2d 1108 (“In order to show ineffective assistance, Mack ‘must prove 
that his counsel were deficient for failing to raise the issues he now presents and that there was a 
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reasonable probability of success had he presented those claims on appeal,” id. at para. 5, quoting 
State v. Sheppard, 91 Ohio St.3d 329, 330, 744 N.E.2d 770, 771 (1991)). 
In the courts of appeals, see, e.g., Bohan v. Dennis C. Jackson Co., L.P.A., 188 Ohio App.3d 446, 
2010 Ohio 3422, 935 N.E.2d 900 (Cuyahoga) (law firm cannot be liable for malpractice (Wuerth); 
beneficiary of revocable trust lacked privity); DiBenedetto v. Miller, 180 Ohio App.3d 69, 2008 
Ohio 6506, 904 N.E.2d 554 (12(B)(6) dismissal affirmed; absence of attorney-client relationship 
between malpractice plaintiff (cognovit note debtor) and defendant attorneys, who confessed 
judgment against debtor on note); Davis v. Eachus, 2004 Ohio 5720, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 5162 
(Pike) (summary judgment for defendant lawyers affirmed; plaintiff presented no evidence of 
professional malpractice premised on failure to challenge deed on grounds of fraud; inasmuch as 
there was no fraud found on part of nonlawyer defendants, “it follows that [the lawyer] could not have 
committed malpractice by failing to challenge the deed on such grounds.”  Id. at para. 46 n.12.). 
Hahn v. Jennings, 2004 Ohio 4789, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4320 (Franklin) (summary judgment 
for defendant attorneys affirmed; court unable to say that defendants overlooked or ignored viable or 
colorable argument in appeal in underlying action on behalf of present plaintiffs); Schneider, Smeltz, 
Ranney & LaFond, P.L.L. v. Kedia, 154 Ohio App.3d 117, 2003 Ohio 4567, 796 N.E.2d 553 
(Cuyahoga) (summary judgment for law firm affirmed; integration clause of settlement agreement 
used to show that malpractice counterclaimant “had read the agreement and found it to be in 
accordance with his understanding,” therefore he cannot contradict that statement to create a genuine 
issue of fact for trial.  Id. at para. 14.); C.R. Withem Enters. v. Maley, 2002 Ohio 5056, 2002 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 5096 (Fairfield) (partial summary judgment for defendant lawyers affirmed; no 
evidence by plaintiffs contradicting defendants’ expert’s affidavit that malpractice claim, based on 
failure to pursue rescission remedy, was meritless; on claim that defendants negligently presented 
witness testimony on compensatory damages, court found plaintiff’s experts’ conclusory affidavit 
insufficient to support claim and plaintiffs’ self-serving affidavit failed to present genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether defendant’s failure to perfect appeal from adverse judgment was 
malpractice); Advanced Analytics Labs., Inc. v. Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, L.P.A., 148 Ohio 
App.3d 440, 2002 Ohio 3328, 773 N.E.2d 1081 (Franklin) (summary judgment for defendant 
lawyers affirmed; plaintiff failed to present evidence creating genuine issue of material fact as to (1) 
defendants’ alleged negligence in preparing financing statements, (2) existence of duty to protect 
client from wrongful treatment by client’s debtor in bankruptcy proceedings, and (3) existence of any 
damage flowing from defendants’ supposedly negligent preparation of subordinated loan agreement) 
(the judicial estoppel aspect of the case is discussed in section 1.1:370 at “Judicial estoppel”); 
Sprague v. Simon, 144 Ohio App.3d 437, 760 N.E.2d 833 (Ashtabula 2001) (summary judgment 
affirmed for want of duty; suit premised on lawyer’s failure timely to file on insured’s behalf 
wrongful death/survivorship crossclaim in underlying action; to extent attorney-client relationship 
existed between plaintiff insured and lawyer, hired by insurance company for limited purpose of 
defending insured on personal injury claim, it did not extend to or create duty with respect to filing of 
crossclaim); Treft v. Leatherman, 74 Ohio App.3d 655, 600 N.E.2d 278 (Hancock 1991) 
(allegation that attorney failed to obtain plea bargain, when no offer of same was made by state, 
insufficient to state malpractice claim; Krahn v. Kinney (failure to disclose plea bargain made by 
state), distinguished).  
See also Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1992) (beneficiaries of inter vivos trust 
created by their grandmother had no standing to bring malpractice action against attorney relating to 
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services performed for grandmother before her death because of lack of privity at that time between 
grandmother and grandchildren), aff’g on this point 747 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ohio 1990). For a case 
raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issues in which the court held that the lawyer’s conduct did 
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, see State v. Baker, 159 Ohio App.3d 462, 
2005 Ohio 45, 824 N.E.2d 162 (Greene) (“a debatable decision concerning trial strategy cannot form 
the basis of a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel,” id. at para. 9, citing State v. Cook, 65 
Ohio St.3d 516, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992)). 
 
1.1:310  Relevance of Ethics Codes in Malpractice Actions 
As was stated with respect to the former OHCPR, “violation of the Disciplinary Rules does not, in 
itself, create a private cause of action.” Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St.3d 
171, 178, 707 N.E.2d 853, 859 (1999) (trade secret/tortious interference case). Accord Am. Express 
Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Mandilakis, 111 Ohio App.3d 160, 675 N.E.2d 1279 (Cuyahoga 
1996) (potential DR 702(B)(1) liability does not give rise to civil liability for malpractice). However, 
as Judge Karpinski noted in her concurring opinion in Kutnick v. Fischer, 2004 Ohio 5378, 2004 
Ohio App. LEXIS 4907 (Cuyahoga), “[a]lthough a violation of the [OHCPR] is not, in itself, a 
form of legal malpractice, the Code sets a background against which legal practice is understood.” Id. 
at para. 96. Accord Findlay/Hancock County Bar Ass’n v. Filkins, 90 Ohio St.3d 1, 7, 734 
N.E.2d 764, 769 (2000) (“a successful disciplinary action may support a malpractice action for 
damages.”). See Columbus Bar Ass’n v. McCorkle, 105 Ohio St.3d 430, 2005 Ohio 2588, 828 
N.E.2d 99 (referencing default judgment in malpractice action obtained by client based on neglect in 
respondent’s letting statute of limitation run on client’s personal injury claim). And see 
Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 61 Ohio App.3d 506, 512, 573 N.E.2d 159, 163 (Franklin 
1989) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that defendant attorney’s conflict of interest violative of 
OHCPR constituted malpractice per se, resulting, without more, in legal malpractice liability; “the 
client must have incurred damages which were directly and proximately caused by the attorney’s 
malpractice”).  Accord DeMeo v. Provident Bank, 2008 Ohio 2936, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 2475 
(Cuyahoga). See also Montgomery v. Gooding, Huffman, Kelly & Becker, 163 F. Supp.2d 831 
(N.D. Ohio 2001) (violations of OHCPR “do not constitute malpractice per se,” id. at 836, citing 
Rogers). 
The Rules of Professional Conduct carry forward these guidelines. See Scope at [20]: 
 Violation of a rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action 
against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case 
that a legal duty has been breached. . . . [The rules] are not designed to 
be a basis for civil liability. . . . Nevertheless, since the rules do 
establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a rule 
may be evidence of a breach of the applicable standard of conduct. 
Conversely, conduct that constitutes malpractice may not rise to the level of a disciplinary violation. 
See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kay, 75 Ohio St.3d 397, 398, 662 N.E.2d 351, 352 (1996) 
(finding that attorney’s misrepresentation to his client concerning the status of his case, which had 
been dismissed, “constituted more than just negligence” and merited disciplinary action). Cf. Collins 
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v. Morgan, No. 68680, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5098 (Cuyahoga Nov. 16, 1995) (dictum) 
(decision of Office of Disciplinary Counsel that conduct of attorney did not warrant disciplinary 
action, in proceeding arising from grievance filed by malpractice plaintiff against defendant attorney, 
does not act as res judicata bar to plaintiff’s subsequent action for malpractice). 
How the OHRPC will change, or not change, this interrelationship between the Rules and a private 
cause of action for malpractice remains to be seen, but likely it will remain the same. See Laws. Man. 
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) §  301:109 (1998).   
One case in which a lawyer-defendant tried to turn the relationship between disciplinary rules and 
attorney liability (here involving settlement funds to which client was entitled, rather than malpractice) 
to his advantage is Watterson v. King, 166 Ohio App.3d 704, 2006 Ohio 2305, 852 N.E.2d 1278 
(Stark).  After being disciplined for charging the client a nonrefundable retainer on top of a 
contingent fee, see Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Watterson, 103 Ohio St.3d 322, 2004 Ohio 4776, 
815 N.E.2d 386, Watterson had the chutzpa in the settlement-fund action to argue on appeal that 
plaintiff was not entitled to recover because “the Ohio Supreme Court’s disciplinary opinion bars any 
further action under the doctrine of res judicata.” 166 Ohio App.3d 704, at para. 18.  The court 
quotes bromides such as violation of the disciplinary rules does not, in itself, create a private cause of 
action [Watterson, of course, was arguing that it defeats a private cause of action] and then concludes, 
correctly, that “a disciplinary action does not bar a civil lawsuit on the same or similar conduct under 
the doctrine of res judicata.”  Id. at para. 18.  It would be one thing if Watterson had been found not 
to have violated the disciplinary rules and then argued that a civil suit against him premised on the 
same or similar conduct was barred; his argument that the civil suit to recover the funds owing was 
barred by res judicata based on a finding of violation is a nonsequitur.  
See also sections 1.6:330, 1.6:630, 1.7:260, and 1.8:900. 
Disclosure requirement for lawyers who do not carry minimum amount of malpractice insurance: Not 
only do the professional responsibility rules play an indirect role in setting standards applied in 
malpractice actions, but they sometimes address malpractice issues more directly. For example, 
effective July 1, 2001, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted former OH DR 1-104, which obligated Ohio 
lawyers (other than government and in-house lawyers) to inform their clients if they failed to maintain 
a minimum level of malpractice insurance ($ 100,000 per occurrence, $ 300,000 aggregate) or if their 
malpractice insurance has been terminated. A standard form of notice was appended to the 
disciplinary rule, as was an acknowledgment by the client that the client has been so informed. The 
lawyer must retain the notice for a minimum of five years after the representation concludes. These 
provisions have been incorporated into the Rules; see Ohio Rule 1.4(c); see also Rule 1.4 cmts. [8] 
& [9]. 
Of the many disciplinary decisions applying DR 1-104, see Columbus bar Ass’n v. DiAlbert, 120 
Ohio St.3d 37, 2008 Ohio 5218, 896 N.E.2d 137; Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Landon, 108 Ohio St.3d 
173, 2006 Ohio 546, 842 N.E.2d 42. See also Toledo Bar Ass’n v. DeLabbio, 101 Ohio St.3d 147, 
2004 Ohio 338, 803 N.E.2d 389, where, in fashioning an appropriate sanction for a lawyer whose 
malpractice insurance had lapsed, the Court made one of the conditions of a stayed six-month 
suspension that respondent cooperate with a monitoring attorney, “including conscientious client 
representation and notice as required by DR 1-104,” id. at para. 11. Ethics opinions citing to former 
DR 1-104 are Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2005-1, 2005 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
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LEXIS 1 (Feb. 4, 2005), and Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-3, 2003 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 6, 2003). In Opinion 2003-3, the Board opined that, in a fee-sharing 
context, each lawyer is responsible for providing the OH DR 1-104 disclosure notice, if applicable, to 
the client. In Opinion 2005-1, OH DR 1-104 was found inapplicable to a lawyer who performed 
research and writing on a contract basis for other attorneys, if the lawyer was not engaged by, did not 
meet with, and did not offer advice to clients. According to the Board, such a lawyer is not considered 
to be engaged in the practice of law. We think the preferable rationale, also stated by the Board, is 
simply that the 1-104(A) notice requirements “apply to attorneys who are engaged by clients to 
provide legal services,” and thus has no application to attorneys who do nothing more than provide 
research and writing to other attorneys on a contract basis.  Id. at *3. 
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1.1:320  Duty to Client [see also 1.1:200] 
Although the former OHCPR provided that a lawyer must represent the client zealously (OH DR 
7-101) within the bounds of the law (OH DR 7-102), all reference to zealous representation has been 
removed from the Rules of Professional Conduct, because, in the Task Force’s words, “[z]ealous 
advocacy is often invoked as an excuse for unprofessional behavior.” ABA Model Rules 
Comparison to Rule 1.3. The lawyer’s duties as an advocate and as an advisor are set forth in Rules 
3.1-3.9 and Rule 2.1, respectively. A lawyer should keep the client informed of relevant 
considerations, Ohio Rule 1.4, and exercise professional judgment in a manner consistent with the 
best interests of the client. See Rule 1.2. The special responsibilities of a public prosecutor and a 
government lawyer are discussed in Rules 3.8 and 1.11, respectively. The extent of a lawyer’s duty of 
loyalty to the client is discussed in section 1.7:210. 
Duties of representation, as delineated in Ohio malpractice and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
cases, include the following: 
 A lawyer is expected to find the law pertinent to a matter. State v. Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303, 
306, 750 N.E.2d 148, 152 (2001) (convictions reversed on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel grounds; 
lawyer at trial and appellate levels of case failed to discover statute that may have provided complete 
affirmative defense to two of the counts on which defendant was convicted; “defense counsel appears 
to have missed this statute in counsel’s investigation and research of the law”) (dissenting, Justice 
Cook noted that the statute in question, to the best of her knowledge, “has never been cited in any 
opinion published by any court in this state,”  id. at 309, 750 N.E.2d at 154); In re A.E., 184 Ohio 
App.3d 812, 2009 Ohio 6094, 922 N.E.2d 1017 (Licking) (ineffective assistance by lawyer in 
failing to educate herself about juvenile offender classification and registration procedures, failing to 
present to the court accurate statement of law relating thereto, and failing to argue on behalf of her 
juvenile sex-offender client that classification and registration of her client was not mandatory, as 
judge erroneously thought, but discretionary only); Motz v. Jackson, No. C-990644, 2001 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 2896 (Hamilton June 29, 2001) (evidence of malpractice present; lawyer-witness for 
plaintiff testified that defendants’ “failure . . . to know the law” with respect to pertinent recent 
decisions violated duty of care, id. at *3); DePugh v. Sladoje, 111 Ohio App.3d 675, 676 N.E.2d 
1231 (Miami 1996) (failure to realize that savings clause was inapplicable in circumstances, resulting 
in loss of claim on limitations grounds, is malpractice per se) (see further discussion of this case at 
section 1.1:370) (compare Kolsen v. Chattman, Gaines & Stern, No. 78781, 2001 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3982 (Sept. 6, 2001) (DePugh per se rule inapplicable and jury verdict for defendants 
affirmed, where evidence that legal issue with respect to availability of savings clause was unclear, in 
contrast to DePugh, in which it was apparent from statutory language that savings provision could not 
be invoked when defendant sought to do so)); cf. Awad v. McKinley, No. 6-89-16, 1991 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 4656 (Hardin Sept. 27, 1991) (failure of lawyer in underlying divorce action to provide 
evidence, requested by domestic relations judge, of “present value” (as distinguished from “present 
cash value”) of defined contribution retirement plan fund was malpractice; judgment of trial court in 
favor of defendant reversed and remanded for determination of damages issue). 
However, a lawyer does not breach the duty “for lack of knowledge as to the true state of the law 
where a doubtful or debatable point is involved.” E.g., Howard v. Sweeney, 27 Ohio App.3d 41, 499 
N.E.2d 383 (Cuyahoga 1985) (syllabus one). See also Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 
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2007) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim with respect to necessity of filing and making part of 
record defendant’s jury waiver in strict compliance with ORC 2945.05; “[b]ecause the law with 
respect to the necessity of strict compliance with § 2945.05 was [then] uncertain, Petitioner’s 
appellate counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal.”  
Id. at 696 (bracketed material added).) Similarly, failure to predict a change in the law is not 
actionable. See, e.g., Howard v. Sweeney supra (finding lawyer’s failure to predict change in 
computation of statute of limitations with respect to asbestos claims nonactionable). The rationale 
underlying this principle was well articulated by the Eighth District Court of Appeals in the Sweeney 
case, where the court remarked: 
 As noted earlier, an attorney will not be held liable for lack of 
knowledge as to the true state of the law where a doubtful or debatable 
point is involved. In the case at bar, the plaintiffs have attempted to go 
beyond that which has already been rejected by attempting to hold the 
defendants liable for failing to accurately predict future changes in the 
law. At the time the complaint was filed, the law was clear. The statute 
began running on an asbestos claim from the date of last exposure. The 
fact that the Sweeney firm took the case hoping the law would change 
does not subject the defendants to liability for failing to accurately 
predict when and how the law would change. Holding an attorney 
liable under these facts would place an impossible burden on attorneys 
who might be willing to accept a case in the hope that the law might be 
changed. The effect of such a holding would be that attorneys would no 
longer take such cases, a result which is contrary to public policy. Thus 
we conclude that an attorney’s acts must necessarily be governed by 
the law as it existed at the time of the act. Counsel’s failure to predict a 
subsequent change in a settled point of law cannot serve as a 
foundation for professional negligence. 
27 Ohio App.3d at 43-44, 499 N.E.2d at 386 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).  Cf. Frank W. 
Schaefer, Inc. v. C. Garfield Mitchell Agency, Inc., 82 Ohio App.3d 322, 337-39, 612 N.E.2d 442, 
452-53 (Montgomery 1992) (on appeal of judgment on jury verdict for plaintiff company on claim 
for negligent failure to provide coverage, court rejected defendant insurance agency’s argument that 
decision of company’s lawyer to settle rather than try underlying personal injury action brought 
against it was unreasonable, because lawyer should have anticipated favorable change in applicable 
law effected by cases decided after underlying action was settled). See also Thompson v. Warden, 
598 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2010) (appellate counsel not ineffective in failing to raise Blakey (Blakey v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)) claim when “the vast majority of precedent in Ohio had already 
determined that Blakely was not applicable . . . at the time Thompson’s appeal was decided [and] the 
Ohio Supreme Court’s later decision to the contrary was not ‘clearly foreshadowed.’ If anything, the 
decision was an abrupt change from prior Ohio precedent.” 598 F.3d at 288 (emphasis by the court; 
ellipsis and bracketed material added)). 
 A lawyer is expected to adhere to the applicable standard of care when conducting a factual 
investigation related to the representation. See Carabotta v. Mitchell, No. 79165, 2002 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 76 (Cuyahoga Jan. 10, 2002) (experts in conflict on whether attorney breached duty of care 
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in making “subject matter” patent search, pursuant to which he failed to discover patent held by 
foreign company; jury verdict for defendant reinstated inasmuch as verdict supported by substantial, 
competent evidence supplied by defendant’s expert); Mercer Sav. Bank v. Worster, No. CA-1273, 
1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 541 (Darke Feb. 15, 1991) (conflicting expert testimony as to whether 
attorney breached duty of care in title search by searching mortgage abstract, but not official 
mortgage index, thereby missing prior mortgage reflected only in index; summary judgment for 
plaintiff bank reversed, because conflicting affidavits presented genuine issue of material fact); 
Canady v. Shwartz, 62 Ohio App.3d 742, 577 N.E.2d 437 (Franklin 1989) (summary judgment 
for attorney reversed because reasonable minds could not conclude that defendant fulfilled his duty to 
investigate thoroughly facts in a criminal case); Smith v. Richardson, No. CA-85-32, 1986 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 5783 (Muskingum Feb. 10, 1986) (because there was conflicting expert testimony as 
to whether attorney conducting title examination in Ohio breaches his duty of care if he does not read 
each document in chain of title and search indices for names of land-contract vendees, trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment to nonmoving lawyer defendant reversed; appellate court went on to hold 
that plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment, inasmuch as lawyer failed to respond to requests 
for admissions and thereby admitted his malpractice, and trial court erred in not considering these 
admissions in ruling on plaintiffs’ motion). See also Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 
2007) (failure to investigate or present compelling and readily available mitigating evidence at 
penalty phase of aggravated felony murder trial constituted ineffective assistance). 
 A lawyer is expected to be competent in drafting legal documents. See RE America, Inc. v. 
Garver, Nos. 66808, 66947, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 394 (Cuyahoga Feb. 8, 1996) (concurring 
opinion) (defendant lawyer breached the duties owing to his clients in counseling and representing 
them in acquisitions, including but not limited to preparing note but failing to include cognovit 
provision or to secure note with collateral; judgment on jury verdict against defendant attorney 
affirmed); Doblanski v. Goldberg, No. 88-T-4080, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 4299, at *3 (Trumbull 
Nov. 17, 1989) (attorney committed malpractice in drafting contract that “failed to contain any of the 
basic warranties concerning the financial condition of the business that a normal contract would 
contain”). 
 A lawyer is expected to be competent and exercise reasonable care in counseling and advising 
clients.  See, e.g., RE America, Inc. v. Garver, Nos. 66808, 66947, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 394 
(Cuyahoga Feb. 8, 1996) (malpractice found where attorney failed to advise client about full 
ramifications of business acquisition); Harrell v. Crystal, 81 Ohio App.3d 515, 611 N.E.2d 908 
(Cuyahoga 1992) (malpractice found for conduct involved in advising clients to invest in speculative 
tax shelters for which the IRS disallowed tax deductions, and in failing to advise clients on ways to 
avoid resulting IRS interest assessments and penalties); Doblanski v. Goldberg, No. 88-T-4080, 
1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 4299 (Trumbull Nov. 17, 1989) (malpractice found where attorney advised 
client to invest in restaurant venture that fails, promised to protect client’s interest, and then breached 
that promise by (1) referring her to inexperienced lawyer to handle the deal; (2) allowing documents 
to be signed where they failed to protect client in normal manner; and (3) not warning her that she was 
paying far too much for far too little, given the valuation of the assets purchased). 
 A lawyer is expected to take reasonable steps to protect his client’s interests. Monastra v. 
D’Amore, 111 Ohio App.3d 296, 676 N.E.2d 132 (Cuyahoga 1996) (wife’s attorney’s alleged 
failure to act to stop diminution of marital estate by husband during divorce proceedings stated claim 
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for malpractice). See Smith v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehabilitation & Corrections, 453 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 
2006) (failure timely to notify criminal defendant/client of result of defendant’s appeal to state 
appellate court constituted ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 A lawyer involved in litigation is expected to be able to handle the proceedings related to the 
litigation, preserve the record, and prosecute an appeal if necessary. State v. Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303, 
750 N.E.2d 148 (2001) (“deficient” performance at trial and appellate level in failing to present 
potentially dispositive statutory defense to two of the counts on which defendant was convicted); 
State v. Irwin, 184 Ohio App.3d 764, 2009 Ohio 5271, 922 N.E.2d 981 (Columbiana) (cumulative 
instances of ineffective assistance in defending client charged with murder required reversal of 
conviction and remand for new trial); State v. Williams, 183 Ohio App.3d 757, 2009 Ohio 4389, 
918 N.E.2d 1043 (Hamilton) (appointed counsel’s failure to consult with, seek advice of, or notify 
defendant prior to filing no-error Anders brief deprived defendant of right of effective assistance of 
appellate counsel); Roberts v. Hutton, 152 Ohio App.3d 412, 2003 Ohio 1650, 787 N.E.2d 1267 
(Franklin) (appellant must, pursuant to OH App R 16(A)(7), present contentions regarding each 
assignment of error and reasons in support of contentions, with citations to authority and record. “It is 
not the duty of this court to search the record for evidence to support an appellant’s argument as to 
alleged error. . . . It is also not appropriate for this court to construct the legal arguments in support of 
an appellant’s appeal.” Id. at para. 18 (citations omitted).); Good v. Krohn, 151 Ohio App.3d 832, 
2002 Ohio 4001, 786 N.E.2d 480 (Allen) (court refused to consider argument in defense of judgment 
below because appellee failed to set forth cross-assignment of error pursuant to ORC 2505.22); State 
v. King, 151 Ohio App.3d 346, 2003 Ohio 208, 784 N.E.2d 138 (Champaign) (failure to request 
instruction on mistake, when there was evidence in record to that effect, fell below objective standard 
of reasonableness in representation of defendant convicted of theft by deception); Taylor v. Franklin 
Blvd. Nursing Home, Inc., 112 Ohio App.3d 27, 677 N.E.2d 1212 (Cuyahoga 1996) (lawyer 
lectured for failure to comply with OH App R 12(A) in setting forth reviewable assignments of error; 
also some assigned errors not briefed or argued). See also Gott v. Bagley, 601 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 
2010) (failure of appellate counsel to raise “an obviously winning claim” — the trial court’s failure to 
grant defendant right of allocution during sentencing phase, which was reversible error under Ohio 
law, constituted ineffective assistance; habeas granted; Richey v. Bradshaw, 498 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 
2007) (ineffective assistance in complete failure to rebut false scientific evidence in arson/murder 
trial). 
But there are limits.  Thus, the court was not impressed by a malpractice plaintiff’s argument that his 
lawyer should have advised him of the voting propensities of Ohio Supreme Court justices, so that he 
could have settled the case prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling adverse to him.  Although the Fifth 
District Court of Appeals held that plaintiff/appellant’s malpractice claim was barred on 
statute-of-limitations grounds, it could not resist noting, in response to this “suspect case theory 
suggested by appellant,” that 
[a]n appellate attorney may have a duty to research how a particular 
judge has ruled on a given issue of law, but that duty is a far cry from 
requiring an attorney to analyze and predict the philosophical 
inclinations of the judges of the Ohio Supreme Court as a component of 
effective appellate representation, which appellant seems to propose. 
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Cicchini v. Streza, 160 Ohio App.3d 189, 2005 Ohio 1492, 826 N.E.2d 379, at para. 17 (Stark). 
 A lawyer is expected to make skilled judgments while carrying out the representation. Broad 
deference is usually given to the attorney where pure issues of judgment are involved. Disagreements 
with a lawyer’s trial strategy, for example, will not give rise to malpractice liability unless the strategy 
is unreasonable or contradicts an express direction of the client. See, e.g., Haller v. Close, No. 90 
AP-853, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 565, at *8 (Franklin Feb. 5, 1991) (“A disagreement over how to 
defend a criminal case does not give rise to malpractice liability. Although unreasonable advice 
which is relied upon can give rise to such liability if it proximately causes harm,” that did not happen 
in this case); Murphey, Young & Smith Co., L.P.A. v. Billman, Nos. 84AP-49, 84 AP-198, 1984 
Ohio App. LEXIS 11643, at *24 (Franklin Nov. 20, 1984) (“[T]here can be no claim for 
malpractice with respect to an attorney selecting one of several courses of action in conducting the 
defense of his client in litigation, including a disciplinary proceeding. This constitutes selection of 
trial strategy, as to which there may be a difference of opinion among attorneys. However, where 
there is a good faith selection of a particular trial strategy, there can be no claim for malpractice, even 
if the strategy be unsuccessful.” Here the concern involved “failing to interview witnesses, deciding 
not to call certain witnesses, and not asking certain questions or making certain objections during the 
disciplinary hearing.”). See also sections 1.2:330 and :370. 
This same distinction applies in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases. Compare State v. Mundt, 
115 Ohio St.3d 22, 2007 Ohio 4836, 873 N.E.2d 828 (failure to question or challenge prior on voir 
dire not ineffective assistance; “[w]e have consistently declined to ‘second-guess trial strategy 
decisions’ or impose ‘hindsight views about how current counsel might have voir dired the jury 
differently.” Id. at para. 63 (citations omitted)); State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002 Ohio 
5304, 776 N.E.2d 26 (failure to object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument 
not ineffective assistance of counsel: “A reasonable attorney may decide not to interrupt his 
adversary’s argument as a matter of strategy.” Id. at para. 42.), State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 
538 N.E.2d 373 (1989) (broad array of claims of ineffective assistance rejected; numerous references 
to “legitimate strategy,” “permissible trial tactics,” “considered choice of counsel,” and the like,  id. 
at 144, 146, 538 N.E.2d at 381, 383); State v. Bahns, 185 Ohio App. 3d 805, 2009 Ohio 5525, 925 
N.E.2d 1025 (Montgomery) (failure to object to inadmissible hearsay premised on medical records 
not admitted in evidence “was a reasonably sound trial strategy given Bahns’s theory of the case.” Id. 
at para. 33, which was that the records, which failed to reflect the defendant nurse’s administration of 
morphine to patients, failed to do so, not because he stole it, but rather because he forgot to record the 
administration in the press of his duties at the time); State v. Bruce, 159 Ohio App.3d 562, 2005 
Ohio 373, 824 N.E.2d 609 (Hamilton) (“we decline to second guess counsel’s strategy,” id. at para. 
14), and State v. Kenney, 2004 Ohio 972, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 867 (Cuyahoga) (no lack of 
effective assistance of appellate counsel by not presenting particular argument; appellate advocate 
can and should winnow contentions down to the most promising), with State v. Barr, 158 Ohio 
App.3d 86, 2004 Ohio 3900, 814 N.E.2d 79 (Columbiana) (counsel ineffective in opening door to 
evidence that had previously been suppressed and offering no objection to elicitation of that evidence; 
while defendant must overcome presumption that allegedly ineffective action might be considered 
sound trial strategy by lawyer, “it’s hard to imagine why he would open the door with these questions.” 
Id. at para. 44), State v. Nichols, 116 Ohio App.3d 759, 689 N.E.2d 98 (Franklin 1996) (even 
debatable trial tactics do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless a competent attorney 
would not reasonably adopt them; lawyer’s errors (including failure to object to highly prejudicial 
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hearsay testimony) found to be more than a matter of tactical decision-making and constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel), and State v. Carpenter, 116 Ohio App. 3d 615, 688 N.E.2d 1090 
(Montgomery 1996) (ineffective assistance of counsel found where counsel’s failure to object to 
prosecutor’s closing, despite closing’s “obvious impropriety,” could not be treated as reasonable 
tactical decision). 
Ohio federal ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases on the matter of strategy include Girts v. Yanai, 
501 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2007) (ineffective assistance; failure to object to prosecutor’s improper 
statements; “[t]his inaction simply cannot be characterized as litigation strategy. There was no 
conceivable benefit to be derived from failing to challenge the prosecutor’s improper statements.” Id.  
at 757.); Mapes v. Tate, 388 F.3d 187, 192-93 (6th Cir. 2004) (failure on appeal to raise claim of 
error fully supported by U.S. Supreme Court decision, was ineffective assistance; “this was not a case 
in which appellate counsel omitted a questionable claim in order to concentrate on more meritorious 
claims; in fact, the opposite appears to be true. . . . No competent attorney, in the circumstances of this 
case, would have failed to raise this issue.”).  
It must be remembered that strategy is not the be-all and end-all. In finding the Ohio appellate court’s 
analysis faulty (unable to reach merits because could not determine whether counsel’s delay in filing 
alibi notice was result of trial strategy or ineffectiveness), the court of appeals in Clinksdale v. 
Carter, 375 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2004) stated as follows: 
This explanation implies that if the delay was strategic, then it 
necessarily could not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. As 
explained more fully below, however [quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 
528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000)], “[t]he relevant question is not whether 
counsel’s choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.” 
375 F.3d at 439. Accord Johnson v. Bagley, 544 F.3d 592, 603 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Johnson’s 
attorneys ‘were not in a position to make … reasonable strategic choice[s] … because the 
investigation supporting their choice[s] was unreasonable,’“ quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 
538 (2003)); Mason v. Mitchell, 543 F.3d 766, 784 (6th Cir. 2008) (“‘strategic choices made after 
less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation,’“ quoting from Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 691 (1984)); Frazier v. Huffman, 343 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2003), (“We can conceive of no 
rational trial strategy that would justify the failure of Frazier’s counsel to investigate and present 
evidence of his brain impairment . . . .” Id. at 794.). 
 
1.1:330  Standard of Care [see also 1.1:200] 
The standard of care expected from lawyers as a matter of professional ethics is set forth in Ohio Rule 
1.1, which provides: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation.” This standard is discussed in section 1.1:200. 
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The standard of care articulated in the malpractice context is quite similar. An attorney is required to 
exercise the knowledge, skill, and ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the legal 
profession similarly situated.  Stoklosa v. McGill, No. L-91-028, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 728 
(Lucas Feb. 21, 1992). An attorney who fails to meet these requirements may be found liable for 
malpractice.  Minick v. Callahan, 24 Ohio Op.3d 104 (App. Lucas 1980). An attorney is also 
required to be ordinarily and reasonably diligent, careful, and prudent in discharging the duties that he 
or she has assumed.  Spangler v. Sellers, 5 F. 882 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881). The “ordinary and 
reasonable” standard is to be distinguished from higher levels of care, such as perfect legal knowledge 
or highest degree of skill.  Stoklosa v. McGill supra. 
One aspect of the test, the “similarly situated” requirement, has not been extensively explored in the 
Ohio case law. Contained within it are two issues. The first is whether in accessing the standard of 
care we look at the conduct of lawyers in some discrete locality within the state or for the state as 
whole. The second is whether we hold all lawyers in the relevant geographic area to one standard or 
whether the standard should be higher for those acting as specialists. 
The locality standard: In at least four Ohio cases the “locality standard” has been used by experts with 
respect to whether there had been a breach of the applicable standard of care. Thus, in Adhesive 
Impressions, Inc. v. Amer, Cunningham & Brennan Co., L.P.A., 89 Ohio App.3d 532, 625 
N.E.2d 643 (Summit 1993), plaintiff’s expert opined that the attorney had performed below the 
accepted standard of care exercised by “attorneys in the Northern Ohio area.”  Id. at 536, 625 N.E.2d 
at 645. In Motz v. Jackson, No. C-990644, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2896 (Hamilton June 29, 
2001), plaintiffs submitted an affidavit by a lawyer who stated that defendants’ “failure to know the 
law” was negligent and “violated the ordinary care standard as it exists in Warren County, Ohio, and 
Hamilton County, Ohio.” Id. at *3. Similarly, in Bingamon v. Curren, No. 90- CA-122, 1991 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 5558 (Greene Nov. 21, 1991), plaintiff’s expert testified that defendant’s tardy filing of 
estate tax returns failed to conform with the standards “of the practice of law in the Greene County 
area.” Id. at para. 3. And in Mercer Savings Bank v. Worster, No. CA-1273, 1991 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5417 (Darke Nov. 15, 1991), the expert testimony from both sides focused on what the 
standard of care was in conducting a title search in Darke County, where the alleged malpractice took 
place. See also Rice v. Johnson, No. 63648, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4109, at *3 (Cuyahoga Aug. 
26, 1993) (applicable standard of care is that required of an attorney “in the community”). While this 
seems a not unreasonable interpretation of the phrase “similarly situated,” general commentary on the 
issue suggests that the pertinent professional community is “that of lawyers undertaking similar 
matters in the relevant jurisdiction (typically a state).” 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers §  52 cmt. b, at 377 (2000) (noting that the locality test has seldom been 
recognized for lawyers and that it is now “generally rejected for all professions.” Id.). Accord Laws. 
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) §  301:106 (1998); see 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. 
Smith, Legal Malpractice §  20:5 (2013 ed.) (knowledge of local rules and practice relevant and 
often essential, but standard or degree of care should be same throughout licensing jurisdiction); John 
C. Nemeth, Legal Malpractice in Ohio, 40 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 143, 162 (1992) (suggesting 
state-wide standard for malpractice actions). One Ohio case has expressly disapproved the use of the 
locality test in a legal malpractice action.  Smith v. Richardson, No. CA-85-32, 1986 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5783, at *3 (Muskingum Feb. 10, 1986) (“We reject the trial court’s attempt to impose on 
expert testimony the rejected ‘locality’ rule of evidence once followed in the State of Ohio in 
connection with expert medical testimony.”). 
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Lawyers acting as specialists: With respect to the specialization issue, while there appear to be no 
Ohio cases on point, it is implicit in Rule 1.1 that a more demanding standard will apply where a 
lawyer undertakes an engagement requiring specialized expertise. Since, under the Rule, “competent 
representation requires” whatever is “reasonably necessary to the representation,” it follows that in 
undertaking a representation requiring specialization skills, the lawyer must have, or obtain, the 
“requisite level of competence” (cmt. [4]) “reasonably necessary to the representation.” See also 
Comment [2], which notes that competent representation can also be provided by association with a 
lawyer of “established competence in the field in question.” According to Mallen and Smith, the 
modern trend of the cases nationwide is to require an attorney taking on a case that requires 
specialized knowledge to “exercise the degree of skill and knowledge possessed by those attorneys, 
who practice in that specialty.” 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice §  
20:4, at 1242 (2012 ed.). Mallen and Smith also note that “[n]o court has rejected that a more 
demanding standard of care should apply to specialists.” Id. at 1246. 
 
1.1:335  Requirement of Expert Testimony 
Expert testimony generally required: As a general rule, in an action for legal malpractice the plaintiff 
must establish by expert testimony the degree of knowledge, skill, and ability ordinarily possessed 
and exercised by lawyers similarly situated. Accordingly, if a plaintiff does not enlist an expert and 
introduce such testimony, the defendant attorney is entitled to summary judgment, e.g., Yates v. 
Brown, 185 Ohio App.3d 742, 2010 Ohio 35, 925 N.E.2d 669 (Lorain); a directed verdict, Minick 
v. Callahan, 24 Ohio Op.3d 104 (App. Lucas 1980); or reversal of judgment for plaintiff, Wertz v. 
Penn, 164 Ohio App.3d 505, 2005 Ohio 6532, 842 N.E.2d 1102 (Montgomery). Cf. Martin v. 
Dadisman, No. 77030, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3843 (Cuyahoga Aug. 24, 2000) (plaintiff, with 
fifteen-years’ paralegal experience, cannot satisfy the expert testimony requirement with his own 
testimony). Similarly, if plaintiff submits an expert affidavit, but it is insufficient, summary judgment 
for the defendant attorney is in order.  C.R. Withem Enters. v. Maley, 2002 Ohio 5056, 2002 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 5096 (Fairfield) (conclusory expert affidavit submitted by plaintiffs failed to state why 
defendants were negligent in their presentation of witnesses who testified on the issue of 
compensatory damages, or what an ordinarily competent attorney would have done that defendants 
failed to do; expert provided no underlying facts in support of his opinion, as required by OH R Evid 
705). Likewise if the affidavit is unsworn. Garland v. Simon-Seymour, 2009 Ohio 5762, 2009 
Ohio App. LEXIS 4854 (Geauga). See also Montgomery v. Gooding, Huffman, Kelly & Becker, 
163 F.Supp.2d 831 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (absence of required expert testimony as to attorney’s breach 
of duty of care; partial summary judgment for defendant attorneys granted.  The court also held that 
expert testimony was not required on the causation issue). But compare the Yates decision supra, 
where the court not surprisingly held that expert testimony was indeed required on, inter alia, 
causation, in circumstances in which the plaintiffs had, for some unknown reason, taken the position 
that more than one of their serial attorneys in a divorce action — not just the defendant in the case at 
bar — were negligent. On such facts, the appellate court reasoned as follows: 
Where multiple attorneys were involved in the underlying 
representation, and where the plaintiffs have alleged negligent 
representation by more than one attorney, the trial court did not err by 
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concluding that expert testimony was necessary to establish a prima 
facie case of legal malpractice in regard to an individual attorney. In 
fact, expert testimony would be critical under these circumstances to 
determining causation and either parsing or eliminating liability. 
Yates, 185 Ohio App.3d 742, at para. 24. 
 
Exception to general rule: Expert testimony is not necessary in cases where the breach of duty to the 
client is well within the common understanding of laypeople.  McInnis v. Hyatt Legal Clinics, 10 
Ohio St.3d 112, 461 N.E.2d 1295 (1984) (per curiam) (attorney’s failure to follow the specific 
instructions of the client was sufficient to establish a breach of duty without expert testimony). 
Accord Nalls v. Nystrom, 159 Ohio App.3d 200, 2004 Ohio 6230, 823 N.E.2d 500 (Montgomery) 
(“straightforward” issue of fact under general laws of contract not requiring expert testimony; 
summary judgment in favor of lawyer reversed); Baiko v. Mays, 140 Ohio App.3d 1, 746 N.E.2d 
618 (Cuyahoga 2000) (summary judgment for defendant attorney, because of plaintiff’s failure to 
provide expert testimony, reversed; conduct at issue – failure to inspect records of dental practice 
being purchased, when there were suspicions of welfare fraud and plaintiff purchaser had insisted 
they be examined – was within ordinary understanding of a lay jury and expert testimony therefore 
not required); Rafferty v. Scurry, 117 Ohio App.3d 240, 690 N.E.2d 104 (Madison 1997) (stating 
and applying exception where defendant attorney, by failing to respond to request for admission, 
admitted that he breached his duty of care in failing to answer complaint in underlying action, 
resulting in default judgment). A more recent case in accord with Rafferty is Estate of Hards v. 
Walton, 2010 Ohio 3596, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3069 (Cuyahoga) (defendant missed filing 
deadline because distracted by family emergency; “[t]his was an admission that he breached the 
standard of care and obviated the estate’s need for an expert to address this issue,” id. at para. 12). 
Compare Burke v. Gammarino, 108 Ohio App.3d 138, 670 N.E.2d 295 (Hamilton 1995) (alleged 
malpractice, in failing to file motion to intervene, failing to have receiver appointed, and failing to file 
certain counterclaims, not so obvious as to relieve counterclaimant of burden of establishing claim 
through expert testimony); Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 61 Ohio App.3d 506, 573 
N.E.2d 159 (Franklin 1989) (attorney’s alleged breach of duty in complex real estate transaction was 
not so obvious as to come within the common understanding of a layperson and obviate the need for 
expert testimony). See Werts v. Penn, 164 Ohio App.3d 505, 2005 Ohio 6532, 842 N.E.2d 1102 
(Montgomery) (on conflicting testimony as to what occurred with respect to erroneous land contract 
prepared by malpractice defendant, magistrate erred in finding breach of duty by defendant; breach 
not so obvious it could be determined as matter of law; expert testimony needed on standard-of-care 
requirement of lawyer in circumstances). 
In contrast to lay plaintiffs, who in the usual case must secure expert testimony, lawyer malpractice 
defendants have been allowed to support their position through their own testimony; outside expert 
testimony is not required. Thus, in Vahdati’bana v. Scott R. Roberts & Assocs. Co., L.P.A., 2008 
Ohio 1219, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1055 (Franklin) (summary judgment for defendant lawyers 
affirmed), the expert testimony in support of the defendant attorneys’ conduct was provided by the 
defendants themselves. The defendant attorney likewise provided the expert affidavit in Adhesive 
Impressions, Inc. v. Amer, Cunningham & Brennan Co., L.P.A., 89 Ohio App.3d 532, 625 
N.E.2d 643 (Summit 1993), but summary judgment for defendant lawyers was reversed because 
conflicting expert affidavits raised issues of fact on scope of duty and breach. This result is consistent 
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with that set forth by the same court of appeals in Haas v. Bradley, 2005 Ohio 4256, 2005 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3877 (Lorain), where the attorney’s affidavit was deemed “a legally sufficient basis upon 
which to grant a motion for summary judgment . . . absent any opposing affidavit of a qualified expert 
for the plaintiff.” Id. at para 26. The Haas language was quoted with approval in Yates supra, yet 
another Ninth District appellate opinion. Accord Christensen v. Leuthold, 2009 Ohio 6869, 2009 
Ohio App. LEXIS 5769 (Crawford) (citing authority, including Hoffman v. Davidson, 31 Ohio 
St.3d 60, 62, 508 N.E.2d 958 (1987) (medical malpractice)). In Estate of Hards v. Walton, 2010 
Ohio 3596, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3069 (Cuyahoga), the defendant supplied his own expert 
affidavit, but it was nullified by his own prior affidavit in which he conceded that his missing a 
motion response deadline was negligent; this “obviated the estate’s need for an expert to address the 
issue.” Id. at para. 13.  
At least one case has expressly rejected the argument that a malpractice defendant cannot rely on his 
own expert affidavit, Perotti v. Beck, No. 00 CA 29, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4535 (Mahoning 
Sept. 24, 2001), and another has specifically endorsed the practice.  Roberts v. Hutton, 152 Ohio 
App.3d 412, 2003 Ohio 1650 787 N.E.2d 1267 (Franklin). Two other cases have explained that the 
expert testimony requisite, if applicable, is the obligation of the plaintiff, not the defendant lawyer 
(even though the lawyer often does supply expert testimony to the effect that his or her conduct did 
not breach any duty to the client).  Murphy v. Redeker, No. 70868, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 115, at 
*2 (Cuyahoga Jan. 16, 1997) (“No such requirement [of expert testimony] is made of the attorney in 
defense of his or her standard of practice”); see Nuckols v. Kapp, No. 97-KO-6, 1999 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 1461, at *5 (Columbiana Mar. 30, 1999) (not a necessity that malpractice defendant present 
independent expert testimony; “a defendant in a malpractice cause of action would, arguably, possess 
the required skill and knowledge to testify as to whether they met the applicable standard of care.” No 
error in allowing defendant so to testify here.). But see Polivka v. Cox, 2002 Ohio 2420, 2002 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 2439 (Franklin). In Polivka, the issue was whether defendant failed to file a timely 
notice of appeal from the denial of his client’s worker’s compensation claim. The lawyer filed his 
own expert affidavit; the plaintiff filed none. The court of appeals nevertheless reversed the grant of 
summary judgment to the lawyer because he failed to satisfy his initial burden of demonstrating the 
absence of a genuine issue of fact. His affidavit “inadequately supported” the motion, primarily 
because he failed to attach the supposedly timely-filed notice of appeal. Since defendant failed to 
meet his initial burden, plaintiff’s reciprocal burden was never triggered. (Although the court does not 
say so, this would clearly seem to be the sort of case in which expert testimony from the plaintiff is not 
needed -- the failure to file a notice of appeal on time is well within the common understanding of a 
layperson.) 
While it may not be mandatory to do so, a lawyer defending a malpractice case who fails to provide 
expert testimony does so at her peril. In C&K Indus. v. McIntyre, Kahn & Kruse Co., L.P.A., 
2012 Ohio 5177, 984 N.E.2d 45 (Cuyahoga), plaintiffs presented expert testimony of professional 
negligence, but the defendant attorneys did not. Instead, they relied on attacking the alleged 
insufficiency of plaintiffs’ expert affidavit. The court of appeals found the affidavit proper and, since 
uncontroverted, held that it created a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants was reversed.  
An unusual situation involving expert testimony in a malpractice action is found in Maust v. Palmer, 
94 Ohio App.3d 764, 641 N.E.2d 818 (Franklin 1994). Defendant moved for summary judgment 
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and provided an affidavit by an Ohio State law professor supporting the defendant’s position that he 
had met the standard of care for Ohio attorneys. Since plaintiff filed no expert affidavit in response, 
the trial court granted the summary judgment motion. Plaintiff, however, had filed a motion to strike 
the affidavit of defendant’s expert, arguing in his own affidavit that he had himself consulted the 
expert about the pending matter; as a result, plaintiff argued, he had an attorney-client relationship 
with the expert and the affidavit should have been stricken. The trial court did not rule on plaintiff’s 
motion to strike. On appeal, the court, finding that the conflicting affidavits precluded summary 
judgment, reversed. It also reasoned that it was not appropriate for the trial court to consider the 
expert’s affidavit until the issue of its admissibility, raised by the motion to strike, was ruled upon. 
Without the expert’s affidavit, according to the court of appeals, the record did not establish that no 
genuine issue of material fact existed and summary judgment was therefore improper on this ground 
as well. 
On the question of admissibility of the expert affidavit, the Maust court noted that “[i]f an 
attorney-client relationship had existed, Professor Jacobs might be barred from testifying pursuant to 
R.C. 2317.02,” which precludes an attorney from testifying “concerning a communication made to 
him by his client in that relation . . . .”  Id. at 768, 641 N.E.2d at 820. One wonders how the expert’s 
affidavit could have contained testimony “concerning a communication made to him by his client 
[plaintiff] in that relation,” when the expert submitted a second, apparently uncontested, affidavit 
indicating that “no communication from plaintiff formed a basis for his opinion.”  Id. at 769 n.3, 641 
N.E.2d at 821 n.3. The court of appeals was not persuaded; as it stated: “That issue is not determined 
hereby and was not determined in the trial court assuming that, if true, it could ‘cure’ any privilege 
violation.” Id. 
Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court, in a medical malpractice case, Vaught v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 
98 Ohio St.3d 485, 2003 Ohio 2181, 787 N.E.2d 631, affirmed the preclusion of the defendant 
doctor from testifying as an expert in his own defense after he failed to file a written expert report in 
accordance with the then-applicable local rule (Cuyahoga CP Gen R 21.1), which has since been 
amended, effective Sept. 1, 2002, to limit the application of the rule to “non-party” expert witnesses 
only. Thus, under the rule as amended, a defendant lawyer acting as his or her own expert need not 
file such a report. 
 
1.1:340  Causation and Damages 
On the legal malpractice front 2008 was a year of seismic developments in the law of causation and 
damages.  Two very important Supreme Court opinions came down, and they changed the lay of the 
land.  First, in June, the Court decided in Paterek v. Petersen & Ibold, 118 Ohio St.3d, 2008 Ohio 
2790, 890 N.E.2d 316, that “collectibility of the judgment lost due to the malpractice is an element of 
the plaintiff’s claim against the negligent attorney.” Id. at para. 1. Second, in Envtl. Network Corp. 
v. Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P., 119 Ohio St.3d 209, 2008 Ohio 3833, 893 N.E.2d 173, the 
Court concluded in the syllabus, which “clarifie[s]” Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 674 N.E.2d 
1164 (1997), as follows: 
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 When a plaintiff premises a legal-malpractice claim on the 
theory that he would have received a better outcome if his attorney had 
tried the underlying matter to conclusion rather than settled it, the 
plaintiff must establish that he would have prevailed in the underlying 
matter and that the outcome would have been better than the outcome 
provided by the settlement. 
Both decisions will be discussed in detail below.  First, however, a brief summary of what the 
landscape looked like pre-Paterik/Envtl. Network: 
The touchstone of legal malpractice causation for years was Vahila v. Hall supra, which held, in the 
language pertinent here with respect to causation, 
we cannot endorse a blanket proposition that requires a plaintiff to 
prove, in every instance, that he or she would have been successful in 
the underlying matter. 
Id. at 428, 674 N.E.2d at 1170. The decisions in the wake of Vahila tended to overlook the “blanket 
proposition” and “in every instance” language, and read Vahila as a general rejection of the 
“case-within-a-case” test. Indeed, the best examples of this are the two court of appeals decisions 
reversed by the Supreme Court in Envtl. Network and Paterek. In both, the lawyers argued that the 
plaintiff needed to prove the case within a case to prevail. In both the appellate court rejected the 
argument, citing Vahila: “Consequently, the standard to prove causation in a legal malpractice case 
requires a claimant to ‘provide some evidence of the merits of the underlying claim,’“ citing Vahila 
(Envtl. Network, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 760, at para. 26 (Cuyahoga)); “the ‘case-within-a-case’ 
approach was rejected by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Vahila v. Hall.” (Paterek, 2006 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 4127, at para. 40 (Geauga)). See also Robinson v. Calig & Handleman, 119 Ohio App.3d 
141, 144, 694 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Franklin 1997) (“Here, the trial court appears to have applied the 
‘but for’ test rejected in Vahila”). 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Envtl. Network put an end to this overreading of Vahila. It 
resurrects the “but for” test and makes it the rule in cases in which plaintiff’s theory is that it would 
have received a better result if the attorney had tried the case to conclusion rather than settling. On 
such a theory, it is difficult to take issue with Justice O’Connor’s statement that 
appellees here could recover only if they could prove that they would 
have succeeded in the underlying case and that the judgment would 
have been better than the terms of the settlement. Thus, the theory of 
this malpractice case places the merits of the underlying litigation 
directly at issue, because it stands to reason that in order to prove 
causation and damages, appellees must establish that appellant’s 
actions resulted in settling the case for less than appellees would have 
received had the matter gone to trial. 
 This type of legal malpractice action, then involves the 
case-within-a-case doctrine. 
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Id. at paras. 18, 19.  Since plaintiffs failed to show that, but for defendants’ malpractice, they would 
have received a better result by trying the case, the court of appeals was reversed and the case 
remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of the defendant lawyers. For a case in 
which the court found the Envtl. Network “better result” causation test was satisfied by the 
malpractice plaintiff, see Feng v. Kelley & Ferraro, 2009 Ohio 1368, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1178 
(Cuyahoga) (affirming judgment for plaintiff on jury verdict). 
Envtl. Network’s case-within-a-case holding deals with the causation element where the plaintiff 
alleges that she would have received a more favorable outcome if her attorney had tried the case 
rather than settling it. In Young-Hatten v. Taylor, 2009 Ohio 1185, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 994 
(Franklin) the plaintiff-appellant argued that Env’tl. Network was a “better result” case the holding 
of which did not apply in a “lost opportunity” case such as Young-Hatten. (The plaintiff alleged that 
the defendant/lawyer’s malpractice caused plaintiff to lose the opportunity to file her medical 
malpractice claim prior to the running of the statute of limitations.) The Young-Hatten court rejected 
the argument based on a case involving a comparable fact situation (loss of opportunity to file product 
liability claim because of running of statute of limitations), Neighbors v. Ellis, 2008 Ohio 2110, 
2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1805 (Butler), in which the appellate court held that the Vahila rule applied, 
but the Supreme Court reversed “on the authority of Environmental Network . . . .” 120 Ohio St.3d 
276, 2008 Ohio 6105, 898 N.E.2d 46. 
At the other end of the spectrum, will Vahila’s “some evidence” rule continue to apply where the 
plaintiff’s damages caused by the malpractice constitute losses other than those tied to the result in the 
underlying action, such as loss of profits, as in Vahila itself? The result in the Neighbors decision 
would seem to indicate to the contrary. And what rule will apply in the often encountered situation in 
which plaintiff’s lawyer does try the case to conclusion and either loses it or comes away with a result 
less favorable than that to which plaintiff claims she was entitled? The definitive answer will, of 
course, have to await future Supreme Court case law, but we strongly suspect that the reasoning 
behind the Envtl. Network result will lead to the “but for” test being applied there as well. Such a 
case would also seem to “place[] the merits of the underlying litigation directly at issue,” and put 
plaintiffs in a position where they “could recover only if they could prove that they would have 
succeeded in the underlying case and that the judgment would have been better than the terms of the” 
judgment obtained. Id. at para. 18. At least one court of appeals has so held. See Eastminster 
Presbytery v. Stark & Knoll, 2012 Ohio 900, 2012 Ohio App LEXIS 779 (Summit) (court 
affirmed summary judgment for lawyer defendants; even if the alleged malpractice – failing to 
include certain evidence in support of summary judgment below – had not occurred, the result under 
settled Ohio law would have been the same in any event). 
The Envtl. Network decision is discussed in Gary W. Spring, The Changing Landscape for Legal 
Malpractice Claims in Ohio, Ohio Law., Sept./Oct. 2009, at 11.  See also the penetrating analysis 
by Judge Holschuh of The Valhalla/Environmental Network precedents in Daido Metal 
Bellefountaine, LLC v. Mason Law Firm Co., LPA, 2010 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 68361 (S.D. Ohio 
2010) (analysis in context of granting motion to remand to state court malpractice claim arguably 
intertwined with federal labor law; court rejected plaintiff’s contention that malpractice claim was 
preempted under LMRA, thereby justifying removal).  
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In the other major malpractice decision, Paterek v. Petersen & Ibold, 118 Ohio St.3d 503, 2008 
Ohio 2790, 890 N.E.2d 316, the Court held that “proof of the collectibility of the judgment lost due to 
the malpractice is an element of the plaintiff’s claim against the negligent attorney.” Id. at para. 1.  
The underlying claim in Paterek was a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident. 
After filing the action, the lawyer voluntarily dismissed it, but then failed to refile within the one-year 
savings statute. In the subsequent malpractice action, liability was admitted; the only issue was the 
damage proximately caused by the breach. The tortfeasor had no assets other than $100,000 
automobile liability coverage.  The defendant lawyers, seeking partial summary judgment, argued 
that damages should be capped at $100,000. The trial court denied the motion and stated that 
“‘[a]lthough Plaintiffs will have to prove the “case within the case,” such proof does not have to go so 
far as to demonstrate . . . that the tortfeasor had assets from which a judgment could be collected.’“ Id. 
at para. 7. 
The malpractice case proceeded to trial, and the parties submitted joint stipulations to the effect that 
the tortfeasor’s only asset was the $100,000 policy, that the injured plaintiffs had underinsured 
motorist coverage in the amount of $250,000, and that the jury would be asked only to return a verdict 
regarding the amount of plaintiffs’ damages.  The jury returned a verdict of $382,000.  The 
defendants sought judgment n.o.v., which the trial court granted, limiting damages to $100,000. That 
court reasoned that, although plaintiffs suffered damages in the amount of $382,000 because of the 
tortfeasor’s negligence, that “‘does not mean that Plaintiff suffered damages in that same amount as a 
result of the negligence of Jonathan Evans and Petersen & Ibold . . . . [T]he damages actually caused 
by the negligence of these Defendants must be limited to the amount that Plaintiff could be reasonably 
certain of receiving had Defendant[s] not been negligent’“ Id. at para. 21. The court of appeals, 
stressing that the trial court’s reliance on the “case within a case” analysis “was rejected by the 
Supreme Court of Ohio in Vahila v. Hall,” 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4127, at para. 40, reversed and 
held that the trial court’s duty was to determine whether the verdict was supported by substantial 
evidence, not whether the verdict was collectible. 
On review, Supreme Court, quoting the Vahila syllabus, emphasized the third prong – that there must 
be a causal connection between the malpractice and the resulting loss. “Thus, the focus in this case is 
the value of the lost cause of action.” Id. at 28. 
[T]he appellant attorneys in this case are not responsible for [the 
tortfeasor’s] negligent conduct; they are responsible for their own. This 
case is not about what Irene Paterek suffered on account of [the 
tortfeasor’s] bad driving, but what she suffered on account of 
appellants’ bad lawyering. The proper inquiry then is this: Had the 
appellants not be negligent, how much could Irene have received from 
a settlement or a judgment? 
In answering this question, the Court follows the “‘prevailing rule . . . that the client’s recovery is 
limited to the amount that would have been collectible,’“ (citing 4 Mallen & Smith, Legal 
Malpractice § 31:17 (2008 ed.), and that the burden of proving collectibility of a lost judgment is on 
the plaintiff.  118 Ohio St.3d 503, at para. 32. 
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We hold that collectibility is logically and inextricably linked to the 
legal-malpractice plaintiff’s damages, for which the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proof. In proving what was lost, the plaintiff must show what 
would have been gained . . . . [H]er injury is measured by what she 
actually would have collected. 
Id. at para. 37. 
As a result, the Supreme Court reversed and, since the appellants had stipulated to the amount 
available from plaintiffs’ UIM policy, over and above the tortfeasor’s $100,000 liability policy 
($250,000 - $100,000 set-off from tortfeasor insurance = $150,000), remanded the case to the trial 
court to enter judgment in the amount of $250,000. 
While the Supreme Court’s decision in Paterek does not get into the “but for” or “case within a case” 
litany in so many words, the result and analysis – particularly the language stating that the plaintiff’s 
“injury is measured by what she actually would have collected,” id. at para. 37, sounds very much 
like the “but for” test without so identifying it. 
The Paterek and Envtl. Network decisions are examined in Monica A. Sansalone, Legal 
Malpractice in Ohio:  A New Horizon?, Clev. Metro. B.J., Nov. 2008, at 48. 
It also should be noted that in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases, the defendant must show both 
professional incompetence and prejudice, the latter of which requires proof of a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different.  State v. Kole, 92 Ohio 
St.3d 303, 750 N.E.2d 148 (2001).  This is the federal rule as well.  E.g., Smith v. Ohio Dep’t of 
Rehabilitation & Corrections, 463 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2006) (ineffective assistance in not notifying 
client of state appellate decision, but no showing that client would have timely appealed but for 
counsel’s failure). 
Damages must be attributable to attorney misconduct: In order to succeed on a malpractice claim, the 
plaintiff must also show that injury or damage resulted from the attorney’s misconduct. See Envtl. 
Network Corp. v. Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P., 119 Ohio St.3d 209, 2008 Ohio 3833, 893 
N.E.2d 173, and Paterek v. Petersen & Ibold, 118 Ohio St.3d 503, 2008 Ohio 2790, 890 N.E.2d 
316, both of which are discussed in detail above. Compare Rumley v. Buckingham, Doolittle & 
Burroughs, 129 Ohio App.3d 638, 718 N.E.2d 964 (Franklin 1998) (OH Civ R 12(B)(6) dismissal 
reversed; plaintiff adequately pleaded breach of duty and resultant damages), with Muehrcke v. 
Housel, 181 Ohio App.3d 361, 2008 Ohio 4445, 909 N.E.2d 135 (Cuyahoga) (proof of actual 
damages required; jury verdict for plaintiff reversed), Advanced Analytics Labs., Inc. v. Kegler, 
Brown, Hill & Ritter, L.P.A., 148 Ohio App.3d 440, 2002 Ohio 3328, 773 N.E.2d 108 (Franklin) 
(summary judgment affirmed because, inter alia, plaintiff’s evidence failed to support claim that it 
was damaged by defendants’ allegedly negligent preparation of subordinated loan agreement), and 
Motz v. Jackson, No. C-990644, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2896 (Hamilton June 29, 2001) 
(summary judgment for defendants proper, given lack of any evidence establishing calculable 
financial loss). See also Burton v. Selker, 36 F. Supp.2d 984 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (summary judgment 
for defendant-attorneys granted, inter alia, because plaintiff failed to show any damages resulting 
from defendants’ alleged malpractice), aff’d, 30 Fed. Appx. 456 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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Speculative damages are insufficient to create liability. DeMeo v. Provident Bank, 2008 Ohio 2936, 
2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 2475 (Cuyahoga); see Pietz v. Toledo Trust Co., 63 Ohio App.3d 17, 577 
N.E.2d 1118 (Lucas 1989) (damage claim by remaindermen, premised on attorney’s alleged 
negligence in reducing value of remainder interest, held speculative where life beneficiary had access 
to all assets and could exhaust the trust). Nonspeculative economic loss resulting from the lawyer’s 
malpractice, however, is recoverable, see McInnis v. Hyatt Legal Clinic, 10 Ohio St.3d 112, 461 
N.E.2d 1295 (1984). With respect to lost profits or actual expenditures, the recovery of which in the 
underlying action was allegedly prevented by the attorney’s negligence, see Breezevale Ltd. v. 
Dickinson, 759 A.2d 627 (D.C. App. 2000) (Ohio law applied; alleged damage not shown with 
necessary reasonable certainty; conclusory testimony of plaintiff’s executive insufficient).  
The amount recoverable may include prejudgment interest (see Okocha v. Fehrenbacher, 101 Ohio 
App.3d 309, 655 N.E.2d 744 (Cuyahoga 1995); Mobberly v. Hendricks, 98 Ohio App.3d 839, 
649 N.E.2d 1247 (Medina 1994)), and amounts expended in mitigating or attempting to mitigate the 
damage caused by the lawyer’s conduct, see Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 538 N.E.2d 1058 
(1989) (cost of setting aside default order entered because lawyer failed to appear at hearing). In 
appropriate circumstances, typically involving fraud or malice, exemplary damages may be awarded. 
Compare Okocha v. Fehrenbacher, 101 Ohio App.3d 309, 655 N.E.2d 744 (Cuyahoga 1995) 
($50,000 punitive damages award affirmed where, inter alia, lawyer wrongfully converted client’s 
settlement proceeds), with David v. Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Block, 79 Ohio App.3d 786, 
607 N.E.2d 1173 (Cuyahoga 1992) (evidence did not show that attorney maliciously or consciously 
disregarded his duties to plaintiff; directed verdict for defendant on punitive damage issue affirmed). 
(The related disciplinary proceeding against Mr. Okocha, arising out of his representation of the 
Fehrenbachers, is reported at Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Okocha, 69 Ohio St.3d 398, 632 
N.E.2d 1284 (1994).) In the absence of such extreme conduct, a claim for lost punitive damages, 
premised on the attorney’s negligence in the underlying action, will be rejected. Friedland v. Djukic, 
191 Ohio App.3d 278, 2010 Ohio 5777, 945 N.E.2d 1095 (Cuyahoga).  
The Supreme Court has noted in dicta that the “‘[v]ast majority of appellate decisions that have 
considered the issue have held that an attorney is not liable for emotional distress damages where the 
attorney’s conduct has been merely negligent.’“ Paterek v. Petersen & Ibold, 118 Ohio St.3d 503, 
2008 Ohio 2790, 890 N.E.2d 316, at para. 28 (quoting from Joseph J. Kelleher, An Attorney’s 
Liability for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 1309, 1319 
(1990)). See Muehrcke v. Housel, 181 Ohio App. 361, 2008 Ohio 4445, 909 N.E.2d 135 
(Cuyahoga) (affirming directed verdict for lawyer on negligent infliction claim). 
Concerning malpractice damages generally, see 3 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal 
Malpractice §§ 21:1-21:21 (2009 ed.). 
 
1.1:350  Waiver of Prospective Liability [see 1.8:910] 
 
1.1:360  Settlement of Client’s Malpractice Claim [see 1.8:920] 
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1.1:370  Defenses to Malpractice Claim 
Raising a defense permitted: Ohio Rule 1.8(h) prohibits an attorney from attempting to exonerate 
himself from, or limit his liability to his client for, malpractice, but of course does not prohibit the 
attorney from raising any defense available to him against a malpractice claim. See, under the former 
OHCPR, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Clavner, 77 Ohio St.3d 431, 674 N.E.2d 1369 (1997) 
(per curiam). 
Potential defenses: The defenses available to an attorney defending a malpractice action are discussed 
in chapters 22 and 23 of 3 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice (2013 ed.). 
Of the nineteen defenses noted, at least eight have been litigated in Ohio. 
Statute of limitations: By far the most common (and most successful) defense is the one-year statute 
of limitations set forth in ORC 2305.11(A)(1). See, e.g., Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, 43 
Ohio St.3d 54, 538 N.E.2d 398 (1989). See generally section 1.1:300. 
Contributory/comparative negligence: Ohio, like most other states, has held that 
contributory/comparative negligence can be a defense to a malpractice action. See Harrell v. Crystal, 
81 Ohio App.3d 515, 611 N.E.2d 908 (Cuyahoga 1992) (comparative negligence; apportionment of 
damages unnecessary where attorneys failed to prove that clients were negligent). 
Res judicata: In DiPaolo v. DeVictor, 51 Ohio App.3d 166, 555 N.E.2d 969 (Franklin 1988), the 
court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of common pleas in favor of the defendant 
attorneys on, inter alia, res judicata grounds. One of the malpractice plaintiffs, the executrix of her 
husband’s estate, was a party to prior probate court proceedings in which the issue whether assets 
should have been included in the deceased’s estate was conclusively determined. The malpractice 
action asserted that those same assets had been wrongfully excluded from the estate by the defendant 
attorneys, who had been retained by the executrix to represent the estate. The final accounting in the 
probate court matter was held to be res judicata as to the executrix’s malpractice action. 
Collateral estoppel:  The lawyer-defendant in Woodrow v. Heintschel, 194 Ohio App.3d 391, 2011 
Ohio 1840, 956 N.E.2d 855 (Lucas), successfully invoked defensive collateral estoppel to preclude 
relitigation of the causation issue; the court of appeals affirmed.  In the underlying contract action, 
counsel for the defendant Woodrows had withdrawn, but notices of the withdrawal and subsequent 
hearings, ultimately resulting in a default judgment against them, never reached the Woodrows.  New 
counsel for the Woodrows in the underlying action moved for Rule 60(B) relief from judgment, and 
the court, in granting the motion, found that the failure of notice was due to various clerical errors and 
irregularities of the court and its staff, not to the negligence of Heintschel.  Since the Woodrows’ 
malpractice claim was premised on showing that the default judgment against them was the result of 
their lawyer’s withdrawal without their knowledge, and since the prior Rule 60(B) ruling had 
determined that this lack of knowledge resulted from the errors of the court and its staff, not 
Heintschel, the Woodrows’ malpractice claim failed as a matter of law because they were precluded 
from relitigating the proximate cause issue. 
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Settlement of underlying action: In a number of Ohio malpractice cases, the attorney has argued that 
the client’s settlement of the underlying action “waived,” “barred,” or “extinguished” the malpractice 
claim. This defense may be something of a red-herring in Ohio, however, as most of the cases appear 
ultimately to turn, not on the fact of settlement, but on an assessment of whether the attorney breached 
his duty of care. Further, it appears that the majority of the more recent cases support the view that the 
client’s settlement of the underlying action is not a defense to a malpractice claim. 
Thus, in Vagianos v. Halpern, No. 76408, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5856, at *3 (Cuyahoga Dec. 14, 
2000) (summary judgment for defendants reversed), defendant lawyers argued that their former 
client’s settlement of the underlying action “operates to waive any claim for legal malpractice against 
[them].” The court of appeals was not persuaded: 
This argument is without merit. Accepting a settlement for a reduced 
amount does not necessarily waive a claim for legal malpractice 
against the attorney whose substandard representation made settlement 
for the reduced amount reasonable. 
Id. 
In DePugh v. Sladoje, 111 Ohio App.3d 675, 676 N.E.2d 1231 (Miami 1996), the defendant 
attorneys similarly argued that the estate’s settlement of a wrongful death action with the county was 
a defense to the plaintiff/beneficiary’s malpractice claim against them. The attorneys, however, had 
not filed the wrongful death action until after the statute of limitations (ORC 2125.02(D)) had run. 
Actually, the case had been filed in time, but then voluntarily dismissed, prior to the running of the 
two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death. Thinking that the one-year savings provision of 
ORC 2305.19 applied, the attorneys refiled the suit eleven months later. But the savings provision 
applies only where there is a voluntary dismissal after the statute of limitations has expired; if the 
dismissal comes during the limitations period, that period continues to run, with no savings period 
tacked on. As a result, the attorneys missed their refiling deadline by about five months. On these 
facts, the Second District Court of Appeals held as follows: 
[W]e conclude that where a settlement is entered into as a result of an 
attorney’s exercise of his reasonable judgment in handling a case, the 
settlement bars a malpractice claim against the attorney. On the other 
hand, a legal malpractice claim is not barred by a settlement with a 
party in the underlying action where the attorney has acted 
unreasonably or has committed malpractice per se. In our judgment, 
when an attorney has made an obvious error which seriously 
compromises his client’s claim, and a settlement is on the table (albeit 
an inadequate one), the client should not be forced to forgo the 
settlement offer as a condition of pursuing the attorney for malpractice. 
 Utilizing this approach, we conclude that missing the statute of 
limitations amounted to malpractice per se by the attorneys who owed 
a duty to the estate or its beneficiaries, so that the estate’s claim is not 
barred by its settlement with the Miami County Board of 
Commissioners. 
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Id. at 687, 676 N.E.2d at 1239. 
Accord Monastra v. D’Amore, 111 Ohio App.3d 296, 676 N.E.2d 132 (Cuyahoga 1996) 
(summary judgment for attorney reversed): 
 We find no merit to Monastra’s claim that D’Amore’s divorce 
settlement with her husband waived her legal malpractice claim against 
him. If the evidence should show that Monastra’s defective 
representation diminished D’Amore’s ability to reach a successful 
settlement or succeed at trial, we see no reason why a waiver of that 
malpractice claim should be implied by reason of the settlement. 
Id. at 302, 676 N.E.2d at 136. 
The Ohio Supreme Court reached a result consistent with this analysis in Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio 
St.3d 421, 674 N.E.2d 1164 (1997) (reversing summary judgment for defendant attorneys where 
underlying civil actions had been settled, allegedly under duress from attorneys and without proper 
disclosure or adequate explanation by attorneys of settlement consequences.  Id. at 427, 674 N.E.2d 
at 1169). Accord Gibson v. Westfall, Nos. 74628, 74977, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4791 (Cuyahoga 
Oct. 7, 1999) (affirming jury verdict against lawyer for malpractice; rejecting lawyer’s argument that 
client’s settlement of underlying suit precluded malpractice recovery). See also Motz v. Jackson, No. 
C-990644, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2896 (Hamilton June 29, 2001) (settlement by plaintiffs of 
underlying claim did not preclude claim for malpractice in which evidence of breach of professional 
duty was presented; summary judgment for lawyers nevertheless affirmed because of absence of 
evidence of damages arising from any such breach). 
On the other hand, where no breach of the duty of due care is found, or the attorney has a plausible 
argument in defense of his chosen course of action, the Ohio courts typically refer to the fact of 
settlement of the underlying action as a further basis for ruling for the malpractice defendant.  Benna 
v. Slavin, No. CV-381241, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5959 (Cuyahoga Dec. 18, 2000) (summary 
judgment for lawyer/defendant affirmed; lawyer on appeal argued that voluntary settlement of 
underlying action by his client barred malpractice claim and that he exercised reasonable professional 
judgment in advising client to settle; appellate court affirmed on ground that lawyer exercised 
reasonable professional judgment and noted also that client had voluntarily settled). Accord E.P.B., 
Inc. v. Cozza & Steuer, 119 Ohio App.3d 177, 694 N.E.2d 1376 (Cuyahoga 1997), where the court 
stated that it was not suggesting that the client’s settlement of the underlying action (here, while 
pending on appeal) always operates as a waiver of the client’s malpractice claim; to the contrary, such 
a claim is not barred if the attorney has acted unreasonably or committed malpractice per se. In the 
case at bar, the attorneys made no error that compromised the client’s underlying claim, and, as a 
result, the summary judgment in the attorney’s favor was affirmed. Similarly, in Sawchyn v. 
Westerhaus, 72 Ohio App.3d 25, 593 N.E.2d 420 (Cuyahoga 1991), the court of appeals affirmed 
summary judgment for the defendant attorney where the client settled the underlying action while an 
appeal from an adverse punitive damage judgment was pending. Although the court did state that the 
settlement extinguished the client’s right to pursue his malpractice claim, it also left no doubt that it 
thought the malpractice claim itself was meritless. The client’s claim against the attorney, who 
represented him only on the punitive damage claim in the underlying action, was premised on the 
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attorney’s failure to settle the punitive damage claim prior to trial. Inasmuch as there would have been 
no liability for punitive damages unless and until actual or compensatory damages had been proved, 
the court remarked that “[p]rior to trial, it is difficult to conceive why punitive damages would be 
settled before a settlement was reached on compensatory damages.”  Id. at 28, 593 N.E.2d at 422. 
The one case found that appears to be an exception to this pattern is Estate of Callahan v. Allen, 97 
Ohio App.3d 749, 647 N.E.2d 543 (Lawrence 1994). In Callahan, the trial court had ruled in favor 
of the client. Reversing, the court of appeals held that the client’s settlement of the underlying case 
with the IRS without appeal constituted a waiver of his malpractice claim against the defendant 
attorney, which claim was premised on the attorney’s handling of estate tax matters. The defendant 
lawyer’s effort to increase the marital deduction and thereby reduce the estate tax liability to zero was 
rejected by the IRS, which ruled that the effort expressly violated a provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code, 26 USC §  2518(b)(4) (2000). The court’s opinion as a whole indicates that the lawyer’s plan 
was inconsistent with the statutory provision directly on point. Thus, the case seems to be one where 
settlement trumped bad lawyering, even though one subsequent case has seen fit to place the case in 
the “plausible argument”/not unreasonable “strategic decisions” category. See DePugh v. Sladoje, 
111 Ohio App.3d 675, 685-87, 676 N.E.2d 1231, 1238-39 (Miami 1996). 
See also Endicott v. Johrendt, No. 99 AP-935, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2697 (Franklin June 22, 
2000) (agreeing with appellant that settlement of underlying action is not always preclusive of 
damages in malpractice case, but finding no need to reach issue because appellant failed to show she 
was damaged by appellee’s withdrawal as counsel).  
Judicial estoppel: The judicial-estoppel defense was invoked and applied in the case of Advanced 
Analytics Labs., Inc. v. Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, L.P.A., 148 Ohio App.3d 440, 2002 Ohio 
3328, 773 N.E.2d 1081 (Franklin). In Advanced Analytics, plaintiff sought to sue defendants for 
malpractice; it claimed, among other things, that the law firm had breached its duty of care to ensure 
that financing documents complied with applicable law and that the firm was negligent in its effort to 
perfect plaintiff’s security interest in the collateral of its debtor. The problem with plaintiff’s claim 
was that it had twice successfully argued to the contrary, before the bankruptcy court in North 
Carolina and on appeal to the federal district court. As the Franklin County Court of Appeals summed 
it up: 
 The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a party from 
assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with a position 
taken in a prior action. . . . The doctrine may be applied only where the 
party making the inconsistent assertion was successful with the prior 
assertion. 
 . . .  The evidentiary materials submitted by the parties . . . 
unequivocally demonstrate plaintiff’s position in the bankruptcy court 
and federal district court proceedings to be that its financing statements 
comported with established case law and statutory requirements, 
including the pertinent provisions of the UCC, and validly perfected 
plaintiff’s security interest in [its debtor’s] assets. . . . Because plaintiff 
successfully asserted that position in the prior proceedings, plaintiff is 
precluded by judicial estoppel from now arguing that, as to the 
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financing statements and security agreement, defendants breached their 
duty to ensure that all such documents comported with the 
requirements of the law, or that defendants were negligent in their 
“effort to perfect the security interest of the Plaintiff relating to the 
collateral of the debtor, EAI, Inc. of North Carolina.” 
Id. at paras. 37-38 (citations omitted; interior quotation from plaintiff’s brief on appeal). 
More recently, the defense of judicial estoppel was asserted but rejected in New Destiny Treatment 
Ctr., Inc. v. Wheeler, 2009 Ohio 6956, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 5887 (Summit). Therein, the 
lawyer defendants obtained summary judgment in the trial court on the ground that there was no 
attorney-client relationship between the alleged client and the lawyers. On appeal, the lawyers 
asserted the equitable ground of judicial estoppel as an additional ground for affirmance: 
 Appellees contend that the Mission [alleged client] is judicially 
estopped from arguing the existence of an attorney-client relationship 
because, in both prior proceedings, the Mission and the Russell/Lupton 
board advanced the position Appellee Wheeler [the lawyer] was not the 
Mission’s attorney. 
Id. at para. 27. But, “in order to assert such a defense, a party must comport with the maxim that ‘he 
who seeks equity must do equity and that he must come into court with clean hands.’“ Id. at para. 28 
(citation omitted):  
Appellees have not come to this Court with clean hands. In the two 
prior actions, Appellees represented themselves as attorneys for the 
Mission, both in words and actions. In the case sub judice, however, 
Appellees claim the absence of an attorney-client relationship. 
Accordingly, we find that Appellees are foreclosed from asserting the 
defense of judicial estoppel. 
Id. at para. 29. The Supreme Court, reversing the result in New Directions, found no evidence of the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship between Mission and Wheeler and her firm. 128 Ohio 
St.3d 39, 2011 Ohio 2266, 950 N.E.2d 157. While the high court set forth the judicial/equitable 
estoppel positions of the parties, it found no need to reach these issues. It did, however, in support of 
its decision that there was no attorney-client relationship, note the fact that the malpractice plaintiffs 
had pled in their complaint that the employment of the lawyers was “actually ‘void and invalid.’“ Id. 
at para. 30. (For whatever reason, the intermediate appellate court made no mention of this rather 
significant admission.) In the words of the Supreme Court, 
New Destiny cites no legal principle that would allow it to deny the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship between [the purported 
client] and Wheeler or the law firm in its complaint while 
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Immunity: Another Mallen and Smith defense that has been litigated in Ohio is immunity from 
liability. There are three decisions on point, all involving public defenders. In Wooden v. Kentner, 
153 Ohio App.3d 24, 2003 Ohio 2695, 790 N.E.2d 813 (Franklin), the court affirmed an OH Civ R 
12(B)(6) dismissal on immunity grounds in favor of a county public defender office and its lawyer 
employees who had represented the plaintiff in a prior criminal case in which the plaintiff had pled 
guilty to corruption of a minor. The office was immune under the governmental discretionary 
function defense set forth in ORC 2744.03(A)(3). The lawyer employees were immune under ORC 
2744.03(A)(6), which provides that a political subdivision’s employees are immune unless, inter alia, 
they act maliciously, in bad faith, or recklessly. In the case at bar plaintiff alleged only negligence; 
“[t]he defendant employees are immune from liability for negligent conduct.” Id. at para. 15. Accord 
Thorp v. Strigari, 155 Ohio App.3d 245, 2003 Ohio 5954, 800 N.E.2d 392 (Hamilton) (lawyer 
employee immune under ORC 2744.03(A)(6); plaintiffs’ constitutional attacks on immunity statute 
(equal protection; right-to-remedy) rejected; summary judgment for defendant affirmed). A similar 
result was reached on summary judgment in the case of Wooten v. Vogele, 147 Ohio App.3d 216, 
769 N.E.2d 889 (Hamilton 2001). In Wooten the appellate court affirmed the trial court on the 
ground that there was no evidence the defendant public defender had engaged in malicious, reckless, 
or wanton conduct or that he had acted in bad faith; as a result, he was immune from liability as a 
matter of law pursuant to ORC 2744.03(A)((6)(b).  (In the Thorp case, Judge Painter, concurring, 
thought it odd that “a person with money can hire an attorney, has a remedy if the attorney errs, but a 
poor person has none.  Alas, the ways of the world; but in this case mandated by the legislature.”  155 
Ohio App.3d 245, at para. 38.) 
Prematurity/exhaustion of other remedies: A legal malpractice claim may not be ripe if the client has 
failed to exhaust other legal remedies available to her. See Petruzzi v. Casey, No. 89- AP-1508, 1990 
Ohio App. LEXIS 1658 (Franklin Apr. 26, 1990) (cruise passenger’s malpractice claim, in which 
she alleged that her attorney’s negligence precluded her from filing suit against cruise line within 
one-year statute of limitations period purportedly imposed by language of contract for passage 
included on cruise ticket, was premature where (1) no statute of limitations had been imposed barring 
appellant’s personal injury claim in any legal proceeding, and (2) there had been no definitive legal 
determination that one-year limitation imposed by cruise line was applicable or enforceable). 
Absence of attorney/client relationship: An additional “defense,” not catalogued by Mallen and Smith, 
is usually available when one not a client of the lawyer attempts to sue the lawyer for malpractice 
and/or negligent representation. In such circumstances, there is no liability unless the plaintiff is in 
privity with the lawyer’s client or the lawyer’s conduct was malicious. The seminal decision is that of 
the Ohio Supreme Court in Scholler v. Scholler, 10 Ohio St.3d 98, 462 N.E.2d 158 (1984) (syllabus 
one); accord Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 512 N.E.3d 636 (1987).  The Scholler rule 
and its exceptions are discussed in detail in section 1.1:410 infra. (One case in which the existence vel 
non of the attorney-client relationship is at the core of a malpractice lawsuit is New Destiny 
Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Wheeler, 128 Ohio St. 3d 39, 2011 Ohio 2266, 950 N.E.2d 157, discussed 
in section 1.1:300 supra.) 
Court of appeals cases applying the general no-liability rule of Scholler include Swiss Reinsurance 
Am. Corp. v. Roetzel & Andress, 163 Ohio App.3d 336, 2005 Ohio 4799, 837 N.E.2d 1215 
(Summit) (affirming summary judgment for lawyer-defendants for want of standing; insurance 
company that retained lawyer to defend insured doctor was neither client of lawyer or in privity with 
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his doctor-client); Brady v. Hickman, 2003 Ohio 5649, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 5034 (Cuyahoga); 
see McGuire v. Draper, Hollenbaugh & Briscoe Co., L.P.A., 2002 Ohio 6170, 2002 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 6003 (Highland) (plaintiff sued X firm for malpractice, then amended complaint to add 
malpractice claim against Y firm, which had been retained by X’s insurance carrier to defend X(!). No 
attorney-client relationship, no privity, no malice; summary judgment for Y defendants affirmed); 
Medpartners, Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold L.L.P., 140 Ohio App.3d 612, 748 N.E.2d 604 
(Cuyahoga 2000) (malpractice jury verdict against law firm in favor of parent corporation reversed 
because firm did not represent parent in merger transaction and thus owed it no duty. The court further 
held there could be no third-party liability to parent in absence of allegations that parent organization 
was in privity with corporation that law firm did represent in merger, or that law firm acted 
maliciously); Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Mandilakis, 111 Ohio App.3d 160, 675 
N.E.2d 1279 (Cuyahoga 1996) (client embezzled funds from companies; summary judgment for 
lawyer on companies’ malpractice claim affirmed because there was no attorney-client relationship 
between lawyer and companies, there was no privity between client and companies, and there was no 
evidence that lawyer acted maliciously in not notifying companies of client’s fraud); Hile v. Firmin, 
Sprague & Huffman Co., L.P.A., 71 Ohio App.3d 838, 595 N.E.2d 1023 (Hancock 1991) 
(lawyers for corporation not liable in malpractice to members of board of directors; no attorney-client 
relationship between lawyers and directors, nor was there privity between directors and corporate 
client). The Medpartners case is also discussed in section 1.1:410; Mandilakis in sections 1.1:410 
and 4.1:300.  
If privity and/or malice is present or alleged, however, the attorney can be subject to suit for 
malpractice by a nonclient. The court of appeals so found on both scores in Leroy v. Allen, Yurasek 
& Merklin, 162 Ohio App.3d 155, 2005 Ohio 4452, 832 N.E.2d 1246 (Union) (reversing order 
granting motion to dismiss by lawyer defendants). The Supreme Court, affirming in part and 
reversing in part, rejected the appellate court’s privity analysis but found that plaintiffs’ allegations of 
“collusion” were sufficient to invoke the malice exception for Rule 12(B)(6) purposes. 114 Ohio 
St.3d 323, 2007 Ohio 3608, 873 N.E.2d 254.  The LeRoy decision is also discussed in sections 
1.1:410 and 1.13:520. 
One court of appeals case has permitted a nonclient to sue a lawyer on a negligent misrepresentation 
theory. See Orshoski v. Krieger, No. OT-01-009, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5018 (Ottawa Nov. 9, 
2001) discussed in section 1.1:410. 
For a case reaching the not-surprising result that a lawyer cannot sue co-counsel for malpractice, see 
Gruenspan v. Thompson, 2003 Ohio 3641, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 3287 (Cuyahoga). 
The “professional judgment rule”: This defense, also not noted by Mallen & Smith, has apparently 
not found much favor in Ohio, at least in the Eighth District Court of Appeals. See Kolsen v. 
Chattman, Gaines & Stern, No. 78781, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3982 (Cuyahoga Sept. 6, 2001); 
Home Indem. Co. v. Kitchen, Deery & Barnhouse, No. 77372, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5487 
(Cuyahoga Nov. 22, 2000). But cf. Murphey, Young & Smith Co., L.P.A., v. Billman, Nos. 
84AP-49, 84 AP-198, 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 11643 (Franklin Nov. 20, 1984). As set forth in 
Murphey, the rule provides that a lawyer will not be held liable for a mere error in judgment if he or 
she acts in good faith and in an honest belief that the advice given and/or acts taken are well-founded 
and in the best interests of the client. The Murphey court, however, quoted the rule in the context of 
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deciding that the selection of a particular trial strategy, as to which there may be a difference of 
opinion among lawyers, or of other strategic decisions relating to litigation, is not a basis for 
malpractice -- a view that can be harmonized with a number of Ohio cases, including at least one from 
the Eighth District. See Benna v. Slavin, No. CV-381241, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5959 
(Cuyahoga Dec. 18, 2000) (summary judgment sustained on grounds, inter alia, that attorney had 
“exercised reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at *3.). Perhaps the key to this rather murky state 
of precedent is found in the term “reasonable.” If, from the spectrum of choices available to the 
lawyer when making tactical decisions, the course chosen can be said to be a reasonable one, there is 
no liability. Thus, the exercise of “reasonable” professional judgment is not actionable, even if it turns 
out in hindsight to be less than perfect. On the other hand, to say that all tactical choices made are 
protected, willy-nilly, so long as made in good faith and in an honest belief that they are well founded, 
irrespective of their reasonableness, may stack the deck too heavily in favor of the malpractice 
defendant. The two seemingly divergent lines of cases discussed above are for the most part 
reconcilable if and when the reasonableness of the choice is factored into the equation. The DePugh 
case, discussed above in this section, captures the distinction explicitly in the context of the lawyer’s 
choice to settle the underlying action -- if that decision was reasonable, no claim will lie; if 
unreasonable or if amounting to “obvious error” or malpractice per se, the claim is viable. See 111 
Ohio App.3d at 687, 676 N.E.2d at 1239. 
Arbitration: In one Ohio case, lawyer defendant sought an OH Civ R 12(B)(6) dismissal on the 
grounds that plaintiff had agreed in the retainer agreement to arbitrate any controversy or claim 
arising out of the retainer. The lawyer thereafter filed a motion to stay and to compel arbitration. The 
trial court denied the motion, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed.  Thornton v. 
Haggins, 2003 Ohio 7078, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6440 (Cuyahoga). The court reasoned as 
follows: 
 We are persuaded by the cases finding such agreements 
unenforceable with regard to the malpractice disputes, and we find the 
reasoning set forth in Opinion 96-9 [Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 96-9, 1996 WL 734408 (Dec. 6, 1996)] compelling. 
We agree that the best interests of the client require consultation with 
an independent attorney in order to determine whether to prospectively 
agree to arbitrate attorney-client disputes. Such agreements are 
therefore not knowingly and voluntarily made absent independent 
consultation. 
Id. at para. 10. This is the result called for under the Rules. See Rule 1.8(h)(1) and section 1.8:910.  
 
1.1:380  Liability to Client for Breach of Contract, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 
     and Other Liabilities 
The Ohio courts have regularly treated cases brought by clients against their lawyers, arising from the 
representation, as malpractice actions, irrespective of whether the client has attempted to plead the 
action as one for breach of contract, negligence, fraud, or whatever. E.g., Hibbett v. City of 
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Cincinnati, 4 Ohio App.3d 128, 446 N.E.2d 832 (Hamilton 1982) (as long as the “gist” of the 
claims assert legal malpractice, attempts to label the action as one based on breach of contract, fraud, 
and negligence will not take the case outside the malpractice statute of limitations). Accord Polivka v. 
Cox, 2002 Ohio 2420, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 2349 (Franklin) (complaint alleging breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress presents cause of 
action for malpractice, regardless of how labeled); Muir v. Hadler Real Estate Mgmt. Co., 4 Ohio 
App.3d 89, 90, 446 N.E.2d 820, 822 (Franklin 1982) (client’s claim predicated on alleged breach of 
contract not in writing, arising from attorney-client relationship, is malpractice claim. “Malpractice 
by any other name still constitutes malpractice. . . . It makes no difference whether the professional 
misconduct is founded in tort or contract, it still constitutes malpractice.”); Blackwell v. Gorman, 
142 Ohio Misc. 2d 50, 2007 Ohio 3504, 870 N.E.2d 1238 (Franklin C.P.) (“Under Ohio law, a 
legal-malpractice claim subsumes within it any of the issues that can arise from the attorney-client 
relationship.  These may include alleged billing errors by the lawyer.  All claims in trust, fraud, or 
contract against a lawyer are, essentially, considered to be malpractice.”  Id. at para. 46 (citations 
omitted)). See DiPaolo v. DeVictor, 51 Ohio App.3d 166, 555 N.E.2d 969 (Franklin 1988) 
(refusing to treat fraud case as other than one for malpractice in absence of allegations that defendant 
attorneys committed the acts in question for their own personal gain), and Endicott v. Johrendt, No. 
99 AP-935, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2697 (Franklin June 22, 2000) (desire to obtain settlement and 
resulting contingent fee not type of personal gain under DiPaolo that would support action for fraud 
separate from malpractice action). 
In a 2011 decision, Katz, Teller, Brandt & Hild, LPA v. Farra, 2011 Ohio 1985, 2011 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 1692 (Montgomery), the Second District Court of Appeals treated all but one of the 
defendant/client’s counterclaims as malpractice claims, which were barred by the statute of 
limitations. The exception was Farra’s claim that the engagement had been fraudulently induced by 
the firm’s oral assertion that his fees would be paid by the other side. Since this alleged fraudulent 
inducement was directly contradicted by the written engagement imposing on Farra the obligation to 
pay the fees, this evidence was barred by the parol evidence rule. 
Other than Farra, the only Ohio cases discovered in which the malpractice label was not imposed 
where the client sought damages by attempting to plead something other than, or in addition to, 
malpractice in a case arising out of the attorney-client relationship are Garland v. Simon-Seymour, 
2009 Ohio 5762, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4854 (Geauga) (affirming summary judgment for 
defendant on both counts; breach of contract claim considered on its own terms separately from 
malpractice claim; no breach found); Muehrcke v. Housel, 181 Ohio App.3d 361, 2008 Ohio 4445, 
909 N.E.2d 135 (Cuyahoga) (considering negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against 
lawyer on its own terms, but finding failure of proof of essential elements of tort); Davis v. Eachus, 
2004 Ohio 5720, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 5162 (Pike) (reversing sua sponte grant of summary 
judgment for defendant lawyer on breach-of-contract claim by client, which claim alleged failure to 
account for funds paid to lawyer and double-billing), and Bennice v. Bennice, 82 Ohio App.3d 594, 
612 N.E.2d 1256 (Ottawa 1992) (client’s fraud claim against his former attorney, based on client’s 
transfer of real property to attorney by signing quitclaim deed in blank at request of attorney and upon 
attorney’s false representation that document would merely allow client to get back into his locked 
house, was not precluded, even though five years later attorney reconveyed the property back to client, 
where client sought damages for loss of use and beneficial enjoyment of the property). See, with 
respect to some of the facts set forth above, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Levin, 35 Ohio St.3d 
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4, 517 N.E.2d 892 (1988), the disciplinary proceeding in which the attorney was indefinitely 
suspended from the practice of law for his conduct in Bennice. With Davis, compare Wilkerson v. 
O’Shea, 2009 Ohio 6550, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 5469 (Butler) (applying one-year malpractice 
limitation to claims styled as breach of contract and unjust enrichment, premised on alleged 
overcharging client for legal services). Wilkerson seems more in step with mainstream Ohio law on 
this issue. 
In three other cases the defendant attorneys sought to use the malpractice statute of limitations, but the 
court found that the claim (or one aspect of it) did not arise out of the attorney-client relationship or 
that there was an issue of fact as to whether it did. In the first, the court of appeals reversed a summary 
judgment for the defendant lawyer because the court believed “the gist of plaintiff’s claim to be both 
in malpractice and breach of contract to perform services not necessarily legal in nature” -- holding 
certificates of deposit in escrow for plaintiff.  Bryant v. Williams, No. CA 9272, 1985 WL 8723, at 
*1 (Ohio App. Montgomery June 7, 1985). Similarly, in the second case, the court held that an 
attorney and his law firm could not avoid liability for breach of escrow duties set forth in the purchase 
agreement drafted by them by pleading the malpractice statute of limitations; their duties as escrow 
agent were governed by the fifteen-year statute of limitations applicable to contracts in writing, ORC 
2305.06.  Saad v. Rodriguez, 30 Ohio App.3d 156, 506 N.E.2d 1230 (Cuyahoga 1986) (summary 
judgment for attorneys, based on one-year malpractice statute of limitations, reversed insofar as 
defendants proximately caused damage to plaintiff purchaser while acting in their capacity as escrow 
agent, as opposed to their capacity as attorneys for purchaser; case remanded for determination of 
capacity in which attorneys acted when they released funds held in escrow prior to having in hand title 
insurance policy on the property, as required by the purchase agreement). In the third case, Endicott 
v. Johrendt, No. 99 AP-935, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2697 (Franklin June 22, 2000), plaintiff 
asserted a variety of claims, all of which were subsumed under the malpractice theory, except the 
court concluded that one aspect of plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 
(relating to actions taken well after the representation had terminated) should be considered on its 
own terms. Even so, the court found that this claim (along with all others) could not survive 
defendant’s summary judgment motion because there was no evidence raising an issue of material 
fact with respect to the existence of extreme and outrageous conduct, an essential element of the 
intentional infliction claim. 
“Other liabilities”: In American Motors, Inc. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 575 N.E.2d 116 
(1991), the Court reinstated a permanent injunction against a former employee/engineer/ lawyer 
(characterized by the Court as “at a minimum, an agent acting on behalf of legal counsel to AMC,”  id. 
at 346, 575 N.E.2d at 119) precluding him from acting as a witness or consultant in litigation against 
his former employer. Defendant was selling and offering to use the employer’s confidential 
information, including trade secrets, privileged information, and work product, which he had 
improperly removed from the employer’s files. See also discussion of Huffstutler at section 1.6:420. 
See generally, with respect to this section, 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§  55 (2000). 
137
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.1 
  
 
1.1:390  Liability When Nonlawyer Would Be Liable 
As stated in 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  56 cmt. b, at 416 (2000): 
Lawyers are subject to the general law. If activities of a nonlawyer in 
the same circumstances would render the nonlawyer civilly liable, or 
afford the nonlawyer a defense to liability, the same activities by a 
lawyer in the same circumstances generally render the lawyer liable or 
afford the lawyer a defense. 
A representative sample of Ohio cases involving the question of attorney liability to, or defense 
against, clients or nonclients, in circumstances where a nonlawyer would be liable or have a defense, 
follows (in each of the cases cited the lawyer’s adversary is a nonclient, unless otherwise noted): 
Abuse of process: See, e.g. Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A., 68 Ohio St.3d 294, 
626 N.E.2d 115 (1994), and Border City Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Moan, 15 Ohio St.3d 65, 472 
N.E.2d 350 (1984) (per curiam).  The abuse-of-process cases involving lawyer defendants are 
discussed at section 1.1:520. 
Breach of contract: In a contract dispute arising out of plaintiff’s renovation of defendant attorney’s 
home, the fact that defendant from time to time represented the plaintiff and its president in legal 
matters did not cause the burden of proof to shift to the attorney defendant to show the fairness of his 
dealings with the sometime client, inasmuch as the house renovation was not a part of, and did not 
arise out of, the attorney-client relationship.  Petersen Painting & Home Improvement, Inc. v. 
Znidnarsic, 75 Ohio App.3d 265, 599 N.E.2d 360 (Geauga 1991) (case decided on general contract 
principles applicable to cost-plus contracts such as the one at issue). See Saad v. Rodriquez, 30 Ohio 
App.3d 156, 506 N.E.2d 1230 (Cuyahoga 1986), and Bryant v. Williams, No. CA 9272, 1985 WL 
8723 (Montgomery June 7, 1985), discussed at section 1.1:380. 
An interesting decision affirming the grant of summary judgment on breach of contract grounds in 
favor of plaintiff company (“CI LLC”) and against defendant-attorney Ward, who had entered into a 
consulting agreement with the company, is Ward v. Cent. Inv. LLC, 2010 Ohio 6114, 2010 Ohio 
LEXIS 5167 (Hamilton).  Lawyer Ward had long represented the plaintiff-company and its founder, 
Bud Koons, as clients.  In recognition of this service, the company and Ward entered into an 
agreement in which Ward committed his “willingness” to provide consulting services regarding the 
company’s business whenever the company requested it, for which Ward would be paid over a 
five-year period, irrespective of whether the company requested any such services.  The contract 
expressly provided that “Ward’s consulting services would not extend to providing legal counsel.”  Id. 
at para. 3.  Just days after the effective date of the agreement, Ward’s law firm and Ward’s son in the 
firm sued the founder’s estate on behalf of a disgruntled nephew of the founder, seeking $300 million 
(the Cundall litigation, filed pursuant to a 50% contingency agreement).  In the words of the court, 
“Ward had played a key role in preparing the Cundall litigation – including suggesting that claims 
existed against the founder and some of his trusts and giving his son and his firm ‘access to the legal 
files of Bud Koons, the Koons trusts, and CI LLC,’” which the court found to be both a breach of the 
express terms of the agreement (Ward’s conduct demonstrated he “was no longer available ‘to 
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provide’ consulting services” to CI LLC and that his “‘willingness’ to consult [the stated 
consideration for his compensation] in any meaningful way was illusory,” id. at para. 18), as well as 
a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing under the contract (“[i]n suggesting and 
aiding the preparation of the Cundall litigation, Ward had acted adversely to the agreed common 
purpose of the consulting agreement” and had given CI LLC false answers to its questions regarding 
his involvement therein, id. at para. 19). 
Breach of fiduciary duty: In Little Beaver Creek Valley R.R. & Historical Soc’y, v. P.L.&W. R.R., 
No. 95- CO-76, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2657 (Columbiana June 10, 1998), the court of appeals 
affirmed a judgment on a jury verdict against a lawyer who, as a trustee for a non-profit corporation, 
breached his fiduciary duty by drafting by-laws for a related for-profit corporation that were not 
protective of the interests of the not-for-profit corporation. 
Consumer protection laws: Lawyer liability when a nonlawyer would be liable can be altered by 
statute. Thus, in Ohio, a transaction between a lawyer and his or her client is expressly excluded from 
the definition of a “consumer transaction” for purposes of Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act 
(“CSPA”). ORC 1345.01(A). As the court noted in Burke v. Gammarino, 108 Ohio App.3d 138, 
142, 670 N.E.2d 295, 298 (Hamilton 1995) (citing ORC 1345.01(A)), plaintiff’s reliance on the act 
for his claim of consumer fraud against his lawyer was “completely misplaced.” This is consistent 
with the rule in most states that have considered the issue; whether by express statutory exclusion or 
judicial decision, consumer protection statutes are typically found not to apply to the professional 
aspects of the practice of law. See 1 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice §  
9.5, at 1075 (2012 ed.). But see Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust v. Gillium, 151 Ohio Misc.2d 36, 2009 
Ohio 2394, 907 N.E.2d 809 (C.P. Hamilton), denying the lawyer’s motion to dismiss the client’s 
civil conspiracy claims asserting the lawyer’s complicity with others, whose conduct allegedly 
“included violations of the Consumer Sales Practice Act, breach of fiduciary duty, and common-law 
fraud.” Id. at para. 14. 
Compare Havens-Jobias v. Eagle, 2003 Ohio 1561, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 1512 (Montgomery), 
where the CSPA was invoked by nonclients against lawyer defendants who had represented their 
client against plaintiffs in a prior lawsuit, but plaintiffs failed to state facts that would constitute a 
violation of the act, even assuming, as the appellate court did (the trial court had so held), that the 
lawyers met the definition of “supplier” under the act contained in ORC 1345.01(C). [Query how a 
lawyer attempting to collect a debt for his client could be a CSPA “supplier” (“a seller, lessor, 
assignor, franchisor, or other person engaged in the business of effecting or soliciting consumer 
transactions, whether or not the person deals directly with the consumer”). Inasmuch as client-lawyer 
transactions by definition are not “consumer transactions,” it seems incongruous that suing a third 
party could be deemed such a transaction, or that the sued third party could be deemed a “consumer” 
(one “who engages in a consumer transaction with a supplier”), entitled to CSPA relief. See ORC 
1345.09.] 
Contribution: Under ORC 2307.31(A), if two or more persons are concurrently liable in tort for a 
common injury, there is a right to contribution. In Costin v. Wick, C.A. No. 95 CA006133, 1996 
Ohio App. LEXIS 233 (Lorain Jan. 24, 1996), the Ninth District Court of Appeals applied this rule 
in holding that a lawyer sued for malpractice can maintain a third-party action against the successor 
attorney based on allegations that the successor contributed to or aggravated the damages claimed by 
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the malpractice plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the third-party 
claim and noted that 
[w]e cannot see any reason for exempting attorneys from the 
application of this statute. If the legislature had intended to create an 
exception for attorneys, it could have done so. 
Id. at *3. 
Conversion: For a case involving a claim of conversion of a client’s personal property (settlement 
proceeds) by her lawyer, who unlawfully negotiated the settlement check made out jointly to both 
without his client’s signature and applied the proceeds to fees allegedly owing, see Okocha v. 
Fehrenbacher, 101 Ohio App.3d 309, 655 N.E.2d 744 (Cuyahoga 1995) (denial of lawyer’s 
motion for summary judgment on client’s counterclaim affirmed). A related disciplinary proceeding, 
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Okocha, arising in part out of conduct in the Fahrenbacher case 
and decided while Fehrenbacher was pending in the court of appeals, is reported at 69 Ohio St.3d 
398, 632 N.E.2d 1284 (1994) (indefinite suspension from the practice of law). In accord with its 
decision in Fehrenbacher (although not citing it) is the Eighth District Court of Appeals’ holding in 
Montali v. Day, 2002 Ohio 2715, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 2812 (Cuyahoga), where summary 
judgment for the defendant lawyer was reversed because conflicting affidavits presented a genuine 
issue of material fact on the conversion claim, as well as on the malpractice claim. The property at 
issue in Montali was a check from the bankruptcy court payable to Montali; she pled and submitted 
evidence by affidavit that her attorney received the check and, despite her demands to deliver it to her, 
had it endorsed and cashed without her authority. 
Fraud: The Ohio Supreme Court in Chemical Bank v. Neman, 52 Ohio St.3d 204, 556 N.E.2d 490 
(1990), affirmed a jury verdict against defendant attorney for fraud in misrepresenting to a deputy 
sheriff seeking to levy on certain stock of defendant’s client that he did not have possession of the 
stock, where the verdict was supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all of the 
essential elements of a fraud claim, including justifiable reliance by plaintiff bank, and thus was not 
against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court further held that the attorney could not act as 
he did under the guise of zealous representation of his client (quoting former OH EC 7-10 in support). 
In Reiner v. Kelley, 8 Ohio App.3d 390, 457 N.E.2d 946 (Franklin 1983), the Tenth District Court 
of Appeals affirmed a judgment holding defendant, attorney for the sellers in real-estate transaction, 
liable for fraudulent misrepresentations made to sellers’ real-estate brokers, from whom lawyer 
obtained a check through misrepresentation and then converted the proceeds. And in Little Beaver 
Creek Valley R.R. & Historical Soc’y v. P.L.&W.R.R., No. 95- CO-76, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 
2657 (Columbiana June 10, 1998), the court of appeals affirmed a fraud judgment against an 
attorney for reckless misrepresentation concerning the inability of nonresidents to hold stock in an 
Ohio corporation. See Bennice v. Bennice, 82 Ohio App.3d 594, 612 N.E.2d 1256 (Ottawa 1992) 
(fraud on client; case discussed at section 1.1:380). 
Another client-fraud case is Berry v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, L.L.P., 182 Ohio App.3d 795, 
2009 Ohio 3067, 915 N.E.2d 382 (Cuyahoga). The plaintiffs in Berry had previously sued the law 
firm for malpractice but the parties settled, executing a settlement agreement and consent judgment 
entry. However, plaintiffs did so without knowledge that the firm had a second malpractice liability 
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policy, which the firm did not disclose in response to interrogatories in the malpractice case. The 
Berrys then sued the Javitch firm for fraudulent inducement, claiming that they would not have settled 
the malpractice case for the settlement amount if they had known of the second policy. The trial court 
granted the law firm’s motion for summary judgment without opinion; reversing, the Eighth District 
found that an issue of material fact existed as to whether Javitch purposefully withheld the existence 
of the second policy. The Supreme Court in turn reversed the court of appeals; it held that such an 
action cannot be pursued “without seeking relief from the consent judgment and rescinding the 
settlement agreement.” Any fraud in the inducement “would render the settlement agreement 
voidable and require the releasor to tender back the consideration paid before attacking the agreement. 
The appropriate method to seek relief was through Civ.R. 60(B).” Berry v. Javitch, Block & 
Rathbone, L.L.P., 127 Ohio St.3d 480, 2010 Ohio 5772, 940 N.E.2d 1265, at paras. 1, 31. 
See also Morrow v. Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., 183 Ohio App.3d 40, 2009 Ohio 2665, 
915 N.E.2d 696, where the court affirmed the 12(b)(6) dismissal of the fraud claim against 
defendants, including the Reminger firm, because, as a matter of law, plaintiffs could not establish 
justifiable reliance on the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation. 
The case of Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc), 
provides a number of views on attorney-fraud liability under Ohio law. (While most of the discussion 
is in the context of a 10b-5 security law claim, it is clear that the same analysis applied to the pendent 
fraud claims under Ohio law.) Plaintiff Rubin brought suit against a law firm and one of its lawyers 
(Barnhart), claiming that Barnhardt made material omissions and misrepresentations of fact, causing 
Rubin to commit funds to one of Barnhart’s clients that subsequently went bankrupt with the result 
that Rubin lost his investment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On 
appeal, a panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that, with respect to the alleged omissions, 
Barnhardt had no duty to speak and, with respect to the alleged misrepresentations, that plaintiff, a 
sophisticated investor represented by counsel could not have justifiably relied upon the statements: 
“where, as in the case here, a party has relied on another attorney when it is represented by its own and 
has the opportunity to learn of the true facts, reliance is unjustifiable.” 110 F.3d 1247, 1257 (6th Cir. 
1997). Judge Boggs, dissenting, pointed out that the rule relied on by the majority 
is limited to reliance on the opinions or research of the other party’s 
attorney on points of law . . . . The theory is that one’s own lawyer 
ought to be able to detect and cure misleading statements of law from 
the other side. Extending the principle to factual representations 
would . . . allow[] an attorney to mislead investors with impunity. This 
is not a privilege afforded by a law degree. 
Id. at 1261 (emphasis in original). The majority’s opinion was vacated and the case set for rehearing 
en banc.  120 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 1997). Upon rehearing, with Judge Boggs now writing for the court, 
the summary judgments for Barnhardt and his firm were reversed and the case remanded for further 
proceedings.  143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Not surprisingly, the en banc opinion is 
consistent with the panel dissent: 
 There is nothing special about Barnhart’s status as an attorney 
that negates his Rule 10b-5 duty to disclose, a duty that ordinarily 
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would devolve under Rule 10b-5 upon a third party under these 
circumstances. . . . 
* * * 
 We are thus left with the defendants’ least persuasive argument: 
that attorneys should be treated differently from other defendants in 
securities-fraud cases. . . . It is perhaps symptomatic of the current 
debate over the state of legal ethics that the defendants would invoke 
the attorney’s duty of confidentiality to justify what, if Rubin’s and [his 
lawyer] Weiss’s affidavits are correct, amount to outright lies. . . . The 
defendants’ argument is no more persuasive when phrased as the 
principle that a party who is represented by counsel cannot rely on the 
opinion of the other party’s attorney. [Thereafter proceeding to 
reiterate the language quoted above from the panel dissent.] 
Id. at 267, 269-70 (bracketed material added). The Sixth Circuit’s en banc opinion is in accord with 
the rule set forth in 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  98 (2000) 
(knowingly making false statements to nonclient). 
Interestingly, on remand, the district court in Rubin again granted summary judgment for defendants, 
but this time around the arguments were different. In other related actions, Rubin had already 
recovered more in settlement than he claimed to have lost; thus he was barred from seeking further 
compensatory relief. Also, after Barnhardt’s statements, there were intervening third-party acts that 
rendered the statements too remote from Rubin’s loss to establish “loss causation” under both federal 
securities law and Ohio common-law fraud.  119 F.Supp.2d 787 (S.D. Ohio 2000). 
Fraud was among the many claims asserted by plaintiffs against the defendant lawyers in 
Havens-Tobias v. Eagle, 2003 Ohio 1561, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 1512 (Montgomery). After 
reciting the elements of common-law fraud and noting that plaintiffs’ claim was premised on various 
conduct relating to attempts to collect an alleged debt, the court made quick work of the claim by 
noting that “[a]t the very least, the Tobiases failed to allege any justifiable reliance on their part on 
representations made by Eagle. For this reason alone, they failed to state a claim of fraud against 
Eagle.” Id. at para. 34. 
Intentional infliction of emotional distress: See Endicott v. Johrendt, 99 AP-935, 2000 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 2697 (Franklin June 22, 2000), discussed at section 1.1:380. 
Invasion of Privacy: Plaintiffs in Havens-Tobias v. Eagle, 2003 Ohio 1561, 2003 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 1512 (Montgomery), argued that the defendant lawyers had invaded their privacy by sending 
collection demand letters to their lawyer and by filing a lawsuit to recover the alleged debt. The court 
of appeals, affirming the dismissal of this claim, noted that these allegations were wholly insufficient 
to constitute the wrongful-intrusion branch of the privacy tort recognized by the Supreme Court in the 
leading case of Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956) (syllabus two); such a claim, 
in debtor-creditor situations, typically depends on evidence of a campaign of harassment against the 
debtor, and plaintiffs did not allege conduct of that sort. 
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Libel and slander: See section 1.1:410 infra for a discussion of cases dealing with lawyer liability for 
defamation and the applicability of the defenses of qualified and absolute privilege in such cases. For 
a full discussion of the absolute privilege as it applies to lawyers, see section 1.1:510. 
The absolute privilege traditionally applies to four categories, and the beneficiary of the privilege 
need not be a lawyer. The categories are: (1) statements made in legislative proceedings, (2) 
statements made in judicial proceedings, (3) official acts of executive officers of a state or nation, and 
(4) acts done in the exercise of military authority.  M.J. DiCarpo, Inc. v. Sweeney, 69 Ohio St.3d 
497, 505, 634 N.E.3d 203, 209 (1994). Absolute privilege is also sometimes provided by statute, see, 
e.g., ORC 2151.142(G)(1)(a) (reporting child abuse). In judicial proceedings, under the absolute 
privilege “witnesses, parties, attorneys, and judges are protected while functioning as such in the 
usual and regular course of judicial proceedings.” Michaels v. Berliner, 119 Ohio App.3d 82, 87, 
694 N.E.2d 519, 522 (Summit 1997). 
The qualified privilege in defamation actions is not limited to the four categories of absolute privilege; 
it also can be asserted by both lawyers and nonlawyers in accordance with the requisites therefor. “A 
qualified or conditional privilege arises when there is ‘good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement 
limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and publication in a proper manner and to 
proper parties only.’ . . . The privilege is defeated by a showing that the allegedly defamatory 
communication was made with ‘actual malice,’ defined as knowledge of falsity or disregard as to 
truth or falsity.” Michaels, id. at 90-91, 694 N.E.2d at 524-25 (summary judgment for defendant 
attorneys reversed because genuine issue of fact existed regarding malice; quoting and citing 
A&B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Central Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 73 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 8, 11-12, 651 N.E.2d 1283, 1290, 1292-93 (1995) (nonlawyer defendant)). Compare 
Gugliotta v. Marano, 161 Ohio App.3d 152, 2005 Ohio 2570, 829 N.E.2d 757 (Summit) 
(nonlawyer defendant; summary judgment for defendant affirmed; no malice; qualified privilege 
applicable to statements made to Better Business Bureau about plaintiff/lawyer). 
Malicious prosecution:  Malicious prosecution cases involving lawyer defendants are discussed in 
sections 1.1:410 and 1.1:520. 
Misappropriation of trade secrets: In Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St.3d 
171, 707 N.E.2d 853 (1999), the Ohio Supreme Court held that the court of appeals correctly reversed 
a summary judgment for the defendant attorneys (a migrating lawyer and her new firm) on plaintiff’s 
claim for misappropriation of trade secrets; there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether 
plaintiff had adequately protected its client list for it to qualify as a trade secret and whether 
defendants had created their own list or had simply used plaintiff’s list. Justice Cook wrote a strong 
dissent. And see American Motors, Inc. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 575 N.E.2d 116 (1991), 
discussed above at section 1.1:380. 
Negligent misrepresentation: See Orshoski v. Krieger, No. OT-01-009, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 
5018 (Ottawa Nov. 9, 2001) (stating claim under 3 Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts §  
552 (1977); erroneous legal advice relied on by nonclient). Orshoski is discussed at section 1.1:410. 
Tortious interference with contract: In the Siegel case, 85 Ohio St.3d 171, 707 N.E.2d 853, the Court 
likewise affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal of summary judgment for defendants (a migrating 
lawyer and her new firm) on plaintiff’s tortious interference with contract claim, where the lawyer 
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sent mailings to her former firm’s clients, for whom she had worked, inviting them to become her 
clients at her new firm. The Court held that the disciplinary rules (former OH DR 2-102(A)(2) and 
2-110(A)(2)) relied on by the migrating lawyer did not protect her conduct, and concluded that there 
was a genuine issue of fact as to whether, in the language of 4 Restatement (Second) of the Law of 
Torts §  768 (1979), she and her new firm had employed “wrongful means” (i.e., utilization of 
protected trade secrets), thereby precluding summary judgment in their favor on the tortious 
interference claim. As with the misappropriation of trade secrets aspect of the case, Justice Cook 
entered a powerful dissent. Siegel is further discussed at sections 1.1:530, 1.2:400, and 7.3:220. 
Another tortious interference-by-lawyer case in which summary judgment for the defendants was 
reversed is Kelley v. Buckley, 193 Ohio App.3d 11, 2011 Ohio 1362, 950 N.E.2d 997 (Cuyahoga) 
(genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary judgment). 
1.1:400  Liability to Certain Nonclients 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.1 
ORC 1339.18, 1782.08(B) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.1 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 301:601 
ALI/LGL § 51 
Wolfram §§ 5.6.4-5.6.5 
  
1.1:410  Duty of Care to Certain Nonclients 
The general rule in Ohio, as set forth by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Scholler v. Scholler, 
10 Ohio St.3d 98, 462 N.E.2d 158 (1984), is that 
an attorney is immune from liability to third persons arising from his 
performance as an attorney in good faith on behalf of, and with the 
knowledge of, his client, unless such third person is in privity with the 
client or the attorney acts maliciously. 
Id. (syllabus one).  
Accord Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 512 N.E.2d 636 (1987). Compare 1 Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  51 (2000). 
The important, and unanimous, 2007 opinion by the Supreme Court in LeRoy v. Allen, Yurasek & 
Merklin, 114 Ohio St.3d 323, 2007 Ohio 3608, 872 N.E.2d 254, also cites and quotes Scholler (and 
Simon) with apparent approval (paras. 15-16), but then in the next paragraph seems to leave the door 
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open a crack for possible future modification of the long-standing rule of lawyer nonliability to third 
parties and its only two equally long-standing exceptions.  Thus, the Court notes that 
as this case now stands, this appeal does not test the continuing validity 
of those precedents.  This case also does not present issues regarding 
whether additional exceptions to the general rule beyond those already 
recognized should exist. 
Id. at para. 17. 
The LeRoy opinion is explored in detail in this section infra at “Developments in Ohio subsequent to 
Elam and Arpadi,” as well as in section 1.13:520. 
Further rumblings about the possibility of change are heard in the concurring opinion of Chief Justice 
Moyer in Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, 118 Ohio St.3d 226, 2008 Ohio 2012, 887 N.E.2d 1167, an 
equally important case decided in 2008.  The majority in Shoemaker rejected the frontal attack made 
by appellants on Simon v. Zipperstein and held that a beneficiary under the testatrix’s will could not 
sue the testatrix’s lawyer for alleged negligence in deeding real estate to one of her sons, thereby 
reducing the value of the estate to the other beneficiaries.  But Chief Justice Moyer, joined by two 
other justices, made clear that if presented again with facts like those in Simon (beneficiary seeking to 
sue testator’s attorney for negligence in drafting will) the Court should revisit the Simon rule:  “I 
believe there would be compelling reasons to recognize a cause of action by an intended beneficiary 
against decedent’s attorney for negligence in the preparation of a will.”  Id. at para. 28.  In the 
meantime, courts of appeals continue to apply the Shoemaker rule to defeat malpractice actions.  E.g., 
Bohan v. Dennis C. Jackson Co., L.P.A., 188 Ohio App. 3d 446, 2010 Ohio 3422, 935 N.E.2d 900 
(Cuyahoga) (beneficiary of revocable trust).  The Shoemaker decision is further discussed this 
section infra at “No Liability to Nonclient Based on Lack of Privity,” “Malpractice; estates and 
trusts.”   
Privity: In order for privity to exist, the interests of the third person must be “concurrent” with the 
interests of the lawyer’s client. See Scholler, 10 Ohio St.3d at 104, 462 N.E.2d at 164 (interests of 
client/spouse in separation agreement leading to dissolution of marriage are not same as those of 
minor child of the marriage; accordingly, child not in privity with spouse for purposes of malpractice 
action against lawyer arising out of his representation of spouse in negotiating and preparing 
agreement).   
Two major cases applying the Scholler privity exception are Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 68 Ohio 
St.3d 453, 628 N.E.2d 1335 (1994), and Elam v. Hyatt Legal Services, 44 Ohio St.3d 175, 541 
N.E.2d 616 (1989), both of which are discussed in detail this section infra. In Arpadi, a limited 
partnership case, privity was found to exist by reason of the fiduciary relationship between the general 
partner and the limited partners. Since the limited partners were in privity with the general partner, 
they could sue the lawyer representing the partnership/general partner for breach of duty of due care 
“regarding matters to which the fiduciary duty relates.” Syllabus three. In Elam, a trust and estates 
case, the Court held that vested beneficiaries of an estate are in privity with the estate’s fiduciary, 
whose attorney, pursuant to the Scholler privity exception, was therefore not immune from suit by the 
beneficiaries for negligence.  As discussed infra at “Developments in Ohio subsequent to Elam and 
Arpadi,” these cases may no longer be good law in Ohio, because of statutory developments. 
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Also, the LeRoy decision teaches that the Arpadi finding of privity is limited in the fiduciary duty 
context to lawyering on “matters to which the fiduciary duty relates”:  Since the lawyers’ conduct at 
issue in LeRoy related to a “private transfer of stock” by the majority shareholder of a close 
corporation, it did not implicate her fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders; as a result, there was 
no privity under the exception to the Scholler general rule of nonliability of lawyers to nonclients for 
malpractice.  LeRoy, at paras. 27-28.  In the Shoemaker case, noted above, the majority opinion 
looked to and quoted with approval the definition of privity found in Black’s Law Dictionary: “‘[t]he 
connection or relationship between two parties, each having a legally recognized interest in the same 
subject matter,’” id. at para. 10 (a definition that seems to beg the question whether a “legally 
recognized interest” exists). 
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Cases in addition to Scholler, LeRoy, and Shoemaker finding the privity element lacking include: 
Noth v. Wynn, 59 Ohio App.3d 65, 571 N.E.2d 446 (Hamilton 1988) (for privity to exist, interests 
must coincide; no such coincidence of interests where purchasers of real estate sought to sue attorneys 
for mortgage lender for alleged failure to disclose title restriction; purchasers and lender had separate 
interests). Nor, in a right-of-privacy suit based on alleged disclosures of private financial information 
by attorneys in the course of defending plaintiffs’ former lawyers against plaintiffs’ malpractice claim, 
were plaintiffs in privity with their former lawyers when, at the time of the disclosure, they were 
adversaries in the malpractice lawsuit.  Hahn v. Satullo, 156 Ohio App.3d 412, 2004 Ohio 1057, 
806 N.E.2d 567 (Franklin). Similarly, lawyers for defendant in Case A were immune from liability 
in subsequent Case B, brought by the lawyer who had represented plaintiff in Case A; lawyer-plaintiff 
in Case B was not in privity with his adversary in Case A.  Gruenspan Co., L.P.A. v. Thompson, 
2003 Ohio 3641, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 3287 (Cuyahoga). Cf. Sayyah v. Cutrell, 143 Ohio 
App.3d 102, 757 N.E.2d 779 (Brown 2001) (reversal of summary judgment for attorney for 
homeowners’ association in malpractice suit by individual members of the association; material issue 
of fact existed as to whether members’ interests were concurrent with interest (if any) of association 
in members’ suit against third party, defended by same lawyer that represented association). See also 
sections 1.1:520 and 3.1:400. 
With the result in Noth, compare Macken v. KDR Holdings, 2007 Ohio 4106, 2007 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3733 (Lorain), where the court found that privity existed between the plaintiff mortgagee and 
the defendant mortgagor such that plaintiff had standing to sue the lawyers who drafted the mortgage 
deed for the mortgagor.  “[W]e conclude under these facts [both parties sought to encumber certain 
land to secure plaintiff’s investment in KDR and both parties agreed on the amount of the 
encumbrance], representing KDR for this transaction was the equivalent of representing Appellant.”  
Id. at para. 17.  It would seem that as between Noth and Macken, Noth has the better of the 
argument. 
Malice: The Scholler malice exception is something of a chameleon, and the formulation of what 
constitutes malice seems to depend on the type of case at issue. Some sense of the variety of 
definitions can be drawn from the following list: 
 Abuse of process -- “an attorney who attempts to obtain relief from a court that he knows to be 
powerless to grant it acts in bad faith. The court concludes, therefore, that Plaintiffs may 
establish that Defendants acted in bad faith, and, therefore, maliciously, when they perverted 
the Ohio proceeding by seeking relief that the Ohio court could not grant.” Luciani v. 
Schiavoni, C-1-97-272, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25918, at *19 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 2, 2001). 
Despite (or perhaps because of?) the panoply of malice definitions, the Luciani court also 
remarked that “Ohio courts have provided precious little guidance in the interpretation of the 
maliciousness requirement of Scholler and similar cases.” Id. at *17.  See further discussion 
of Luciani in this section infra at “Liability to Nonclient Found or Supported Based on 
Malicious Conduct” and in section 1.1:520. 
 Conversion -- no malice under Scholler where attorney’s actions based on good-faith, if 
erroneous, belief; malice implies a “condition of mind which prompts a person to do a 
wrongful act willfully, that is, on purpose, to the injury of another without justification or 
excuse.” Moffitt v. Litteral, 2002 Ohio 4973, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 5000, at para. 82 
147
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.1 
  
(Montgomery). (This definition was also quoted with approval in the Sprouse opinion, cited 
below.) 
 Defamation -- in applying the malice exception to the qualified privilege rule, malice means a 
statement made with actual knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth or 
falsity.  A&B-Abell v. Columbus/Central Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 73 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 651 N.E.2d 1283 (1995) (nonlawyer defendant). 
 Intentional interference with parental relationship and fraud -- malice defined “to include 
actions taken by the attorney with an ulterior motive separate and apart from the good faith 
representation of the client’s interests.” Sprouse v. Eisenman, 2005 Ohio 463, 2005 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 487, at para. 4 (Franklin) (no malice where attorney, allegedly falsely and 
misleadingly, had in good faith told plaintiffs (the birth father and his family) that her clients 
(the birth mother and her family) were still considering parenting options shortly before the 
birth mother put the baby out for adoption). 
 Malicious civil prosecution -- malice described as intentionally doing a wrongful act without 
lawful excuse and with intent to inflict injury.  Butts v. Bjelovuk, 129 Ohio App.3d 134, 717 
N.E.2d 381 (Cuyahoga 1998). 
 Malicious criminal prosecution -- malice “means an improper purpose, or any purpose other 
than the legitimate interest of bringing an offender to justice.” Criss v. Springfield Township, 
56 Ohio St.3d 82, 85-86, 564 N.E.3d 440, 443 (1990) (nonlawyer defendant). 
 Malpractice -- No allegations of “special circumstances such as fraud, bad faith, collusion, or 
other malicious conduct which would justify departure from the [Scholler] general rule.” 
Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 76-77, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987). No malice 
because no evidence of “hatred, ill-will, or a spirit of revenge.” McGuire v. Draper, 
Hollenbaugh & Brisco Co., L.P.A., 2002 Ohio 6170, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 6003, at 
para. 66 (Highland). 
 Right of privacy -- act of sending allegedly private documents to a copying service for 
reproduction “does not constitute malicious conduct or conduct without legal justification or 
excuse .” Hahn v. Satullo, 156 Ohio App.3d 412, 2004 Ohio 1057, 806 N.E.2d 567, at para. 
68 (Franklin). 
 
Liability to Nonclient Found or Supported Based on Privity 
As noted above, two principal opinions dealing with attorney liability to a nonclient premised on the 
privity exception are Elam v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 44 Ohio St.3d 175, 541 N.E.2d 616 (1989) 
(estates and trusts), and Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 68 Ohio St.3d 453, 628 N.E.2d 1335 (1994) 
(limited partnerships). 
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In Elam, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] beneficiary whose interest in an estate is vested is in 
privity with the fiduciary of the estate, and where such privity exists the attorney for the fiduciary is 
not immune from liability to the vested beneficiary for damages arising from the attorney’s negligent 
performance.” 44 Ohio St.3d 175, 175, 541 N.E.2d 616, 616-17 (syllabus) (summary judgment for 
attorneys reversed; after death of testator, counsel for executor caused real property to be transferred 
in fee simple to executor, whereas under will executor was granted life estate only, with remainder to 
go to plaintiff/vested beneficiaries in fee simple). Based on the clearly vested interest of the 
beneficiaries in the case before it, the Elam Court distinguished its earlier decision in Simon v. 
Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 512 N.E.2d 636 (1987) (per curiam), which had held that the 
attorney who prepared the testator’s will was immune from liability for malpractice in preparation of 
the will to a potential beneficiary of his father’s estate for want of privity. (Interestingly, Elam noted 
“without comment” that review of the facts “seems to indicate that the person’s interest [in Simon] 
was vested.” See 44 Ohio St.3d 175, 177 n.2, 541 N.E.2d 616, 618 n.2. But, in its most recent 
excursion into this territory, the Court in Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, 118 Ohio St.3d 226, 2008 
Ohio 2012, 887 N.E.2d 1167, used the Zipperstein potential beneficiary rationale to explain why the 
beneficiaries in that case were not in privity – because “their rights as beneficiaries did not vest until 
[their mother’s] death.” Id. at para. 10.) See also DePugh v. Sladoje, 111 Ohio App.3d 675, 676 
N.E.2d 1231 (Miami 1996) (holding rationale of Elam to be equally persuasive on mirror-image 
facts presented; administrator of estate was in privity with beneficiary and therefore had standing to 
sue beneficiary’s attorney for malpractice). 
In Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 68 Ohio St.3d 453, 628 N.E.2d 1335 (1994), the Ohio Supreme 
Court held that attorneys for a limited partnership and its general partner owe a duty of due care 
arising from the attorney-client relationship to limited partners regarding matters to which the 
fiduciary duty relates. The Court first rejected the defendant attorneys’ argument that former OH EC 
5-18 (subsequently renumbered 5-19) supported the view that no duty is owed to limited partners by 
the attorney for the partnership; the Court found this provision inapposite because, unlike a 
corporation, a partnership is an aggregate of individuals and does not constitute a separate legal entity. 
The Arpadi decision was based on the premise that the general partner of a limited partnership owes 
a fiduciary duty to the limited partners, 68 Ohio St.3d at 454, 628 N.E.2d at 1336 (syllabus two), 
and that “the fiduciary relationship between the general partner and the limited partners provides the 
requisite element of privity under Elam, supra. Such privity, in turn, extends the duty [of care] owed 
[by the attorney] to the general partner to the limited partners regarding matters of concern to the 
enterprise.” 68 Ohio St.3d at 458, 628 N.E.2d at 1339 (bracketed material added). 
One aspect of the holding in Arpadi, however, was not expressly limited to partnership law. In 
syllabus three, the Court stated the rule in terms applicable to fiduciaries generally: 
 Those persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed are in privity 
with the fiduciary such that an attorney-client relationship established 
with the fiduciary extends to those in privity therewith regarding 
matters to which the fiduciary duty relates. (Elam approved and 
followed.) 
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Id. at 454, 628 N.E.2d at 1336 (syllabus three). This extension of the attorney-client relationship 
and its related duties caused concern in the estate and trust legal community and led to the enactment 
of ORC 1339.18 and the adoption of former OH EC 5-16, discussed this section below at “The ‘duty’ 
issue.” See Sidney Nudelman, Adoption of a New Ethical Consideration Relating to Lawyer’s 
Representation of a Trustee of an Express Trust, Executor, Administrator or Personal 
Representative, Prob. L.J. of Ohio, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 17 (discussing adoption of former OH EC 
5-16 as resolving some of the concerns of estate and trust practitioners raised by Arpadi); Robert G. 
Dykes, Scope of Lawyer’s Duty in Estates and Trusts Clarified, Prob. L.J. of Ohio, Jan.-Feb. 
1999, at 44 (similar discussion regarding enactment of ORC 1339.18). 
Arpadi is cited by the Restatement as being out of sync with the “apparent majority of recent 
decisions” that, “[c]onsistent with the position of the Section and Comment [h],” hold “that a lawyer 
for a limited partnership does not owe a duty of care to partners.” 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers §  51 reporter’s note to cmt. h, at 373 (2000).  The same reporter’s note cites 
ORC 1339.18, but makes no mention of Elam. 
Developments in Ohio subsequent to Elam and Arpadi: In response to the Court’s decisions in 
Arpadi and Elam, the legislature amended the Ohio Revised Code to make clear that a limited 
partnership was a legal entity, a position Arpadi had rejected, and enacted a new Code section 
providing that a lawyer for a fiduciary who is a trustee or an executor or administrator does not, absent 
express agreement to the contrary, owe duties to those to whom the fiduciary owes fiduciary 
obligations.  
The “entity” issue:  In 1996 the Ohio legislature amended ORC 1782.08(B) by adding the words “an 
entity” to the then-existing language. Pursuant to subsequent amendment (adding a new subpart B), 
the relevant language is now contained in ORC 1782.08(C) and reads as follows: 
 A limited partnership is an entity formed at the time of filing the 
certificate of limited partnership pursuant to section 1782.13 of the 
Revised Code [ORC 1782.13] or at any later time specified in the 
certificate if, in either case, there has been substantial compliance with 
the requirements of divisions (A) and (B) of this section [ORC 
1782.08(A)-(B), setting forth requisites of limited partnership 
formation]. 
(Emphasis and bracketed material added.) 
In comments on Substitute House Bill 495, which as enacted into law (146 Ohio Laws 5359) 
included the 1996 amendment to ORC 1782.08(B), the Corporation Law Committee of the Ohio 
State Bar Association stated that “[t]o the extent that the decision in Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 68 
Ohio St.3d 453 (1994) was based on the court’s conclusion that the limited partnership was not an 
entity, the result in that case would now be different.” 
Since the effective date of the amendment to ORC 1782.08(B), a number of cases have continued to 
cite Arpadi as good law on the entity issue. Until 2009 (see the Fornshell decision, discussed below), 
no case had cited ORC 1782.08(B) or (C) or indicated that Arpadi’s holding that a limited 
partnership is not an entity is no longer the law of Ohio. In a word, Ohio decisions ignored the statute. 
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E.g., Geren v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2002 Ohio 1230, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 969 (Lucas, Mar. 8, 
2002); Sekulovski v. Bubev, No. 99 AP-1224, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3553 (Franklin Aug. 8, 
2000). Federal cases applying Ohio law have done likewise. See, e.g., Thompson v. Karr, 182 F.3d 
918, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16846 (6th Cir. 1999) (table); Supremacy Capital Co. v. Tri-Med 
Fin. Co., 165 F. Supp.2d 679 (S.D. Ohio 2001). 
Further evidence that Arpadi should no longer be read as stating the law of Ohio on the entity issue is 
found in Ohio Rule 1.13 cmt. [1], which expressly states that “[t]he duties defined in this rule [with 
respect to an organization as client] apply equally to unincorporated associations.” Since partnerships 
and limited partnerships are by definition unincorporated associations, a lawyer for such an 
association, under 1.13(a), represents the partnership, i.e., the entity, not the individual partners. See 
further discussion at sections 1.7:340 and 1.13:230. 
Yet another effort by the legislature to make clear that general and limited partnerships are “entities” 
was found in the enactment of ORC 1775.01(G), effective October 12, 2006.  This provision once 
again expressly stated that “entity” means “[a]ny of the following organizations . . . [a]n 
unincorporated business or for profit organization, including a general or limited partnership.”  ORC 
1775.01(G)(2)(d). The provisions of Ch 1775 were repealed and replaced by Ch 1776, effective 
January 1, 2010. The identical language quoted above is now found in ORC 1776.01(G)(2)(d).  See 
also ORC 1776.21(A), which states that a “partnership is an entity distinct from its partners.” 
Finally, in Fornshell v. Roetzel & Andress, 2009 Ohio 2728, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 2265 
(Cuyahoga), the Eighth District Court of Appeals, per Judge Dyke, saw the light and cited ORC 
1782.01(C) and 1782.08 in ruling that limited liability companies (the organization there at issue) as 
well as limited partnerships such as that in Arpadi, are “entities.”  
More recently, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas recognized the statutory “entity” rule in 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P. v. Bonasera, 157 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 2010 Ohio 1677, 
926 N.E.2d 375 (C.P. Franklin). Despite acknowledging the entity rule, however, the court went on 
to state (in an intra-law firm dispute involving the departure of an entire branch office, in which the 
parent firm made claims of breach of fiduciary duty) that even though Buckingham is a distinct entity 
that does not also mean that individual members of the board of 
managers owed duties only to the partnership entity and could ignore 
the corporate partners and their shareholders [the lawyers] in this 
interlocking business arrangement. As explained above, fiduciary-duty 
law is not so rigid. 
Id. at para 37. As a result, the court denied a motion by members of the board of managers of the 
overarching law firm entity for judgment on the pleadings on the migratory lawyers’ counterclaim for 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the board.  (The court also denied the migratory lawyers’ motion 
for summary judgment on all of the firm’s claims.) 
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The “duty” issue:  In December 1998 the Ohio legislature enacted ORC 1339.18 (effective March 22, 
1999; renumbered ORC 5815.16, effective January 1, 2007), which would appear to have repudiated 
Elam and an unlimited reading of syllabus three of Arpadi. The section reads as follows: 
 (A) Absent an express agreement to the contrary, an attorney 
who performs legal services for a fiduciary, by reason of the attorney 
performing those legal services for the fiduciary, has no duty or 
obligation in contract, tort, or otherwise to any third party to whom the 
fiduciary owes fiduciary obligations. 
 (B) As used in this section, “fiduciary” means a trustee under an 
express trust or an executor or administrator of a decedent’s estate. 
(At about this same time, an ethical consideration, designed to deal with the perceived problem of 
conflicting multiple representation raised by the language in syllabus three of Arpadi extending the 
fiduciary’s attorney-client relationship to those in privity with the fiduciary, was adopted by the Ohio 
Supreme Court, effective November 1, 1999. See former OH EC 5-16, which stated that a lawyer 
representing a fiduciary having fiduciary duties to third parties was not engaged in multiple 
representation, even if the fiduciary and the third parties had conflicting interests. As used in the 
ethical consideration, “fiduciary” included only a trustee under an express trust or an executor, 
administrator, or personal representative.”) 
A further attempt by the General Assembly to repudiate an unrestricted reading of Arpadi syllabus 
three occurred with the passage of Am. Sub. H.B. 301, effective October 12, 2006. See ORC 
1701.921(A) (corporations); 1705.61(A) (limited liability companies); 1782.65(A) (limited 
partnerships).  As to each of these entities, the relevant statutory language is that “[a]bsent an express 
agreement to the contrary,” a lawyer “performing services for” the entity 
owes no duty to, incurs no liability or obligation to, and is not in privity 
with the [constituents or creditors of the entity] by reason of 
performing services for the [entity]. 
Each of these provisions also has a subsection (B), which states the identical restrictions on duty, 
liability, privity, etc., regarding a lawyer performing services for the entity’s constituents.  Since 
Arpadi was a limited partnership case and since each of the provisions is identical in structure, we 
will quote only 1782.65(B) here.  It states in relevant part: 
 Absent an express agreement to the contrary, a person . . . 
performing services for a general or limited partner or a group of 
general or limited partners of a limited domestic or foreign limited 
partnership owes no duty to, incurs no liability or obligation to, and is 
not in privity with the limited partnership, any other general or limited 
partners of the limited partnership, or the creditors of the limited 
partnership by reason of . . . performing services for the general or 
limited partner or group of general or limited partners. 
This language in 1782.65(A) & (B) seems to directly repudiate the core holding in Arpadi that the 
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lawyer for the general partner and the limited partnership can be liable or has a duty of care to the 
limited partners, even though the lawyer was not representing them.  (This limitation of liability, at 
least with respect to corporations and limited liability companies and their constituents, is noted in 
Gary P. Krieder & F. Mark Reuter, Significant 2006 Amendments to Ohio Business 
Organization Statutes, Ohio Law., Jan./Feb. 2007, at 30, 31-32; no mention is made of the Arpadi 
conundrum.) 
Once again, the Fornshell case comes to the rescue and cites ORC 1705.61 (the provision addressing 
limited liability companies) in support of its ruling that the defendant law firm, representing the 
limited liability company, owed no duty to the minority owner of the company or the minority 
owner’s manager. In doing so, it found Arpadi’s rule that the limited partnership’s attorney was in 
privity with the owners of the partnership and therefore owed them a duty had “essentially been 
abrogated” by the statutory changes. See 2009 Ohio 2728, at paras. 53-59. 
While to our knowledge the 2006 amendments to the Revised Code have not yet generated any case 
law other than Fornshell, one would have expected otherwise for the comparable provisions adopted 
in 1999. Nevertheless, with one exception (discussed in the last paragraph of this subsection), no case 
has cited ORC 1339.18 or OH EC 5-16; instead, they continue to cite Elam and Arpadi as good law 
on the duty point. See, e.g., Brinkman v. Doughty, 140 Ohio App.3d 494, 748 N.E.2d 116 (Clark 
2000). In Brinkman, certain relatives of the deceased brought a malpractice action against the 
lawyers who had represented the executrix and who had pursued wrongful death claims. The 
wrongful death action was settled, but the Brinkman plaintiffs did not share in the proceeds. In the 
malpractice action, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant lawyers on the ground 
that plaintiffs were not in privity with the fiduciary for the estate, since their interests were potential 
only and not vested. The Second District Court of Appeals reversed. Relying on the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Elam and Arpadi, the court held that the executrix owed a fiduciary duty to all statutory 
beneficiaries under the wrongful-death statute; that being so, plaintiffs were in privity with the 
executrix and could sue the lawyers for the executrix for malpractice, because the lawyer’s duty runs 
not only to the client but also to those to whom the client owed a fiduciary duty. ORC 1339.18 was 
not mentioned in the opinion. The Supreme Court denied review.  91 Ohio St.3d 1480, 744 N.E.2d 
1194 (2001). 
A more recent example, Wanamaker v. Davis, 2007 Ohio 4340, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3878 
(Greene), produced a similar result based on Elam. As in Brinkman, the Wanamaker court of 
appeals reversed summary judgment for the defendant lawyer; it reasoned as follows: 
 In the case at bar, the trial court found that appellant did not 
have standing to bring the estate’s malpractice claim because appellant 
was not the executrix at the time she filed the complaint. [The estate 
had previously been closed.] However, at that time, appellant was also 
the trustee of the Trust. It is undisputed that the Trust was the sole 
beneficiary of Mr. Casey’s will. Because the Trust is the beneficiary of 
the estate, and not a potential beneficiary, it has a vested interest in the 
estate. [Elam] at 177. Applying Elam here, we find that the Trust was 
in privity with appellant in her capacity as the executrix of the estate. Id. 
at 176. It follows then that Davis [the lawyer] is not immune from 
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liability to the Trust, the vested beneficiary, for damages arising from 
his negligent performance. Id. at 177. We therefore find that as Trustee 
of the Trust, appellant had the authority to assert the estate’s legal 
malpractice claim. 
Wanamaker, at para. 21 (emphasis by the court; bracketed material added). Again, ORC 1339.18, 
which would have called for the opposite result, was not mentioned. And again, the Supreme Court 
denied review. 116 Ohio St.3d 1477, 2008 Ohio 153, 879 N.E.2d 785. 
Two other court of appeals decisions quote and apply Arpadi syllabus three on the privity/fiduciary 
duty/attorney-client relationship issue, LeRoy v. Allen, Yurasek & Merklin, 162 Ohio App.3d 155, 
2005 Ohio 4452, 832 N.E.2d 1246 (Union); Euclid Retirement Village, Ltd. P’ship v. Giffin, 
2002 Ohio 2710, 2002 Ohio App. Lexis 2788 (Cuyahoga), but neither run afoul of ORC 1339.18 or 
OH EC 5-16, since the fiduciaries in LeRoy and Euclid Village were, respectively, a majority 
shareholder and a limited partnership general partner, not a trustee of an express trust or an executor 
or administrator of a decedent’s estate. [But see new ORC 1701.921 and 1782.65, discussed above.] 
A unanimous Supreme Court in LeRoy, however, in no uncertain terms reversed the court of appeals 
on the privity issue, 114 Ohio St.3d 323, 2007 Ohio 3608, 872 N.E.2d 254.  Pursuant to the Court: 
 The major flaw in the court of appeals’ reasoning is that Arpadi 
found privity in a partnership situation specifically only as to “matters 
to which the fiduciary duty relates.”  Arpadi, 68 Ohio St.3d at 458, 628 
N.E.2d 1335.  The claims of LeRoy and Miller, however, are not such 
claims.  A private transfer of stock does not, in and of itself, implicate 
any fiduciary duty on the part of a majority shareholder toward 
minority shareholders. 
 The transfer of stock that LeRoy and Miller challenge in this 
case is fundamentally different from the legal work at issue in Arpadi, 
in which the alleged legal malpractice that occurred was for legal 
representation specifically done regarding partnership matters.  The 
transfer of stock was a purely private matter, personal to Mary 
Elizabeth Behrens, and was not done on behalf of Marysville 
Newspapers.  For that reason, the legal work done by defendants 
regarding that transfer does not implicate the fiduciary duties discussed 
in either Arpadi or Crosby, the privity exception of  Simon is clearly 
inapplicable, and LeRoy and Miller failed to state a valid claim under 
that exception.  We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on this 
issue. 
Id. at paras. 27-28. 
Thus, Arpadi was of no help to the LeRoy plaintiffs because its privity rule is limited to “matters to 
which the fiduciary duty relates,” id. at para. 27, and the private transfer of stock at issue in LeRoy 
was not such a matter.  Without a majority shareholder fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders 
relating to that transaction, the Court held that there was no privity between the majority and the 
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minority, and without privity, there was no duty of care on the part of the lawyers for the majority 
shareholder to the nonclient minority shareholders. (Presumably, pursuant to the LeRoy analysis, the 
Arpadi privity rule would still lie if the lawyer’s work is on a “matter[] to which the fiduciary duty 
relates.”) 
(While it did not affect the result, it should be noted that the Court in LeRoy telescoped the Arpadi 
fiduciary duty/privity/duty-of-care analysis into one of fiduciary duty/privity only.  Arpadi held that 
the general partner owes a fiduciary duty to the limited partners and “[a] fortiori [the limited partners] 
are in privity with the fiduciary such that an attorney client relationship established with the fiduciary 
extends to those in privity therewith regarding matters to which the fiduciary duty relates.  
Therefore, . . . the duty arising from the attorney-client relationship . . . must be viewed as extending 
to the limited partners as well.” 68 Ohio St.3d at 458, 628 N.E.2d at 1339 (emphasis added); accord 
syllabus three.  In LeRoy, it was privity, not “the duty arising from the attorney-client relationship,” 
that the Court held existed only as to “matters to which the fiduciary duty relates.” 114 Ohio St.3d 
323, at para. 27.) 
Having decided the privity issue on the ground that “the legal activities in this case were inherently 
not ‘matters to which the fiduciary duty relates,’” id. at para. 30, and that such a relationship is a 
prerequisite to application of the Arpadi rule, the LeRoy Court did not address defendants’ 
alternative argument – that the court of appeals erred in extending the Arpadi duty of care rule to the 
close-corporation context by use of Crosby’s language that the fiduciary duty owing in a close 
corporation is “similar” to that owed in a partnership because of their “fundamental resemblance.”  Id. 
at paras. 25, 30.  Instead, “resolution of [this] issue by this court must await another day.”  Id. at 
para. 30.  (In doing so, the Supreme Court referred to a Sixth Circuit case, Thompson v. Karr, 182 
F.3d 918, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16846 (6th Cir. 1999) (table), that the defendants “point out . . . 
expressly declined to employ Crosby in this way to extend the holding of Arpadi . . . .”  Id. at para. 
29 (ellipses added).  While technically correct, the express declination was based on the fact that 
“[t]he courts of Ohio have not so far extended Arpadi to close corporations” and “it is the place of the 
Ohio courts, if not the Ohio legislature, and not this court sitting in diversity, to extend the fiduciary 
and professional duties of attorneys of close corporations to the corporations’ minority shareholders” 
by means of the Arpadi analogy, as a matter of Ohio law.  Thompson, at *26, 27.  As we have seen, 
far from “extending” the Arpadi duties, “the Ohio legislature” has eliminated them, as the Ohio 
courts finally recognized in the Fornshell decision, discussed above.)   
Finally, note that even the Supreme Court in LeRoy gives no indication of the existence of the 
legislature’s assault on Arpadi.  Arpadi is cited and discussed, its syllabi are quoted (see paras. 22 & 
23), but there is not one word in LeRoy alluding to ORC 1782.65(B), in which, as discussed above, 
the duty of care to the limited partners, imposed by Arpadi on lawyers for a limited partnership 
and/or its general partner, is flatly repudiated. (Even though the operative facts in LeRoy occurred 
well before the 2006 enactments repudiating Arpadi, a footnote reference to the prospective demise 
of the Arpadi rule would not have been out of place.) 
The lone case (the previously mentioned exception) in which ORC 1339.18 is cited does nothing to 
clarify Ohio law on this issue; if anything, it further muddles it.  In Haller v. Wiles, Doucher, Van 
Buren & Boyle, No. 99CVA04-2975, 1999 WL 34828689 (C.P. Franklin July 13, 1999), the 
defendant lawyers for the administrator of an estate raised 1339.18 in support of their motion for 
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summary judgment on a malpractice claim (which motion was granted on other grounds).  They quite 
properly argued that with respect to the claim of the nonclient plaintiff the statute “provides immunity 
to an attorney who provides legal services for a fiduciary.”  The judge, however, without any basis or 
explanation, quite erroneously held that 1339.18 “applies to commercial transactions and the uniform 
commercial code,” which of course it does not.  (The title of Chapter 1339 is “Fiduciary Law.”)  So 
much for the one citation of ORC 1339.18.  (For the record, as of January 1, 2007, this provision has 
been renumbered and is now found in Chapter 5815 at 5815.16, along with all of the other provisions 
formerly in Chapter 1339.)  The summary judgment in Haller was affirmed at 2000 WL 739435 
(App. Franklin June 8, 2000); the statute was not mentioned. 
Presumably, now that the Fornshell decision is on the books, other courts will follow suit, and the 
Arpadi privity rule will be repudiated, not only in theory, by statutes that the courts have until now 
ignored, but in practice, by the application of those statutes to the cases at hand. 
 
Liability to Nonclient Found or Supported Despite Absence of Privity 
A significant case in the lawyer-liability-to-nonclient area is Orshoski v. Krieger, No. OT-01-009, 
2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5018 (Ottawa Nov. 9, 2001). Invoking 3 Restatement (Second) of the 
Law of Torts §  552 (1977) (liability imposed on one who, having a pecuniary interest in the 
transaction, negligently provides false information, given with the intent to guide another, that is 
justifiably relied upon by, and results in pecuniary loss to, the recipient), Orshoski reversed a OH 
Civ R 12(B)(6) dismissal based on the one-year malpractice statute of limitations and held that a 
lawyer can be held liable to a nonclient for negligent misrepresentation under §552, irrespective of the 
absence of privity and malice. There was no allegation of attorney malice, and the court expressly 
held that the plaintiff was not in privity with the lawyer’s client.  2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5018, at *7. 
The Ohio Supreme Court declined review.  94 Ohio St.3d 1488, 763 N.E.2d 1185 (2002). 
The facts, as set forth in the complaint and accepted as true by the court, indicated that plaintiffs were 
interested in buying a lot in a subdivision with the intention of putting a prefabricated home on the lot. 
Prior to making the offer, they inquired of the subdivision’s real estate agent (son of the 
owner-developer) whether a prefabricated house would pass muster under the subdivision’s 
restrictive covenants. The son passed the question to his father, who in turn inquired of his lawyer, 
appellee John Kocher. Kocher, who had drafted the covenants, opined that such a home would not 
violate the pertinent restrictive covenant, and this advice was relayed to plaintiffs, who proceeded to 
buy the lot and put a prefab home on it. Of course, the prefab home was found to be in violation of the 
covenant (see Brooks v. Orshoski, 129 Ohio App.3d 386, 717 N.E.2d 1137 (Ottawa 1998)), and 
the instant case was filed against, among others, Kocher to recover the resulting economic damages. 
As the appellate court stated, “the real issue here is whether appellants’ tort claim of negligent 
misrepresentation against an attorney is a claim upon which relief can be granted,” 2001 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5018, at *7 -- as a consequence making the four-year statute of limitations, rather than the 
one-year malpractice statute, applicable. In concluding that such a claim is actionable, the court, in 
applying Restatement §  552, noted that a number of Ohio courts have invoked the section in the 
“business context, thereby eliminating any requirement of privity.” Id. at *10. The court conceded 
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that this rule has not been extended to attorneys, but noted that in no attorney case following the 
Scholler rule (no liability in the absence of privilege or malice) had the applicability of §  552 liability 
been raised. Agreeing with the lone dissent in Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 512 N.E.2d 
636 (1987), to the effect that the “requirement of privity in a legal malpractice action should be put to 
a well-deserved burial,”  id. at 77-78, 512 N.E.2d at 639, and noting the limitations imposed by 
“[s]ection 552(a)” [sic 552(2)(a)], the court of appeals concluded that “the third party entitled to bring 
such a claim is thereby confined only to one directly affected by the attorney’s misrepresentation and 
whose interest is identical to those of that attorney’s client.” 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5018, at *14 
(bracketed material added). 
While purporting to enumerate that the complaint had indeed alleged each of the prerequisites of a 
negligent misrepresentation claim, id., the court did not mention either the pecuniary interest requisite 
or its own “identical interest” test. As to the former, perhaps the seller’s lawyer had an indirect 
pecuniary interest in the transaction; comment d to §  552 (3 Restatement (Second) of the Law of 
Torts §  552 cmt. d (1977)) would seem to indicate that this is sufficient. Nor did the court elaborate 
on its holding that a plaintiff’s “interest [must be] identical to those of that attorney’s client.” 
(Ironically, it bears more than a passing likeness to the Scholler privity exception, which the 
Orshoski court was at pains to explain did not exist in the case before it.) The “identical interest” 
element is not found in §  552, and the court neither indicated its source nor explained how this 
requirement was satisfied by the allegations of the complaint. It is difficult to understand how the 
interest of the owner/developer (the client) in selling a lot in his subdivision could be “identical” to 
that of the potential buyer, particularly when, as noted above, the court had previously held that the 
potential buyer was not in privity with the owner/developer. Perhaps the court intended its “identical 
interest” test to mean identical merely with respect to the information conveyed - i.e., conveyed for 
the intended benefit of both the third party and the client, to facilitate the purchase and sale of the lot. 
Compare Altier v. Valentic, 2004 Ohio 5641, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 5083 (Geauga), finding 
Orshoski inapposite because plaintiff did not assert that he relied on the attorney’s representations, 
“nor does he claim that his interest is, in any way, identical to that of [the lawyer’s] client . . . .” Id. at 
para. 35 (dismissal of negligent representation claim affirmed). Accord Brady v. Hickman & 
Lowder Co., LPA, 2004 Ohio 4745, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4307 (Cuyahoga) (reliance on 
Orshoski “misplaced”; plaintiff could not establish “that her interests are identical to Hickman’s 
clients” id. at para. 23 -- in fact, their interests were adversarial, not identical, id. at n.10). 
While the analysis does not proceed along privity/no privity lines (indeed, Scholler v. Scholler is not 
even cited), the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Biddle v. Warren General Hospital, 86 
Ohio St.3d 395, 715 N.E.2d 518 (1999), would appear to be a case in which liability of a law firm 
was left open, despite the absence of privity. Although the main thrust of the opinion dealt with the 
recognition of an independent tort for unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information 
and the defendant hospital’s potential liability thereunder, an ancillary holding in the case (a putative 
class action brought on behalf of the hospital’s affected patients) was that a third party (here the 
hospital’s law firm) that induces such conduct can also be held liable; the requisites for such 
third-party liability do not turn on the existence or absence of privity. See  id. at 395, 715 N.E.2d at 
519-20 (syllabus three). Summary judgment for both hospital and law firm was held to have been 
improperly granted, and the case was remanded for consideration of class-certification issues. 
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In Hageman v. Sw. Gen. Health Ctr., 119 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008 Ohio 3343, 893 N.E.2d 153, the 
Court applied the Biddle rule of potential liability to a lawyer who had lawfully obtained confidential 
medical information in discovery from the opposing party’s (husband’s) psychiatrist, in connection 
with divorce litigation in which the lawyer was representing the wife; the lawyer had then provided 
the medical information to the prosecutor in the pending criminal case against the husband on charges 
of assaulting his wife. Five justices concurred in the syllabus to the effect that “[a]n attorney may be 
liable to an opposing party for the unauthorized disclosure of that party’s medical information that 
was obtained through litigation.” (syllabus). As in Biddle, this potential liability to a third person can 
exist despite the absence of privity. 
But it has been held that the rule is otherwise, where the confidentiality of medical records has been 
waived – for example, by the affected party’s refusal to enter into a protective order regarding 
psychological reports and then filing those records with a court, where they are public records. In such 
a case, the lawyer representing the affected party’s adversary, upon whom the documents were served, 
is not liable under the Hageman rule for distribution to others in his law firm and to the general 
counsel for his client. See Kodger v. Ducatman, 2012 Ohio 2517, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2208 
(Cuyahoga), discretionary appeal not allowed, 133 Ohio St.3d 1423, 2012 Ohio 4902, 976 N.E.2d 
914 (affirming grant of summary judgment to defendants in suit brought for alleged unauthorized 
disclosure of medical records). 
 
No Liability to Nonclient Based on Lack of Privity 
Debtor and creditor: Noth v. Wynn, 59 Ohio App.3d 65, 571 N.E.2d 446 (Hamilton 1988) (an 
attorney who represented a lender in connection with a real-estate transaction was immune from 
liability to the purchasers for the alleged failure to disclose the title restrictions because the 
undisputed evidence showed that the client and the third party had a debtor-creditor relationship and 
were not in privity with each other). 
Fraud: In the course of holding that fraud allegations against attorneys by nonclients were insufficient 
for failure to allege that the defendants committed the allegedly wrongful acts for their own personal 
gain, the court acknowledged the Scholler rule requiring privity or malice, but made no real analysis 
of whether either was present.  DiPaolo v. DiVictor, 51 Ohio App.3d 166, 555 N.E.2d 969 
(Franklin 1988). 
Invasion of privacy: In a suit against the attorneys defending plaintiffs’ former lawyers against a 
malpractice claim, plaintiffs (the Hahns) alleged that the defendant-attorneys (Satullo and his firm, 
Reminger & Reminger) disclosed private information contained in the Hahns’ bank credit file. 
Assuming this to be so, the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that there could be no recovery under 
the Scholler rule because “at the time of the alleged disclosure, plaintiffs were not in privity with 
Satullo’s clients, plaintiffs’ former attorneys against whom plaintiffs brought suit.” Hahn v. Satullo, 
156 Ohio App.3d 412, 2004 Ohio 1057, 806 N.E.2d 567, at para. 65 (Franklin). 
Malpractice; class action: Plaintiffs sued attorneys for malpractice for erroneously opining that a 
program was not a sale of securities under Ohio law. Plaintiffs did not register the program as a 
securities sale and sold the program to over 400 purchasers. A cease-and-desist order was issued by 
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the Ohio Division of Securities. Plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of the purchasers; the 
trial court denied certification. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the class members could 
not maintain a malpractice action against defendants because the class members were not in privity 
with the plaintiffs.  Columbus Consol. Agency, Inc. v. Wolfson, 70 Ohio App.3d 467, 591 N.E.2d 
385 (Franklin 1990) (applying Scholler rule). 
Malpractice; corporate directors: Inasmuch as on the facts presented there was no privity between 
corporate directors and the corporation, the attorneys for the corporation (but not for the directors) 
were not liable to the directors for failure to inform them of possibility of personal liability arising out 
of corporation’s nonpayment of sales taxes.  Hile v. Firmin, Sprague & Huffman Co., L.P.A., 71 
Ohio App.3d 838, 595 N.E.2d 1023 (Hancock 1991) (Scholler applied). 
Malpractice; divorce proceedings: Since an attorney who represents the wife in a matrimonial action 
does not automatically represent the interests of a minor child of the marriage, the wife cannot 
successfully maintain a malpractice action against the attorney on behalf of the child based on 
allegations that the attorney negligently negotiated and prepared the child-support provisions of a 
separation agreement.  Scholler v. Scholler, 10 Ohio St.3d 98, 462 N.E.2d 158 (1984). In such a 
case, in the absence of allegations that the attorney acted maliciously, the child is not, as he must be, 
in privity with the attorney’s client (the wife) because “it cannot be said that the interests of the wife in 
negotiating a separation agreement to achieve a fair division of marital assets are concurrent with the 
interests of the child to receive support.”  Id. at 104, 462 N.E.2d at 164. See Darrow v. Zigan, 2009 
Ohio 2205, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1860 (Hancock) (failure of ex-spouse’s lawyer to file quitclaim 
deed as promised to detriment of plaintiff, in context of dissolution of marriage proceeding, not 
actionable; Scholler qualified immunity rule applied; no allegation that defendant/lawyer acted with 
malice and plaintiff was not in privity with ex-spouse; “a dissolution of marriage, though not an 
adversarial proceeding, involves conflicting aims and objectives. Ultimately, the interests of the 
parties to the dissolution are not the same.” Id. at para. 20.); Strauch v. Gross, 10 Ohio App.3d 303, 
462 N.E.2d 433 (Franklin 1983) (attorney for plaintiff’s former spouse in dissolution of marriage 
proceeding not liable to plaintiff for malpractice where the plaintiff was neither the attorney’s client 
nor in privity with his client; no duty owing by attorney to plaintiff in such circumstances, whether the 
attorney’s conduct was negligent or intentional). [Query whether intentional malicious conduct 
would require a different result; malicious conduct not discussed by the court. See “Liability to 
Nonclient Found or Supported Based on Malicious Conduct” infra. Plaintiff pleaded malicious 
conduct, but filed no affidavit or other evidence in opposition to the attorney’s successful motion for 
summary judgment, which was affirmed on appeal.] 
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Malpractice; embezzlement by client: In Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Mandilakis, 
111 Ohio App.3d 160, 165, 675 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 (Cuyahoga 1996), the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals held: “Absent any evidence of privity between [the client] and American Express [or First 
Data, the plaintiffs here] or malice by [the client’s attorney], we conclude that there is no basis to 
apply these exceptions to the general rule that attorneys are not liable to non-client third parties for 
legal malpractice.” (bracketed material added). Former OH DR 7-102(B)(1), which placed a duty on 
an attorney to disclose a client’s fraud to a defrauded third party (which duty with respect to fraud on 
any person was not adopted as part of Ohio Rule 3.3(b); see section 3.3:700), was held not to give 
rise to actionable civil liability to nonclient third parties, as opposed to disciplinary action, for its 
violation. Thus, the attorney could not be liable under a legal malpractice theory to companies from 
which the client embezzled funds, based on the lawyer’s failure, once he learned of the embezzlement, 
to ask the client to stop the scheme or to notify the companies. The Mandilakis case is also discussed 
in sections 1.1:370 and 4.1:300. 
Malpractice; estates and trusts: As noted above, ORC 1339.18 (now renumbered as ORC 5815.16) 
purports to eliminate any duty of a lawyer for a fiduciary (defined to include a trustee of an express 
trust and an executor or administrator of decedent’s estate) to those to whom the fiduciary owes 
fiduciary obligations. As also noted above, however, this statute has thus far been ignored by the 
courts. This state of affairs requires that the pre-statute case law on privity in the estates and trusts 
context must still be consulted. 
Pursuant to that case law, a distinction is drawn between situations in which the beneficiary’s interest 
is vested and those in which it is not. Vested beneficiaries are viewed as being in privity with the 
fiduciary of the estate and hence can bring malpractice actions against the fiduciary’s attorney. E.g., 
Elam v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 44 Ohio St.3d 175, 541 N.E.2d 616 (1989). Beneficiaries whose 
interests have not yet vested are not in privity and, in the absence of malice, cannot recover against the 
attorney in malpractice. See, e.g., Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 512 N.E.2d 636 (1987) 
(per curiam) (no privity with testator because potential beneficiary’s interest not vested); Lewis v. 
Star Bank, N.A., 90 Ohio App.3d 709, 630 N.E.2d 418 (Butler 1993) (potential beneficiaries of 
revocable inter vivos trust are not in privity with settlor and therefore cannot sue settlor’s attorney for 
malpractice in allegedly failing to provide certain estate-planning and tax advice prior to settlor’s 
death; court, reconciling Simon and Elam, notes that Elam involved lawyer error made after death of 
testator, when plaintiff-beneficiary’s rights were fully vested, whereas negligence in Simon occurred 
prior to testator’s death). Likewise, in Smith v. Brooks, No. 76564, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4167 
(Cuyahoga Sept. 14, 2000) (summary judgment for defendant attorneys affirmed), the court held that 
appellant children and grandchildren were only potential beneficiaries when the alleged malpractice 
occurred – because testator’s wife had complete control over the funds in testator’s estate, “appellants 
had no entitlement to anything; thus, since their interest had not vested, they had no privity.” Id. at 
*18. A similar result was reached in Dykes v. Gayton, 139 Ohio App.3d 395, 744 N.E.2d 199 
(Franklin 2000), where the court of appeals affirmed a dismissal in a suit by intended beneficiaries 
under a will against the lawyer preparing the will, who neglected to obtain the statutorily required 
signature of one of the two attesting witnesses. As a result, the will was not admitted to probate. 
Citing Scholler and Simon v. Zipperstein (but not Elam) as controlling authority, the court 
concluded that the trial court was correct in holding that the failure to allege privity with the decedent 
was fatal.  
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Against the backdrop of these decisions finding no privity, particularly Simon v. Zipperstein, the 
more recent, and important, decision in Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, 118 Ohio St.3d 226, 2008 
Ohio 2012, 887 N.E.2d 1167, must be considered.  In Shoemaker, the defendant-lawyer, at the 
request of his client, effected a real estate transfer of a farm owned by the client to one of her sons.  
(The lawyer, Gindlesberger, also drafted her will and two codicils, apparently leaving the estate assets 
to her three children equally.)  After the client, Mrs. Schlegel, died in 2003, the other two children 
found that estate assets would have to be sold to pay taxes on the transfer of the farm.  They sued the 
lawyer for malpractice and alleged negligence in preparation of the document transferring the farm 
and in failing to advise their mother of the tax consequences. 
The lower courts ruled for Gindlesberger because of the lack of any attorney-client relationship or 
privity between the beneficiaries and their mother.  In the Supreme Court the beneficiaries argued that 
Simon should be overruled and that beneficiaries ought to be able to maintain an action for 
malpractice against the attorney, “even though the beneficiary is not in privity with the attorney’s 
client.”  Id. at para. 7.  The Supreme Court affirmed, with Chief Justice Moyer concurring, joined by 
two other justices. 
The starting point in the Court’s analysis was the Scholler rule, pursuant to which “attorneys in Ohio 
are not liable to a third party for the good faith representation of a client, unless the third party is in 
privity with the client for whom the legal services were performed.”  Id. para. 9.  Citing the result in 
Simon, the Court said “[t]he same applies here -- the appellants were not in privity with their mother, 
the client, because they were only potential beneficiaries to her will and their rights as beneficiaries 
did not vest until her death.”  Id. at para. 10. 
In making their assault on the privity rule, appellants advanced two public policy arguments -- first, 
that the “antiquated” Ohio privity rule is the minority rule; second, that “an attorney who drafts a will 
for a client is aware that his or her professional competence affects not only the client but also those 
whom the client intends to benefit from the will.”  Id. at para. 13.  The majority opinion counters 
with three public policy arguments of its own: the privity rule protects the attorney’s duty of loyalty 
and effective advocacy for the client, without threat of third-party lawsuits that might compromise the 
representation; without the privity rule, attorneys could have conflicting duties and divided loyalties; 
and without it there would be “unlimited potential liability for the lawyer.”  Id. at paras. 14-15.  (At 
this point the Court also invoked Rule 1.7 cmt. [1] to the effect that principles of loyalty and 
independent judgment underlie the conflict-of-interest rules; the Court reads this as “underscore[ing] 
the need to ensure that a lawyer is not liable to parties who are not in privity with the lawyer’s client.” 
Id. at para. 16.).  For these reasons, “[w]e decline the appellant’s invitation to relax our strict privity 
rule.”  Id. at para. 17.  In the process, the majority noted that it is not necessarily so that the privity 
rule does not allow a remedy for a wrong and cited cases from other jurisdictions suggesting that the 
estate or personal representative might stand in the shoes of the testator.  “This may well be a solution 
to the problem, but it is a question for another day.”  Id.  [But query whether it was not a question 
presented in the case at bar, inasmuch as one of the appellants was the executor of the estate; perhaps 
appellants did not pursue this line of argument.]  Almost as an afterthought, the majority notes the 
important fact that 
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[i]n this case, the basis for extending liability is even more tenuous 
because the increased tax liability to the estate arose from the transfer 
of the . . . farm, not from the decedent’s will. 
Id. at para. 19. 
It is this final point that is at the core of Chief Justice Moyer’s concurrence: 
Under the [appellants’] proposed exception, an attorney could be liable 
to his client’s beneficiaries for negligence in connection with a large 
and loosely defined group of transactions; the appellants do not present 
compelling reasons for creating such a broad exception to the privity 
rule.  Nevertheless, I write separately to distinguish the exception 
proposed by the appellants in this case and the one considered in Simon 
v. Zipperstein (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 512 N.E.2d 636, to 
acknowledge that, in a case with different facts, there would be 
compelling reasons for adopting the exception we rejected in 
Zipperstein. 
Id. at para. 23.  After noting that there is no case authority anywhere supporting the broader 
exception advanced by appellants, that that rule provides no limitation on its scope, and that damage 
to the beneficiaries in such a case is less foreseeable than it is in a will-drafting case, the Chief Justice 
cites to courts in “many states” that have allowed beneficiaries to sue for mistakes in preparing a will.  
His principal ally, however, is Justice Brown, who argued in his dissent in Zipperstein that no real 
conflict of interest exists in such a situation.  The Chief Justice agrees and quotes Justice Brown’s 
language that makes the point forcefully – if the lawyer, whose job it is to draft a will that carries out 
the client’s intentions, fails to do so, “‘with the result that an intended beneficiary receives less than 
the client desired, surely the client, if he or she were still alive, would want the intended beneficiary to 
bring an action against the attorney.’”  Id. at para. 31 (emphasis in original).  Chief Justice Moyer is 
also persuaded that there is a “strong need for attorney accountability in preparing wills” and that it 
serves no purpose to continue the strict privity rule for lawyers when it has been abrogated concerning 
the malpractice liability of other professionals, such as accountants and architects.  Id. at para. 33.  
Given the Chief Justice’s opinion, one might not want to bet the farm on the continued longevity of 
the holding in Simon v. Zipperstein. 
Since deciding Shoemaker, the Supreme Court has “affirmed on the authority of Shoemaker” the 
case of Peleg v. Spitz, 2007 Ohio 6304, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 5534 (Cuyahoga), aff’d, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 446, 2008 Ohio 3176, 889 N.E.2d 1019. The Peleg decisions are interesting because, first, the 
court of appeals, after affirming summary judgment for the defendant attorneys on plaintiff’s 
malpractice claim for want of privity, duly noted various other appellate decisions questioning the 
existing standing/privity rule with respect to potential beneficiaries seeking to sue a lawyer who had 
allegedly breached the duty of care in preparing a will. And, according to the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals, “[a] similar argument exits with respect to trusts.” 2007 Ohio 6304, at para. 24 (the 
plaintiff in Peleg was a potential beneficiary under an irrevocable trust reserving to the settlor the 
power to change beneficiaries). Second, the Supreme Court affirmance was unanimous, thus 
indicating that Chief Justice Moyer’s Shoemaker concurrence, which questioned the viability of the 
Simon no-privity rule in the will context, would not be extended to testamentary trusts, despite the 
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court of appeals’ suggestion that a “similar argument exists with respect to trusts.” (See also 
Berkmyer v. Serra, 2011 Ohio 5901, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4832 (Stark), discretionary appeal 
not allowed, 131 Ohio St.3d 1484, 2012 Ohio 1143, 963 N.E.2d 824 (following the Zipperstein 
no-privity precedent in a revocable testamentary trust/malpractice case brought by trust beneficiaries 
against the settlor’s lawyer; thereby rejecting appellants’ argument based on the views expressed by 
Justice Brown dissenting in Zipperstein and Chief Justice Moyer concurring in Shoemaker.) 
It is also interesting that, if both the Moyer view were to prevail and ORC 1339.18 were to be 
recognized and enforced, then the law of Ohio would do an about-face on both fronts – malpractice 
suits by vested beneficiaries against lawyers for fiduciaries, permitted under Elam because privity 
was present, would be precluded by the statute, and suits by nonvested beneficiaries against lawyers 
for testators, precluded under Simon because privity was absent, would be permitted. 
Another aspect of lawyer liability to nonclients in the trusts and estates area was treated in Hosfelt v. 
Miller, No. 97-JE-50, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5506 (Jefferson Nov. 22, 2000). In Hosfelt, the 
defendant-attorneys were allegedly negligent in giving estate-planning advice to a widow and in the 
administration of the husband’s estate, with the result that the widow’s estate had to pay a substantial 
sum in federal estate taxes that could have been avoided. The suit, brought by the administrator of the 
widow’s estate (not by her beneficiaries), was dismissed on summary judgment by the trial court on 
the ground that, pursuant to Simon v. Zipperstein, the beneficiaries were only potential beneficiaries 
and thus not in privity with the client (the widow) for whom the legal services were rendered. The 
appellate court reversed. Seeing the case in a completely different light, the Seventh District Court of 
Appeals agreed with appellant that this was an action by the legal representative of the widow’s estate, 
not by the beneficiaries, to preserve estate assets, that the malpractice claim held by the widow 
survives her death, and that the legal representative is the proper party to bring such a claim. 
See also the Firestone v. Galbreath litigation, which raised the question of lawyer liability for 
tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance. In an opinion reported at 976 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 
1992), the Sixth Circuit held that the malpractice claim failed for want of privity between the plaintiff 
beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust and the settlor (their grandmother) with respect to services 
performed by the grandmother’s attorney before her death. The court of appeals disposed of all issues 
in the case save one -- whether Ohio recognized a cause of action for intentional interference with 
expectancy of inheritance, and, if so, who has the right to bring the action. The Sixth Circuit certified 
the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, which ruled that the tort is recognized in Ohio and that “any 
person” who can prove the elements of the tort has the right to maintain the action.  Firestone v. 
Galbreath, 67 Ohio St.3d 87, 88, 616 N.E.2d 202, 203 (1993). Based on the Supreme Court’s 
certification decision, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that there was no such tort 
in Ohio and remanded for factual development and disposition of the issue.  Firestone v. Galbreath, 
25 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 1994). On remand, Judge Graham granted the attorney-defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment and held that plaintiff provided no evidence creating a genuine issue of material 
fact as to any of the following essential elements of the tort: intentional interference, tortious conduct, 
or reasonable certainty of realization of the expectancy but for the conduct of defendants.  Firestone 
v. Galbreath, 895 F. Supp. 917 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 
Query whether Firestone renders irrelevant one of the two alternative requisites for nonclient suits 
against lawyers as set forth in Scholler – privity. The Ohio Supreme Court did not address (and was 
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not asked) against whom the intentional interference tort might be asserted. Even if the plaintiff were 
in privity, however, it would not be dispositive for purposes of this tort; each of the five elements as 
set forth by the Supreme Court, 67 Ohio St.3d at 88, 616 N.E.2d at 203, would still have to be 
established. As the district court noted on remand, plaintiff at most alleged negligence or malpractice, 
neither of which is available to a nonclient in the absence of privity, and mere negligence or 
malpractice by the attorney is not enough to satisfy the tort at issue.  895 F. Supp. at 932. There must 
be intentional and tortious conduct, such as actual fraud, duress, or undue influence. These elements 
are akin to the other prong of the Scholler rule -- that an attorney is not immune from suit by a third 
party if the attorney acted with malice. 
Malpractice; claim by nonclient insurer: In Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp. v. Roetzel & Andress, 
163 Ohio App.3d 336, 2005 Ohio 4799, 837 N.E.2d 1215 (Summit), the defendant lawyers had 
been retained by the insurance company to defend a doctor in the underlying medical malpractice 
action. The doctor (together with the lawyer retained to defend him) disagreed with the insurer on 
whether the case should be settled or tried. After the retained lawyer was replaced, the insurer agreed 
to settle the case after two days of trial. The insurer then sued the lawyer for malpractice. The trial 
court granted summary judgment for the defendant lawyer and his firm; the court of appeals affirmed. 
After unsuccessfully arguing that it was a client of the lawyer, the insurance company further argued 
that it had standing to pursue the litigation because it was in privity with the doctor client. In holding 
that the insurance company was not in privity with the doctor, the Ninth District Court of Appeals 
stated the issue in terms of “whether the parties’ interests are the same, such that representing the 
client is equivalent to representing the party alleging privity with the client.” Id. at para. 27 (citing 
Scholler). Because the interests of the doctor and the insurance company diverged on the settlement 
issue - the doctor wanted the case settled within policy limits; the insurance company refused - there 
was no mutuality of interest and hence no privity. 
Malpractice; lawyers for malpractice defendant: Plaintiff/appellant hired law firm Y to represent him 
in an underlying wrongful discharge/age discrimination case. Y missed the statute of limitations. Y’s 
insurance carrier referred the potential malpractice claim against Y to law firm Z. Plaintiff sued Y for 
malpractice and, in an amended complaint, added Z as a malpractice defendant as well. The trial court 
granted summary judgment to Z, and the court of appeals affirmed. On the privity issue, the court held 
that there was no privity because plaintiff and the appellees (firm Z) “did not share a mutual interest. 
The interest of the attorney-client relationship between appellant and [Y] was to prosecute appellant’s 
claims against K-Mart. The interest of the attorney-client relationship between [Y] and appellees [Z] 
was to protect [Y] against appellant’s potential malpractice claim. Appellant did not share an interest 
in protecting [Y] from malpractice liability. Appellant’s interest in retaining [Y] and the [Y] 
defendants’ interest in retaining [Z] could not have been more diverse.” McGuire v. Draper, 
Hollenbaugh & Briscoe Co., L.P.A., 2002 Ohio 6170, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6003, at para. 63 
(Highland). 
Malpractice; merger transactions: Law firm represented surviving corporation in merger with a 
corporation set up by a parent corporation solely for the purpose of the merger, after which the 
surviving corporation became a wholly-owned subsidiary of the parent. All shares of the survivor 
were exchanged for $ 44 million in common stock of the parent. Although entitled to participate, 
certain redeemed shareholders of survivor had been overlooked by law firm. The overlooked 
shareholders sued the parent corporation and won, and the parent sued the law firm for malpractice. In 
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reversing a jury verdict for the parent and entering judgment for the firm, the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals in Medpartners, Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., 140 Ohio App.3d 612, 748 
N.E.2d 604 (Cuyahoga 2000), held that, while the firm represented and owed a duty to the surviving 
corporation, it had no attorney-client relationship with the parent and thus could not be liable in 
malpractice. Nor was it liable to the parent as a nonclient third party, in the absence of allegations (or 
evidence) that the parent was in privity with the firm’s client or that the law firm had acted 
maliciously. 
Malpractice; transfer of stock in closely held corporation:  See LeRoy v. Allen, Yurasek & Merklin, 
114 Ohio St.3d 323, 2007 Ohio 3608, 872 N.E.2d 254, discussed at “Developments in Ohio 
subsequent to Elam and Arpadi,” this section supra. 
Negligent representation: Plaintiff’s attempt to overcome lack of attorney-client relation with 
defendant lawyers by pleading that the lawyers’ representation of their client (not the plaintiff) was 
negligent failed for, inter alia, lack of allegations of privity with the client, who was in a position 
adverse to plaintiff. The appellate court therefore affirmed the trial court’s grant of defendants’ 
motion for judgment on the pleadings.  Brady v. Hickman & Lowder Co., L.P.A., 2003 Ohio 5649, 
2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 5034 (Cuyahoga). 
Specific performance: Lowe v. Eyler, 23 Ohio Misc.2d 11, 491 N.E.2d 405 (C.P. Clermont 1985) 
(complaint for specific performance by A and B against C and D and the attorneys for C and D; 
attorneys’ motions to dismiss granted for, inter alia, want of privity). 
Workers’ compensation: An employer’s attorney did not owe any duty to a workers’ compensation 
claimant, and claimant was not in privity with employer so as to render the employer’s attorney liable 
to the claimant with respect to the disallowance of the claimant’s workers’ compensation claim.  
Taylor v. Microdot, Inc., 79 Ohio App.3d 485, 607 N.E.2d 855 (Cuyahoga 1992). 
 
Liability to Nonclient Found or Supported Based on Malicious Conduct 
Abuse of process: The elements of abuse of process are: (1) a legal proceeding has been set in motion 
in proper form and with probable cause; (2) the proceeding has been perverted to attempt to 
accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed; and (3) direct damage resulted from the 
wrongful use of process.  Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A., 68 Ohio St.3d 294, 
626 N.E.2d 115 (1994) (syllabus one).  Yaklevich, the leading Ohio abuse-of-process decision, was 
a lawyer vs. law firm case.  For a variety of reasons, we have concluded that Yaklevich and its 
progeny are more appropriately discussed in 1.1:510, rather than here.  First, even though Yaklevich 
involved lawyer liability to a nonclient – the subject of the Scholler rule – Scholler is not even cited.  
Second, there is nothing in the rule set forth in the Yaklevich syllabus (or anywhere else in the body 
of the opinion) that even mentions “malice”; it is injected only by the plaintiff’s complaint.  Third, the 
Court’s footnote 2 (quoting W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser on Torts 898 (5th ed. 1984)), also 
suggests that malice is not an integral element of the tort.  See 68 Ohio St.3d 298 n. 2, 626 N.E.2d at 
118 n.2: “‘there is no liability [for abuse of process] where the defendant has done nothing more than 
carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions’” (bracketed 
material and emphasis added).  Perhaps a case can be made that malice is implicit in the second 
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Yaklevich element – perverting the proceeding to accomplish an ulterior purpose – and one Ohio 
federal case has read the law in a manner consistent with this analysis.  See Luciani v. Schiavone, 
C-1-97-272, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25918 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 2, 2001), where, after defendants 
injected Scholler immunity as a defense, the court found that under Zipperstein bad faith is 
tantamount to malice and that, inasmuch as a lawyer seeking to obtain relief from a court powerless to 
grant it is acting in bad faith, defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because plaintiffs 
may establish that the lawyer-defendants acted maliciously “when they perverted the Ohio 
proceeding by seeking relief that the Ohio court could not grant.”  Id. at *19.  Nevertheless, we 
believe this tort, as invoked against lawyers, is more appropriately discussed in section 1.1:520 infra.  
Conversion: The Scholler immunity rule was held not to apply in a case in which the nonclient sued 
lawyers for an estate; the complaint alleged that they participated in a wrongful taking of property 
belonging to the plaintiff, the deceased’s widow.  Carrocia v. Carrocia, 21 Ohio App.3d 244, 486 
N.E.2d 1263 (Cuyahoga 1985). Reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on the 
one-year malpractice statute of limitations, the court of appeals held that the four-year statute for 
conversion (ORC 2305.09) applied and remanded for further proceedings. In the court’s view, the 
complaint sufficiently alleged malice or bad faith to take the case out of the general rule of lawyer 
immunity to third persons established in Scholler. 
Compare Moffitt v. Litteral, 2002 Ohio 4973, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 5000 (Montgomery), 
where the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant lawyer on plaintiff’s conversion claim 
because, under Scholler, the lawyer was not in privity with the plaintiff and acted, not with malice, 
but on the basis of his good-faith belief, even though that belief turned out to be erroneous. 
Libel and slander - Qualified privilege: Lawsuits against lawyers for defamation typically fall into 
two categories -- those in which the lawyer may have a qualified privilege to publish the matter in 
question and those in which the lawyer may be absolutely privileged to do so. See Bigelow v. 
Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N.E.2d 584 (1941), for a comparison of the two privileges and an 
extensive discussion of absolute privilege. As is more fully set forth in section 1.3:390 supra, absent 
malice, the qualified privilege protects the speaker from liability for statements made in good faith in 
the discharge of a public or private duty or in the conduct of her own affairs in matters where her 
interest is concerned, with publication to appropriate persons only, e.g., Gruenspan v. Seitz, 124 
Ohio App.3d 197, 705 N.E.2d 1255 (Cuyahoga 1997), whereas the absolute privilege protects the 
speaker in four traditional categories: (1) statements made in legislative and (2) judicial proceedings, 
(3) official acts of executive officers of a state or nation, and (4) acts done in the exercise of military 
authority. 
In the former instance, qualified privilege, the rule fits within the Scholler mold -- the privilege 
applies to statements made by a lawyer in furtherance of the client’s, the lawyer’s, or the public’s 
interests and the lawyer cannot be held liable to nonclients unless the statement was made with actual 
malice, that is, with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. See 
A&B-Abell v. Columbus/Central Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 651 
N.E.2d 1283 (1995) (nonlawyer defendant). There were two Ohio qualified privilege cases found 
involving lawyers as defendants. In the first, Michaels v. Berliner, 119 Ohio App.3d 82, 694 
N.E.2d 519 (Summit 1997), the court reversed a grant of summary judgment for the defendant 
attorneys because plaintiff, also an attorney, had brought forth evidence showing that a genuine issue 
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of fact existed regarding the presence of actual malice. See  id. at 90-92, 694 N.E.2d at 524-25. The 
second case, Krakora v. Gold, No. 98 CA 141, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4699 (Mahoning Sept. 28, 
1999), is discussed in this section infra under the heading “No Liability to Nonclient Based on 
Absence of Malicious Conduct” and in section 1.1:510. 
The latter instance, absolute privilege for lawyer statements made in a judicial proceeding, applies a 
special rule not covered by Scholler; see discussion this section infra under the heading “No 
Liability to Nonclient even if Conduct Is Malicious.” A comprehensive review of the lawyer’s 
absolute privilege is set forth in section 1.1:510. 
Malicious prosecution: In a decision the dissent termed a “judicial aberration,” the Ohio Supreme 
Court in Border City Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Moan, 15 Ohio St.3d 65, 472 N.E.2d 350 (1984) 
(per curiam), reversed the ruling of the two lower courts sustaining defendant attorneys’ OH Civ R 
12(B)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a malicious prosecution claim upon which relief could 
be granted. Relying heavily on its then-recent decision in Scholler v. Scholler, 10 Ohio St. 98, 462 
N.E.2d 158 (1984) (decided after both courts below had ruled), the majority concluded that the 
complaint was sufficient to withstand the motions to dismiss: 
Scholler establishes that an attorney may be liable to third persons if 
the attorney acts maliciously. Further, appellant’s complaint does 
allege intentionally inflicted harm as a result of the numerous lawsuits 
commenced by appellees. It will be incumbent upon appellant to 
establish that these lawsuits were instituted maliciously, without 
probable cause, and, as a general rule, were terminated in appellant’s 
favor. Nonetheless, it does not render appellant’s complaint fatally 
defective and subject to dismissal that each element of this cause of 
action was not set forth in the complaint with crystalline specificity. 
Id. at 66, 472 N.E.2d at 352 (citing to OH Civ R 8(A)(1), requiring only “a short and plain statement 
of the claim that the pleader is entitled to relief”). In a persuasive dissent, two justices argued that the 
complaint did not state an actionable claim for malicious prosecution and therefore had been properly 
dismissed. The dissenting justices noted that the allegations of the complaint satisfied only the first of 
the four elements of a malicious prosecution claim -- [1] malicious institution of the prior claim -- 
“and do not allege or even give rise to an inference that the remaining three essential, designated 
elements exist, namely [2] lack of probable cause, [3] termination of the prior proceedings in [the 
malicious prosecution] plaintiff’s favor, and [4] seizure of the person or property of [the malicious 
prosecution] plaintiff.” 15 Ohio St.3d at 68, 472 N.E.2d at 352-53 (bracketed material added). The 
dissenters thought Scholler irrelevant, since it was not a malicious prosecution case. In three 
subsequent decisions, two of which did not involve lawyers as parties, the Supreme Court 
reconfirmed that all four factors, including the controversial seizure-of-plaintiff’s-person-or-property 
requisite, are “essential elements [that] must be alleged by the plaintiff” in an action for malicious 
civil prosecution in Ohio.  Robb v. Chagrin Lagoons Yacht Club, Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d 264, 264, 
662 N.E.2d 9, 10 (1996) (syllabus); accord Crawford v. Euclid Nat’l Bank, 19 Ohio St.3d 135, 
139, 483 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (1985). The third decision, Kelly v. Whiting, 17 Ohio St.3d 91, 477 
N.E.2d 1123 (1985), a lawyer case decided after Border City, did not turn on the presence or absence 
of malice; it is discussed in section 3.1:400. It should also be noted that in another case not involving 
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lawyers as parties, the Ohio Supreme Court established that the seizure of person or property is not a 
necessary element of the tort of malicious criminal prosecution.  Trussell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 53 
Ohio St.3d 142, 559 N.E.2d 732 (1990). 
In addition to Border City, a number of court of appeals cases involving lawyers find or support 
liability based on malicious conduct. Unlike Border City, however, these decisions have consistently 
applied the four-part test. E.g., Dever v. Lucas, 174 Ohio App.3d 725, 2008 Ohio 332, 884 N.E.2d 
641 (Delaware) (each element sufficiently alleged; 12(B)(6) dismissal reversed); Butts v. Bjelovuk, 
129 Ohio App.3d 134, 717 N.E.2d 381 (Cuyahoga 1998) (summary judgment for defendant 
attorney reversed; court found that conflicting evidence created genuine issue of material fact as to 
defendant’s malice and lack of probable cause in bringing eviction action against plaintiff and that 
plaintiff had satisfied the other two elements of the tort (termination of prior action in her favor and 
seizure of her property through garnishment of her bank account)); Shore, Shirley & Co. v. Kelley, 
40 Ohio App.3d 10, 531 N.E.2d 333 (Cuyahoga 1988) (upholding jury verdict against defendant 
attorney; $ 15,000,000 counterclaim, filed by attorney with malice and without probable cause in 
prior action and dismissed therein, caused cancellation of claimant accounting firm’s malpractice 
insurance and other damages). See Pollack v. Kanter, 68 Ohio App.3d 673, 589 N.E.2d 443 
(Cuyahoga 1990) (malicious criminal prosecution case decided one month before Trussell came 
down; reversing OH Civ R 12(B)(6) dismissal of complaint alleging that defendant lawyers 
forwarded to prosecutors letter written by plaintiff lawyer, as a result of which plaintiff was arrested 
and indicted for extortion, which indictment was later nolled; allegations that indictment secured by 
perjured testimony sufficient to infer malice and lack of probable cause). 
Finally, one should be aware that the Ohio Supreme Court in Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & 
Rowe Co., L.P.A., 68 Ohio St.3d 294, 626 N.E.2d 115 (1994), an abuse of process case, also 
discussed the tort of malicious prosecution. Malicious prosecution is further discussed in section 
1.1:520. 
Malpractice: LeRoy v. Allen Yurasek & Merklin, 162 Ohio App.3d 155, 2005 Ohio 4452, 832 
N.E.2d 1246 (Union) (reversal of grant of motion to dismiss in favor of defendant lawyers; allegation 
of collusion sufficient under malice exception permitting suits against nonclients). In affirming on 
this point, 114 Ohio St.3d 323, 2007 Ohio 3608, 872 N.E.2d 254, the Supreme Court expressly 
approved the appellate court’s application of the rule of Simon v. Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St.3d 74, 
76-77, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987), given the presence in the LeRoy complaint of the “‘special 
circumstances such as fraud, bad faith, collusion, or other malicious conduct which would justify 
departure from the general rule.’” 114 Ohio St.3d 323, at paras. 32-33 (quoting Simon).  
Various state-law tort claims: In Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys, P.C., 76 
F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 1996), plaintiffs sued a competitor and the competitor’s attorneys for actions 
taken in connection with a search and seizure issued in the competitor’s copyright action against 
plaintiffs in the case at bar. The corporate plaintiff sued for trespass, conversion, abuse of process, and 
malicious use of civil process. The individual plaintiffs, employees of Vector, sued for invasion of 
privacy, abuse of process, and malicious use of civil process. The trial court granted the attorneys’ 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Reversing, the Sixth 
Circuit held that while under Ohio law attorneys generally enjoy immunity from liability to third 
persons for acts performed in good faith and with the knowledge of their clients, there is no immunity 
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where the attorneys acted maliciously (citing Scholler). The court found that malice had been 
sufficiently alleged to survive a motion to dismiss. 
No Liability to Nonclient Based on Absence of Malicious Conduct 
Abuse of process:  The abuse-of-process cases are discussed in section 1.1:520. 
Interference with business relationship: In Altier v. Valentic, 2004 Ohio 5641, 2004 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5083 (Geauga), the court affirmed summary judgment for defendant/lawyer on plaintiff’s 
interference-with-business claim, because qualified privilege was applicable and there was no 
showing that the communications at issue were made with actual malice. 
Interference with parental relationship and fraud: Sprouse v. Eisenman, 2005 Ohio 463, 2005 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 487 (Franklin) (no malice where attorney, allegedly falsely and misleadingly, had in 
good faith told plaintiffs (the birth father and his family) that her clients (the birth mother and her 
family) were still considering parenting options shortly before the birth mother put the baby out for 
adoption). 
Invasion of privacy: In a suit against the attorneys defending plaintiffs’ former lawyers against a 
malpractice claim, plaintiffs alleged that the attorneys disclosed private information contained in 
plaintiffs’ bank credit file. Assuming this to be so, the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that there 
could be no recovery under the Scholler rule because “plaintiffs failed to show malice to prevent 
application of qualified immunity as a bar to plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claim.” Hahn v. Satullo, 
156 Ohio App.3d 412, 2004 Ohio 1057, 806 N.E.2d 567, at para. 62 (Franklin). 
Libel and slander - Qualified privilege: As noted above, there are two Ohio defamation/qualified 
privilege cases involving lawyers as defendants. The first, Michaels v. Berliner, is discussed supra 
in this section under the heading “Liability to Nonclient Found or Supported Based on Malicious 
Conduct.” The second is Krakora v. Gold, No. 98 CA 141, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4699 
(Mahoning Sept. 28, 1999) (pre-litigation letter from counsel to opposing counsel found not to have 
been made with malice and therefore protected by qualified privilege). See also Gruenspan v. Seitz, 
124 Ohio App.3d 197, 705 N.E.2d 1255 (Cuyahoga 1997), a defamation action, where the court 
found a qualified privilege existed for statements made in a medical malpractice action by a 
doctor/expert witness to the judge (who did not hear the case; it was transferred to a visiting judge for 
trial) about a lawyer who was the plaintiff in the defamation action against the doctor and had been 
plaintiff’s attorney in the underlying medical malpractice action. Accord Gugliotta v. Morano, 161 
Ohio App.3d 152, 2005 Ohio 2570, 829 N.E.2d 757 (qualified privilege protected statements to 
Better Business Bureau by former client about lawyer/plaintiff). 
Malicious prosecution: Where the evidence clearly discloses that the prior actions (one civil, one 
criminal) filed by defendant attorneys against plaintiff were instituted in good faith and without 
malice, there is no liability for malicious civil or criminal prosecution.  Woyczynski v. Wolf, 11 
Ohio App.3d 226, 464 N.E.2d 612 (Cuyahoga 1983) (summary judgment for attorneys affirmed). 
(Woyczynski was disapproved by the Ohio Supreme Court in Trussell v. General Motors Corp., 53 
Ohio St.3d 142, 559 N.E.2d 732 (1990), insofar as it implied that seizure of person or property is an 
element of malicious criminal prosecution.  Id. at 146, 559 N.E.2d at 736.) Accord Tilberry v. 
McIntyre, 135 Ohio App.3d 229, 733 N.E.2d 636 (Cuyahoga 1999) (defendant attorneys had good 
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faith basis to seek sanctions in the underlying federal action, even though sanctions award 
subsequently reversed; summary judgment for attorney defendants affirmed). (Although the granting 
of a motion to dismiss by defendant lawyers was affirmed in Kelly v. Whiting, 17 Ohio St.3d 91, 
477 N.E.2d 1123 (1985), the affirmance was premised on the absence of the third and fourth elements 
of the tort -- successful termination of prior proceeding and seizure of plaintiff’s person or property; 
the malice element was not a factor in the decision.) Malicious prosecution is further discussed at 
sections 1.1:520 and 3.1:400. 
Malpractice: The court in Medpartners, Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., 140 Ohio 
App.3d 612, 748 N.E.2d 604 (Cuyahoga 2000), reversed a jury verdict for plaintiff where there was 
no allegation (or evidence) that the firm had acted maliciously. See further discussion of the case this 
section supra at “No Liability to Nonclient Based on Lack of Privity.”  Accord Cunningham v. 
Cunningham, 2009 Ohio 4648, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 3935 (Franklin) (affirming summary 
judgment for defendants; no evidence disputing that defendants acted only in accord with good-faith 
representation of their clients). 
The court likewise found an absence of malice in affirming summary judgment for defendant law 
firm in McGuire v. Draper, Hollenbaugh & Briscoe Co., L.P.A., 2002 Ohio 6170, 2002 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 6003 (Highland). In so holding, the court found no evidence of conduct exhibiting 
“hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge.” Id. at para. 66. The court further rejected appellant’s 
argument that violation of ethical rules – assuming such occurred – demonstrates malice. See further 
discussion this section supra at “No Liability to Nonclient Based on Lack of Privity.” 
Negligent misrepresentation: Plaintiff’s effort to avoid the consequences of having no attorney-client 
relationship with defendant lawyers was unavailing because such a claim requires either privity with 
the lawyers’ client or malice by the lawyers. In addition to failing the privity test, plaintiff’s complaint 
did not allege that the lawyers acted maliciously. The trial court’s grant of defendants’ motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to OH Civ R 12(C), was affirmed.  Brady v. Hickman & 
Lowder Co., L.P.A., 2003 Ohio 5649, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 5034 (Cuyahoga). 
Specific performance: In Lowe v. Eyler, 23 Ohio Misc.2d 11, 491 N.E.2d 405 (C.P. Clermont 
1985), the plaintiffs sought specific performance of a real estate contract and named as defendants 
both the sellers and their attorneys. On motions to dismiss by the attorneys, the court granted the 
motions and held, inter alia, that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted against the attorney defendants “insofar as the complaint fails to allege that either attorney 
acted maliciously.”  Id. at 12, 491 N.E.2d at 407. 
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Workers’ compensation: An attorney for an employer was not liable to a workers’ compensation 
claimant who was not in privity with the employer, with respect to the disallowance of the claimant’s 
workers’ compensation claim, absent any evidence of malicious conduct by the attorney.  Taylor v. 
Microdot, Inc., 79 Ohio App.3d 485, 607 N.E.2d 855 (Cuyahoga 1992). 
No Liability to Nonclient even if Conduct Is Malicious 
Libel and slander - Absolute privilege: One area that does not fit the Scholler rule of lawyer liability 
to a nonclient for malicious conduct is the absolute privilege defense afforded by the law of 
defamation to otherwise libelous or slanderous statements. Pursuant thereto, an attorney in a judicial 
proceeding is immune from liability to both parties and nonparties so long as the statement in question 
bears some reasonable relation to the proceeding, irrespective of whether the lawyer acted with actual 
malice. 
A full discussion of the absolute privilege as it applies to lawyers is found at section 1.1:510. 
Rule 11 violation: This is another example of deviation from the usual outcome under the Scholler 
formula for determining whether an attorney may be liable to nonclients. The court in Bales v. Hack, 
31 Ohio App.3d 111, 509 N.E.2d 95 (Clark 1986), rejected the husband’s argument for liability 
premised on the wife’s attorney’s alleged violation of OH Civ R 11 in filing groundless counterclaim 
allegations in the underlying divorce action. The court concluded that, while an OH Civ R 11 
violation might subject the attorney to disciplinary action, it does not “bestow upon the wounded 
party a civil action for damages.” 31 Ohio App.3d at 114, 509 N.E.2d at 99 (citing and following 
Border City Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Moan, 15 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 n.1, 472 N.E.2d 350, 352 n.1 
(1984), which held that the language of OH Civ R 11 “does not provide the basis for a civil action 
against the attorney who violates this rule.”). Accord Goff v. Ameritrust Co., Nos. 65196, 66016, 
1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1916 (Cuyahoga May 5, 1994); see Gordon Food Serv., Inc., 76 Ohio 
App.3d 105, 601 N.E.2d 131 (Lucas 1991). Note that, unlike the usual outcome under Scholler, this 
result would follow even if the attorney acted maliciously. The Bales allegations, which were 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, were that homosexuality as a 
ground for divorce had been included in the counterclaim for the sole purpose of damaging the 
husband. Nor in Border City did allegations of malicious institution of suit deter the Court from 
rejecting the attempt to ground a civil action on violation of OH Civ R 11. See further discussion of 
attempting to ground a civil action on violation of OH Civ R 11 at the end of section 3.1:400. 
 
1.1:420  Reliance on Lawyer’s Opinion [see 2.3:300] 
 
1.1:430  Assisting Unlawful Conduct [see also 1.2:600-:630] 
Ohio Rule 1.2(d) states that “[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in 
conduct the lawyer knows is illegal or fraudulent.” See section 1.2:600. If the client insists that the 
lawyer engage in such conduct, the lawyer must withdraw. Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(1). See section 
1.16:230. If the client “persists in a course of action involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer 
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[does not know but] reasonably believes is illegal or fraudulent,” the lawyer may withdraw. Ohio 
Rule 1.16(b)(2). See section 1.16:320. The lawyer is also obligated to disclose facts (including 
information protected by Rule 1.6) where necessary to avoid assisting a client’s illegal or fraudulent 
conduct. Ohio Rule 4.1(b). See section 4.1:300. 
1.1:440  Knowledge of Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty [see also 1.13:520] 
In Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 68 Ohio St.3d 453, 628 N.E.2d 1335 (1994), the Supreme Court 
reversed the lower courts’ grant and affirmance of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, an 
attorney and his law firm who represented a limited partnership and its general partner, in a 
malpractice action brought against them by the limited partners. One of the bases underlying the 
Court’s holding -- that the duty of due care owed by attorneys in providing legal services to the 
limited partnership and it general partner extends to the limited partners as well -- was that the general 
partner was a fiduciary with respect to its dealings with the limited partners. 
The limited partnership was formed to acquire and develop an apartment complex and to convert the 
apartments for resale as condominium units. Prior to investing, the limited partners received a private 
placement memorandum (“PPM”), which solicited investments in the partnership venture. One of the 
inducements in the PPM was a formula for releasing individual apartments from the mortgage liens, 
in order to permit the sale and transfer of the units. After the limited partners invested, Jankel (the 
general counsel, president and director of the general partner) and the outside attorney attempted to 
have the release provisions incorporated into the purchase agreements. The mortgagees, however, 
refused to agree. The subsequent purchase agreement omitted any reference to the release provisions, 
and this omission was not disclosed to any of the limited partners. The limited partners contended that 
the absence of the release provisions caused the project to fail and become bankrupt. The Court 
specifically noted that the drafting of the purchase agreement was done by the general partner’s 
attorney “with the approval of Jankel,” the general partner’s principal.  68 Ohio St.3d at 456, 628 
N.E.2d at 1337. The case was remanded for disposition of the issues of breach of duty, causation, and 
damages.  
See further discussion of Arpadi in section 1.1:410 supra at “Liability to Nonclient Found or 
Supported Based on Privity.” 
 
1.1:450  Failing to Prevent Death or Bodily Injury 
There appear to be no Ohio cases on point. 
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1.2:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.2 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.2 
1.2:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.2 differs from the Model Rule in a number of respects: 
Division (a) is “subject to divisions (c), (d), and (e)” of the Rule, not 
just (c) and (d), as in MR 1.2(a). A new third sentence has been added, 
spelling out courtesies that do not violate the Rule. In the last sentence, 
Ohio deletes the language “, after consultation with the lawyer,” 
following the words “client’s decision”. 
There is no division (b); the language of MR 1.2(b) has been moved to Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [5]. 
Division (c) strikes “the” before “representation” and substitutes “a 
new or existing”. At the end of the sentence, the Model Rule language 
has been altered by the deletion of “the client gives informed consent.” 
and substituting its place “communicated to the client, preferably in 
writing.”, following the words “circumstances and”. 
Division (d) changes the word “criminal” to “illegal”; “fraudulent, but 
a” to “fraudulent. A”; and “to make” to “in making”. 
Division (e) is not found in the Model Rule; it adds the language of 
former OH DR 7-105(A), supplemented with “professional 
misconduct allegations” after “criminal charges or”. 
1.2:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the former Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the 
Correlation Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.2(a): DR 7-101(A)(1), EC 
7-7, 7-8, 7-10. 
[There is no Ohio Rule 1.2(b).] 
The following sections of the former Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the 
Correlation Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.2(c): None. 
The following sections of the former Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the 
Correlation Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.2(d): DR 7-102(A)(7), EC 
7-4. 
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The following section of the former Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the 
Correlation Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.2(e): DR 7-105. 
1.2:200  Creating the Client-Lawyer Relationship 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.2 
ORC 4705.15 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.2 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.181, 2.212 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 31:101 
ALI-LGL §§ 14-18, 31 
Wolfram § 9.2 
1.2:210  Formation of Client-Lawyer Relationship 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.181 (1996). 
As a general rule, no formalities are necessary to establish a client-lawyer relationship. Thus, the lack 
of a retention arrangement, fee payment, or absolute confidentiality requirements is not dispositive in 
deciding whether an attorney-client relationship exists. E.g., Henry Filters, Inc. v. Peabody Barnes, 
Inc., 82 Ohio App.3d 255, 611 N.E.2d 873 (Wood 1992). See, in the disciplinary context, 
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Ballou, 109 Ohio St.3d 152, 2006 Ohio 2037, 846 N.E.2d 519, 
where the Court found that an attorney-client relationship had existed despite nonpayment of the fee 
by the client. “Respondent advised the client that he could not continue representing him ... without 
payment.” Id. at para. 4 (emphasis added). Further background on this issue is provided by the 
Board’s conclusion that the client “had come to expect from their past professional relationship [a 
prior traffic case] that respondent would accept late payments while continuing to provide 
representation.” Id. at para. 5. Justice Lundberg Stratton, dissenting, was not persuaded: “I do not 
agree that accepting late payment in one prior case from a drinking buddy is sufficient ground for 
creating a subsequent contract for new employment.” Id. at para. 13 (emphasis in original). 
Nor is it essential that there be an express written contract confirming the relationship (unless a 
contingent-fee arrangement is involved, see Rule 1.5(c)(1) and section 1.5:610). The Ohio Supreme 
Court confronted this issue in the context of whether an attorney could be found to have violated 
former OH DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of legal matter entrusted to the attorney) in the absence of an 
express written contract or full payment of a retainer. In Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. Hardiman, 100 
Ohio St.3d 260, 2003 Ohio 5596, 798 N.E.2d 369, the Court answered in the affirmative: 
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 An attorney-client relationship may be created by implication 
based upon the conduct of the parties and the reasonable expectations 
of the person seeking representation. 
Id. at syllabus. (Interestingly, Hardiman was not cited in Ballou, discussed above, which likewise 
involved a violation of DR 6-101(A)(3) and the question whether there was an employment 
relationship, given nonpayment of the retainer and the client’s expectation that late payment would be 
acceptable based on prior representation. See also Hamrick v. Union Twp., 79 F. Supp.2d 871, 876 
(S.D. Ohio 1999) (attorney-client relationship found; “[i]t makes absolutely no difference that [the 
lawyer] never met with Defendant McMillan, never opened a file on him, or never signed an 
Agreement of Representation”). With Hardiman, compare Disciplinary Counsel v. Mamich, 125 
Ohio St.3d 369, 2010 Ohio 1044, 928 N.E.2d 691, in which the Rule 1.2 (and 1.4) charges were 
dismissed because the requisite express or implied attorney-client relationship was not established; in 
contrast to the circumstances in Hardiman giving rise to creation of the relationship by implication, 
in Mamich the “client” (the daughter of one of respondents actual clients) “had no reasonable 
expectation that respondent was representing her.” Id. at para. 13. 
In making this determination, the courts look to see if the client sought to form a client-lawyer 
relationship, David v. Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Rock Co., L.P.A., 79 Ohio App.3d 786, 
798, 607 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (Cuyahoga 1992) (“where a person approaches an attorney with the 
view of retaining his services, an attorney-client relationship is created”), and if the lawyer responded 
in a way that could create a reasonable belief by the client that the relationship has been created.  
Hardiman, 100 Ohio St.3d 260, 2003 Ohio 5596, 798 N.E.2d 369, at para. 10 (“The determination 
of whether an attorney-client relationship was created turns largely on the reasonable belief of the 
prospective client.”). Accord New Destiny Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Wheeler, 129 Ohio St.3d 39, 
2011 Ohio 2266, 950 N.E.2d 157 (elaborating on and confirming Hardiman rule; this aspect of New 
Destiny is discussed in more detail at section 1.1:300 supra. See Stuffleben v. Cowden, 2003 Ohio 
6334, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 5676 (Cuyahoga) (“it is a question of both what the putative client 
believed and whether or not that belief was reasonable based on the surrounding circumstances,” id. 
at para. 22). Some factors the courts look for in making this assessment are 
 whether the client (or prospective client) shared confidential information with the attorney, 
Taylor v. Shelton, 172 Ohio St. 118, 121, 173 N.E.2d 892, 895 (1961) (“[C]ommunications 
made by a person to an attorney with the view of retaining the attorney to act on his behalf 
constitute privileged communications. It might well be said that a tentative attorney-client 
relationship exists during such period.”); Landis v. Hunt, 80 Ohio App.3d 662, 669, 610 
N.E.2d 554, 558 (Franklin 1992) (“the determination that the relationship invoked such trust 
and confidence in the attorney that the communication became privileged and, thus, the 
information exchanged was so confidential as to invoke an attorney-client privilege” is “[a]n 
essential element as to whether an attorney-client relationship has been formed”). Compare 
McGuire, Draper, Hollenbaugh & Briscoe Co., L.P.A., 2002 Ohio 6170, 2002 Ohio App. 
LEXIS (Highland) (applying Landis test, no attorney-client relationship existed where no 
evidence that appellant communicated confidential information to attorneys).  
 whether the lawyer provided some form of legal advice to the client. “An attorney-client 
relationship exists in the traditional sense when ‘an attorney advises others as to their legal 
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rights, a method to be pursued, the forum to be selected, and the practice to be followed for the 
enforcement of their rights.’” Sayyah v. Cutrell, 143 Ohio App.3d 102, 111, 757 N.E.2d 
779, 786 (Brown 2001) (quoting Landis). 
With respect to who represents whom in a cognovit note context, compare DiBenedetto v. Miller, 
180 Ohio App.3d 69, 2008 Ohio 6506, 904 N.E.2d 554 (Hamilton) (lawyers confessing judgment 
in favor of creditor client do not represent debtor against whom judgment confessed), with Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-3, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (April 16, 
1993) (circumstance raises multiple client conflict-of-interest concerns; creditor’s lawyer cannot 
confess judgment unless note contains express waiver of conflict by debtor or specifics that creditor’s 
lawyer may do so). 
Issues concerning the attorney-client relationship when the client is an entity, including both 
advertent and inadvertent relationships with entity constituents, are discussed in sections 
1.13:200, :400-:500. 
At times, the law may also recognize a derivative client-lawyer relationship where a third person is 
considered in privity with the retaining client. If the retaining client owes a fiduciary duty to third 
parties, the lawyer who assists in carrying out those fiduciary duties is treated as having a client 
relationship with the third party as well, at least for malpractice purposes.  Arpadi v. First MSP 
Corp., 68 Ohio St.3d 453, 628 N.E.2d 1335 (1994) (because general partner owes fiduciary 
relationship to limited partners, limited partners are in privity with general partner, and lawyer-client 
relationship between attorney and general partner extended to limited partners); Elam v. Hyatt Legal 
Servs., 44 Ohio St.3d 175, 541 N.E.2d 616 (1989) (because executor of estate owes fiduciary duty to 
beneficiaries whose interests have vested, beneficiaries are in privity with executor, and client-lawyer 
relationship between attorney and executor extends to beneficiaries). Legislative action in the wake of 
Elam and Arpadi (action which has, to date, been ignored by the courts) are detailed in section 
1.1:410, at “Developments in Ohio subsequent to Elam and Arpadi.” 
Where a person approaches someone who is a lawyer to act on their behalf in a nonlegal capacity, the 
client-lawyer relationship does not arise.  Petersen Painting & Home Improvement, Inc. v. 
Znidarsic, 75 Ohio App.3d 265, 599 N.E.2d 360 (Geauga 1991) (nonlaw-related dealings between 
lawyer and former client were not part of attorney-client relationship). See also David v. 
Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Rock Co., L.P.A., 79 Ohio App.3d 786, 607 N.E.2d 1173 
(Cuyahoga 1992) (question of fact whether lawyer was approached to act as client’s attorney, or 
merely as expert witness and therefore outside attorney-client relationship). 
Once established, an attorney-client relationship remains in effect until effectively terminated. See 
section 1.2:270. 
1.2:220  Lawyer’s Duties to Prospective Client [see section 1.18:200] 
1.2:230  When Representation Must Be Declined [see 1.16:700] 
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1.2:240  Client-Lawyer Agreements 
The subject of client-lawyer agreements is dealt with in two different parts of the Rules -- Rule 1.2(c) 
and Rule 1.5(b). 
Ohio Rule 1.2(c) authorizes a lawyer to limit the scope of a new or existing representation, so long as 
the limitation is reasonable and is communicated to the client, “preferably in writing.” 
As with the Rule 1.2(c) limitation, a writing is likewise “preferabl[e]” in satisfying the 
communication to the client required (with a limited exception) by Rule 1.5(b), which states that 
the nature and scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the 
fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be 
communicated to the client, preferably in writing, ... unless the lawyer 
will charge a client whom the lawyer has regularly represented on the 
same basis as previously charged. 
Rule 1.5(b) is discussed in more detail in section 1.5:500 infra. 
As stated above, a Rule 1.2(c) limitation on the scope of the representation, if utilized, must be 
communicated to the client. Should the lawyer decide to limit the representation, the comments 
provide further guidance. 
Comment [7] speaks to the requirement that any limitation must be reasonable -- thus, the time 
allotted to any limited representation “must be sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could 
rely.” Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt [7]. 
Although a lawyer cannot, through use of a limited representation agreement, exempt himself from 
the Rule 1.1 duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered in 
determining the knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation. Id. Comment [7] is further discussed in section 1.2:510. 
The preferred written confirmation of limitation of representation, if used, “may be any writing that is 
presented to the client that reflects the limitation, such as a letter or electronic transmission addressed 
to the client or a court order.” Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt [7A]. A court order appointing a lawyer is deemed 
sufficient to confirm the scope of that representation. Id. The comment further provides that a “form 
or checklist” may be used by the lawyer, specifying “the scope of the client-lawyer relationship and 
the fees to be charged.” Id. 
Finally, Comment [8] counsels that “[a]ll agreements concerning a lawyer’s representation of a client 
must accord with the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct,” citing, “e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6.” 
Similar to Rule 1.2, the former OHCPR (as well as the Supreme Court in Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. 
Hardiman, 100 Ohio St.3d 260, 2003 Ohio 5596, 798 N.E.2d 369, at para. 12) expressed a 
preference for written representation agreements between client and lawyer (OH EC 2-18), but there 
was no requirement that such contracts be in writing. A writing requirement was and is imposed by 
statute, however, with respect to tort actions in which the lawyer is charging a contingent fee, ORC 
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4705.15, and is now mandatory for all contingent-fee agreements. Ohio Rule 1.5(c)(1). See section 
1.5:610. See also Rule 1.5(b), discussed at section 1.5:500. 
For guidance on what one might include in a retainer agreement, see Jack A. Guttenberg & Lloyd B. 
Snyder, The Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  3.4(A), at 74 (1992). The other side of 
the coin -- where no contract is effected -- can be covered by a non-engagement letter, to make clear 
that no attorney-client relationship was entered into. Id. at 75. 
Rules generally applicable to lawyer-client contracts are set forth in 1 Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers §  18 (2000), including the rule that such a contract should be construed 
“as a reasonable person in the circumstances of the client would have construed it.” Id. at §  18(2). As 
the Restatement notes, many courts have stated that if the client-lawyer contract is found to contain 
ambiguities, they should be resolved against the lawyer. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Holston, 70 Ohio 
App.2d 55, 434 N.E.2d 738 (Lucas 1980) (dictum). The Restatement explains, however, that this 
maxim “can be taken to mean that the principle comes into play only when other means of 
interpreting the contract have been unsuccessful,” whereas the rule of §  18(2) “governs the 
construction of the contract in the first instance.” Restatement §  18 cmt. h. 
Where the contract is made (or modified) after representation has begun, the client may avoid it 
unless the lawyer shows that the terms are fair and reasonable; where the contract is made after 
representation is completed, the client may avoid it if he or she was not informed of material facts. 1 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  18(1)(a)-(b) (2000). An Ohio case under 
the former OHCPR, involving an attempt to collect a contingent fee after the case was completed by 
conditioning return of the client’s files (to which the client has an absolute right after discharge, see 
Ohio Rule 1.16(b)) on a guaranty of such payment, was Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachik & 
Webster v. Lansberry, 68 Ohio St.3d 570, 629 N.E.2d 431 (1994) (guaranty of payment of 
contingent fee held unenforceable; firm’s recovery limited to quantum meruit basis only). 
For discussion of client-lawyer fee agreements and communication regarding fees, see sections 
1.5:210 and 1.5:500. 
1.2:250  Lawyer’s Duties to Client in General 
The general duties of an Ohio lawyer to his or her client are discussed at various points of this ethics 
treatise and include the duties of: 
 competence (Ohio Rule 1.1), discussed at section 1.1:200; 
 diligence (Ohio Rule 1.3), discussed at section 1.3:200; 
 communication (Ohio Rule 1.4), discussed at section 1.4:200; 
 confidentiality (Ohio Rule 1.6), discussed at section 1.6:200; 
 loyalty (Ohio Rule 1.7), discussed at section 1.7:210; and 
 safekeeping of property (Ohio Rule 1.15), discussed at section 1.15:200. 
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The Restatement covers a lawyer’s duties to the client at 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers §  16 (2000). In addition to the duties listed above, the Restatement notes that 
the lawyer must also “fulfill valid contractual obligations to the client” and generally 
proceed in a manner reasonably calculated to advance a client’s lawful 
objectives, as defined by the client after consultation[.] 
1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  16(1), (4) and cmts. c & f (2000). 
Allocation of authority in fulfilling these obligations is treated in Ohio Rule 1.2(a). See discussion at 
section 1.2:310. 
 
1.2:260  Client’s Duties to Lawyer 
There is nothing in the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct (or in the Model Rules or the former 
OHCPR, for that matter) touching on the client’s duty to the lawyer. An overview on this subject is 
provided at 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  17 (2000), where the basic 
rules are set forth, with cross-references to greater detail in other sections of the Restatement. In a 
nutshell, in matters covered by the representation, the client must: 
 (1) compensate the lawyer for services and expenses; 
 (2) indemnify the lawyer where the client has exposed the 
lawyer to liability without fault of the lawyer (e.g., indemnification for 
proper expenditures made on the client’s behalf, such as court reporter 
fees); and 
 (3) satisfy valid contractual obligations to the lawyer. 
Id. at § 17(1)-(3). 
 
1.2:270  Termination of Lawyer’s Authority 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.212 (1996). 
The lawyer-client relationship can be terminated by completion of the representation, discharge by 
the client, or withdrawal by the attorney. While Ohio Rule 1.16 provides substantial guidance as to 
the procedural protections surrounding termination, (see section 1.16:500), it does not address how to 
determine whether the representation has been effectively terminated. 
Ascertaining when the representation has been terminated is important for several reasons. First, 
termination of the relationship may trigger a right to fees on the lawyer’s part, as well as an obligation 
to return monies, papers, and other property belonging to the client. See sections 1.15:200 and 
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1.16:500-:600. Second, termination changes the duties owed by the lawyer from those expansive 
duties owed a current client to the more limited duties owed a former client. For example, where 
representation is continuing, the more demanding current-client conflict rules govern the attorney’s 
conduct; if representation has ended, the more permissive former-client conflict rules apply.  
Columbus Credit Co. v. Evans, 82 Ohio App.3d 798, 613 N.E.2d 671 (Franklin 1992) 
(addressing relationship between effective termination of employment and multiple-client conflicts 
under former OHCPR). Third, the completion of the representation as to a particular undertaking or 
transaction may mark the time from which the statute of limitations will begin to run with respect to 
lawyer malpractice alleged to have occurred during the course of the representation.  Zimmie v. 
Calfee, Halter & Griswold, 43 Ohio St.3d 54, 538 N.E.2d 398 (1989). See section 1.1:300. 
Often, termination of the relationship will be quite clear to all concerned, as where the lawyer has 
been hired to accomplish a discrete task and has done so, or where the client explicitly discharges the 
attorney. See Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Mogul, 79 Ohio St.3d 369, 681 N.E.2d 1331 (1997) 
(respondent was discharged by clients but nevertheless failed to withdraw from litigation on behalf of 
clients until eighteen months after being fired; conduct violated mandatory-withdrawal-on-discharge 
provisions of former OH DR 2-110(B)(4), now Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(3)). A closing letter from the 
lawyer to the client may help to establish the date of termination. Conduct, however, also can signal 
termination of the relationship.  Triplett v. Benton, 2003 Ohio 5583, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS at 
para. 13. (Franklin) (“Any conduct that dissolves the essential mutual confidence between the 
attorney and client signals the termination of that relationship.”). Compare Lucas v. Kurt, 72 Ohio 
App.3d 511, 595 N.E.2d 478 (Lucas 1991) (hiring of new counsel effectively terminated 
attorney-client relationship with initial counsel), with Feudo v. Pavlik, 55 Ohio App.3d 217, 563 
N.E.2d 351 (Cuyahoga 1988) (mere discussions with new attorney about case, without knowledge of 
original lawyer, did not signal termination of relationship). See Triplett supra (client’s stated 
intention to file malpractice action terminated relationship); DiSabato v. Thomas M. Tyack & 
Assocs. Co., L.P.A., No 98 AP-1282, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4212, at *7 (Franklin Sept. 14, 1999) 
(“retaining another attorney to file a suit regarding the same subject matter is an affirmative act 
demonstrating to a reasonable person that the attorney-client relationship had ended”); Brown v. 
Johnstone, 5 Ohio App.3d 165, 450 N.E.2d 693 (Summit 1982) (client initiation of grievance 
proceeding against lawyer was indicative of termination of relationship). 
In more ambiguous situations, the question of whether the relationship has terminated becomes a 
question of fact.  Omni-Food & Fashion, Inc. v. Smith, 38 Ohio St.3d 385, 528 N.E.2d 941 (1988). 
See also Artromick Int’l, Inc. v. Drustar, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 226 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (thoughtful 
discussion of termination of client-lawyer relationship in context of motion for disqualification; on 
facts presented, court found that attorney-client relationship had terminated; therefore, motion by 
former client (present plaintiff) to disqualify firm representing present defendant, because one of its 
lawyers had previously represented present plaintiff in unrelated matters, was denied). 
An interesting case confronting the issue of determining whether termination has occurred in 
ambiguous situations is Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Ballou, 109 Ohio St.3d 152, 2006 Ohio 
2037, 846 N.E.2d 519. In Ballou, the respondent was found to have violated former OH DR 
6-103(A)(3) (neglect) for failing to appear on a client’s behalf at an eviction proceeding. But before 
the eviction hearing took place, 
181
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.2 
  
[r]espondent advised the client that he could not continue representing 
him and would not appear in court on the client’s behalf without 
payment [of the retainer]. Respondent also told the landowner’s lawyer 
that he no longer represented the client because he had not been paid. 
Id. at para. 4. It was also noted by the Board that respondent did not confirm his decision to withdraw 
in writing to either the client or opposing counsel as he should have done. Id. at paras. 5, 8. 
On these facts, the Court upheld the finding of neglect of the client’s matter by not attending the 
eviction hearing, which took place after respondent’s purported withdrawal. Although not expressly 
saying so, it is implicit in this determination that the steps taken by respondent to withdraw were 
ineffective to accomplish termination of his attorney-client relationship. 
The lone dissenter, Justice Lundberg Stratton, forcefully disagreed. After noting her belief that the 
client’s failure to pay the retainer was a breach of their contract and that the Court’s reliance on the 
failure to confirm the withdrawal in writing was inconsistent with the holding in Trumbull County 
Bar Ass’n v. Donlin, 76 Ohio St.3d 152, 666 N.E.2d 1137 (1996) (disciplinary rules do not require 
that notice of withdrawal be reduced to writing), Justice Lundberg Stratton stated as follows: 
[T]he respondent told the former client and opposing counsel, that he 
would no longer actively represent the client in this matter. He 
specifically told the client that he would not appear in court on his 
behalf. The record does not reflect that respondent even filed an entry 
of appearance in the pending eviction proceeding. Nevertheless, the 
majority determines that respondent neglected a legal matter by failing 
to appear at the hearing. 
Id. at para. 16. The Justice also found this conclusion to be “directly contradict[ory]” of the holding 
in Smith v. Conley, 109 Ohio St.3d 141, 2006 Ohio 2035, 846 N.E.2d 509 (attorney-client 
relationship terminated for malpractice statute-of-limitation purposes when lawyer informed client, 
by telephone and two letters memorializing telephone conversation, that he would no longer represent 
him; termination found even though lawyer remained as counsel of record in case and had not 
obtained permission to withdraw as required by local court rule). (The Conley case is further 
discussed in section 1.1:300 at “Accrual of Claim.”) 
Justice Lundberg Stratton’s concern was that Ballou, with its seeming conflict with Donlin and 
Smith, “sends a confusing message to the bar.  109 Ohio St.3d at para. 15. In sum, Ballou 
demonstrates that reasonable justices can come to different conclusions on the termination issue when 
the circumstances are ambiguous. 
 
1.2:300  Authority to Make Decisions or Act for Client 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.2(a) 
OH Civ R 60(B)(1), (B)(5) 
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Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.2(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  7.20-7.22 
Becker, Guttenberg & Snyder, The Law of Professional Conduct in Ohio §§  8.19-8.22 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:306 
ALI-LGL §§  21-23, 25-29 
Wolfram §§  4.4, 4.6 
 
1.2:310  Allocating Authority to Decide between Client and Lawyer 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.20 (1996). 
In representing a client, the lawyer’s role is to further the client’s objectives through legally 
permissible means. A basic provision in the Rules implementing this obligation is Ohio Rule 1.2(a), 
which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
 Subject to divisions (c), (d), and (e) of this rule, a lawyer shall 
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the 
representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client 
as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take 
action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the 
representation. . . . A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether 
to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the 
client’s decision as to the plea to be entered, whether to waive a jury 
trial, and whether the client will testify. 
Consultation between lawyer and client on the means of achieving the goals of the representation is 
required by Ohio Rule 1.4(a)(2). This (together with other, nonmandatory, consultation) often results 
in agreement between them as to the objectives of the representation and the means to be employed to 
reach them. Should a disagreement arise, however, the client, in most instances, is entitled to make 
the final decision. Accommodating the client’s decision-making authority with the lawyer’s personal 
conscience and role in the legal system can be difficult at times. See section 1.2:400. 
It must be recognized that a client has no right to demand that her lawyer perform certain actions. The 
lawyer cannot assist the client to achieve illegal or fraudulent ends, Ohio Rule 1.2(d) (see sections 
1.2:610-:620), nor can the lawyer pursue legal ends through impermissible means. If the client insists 
on behavior that the lawyer reasonably believes to be illegal or fraudulent, the lawyer may withdraw 
from the representation, Ohio Rule 1.16(b)(2) (see section 1.16:320); if the lawyer knows it to be 
illegal or fraudulent, he or she must withdraw. Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(1). See section 1.16:230. 
183
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.2 
  
Further, a lawyer needs a certain amount of latitude in dealing with other attorneys, third parties, and 
the court. Acting in a courteous and professional manner in those dealings violates no duty to the 
client, and the client has no right to insist that the lawyer behave otherwise. The third sentence of 
Rule 1.2(a) so states. See section 1.2:330. The only recourse for a client dissatisfied with the lawyer’s 
conduct in this regard is to discharge the attorney. 
Beyond these areas, a wide variety of decisions remain to be made about the objectives of the 
representation and the means to achieve them. Because in the relationship the client is the principal, 
whose interests will be directly affected by the outcome of the representation, the Rules grant primary 
decision-making responsibility to the client. As stated in Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [1], the client has “the 
ultimate authority” concerning the legal objectives of the representation. Nevertheless, the lawyer is 
the one called upon to carry out the representation on the client’s behalf. Deference to the attorney’s 
expertise, as well as the lawyer’s need to maintain personal and professional integrity, suggests that 
certain issues should be within the attorney’s authority to decide. Ohio Rule 1.2(a) & cmts. [1]-[4A] 
seek to accommodate these competing concerns. 
Allocation of decision-making responsibility raises special problems and difficulties where the client 
is an organization or has diminished capacity. See sections 1.13.200 and 1.14:200, respectively. 
 
1.2:320  Authority Reserved to Client 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.21 (1996). 
There are certain decisions that the law clearly recognizes are for the client. While the lawyer is 
encouraged to advise the client with respect to these concerns, the final decision-making 
responsibility is that of the client. 
Civil actions: In the civil arena, Rule 1.2(a) states that the lawyer “shall abide by” the client’s 
decision whether to settle a matter. Accord, that settlement was the client’s decision under the former 
OHCPR as well, Goldauskas v. Elyria Foundry Co., 145 Ohio App.3d 490, 763 N.E.2d 645 
(Lorain 2001). 
The client’s right to decide whether to accept a settlement may work to the lawyer’s detriment at 
times. It is not unethical, for example, for defense counsel to make an offer of settlement that 
simultaneously addresses the merits of the dispute and the defendant’s potential liability for attorney 
fees.  Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986). Even if the settlement offer as to the merits is 
conditioned on a complete waiver of the plaintiff’s right to seek an award of statutory attorney fees 
from the defendant, plaintiff’s lawyer’s duty is to exercise independent professional judgment in 
counseling the client, and to abide by the client’s decision as to the settlement.  Id. at 727-28 & n.14. 
See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 92-93-08 (n.d.) (discussing this issue and ways in which lawyer can 
protect his interest consistent with these ethical restrictions). Similarly, in a contingent-fee case, the 
lawyer must abide by the client’s decision to accept a settlement, even if the lawyer would like to 
pursue the case further in the hope of securing a higher recovery, to which the contingency-fee 
percentage would be applied. Paxton v. Dietz, No. 84 AP-972, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 7938 
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(Franklin Mar. 28, 1985) (relying on former OH EC 7-7 & 7-8); see Michael T. Tully Co., L.P.A., 
v. Dollney, 42 Ohio App.3d 138, 537 N.E.2d 242 (Lorain 1987) (client who had not recovered 
anything on his contingent-fee claim could reject settlement offer and discharge lawyer without 
incurring any liability to lawyer for fee). The same result follows where the client settles the case 
without recovering any damages and dismisses the attorney. Hawthorne v. Benton Ridge Tel. Co., 
No. 99 AP-1476, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5193 (Franklin Nov. 9, 2000). See also Gruenspan Co., 
L.P.A. v. Thompson, 2003 Ohio 3641, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS (Cuyahoga) (commenting on 
presence of evidence tending to show that lawyer had refused to settle “in order to increase his 
contingency fee,” id. at paras. 70, 78). 
Settling a case without client authorization is a disciplinary violation. Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Longino, 128 Ohio St.3d 426, 2011 Ohio 1524, 945 N.E.2d 1040 (unilaterally settling without 
client’s knowledge provides no opportunity for client to make decision that lawyer “shall abide by”; 
conduct violates Rules 1.2(a), 1.4(a)(1) and 1.4(a)(3)). To assure that the client can fully exercise this 
settlement authority, the lawyer must relay all settlement offers to the client. Rule 1.2 cmt. [1]; Rule 
1.4(a)(1). See section 1.4:400. If the lawyer fails to do so and settles without the client’s authority, the 
client may, in certain circumstances, nevertheless be bound by the result, even though the lawyer is 
subject to sanction for doing so. Compare Argo Plastic Prods. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 15 Ohio 
St.3d 389, 474 N.E.2d 328 (1984) (unauthorized settlement enforced), with Bar Ass’n of Greater 
Cleveland v. Kless, 17 Ohio St.3d 21, 476 N.E.2d 1035 (1985) (sanctioning attorney who settled 
without authority in Argo). Unauthorized settlement (including Argo) is further discussed in section 
1.2:340. 
Nor can a lawyer nullify the client’s authority over settlement decisions by including in a contingent 
fee agreement a provision that prohibits the client from settling “without complete prior approval of 
the lawyer.” Gruenspan Co., L.P.A. v. Thompson, 2003 Ohio 3641, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 
(Cuyahoga). “That provision was clearly voidable.” Id. at para. 67. In accord under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct is Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2010-6, 2010 Ohio 
Griev. Discip 6 (Oct. 8, 2010), opining that, absent extraordinary circumstances (such as imminent 
emergency surgery on the client), a lawyer violates both Rule 1.2(a) and 1.4(a) if the contingent fee 
agreement with the client grants the lawyer a power of attorney to exercise full control over the matter, 
including entering into a settlement agreement and signing the settlement papers and check and 
closing statement on the client’s behalf. 
Criminal cases: Also pursuant to Rule 1.2(a), a criminal defendant has the ultimate authority to make 
such fundamental decisions as what plea to enter (to make this right meaningful, counsel should 
convey all plea bargains offered and provide guidance on their merits; failure to convey an offer, 
unless the failure is adequately explained, may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, State v. 
Manning, No. WD-84-84, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 8328 (Wood July 12, 1985)), to waive the right 
to a jury trial, or to take the stand. The Supreme Court in Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), states 
that it is also the client’s right to decide whether to pursue an appeal. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, that a lawyer, who in a capital case proposed a defense 
strategy of conceding guilt in order to focus on avoiding the death sentence but was unable to get his 
client’s express approval, did not thereby render ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment.  Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004). Contrary to the position of the Florida 
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Supreme Court that this conduct violated the rule of the Barnes case supra (entering guilty plea is 
decision defendant must make), Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, concluded that 
pursuing the concession-of-guilt strategy was not tantamount to a guilty plea, because the defendant, 
unlike defendants who plead guilty, retained the right to appeal trial errors and to a trial of the guilt 
phase, thereby separating the potentially prejudicial evidence of guilt from the penalty phase. The 
Court further emphasized that the lawyer did on several occasions propose the strategy to defendant, 
but defendant was unresponsive -- he neither consented nor objected. In these circumstances, there is 
“no blanket rule demanding the defendant’s explicit consent. Instead, if counsel’s strategy, given the 
evidence bearing on defendant’s guilt, satisfies the Strickland [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984)] standard, that is the end of the matter; no tenable claim of ineffective assistance would 
remain.” Id. at 563. 
Limits from other Ohio Rules: The foregoing discussion does not exhaust the list of matters over 
which the client has decision-making authority. Other Rules also delineate issues for the client to 
decide. If other grounds for withdrawal recognized in the Rules are not present, a lawyer cannot 
withdraw from representation without the client’s consent. Ohio Rule 1.16(b)(7). See section 
1.16:320. Client consent also is necessary for a lawyer to split fees with another attorney outside his 
firm, Ohio Rule 1.5(e)(2), see section 1.5:800, or to continue the representation in the face of a 
conflict of interest. Ohio Rules 1.7(b)(2) and 1.8(a)(3), (b), (f)(1), (g), (h)(2)(iii). See sections 
1.7:240, 1.7:500, 1.8:220, and 1.8:710. 
Providing information necessary to client decision-making: The primacy of client decision-making in 
the lawyer-client relationship, particularly with respect to the objectives of the representation, is 
expressly recognized in Ohio Rule 1.2(a). Substantial communication by the lawyer is required to 
assure that the client can exercise this authority in a meaningful manner. Ohio Rule 1.4(a). See 
generally Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-30, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 13, at *1 (Dec. 16, 1988) (“Attorneys have an obligation to exert their best efforts to insure 
that their clients remain fully informed of all relevant considerations regarding the representation.”). 
At times, the failure to meet this duty of communication will subject the lawyer to sanction. See 
sections 1.3:200 and 1.4:200-:400. The lawyer is encouraged to consult with the client about both the 
legal and nonlegal implications of a contemplated course of action. Ohio Rule 2.1. See section 
2.1:300. While not expressly covered by the OHRPC, it would seem that guidance provided in 
former OH EC 7-8 -- that “the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods 
because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client” -- is generally consistent with the principles 
set forth in Ohio Rule 1.2(a). 
Client instructions: In some areas, a lawyer is free to act without explicit instructions from the client. 
Once instructed by the client, however, the lawyer is duty-bound to follow those instructions. Failure 
to follow the specific instructions of a client can give rise to malpractice liability. For example, where 
a client seeking a divorce explicitly requested and received a promise from the attorney to keep the 
proceedings out of the newspaper, and the attorney ignored that instruction and caused a paper to 
publish a notice of the pending divorce, the attorney’s action was a breach of his duty and contrary to 
former OH EC 7-8 (now see Rule 1.4(a)(3)), which called for the lawyer to inform the client of 
“relevant considerations,” -- in this case “the legal necessity of the publication.” This failure stated a 
cause of action for malpractice.  McInnis v. Hyatt Legal Clinics, 10 Ohio St.3d 112, 113, 461 
N.E.2d 1295, 1297 (1984) (per curiam). Accord Hosfelt v. Miller, No. 97- JE-50, 2000 Ohio App. 
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LEXIS 5506 (Jefferson Nov. 22, 2000) (“An attorney who is specifically instructed by a client 
should follow those instructions with reasonable care, or he or she may be liable for all damages 
proximately caused by the failure,” id. at *14, citing McInnis). 
A disciplinary case under the Code falling in this category is Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v Britt, 
109 Ohio St.3d 97, 2006 Ohio 1933, 846 N.E.2d 39 (violation of DR 6-101(A)(3) and 7-101(A)(2) 
& (3)). In Britt, respondent was hired, inter alia, to represent a licensed practical nurse in connection 
with administrative disciplinary proceedings brought against the nurse. While the opinion does not 
disclose explicitly that the client “instructed” respondent to request a hearing before the nursing board, 
it does make clear that the client “desperately wanted a hearing” in order to attempt to regain an 
unrestricted license to practice. Id. at para. 5. To this end, upon receipt of the nursing board’s Notice 
for Opportunity for Hearing, the client “immediately advised respondent by telephone and personally 
delivered the notice to him.” Id. Despite these facts, “[r]espondent did not file the hearing request, 
because, in the exercise of his professional judgment, he had decided that appearing before the 
nursing board would not advance his client’s interests.” Id. at para. 6. This decision “likely” resulted 
in the client receiving a more severe sanction then would have been the case had a hearing been 
requested in accordance with the client’s desires. Id. at para. 13. While it might be argued that the 
decision on hearing or no hearing is a tactical one that is properly for the lawyer, not the client, there 
can be a little doubt that the lawyer’s conduct would have violated Rule 1.2(a) had it been applicable 
-- at a minimum, the respondent failed the obligation to “consult with the client as to the means by 
which [the objectives of the representation] are to be pursued.” This failure was particularly glaring in 
the Britt case, given the client’s strong desires in favor of a hearing. 
The client’s instructions, of course, must be valid to be binding on the lawyer. For example, following 
the clients’ direction to disburse funds to them will not serve as an excuse for violating the terms of an 
escrow agreement under which the lawyer is holding the proceeds of the sale of property when a 
problem with the sale arises. See Ohio Rule 1.15(e) & cmt. [4]. Under the former OHCPR, see City 
of Ravenna v. Fouts, No. 92- P-0098, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 379 (Portage Feb. 4, 1994) (lawyer 
cannot “hide behind” former OH EC 7-7 and OH EC 5-21 with “lame excuse” that “clients made 
him do it,” id. at *6). Citing and quoting Fouts, the court in Shiepis Clinic of Chiropractic, Inc. v. 
Stevenson, No. 1995 CA 00343, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3707 (Stark July 8, 1996), likewise held 
that the attorney could not use his client’s instructions to excuse his failure to pay medical fees to the 
provider from settlement proceeds. 
The result under the Rules is consistent with the holding in the Shiepis case.  Thus, to the extent a 
lawyer holds client funds out of which the client has agreed to pay a third party, and the client later 
decides to abrogate that agreement, the lawyer’s obligation is again measured by Rule 1.15(e) and 
cmt. [4]. Under division (e) the lawyer must hold the funds in accordance with Rule 1.15(a) until the 
dispute is resolved. Comment [4] provides that where a third party has a lawful interest in the property, 
the lawyer 
may have a duty under applicable law to protect third-person interests 
of which the lawyer has actual knowledge against wrongful 
interference by the client.  
Ohio Rule 1.15 cmt. [4]. The appropriate course for the lawyer in this situation may include seeking 
resolution of the dispute from a court. Id. This manner of resolution of the problem is consistent with 
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that reached by the Board of Commissioners in Opinion 95-12, where the Board opined that the 
attorney should hold the funds until their proper owner is determined by mediation, arbitration, or 
interpleader. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 95-12, 1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 3 (Oct. 6, 1995). 
Nondisciplinary allocation of authority: Questions of the allocation of authority between the lawyer 
and the client often arise outside of the disciplinary context. While not directly on point, such 
decisions nevertheless may serve as a guide for the kinds of decisions that should be left to the client. 
For example, without express authorization, the lawyer has no authority to endorse the client’s name 
on a check tendered to effect a settlement.  Morris v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 45, 517 
N.E.2d 904 (1988) (syllabus). And the disposition of the client’s real property requires the express 
authorization of the client. See Morr v. Crouch, 19 Ohio St.2d 24, 249 N.E.2d 780 (1969); Ottawa 
County Comm’rs v. Mitchell, 17 Ohio App.3d 208, 478 N.E.2d 1024 (Ottawa 1984). 
The Restatement position with respect to authority reserved to the client is set forth in 1 Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  22 (2000). 
 
1.2:330  Authority Reserved to Lawyer 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.22 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.2(a), while recognizing that the lawyer must “abide by the client’s decisions” as to 
objectives of the representation, implicitly gives the lawyer sway as to the means by which they are to 
be achieved. Regarding the means used to achieve the desired ends, Comment [2] notes that 
[c]lients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their 
lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their 
objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal, and tactical 
matters. 
Rule 1.2 cmt. [2]. 
Division (a) also recognizes the right of the lawyer to “take such action on behalf of the client as is 
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.” This “implied authorization” covers a lot of 
ground, as to which see below. 
Further, Rule 1.2(a) expressly states that 
A lawyer does not violate this rule by acceding to requests of opposing 
counsel that do not prejudice the rights of the client, by being punctual 
in fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive 
tactics, and by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons in 
the legal process. 
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Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [4A] emphasizes that these acts of courtesy and professionalism do not breach 
any duty to the client, and the client cannot compel the lawyer to act otherwise. Nor, of course, can the 
client demand that the lawyer perform or assist unlawful acts. See Rule 1.2(d) and section 1.2:600. 
Subject to these limitations, the client can authorize the lawyer in advance to take specific action on 
the client’s behalf. See Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [3]. 
The lawyer’s implied authority to do those things necessary to carry out the representation (Rule 
1.2(a) & cmt. [1]) is seen most often in the context of matters requiring immediate decision by the 
lawyer -- typically in the course of trial, hearings, depositions, and other litigation-related matters 
where consultation is not practicable. See 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  
23(2) & cmt. d (2000). 
This implied authority is recognized in Ohio (and other) precedent, which confirms the lawyer’s 
power to act when quick decisions are needed and when the decisions to be made are ones for which 
the special expertise of a lawyer weighs more heavily in the resolution than the general experience of 
a layperson. See, e.g., Blake v. Ingraham, 44 Ohio App.3d 38, 39, 540 N.E.2d 759, 760 (Medina 
1989) (“It is the attorney, and not the client, who, due to his professional education and experience, is 
in charge of litigation.”). See generally Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (finding no 
constitutional violation in lawyer’s refusal to include in appeal brief nonfrivolous issues that the client 
insisted on raising, and stressing the need for educated professional judgment in determining what 
issues should be raised on appeal and how they should be presented). Accord, regarding conceding 
guilt in order to focus on penalty phase in capital case, Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004), 
discussed at section 1.2:320. The court reached a similar result in the malpractice context in Hahn v. 
Jennings, 2004 Ohio 4789, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4320 (Franklin). The plaintiffs there argued 
that their former lawyer committed malpractice when he ignored their insistence that, in the 
underlying appeal, he brief and argue the Magnuson-Moss express-warranty issue. The court of 
appeals disagreed: 
Although [former] DR 7-101(A)(1) provides that a lawyer should not 
intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client, DR 
7-101(B)(1) also permits a lawyer to exercise his professional 
judgment in failing to assert a position of his client. . . . [W]e cannot say 
that his decision to forego appeal of their Magnuson-Moss express 
warranty argument constituted legal malpractice. 
Id. at para. 28 (bracketed material added). 
The lawyer’s authority to make decisions in the representation is most clearly seen in the context of a 
trial. “Decisions about what evidence to present and which witnesses to call . . . are committed to 
counsel’s professional judgment.” State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003 Ohio 4396, 794 
N.E.2d 27, at para. 127 (assessing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim). This mirrors the advice 
given in Guttenberg and Snyder: 
 In the area of litigation an attorney is responsible for making all 
decisions concerning tactics and strategy in the preparation and 
execution of the law suit. Decisions involving tactics and strategy have 
been interpreted very broadly. These decisions include, among others, 
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what theories to develop, which witnesses to call, what evidence to 
challenge or use at trial, what objections to raise, what constitutional 
issues to raise, what issues to preserve for appeal, and all other 
decisions relating to investigation and trial of the law suit not 
specifically reserved to the client. 
Jack A. Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  6.6, 
at 164-65 (1992). See also Susan J. Becker, Jack A. Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of 
Professional Conduct in Ohio § 8.21[1], at 8-43 (2009-10 ed.); ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function, Std. 4-5.2(b) (3d ed. 1993). 
For example, a decision by trial counsel not to request a jury instruction on aggravated assault, which 
would have conflicted with the defense of self-defense, was a reasonable tactical decision; “a 
reviewing court may not second-guess decisions of counsel that can be considered matters of trial 
strategy.”  State v. Baker, 159 Ohio App.3d 462, 2005 Ohio 45, 824 N.E.2d 162 (Greene).  
Similarly, the decision not to seek to suppress the pretrial statement of the defendant to the police 
sometimes falls in this category. State v. Robertson, No. 78 AP-584, 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 
10943 (Franklin July 31, 1979); see State v. Korp, No. 56132, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 5069 
(Cuyahoga Nov. 2, 1989) (lawyer’s trial decision not to present evidence and to accept prosecutor’s 
version of facts binding on client). So too would a decision to waive the client’s right to a speedy trial 
in order to assure an opportunity for adequate preparation for trial.  State v. McBreen, 54 Ohio St.2d 
315, 376 N.E.2d 593 (1978) (syllabus) (“A defendant’s right to be brought to trial within the time 
limits expressed in R.C. 2945.71 may be waived by his counsel for reasons of trial preparation and the 
defendant is bound by the waiver even though the waiver is executed without his consent.”); accord 
State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27, 2002 Ohio 7017, 781 N.E.2d 72, at para. 33 (applying McBreen 
rule). 
While many of these cases supporting the freedom of a lawyer to act on his own arise outside of the 
disciplinary context, their strong language and policy arguments suggest that such practices should be 
seen as being within the lawyer’s implied authority recognized by Ohio Rule 1.2(a). 
Even in areas where decision-making authority rests with the lawyer, however, an attorney always 
has an obligation to exert his best efforts to insure that his client remains fully informed of all relevant 
considerations regarding the representation. Ohio Rule 1.4(a). See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 88-30, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (Dec. 16, 1988). 
It is also worthy of note that the Ohio Supreme Court has read Rule 1.2(a) as “prohibiting a lawyer 
from intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives of his clients.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoff, 
124 Ohio St.3d 269, 2010 Ohio 136, 921 N.E.2d 636, at para. 8. (Unlike former DR 7-101(A)(1), 
which contained the “intentionally failing” proscription, it is difficult to find language in 1.2(a) that 
can be read as expressing the prohibition quoted by the Court in Hoff.) 
The only other case of which we are aware invoking the objectives-of-the-client aspect of Rule 1.2(a) 
is Disciplinary Counsel v. Ranke, 130 Ohio St.3d 139, 2011 Ohio 4730, 956 N.E.2d 288, and it too 
seems an odd application of the rule. In Count Two, Ranke was hired to pursue a criminal appeal. She 
filed a notice of appearance, but never filed an appellate brief, despite four extensions of time. After 
the appeal was dismissed, the client wrote to respondent asking about the status of her appeal, and 
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Ranke neither answered nor told the client that the appeal had been dismissed. This conduct, the 
relator charged, violated 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 8.4(d) and 8.4(h), in addition to 1.2(a). Only Rule 1.2(a) 
seems a bit of a reach, and the Court does not explain just how Ranke's neglect and failure to keep the 
client informed also constituted a breach of the rule's mandate "requiring a lawyer to abide by a 
client's decisions regarding the objectives of the representation." Id. at para. 13. 
On the topic of authority reserved to the lawyer, see generally 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers §  23 (2000). 
1.2:340  Lawyer’s Authority to Act for Client 
A lawyer’s authority can be actual or apparent. The general rule with respect to actual authority is set 
forth in 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  26 (2000), which states that the 
lawyer’s act is that of the client in proceedings before a tribunal or in dealings with a third party if 
(1) the client has expressly or impliedly authorized the act; 
(2) authority concerning the act is reserved to the lawyer as stated in § 23 
[see section 1.2:330]; or 
(3) the client ratifies the act. 
When one turns to the lawyer’s apparent authority, the Restatement rule is as follows: 
 A lawyer’s act is considered to be that of the client in 
proceedings before a tribunal or in dealings with a third person if the 
tribunal or third person reasonably assumes that the lawyer is 
authorized to do the act on the basis of the client’s (and not the lawyer’s) 
manifestations of such authorization. 
1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  27 (2000). In general, “the lawyer has 
apparent authority to do acts that reasonably appear to be calculated to advance the client’s objectives 
in the representation, except for matters reserved to the client under §  22.” Id. at cmt. c. See section 
1.2:320. As stated by Guttenberg and Snyder, “[a] lawyer’s general retainer authorizes, explicitly or 
implicitly, conduct by the attorney that is necessary to effectuate the objectives of the representation.” 
Jack A. Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  
6.4(C), at 150 (1992). While this apparent authority is broad, such authority arising from retention 
alone does not extend to matters reserved for client decision, such as approval of settlements. 
Restatement §  27, at cmt. a. 
Apparent authority can extend beyond actual authority when the client has limited the lawyer’s actual 
authority but that limitation has not been disclosed to a third party, and instead the client has indicated 
to the third party that the lawyer is authorized to act. Id. at cmt. b. 
Most of the case law in Ohio dealing with the lawyer’s authority to act for the client has arisen in the 
context of whether the lawyer had authority to settle a case and the consequences if he or she did not. 
This subject is addressed in the remaining paragraphs of this section. 
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Unauthorized settlements - Disciplinary violations: Ohio Rule 1.2(a) specifies that the lawyer “shall 
abide” the client’s decision on settlement issues. Obviously, the failure to do so is a disciplinary 
violation, as it was under the former OHCPR (OH DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(3), or both, were 
typically invoked). E.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mishler, 118 Ohio St.3d 109, 2008 Ohio 1810, 
886 N.E.2d 818 (settling two cases for amount that client had expressly rejected violated DR 
7-101(A)(3)); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Slack, 88 Ohio St.3d 274, 725 N.E.2d 631 (2000) (settling case 
without client’s knowledge; for this and numerous other violations, respondent disbarred); Bar Ass’n 
of Greater Cleveland v. Kless, 17 Ohio St.3d 21, 476 N.E.2d 1035 (1976) (respondent suspended 
for one year for entering into settlements in excess of settlement authority). 
In Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. Rockman, 94 Ohio St.3d 12, 759 N.E.2d 773 (2001), the respondent 
took the unauthorized settlement violation to the next level and falsely represented to the insurance 
company for the defendant in a drunk-driving accident case that he represented Hernandez, the 
plaintiff (which he did in other matters, but not this one). Respondent then negotiated and settled his 
“client’s” claim against the insurance company without Hernandez’s permission. For this and other 
violations of his ethical obligations to Hernandez, Rockman was permanently disbarred. 
Unauthorized settlements - Malpractice liability: Settling a case without authority to do so may 
subject the lawyer to malpractice liability as well.  Caine v. Steele, No. 39656, 1979 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 10477 (Cuyahoga Nov. 1, 1979) (alleging that lawyer settled without client’s authority states 
claim in malpractice upon which relief can be granted). See also Susan J. Becker, Jack A. 
Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of Professional Conduct in Ohio § 8.21[1], at 8-43 n. 
183 (2009-10 ed.) (noting that such unauthorized conduct can subject the lawyer to malpractice 
claims or disciplinary action). 
Enforcing unauthorized settlements - General rule: With one important exception discussed below, 
Ohio law is that unauthorized settlements are generally not binding on the client. The Restatement 
rule to that effect is as follows: 
Generally a client is not bound by a settlement that the client has not 
authorized a lawyer to make by express, implied, or apparent 
authority . . . . When a lawyer purports to enter into a settlement 
binding on the client but lacks authority to do so, the burden of 
inconvenience resulting if the client repudiates the settlement is 
properly left with the opposing party, who should know that 
settlements are normally subject to approval by the client and who has 
no manifested contrary indication from the client. The opposing party 
can protect itself by obtaining clarification of the lawyer’s authority. 
Refusing to uphold a settlement reached without the client’s authority 
means that the case remains open, while upholding such a settlement 
deprives the client of the right to have the claim resolved on other 
terms. 
1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  27 cmt. d, at 204-05 (2000). (A brief 
review of the varying approaches taken by courts nationally can be found in Thomas Spahn, 
Settlement Agreements:  When “A Deal Is Not a Deal,” 20 Experience No. 2 (2010), at 46.) 
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In Ohio, the general rule is that express authority (more often phrased in Ohio as “special” or “specific” 
authorization) is required, particularly with respect to settlements involving the client’s real estate 
interests. The following cases (all nondisciplinary) reach this result in the real estate context. 
The leading case is Morr v. Crouch, 19 Ohio St. 2d 24, 249 N.E.2d 780 (1969), where the Court 
held that the trial court erred in denying a motion to vacate a journal entry of settlement involving sale 
of the client’s real estate by the client’s lawyer, who admitted he had not been given authority to sell 
or settle. In doing so, the Court stated that the rule in Ohio is as follows: 
 An attorney who is without special authorization has no implied 
or apparent authority, solely by virtue of his general retainer, to 
compromise and settle his client’s claim or cause of action. 
Id. at 24, 249 N.E.2d at 781 (syllabus two). (In the body of the opinion, the words “specific 
authorization” were used; cases following Morr have used both formulations, seemingly 
interchangeably.) Moreover, 
 [w]here the power claimed for an attorney is to sell real estate, 
the agent’s authority must be expressly given before a contract for the 
sale of land will bind the client. 
Id. at 25, 249 N.E.2d at 781 (syllabus three). 
The other major precedent in the Morr line of cases involving settlement with respect to real estate 
interests is Ottawa County Comm’rs v. Mitchell, 17 Ohio App.3d 208, 478 N.E. 2d 1024 (Ottawa 
1984), in which the court, in addition to following Morr syllabus two with respect to settlement 
authority (and citing numerous additional cases in accord), spelled out further details concerning the 
rule. Thus, 
 In representation concerning the client’s real estate, “the existence of the attorney’s express 
authority to act on his client’s behalf is absolutely crucial to the efficacy of his dealings with 
other parties.” 
 Express authority may be oral, but the better practice is to reduce the authority to writing; to 
establish that such authority was verbally conferred, clear and convincing evidence is 
required. 
 “Parties dealing with a known agent have a duty to ascertain the scope and limitations of his 
authority in matters concerning [settlement] agreements to sell or convey his principal’s real 
estate or an interest therein.” 
Id. at 208; 478 N.E.2d at 1025-26 (syllabi 1-4, 6). 
Applying these principles, Ottawa v. Mitchell rejected the effort by county commissioners to 
enforce a settlement reached in a real estate appropriation case, where the evidence failed to show that 
the client had given his lawyer the express authority to bind him to a settlement without the client’s 
“final, written approval of the terms thereof.”  Id. at 214, 478 N.E.2d at 1031. 
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Other unauthorized settlement cases involving the client’s real-estate interests include: City of West 
Carrollton v. Bruns, No. CA 17054, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6045 (Montgomery Dec. 18, 1998) 
(law director had no express or implied authority to settle appropriation case without authorization 
from city council; denial of motion by landowner to compel city to comply with settlement affirmed; 
quoting Morr rule that absent specific authorization attorney has no implied or apparent authority to 
settle client’s claims); Sleepy Hollows, Inc. v. Ottawa County Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 89- OT-50, 
1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2270 (Ottawa May 17, 1991) (reversing order enforcing settlement and 
compelling appellants to grant easements; unrebutted evidence that lawyer had no authority to settle; 
Morr “general rule” of no implied or apparent authority without special authorization quoted, which 
rule “applies regardless of the nature of the underlying claim or cause of action” but “has special force 
in matters of real estate,” Id. at *3); see Helman v. Thomas, 2001 Ohio 1637; 2001 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 4755 (Summit Oct. 24, 2001) (quoting Morr rule requiring specific authorization, but 
affirming enforcement of settlement involving claimed real estate interest of client where client 
offered no evidence to dispute lawyer’s testimony that he had client’s express authority to settle on 
terms agreed upon); Tinlin v. White, No. 653, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1917 (Carroll May 15, 
1996) (reversing, for abuse of discretion, trial court’s failure to grant appellants’ motion for relief 
from judgment under OH Civ R 60(B)(5) based on unauthorized settlement involving appellant’s 
real estate interests; stringent requirements stated in Morr and Ottawa County for real estate 
settlements emphasized). Citing Ottawa County, Tinlin found the lawyers’ affidavits -- the only 
evidence supporting authorization, which evidence was disputed -- to be “unacceptable.” Compare 
Helman supra, which allowed such evidence where it was undisputed. 
Even where real estate interests are not involved, the majority of Ohio cases refuse to enforce 
settlement by lawyers entered into without authority from their clients; these cases typically cite the 
Morr “special authorization” rule as well. See, e.g., Schalmo Builders, Inc. v. Zama, 2008 Ohio 
5879, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4924 (Cuyahoga) (“specific authorization” required; order granting 
motion to enforce settlement reversed); Walker v. Sombol, No. 18478, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 
1518 (Montgomery Mar. 30, 2001) (client’s lawyer found not to have had authority to settle case; 
refusal to enforce settlement affirmed; Morr specific authorization rule quoted with approval); 
Watral v. Tree Preservation Co., No. 76853, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1857 (Cuyahoga Apr. 27, 
2000) (reversal of enforcement of settlement; undisputed facts showed that no settlement authorized 
or accepted; Morr rule quoted); Seitz v. Plummer, No. 99 AP-350, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6462 
(Franklin Dec. 30, 1999) (reversing grant of motion to enforce settlement agreement; hearing needed 
to resolve disputed issue whether counsel had “special authorization” to settle as required by Morr 
rule). Compare Garrison v. Daytonian Hotel, Inc., 105 Ohio App.3d 322, 663 N.E.2d 1316 
(Montgomery 1995) (enforcement of settlement affirmed where evidence supported finding that 
lawyer’s specific authorization from client to settle had not been withdrawn; Morr rule cited with 
approval).  See also Columbus Bar Ass’n v. DeVillers, 116 Ohio St.3d 33, 2007 Ohio 5552, 876 
N.E.2d 530 (DeVillers is somewhat janus-faced on the unauthorized settlement issue: in one of the 
counts against respondent a “settled” case (not involving real estate interests) was restored to the 
calendar based on respondent’s lack of authorization from his client, but the case was later dismissed, 
based on a second settlement that apparently had also not been authorized.) 
Enforcing unauthorized settlements - Exception to general rule - Argo: The exception to the 
foregoing general rule comes into play when the client’s attempt to avoid the unauthorized settlement 
is premised upon a motion for relief from judgment under OH Civ R 60(B)(1). The leading case is 
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Argo Plastic Prods. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 15 Ohio St.3d 389, 474 N.E.2d 328 (1984), pursuant 
to which the Supreme Court held that the judgment entered on the unauthorized settlement could not 
be set aside under OH Civ R 60(B)(1). In Argo, Kless, an assistant law director for the City of 
Cleveland, whose lawyers did not have authority to settle a case for the city for an amount in excess of 
$2,500 without the approval of the city’s law director (absent here), settled a case for more than 
$550,000. When the city discovered the amount of the settlement, upon which judgment had been 
entered, it sought relief from the judgment under OH Civ R 60(B)(1) on the ground of “surprise.” 
The trial court denied the motion; the court of appeals reversed; but the Supreme Court, reversing the 
court of appeals, held that the city was bound by the action of its assistant law director. The Court did 
not make any reference to its earlier decision in Morr v. Crouch; instead, it applied a general OH 
Civ R 60(B)(1) analysis (not limited to the “surprise” aspect), for purposes of which 
the conduct of counsel is imputed to his client. It follows that the city 
may not now obtain relief from judgment under Civ. R. 60(B)(1) solely 
on the ground of misconduct by its own attorney. Thus, under our 
holding in GTE [GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Indus., Inc., 47 
Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976)], supra, any “mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect,” as set forth in Civ. R. 
60(B)(1), by counsel for a party does not entitle that party to relief from 
judgment under the rule. 
 . . . [W]e therefore impute Kless’ actions to the city in 
considering whether the city may obtain relief from judgment under 
Civ. R. 60(B)(1). That being the case, the city’s contention that Civ. R. 
60(B) relief is warranted where its attorney exceeds his settlement 
authority is without merit. The city’s remedy, if any, lies elsewhere. 
 While we have sympathy for the city’s situation, we feel it 
would be manifestly unjust to appellants herein to vacate the judgment 
entered below pursuant to the settlement on the amount of damages. 
Using the language employed in GTE, supra, we would be “‘visiting 
the sins of * * * [the city’s] lawyer upon the * * * [appellants].’” 
15 Ohio St.3d at 392-93, 474 N.E.2d at 331-32 (emphasis, ellipses, and bracketed material (except 
full GTE cite) by the Court; inner quotation from Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 634 n.10 
(1962)). It is worthy of note that Argo not only fails to mention the fact that counsel’s conduct was 
expressly characterized in GTE as “not excusable” (“This is not excusable neglect,” 47 Ohio St.2d at 
153, 351 N.E.2d at 117), but also leaves the distinct impression that GTE was an excusable neglect 
case (e.g., “the principle expressed in GTE, supra, with respect to excusable neglect . . .”, 15 Ohio 
St.3d at 392, 474 N.E.2d at 331; “under our holding in GTE, supra, any ‘… excusable neglect,’ as 
set forth in Civ. R. 60(B)(1), by counsel for a party does not entitle that party to relief from judgment 
under the rule.” Id. at 393, 474 N.E.2d at 331.). Indeed, the Argo Court’s reliance on Link likewise 
fails to note that the lawyer’s conduct in Link was “unexcused,” 370 U.S. at 633. 
While the city in Argo was unable to set aside the unauthorized settlement, its lawyer was disciplined 
for exceeding his authority. See Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Kless, 17 Ohio St.3d 21, 476 
N.E.2d 1035 (1985) (one-year suspension imposed; the three dissenters would have imposed 
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indefinite suspension). See also Columbus Bar Ass’n v. DeVillers, 116 Ohio St.3d 33, 2007 Ohio 
5552, 876 N.E.2d 530 (discipline imposed for, inter alia, entering into unauthorized settlement). 
Argo was followed in Weir v. Needham, 26 Ohio App.3d 36, 498 N.E.2d 175 (Medina 1985) 
(refusing to vacate under OH Civ R 60(B)(1) unauthorized settlement involving transfer of client’s 
interest in real estate); see Louden v. Cooper, 2004 Ohio 5127, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4760 
(Mahoning) (alternative holding; enforcing unauthorized settlement of dispute involving outstanding 
water bill constituting lien on client-purchaser’s penalty); Maumee Equip., Inc. v. Smith, No. 
L-85-168, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 9378 (Lucas Nov. 22, 1985) (alternative holding; enforcing 
unauthorized settlement in non-real estate case); cf. Poe v. Ferguson, 2008 Ohio 1442, 2008 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 1250 (Hamilton) (following Argo in negligent-dismissal-with-prejudice case; court 
concludes that lawyer’s neglect was not excusable). 
As an OH Civ R 60(B)(1) matter, the Argo result would appear to be the correct one, since the act of 
unauthorized settlement is typically not the product of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect. Indeed, in the disciplinary case against the Argo lawyer, the respondent “admitted to 
knowingly entering into these settlements [there were two others in addition to that in Argo] without 
authorization.” Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Kless, 17 Ohio St.3d at 21, 476 N.E.2d at 1036 
(bracketed material added). A subsequent Supreme Court decision, in distinguishing Argo, stated that 
“the attorney’s conduct in Argo” in effecting an unauthorized settlement “constituted active 
misconduct between a client and his counsel.” Moore v. Emmanuel Family Training Ctr., Inc., 18 
Ohio St.3d 64, 68, 479 N.E.2d 879, 883 (1985) (i.e., active misconduct by the lawyer toward his 
client). See also the characterization in the Argo dissent of Kless’s conduct as “acts of spite, malice, 
or incompetence.” 15 Ohio St.3d at 394, 474 N.E.2d at 332. (Cf. the reference in another 
disciplinary decision to the lawyer’s having successfully moved the trial court under OH Civ R 
60(B)(1) to vacate the judgment entered on an unauthorized settlement, based on the argument that 
“the trial court had been to blame for erroneously filing the entry.” Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. 
Josselson, 43 Ohio St.3d 154, 155, 539 N.E.2d 625, 626 (1989).)  
Argo’s dictum that “any” lawyer “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” will always 
result in denial of OH Civ R 60(B)(1) relief to the moving party, however, is clearly wrong. The best 
evidence of this is Moore v. Emmanuel Family Training Ctr., Inc., 18 Ohio St.3d 64, 479 N.E.2d 
879 (1985). Moore, a nonsettlement case, noted that, under both GTE and Argo, counsel’s conduct is 
imputed to the client. Id. at 68, 479 N.E.2d at 883. But the key issue is whether “such conduct is 
‘excusable’ …” Id. at 68, 479 N.E.2d at 884. 
In GTE at 152 [, 351 N.E.2d at 117,] we provided additional guidance 
as to when conduct is excusable: “‘[I]f an attorney’s conduct falls 
substantially below what is reasonable under the circumstances, the 
client’s remedy is against the attorney * * *.’” (Emphasis added.) We 
then concluded that the attorney’s conduct in GTE “* * * reveals a 
complete disregard for the judicial system and the right of the appellee. 
This is not excusable neglect.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 153 [, 351 
N.E.2d at 117]. 
Id. (bracketed material added). 
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In other words, if the lawyer’s neglect is not excusable, the only remedy is a malpractice action 
against the lawyer; if it is, then 60(B)(1) provides an avenue for relief, despite the imputation of 
counsel’s conduct to the client. In Moore, “[a]lthough the negligence of counsel will be imputed to 
the moving party,” id. at 68, 479 N.E.2d at 884, that negligence was found excusable and 60(B)(1) 
relief was granted. Accord Kay v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 76 Ohio St.3d 18, 665 N.E.2d 1102 (1996) 
(defendant entitled to relief from judgment where, in nonsettlement context, its counsel timely 
prepared answer but it was inadvertently placed in file drawer rather than filed with court; upon 
learning of entry of default judgment, defendant’s attorney filed motion for relief from judgment, 
with affidavits, the next day; after denial of the motion, the court of appeals affirmed; reversing, the 
Supreme Court found that counsel’s motion and supporting evidence showed excusable neglect 
warranting relief under Rule 60(B)(1)); Bodnar v. Bodnar, 2006 Ohio 3300, 2006 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3214 (Richland) (conduct of counsel constituted mistake or inadvertence entitling client to 
relief under Rule 60(B)(1), as granted by trial court); Stewart v. Heard, 2005 Ohio 5241, Ohio App 
LEXIS 4745 (Montgomery) (even if conduct of counsel (filing dismissal entry with prejudice, 
instead of without prejudice, as intended) not excusable, it constituted mistake or inadvertence; 
granting of Rule 60(B)(1) motion affirmed); Price Bros. Co. v. Atlas Sewer & Pipe Cleaning Co., 
No. 11035, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 5371 (Montgomery Dec. 28, 1988) (excusable neglect by 
counsel, affirming grant of Rule 60(B)(1) motion; Argo not followed: “we are persuaded by 
subsequent Ohio Supreme Court cases [Moore; Griffey] that attorney neglect, although clearly 
imputable to the client, is nevertheless a basis for relief if excusable,” id. at *5).  
See also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Clavner, 77 Ohio St.3d 431, 674 N.E.2d 1369 (1997) 
(noting, in context of disciplinary case, that OH Civ R 60(B)(1) motion to vacate judgment, based on 
respondent’s mistake as to correct trial date, had been granted); Busacca v. MacGuire & Schneider, 
LLP, 162 Ohio App.3d 689, 2005 Ohio 4215, 834 N.E.2d 856 (stating that in prior stage of the 
litigation, trial court’s grant of summary judgment noted that no response had been filed when in fact 
plaintiffs had filed response earlier that day; plaintiffs’ motion for relief from judgment under Rule 
60(B) [subsection unspecified] granted; trial court, at time of its entry, was not aware of filing). 
Compare Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 514 N.E.2d 1122 (applying GTE rule in affirming 
denial of Rule 60(B)(1) motion; conduct of medical-malpractice defendant and his insurance carrier 
in failing to answer and not filing motion for relief for 51 days after answer due and a month and a half 
after default judgment had been entered constituted inexcusable neglect, which exhibited “a disregard 
for the judicial system and the rights of the plaintiff.”  Id. at syllabus.); Chapman v. Chapman, 
2006 Ohio 2328, 2006 Ohio App LEXIS 2169 (Montgomery) (client argued that his counsel’s 
failure to enter into evidence certain psychological reports called for 60(B)(1) relief; court of appeals 
held that, taking client’s allegations as true, “his counsel at the civil protection hearing neglected to 
perform the basic duties of his representation.  Such conduct is not ‘excusable’” for 60(B)(1) purposes, 
id. at para. 18, citing Kay v. Marc Glassman); Swan v. Swan, 2005 Ohio 4636, 2005 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 4173 (Franklin) (same; failure to perform basic duties of representation constitutes complete 
disregard for judicial system, which is not excusable). As stated in 2 James M. Klein & Stanton G. 
Darling II, Baldwin’s Ohio Civil Practice §  60:38, at 755 (2d ed. 2004), the Argo dictum “is 
almost certainly incorrect as to mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect.”  
To summarize, the decided weight of Ohio authority on settlements by lawyers, absent specific 
authorization from the client, would appear to be that such unauthorized settlements are 
unenforceable, particularly but not exclusively if they involve real estate interests. But, if such a 
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settlement has been reduced to judgment from which relief is sought under Rule 60(B)(1), Argo 
holds the settlement enforceable. 
Thus we have, in essence, two Supreme Court ships “passing in the night” without any recognition in 
Argo that Morr even existed. In terms of enforceability of unauthorized settlements entered into by 
lawyers, the two decisions seem to be at odds with one another: Argo holds that a judgment premised 
on a lawyer’s unauthorized settlement will not be set aside and is enforceable; Morr and its progeny 
hold that such settlements are unenforceable. Under the Argo result, an unauthorized settlement is 
functionally indistinguishable from one that has “special authorization” under Morr. We believe that 
Argo should be cabined to its 60(B)(1) procedural context and that Morr should be recognized as the 
general rule outside that context. A further footnote on this issue: In Morris v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 35 
Ohio St.3d 45, 517 N.E.2d 904 (1988), a unanimous decision not involving real estate interests that 
came down three years after Argo (which was not cited), the Court quoted with approval the “special 
authorization” rule as set forth in Morr syllabus two,  id. at 48, 517 N.E.2d at 908, in concluding that 
a lawyer, absent express authority, had no authority to endorse the names of his insured clients on 
insurer’s checks tendered to effect settlement of the insurer’s obligation under the policy; the 
insurer’s obligation remained in effect. 
It is worthy of note that a 2009 court of appeals opinion, involving the enforceability of an alleged 
settlement agreement entered into by plaintiffs’ lawyer, confronted the Morr/Argo conflict and 
concluded that the two cases can be reconciled. Adkins v. Estate of Place, 180 Ohio App.3d 747, 
2009 Ohio 526, 907 N.E.2d 354 (Clark). In the words of the Adkins court, in Argo the Supreme 
Court 
was at pains to note, repeatedly, that the issue under review arose in the 
context of a motion for relief from judgment. The judgment on the 
settlement in that case had already become final, so that the 
extraordinary circumstances set forth in Civ. R. 60(B) were required to 
relieve the aggrieved litigant from its effects. The Supreme Court 
employed the familiar principle that bad lawyering is not a justification 
for relief, under Civ. R. 60(B), from a judgment that has become final. 
 By contrast, the judgment on the settlement in the case before 
us, like the judgment in Morr v. Crouch, supra, has not become final, a 
timely appeal having been taken from that judgment. We conclude that 
these two cases . . . are distinguishable upon the ground that the former 
[Morr] involved a judgment that had not yet become final, while the 
latter [Argo] involved a judgment that had become final, and that we 
therefore need not conclude that in deciding Argo Plastic Products, the 
Ohio Supreme Court implicitly overruled Morr v. Crouch. 
Id. at paras. 35-36. 
(Query whether the Adkins court’s “final judgment” analysis effectively distinguishes Argo from 
Morr.) Although it is true that Rule 60(B) applies only to a “final judgment, order of proceeding,” so 
too, a judgment is subject to appeal only if it constitutes a “final order.” See ORC 2505.02; see also 
2505.03: “[e]very final order, judgment, or decree . . . may be reviewed on appeal. . . .”) 
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1.2:350  Lawyer’s Knowledge Attributed to Client 
“Imputed knowledge is information possessed by an attorney that is deemed to be possessed the client, 
regardless of whether the attorney has actually conveyed this information to the client.” Jack A. 
Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  6.3(C), at 
145 (1992). See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 634 & n.10 (1962); State ex rel. Weiss v. 
Indus. Comm’n, 65 Ohio St.3d 470, 605 N.E.2d 37 (1992) (notice of Supreme Court entry, served 
on attorney general, constituted constructive notice to attorney general’s clients); State v. Utz, 2001 
Ohio 2165; 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1010 (Crawford Mar. 8, 2001) (notice of hearing provided to 
defendant’s attorney imputed to defendant); Jewell v. Underwood, No. 2000- CA-61, 2000 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 6030 (Greene Dec. 22, 2000) (plaintiff cannot claim that defendant misrepresented that 
she was trained divorce mediator when defendant had informed plaintiff’s attorney that she was not; 
plaintiff bound by his attorney’s knowledge); Caldwell v. Brown, 109 Ohio App.3d 609, 672 
N.E.2d 1037 (Montgomery 1996) (presentment of claim against estate to executor’s attorney, rather 
than executor, held sufficient); Int’l Lottery, Inc. v. Kerouac, 102 Ohio App.3d 660, 657 N.E.2d 
820 (Hamilton 1995) (knowledge of notices of trial date and application for judgment, sent to 
defendant’s attorney, imputed to defendant; denial of OH Civ R 60(B) motions affirmed). See also 
OH Civ R 5(B) (service on represented party effected by service on party’s attorney). But see 
Chorpenning v. Ohio Div. of Real Estate, No. 88 CA 7, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 2202 
(Washington May 9, 1989) (notice of appeal filed with agency’s attorney held insufficient under 
statute requiring filing with agency). See generally 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers §  28 (2000). 
The imputed knowledge rule encompasses all information material to the representation received by 
the attorney acting within the scope of his or her employment for the client. If, however, the 
information is obtained by the lawyer outside the scope of the representation, the information is not 
imputed to the client. See, e.g., Nickschinski v. Sentry Ins. Co., 88 Ohio App.3d 185, 623 N.E.2d 
660 (Cuyahoga 1993) (knowledge obtained by attorney, while representing different client in 
different matter, not attributed to client). 
This imputation rule makes sense, given both the agency relationship between client and lawyer and 
the lawyer’s duty of communication to the client. See Ohio Rule 1.4 and sections 1.4:200-:300. It 
would also seem to be a practical necessity in facilitating the efficient transmission of important 
information within the justice system. Cf. Payton v. Rehberg, 119 Ohio App.3d 183, 694 N.E.2d 
1379 (Cuyahoga 1997), discussed in section 1.2:370. 
 
1.2:360  Lawyer’s Act or Advice as Mitigating or Avoiding Client Responsibility 
Other than the decisions expressly reserved to the client under Rule 1.2(a), clients are generally held 
responsible for acts performed by or on the advice of their lawyers. This section examines possible 
exceptions to that rule under general law. (The Ohio Rules do not directly address this issue.) Thus, as 
stated in 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  29 (2000): 
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 (1) When a client’s intent or mental state is in issue, a tribunal 
may consider otherwise admissible evidence of a lawyer’s advice to the 
client. 
 (2) In deciding whether to impose a sanction on a person or to 
relieve a person from a criminal or civil ruling, default, or judgment, a 
tribunal may consider otherwise admissible evidence to prove or 
disprove that the lawyer who represented the person did so 
inadequately or contrary to the client’s instructions. 
Under §  29(1), a client charged with knowing violation of the law may be able to introduce evidence, 
going to the client’s state of mind, that his or her lawyer gave advice that the conduct was lawful. And 
in the malicious prosecution area, if a lawyer had advised that there were good grounds to support 
institution of the underlying litigation and the client relied in good faith on such advice (based on the 
client’s full disclosure of the facts), “such reliance conclusively establishes probable cause.” Id. cmt. 
c, at 213. 
Ohio case law is to the same effect; it provides that advice of counsel is a “complete defense” to a 
malicious prosecution action, provided the necessary condition of full disclosure of the facts by the 
client is present. See Woodruff v. Paschen, 105 Ohio St. 396, 137 N.E. 867 (1922) (approving trial 
court’s statement of general rule that advice of counsel is complete defense if defendant proves that he 
or she sought advice of counsel, that counsel was fairly informed of all material facts, and that client 
followed counsel’s advice in good faith, but holding that where petition charges maintenance, as well 
as institution, of malicious prosecution action, advice of counsel is complete defense only if it covers 
time from institution to final disposition of the action). Accord, as to the general rule, Burkholder v. 
Emahiser, No. OT-01-020, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1317 (Ottawa Mar. 22, 2002) (summary 
judgment for defendants affirmed; “the undisputed evidence supports a conclusion that those 
[criminal] proceedings were initiated based on probable cause and on the advice of counsel,” id. at 
*4); Uebelacker v. Cincom Sys., Inc., 48 Ohio App.3d 268, 549 N.E.2d 1210 (Hamilton 1988) 
(acting on advice of counsel after full disclosure of relevant facts constitutes complete defense; 
summary judgment for party defending against malicious prosecution counterclaim affirmed). 
While the great majority of cases discussing the advice-of-counsel defense are malicious-criminal- 
prosecution cases, the defense has been applied in the malicious-civil-prosecution context as well. 
See, e.g., Perry v. Adjustable Awning, Inc., 117 Ohio App. 486, 192 N.E.2d 672 (Summit 1962). 
Ohio examples of application of the position set forth in 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers §  29(2) (2000) can be found in cases under ORC 2323.51, pursuant to which 
sanctions can be imposed on the client, counsel of record, or both, for frivolous conduct in litigation. 
In deciding upon whom the sanction should fall, numerous Ohio decisions have concluded that the 
punishment should be imposed on the person actually responsible for the misconduct. See, e.g., 
Cseplo v. Steinfels, 116 Ohio App.3d 384, 388, 688 N.E.2d 292, 294 (Franklin 1996) (ORC 
2323.51 “provides a mechanism to place the blame directly where the fault lies”; imposition of 
sanctions on parties, as opposed to their lawyer, was inappropriate). Accord Master v. Chalko, No. 
573200, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2014 (Cuyahoga May 11, 2000) (sanctions properly imposed on 
both party and lawyer). These cases are discussed in section 3.1:300 at “Who may be sanctioned for 
misconduct.” 
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Another application of the §  29(2) rule is in the unauthorized settlement cases discussed above, 
except that one of the prime examples of a lawyer acting “contrary to the client’s instructions” is 
Argo, and it went the other way. In the disciplinary context, at least, there are cases sanctioning 
lawyers for violating the client’s settlement instructions. See, e.g., Mishler and Kless, discussed in 
section 1.2:340 supra. 
 
1.2:370  Appearance Before a Tribunal 
When a lawyer enters an appearance before a tribunal, it is presumed that he or she has the authority 
to do so. A party claiming otherwise has the burden of persuasion. See State ex rel. Juergens v. Ind. 
Comm’n, 127 Ohio St. 524, 189 N.E. 445 (1934): 
[W]e can see no reason why a claimant may not confide the power of 
filing his application [for rehearing before the Industrial Commission] 
to an attorney, and authorize him to act in his behalf. . . . The written 
application signed by him as such attorney was presumptive evidence 
of his authority to file the application, and such authority is presumed 
until repelled by evidence. “It is well established in the courts of this 
country, federal and state, that the appearance of a regularly admitted 
attorney of law is presumptive evidence of his authority to represent the 
person for whom he appears. This rule is well established in Ohio.” 
Id. at 527, 189 N.E. at 446 (bracketed material added; quotation from Ohio Jurisprudence). Accord 
Payton v. Rehberg, 119 Ohio App.3d 183, 694 N.E.2d 1379 (Cuyahoga 1997) (rejecting plaintiff’s 
argument that counsel’s filing of notice of voluntary dismissal was unauthorized; ‘[i]t is essential to 
the effective operation of the legal system that the courts be entitled to rely on the signature of counsel 
as evidence of implied authority,”  id. at 190, 694 N.E.2d at 1384); 1 Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers §  25 (2000). Language in other Ohio case law is generally consistent with 
the foregoing view. See section 1.2:330 supra. The presumption does not apply in proceedings 
between lawyer and client. Restatement §  25 at cmt. d. 
 
1.2:380  Authority of Government Lawyer 
With regard to a government lawyer’s authority (or lack thereof) in the context of settlement, see 
Argo Plastic Prods. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 15 Ohio St.3d 389, 474 N.E.2d 328 (1984), 
discussed in section 1.2:340. For a discussion of who is the client of a government lawyer, see section 
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1.2:400  Lawyer’s Moral Autonomy 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [5] 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.2(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.23 
Commentary 
Wolfram §  10.4 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.23 (1996). 
In numerous instances, the Ohio ethics rules and Ohio practice recognize the moral autonomy of the 
lawyer. At the outset of any potential lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer exercises moral autonomy 
in deciding whether to accept the representation. Cf. Ohio Rule 6.2 cmt. [1]. That autonomy is 
tempered, however, when a tribunal seeks to appoint a lawyer to represent a client. Id. See section 
6.2:200. The Rules encourage lawyers to take on controversial and unpopular client cases, and stress 
that in representing such clients the lawyer is not approving the conduct or endorsing the client’s 
position as her own. Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [5]. 
The Rules also give room for the exercise of moral autonomy during the lawyer-client relationship. In 
defining the scope of the representation under Rule 1.2(c), the lawyer may insist upon reasonable 
limitations on the means to be employed to meet the client’s objectives, if the lawyer finds any of 
those means repugnant or imprudent. Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [7]. 
Under Ohio Rule 1.16(b)(2), a lawyer may withdraw if the client persists in having the lawyer 
provide services regarding a course of action the lawyer “reasonably believes” to be illegal or 
fraudulent. This gives the lawyer the freedom to avoid entanglement with potentially unlawful 
activity if she so chooses. The lawyer also may withdraw if the client insists upon action the lawyer 
regards as “repugnant” or with which the lawyer has a “fundamental disagreement.” Ohio Rule 
1.16(b)(4). See section 1.16:320. In an adjudicatory matter, the court’s consent to the withdrawal in 
such circumstances is usually required. Ohio Rule 1.16(c). See section 1.16:400. 
As stated by Guttenberg and Snyder: “The need for professional autonomy is seen as a necessary 
ingredient for maintaining a highly skilled and well trained profession.” Jack A. Guttenberg & 
Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  6.4(E), at 152-53 (1992). 
An interesting case study implicating these considerations and underscoring the difficulties that can 
arise, both when a firm accepts an unpopular representation and when it withdraws from that 
representation, is King & Spaulding's acceptance of and withdrawal from its representation of the 
House of Representatives in defense of the Defense of Marriage Act, which the Justice Department 
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had previously concluded it could not defend as constitutional. The matter is reviewed in John 
Gibeaut, At Unease, ABAJ, July 2011, at p. 24. 
Prohibited restrictions on lawyer’s right to practice upon termination of employment relationship: See 
section 5.6:200. 
Prohibited restrictions on lawyer’s future practice as a part of settlement of litigation: See section 
5.6:300. 
 
1.2:500  Limiting the Scope of the Representation 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.2(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.2(c) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:309 
ALI/LGL §  19 
Wolfram §  5.6.7 
 
1.2:510  Waiver of Client or Lawyer Duties 
Ohio Rule 1.2(c) provides that “[a] lawyer may limit the scope of a new or existing representation if 
the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and communicated to the client, preferably in 
writing.” Rule 1.2 cmt. [7] further expounds on limited representation agreements. The comment, 
while noting that there is “substantial latitude” in defining the scope of the relationship, emphasizes 
that “any limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances.” The comment then goes on to 
discuss reasonableness in the context of various examples of limitations on the representation. Thus, 
if a client simply wants general legal information about an uncomplicated problem, “the lawyer and 
client may agree that the lawyer’s services will be limited to a brief telephone conversation.” Id. For 
such a limitation to be reasonable, however, the time allotted must be “sufficient to yield advice upon 
which the client could rely.” Id. Limitations also may exclude “specific means that might otherwise 
be used to accomplish the client’s objectives,” such as limitations regarded as too costly by the client 
or as repugnant or imprudent by the lawyer. Id. The Task Force, in its Report at 21 (2005), suggests 
that an appropriate limitation would be a litigator’s declining to advise on the taxability of a client’s 
recovery, but that it would be unreasonable for a lawyer handling a contingent-fee case not to 
represent the client on appeal from an adverse judgment, unless the limitation was expressly stated in 
the fee agreement. 
With respect to limited representation, the Task Force further states in its Report that 
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Rule 1.2(c) would also permit the Supreme Court to set forth 
circumstances in which a lawyer may ethically provide “unbundled” 
legal services -- that is, to assist a client with only one portion of a 
single case or transaction. 
Id. at 21. The Report goes on to note that unbundling has been adopted in some states “to increase 
the affordability of legal services.” Id. It also refers to the form of unbundling contemplated by Ohio 
Rule 6.5 -- “that is, ‘short-term limited legal services’ -- without expectation of continuing 
representation, provided under the auspices of a nonprofit organization or court.” Report at 21. See 
section 6.5:200. Finally, the comment states that a limited-representation agreement, although not 
exempting the lawyer from providing competent representation under Rule 1.1, “is a factor to be 
considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation.” Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [7]. 
There is one Ohio federal case citing to the former OHCPR in which the essence of the limited 
representation principle was applied. See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 
440 F.Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (city agreed that law firm’s ad hoc representation of it as special 
bond counsel would not impinge on law firm’s long-standing relationship as general counsel for 
electricity supplier, including in lawsuits adverse to city, and waived any ethical objections as to law 
firm’s duties with respect thereto; city’s motion to disqualify law firm in antitrust suit filed by city 
against, among others, electricity supplier, denied), aff’d, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977). The CEI 
decision was relied upon in Morgan v. North Coast Cable Co., No. 57209, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 
5015 (Cuyahoga Nov. 15, 1990); in reversing a ruling of disqualification of plaintiff’s attorney, the 
court held in the alternative that even if the complaining party had standing to raise the 
disqualification issue, the lawyer’s present client (as well as a former client in related litigation) had 
twice waived the conflict by affidavit. The Supreme Court affirmed on lack-of-standing grounds, 63 
Ohio St.3d 156, 586 N.E.2d 88 (1992) (syllabus), and also agreed with the court of appeals’ 
conclusion with respect to waiver.  Id. at 161, 586 N.E.2d at 92. 
The general principle is set forth in 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  19(1) 
(2000): 
a client and lawyer may agree to limit a duty that the lawyer would 
otherwise owe to the client if: 
 (a) the client is adequately informed and consents; and 
 (b) the terms of the limitation are reasonable in the 
circumstances. 
The CEI case is cited by the Restatement as an example of an exception to the otherwise applicable 
duty of the lawyer to “avoid impermissible conflicting interests” -- the duty of loyalty. See 1 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  16(3) reporter’s note to cmt. c (2000). 
The City was (presumably) a sophisticated client and was the one that sought the limited 
representation, even though it knew of the law firm’s general representation of the electricity supplier 
on the other side of its antitrust suit. As noted at various places during the Restatement comments, 
these factors cut in favor of waiver. 
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Another aspect of the limitation-of-representation issue can arise in the insurance context when an 
insurer seeks to limit, in various ways, the manner in which the lawyer represents the insured (usually 
for cost-control purposes). See generally 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The 
Law of Lawyering §  5.11, at 5-32 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-2) & 5-70 (3d ed. Supp. 2004), which notes 
that, in those jurisdictions considering the insured the only client, various state bar association ethics 
committees have opined that insistence by the insurer on programs to limit expenses is a violation of 
the rules. Although Hazard and Hodes do not cite to Ohio, the Board of Commissioners issued such 
an opinion under the former OHCPR. See Bd. of Comm’rs of Grievances & Discipline Op. No. 
2000-3, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 1, 2000), discussed in section 1.7:410 at 
“Insured-insurer conflicts - Impermissible insurer-imposed controls on lawyer conduct.” 
 
1.2:520  Written Confirmation of Nature and Scope of Representation 
See discussion at sections 1.2:240, 1.2:510, and 1.5:500. 
 
1.2:600  Prohibited Assistance 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.2(d) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.51 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:311 
ALI-LGL §§  23(1), 94(2) 
Wolfram §  13.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.51 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.2(d), like its former Code analog (OH DR 7-102(A)(7)), prohibits a lawyer from 
counseling or assisting the client in conduct the lawyer “knows is illegal or fraudulent.” “Illegal” is 
defined in Ohio Rule 1.0(e) as “denot[ing] criminal conduct or a violation of an applicable statute or 
administrative regulation.” In contrast, the Model Rule language precludes assistance in known 
“criminal or fraudulent” conduct. Ohio’s use of illegal rather than criminal is also present in a number 
of other of the new Rules, i.e., 1.6(b)(3), 1.16(b)(2), 4.1(b), 8.4(b). Unfortunately, the word “illegal,” 
despite being a defined term, covers a multitude of sins; its outer boundaries are both obscure and 
overbroad, in comparison with the Model Rules terminology. (Does it cover parking violations? See 
ORC Ch 4521, entitled “Local, Noncriminal Parking Infractions.” Is it underinclusive as well? 
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Under the Rule, is a lawyer free knowingly to counsel or assist his client in violating the constitution?) 
In contrast, as the Task Force itself has stated in support of Rule 1.6(b)(1), the future-crime exception 
to confidentiality “provides a ‘bright-line’ rule for lawyers by limiting disclosure to future acts that 
public policy has determined should be codified as crimes.” Task Force Report at 8 (2005). Accord 
1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  82, cmt. d, at 616-17 (2000) (while other 
misconduct can pose threat of serious harm, “the prevailing view limits the exception [to the 
attorney-client privilege] to crimes and frauds. The actual instances in which a broader exception 
might apply are probably few and isolated, and it would be difficult to formulate a broader exception 
that is not objectionably vague.” (bracketed material added)). To similar effect, see id. at §  67 cmt. d. 
Moreover, according to the Task Force (Report at 13), 
Rule 1.2(d) requires a lawyer who advises a client about proposed 
conduct to determine whether some or all of it might constitute illegal 
or fraudulent activity. 
(Emphasis added.) This obligation, if it indeed exists (there is nothing of which we are aware in the 
Rule or the comments to this effect), could greatly add to a lawyer’s burden (and the client’s cost) in 
representation; arguably, it imposes an affirmative obligation on the lawyer in every instance to 
undertake a review of all “applicable” statutes and regulations in order to determine potential 
illegality. (“Applicable” statutes and regulations include, of course, not just those of Ohio, but federal 
and any other state laws and regulations that may be implicated by the proposed conduct. See the 
Task Force’s unfair labor practice example, Report at 12-13.) This is not to say that a lawyer can 
ignore the obvious if red flags are flying, see ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 42-43 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary), but the Task Force’s more demanding language is a 
far cry from the prohibition against counseling or assisting a client in conduct “known” to be illegal or 
fraudulent, as stated in Rule 1.2(d). 
Also important, in terms of both uniformity and fostering a common understanding among lawyers in 
jurisdictions following some form of the Model Rules as to what conduct is acceptable and what is not, 
is that we have found no jurisdiction, other than Ohio, that uses “illegal” instead of “criminal” in Rule 
1.2(d). In this regard, the unique Ohio language would appear to be at odds with three principal 
purposes of moving to the Model Rules in the first place: 
 By adopting the Model Rules, Ohio will become more relevant in national discussions on the 
subject of legal ethics. Moreover, Ohio practitioners will have the benefit of case law and 
advisory opinions from other jurisdictions that have interpreted and applied the Model Rules. 
 Adoption of the Model Rules will facilitate the ability of lawyers who practice in Ohio and 
other jurisdictions to understand and comply with ethical standards of the various jurisdictions 
in which they practice. 
 Adoption of the Model Rules will facilitate legal ethics instruction in Ohio law schools. 
Currently, Ohio law schools must teach both the Model Rules, which are tested on the 
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, and the Ohio Code, which is addressed in 
the essay portion of the Ohio Bar Examination. 
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Task Force Report p. 2. With all respect, these “benefits” are lost when the otherwise universally 
operative language is changed. And, even though it might be said that Ohio Rule 1.2(d) merely 
continues the use of “illegal” in former OH DR 7-102(A)(7), the fact of the matter is that virtually all 
of the cases decided under the Code provision involved criminal conduct. See Baldwin’s Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. 906-08 (2000) & Supp. 2008, at 816-18. Whether that will remain true under the new 
definition of “illegal” in Rule 1.0(e) (expressly including violation of any statute or regulation) seems 
unlikely; if the definition is taken at face value, Ohio will be isolated from all other Model Rule 
jurisdictions on this point. 
Further confusion is engendered by the fact that in some places, the Ohio Rules retain the Model 
Rules “criminal or fraudulent” language, as in Rule 3.3(b), which is analogous to the obligation in 
former OH DR 7-102(B)(1) to disclose fraud (7-102(B)(1) did not address disclosure of either 
criminal or illegal conduct). And yet in Rule 4.1(b), also derived from 7-102(B)(1), the operative 
words are “illegal or fraudulent.” Ethics rules should be designed to guide lawyers, not confound 
them. The illegal/criminal variation fails that test. Another ramification of the use of “illegal” in Rule 
1.2(d) is discussed below in section 1.2:630. 
In sum, while the lawyer is duty bound to represent the client in the client’s pursuit of legal ends 
through legal means, Rule 1.2(d) precludes the lawyer from acceding to client demands for help in 
carrying out known illegal or fraudulent conduct. If a client insists that the lawyer do so, the lawyer 
must withdraw. Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(1). See section 1.16:230. If the lawyer remains in the 
representation and counsels or assists the client in such conduct, there is a violation of Ohio Rule 
1.2(d). 
Division (d) does not, however, prohibit the lawyer from advising the client about the criminal or civil 
consequences of a proposed course of action. That is exactly the sort of advice lawyers are 
encouraged to give; Rule 1.2(d) and cmt. [9] expressly recognize that this is not counseling or 
assisting in improper conduct. 
Rule 1.2(d) does not directly address issues relating to disclosure of privileged information, but it 
must be remembered that a closely related provision, Rule 4.1(b), does just that. Under 4.1(b), a 
lawyer shall not, in the course of representing a client, 
knowingly . . . fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is 
necessary to avoid assisting an illegal or fraudulent act by a client. 
Thus, in discharging the Rule 1.2(d) duty not to assist a client in conduct the lawyer knows is illegal 
or fraudulent, the lawyer must be mindful that he or she also has an affirmative obligation under Rule 
4.1(b) to disclose material facts, including privileged information (see Rule 4.1 cmt. [3]), if the 
failure to do so is knowing and if disclosure is necessary to avoid such assistance. Although not 
expressly stated in the Rule, it would appear that the Rule 4.1 disclosure obligation is directed at 
client illegality or fraud toward other persons, not a tribunal. (See Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 
4.1: “Division (b) parallels ... the ‘fraud on a person’ portion of DR 7-102(B)(1). The ‘fraud on a 
tribunal’ portion of DR 7-102(B)(1) is now found in Rule 3.3.” See also the title of Rule 4.1 of the 
treatise, “TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS,” and the overall caption for Rules 
4.1-4.4, “TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN CLIENTS.”) Further discussion of 
the Rule 4.1(b) duty is contained in section 4.1:300. 
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Ohio Rule 1.2(d), like its former OHCPR analog (OH DR 7-102(A)(7)), can involve, but is not 
limited to, illegal or fraudulent client conduct that impacts on a tribunal. Conduct directed at a tribunal 
implicates the provisions of Rule 3.3(b), which is concerned with known past, present, or future 
“criminal [not “illegal”] or fraudulent conduct” by any person “including the client.” In the 3.3(b) 
context, a lawyer must take reasonable measures to rectify, including, if necessary, disclosure to the 
tribunal. See section 3.3:700.  
Note however, that the 3.3(b) obligation is limited to circumstances in which the criminal or 
fraudulent conduct by a client or another not only relates to an adjudicative proceeding; the lawyer 
with knowledge of the fraud or crime must represent the client in the adjudicative proceeding. If, as 
was the case in Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Brien, 120 Ohio St.3d 334, 2008 Ohio 6198, 899 N.E.2d 
125, respondent’s assisting his client’s fraud on the bankruptcy court would not implicate Rule 3.3(b), 
because the lawyer/respondent was not representing the client in the bankruptcy proceeding. But such 
assistance would violate Rule 1.2(d). Note further as to O’Brien that there was a finding of violation 
of DR 7-102(A)(7) (which, like 1.2(d) and 3.3(b), requires that the lawyer “know” of the fraud), even 
though the “knowledge” of the lawyer appears to have been something less than absolute: 
The evidence showed that when respondent ordered the disbursements 
[of his client’s house-sale proceeds in his client-trust account] to be 
made, he was fully aware of the bankruptcy, harbored the reasonable 
suspicion that [the client] had not disclosed the house-sale proceeds to 
the bankruptcy court, and had the means to inform himself. 
Id. at para. 14 (emphasis and bracketed material added).  
 
1.2:610  Counseling Illegal Conduct 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.51 (1996). 
As indicated above, many of the former OH DR 7-102(A)(7) cases involved counseling or assisting 
illegal client conduct directed at a tribunal, but there were exceptions. One of the most egregious, 
where the lawyer purported to be counseling his client in illegal conduct directed at a tribunal, but in 
fact was defrauding the client, was Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Atkin, 84 Ohio St.3d 383, 704 
N.E.2d 244 (1999), where the respondent had falsely suggested to his client that he could bribe a U.S. 
District Court judge and, as a result, had obtained from the client $ 550,000 that he used for his 
personal benefit and failed to report for income tax purposes. Following the lawyer’s felony 
conviction on numerous counts involving moral turpitude, including obstruction of justice (see 
United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming conviction)), the lawyer was 
permanently disbarred by the Ohio Supreme Court in the subsequent disciplinary proceeding for, 
inter alia, violation of OH DR 7-102(A)(7). While noting that a sanction of indefinite suspension has 
been imposed even where there is no damage to the judge resulting from such conduct, the Court 
made clear that this case was different. Although the judge in question was found not to be in any way 
involved in the scheme, he was nevertheless subjected to an investigation and a complete audit by the 
U.S. Attorney’s office. In such cases, “the offending attorney’s lack of intent to carry out the bribe [is] 
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not a mitigating factor.” 84 Ohio St.3d at 385, 704 N.E.2d at 246. Accord Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. 
Consoldane, 50 Ohio St.2d 337, 364 N.E.2d 279 (1977) (respondent testified that his request for 
funds from his incarcerated client for payment to unnamed others in order to obtain shock probation 
was a “ruse, with the hope of obtaining his fee for past services,”  id. at 338, 364 N.E.2d at 280; 
indefinite suspension imposed). 
A more recent case, in many ways similar to the client fraud present in Atkin, is Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Lawson, 130 Ohio St.3d 184, 2011 Ohio 4673, 956 N.E.2d 839. In Lawson, the 
respondent and one of his clients, a doctor, conspired to obtain prescription drugs illegally. During the 
course of the conspiracy, respondent sought to defraud his client/co-conspirator by falsely telling the 
doctor that respondent was about to be indicted, but that if the doctor gave him $50,000, respondent 
could bribe the necessary officials and make the investigation disappear. When the doctor was unable 
to come up with the money, respondent proposed "loaning" the doctor the money to be used for the 
bribe. When the doctor was thereafter unable to repay the "loan," respondent used the supposed 
indebtedness to pressure the doctor into writing illegal prescriptions at no cost to respondent. This 
conduct, violative of DR 7-102(A)(7), together with violations of six other disciplinary rules and a 
prior indefinite suspension, resulted in his disbarment. 
While the cases just discussed involved counseling illegal conduct for the lawyer’s personal gain, 
such a motive is not required.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 79 Ohio St.3d 115, 679 
N.E.2d 1098 (1997) (aiding and abetting filing of client’s false federal corporate tax return; lawyer, 
who did not profit from the illegal conduct but who was convicted on various federal charges, was 
suspended for one year for violation of OH DR 7-102(A)(7), with credit for time served pursuant to 
indefinite suspension imposed after conviction). Compare Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg, 126 
Ohio St.3d 360, 2010 Ohio 3285, 933 N.E.2d 1085 (felony convictions for money laundering and 
conspiracy to obstruct proceedings before federal agencies; although respondent “apparently” did not 
personally benefit for his actions on behalf of corporation for which he was general counsel, “the 
board determined that respondent acted with a dishonest or selfish motive,” id. at para. 15).See also 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Cirincione, 102 Ohio St.3d 117, 2004 Ohio 1810, 807 N.E.2d 320, where 
respondent assisted his client in obtaining lodging in violation of a court order of judicial release by 
misrepresenting the facts to the landlord. 
Former OH DR 7-102(A)(7) violations often transgressed other disciplinary rules as well. An 
attempted bribery by a lawyer of his client’s arresting officers, for example, violated not only 
7-102(A)(7), but also former DR 1-102(A)(3) (“A lawyer shall not: . . . [e]ngage in illegal conduct 
involving moral turpitude”) and 1-102(A)(5) (“A lawyer shall not: . . . [e]ngage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice”).  Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Italiano, 24 Ohio 
St.3d 204, 494 N.E.2d 1113 (1986).  
In addition to disciplinary consequences, counseling illegal conduct obviously may give rise to 
criminal liability as well. For example, a lawyer’s conduct in violation of former OH DR 7-102(A)(7) 
can serve to obstruct justice. See the Atkin case, discussed in the second paragraph of this section. In 
Italiano, respondent’s offer of his client’s money to the arresting officers in return for a reduction of 
the traffic charge against his client violated this provision and resulted in respondent’s conviction on 
two counts of attempted bribery. See State v. Italiano, 18 Ohio St.3d 38, 479 N.E.2d 857 (1985) 
(affirming conviction). 
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And see the discussion of the obligations of a lawyer for a publicly-traded company in preventing 
illegal acts or substantial financial injury to the company or its investors under regulations 
promulgated by the SEC pursuant to section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (15 USC §  7245 (2003)) 
at sections 1.6:350 and 1.13:310. 
 
1.2:620  Assisting Client Fraud 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.51 (1996). 
In addition to fraud on a tribunal (see section 3.3:700), misconduct under Ohio Rule 1.2(d) can 
facilitate a scheme to defraud others. Thus, in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Shaffer, 98 Ohio 
St.3d 342, 2003 Ohio 1008, 785 N.E.2d 429, the lawyer’s conduct -- counseling his client to forge 
the signature of the client’s grandmother on a power of attorney, as part of a scheme to defraud with 
respect to the sale of real estate owned by the incapacitated grandmother -- violated former OH DR 
1-102(A)(4) (“A lawyer shall not: . . . [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation”), as well as 7-102(A)(7). The Shaffer case is further discussed at section 8.4:400. 
Additional instances under former OH DR 7-102(A)(7) include: participation in a scheme to reobtain 
property forfeited by his client because of criminal conviction; at a sheriff’s sale the lawyer signed an 
affidavit falsely stating that he was not bidding on the property for the benefit of his client, Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Camera, 68 Ohio St.3d 478, 628 N.E.2d 1353 (1994) (conduct also 
violated former OH DR 1-102(A)(3)-(5) and 7-102(A)(3), (5)); assisting a client’s attempt to defeat a 
state agency’s valid reimbursement claim for time spent in a state mental institution, Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Hartke, 67 Ohio St.3d 65, 616 N.E.2d 186 (1993) (conduct also violated OH DR 
1-102(A)(4) and 5-104(A)). But cf. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Wallace, 83 Ohio St.3d 496, 700 
N.E.2d 1238 (1998) (since relator did not establish by requisite degree of proof that otherwise lawful 
real estate transfer, in which respondent Wallace admittedly participated, was fraudulent conveyance 
within meaning of ORC 1336.04-.05, conveyance did not form basis for violation of former OH DR 
7-102(A)(7)). 
Special problems arise with respect to client past conduct that has continuing fraudulent or illegal 
consequences. See Rule 1.2 cmt. [10]. Under these circumstances, allowing a client to continue its 
course without rectifying the past act may constitute assisting the client in such improper conduct. For 
example, where a client fraudulently secures from the IRS subchapter S treatment providing 
continuing tax benefits, the lawyer cannot assist in future tax filings based on the subchapter S status, 
even if the lawyer had nothing to do with the original conduct. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 
87-10 (Sept. 17, 1987). 
 
1.2:630  Counseling About Indeterminate or Uncertain Law 
Ohio Rule 1.2(d) authorizes the lawyer to discuss with the client “the legal consequences of any 
proposed course of conduct.” Thus, while assisting client wrongdoing is prohibited, this prohibition 
“does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that 
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appear likely to result from a client’s conduct.” Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [9]. And, of course, those 
consequences are often less than clear. As Hazard and Hodes note: 
Legal consequences and the content of the law itself often are highly 
indeterminate and are subject to manipulation by human actors, 
including the very lawyer who is counseling the client about the law. 
1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  5.14, at 5-47 (3d ed. 
Supp. 2005-2). See also 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  94 cmt. c 
(2000); Stephen Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence 
and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 Yale L.J. 1545 (1995). 
Closely related is the “test case” situation, where the client believes in good faith that the law in 
question is invalid or inapplicable on the facts. Encouraging lawyer participation in such cases 
furthers the development of the law. 
Serious test cases thus also generally result in upholding the law. If the 
client’s position prevails, the law will have been clarified, and will be 
correctly applied in future cases like those presented by the client. If the 
client’s test case fails, not only will the law (as understood before the 
challenge) be applied, but this now reinforced view of law will also 
more clearly be applicable to others in the future. 
1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  5.15, at 5-48 to 5-49 
(3d ed. Supp. 2005-2). The final clause of Ohio Rule 1.2(d) is in accord; it states that the lawyer 
“may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, 
or application of the law.” Comment [12] “recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation 
of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or 
regulation or the interpretation placed on it by governmental authorities.” Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [12]. 
A third category involves the client who knows the conduct is unlawful but wishes to take action as a 
matter of conscience or protest -- “civil disobedience.” While “[c]ivil disobedience occupies an 
honorable place in the history of American political and moral life, . . . [i]n the eyes of the law, civil 
disobedience constitutes law breaking, and lawyers must advise clients accordingly if asked about a 
planned activity in advance.” 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of 
Lawyering §  5.15, at 5-49 (3d ed. Supp. 2003). See Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [12], quoted above. 
The second of these categories -- the test case -- raises an additional issue arising from Ohio’s change 
from the Model Rule prohibition against assisting “criminal” conduct to assisting “illegal” conduct. 
Admittedly, there is a certain tension in MR 1.2(d)’s prohibition against assisting a client’s known 
criminal conduct and the same paragraph’s approval of assisting a client in “making a good faith 
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law,” which may involve 
“disobedience of the statute or regulation or the interpretation placed on it by governmental 
authorities.” MR (and Ohio) Rule 1.2 cmt. [12]. Under the Ohio “illegal”-rather-than-”criminal” 
formulation, however, there is a significantly larger body of law to which this rather delicate 
distinction (between the prohibition against assisting unlawful conduct and the permitted assistance 
in testing and/or disobeying a law) applies. Under the Model Rule language, a lawyer need not think 
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twice about assisting a client’s good faith effort to test the validity or applicability of a noncriminal 
statute or regulation; she must do so under the Ohio Rule. 
 
1.2:700  Warning Client of Limitations on Representation 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [13] 
Ohio Rule 1.4(a)(5) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.2(e) [deleted by 2002 amendments; see discussion below] 
Under the 2002 amendments to the Model Rules, MR 1.2(e) was eliminated and its substance moved 
to MR 1.4(a)(5). These changes are reflected in the new Ohio Rules. See Ohio Rule 1.4(a)(5) and 
Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [13]. See also ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 43, 
62-63 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). 
While limited representation requires that the lawyer consult with the client and obtain her informed 
consent to the limitation, see section 1.2:510, the “warning of limitations” discussed in this section is 
of a different nature: it deals with the lawyer’s obligation when the client seeks assistance that would 
be unlawful or ethically improper for the lawyer to provide. When the circumstances warrant, the 
lawyer must warn the client that he cannot provide the assistance sought. This obligation to “consult” 
is triggered, in the language of the Rules, when 
the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the 
Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
Ohio Rule 1.4(a)(5). 
This consultation duty would include, of course, circumstances in which the prohibition against 
assisting client illegality or fraud comes into play, Ohio Rule 1.2(d) (see sections 1.2:610-:620), but 
would not be so limited. See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 62-63 (6th ed. 
2007) (commentary to MR 1.4(a)(5)); 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & William Hodes, The Law of 
Lawyering §  7.5 (3d ed. Supp. 2003). For example, the warning would also be called for if the client 
wanted the lawyer to do that which the disciplinary rules prohibit him from doing, such as asserting 
frivolous claims. See Ohio Rule 3.1, discussed in section 3.1:200. The full disclosure required before 
a client can give informed consent to a conflict can be viewed as a warning to the client of potential 
limitations on the representation. See Rule 1.7 of the treatise. 
 
1.2:800  Identifying to Whom a Lawyer Owes Duties 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.2 
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Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.2 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:101 
ALI-LGL §§  50-51 
1.2:810  Prospective Clients [see 1.18:200] 
 
1.2:820  Persons Paying for Representation of Another [see 1.7:400] 
 
1.2:830  Representing an Entity [see 1.13:200] 
 
1.2:840  Representing a Fiduciary [see also 1.13:520] 
Ohio Rule 1.2 cmt. [11] states that when representing a fiduciary, “the lawyer may be charged with 
special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary.” 
As noted in section 1.13:520, which deals with organizational clients, the law in Ohio with respect to 
whom a lawyer representing a fiduciary owes duties is problematic at best. The discussion in section 
1.13:520 centers on the limited partnership case of Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 68 Ohio St.3d 453, 
628 N.E.2d 1335 (1994), and its legislative aftermath. Another Ohio Supreme Court case, Elam v. 
Hyatt Legal Servs., 44 Ohio St.3d 175, 541 N.E.2d 616 (1989), involving a nonorganizational 
client with fiduciary duties, is also relevant here. In Elam, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer for 
the executor of an estate could be sued for malpractice by the estate’s vested beneficiaries, to whom 
the executor owed a fiduciary duty. The Ohio General Assembly responded to this decision by 
enacting ORC 1339.18, pursuant to which an attorney for a fiduciary (expressly including an 
executor) owes no duty to those to whom the fiduciary owes fiduciary obligations. Amazingly, the 
legislation has been ignored, and Elam continues to be cited as authority on this point. E.g., 
Brinkman v. Doughty, 140 Ohio App.3d 494, 748 N.E.2d 116 (Clark 2001) (duty of care arising 
out of attorney-client relationship existing between administrator of estate and attorneys for the estate 
extended to beneficiaries for purposes of legal malpractice action brought by beneficiaries). Elam 
(and Arpadi) and the subsequent legislative developments are discussed in detail in section 1.1:410, 
at “Liability to Nonclient Found or Supported Based on Privity”; see also section 1.2:210 supra. 
 
1.2:850  Class Action Clients 
In addition to the named class representative(s), the class action lawyer may have duties to the other 
class members as well. Thus, as noted by the Restatement, confidential communications by class 
members made directly to the lawyer for the class may be privileged. 1 Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers §  14 cmt. f (2000). Since class members may have no practical alternative 
to remaining in the class if they wish to enforce their rights, class-action lawyers “have duties to the 
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class as well as to the class representatives. A class-action lawyer may therefore be privileged or 
obliged to oppose the views of the class representatives after having consulted with them. . . . The 
lawyer should act for the benefit of the class as its members would reasonably define that benefit.” Id. 
at 131-32. See also former OH DR 2-104(A)(5) (a lawyer in a class action may accept, but cannot 
seek, representation of those needed for joinder in the action). This OHCPR provision was not 
carried over into the Ohio Rules. 
 
1.2:900  Threatening Prosecution 
Primary Ohio References 




Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  7.81-7.84 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  71:601 
Wolfram §  13.5.5 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  7.81-7.84 (1996). 
In general: Ohio Rule 1.2(e) precludes a lawyer from presenting, participating in presenting, or 
threatening to present criminal charges or professional misconduct allegations solely for the purpose 
of obtaining an advantage in a civil matter, unless such conduct is “otherwise required by law.” (The 
prohibition in Rule 1.2(e) is carried forward from the Code (OH DR 7-105(A)); there is no paragraph 
(e) in MR 1.2.) This type of conduct is an abuse of the judicial process and lessens public confidence 
in the legal system. See Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 164, 2006 Ohio 550, 
842 N.E.2d 35. 
Basic prohibition: Rule 1.2(e) requires that both an act and a motive be present to subject a lawyer’s 
conduct to sanction under this provision. The act required to trigger sanction is to “present, participate 
in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges or professional misconduct allegations.” To 
violate the Rule, however, the act must also be undertaken “solely to obtain an advantage in a civil 
matter.” Thus, threatening to bring or actually bringing criminal or disciplinary charges against 
another is not improper in itself. The prohibition applies only when this is done “solely to obtain an 
advantage in a civil matter.” A city law director, for example, may simultaneously pursue both a 
criminal action and a civil action against a defendant arising out of the same conduct. Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n Informal Op. 77-5 (Apr. 25, 1977). Only if the threat of criminal prosecution were used solely 
to gain an advantage in the civil action would a violation occur. Id. 
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A classic instance of threatening to present criminal charges is found in Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 164, 
2006 Ohio 550, 842 N.E.2d 35. The respondent represented a mother in a custody dispute. The 
child’s aunt was seeking custody but her complaint was dismissed on procedural grounds. 
Respondent mistakenly thought that this operated immediately to return custody to his client, and he 
so advised the client. (The court had the child placed in protective custody while the issue of the 
child’s welfare, if the child were placed in the custody of her parents, was investigated.) When 
respondent’s client was unable to locate the child at day-care centers, she became distraught and 
brought up pursuing kidnapping charges against the aunt. Respondent called the Cleveland Police 
Department, the aunt’s employer, to see if she was at work. (She was not.) Respondent told the police 
sergeant with whom he talked that if the aunt didn’t turn over the child, “kidnapping charges might be 
filed.” Id. at para. 6. Respondent also dropped the name of the county prosecutor, indicating that he 
“would personally go see him in order to get kidnapping charges filed.” Id. He made similar 
references in conversations with the aunt’s lawyer. 
In the disciplinary proceeding, respondent argued that “he did not threaten criminal charges against 
the aunt to gain an advantage in the custody matter.” Id. at para. 23. Instead, he claimed he was 
trying to “prevent the aunt from being prosecuted for kidnapping.” Respondent’s “explanation” was 
found by the panel, board, and Court to be, not surprisingly, “implausible.” Id. As stated by the 
Supreme Court, 
[W]e agree with the board that respondent’s mentioning that the county 
prosecutor was his friend in connection with threatening to bring 
kidnapping charges was intended to intimidate . . . . We therefore find 
that he violated DR 7-105 . . . . 
Id. at para. 25.  Although the Court does at one point say, in discussing aggravating factors for 
sanctions purposes, that respondent had an “improper motive” for calling the aunt’s employer, id. at 
para. 16, the motive requisite contained in 7-105 (and in Rule 1.2(e)) is not otherwise addressed in 
Wise. (This aspect of the Rule is discussed this section infra.) 
In an OHCPR case more recent than Wise, Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Cunningham, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 188, 2008 Ohio 1979, 887 N.E.2d 343, the Court again looked to the DR 7-105(A) requisites 
and found them present, even though the acts involved seem a bit on the thin side. In Cunningham 
the respondent was representing a client in post-decree domestic relations proceedings. Allegations 
surfaced to the effect that the client’s ex-husband may not have reported assets that should have been 
subject to division as marital property. These amounts included “funds that might have been obtained 
illegally.” Id. at para. 3. 
Respondent cited these allegations in a January 2005 letter to the 
ex-husband, hoping to induce payment of child support, spousal 
support, health insurance, and education expenses on terms favorable 
to his client. 
 The ex-husband submitted a grievance to relator, alleging that 
respondent had attempted to exert improper influence to gain an 
advantage for his client. In reply, respondent denied having explicitly 
or implicitly threatened the ex-husband with criminal prosecution, 
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explaining that he had intended instead to quickly and quietly resolve 
the couple’s financial differences without jeopardizing the 
ex-husband’s employment. The domestic-relations court later granted 
respondent’s motion to vacate his client’s divorce decree, finding that 
the husband had defrauded the court. 
 Respondent’s letter presented a list of demands and promised 
that his client would “forgo further proceedings” if the ex-husband 
agreed to them. The letter also promised that respondent’s client would 
proceed no further with her investigation if the ex-husband took 
“advantage of this offer.” We find that this letter constituted a violation 
of DR 7-105. 
Id. at paras. 3-5. The rather cursory and unenlightening analysis in the last paragraph of the 
quotation may well be explained by the fact that, after denying a 7-105 violation in his reply to the 
grievance, respondent later “concedes without disputing intent that he violated his duty under DR 
7-105.” Id. at para. 7. Still, it would have been helpful if the Court had set forth the January 2005 
letter in full. 
While there is little Ohio case law other than Wise and Cunningham interpreting the act requirement, 
authority from other states suggests that courts do not distinguish between well-founded and 
ill-founded criminal charges, or between serious crimes and minor infractions. Charles W. Wolfram, 
Modern Legal Ethics §  13.5.5 (1986). Pursuant to this approach, any threat of criminal prosecution, 
assuming the lawyer does so “solely” to gain an advantage in a civil matter, violates this provision. As 
the Rule makes clear, the mere threat of criminal prosecution is enough to constitute a violation; 
criminal charges need never be filed. Id. An Ohio Supreme Court case in accord is Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson, 95 Ohio St.3d 364, 2002 Ohio 2222, 768 N.E.2d 617 (threatening 
to file criminal charges if fee not paid violated former OH DR 7-105(A), which, except for lack of 
reference to “professional misconduct allegations” and the absence of the introductory phrase 
“Unless otherwise required by law,” both of which were added by the new Rule, was identical to 
1.2(e)). Some courts have held that even if all the lawyer does is delay a criminal matter in order to 
gain an advantage in a civil suit the provision is violated. Wolfram §  13.5.5. See In re Vasser, 382 
A.2d 1114 (N.J. 1978) (attempt to delay criminal assault prosecution to secure leverage in divorce 
action). Considering that a gratuitous delay in a criminal matter would tend to diminish public 
confidence in our legal system, a fundamental concern underlying Rule 1.2(e), this interpretation 
appears justified. 
The requirement that the act be done “solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter” contains two 
restrictions. The Rule’s concern is limited to situations in which the threat to present criminal or 
disciplinary charges is made “solely” to obtain an advantage in a civil matter. If the lawyer has both a 
permissible and an impermissible motive for the action, Rule 1.2(e) would appear not to apply. 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the courts seldom mention this single-motive limitation 
and reliance on a multiple motive defense is risky at best. See, e.g., People ex rel. Gallagher v. Hertz, 
608 P.2d 335 (Colo. 1979) (implicitly rejecting the multiple motive defense). Second, the threat must 
be directed to gain some advantage in a civil action. Without this motivation, such a threat is 
permissible. 
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Statutory requirements creating a duty for a party in a civil matter to warn another party of possible 
criminal liability illustrate the interplay of the requirements for an act and a motive. At times, the 
legislature enacts a statute providing that before a party can pursue a civil action, the party must send 
to the prospective defendant a notice that includes a statement to the effect that if the matter is 
resolved within a certain time period, the prospective defendant cannot be criminally prosecuted, but 
that if it is not settled, criminal process may be initiated. Compliance with such a statute would not be 
a violation of Ohio Rule 1.2(e), because the motivation for the notice is to comply with the statute 
rather than solely to obtain an advantage in the civil action. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 87-9 
(July 16, 1987) (applying former OH DR 7-105(A) in light of former ORC 2307.61, pertaining to 
civil actions involving willful damage to property or theft). Further, to provide such notice does not 
threaten to prosecute or to institute charges, the act required to find a violation; it simply gives the 
debtor information as to how to avoid criminal prosecution. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 91-5 (Feb. 19, 
1991). Such a scenario would also fall within the “[u]nless otherwise required by law” limitation in 
Rule 1.2(e). 
Under the former OHCPR, the Cleveland Bar Association found that, even without a statutory 
requirement, a lawyer’s inclusion, in a collection letter to a debtor of his clients, of information about 
possible criminal ramifications of failing to pay on a contractual debt did not violate this provision. 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 91 (Aug. 2, 1973). The Ohio Supreme Court, however, took a different 
view in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Cohen, 86 Ohio St.3d 100, 712 N.E.2d 118 (1999). In Cohen, the 
lawyer sent letters threatening criminal prosecution to a former client in an effort to obtain payment of 
his own unpaid legal fees incurred in representation of the client in a civil action. In adopting the 
findings, conclusion, and recommendation (public reprimand) of the Board, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that “[b]ecause respondent’s letters to his client state that the threat of criminal charges 
would be withdrawn if his fees were paid, we find, as did the board, that those threats were solely for 
the purpose of obtaining an advantage in a civil action and so violated the Disciplinary Rule [OH DR 
7-105].”  Id. at 101, 712 N.E.2d at 119. 
Must there be a “civil action” in existence at the time of the threat? The case law indicates not, and 
that makes sense from a public policy standpoint: the threat and resultant damage are in no way 
dependent on there being a pending civil action. In Watson, respondent filed a civil action for his 
unpaid fees but did so after, not before, the threat of criminal action was made. In Cohen, there is no 
indication that respondent filed a civil action to recover his fees, either before or after the threat. And, 
in the most recent of this type of case (and the first decided under Rule 1.2(e)) there was no civil case 
for fees before or after the threat of criminal action to induce payment of legal fees. Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Hartke, 132 Ohio St.3d 116, 2012 Ohio 2443, 969 N.E.2d 1189. (While there were 
apparently “civil actions” underlying the fee disputes (representation to reopen divorce decree for 
client in Watson; representation in unidentified civil action in Cohen; representation in divorce 
proceeding in Hartke) – this is not the 1.2(e) “civil matter” in which the lawyer is seeking “to obtain 
an advantage” by means of the threat.) 
Common misconduct: Ohio Rule 1.2(e) would clearly be violated if a lawyer openly threatened 
criminal or disciplinary consequences for the sole purpose of forcing the opposition to comply with a 
request in a civil action. Under the language of former OH DR 7-105(A), for example, a lawyer, who 
wrote opposing counsel that unless the opposing party dropped all claims in a property dispute and 
either paid rent that the lawyer claimed was due or vacated the property in question the lawyer would 
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“‘bring to the attention of the Prosecutors’ Office the enclosed documents for the purpose of seeing 
[sic] criminal prosecution,’” was disciplined for violating 7-105(A).  Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. King, 67 Ohio St.3d 236, 237, 617 N.E.2d 676, 677 (1993). 
Under prior law (and presumably under Rule 1.2(e) as well), the threat need not have been tied 
directly to a specific advantage sought in the civil action for a violation to be found. A city law 
director, who also had a private practice, was sanctioned for violating OH DR 7-105(A) when he 
threatened a deponent in a civil action by stating: “Don’t get smart with me or you won’t get out of 
this town,” and then initiated a criminal proceeding against the deponent that clearly was not 
supported by probable cause (thereby also violating OH DR 7-103(A)).  Stark County Bar Ass’n v. 
Russell, 25 Ohio St.3d 124, 125, 495 N.E.2d 430, 431 (1986). 
Release of civil liability: Special problems may arise in this area when parties attempt to secure a 
release from civil liability in exchange for an agreement not to pursue criminal charges. Such a 
promise could occur either between private parties or between a private party and the government. 
The analysis varies somewhat depending on the context. 
In the situation involving private parties, the Ohio Supreme Court under the former OHCPR focused 
more on whether such an agreement was enforceable rather than whether participating in the making 
of such an agreement was unethical. For example, in Brown v. Best Products Co., 18 Ohio St.3d 32, 
479 N.E.2d 852 (1985), the Court ruled that any release executed by private parties whereby one 
party agreed to release another party from civil liability in exchange for a promise by the other not to 
pursue a criminal action was void as against public policy. The Court explained that any such 
agreement is, by its very nature, the product of duress. Further, it is void for lack of consideration, 
because the public prosecutor, not the private party, makes the ultimate determination as to whether a 
criminal action will be prosecuted. 
In the government setting, a somewhat different set of factors comes into play. The BCGD addressed 
one aspect of this problem in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 94-10, 1994 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (Aug. 12, 1994). The Board advised that when a prosecutor determines that 
a properly instituted criminal action lacks merit, it violated former OH DR 7-105(A) (and 
1-102(A)(5)) for the prosecutor to offer to dismiss the criminal charge in exchange for the defendant’s 
promise to sign a release of all civil claims against the city and police officers involved. When a 
prosecutor determines that a case lacks merit, the prosecutor has an independent ethical duty to 
dismiss the action, which duty should not be conditioned on the defendant’s agreement to relinquish 
his civil and constitutional rights. Such a misuse of the criminal process constituted a threat to 
continue a criminal action for the purpose of securing an advantage in a civil matter, a violation of 
OH DR 7-105(A), and would likewise violate Ohio Rule 1.2(e). If the criminal charge to be dropped 
has merit, the permissibility of a release-dismissal agreement is unclear. From a Rule 1.2(e) 
perspective, it would seem that the issue should turn on whether the threat to continue criminal 
prosecution in the absence of a release of civil liability is motivated “solely to obtain an advantage in 
a civil matter.”  
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1.3:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.3 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 6.16-6.17, 7.36-7.37 
 
1.3:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.3 is identical to the Model Rule. 
 
1.3:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Task Force 
cross-reference table as related to Ohio Rule 1.3: DR 6-101(A)(3), DR 7-101(A)(1). 
 
1.3:200  Diligence 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.3 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 6.13, 7.29-7.34 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 31:901 
ALI-LGL § 16 
Wolfram § 10.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 6.13, 7.29-7.34 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.3 is short and to the point: in representing a client, a lawyer “shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness.” The diligence aspect of the obligation will be addressed in this section; 
promptness is covered in section 1.3:300. 
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The language in the Ohio comments (which, it should be noted, vary significantly from the comments 
to MR 1.3) pertinent to the duty of diligence includes the following: 
 A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of client despite 
opposition, obstruction, or personal inconvenience to the lawyer. A 
lawyer also must act with commitment and dedication to the interests 
of the client. 
Ohio Rule 1.3 cmt. [1] (but not with “zeal”; Ohio Comment 1 deletes the reference in MR cmt. 1 to 
acting “‘with zeal in advocacy’ . . . because ‘zeal’ is often invoked as an excuse for unprofessional 
behavior.” Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.3. But old habits die hard. See Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 49, 2009 Ohio 5960, 918 N.E.2d 992, where the opinion, authored by 
Chief Justice Moyer, referred “to an attorney, responsible for zealously representing his clients’ 
interests,” id. at para. 17, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Rohrer, 124 Ohio St.3d 65, 2009 Ohio 5930, 
919 N.E.2d 191, where the per curiam Court found that respondent’s misconduct was “not justified 
by an otherwise commendable desire to protect a client and engage in zealous advocacy.” Id. at para. 
26.) See also Disciplinary Counsel v. Stafford, 128 Ohio St.3d 446, 2011 Ohio 1484, 946 N.E.2d 
193 (“We emphasize that respondent is not subjected to sanction here because he is a zealous 
advocate. . . .”, id. at para. 83). 
Moreover, 
 [a] lawyer must control the lawyer’s work load so that each 
matter can be handled competently. 
Rule 1.3 cmt. [2]. (Authority under the former OHCPR likewise indicated that an excessive caseload 
was no excuse for neglect. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Rieser, 72 Ohio St.3d 130, 
647 N.E.2d 1366 (1995).) 
[N]eglect [is] inconsistent with a lawyer’s duty of diligence, 
undermine[s] public confidence, and may prejudice a client’s cause. 
Reasonable diligence . . . [is] expected of a lawyer in handling all client 
matters and will be evaluated in light of all relevant circumstances. The 
lawyer disciplinary process is particularly concerned with lawyers who 
consistently fail to carry out obligations to clients or consciously 
disregard a duty owed to a client. 
Rule 1.3 cmt. [3]. 
 A lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters 
undertaken for a client, unless the client-lawyer relationship is 
terminated as provided in Rule 1.16. 
Rule 1.3 cmt. [4]. This continues the obligation to carry out the contract of employment, subject to 
the right to withdraw, contained in former OH DR 7-101(A)(2). See treatise at Rule 1.16 and sections 
1.7:300 and 3.7:200. 
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Comment [5] cautions that the duty of diligence “may require” a sole practitioner, in order to prevent 
neglect of client matters in the event of death or disability, to prepare a plan that designates another 
lawyer to review client files, notify clients of the death or disability, and determine whether 
immediate protective action is needed. Ohio Rule 1.3 cmt. [5]. 
It seems reasonable to expect that the case law under former OH DR 6-101(A)(3) (and to a lesser 
extent, perhaps, 7-101(A)(1)-(3)), will be regarded as pertinent to the interpretation of Ohio Rule 1.3, 
inasmuch as the former states the negative (“shall not neglect”) and the new Rule states the 
affirmative (“shall be reasonably diligent”) of the same basic ethics proposition. The pre-Rule cases 
are therefore set forth in some detail below. Before doing so, however, note should be made that the 
first invocation of Rule 1.3 in a disciplinary case occurred in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lawson, 119 
Ohio St.3d 58, 2008 Ohio 3340, 891 N.E.2d 749, where respondent violated the rule “because he did 
little for his client for nearly six months,” in which time he “did nothing . . . except to file an 
appearance, move for continuances, and meet twice with a prosecutor.” Id. at paras. 55, 54. Lawson 
also violated Rule 1.3 (and 1.1) in another count by failing to obtain service over a four-month period 
and failing to account for and refund unearned fees. See id. at para. 48 (query why, as to the latter 
misconduct, Rule 1.15(d) was not invoked). Another neglect case decided under Rule 1.3 is Lake 
County Bar Ass’n v. Rozanc, 123 Ohio St.3d 78, 2009 Ohio 4207, 914 N.E.2d 192, where the 
respondent failed to file papers signed by the client seeking to release the estate from probate 
administration and “admitted to having done nothing else for his client,” who was serving as executor 
of his mother’s estate. Id. at para. 4. In imposing an indefinite suspension for violation of 1.3 and 
numerous other rules, the Court in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Grote, 127 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010 Ohio 
4833, 935 N.E.2d 832, invoked the “tantamount to theft” language often used in neglect cases under 
the Code of Professional Responsibility:  “an attorney’s failure to render legal services that he or she 
has been paid to complete is ‘tantamount to theft,’” id. at para. 19, quoting from the Sigall case, cited 
in the next paragraph of the treatise. 
Former OH DR 6-101(A)(3) 
Neglect - Typical violations: Neglect was, and is, a very serious offense, which the Ohio Supreme 
Court has characterized as “‘tantamount to theft of [the] fee from the client.’” Warren County Bar 
Ass’n v. Lieser, 79 Ohio St.3d 488, 490, 683 N.E.2d 1148, 1149 (1997) (quoting Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Sigall, 14 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, 470 N.E.2d 886, 888 (1984)). (One other 
“serious matter” quote is worth noting: the Iowa Supreme Court in Comm. on Prof’l Ethics v. Freed, 
341 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Iowa 1983), equated respondent’s neglect with “the conduct of a surgeon who, 
without transferring responsibility, drops his scalpel and abandons his patient in the course of an 
operation.”) Such conduct reflects adversely, not only on the lawyer involved, but on the entire legal 
profession as well. Sigall supra at 18, 470 N.E.2d at 888. 
Many cases can be cited for the proposition that accepting a retainer but failing to do any work on the 
matter for which the lawyer was retained constitutes sanctionable neglect.  See, e.g., Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Brown, 121 Ohio St.3d 445, 2009 Ohio 1249, 905 N.E.2d 184 (failure to open and 
administer estates as engaged to do); Akron Bar Ass’n v. Markovich, 117 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008 
Ohio 862, 883 N.E.2d 1046 (“abandoned” client’s case after accepting retainer); Cuyahoga Bar 
Ass’n v. Scott-Chestang, 109 Ohio St.3d 405, 2005 Ohio 2711, 848 N.E.2d 507 (multiple instances 
of accepting retainer but failing to file bankruptcy petition as promised) (a further instance of neglect 
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by the respondent resulted in a second indefinite suspension, to be served concurrently with that 
imposed in 109 Ohio St.3d 405, see Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Scott-Chestang, 113 Ohio 
St.3d 310, 2007 Ohio 1956, 865 N.E.2d 48)); Greene County Bar Ass’n v. Fodal, 100 Ohio St.3d 
310, 2003 Ohio 5852, 798 N.E.2d 1082 (numerous retainers of respondent by clients to handle 
variety of civil, estate, divorce, and bankruptcy matters; actions never filed; disbarment ordered for 
these and other violations of OH DR 6-103(A)(3), among other provisions); Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Dahling, 90 Ohio St.3d 246, 737 N.E.2d 25 (2000) (over two-year period respondent 
was given retainers to file over 30 bankruptcy cases but did not do so; despite this failure, he did not 
return either fees or client’s files; respondent was disbarred for violation of OH DR 6-101(A)(3) and 
a host of other disciplinary rules); Lorain County Bar Ass’n v. Fernandez, 89 Ohio St.3d 82, 728 
N.E.2d 1056 (2000) (failing to file divorce action on behalf of client wife, with result that husband 
obtained divorce in Texas in action in which respondent failed to answer on behalf of wife); 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Harvey, 79 Ohio St.3d 389, 683 N.E.2d 1070 (1997) (respondent, hired to 
represent client in age-discrimination case, failed to file action, told client action filed, and even had 
client show up for nonexistent depositions, which respondent told client had been cancelled at last 
minute by other side. Indefinite suspension imposed for violation of former OH DR 6-101(A)(3) and 
numerous other rules).  Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Nardi, 61 Ohio St.3d 538, 541, 575 N.E.2d 793, 
795 (1991) (Board of Commissioners described as “outrageous” lawyer’s “pattern of taking large 
sums of money from vulnerable clients and families in immigration and postconviction cases and 
doing little or nothing on their behalf”; Supreme Court adopted Board’s recommendation of 
indefinite suspension). 
A poster case for total neglect of a client (as well as numerous other ethical violations) under the 
former OHCPR is Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Clifton, 79 Ohio St.3d 496, 684 N.E.2d 33 
(1997). Clifton was both the guardian and the attorney for the guardianship of the person and estate of 
an incompetent, who, at the time of respondent’s appointment in 1984 had assets in excess of a 
half-million dollars. By the time respondent resigned eight years later, in 1992, he had, among other 
misdeeds, managed to misappropriate almost $300,000 from the estate for use in his business and for 
personal expenses. Some of his transgressions are set forth here in detail: 
 Between April 1986 and September 1990, respondent not only 
retained for his own use dividends and interest belonging to the estate, 
but also borrowed $172,407 from Cawein’s estate without authority. 
He retained proceeds of sales of the estate’s stocks, proceeds from the 
sales of stock received in stock splits, and proceeds from distributions 
of the estates of Cawein’s relatives and executed six personal five-year 
promissory notes for the borrowed amounts. He did not timely pay 
these notes because he determined at the time the notes were due that 
Cawein’s estate did not need the money and that it was not convenient 
for him to make the payments. Respondent transferred the funds 
represented by the notes to Jamaica Trading Shares, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation that he formed and owned. The funds in Jamaica Trading 
were used to meet respondent’s professional and personal obligations, 
such as the purchase of an automobile for himself. . . . 
* * * * 
223
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.3 
  
 The panel also found that during his guardianship respondent 
visited Cawein infrequently. His testimony indicated that during the six 
[sic, eight] years of his guardianship, he purchased only $800-$1,200 in 
clothes for her, and the employees of the nursing home testified that 
Cawein was dressed with clothes left at the nursing home when other 
occupants departed or died. . . . Respondent would not authorize speech 
therapy for Cawein, nor would he authorize the purchase for Cawein of 
a recommended “lap board” and a “communications board” (an item 
with icons to which she could point to indicate her needs.) The estate, 
however, maintained a subscription to The Wall Street Journal. 
Id. at 496-97, 497-98, 684 N.E.2d at 33, 34. 
In response to this litany of horrors, the Supreme Court reacted in part as follows: 
 The respondent undertook the dual roles of guardian and 
attorney for the guardianship of both the person and the estate of an 
incompetent woman who it appears had no close relatives. As the 
record indicates, respondent failed miserably in the performance of his 
duties in both roles. Over a six-year period respondent wasted his 
ward’s considerable estate through negligence and design. Just as 
important, over those same six years, respondent failed to provide 
adequately for the care and comfort of his ward. 
* * * * 
 . . . [T]he guardian of an elderly woman has a duty to provide 
care and maintenance according to her means and position in life. The 
successor guardian found Cawein poorly dressed in a crowded, shabby 
room with no curtains, a broken television, and an inadequate 
wheelchair. Under those circumstances, respondent failed to maintain 
Cawein according to the means of a woman with an estate initially 
valued at over $500,000. The successor trustee in this case took the 
kind of responsible action that should have been taken by respondent. 
 . . . Frankly, we find respondent’s action as the guardian of the 
person and estate of Cawein to be despicable and contemptuous. 
Id. at 499-500, 684 N.E.2d at 35-36 (citation omitted). His performance as attorney for the 
guardianship -- commingling, misusing, and dissipating the estate -- was no better. Not surprisingly, 
Clifton was disbarred. 
In addition to the wholesale abdication of duty, a la Clifton, lawyers were found under the former 
OHCPR to have committed neglect by such acts as: 
 failing to file required pleadings or other papers, see, e.g., Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. 
Johnson, 123 Ohio St.3d 65, 2009 Ohio 4178, 914 N.E.2d 180 (failure to respond to motion 
for summary judgment, resulting in monetary judgment against client); Disciplinary Counsel 
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v. Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008 Ohio 3194, 891 N.E.2d 324 (failing to file  with probate 
court required estate accounts when representing two estates); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Schwieterman, 115 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007 Ohio 4266, 873 N.E.2d 810 (failure to answer 
complaint, resulting in default judgment); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Travis, 101 
Ohio St.3d 322, 2004 Ohio 785, 804 N.E.2d 969 (failing to file briefs or trial record in 28 
criminal appeals, resulting in dismissal of 26 appeals and appointment of new counsel in the 
two other cases; Court noted that “neglect of even one client’s affairs is untenable, and 
respondent abandoned matters entrusted by 28 clients.” Id. at para. 11); Richland County 
Bar Ass’n v. Brickley, 97 Ohio St.3d 285, 2002 Ohio 6416, 779 N.E.2d 750 (failure to 
answer complaint, resulting in default judgment; in another case for same client respondent 
failed to respond to summary-judgment motion and then failed to move for relief from the 
resulting adverse judgment); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Pommeranz, 93 Ohio St.3d 139, 753 
N.E.2d 175 (2001) (failure to file entry journalizing consent agreement, resulting in dismissal 
of client’s action to recoup past-due child support). 
 failure to appear at scheduled court proceedings, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Horan, 123 
Ohio St.3d 60, 2009 Ohio 4177, 914 N.E.2d 175 (pattern of failure to appear at scheduling 
conference, preliminary hearing, custody hearing, traffic-matter hearing); Columbus Bar 
Ass’n v. Hayes, 118 Ohio St.3d 336, 2008 Ohio 2466, 889 N.E.2d 109 (failure to appear at 
oral argument in client’s criminal appeal; failure to appear at client’s arraignment; arriving 
late for client’s felony trial); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Kraus, 116 Ohio St.3d 302, 2007 Ohio 
6458, 878 N.E.2d 1028 (numerous instances of missing appearances on behalf of clients at 
arraignments, pretrials, and sentencing proceedings; “respondent unconscionably abandoned 
clients at a most dangerous time – during criminal prosecutions,” id. at para. 24). 
 failing to prosecute a matter diligently, e.g., Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Randall, 118 Ohio St.3d 
408, 2008 Ohio 2709, 889 N.E.2d 535 (failure to prosecute numerous social security appeals 
in U.S. district court resulting in dismissal of the cases for want of prosecution); Cuyahoga 
Bar Ass’n v. Jurczenko, 114 Ohio St.3d 229, 2007 Ohio 3675, 871 N.E.2d 564 (dismissal 
of client’s bankruptcy case for want of prosecution). 
 filing case in wrong court, Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Winkfield, 107 Ohio St.3d 360, 2006 
Ohio 6, 839 N.E.2d 924 (monetary claim filed on behalf of client exceeded court’s 
jurisdiction; despite this and numerous other violations, coupled with prior disciplinary record, 
Court imposed indefinite suspension rather than disbarment, given significant mitigating 
factors of mental illness and traumatic childhood). 
 failing to respond to discovery requests, e.g., Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Johnson, 123 
Ohio St.3d 65, 2009 Ohio 4178, 914 N.E.2d 180 (failure to respond to interrogatories, 
requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents). 
 failing to make a proper accounting or to pay out funds in a timely fashion as the client directs 
(see section 1.15:220), e.g., Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Peters, 87 Ohio St.3d 348, 721 N.E.2d 26 
(1999) (delay of nearly one year in paying client’s medical bills from settlement funds 
violated former OH DR 6-101(A)(3)). 
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 failing to protect client interests, e.g., Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Ellison, 118 Ohio St.3d 128, 
2008 Ohio 1808, 886 N.E.2d 836 (giving up on obtaining Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order for client); Disciplinary Counsel v. Simonelli, 113 Ohio St.3d 215, 2007 Ohio 1535, 
863 N.E.2d 1039 (in failing to meet with client, failing to explain bankruptcy documents to 
client before she signed them, and sending unprepared attorney to bankruptcy court, 
“respondent failed to show proper care for his client’s legal needs,” id. at para. 23); Dayton 
Bar Ass’n v. Gerren, 110 Ohio St.3d 297, 2006 Ohio 4482, 853 N.E.2d 302 (respondent, 
retained to pursue wrongful-termination claim, concluded it had no merit but failed to so 
advise client; as a result, “the client had no opportunity to consult other counsel before the 
statute-of-limitations period elapsed.”  Id. at para. 8.); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. 
Kelley, 105 Ohio St.3d 55, 2004 Ohio 7009, 822 N.E.2d 351 (mishandling clients’ 
bankruptcy schedules to their detriment; Court quotes panel’s conclusion that “Respondent’s 
clients would have been better served by other counsel, or even no counsel, than by the 
services rendered by Respondent.” Id. at para. 18.); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Young, 92 
Ohio St.3d 417, 750 N.E.2d 1117 (2001) (respondent’s “continued and pervasive neglect of 
his clients’ interests,” by accepting retainers and then doing nothing for his clients, among 
other violations, revealed his “callous indifference to his clients’ interests and to the standards 
of professional ethics required of a member by the bar,”  id. at 417, 418, 750 N.E.2d at 1117, 
1118, and justified permanent disbarment); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Paplardo, 71 
Ohio St.3d 377, 643 N.E.2d 1134 (1994) (lawyer’s misconduct in handling guardianship 
included failure to file inventory in probate court for ward, failure to pay ward’s nursing home 
bills, and failure to apply for Medicaid benefits for ward). 
Three DR 6-101(A)(3) cases in which a respondent’s conduct could fairly be characterized as 
failure to protect his client’s interests arguably raised competence or lack of preparation 
concerns, rather than (or in addition to) neglect. The conduct of respondent in Cleveland 
Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Kealy, 125 Ohio St.3d 238, 2010 Ohio 1554, 927 N.E.2d 591, ended 
up costing the client a default judgment; in addition to failures to respond to discovery and to 
attend hearings, including the trial, Kealy also filed, in a vehicular personal injury action 
brought by the other driver’s insurance company against his client, a counterclaim alleging 
that his client suffered injuries caused by the other driver. Unfortunately, he did not join the 
other driver as a party to the litigation. This would seem to raise competence issues, as 
opposed to the neglect exhibited by his discovery and hearing-date failures. In Toledo Bar 
Ass’n v. Hickman, 113 Ohio St.3d 164, 2007 Ohio 1256, 863 N.E.2d 169, respondent 
undertook to represent a client who sought to reopen his divorce case, which had terminated 
fifteen years earlier.  The client wanted to show by genetic testing that, contrary to the finding 
in the divorce proceedings, he was not the father of a son born during the marriage, in the hope 
of preventing the Social Security Administration from garnishing his wages to collect 
arrearages for child support.  “Respondent accepted these payments, agreeing to pursue the 
termination of [the client’s] parentage status even though the claim was not legally viable at 
the time.  Respondent admitted that he should have realized this and told his client.”  Id. at 
para. 6.  Respondent also represented a Mexican maid who spoke little English in a 
criminal-theft matter.  He had a friend of the client act as an interpreter to prepare for trial.  
Despite a court-ordered separation of witnesses, respondent listed the interpreter as a witness; 
as a result, respondent had to try the case without an interpreter and his client was found guilty 
on felony charges.  (New counsel had the verdict set aside on ineffective-assistance-of- 
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counsel grounds and the client ultimately pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor charge.)  
Similarly, in Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. DiMartino, 114 Ohio St.3d 174, 2007 Ohio 
3605, 870 N.E.2d 1166, respondent was found to have violated DR 6-101(A)(3) even though 
the relief sought by his client was impossible under the terms of the client’s plea agreements, 
which were entered into prior to respondent’s representation.  In the words of the Court, “[a]t 
some point, respondent realized that he could neither successfully appeal nor obtain judicial 
release for [his client] because of the terms of his plea agreements.”  Id. at para. 8.  It would 
seem that that belated realization ought to have occurred much earlier if respondent had 
adequately prepared in undertaking the representation or, alternatively, had the necessary 
competence to do so. 
 ignoring clients’ efforts to communicate about their pending bankruptcy cases, Cleveland 
Bar Ass’n v. Kodish, 110 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006 Ohio 4090, 852 N.E.2d 160. 
 abandoning representation without advising affected clients, Erie-Huron Counties Bar 
Ass’n v. Evans, 123 Ohio St.3d 103, 2009 Ohio 4146, 914 N.E.2d 381 (multiple instances of 
filing initial pleading and then taking “no further action in the case”); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Jimerson, 113 Ohio St.3d 452, 2007 Ohio 2339, 866 N.E.2d 495 (abandonment of client’s 
personal-injury case, thereby “precluding her from ever recovering for her injuries,” id. at 
para. 16); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Smith, 67 Ohio St.3d 71, 616 N.E.2d 190 (1993) 
(lawyer, representing prisoners in concert with organization called National Legal 
Professional Associates (“NLPA”), became concerned that relationship might constitute 
aiding unauthorized practice of law and ceased working on cases in which NLPA was 
involved. By doing so, without contacting affected clients and refunding any unearned fees, 
lawyer was found to have committed neglect.). For an interesting discussion of the lawyer’s 
continuing duty to the client when the client can no longer be located, see Cincinnati Ethics 
Op. 96-97-02 (Oct. 21, 1997). Ohio Rule 1.3 cmt. [4] affirmatively states that a lawyer 
should carry the representation through to conclusion, unless the relationship is terminated 
pursuant to Ohio Rule 1.16. 
 failing to obtain approval before settling or dismissing case (see sections 1.2:320, :340), e.g., 
Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. Meros, 89 Ohio St.3d 304, 731 N.E.2d 629 (2000) (dismissing two 
of client’s cases without her knowledge or consent). 
While failure to communicate important information to the client was policed under the Code 
primarily by DR 6-101(A)(3), this duty is now expressly stated in Ohio Rule 1.4(a)(3); the former 
Code cases are treated in section 1.4:200.  Rule 1.4(a)(4) also obligates the lawyer to comply with 
reasonable requests for information; this aspect of what was formerly treated as neglect is likewise 
treated in section 1.4:200. 
A particularly egregious violation of the obligations of diligence and promptness was presented in 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Komarek, 84 Ohio St.3d 90, 702 N.E.2d 62 (1998). The respondent in 
Komarek had filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case on behalf of his client, Hill. The case was dismissed 
because respondent failed to file a timely reorganization plan. This dismissal vacated the bankruptcy 
stay provisions and 
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permitted Hill’s home mortgage lender to recommence a foreclosure 
action on Hill’s house. Respondent’s July 1994 motion for 
reconsideration of the Chapter 13 dismissal was opposed by the home 
mortgage lender on the ground that Hill had filed a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy in 1988 and was therefore precluded from filing another 
bankruptcy petition. Without consulting Hill, who would have 
informed respondent that he was not the “Melvin Hill” who had 
previously filed bankruptcy, respondent filed a reply memorandum 
conceding Hill’s previous Chapter 7 filing. The motion for 
reconsideration was denied, the mortgagee completed its foreclosure, 
and Hill was evicted from his home. 
Id. at 92-93, 702 N.E.2d at 64-65. For this and many other OHCPR violations, respondent was 
indefinitely suspended instead of disbarred, based on mitigating factors relating to his mental 
condition. 
Neglect - Harm to client not required: While neglect often results in substantial harm to the client, see, 
e.g., Komarek, above, violation of former OH DR 6-101(A)(3) was found even where the client 
suffered no prejudice. E.g., Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Bernard, 98 Ohio St.3d 414, 2003 
Ohio 1483, 786 N.E.2d 450 (public reprimand where “misconduct did not harm the client other than 
causing her considerable delay in pursuing her personal injury case, id. at para. 17); Lorain County 
Bar Ass’n v. Haynes, 88 Ohio St.3d 164, 724 N.E.2d 410 (2000) (public reprimand where violation 
was solitary incident and there was lack of financial harm to client); Stark County Bar Ass’n v. 
Tscholl, 57 Ohio St.3d 211, 567 N.E.2d 265 (1991) (public reprimand is proper sanction for attorney 
whose failure to file timely judgment entry resulted in dismissal of divorce settlement, but who, on 
learning of situation, rectified it by filing successful motion to vacate dismissal and by reimbursing 
client for additional legal fees incurred). Compare Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Shay, 105 Ohio St.3d 
437, 2005 Ohio 2590, 828 N.E.2d 105, where a public reprimand, pursuant to a consent-to-discipline 
agreement, was imposed even though respondent’s neglect harmed his clients and violated DR 
7-101(A)(3) as well as 6-101(A)(3). Chief Justice Moyer, dissenting as to the sanction and writing on 
behalf of two other justices, would have imposed a six-month suspension. 
That harm is likewise not a requisite under new Rule 1.3 is implicit in the language of Comment [3], 
which notes that sanctionable “neglect . . . may prejudice a client’s cause.” Ohio Rule 1.3 cmt. [3] 
(emphasis added). 
Neglect - Single versus multiple acts of neglect: It is unclear whether the pre-Rule precedent on single 
as opposed to multiple acts of neglect remains intact. There can be little doubt, however, that the focus 
under Ohio Rule 1.3 will be “particularly concerned with lawyers who consistently fail to carry out 
obligations to clients . . . .” Ohio Rule 1.3 cmt. [3] (emphasis added). In this respect, the Rule 
confirms pre-Rule authority that neglect “‘usually requires a pattern of disregarding obligations or 
repeated omissions by an attorney.’” Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Dzienny, 72 Ohio St.3d 173, 176, 648 
N.E.2d 499, 502 (1995) (quoting Jack A. Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of 
Professional Responsibility in Ohio 201 (1992)). But there were also cases under the former 
OHCPR where a single instance of neglect -- even if not coupled with other misconduct and even if 
causing no harm to the client -- was sanctioned.  Lorain County Bar Ass’n v. Haynes, 88 Ohio 
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St.3d 164, 166, 724 N.E.2d 410, 411 (2000) (respondent publicly reprimanded for “solitary act of 
neglect in an otherwise unblemished legal career”).  Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. Lazzarro, 98 Ohio 
St.3d 509, 2003 Ohio 2150, 787 N.E.2d 1182, is another example of violation based on a single act 
of neglect, but the single act was a biggie. In the Court’s words, 
respondent accepted cocaine as a legal fee from a client, used the drug, 
and ended up missing the next day in court representing another client 
during the second day of trial. 
Id. at para. 2 (one-year suspension, stayed on conditions). It seems safe to predict that any instance 
of neglect will continue to run the risk of sanction under Rule 1.3, with the potential range of 
punishment dependent upon the variables of the particular case. 
The respondent in Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Berk, 132 Ohio St.3d 82, 2012 Ohio 2167, 969 
N.E.2d 256, seized on the “consistently” language from Rule 1.3 cmt. [3] quoted above, in arguing 
that “his lack of diligence is nothing more than simple negligence” and not a violation of the Rule. Id. 
at para. 11. In response, the Court noted that while “neglect usually involves a pattern of omissions 
or ignored obligations,” id. at para. 12 (emphasis by the Court), respondent’s argument was 
unavailing in any event, inasmuch as Berk’s conduct, missing two appearances in each of two cases, 
was sufficient to constitute a pattern. 
Neglect - Sanctions: It must be remembered that the adoption of the Ohio Rules of Professional 
Conduct does not change the sanctions apparatus. The Rules for the Government of the Bar still 
provide the sanctions available (Gov Bar R V 6(B)), as well as the guidelines for imposition, 
including aggravating and mitigating factors. Gov Bar R, App. II (BCGD Proc Reg § 10(B)). See 
section 0.2:240 at “Hearing - Board determination and recommendation” and “Supreme Court order - 
Sanctions for misconduct.” 
As stated in BCGD Proc Reg § 10(A), “[e]ach disciplinary case involves unique facts and 
circumstances.” As a result, and because so many variables can come into play (e.g., other violations, 
presence of mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances), it is difficult to state general rules with 
respect to sanctions for lack of reasonable diligence and/or promptness. An indication of the sanctions 
often imposed in the various categories follows: 
 Isolated instances of neglect typically have drawn a public reprimand, if no other violations 
are involved and there are no significant aggravating factors. E.g., Cuyahoga County Bar 
Ass’n v. Leneghan, 117 Ohio St.3d 103, 2008 Ohio 506, 881 N.E.2d 1241. When the single 
act is combined with failure to cooperate in the investigation or with other violations or 
aggravating factors, it is likely that a more substantial sanction will be imposed, but there can 
be exceptions. Compare Disciplinary Counsel v. Dundon, 129 Ohio St.3d 571, 2011 Ohio 
4199, 954 N.E.2d 1186 (public reprimand, despite other violations (DR 9-102(B)(4) and 
Rule 1.4(a)(2), (3) and (4)) arising out of actions described as an "aberration"; no aggravating 
factors and numerous (5) mitigating factors, including cooperation during disciplinary 
process), with Disciplinary Counsel v. Lape, 130 Ohio St.3d 273, 2011 Ohio 5757, 957 
N.E.2d 772 (neglect with respect to one matter, failure to cooperate; other violations 
stemming from incident; one aggravating factor; six-month stayed suspension imposed); 
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Glaeser, 120 Ohio St.3d 350, 2008 Ohio 6199, 899 N.E.2d 
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140 (failure to pursue client’s case, misleading client that he had, failure to return client’s 
property; two-year suspension with one year stayed on conditions); Lorain County Bar 
Ass’n v. Lang, 109 Ohio St.3d 48, 2006 Ohio 1830, 845 N.E.2d 513 (single act of neglect 
plus failure to cooperate; one-year suspension with six months stayed on condition); Dayton 
Bar Ass’n v. Andrews, 105 Ohio St.3d 453, 2005 Ohio 2696, 828 N.E.2d 360 (one instance 
of professional neglect; prior disciplinary record; overwhelming mitigating factors; court 
imposed six-month stayed suspension, instead of public reprimand agreed to by respondent 
and relator and recommended by panel and Board); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Lehotsky, 105 
Ohio St.3d 226, 2004 Ohio 1204, 824 N.E.2d 534 (single act of neglect; failure to cooperate; 
one-year suspension imposed); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Forg, 97 Ohio St.3d 495, 2002 
Ohio 6727, 780 N.E.2d 582 (multiple rule violations arising out of “single incident”; 
one-year suspension with six months stayed); and Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Korda, 94 Ohio 
St.3d 133, 760 N.E.2d 824 (2002) (“one isolated incident” while in “alcoholic crises,” 
retainer fully restored to clients but not timely so, resulting in former 9-102(B)(4) violation, 
cooperation in investigation; Board recommended indefinite suspension, which Court 
reduced to two years with one year stayed). 
 A pattern of neglect, particularly if accompanied by failure to cooperate, has typically resulted 
in an indefinite suspension. E.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Emerson, 122 Ohio St.3d 176, 
2009 Ohio 2883, 909 N.E.2d 635 (Board’s recommendation of two-year suspension with one 
year stayed rejected by Court; “we have consistently imposed an indefinite suspension from 
practice for lawyers who repeatedly neglect their client’s legal interests and fail to cooperate 
in the ensuing disciplinary investigation,” id. at para. 15). Accord Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Van Sickle, 128 Ohio St.3d 376, 2011 Ohio 774, 944 N.E.2d 677; Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Broschak, 118 Ohio St.3d 236, 2008 Ohio 2224, 887 N.E.2d 1176. Other recent case law 
suggests, however, that such “consistency” may be just as often honored in the breach. See the 
decision in Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Sakmar, 127 Ohio St.3d 244, 2010 Ohio 5720, 
938 N.E.2d 355.  Sakmar invokes the neglect + failure to cooperate = indefinite suspension 
rubric (id. at para. 11), but then proceeds to approve the Board’s recommendation of a 
sanction of two years with the second year stayed. In doing so, it reviewed the aggravating and 
mitigating factors in three cases involving similar violations decided under the Rules (even 
though one of them did not involve Rule 1.3) and found that the case “most comparable” for 
sanction purposes was a neglect case in which the respondent had cooperated in the 
investigation.  As a result, one reasonable reading of Sakmar is that the presence of failure to 
cooperate, as in Sakmar, may no longer be a bright-line indicator of the indefinite suspension 
sanction in neglect cases, but rather merely one of the aggravating factors to be considered.  
We say this fully aware that the “consistently recognized” language may well still be invoked 
in appropriate cases (as it was in Van Sickle), but that there will be instances in which the 
Court finds exceptions to this rule (as in Sakmar). Further blurring is seen in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Hallquist, 128 Ohio St.3d 480, 2011 Ohio 1819, 946 N.E.2d 224, which, like 
Sakmar, paid lip service to the indefinite suspension template for pattern of neglect coupled 
with failure to cooperate, but went along with the Board’s rejecting that sanction (“[w]ithout 
explaining its reasoning,” id. at para. 11) and imposing instead a two-year suspension with 
six months stayed, despite six aggravating factors and only one in mitigation.  The Court cites 
three other cases (not including Sakmar) in which it has not “consistently” imposed an 
indefinite suspension in such circumstances. As the Hallquist Court further reminds us, 
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immediately after recognizing the indefinite suspension “rule,” “[w]e have also recognized 
that each disciplinary case is unique and that we may consider ‘all relevant factors’ in 
determining what sanction to impose. See BCGD Proc.Reg 10(B); Columbus Bar Assn. v. 
Chasser, 124 Ohio St.3d 578, 2010 Ohio 956, 925 N.E.2d 595, para. 20.” Hallquist, at para. 
12. 
 There are cases, including at least five decided in 2010, in which an indefinite suspension has 
been imposed for a single instance of neglect, coupled with failure to cooperate. See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Meade, 127 Ohio St.3d 393, 2010 Ohio 6209, 939 N.E.2d 1250; 
Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Wilson, 127 Ohio St.3d 10, 2010 Ohio 4937, 935 N.E.2d 841; 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Clovis, 125 Ohio St.3d 434, 2010 Ohio 1859, 928 N.E.2d 1078; 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Sayler, 125 Ohio St.3d 403, 2010 Ohio 1810, 928 N.E.2d 
724; Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoff, 124 Ohio St.3d 269, 2010 Ohio 136, 921 N.E.2d 636. 
Accord Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Farah, 136 Ohio St.3d 295, 2013 Ohio 3680, 995 N.E.2d 201 
(failure to file settlement judgment entry in case seeking reinstatement of granddaughter 
visitation-rights, resulting in dismissal of reinstatement suit); Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. 
Kelly, 132 Ohio St.3d 292, 2012 Ohio 2715, 971 N.E.2d 922 (failure to pursue 
representation of client in divorce matter; Court rejected Board’s recommendation of 
two-year suspension with one year stayed on condition that respondent refund fee to client; 
instead, master commissioner’s recommendation of indefinite suspension adopted); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Nittskoff, 130 Ohio St.3d 433, 2011 Ohio 5758, 958 N.E.2d 1223 
(failure to file estate-tax returns for one client, resulting in substantial damages to client; 
six-month suspension recommended by Board rejected). (In all of these cases, it should be 
noted there were violations of other disciplinary rules as well, not just that relating to neglect.) 
See also Akron Bar Ass’n v. Carr, 135 Ohio St.3d 390, 2013 Ohio 1485, 987 N.E.2d 666 
(following neglect-plus-failure-to-cooperate formula in imposing indefinite suspension, 
where the failure to cooperate was coupled, not with neglect, but with incompetence in 
violation of Rule 1.1). 
 When a pattern of neglect is counterbalanced by full cooperation in the investigation (and 
other mitigating factors), a lesser penalty is often imposed.  E.g., Erie-Huron Grievance 
Comm. v. Stoll, 127 Ohio St.3d 290, 2010 Ohio 5985, 939 N.E.2d 166 (two-year suspension 
with one year stayed); Disciplinary Counsel v. Friedman, 114 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007 Ohio 
2477, 866 N.E.2d 1076 (two-year suspension with final six months stayed). But not always. 
See Disciplinary Counsel v. Schiller, 123 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009 Ohio 4909, 915 N.E.2d 
324, where, despite cooperation and at least one other mitigating factor, an indefinite 
suspension was nevertheless imposed where the pattern of neglect was pervasive and coupled, 
inter alia, with failure to return unearned fees. After citing authority showing that a pattern 
plus failure to cooperate results in an indefinite suspension, the Court reached the same result 
here because “[t]he present case shows no failure to cooperate, but does present a much larger 
pattern of neglect.” Id. at para. 24. 
Apparently, two instances of neglect could constitute a “pattern” that, when coupled with 
failure to cooperate, justified an indefinite suspension. See Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Church, 
114 Ohio St.3d 41, 2007 Ohio 2744, 867 N.E.2d 834 (following Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Judge infra); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Judge, 96 Ohio St.3d 467, 2002 Ohio 4741, 
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776 N.E.2d 21, at para. 5 (“[r]espondent’s misconduct in this case is part of the pattern of 
neglect that was discussed in his prior disciplinary case”). The prior case was Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n v. Judge, 94 Ohio St.3d 331, 763 N.E.2d 114 (2002), which involved neglect with 
respect to two clients and failure to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation. It also has been 
held that a pattern of misconduct also can occur even though it “affected only two clients 
[husband and wife] in a single matter.”  Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Olivito, 110 Ohio 
St.3d 64, 2006 Ohio 3564, 850 N.E.2d 702, at para. 12. Mismanagement of two separate 
collection matters likewise constitutes a “pattern of neglect” under Rule 1.3. Allen County 
Bar Ass’n v. Brown, 124 Ohio St.3d 530, 2010 Ohio 580, 925 N.E.2d 112. 
The two Judge cases raise another interesting aspect of the indefinite-suspension sanction. 
Even though respondent had been indefinitely suspended in the first case, decided in February 
2002, the sanction imposed in the second case, decided in October 2002, was another 
indefinite suspension. Since respondent could not apply for reinstatement until two years after 
the order suspending him, the net effect of the second suspension was to defer the first 
available date for seeking reinstatement by seven months. Justice Cook, dissenting, thought 
the second indefinite suspension redundant (“[w]e have already imposed an indefinite 
suspension upon the respondent for conduct similar to that involved in this case”) and would 
have disbarred respondent the second time around.  96 Ohio St.3d 467, 2002 Ohio 4741, 776 
N.E.2d 21, at para. 7. And in Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Paulson, 111 Ohio St.3d 415, 
2006 Ohio 5859, 856 N.E.2d 970, the Court found that where the pattern of misconduct 
coupled with failure to cooperate occurred regarding one client, not multiple clients, a 
two-year, rather than indefinite, suspension was the appropriate sanction.  Chief Justice 
Moyer in dissent argued that indefinite suspension was called for, even though the misconduct 
involved only one client.  Id. at paras. 14-15.  For a case in which neglect of one client (no 
pattern found), coupled with failure to cooperate and failure to return the client’s file, resulted 
in an indefinite suspension, even though the respondent had no prior disciplinary record, see 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Leahr, 114 Ohio St.3d 481, 2007 Ohio 4263, 873 N.E.2d 288.  In a 
case decided the same day, similar misconduct, coupled with a prior disciplinary record, also 
resulted in an indefinite suspension.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Gosling, 114 Ohio St.3d 474, 
2007 Ohio 4267, 873 N.E.2d 282.   
Indefinite suspension also has been held appropriate where the neglect, even if not labeled a 
“pattern,” was coupled with dishonesty and failure to refund unearned fees, as well as failure 
to cooperate. E.g. Akron Bar Ass’n v. Maher, 121 Ohio St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 356, 901 
N.E.2d 803.  
Where the pattern of neglect “permeates his practice,” coupled with failure to cooperate 
and/or other serious violations, disbarment may be warranted.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Foster, 97 Ohio St.3d 292, 2002 Ohio 6415, 779 N.E.2d 755; see Warren County Bar 
Ass’n v. Lieser, 82 Ohio St.3d 8, 693 N.E.2d 766 (1998) (continued pattern of neglect, after 
prior indefinite suspension, together with failure to cooperate, resulted in disbarment). The 
likelihood of disbarment in such circumstances becomes greater “[i]n the absence of any 
compelling mitigating evidence.” Greene County Bar Ass’n v. Fodal, 100 Ohio St.3d 310, 
2003 Ohio 5852, 798 N.E.2d 1082, at para. 32 (pattern of neglect and failure to cooperate 
coupled with numerous other violations: “Respondent routinely took his clients’ money and 
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provided nothing in return”; disbarment ordered). Accord Warren County Bar Ass’n v. 
Marshall, 121 Ohio St.3d 197, 2009 Ohio 501, 903 N.E.2d 280 (pattern of misconduct, prior 
violations, failure to cooperate, other violations, no mitigating factors; respondent disbarred); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Lantz, 102 Ohio St.3d 93, 2004 Ohio 1806, 807 N.E.2d 298 
(“respondent engaged in a continuous course of neglect and misappropriation without 
restitution and then failed to cooperate in the investigation of grievances. Disbarment is in 
order.” Id. at para. 16.).  While the Court did not invoke the “permeate the practice” mantra 
expressly in Disciplinary Counsel v. Lord, 114 Ohio St.3d 466, 2007 Ohio 4260, 873 
N.E.2d 273, it was clearly present (mishandling six more cases for eight clients after having 
been sanctioned for failing to file documents for eight clients in six prior cases); this, together 
with failure to cooperate, resulted in disbarment. Accord Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Mason, 118 
Ohio St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 2704, 889 N.E.2d 539 (“continuous course of conduct” involving, 
inter alia, neglect and failure to cooperate; Lord cited in support of imposition of disbarment 
for this “repeated misconduct,” id. at para. 32. 
If significant mitigating circumstances were present, however, such misconduct often resulted 
in an indefinite suspension. E.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 2008 
Ohio 3340, 891 N.E.2d 749 (despite pervasive misconduct, including neglect, permeating his 
practice, respondent was indefinitely suspended rather than disbarred, given presence of 
significant mitigating evidence); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Golden, 97 Ohio St.3d 
230, 2002 Ohio 5934, 778 N.E.2d 564 (recognizing disbarment as appropriate sanction where 
neglect permeates the practice, but imposing indefinite suspension in face of mitigating factor 
of severe depression). The Court reached the same result (indefinite suspension) in 
Erie-Huron Counties Joint Certified Grievance Comm. v. Meyerhofer, 99 Ohio St.3d 62, 
2003 Ohio 2467, 788 N.E.2d 1078, where misappropriation of client funds and neglect 
(which normally result in disbarment) were not coupled with lack of cooperation, and a 
significant mitigating factor (mental illness) was present. Accord Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Brumbaugh, 99 Ohio St.3d 65, 2003 Ohio 2470, 788 N.E.2d 1076, (“egregious” 
misconduct, coupled with mitigating factor of alcoholism, resulted in indefinite suspension). 
The court gave even greater weight to the mitigating factor of alcoholism in Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Grdina, 101 Ohio St.3d 150, 2004 Ohio 299, 803 N.E.2d 392, 
where, in a case also involving multiple offenses and failure to cooperate, the appropriate 
sanction (jointly suggested by relator and respondent) was found to be a two-year suspension 
with one year stayed on condition that respondent comply with his Ohio Lawyers Assistance 
Program contract. And when the pattern of neglect is counterbalanced by full cooperation in 
the investigation (and other mitigating factors), a lesser penalty also may be justified. E.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Friedman, 114 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007 Ohio 2477, 866 N.E.2d 1076 
(two-year suspension with final six months stayed). 
While the previously cited cases reflect the usual sanctioning pattern, there have been occasions when 
the Court imposed sanctions seemingly out of step with normal practice.  Lake County Bar Ass’n v. 
Ryan, 109 Ohio St.3d 301, 2006 Ohio 2422, 847 N.E.2d 430, provides one example. Since the 
Supreme Court has meted out an indefinite suspension (or worse) for conduct that pales in 
comparison to that in Ryan, the case is difficult to fathom.  Respondent’s transgressions were as 
follows: 
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 Regarding the first count, respondent represented a client against whom a seven million dollar 
consent judgment had been entered. The creditor’s committee agreed to allow the debtor to 
attempt to foreclose mortgages held by the debtor and, pursuant to respondent’s offer to do so, 
hired respondent to pursue the foreclosure actions on the debtor’s behalf. Negotiations were 
held and a fee agreed to. 
 The unearned retainer paid by the creditor’s committee was not deposited in a client trust 
account, but was instead used for personal expenses by the respondent. 
 Respondent committed to file the necessary foreclosure papers in accordance with his 
representation but did not do so. In fact, he falsely represented to the committee that he had 
prepared the necessary documents and would soon file them. 
 Numerous inquiries by various people on behalf of the creditor’s committee as to the status of 
the foreclosure proceedings were ignored by respondent, as were requests for return of the 
retainer. (The committee had to sue respondent for the amount owing, of which it received 
only a part.). 
 After the creditor’s committee filed a grievance against respondent for his dereliction, 
respondent failed to cooperate in the relator’s investigation.  
 The second count, if anything, is even worse. Here, respondent agreed to represent an elderly, 
vulnerable couple who had been denied unsupervised visitation rights with their grandchild. 
 Again, respondent took the retainer, but instead of placing it in a client trust as required, used 
the funds for his own personal expenses. 
 Again, inquiries from the clients over the course of more than a year as to the status of matter 
were either ignored or met with “he was working on the case and would call the couple when 
he had some information.” Id. at para. 17. 
 The couple had to sue for return of unearned fees. The judgment in their favor was unpaid at 
the time of the panel hearing. 
The bar association’s suggested sanction of a six-month suspension in the face of this misconduct 
seems incomprehensible. Even the sanction ultimately imposed by the Court – a two-year suspension 
with one year stayed – is uncharacteristically light, given the “dishonest and selfish motive by 
retaining unearned funds from his clients and repaying none of it until forced through litigation,” and 
“a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses,” id. at para. 21. Ryan continued to violate the 
disciplinary rules in Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Ryan, 123 Ohio St.3d 178, 2009 Ohio 4232, 915 
N.E.2d 304, where he again neglected a client’s case, resulting in the client’s losing a personal injury 
action worth, according to successor counsel, $75,000-$150,000. Nevertheless, the Court imposed 
only a two-year suspension with the last six months stayed. Chief Justice Moyer, joined by two other 
justices, would have imposed an indefinite suspension. 
Another case that is difficult to square with the Court’s usual response in such circumstances is 
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Marosan, 109 Ohio St.3d 439, 2006 Ohio 2816, 848 N.E.2d 837.  
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Marosan had previously been suspended for two years, with 18 months stayed on conditions.  He then 
violated the conditions and was ordered to serve the full two-year term.  In the present case, he was 
retained to open a probate estate for the client’s deceased husband but did not do so.  He failed to 
deposit the retainer in his trust account and only after two years did he return the unearned retainer 
and the husband’s will.  He carried no malpractice insurance during this time.  He failed to cooperate 
in the disciplinary investigation.  As aggravating factors, the Board found prior violations, multiple 
offenses, a pattern of misconduct, and failure to cooperate.  The only mitigating factor found by the 
Board was that Marosan did not act from a dishonest or selfish motive, but the Court expressly found 
to the contrary.  The Board’s sanction recommendation was a six-month suspension, to be served 
concurrently with the existing one.  Even though quoting its prior precedent to the effect that 
accepting retainers and doing nothing was tantamount to theft and that neglect and a failure to 
cooperate warrant an indefinite suspension, the Court concluded that a six-month suspension to be 
served consecutively was appropriate. 
A similar case, although not as extreme, is Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Russell, 111 Ohio St.3d 421, 
2006 Ohio 5861, 856 N.E.2d 976 (pattern of misconduct, multiple violations, initial failure to 
cooperate, harm to vulnerable clients, withholding information from clients material to the client’s 
interests, such as initiation of contempt proceedings against the client and settlement offer made by 
the other side, neglect, including letting statute of limitations run on client’s claim). Despite all this, 
respondent received only a twelve-month suspension, all stayed on conditions; the Court was 
obviously impressed by respondent’s remorse, his subsequent cooperation in the investigation, and 
his willingness to compensate his victims for the harm they suffered.  “As we have said, the purpose 
of the disciplinary process is not to punish the offender, but rather to protect the public. . . . With the 
supervision recommended by the board [monitoring], we trust that respondent’s conduct will not be 
repeated.”  Id. at para. 16. 
Outside the disciplinary context, neglect is often asserted as a ground for a malpractice action. E.g., 
Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989) (failure to disclose settlement offer 
in civil action and to communicate prosecutor’s offer to dismiss charges in return for testimony in 
criminal action supported claim for malpractice); Williams v. Hyatt Legal Servs., No. 14235, 1990 
Ohio App. LEXIS 934 (Summit Mar. 14, 1990) (lawyer’s failure to contact mortgage company or 
to file for bankruptcy, which failure resulted in client losing her house to foreclosure, constituted 
malpractice). See also Columbus Bar Ass’n v. McCorkle, 105 Ohio St.3d 430, 2005 Ohio 2588, 
828 N.E.2d 99 (in disciplinary action for, inter alia, neglect, Court noted that client for whom 
respondent had failed to file suit before statute ran had sued for malpractice and obtained default 
judgment). See section 1.1:330. 
Neglect - Coupled with other disciplinary violations: Under the former OHCPR, cases of neglect 
often involved violations of other disciplinary provisions as well, such as mishandling or failing to 
account for client property or funds in violation of OH DR 9-102(B) duties. E.g., Cuyahoga County 
Bar Ass’n v. Peto, 115 Ohio St.3d 421, 2007 Ohio 5250, 875 N.E.2d 593 (abandoning client and 
failure to comply with client request to return file and account for fees); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Tyack, 107 Ohio St.3d 35, 2005 Ohio 5833, 836 N.E.2d 568 (numerous instances of neglect 
coupled with violation of former DR 9-102(B)(4) by failing to return unearned retainer, which is 
“tantamount to theft,” id. at para. 30); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Griffin, 90 Ohio St.3d 307, 
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737 N.E.2d 1282 (2000) (in addition to neglect, respondent’s mishandling of client’s funds violated 
OH DR 9-102(B)(3) and (4)). See section 1.15:220. 
Similarly, by neglecting the representation, a lawyer’s conduct often also violated OH DR 
7-101(A)(1) (failing to seek the lawful objectives of the client) OH DR 7-101(A)(2) (failing to carry 
out the contract of employment), and/or OH DR 7-101(A)(3) (intentionally prejudicing or damaging 
a client’s interests). See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Broschak, 118 Ohio St.3d 236, 2008 Ohio 
2224, 887 N.E.2d 1176 (serial instances of failure to file transcripts and briefs in criminal appeals, 
resulting in numerous violations of DR 6-101(A)(3) and 7-101(A)(1)-(3)); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Higgins, 117 Ohio St.3d 473, 2008 Ohio 1509, 884 N.E.2d 1070 (multiple failures to appear on 
behalf of client at pretrial and trial settings; violations of 6-101(A)(3) and 7-101(A)(1) & (2)); 
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Church, 116 Ohio St.3d 563, 2008 Ohio 81, 880 N.E.2d 917 
(failure to respond to adversary’s summary judgment motion violated 6-101(A)(3) and 
7-101(A)(1)-(3)); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Douglas, 113 Ohio St.3d 221, 2007 Ohio 1536, 863 
N.E.2d 1044 (respondent hired to file bankruptcy on behalf of two different clients; bankruptcy 
petition filed in neither; conduct violated DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2) & (3)); Columbus Bar 
Ass’n v. Ginther, 98 Ohio St.3d 345, 2003 Ohio 1010, 785 N.E.2d 432 (persistent failure to protect 
client’s interests in attempt, flawed at every turn, to obtain for client professional counselor’s license 
also violated, inter alia, OH DR 7-101(A)(1), (2) & (3)) (Ginther was subsequently suspended 
indefinitely for a similar pattern of misconduct, involving multiple clients, violative of, inter alia, DR 
6-101(A)(3), 7-101 (A)(1), (2) & (3), Columbus Bas Ass’n v. Ginther, 108 Ohio St.3d 48, 2005 
Ohio 79, 840 N.E.2d 628); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Wolfrom, 91 Ohio St.3d 52, 741 N.E.2d 510 
(2001) (inaction in various matters, including failing to purchase trial transcript as agreed for appeal 
and then dismissing appeal without client’s knowledge, violated, inter alia, all three subsections of 
OH DR 7-101(A)). Even where such conduct results in a pattern and involves multiple offenses, if 
offset by significant mitigating factors (such as extensive pro bono service), the Court has seen fit to 
order a one-year stayed suspension. Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Micciulla, 106 Ohio St.3d 19, 2005 
Ohio 3470, 830 N.E.2d 332. Accord Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Albrecht, 106 Ohio St.3d 301, 2005 
Ohio 4984, 834 N.E.2d 812 (alcohol dependency mitigation). 
Conduct violative of OH DR 6-101(A)(3) has also been found to contravene former OH DR 
1-102(A)(6), which prohibits engaging in conduct “that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law.” See, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Flanagan, 77 Ohio St.3d 381, 674 N.E.2d 681 
(1997) (unprofessional conduct and neglect relating to bankruptcy matter). See also section 8.4:1000. 
It was not uncommon for the 6-101(A)(3)/1-102(A)(6) combination to be coupled with violation of 
DR 1-102(A)(5) as well. E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Maley, 119 Ohio St.3d 217, 2008 Ohio 3923, 
893 N.E.2d 180; Disciplinary Counsel v. Greco, 107 Ohio St.3d 155, 2005 Ohio 6045, 837 N.E.2d 
369. 
If the lawyer attempted to cover up the neglect, this could implicate former OH DR 1-102(A)(4), as 
conduct constituting behavior involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. E.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 122 Ohio St.3d 293, 2009 Ohio 3501, 910 N.E.2d 1034. 
Multiple instances of such conduct, including fabricating a court entry on which respondent forged 
the judge’s name, occurred in Disciplinary Counsel v. Lentes, 120 Ohio St.3d 431, 2008 Ohio 6355, 
900 N.E.2d 167 (“‘Respondent’s dishonesty in his law practice, his lack of cooperation in the 
disciplinary process, and his repeated neglect of his client’s legal matters demonstrate that he is not fit 
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to practice law,’” id. at para. 34, quoting from Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Smith, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 95, 2007 Ohio 4270, 873 N.E.2d 1224). Similarly, in Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Vala, 
92 Ohio St.3d 107, 748 N.E.2d 1103 (2001), respondent, among acts of neglect and other 
misconduct, filed a personal-injury action for the client but voluntarily dismissed it without the 
client’s consent. Respondent refiled the case but failed to respond to a motion to dismiss based on the 
expiration of the statute of limitations. Although the case was then dismissed with prejudice, Vala did 
not tell the client that; instead, respondent told her that the case was set for a status hearing. “In view 
of [his] past disciplinary violations and his constant and repeated neglect of his professional duties,” 
Vala was disbarred.  Id. at 108, 748 N.E.2d at 1105. Accord Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Slavin, 121 
Ohio St.3d 618, 2009 Ohio 2015, 906 N.E.2d 1121 (failure to file within limitations period, then 
attempting to cover-up neglect by reporting to client that case had settled and paying “settlement” 
amount himself); Disciplinary Counsel v. Rooney, 110 Ohio St.3d 349, 2006 Ohio 4576, 853 
N.E.2d 663 (failure to file papers necessary to administer estate, for which respondent had been hired, 
but falsely telling client that all probate matters were being taken care of; because of 
misrepresentation, Court rejected stayed six-month suspension and imposed six-month suspension 
with no stay, despite significant mitigating factors; dishonest conduct calls for actual suspension, 
“particularly when that conduct is designed to ‘mislead a court or client.’” Id. at para. 13); 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Deaton, 102 Ohio St.3d 19, 2004 Ohio 1587, 806 N.E.2d 503 (neglect of 
legal matters for eleven different clients, to whom he “routinely lied . . . about the progress in their 
cases,” id. at para. 2 (one of the clients whose matter he neglected when acting as lead counsel and to 
whom he lied about the status of the matter was his own law firm!); deliberate concealment of his 
neglect to protect his own interests and failure to cooperate in investigation required disbarment); 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Glatki, 88 Ohio St.3d 381, 726 N.E.2d 993 (2000) (repeated commitments 
to clients to take action that was never taken; in addition to former OH DR 6-101(A)(3) and 
7-101(A)(1) and (2), “[w]e further find that although the board did not so conclude, relator charged 
and proved by the requisite clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s conduct [in three of the 
matters] violated DR 1-102(A)(4) . . . . Relator [sic respondent] misrepresented the status of each of 
these cases to her clients.”  Id. at 383, 726 N.E.2d at 995). See also section 8.4:400. 
Where such neglectful and dishonest or deceitful misconduct “permeates” the attorney’s practice, 
disbarment is ordinarily the sanction imposed. E.g., Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Foster, 97 Ohio St.3d 
292, 2002 Ohio 6415, 779 N.E.2d 755, at para. 13. Particularly is this so when coupled with the 
attorney’s ignoring of investigative inquiries by the disciplinary body. Id. Accord Lentes supra. 
Former OH DR 7-101(A)(1)-(3). 
In addition to former OH DR 6-101(A)(3), Ohio Rule 1.3 subsumes the three interrelated (and often 
overlapping) duties imposed on lawyers by OH DR 7-101(A). Pursuant thereto, a lawyer could not 
intentionally: (1) fail to seek the lawful objectives of the client through the permissible means 
established by the law and the OHCPR; (2) fail to carry out a contract of employment for 
professional services with a client; or (3) prejudice or damage his client during the course of their 
professional relationship. OH DR 7-101(A)(1)-(3). 
Two points worthy of note, in comparing Ohio Rule 1.3 with former OH DR 7-101(A)(1)-(3): First, 
there is no “intent” requirement in Rule 1.3; second, the references to “zealousness” in former Canon 
7, in the title to OH DR 7-101, and in former OH EC 7-1 have been deleted, even to the point of 
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striking Model Rule language referring to a lawyer’s duty to act “with zeal in advocacy” on a client’s 
behalf in the second sentence of Comment [1]. The Task Force Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.3 
addresses this issue expressly: 
 Neither Model Rule 1.3 nor any of the Model Rules on 
advocacy states [sic] a duty of “zealous representation.” The reference 
to acting “with zeal in advocacy” is deleted from Comment [1] because 
“zeal” is often invoked as an excuse for unprofessional behavior. 
Despite the title of Canon 7 of the Ohio Code of Professional 
Responsibility and the content of EC 7-1, no disciplinary rule requires 
“zealous” advocacy. 
Many of the nuances of and distinctions between subdivisions (1), (2) and (3) of former OH DR 
7-101(A) are no longer relevant under Ohio Rule 1.3 and need not be discussed here. Suffice it to say 
that most, if not all, violations of 7-101(A) will now fall within the scope of Rule 1.3. A 
representative sampling of those decisions follows. 
Litigation misconduct: Violations of OH DR 7-101(A) typically (but not exclusively) involved 
failings in the litigation context and often overlapped with violations of former OH DR 6-101(A)(3). 
(In the list that follows, Sabroff, Mullaney, Mishler, Wagner, Lukey, Katalinas and Williams 
were not 6-101(A)(3) cases.) E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabroff, 123 Ohio St.3d 182, 2009 Ohio 
4205, 915 N.E.2d 307 (voluntarily dismissing client’s personal injury action without her consent, 
followed by settling case despite fact that client told respondent that she was not accepting offer and 
then misappropriating settlement proceeds; DR 7-101(A)(3) violated, among other provisions); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. McShane, 121 Ohio St.3d 169, 2009 Ohio 746, 902 N.E.2d 980 (did no 
work on case for which engaged; because of significant mitigating factors of mental disability, 
sanction was two-year stayed suspension); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 
2008 Ohio 4541, 894 N.E.2d 1210 (failure to develop strategy to fit clients’ individualized needs 
violated DR 7-101(A)(1) obligation to seek clients’ lawful objectives); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Zigan, 118 Ohio St.3d 180, 2008 Ohio 1976, 887 N.E.2d 334 (failing to file any pleadings after 
undertaking representation); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mishler, 118 Ohio St.3d 109, 2008 Ohio 1810, 
886 N.E.2d 818 (settling cases for amount expressly rejected by client and paying none of proceeds to 
client); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Wagner, 117 Ohio St.3d 456, 2008 Ohio 1200, 884 
N.E.2d 1053 (knowingly violating duty to protect clients’ interests by abandoning their bankruptcy 
cases); Warren County Bar Ass’n v. Marshall, 113 Ohio St.3d 54, 2007 Ohio 980, 862 N.E.2d 
519 (failure to file any motions for post-conviction relief as hired to do); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Lukey, 110 Ohio St.3d 128, 2006 Ohio 3822, 851 N.E.2d 493 (respondent violated 7-101(A)(3) 
“because his failure to provide available mitigation evidence resulted in the grandson’s extended 
detention,” id. at para. 13); Disciplinary Counsel v. Lantz, 102 Ohio St.3d 93, 2004 Ohio 1806, 
807 N.E.2d 298 (doing nothing after filing for continuance in custody case, resulting in client’s loss 
of custody of son); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Golden, 97 Ohio St.3d 230, 2002 Ohio 5934, 
778 N.E.2d 564 (failure to file Qualified Domestic Relations Order, which would have enabled client 
to receive portion of former husband’s pension); Allen County Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 92 Ohio 
St.3d 104, 748 N.E.2d 1101 (2001) (filing notice of appeal in criminal matter but then, on day 
appellants’ brief was due, dismissing appeal without advising clients that appeal would be dismissed); 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Harp, 91 Ohio St.3d 385, 745 N.E.2d 1032 (2001) (failure to 
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respond to motion to dismiss appeal for want of prosecution in worker’s compensation case, resulting 
in dismissal of appeal); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Komarek, 84 Ohio St.3d 90, 702 N.E.2d 62 (1998) 
(butchered Chapter 13 bankruptcy representation by respondent, as a result of which client lost his 
home); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Cox, 83 Ohio St.3d 218, 699 N.E.2d 455 (1998) (one client’s case 
dismissed for want of prosecution; another not filed at all and statute of limitations ran; because of 
these and numerous other violations “that demonstrate contempt for his client and the bar,” id. at 22, 
699 N.E.2d at 458, respondent was disbarred); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Beckett, 37 Ohio St.3d 160, 
524 N.E.2d 513 (1988) (failing to seek continuance, resulting in arrest of client for nonappearance at 
criminal proceeding). 
Nonlitigation misconduct: Examples of violations of 7-101(A) in a nonlitigation setting are: 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. DeVillers, 116 Ohio St.3d 33, 2007 Ohio 5552, 876 N.E.2d 530 (among 
other violations for neglect, respondent, in his representation of nursing home client, failed to pay for 
client’s medical and pharmaceutical services; as is often the case, the 7-101(A)(1)-(3) violations were 
coupled with violations of 6-101(A)(3)); Disciplinary Counsel v. Young, 113 Ohio St.3d 36, 2007 
Ohio 975, 862 N.E.2d 504 (abandonment of guardianship duties for incompetent veteran violated 
DR 7-102(A)(2) as well as 6-101(A)(3); “‘[r]espondent knew he had an employment contract to act 
as Gordon’s guardian and he intentionally failed to carry it out.’” Id. at para. 15 (quoting Board); 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Diehl, 105 Ohio St.3d 469, 2005 Ohio 2817, 828 N.E.2d 1004 (conversion 
of estate funds to own use; violation of DR 7-101(A)(3); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Newman, 
102 Ohio St.3d 186, 2004 Ohio 2068, 808 N.E.2d 375 (abandoning disabled client after client 
defaulted on lease with shopping center, which respondent also represented; shopping center obtained 
judgment lien on client’s house, forcing him into bankruptcy; “we conclude the respondent 
specifically disregarded his disabled client’s interests and exposed the client to avoidable financial 
ruin,” id. at para. 18, thereby violating OH DR 7-101(A)(3)); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Lutchin, 93 Ohio St.3d 147, 753 N.E.2d 181 (2001) (failure to prepare and file federal income tax 
returns); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Young, 92 Ohio St.3d 417, 750 N.E.2d 1117 (2001) (failure to 
incorporate client’s business); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Lavallo, 67 Ohio St.3d 308, 617 N.E.2d 
1100 (1993) (failure to take any action to obtain tax release on checking account of client’s deceased 
mother and failure to respond to client’s inquiries); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Nasrallah, 67 
Ohio St.3d 238, 617 N.E.2d 677 (1993) (failure to arrange for clients to be represented in lawyer’s 
absence); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Auwaeter, 69 Ohio St.2d 85, 430 N.E.2d 947 (1982) (failing to 
register shares of stock for client). 
Another common area of lawyer misconduct in former OH DR 7-101(A) cases involved the 
mishandling of client funds, such as failure to pay off a client’s existing mortgage with funds that had 
been placed in escrow by the new mortgagee for that purpose, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Zumstein, 93 Ohio St.3d 544, 757 N.E.2d 327 (2001), and failure to take steps necessary to preserve 
client property and funds, Warren County Bar Ass’n v. Lieser, 82 Ohio St.3d 8, 693 N.E.2d 766 
(1998). 
While all three of the 7-101(A) categories ostensibly required “intentional” conduct by the offending 
lawyer, this point is seldom addressed in the cases.  Indeed, on the facts of some of the decisions, one 
would be hard-pressed to read the conduct as intentional, as opposed to merely negligent.  See, e.g., 
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Frenden, 114 Ohio St.3d 236, 2007 Ohio 3676, 871 N.E.2d 570, 
where violations of DR 7-101(A)(1)-(3) were premised on the lawyer’s failure to “arrange for 
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payment of [an out-of-state traffic] ticket, which carried a $100 fine, on time.” id. at para. 4, and 
Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Di Martino, 114 Ohio St.3d 174, 2007 Ohio 3605, 870 N.E.2d 
1166, where the most important reason underlying respondent’s 7-101(A)(2) violation for failing to 
carry out the contract of employment to appeal and seek judicial release was that the terms of his 
client’s plea agreements (under which he received “mandatory sentences that were not appealable and 
that made him ineligible for early judicial release,” id. at para. 4) made the end sought impossible.  
Respondent’s failure to understand this until well into the representation does not fit comfortably with 
a charge of intentional conduct. Compare Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Mazanec, 114 Ohio 
St.3d 427, 2007 Ohio 4268, 872 N.E.2d 1207, where there was no doubt that respondent’s 
infractions were intentional -- respondent’s violation, for example, of 7-101(A)(3) was premised 
upon stealing large sums from his client’s trust account while purportedly acting as trustee.  A 
unanimous Court concluded that, because of the egregiousness of this misconduct and respondent’s 
failure to cooperate, even though it involved only one client and was respondent’s first disciplinary 
violation in 30 years of practice, “he is not fit to practice law.” id. at para. 11, and was disbarred. 
Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 84, 2009 Ohio 500, 902 N.E.2d 25 (failure 
to provide UIM insurer of notice of settlement with tortfeasor’s insurer, resulting in denial of client’s 
UIM coverage, coupled with misleading client about status of case in various ways, including 
fabricating false explanatory letter to client).  
A decision which does touch, however briefly, on the “intentional” aspect of 7-101(A) is 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Maley, 119 Ohio St.3d 217, 2008 Ohio 3923, 893 N.E.2d 180, where, in 
sanctioning the respondent for his failure to supervise his secretary in violation of, inter alia, DR 
7-101(A)(3), the Court stated that ‘[h]e either knew or should have known that she was taking money 
from clients and performing legal work for them. Further, once he had actual knowledge of her 
actions, he failed to promptly act to protect the clients’ interests.” Id. at para. 14. And in Cleveland 
Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Ranke, 127 Ohio St.3d 126, 2010 Ohio 5036, 937 N.E.2d 84, the lack of 
evidence of intentional conduct led to the dismissal of the charges of violation of DR 7-101(A)(1)-(3) 
leveled against respondent. See id. at para. 15. 
Professionalism considerations: Particularly in a highly contentious matter, the client may want the 
lawyer to take a grudging and hostile stance in dealing with adversaries in the proceeding. Although 
the lawyer must be sensitive to the client’s wishes, under the former OHCPR she did not need to 
accede to them in every instance, especially where to do so would have violated the basic tenets of 
professionalism. See former OH EC 7-37 (“[I]ll feeling [between clients] should not influence a 
lawyer in his conduct, attitude, and demeanor towards opposing lawyers.”). Former OH DR 
7-101(A)(1) explicitly identified several areas in which a lawyer could temper the adversarial 
relationship without violating the duty to seek the client’s lawful objectives through reasonably 
available means. Thus, a lawyer could properly (1) comply with reasonable requests from opposing 
counsel that do not prejudice the rights of the client, (2) be punctual in fulfilling all professional 
commitments, (3) avoid offensive tactics, and (4) treat with courtesy all persons involved in the legal 
process. Former OH DR 7-101(B) similarly provided latitude to the attorney, “where permissible,” to 
forgo asserting a right or position of the client ((B)(1)) and to refuse to participate or aid in conduct 
the lawyer believed unlawful, even though there was support for the argument that the conduct was 
legal. ((B)(2)). See sections 1.2:300, :300, 400, and 1.16:320. 
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Rule 1.3 muddies the waters just a bit as to the status of such permissive conduct by an Ohio lawyer. 
Thus, Model Rule comment language referring to the treatment of all persons involved in the legal 
process with courtesy and respect, and a reference to not being obligated to “press for every 
advantage,” have been deleted from Ohio Rule 1.3 cmt. [1]. The Task Force states that these 
references have been deleted because the “choice of means to accomplish the objectives of the 
representation are governed by the lawyer’s professional discretion . . ., as specified in Rule[] 
1.2(a) . . . .” ABA Model Rules Comparison to Rule 1.3. Indeed, Rule 1.2(a) expressly refers to a 
lawyer’s treatment of “all persons in the legal process” “with courtesy and consideration” as not being 
inconsistent with the lawyer’s obligations to further the client’s interests by legally permissible means. 
Accord Rule 1.2 cmt. [4A]. See section 1.2:330. It should be further noted that the Statement on 
Professionalism, contained in Gov Bar R App. V, contains a number of admonitions urging lawyers 
to be courteous and civil in their dealings with opposing parties and counsel and with the courts and 
their staffs. See section 4.4:200. 
In this connection, in one pre-Rule disciplinary case, Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Batt, 78 Ohio St.3d 189, 
677 N.E.2d 349 (1997), the Court, in describing the panel’s findings with respect to respondent’s 
unseemly tactics at an administrative hearing (for which, along with other misconduct, he was 
disbarred), reiterated that one of the violations found was of “[OH DR] 7-101(A)(1) (failing to avoid 
offensive tactics and failing to treat with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal 
process),”  id. at 190, 677 N.E.2d at 351. In this regard, the Court further stated: 
We recognize that an attorney must zealously represent his client, but 
we also recognize that an attorney has a duty to be civil to opposing 
counsel and the court. 
Id. at 192, 677 N.E.2d at 352 (emphasis added). Thus, actions of courtesy and professional conduct 
toward others, which the former disciplinary rule protected as safe harbors not violative of the former 
duty to represent the client zealously, appear to have been read in Batt as obligations that, if not 
followed, constituted an affirmative violation of former OH DR 7-101(A)(1). The Ohio Supreme 
Court quoted this duty language with approval in two subsequent cases in which 7-101(A)(1) was not 
mentioned. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson, 84 Ohio St.3d 386, 387, 704 N.E.2d 
246, 247 (1999); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Nicholson, 80 Ohio St.3d 275, 277, 685 N.E.2d 
1234, 1236 (1997). Query whether the “duty” espoused in Batt survives under Rule 1.3. 
In Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-11, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 
(Dec. 3, 1993), the Board also described this permissive OH DR 7-101(A)(1) right in more 
mandatory terms -- “there is a responsibility under [OH] DR 7-101(A)(1) to act courteously toward 
opposing counsel.” Id. at *2. In this opinion, the Board found that a lawyer who had inadvertently 
obtained a confidential memorandum of an opposing party through a public-records search should at 
least disclose that fact to opposing counsel and provide counsel with a copy of the memorandum if 
requested. To do so would not undercut the duty of zealousness owed the client. The failure to notify, 
the Board opined, would violate former OH DR 1-102(A)(4), whereas providing a copy on request 
would comply with the spirit of former OH DR 7-101(A)(1). 
The inadvertently-sent-document issue is now covered explicitly by Ohio Rule 4.4(b) and cmt. [2] 
thereto. See section 4.4:300. 
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1.3:300  Promptness 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.3 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 6.13 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 31:401 
ALI-LGL § 16 
Wolfram § 10.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 6.13 (1996). 
As is forcefully stated in MR 1.3 cmt. [3] (language that for some reason was deleted from Ohio 
Rule 1.3 cmt. [3]): “Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than 
procrastination.” In Ohio, procrastination is covered by the Rule 1.3 obligation imposed on a lawyer 
to act on behalf of a client “with reasonable . . . promptness.” The Ohio Rule version of the language 
pertinent to delay in the comments is as follows: 
 Delay . . . [is] inconsistent with a lawyer’s duty of diligence, 
undermine[s] public confidence, and may prejudice a client’s cause. 
Reasonable . . . promptness [is] expected of a lawyer in handling all 
client matters and will be evaluated in light of all relevant 
circumstances. 
Ohio Rule 1.3 cmt. [3]. 
The variance of the Ohio Rule comment from the Model Rule comment is unfortunate. In addition to 
the deletion of the first sentence dealing with procrastination, the Ohio comment has taken out 
material helpful to a lawyer seeking guidance on this issue. Thus, after noting that the passage of time 
can indeed adversely affect a client’s position (i.e., the statute of limitations), the Model Rule 
comment goes on to say that “[e]ven where the client’s interests are not affected in substance, 
however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the 
lawyer’s trustworthiness.” This advice seems to us to be both important and instructive. In its stead, 
Ohio Rule 1.3 cmt. [3] includes a repetition of the language of the Rule (“[r]easonable diligence and 
promptness are expected”) coupled with the singularly uninformative caution that a lawyer’s 
diligence and promptness “will be evaluated in light of all relevant circumstances.” 
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This seeming lesser emphasis in Ohio on the promptness aspect can sometimes be reflected in the 
case law, where 1.3 violations are sometimes referred to as conduct lacking in diligence, as opposed 
to promptness, despite the clear indication that the problem was unreasonable delay. Thus, in 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Peden, 134 Ohio St.3d 579, 2012 Ohio 5766, 984 N.E.2d 1, the violation 
was characterized only in diligence terms, even though respondent took nine months to file a 
dissolution of marriage petition, which 
was not a complicated matter. King’s [the client’s] husband did not 
contest the matter, and there were no children, no property, and no 
financial issues involved. Even Peden agreed that this was a simple, 
uncontested case. Yet it took nine months for Peden to file King’s 
petition for dissolution. Peden, in fact, admitted during the panel 
hearing that he did not work diligently on King’s case. 
Id. at para. 39. On these facts, one would have thought that lack of promptness at least would have 
rated a passing mention. 
In the first case decided under Rule 1.3 dealing with promptness concerns, the respondent was found 
to have violated the Rule (and DR 6-101(A)(3)) “by failing to administer the Hinkle estate in a timely 
and reasonably competent manner . . . .” Akron Bar Ass’n v. Maher, 121 Ohio St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 
356, 901 N.E.2d 803, at para. 41. (To say that he did not act in a timely manner somewhat 
understates the problem: “Though Hinkle’s mother’s estate was uncomplicated, with assets with 
approximately $20,000, it remained open for ten years . . . .” Id. at para. 37 (emphasis added).) 
Accord Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Rozanc, 123 Ohio St.3d 78, 2009 Ohio 4207, 914 N.E.2d 192 
(“Respondent’s inaction held up proceedings in the estate until April 2008. The delay in opening the 
estate eventually caused several of the client’s sisters to call the new attorney and complain.” Id. at 
para. 8.). 
Much of the precedent under the former OHCPR will, as it is with respect to diligence, be of 
assistance in defining the parameters of unacceptable delay. The duty of promptness, needless to say, 
obligates a lawyer to meet deadlines for filings and scheduled appearances in legal proceedings. The 
prior case law amply confirmed this. Thus, numerous cases found a violation of OH DR 6-101(A)(3) 
for failure to file within the applicable statute of limitations. See, e.g., Toledo Bar Ass’n v. DiLabbio, 
101 Ohio St.3d 147, 2004 Ohio 338, 803 N.E.2d 389; cf. Disciplinary Counsel v. Sobol, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 65, 2008 Ohio 118, 886 N.E.2d 191 (failure to refile case during one-year savings period 
following voluntary dismissal as result of having erroneously recorded filing deadline as February 2, 
2006, rather than February 2, 2005). A missed statute-of-limitations malpractice case decided under 
the rules is Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Malynn, 131 Ohio St.3d 377, 2012 Ohio 1293, 965 
N.E.2d 299, where the Court characterized respondent’s 1.3 violation as a failure to act with 
“reasonable diligence”; even though the opinion acknowledged that this was a failure to handle the 
matter “in a timely matter,” the “promptness” prong of the rule for some reason was not invoked. 
Violations for failure to act with necessary promptness were also found where the lawyer 
 missed court-imposed or other deadlines, e.g., Lorain County Bar Ass’n v. Robinson, 121 
Ohio St.3d 24, 2009 Ohio 262, 901 N.E.2d 783 (delays of months in filing bankruptcy 
petitions to the prejudice of his clients; violation of 6-101(A)(3) and 7-101(A)(3)); 
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Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008 Ohio 3194, 891 N.E.2d 324 
(taking “seven years” to respond to probate court request for time records concerning 
respondent’s representation of estate, id. at para. 64 (emphasis by the Court)); Cincinnati 
Bar Ass’n v. Schwieterman, 115 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007 Ohio 4266, 873 N.E.2d 810 (missing 
deadlines for filing final decree in divorce matter, resulting in dismissal of action for failure to 
prosecute); Akron Bar Ass’n v. Paulson, 112 Ohio St.3d 334, 2006 Ohio 6678, 859 N.E.2d 
932 (failure to file discrimination lawsuit within 90-day federal regulatory deadline after 
client received “right to sue” letter; conduct also violated DR 7-101(A)2); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. King, 103 Ohio St.3d 438, 2004 Ohio 5470, 816 N.E.2d 1040 (failure to 
“respond to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, interrogatories, or request for 
production of documents within the time required in the court’s scheduling order,” id. at para. 
5); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Chandler, 81 Ohio St.3d 491, 692 N.E.2d 568 (1998) 
(failure to file timely estate tax return, resulting in interest and penalties assessed against 
estate; failure to file timely notice of appeal, resulting in dismissal of appeal); Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Floyd, 74 Ohio St.3d 599, 660 N.E.2d 1150 (1996) (failure to file 
timely petition for certiorari with United States Supreme Court); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Sullivan, 65 Ohio St.3d 293, 603 N.E.2d 983 (1992) (counsel’s “dilatory handling” of 
defense of litigation consisted of missing both deadlines and scheduled hearings, as well as 
being habitually late); or 
 failed to appear at scheduled hearings, e.g., Lorain County Bar Ass’n v. Kaderbek, 100 
Ohio St.3d 295, 2003 Ohio 5754, 798 N.E.2d 607 (status conference in client’s divorce case; 
conference rescheduled; respondent again failed to appear); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Brown, 90 Ohio St.3d 273, 737 N.E.2d 516 (2000) (client’s sentencing hearing; failure to 
appear at another client’s arraignment (and failure to appear at two show-cause hearings 
directed at respondent); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Harwood, 87 Ohio St.3d 123, 717 N.E.2d 
705 (1999) (trial); Cincinnati Bar v. Sullivan, discussed in prior paragraph. See also ORC 
4705.06, which provides: 
 If a suit is dismissed for the nonattendance of an attorney at law 
practicing in any court of record, it shall be at his costs, if he has not a 
just and reasonable excuse. He shall be liable for all damages his client 
sustains by such dismissal, or any other neglect of his duty, to be 
recovered in any court of record. 
Conduct of this sort, of course, may also support a claim for malpractice. See, e.g., Bingamon v. 
Curren, No. 90- CA-122, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5558 (Greene Nov. 21, 1991). 
Even if missing a formal deadline or hearing date is not involved, unreasonable delay just as surely 
will violate the Rule, and pre-Rule cases are in accord. See Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Dice, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 455, 2008 Ohio 6787, 900 N.E.2d 189 (seven extensions to file appellate brief in federal 
criminal case caused “unnecessary delay in his incarcerated client’s case,” id. at para. 4); Columbus 
Bar Ass’n v. Gueli, 119 Ohio St.3d 434, 2008 Ohio 4786, 894 N.E.2d 1231 (failure to 
conscientiously complete and file shared parenting agreement; failure to conscientiously pursue 
medical malpractice action); Disciplinary Counsel v. Bubna, 116 Ohio St.3d 294, 2007 Ohio 6436, 
878 N.E.2d 632 (delay of more than 18 months in paying client’s medical bills from settlement 
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proceeds adversely affected client’s credit and required him to repeatedly fend off collection efforts); 
Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Butts, 114 Ohio St.3d 472, 2007 Ohio 4265, 873 N.E.2d 279 (similar 
delay of 15 months in paying client’s creditors after settlement of personal injury action in client’s 
favor, resulting in lowering of client’s credit rating and her inability to obtain credit for loans).  
A prime example of extraordinary delay is found in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. McGill, 87 Ohio St.3d 128, 
717 N.E.2d 709 (1999), where the respondent filed a personal-injury suit on behalf of his client and 
initially pursued settlement possibilities with the insurance companies, but failed to provide 
necessary information to one of the insurance companies and then did nothing for years, with the 
result that the client’s suit was dismissed without prejudice and the client received no settlement 
monies from the insurance companies until she hired another lawyer. Respondent was sanctioned 
under former OH DR 6-101(A)(3) and 7-101(A)(2) for his “ten-year delay in processing his client’s 
claim against insurance companies which were ready to pay with proper releases . . . .”  Id. at 130, 
717 N.E.2d at 711. Other examples include: Columbus Bar Ass’n v. DeVillers, 116 Ohio St.3d 33, 
2007 Ohio 5552, 876 N.E.2d 530 (master commissioner appointed by probate court found “delay, 
neglect, and missing paperwork,” id. at para. 11, in respondent’s handling of five estate matters; in 
another count, respondent “failed to pay [another client’s] nursing home expenses on time and did not 
timely respond to the nursing home’s attempt to contact him,” id. at para. 8); Green County Bar 
Ass’n v. Fodal, 92 Ohio St.3d 99, 748 N.E.2d 1097 (2001) (numerous instances of dilatory action, 
many prejudicial to clients, including six-week delay in filing formal decree in divorce action, as 
result of which client’s child-support payments were delayed; failure to record deed of transfer six 
months after decree in divorce action; indefinite suspension imposed); Northwest Bar Ass’n v. 
Archer, 67 Ohio St.3d 97, 616 N.E.2d 210 (1993) (21-month delay in filing for bankruptcy and/or 
trusteeship); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Bridgeforth, 40 Ohio St.3d 2, 531 N.E.2d 317 (1988) (although 
client suffered no prejudice, lawyer’s nearly two-and-one-half year delay in incorporating client’s 
business was neglect subject to sanction). See also Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Mogul, 79 Ohio 
St.3d 369, 681 N.E.2d 1331 (1997), where the Supreme Court, relying on findings by the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals to the effect that respondent in a federal case had been “outrageously 
dilatory” with respect to discovery, adopted the conclusions of the panel and the board that his failure 
to respond to a motion for summary judgment in the federal action was not justified by allegedly 
having inadequate time for discovery and constituted a violation of former OH DR 6-101(A)(3).  Id. 
at 371, 681 N.E.2d at 1332. 
And there is certainly no room for the attitude expressed by one Ohio attorney who stated: 
“[I]f a client tells me that he’s impatient about the time going on and 
he’s highly disgruntled and he’s going to do something about it if I 
don’t get off my butt and get going, then it spurs me into action. Until I 
get such a call, I don’t know that the time is that important to the 
client.” 
Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Kelly, 4 Ohio St.3d 188, 190 n.3, 447 N.E.2d 1304, 1305 n.3 
(1983). 
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1.4:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.4 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.4 
 
1.4:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Division (a) is identical to MR 1.4(a), with the following exceptions: 
In division (a)(4) “promptly comply” has been replaced by “comply as 
soon as practicable”; “from the client” has been added after 
“information”. 
Division (b) is identical to MR 1.4(b). 
Division (c) is added; there is no comparable provision in MR 1.4. 
1.4:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rules 1.4(a) & (b): EC 7-8, 9-2. 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.4(c): DR 1-104. 
 
1.4:200  Duty to Communicate with Client 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.4(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.4(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  9.35, 9.38 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:501 
ALI-LGL §  20 
Wolfram §§ 4.5, 4.6 
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The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  9.35, 9.38 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.4 contains an explicit, comprehensive obligation on the part of a lawyer to communicate 
with clients. In the words of ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 55 (6th ed. 
2007) (commentary), this is “among the most fundamental of the lawyer’s obligations to the client.” 
It includes informing the client of any circumstance requiring the client’s informed consent and of the 
status of the matter (subdivisions (a)(1) & (3)), consulting as to the means by which the client’s 
objectives can be achieved ((a)(2)), complying with client requests for information ((a)(4)), and 
consulting with the client when the lawyer knows the client expects assistance not permitted by the 
Rules. (Subdivision (a)(5)). Under division (b), the lawyer must provide the client with the 
information necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions about matters arising during 
the representation. And, pursuant to a provision not found in the Model Rules, the lawyer must inform 
the client if the lawyer does not have a minimum amount of professional-liability insurance. (Division 
(c)). 
Rule 1.4(a)(1) was applied in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Brown, 121 Ohio St.3d 445, 2009 Ohio 
1249, 905 N.E.2d 184, where the respondent violated the Rule by cashing a cashier’s check made 
payable to the decedent without the consent of the client who had engaged him to administer the 
estate. Rule 1.4(a)(2) was invoked in Greene County Bar Ass’n v. Saunders, 127 Ohio St.3d 241, 
2010 Ohio 5708, 938 N.E.2d 352; the respondent there ignored the client’s calls, rather than 
consulting with her in order to determine the means of accomplishing her objectives, as the rule 
required. And Rule 1.4(a)(3) was found to have been violated in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Kizer, 123 
Ohio St.3d 188, 2009 Ohio 4763, 915 N.E.2d 314, where respondent failed to keep her clients 
informed of important information on the status of matters, such as failing to let the client know of 
hearing settings. Accord, as to 1.4(a)(3), Disciplinary Counsel v. Bursey, 124 Ohio St.3d 85, 2009 
Ohio 6180, 919 N.E.2d 198 (multiple instances of failure to keep clients apprised of status of 
matters). The respondent violated his 1.4(a)(4) duty to answer a client’s reasonable requests for 
information in Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Gottehrer, 124 Ohio St.3d 519, 2010 Ohio 929, 924 
N.E.2d 825. (For a case in which all of the subparts of Rule 1.4(a) (as well as 1.4(b) and (c)) were 
found to have been violated, see Lorain County Bar Ass’n v. Godles, 128 Ohio St.2d 279, 2010 
Ohio 6274, 943 N.E.2d 988.) 
Although there was no disciplinary rule directly addressing the issue, case law under the former 
OHCPR generally confirmed this obligation of communication. See Golauskas v. Elyria Foundry 
Co., 145 Ohio App.3d 490, 763 N.E.2d 645 (Lorain 2001) (citing both former OH EC 7-7 and 7-8 
in support of proposition that settlement offer must be transmitted by attorney to client). See generally 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-30, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 
(Dec. 16, 1988): 
Attorneys have an obligation to exert their best efforts to insure that 
their clients remain fully informed of all relevant considerations 
regarding the representation. 
Id. at *2-3. And see Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 74-6 (Mar. 22, 1974) (citing to former OH 
EC 9-2 in opining that criminal-defense lawyer should disclose to his clients in cases pending in X 
county that his brother-in-law is prosecuting attorney for X county). 
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A classic example under the Code of serial “fail[ure] to communicate with clients” is Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Broschak, 118 Ohio St.3d 236, 2008 Ohio 2224, 887 N.E.2d 1176.  Broschak was 
indefinitely suspended for a wide range of disciplinary violations, but prominent among them was the 
persistent communication failure.  Everyone of the eight counts in the complaint contained instances 
of respondent’s failure to respond to client requests or to provide information important to the 
representation (such as failure to inform his client of the dismissal of the client’s appeal).  If the Rules 
had been applicable, he clearly would have been guilty of multiple violations of 1.4(a) & (b). 
This general duty of communication was enforced under the Code primarily through invocation of 
OH DR 6-101(A)(3), the prohibition against neglect of an entrusted legal matter. Examples of these 
6-101(A)(3) failure-to-communicate decisions, which would now violate Rule 1.4(a)(3) (obligating 
the lawyer to keep the client informed about the status of the matter), include, in addition to Broschak, 
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 122 Ohio St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 2371, 907 N.E.2d 1172 (failure to 
apprise client of entry of summary judgment in opponent’s favor, resulting in client’s loss of 
opportunity to appeal decision); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Dice, 120 Ohio St.3d 455, 2008 Ohio 6787, 
900 N.E.2d 189 (“failing to properly provide status reports,” id. para. 5, to client regarding criminal 
appeal); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Schwieterman, 115 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007 Ohio 4266, 873 N.E.2d 
810 (failure to inform client that he was no longer with law firm and that he would be unavailable for 
a month); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Britt, 109 Ohio St.3d 97, 2006 Ohio 1933, 846 N.E.2d 
39 (even though client nurse “desperately wanted a hearing before the nursing board to explain the 
extraordinary circumstances of her situation,” respondent not only elected in the exercise of his 
“professional judgment” not to file the hearing request; he also failed to inform his client of this fact, 
id. at paras. 5-6; as a result, client likely received more severe sanction than she would have if 
hearing had been held; DR 6-103(A)(3) violated, among other rules).  
Failures of this sort also can result in viable malpractice claims. See Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 
103, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989) (failure to disclose to client settlement offer in civil action and failure to 
communicate to client prosecutor’s offer to dismiss charges in return for testimony in criminal action 
supported claim of malpractice).   
A lawyer’s ignoring reasonable requests for information about the representation, also treated as 
neglect under the Code, transgresses Ohio Rule 1.4(a)(4), and the Supreme Court so held in 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Brown, 121 Ohio St.3d 445, 2009 Ohio 1249, 905 N.E.2d 184 (failure to 
respond to client’s telephone calls seeking information violated 1.4(a)(4)).  For examples of such 
cases under the Code, see, again in addition to Broschak, Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Glatki, 88 Ohio 
St.3d 381, 726 N.E.2d 993 (2000) (numerous failures to communicate with clients about their cases, 
despite repeated inquiries by clients, violated OH DR 6-101(A)(3)); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Stranathan, 71 Ohio St.3d 303, 643 N.E.2d 1077 (1994) (failure to respond to client inquiries). 
Another pre-Rule case that demonstrates the importance of the 1.4(a)(4) duty of complying “as soon 
as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the client” is Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Kodish, 110 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006 Ohio 4090, 852 N.E.2d 160, where in numerous instances and 
with numerous clients, respondent repeatedly “ignored her client’s efforts to communicate about the 
pending bankruptcy case,” id. at para. 8, resulting in multiple violations of former OH DR 
6-101(A)(3). 
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An additional OH DR 6-101(A)(3) case involving the duty of communication is Cuyahoga County 
Bar Ass’n v. Hardiman, 100 Ohio St.3d 260, 2003 Ohio 5596, 798 N.E.2d 369, in which the 
Supreme Court held that this rule could be violated in the absence of an express attorney-client 
relationship. In rejecting respondent’s argument that no attorney-client relationship was formed 
because the client paid only a part of the requested retainer, the Court stated as follows with respect to 
the duty of communication in the circumstances: 
Based on Moore’s [the client] attempted communications, his partial 
payment, and respondent’s knowledge of the legal subject matter, 
respondent had a duty to inform Moore that he would not perform any 
work on the matter until full payment was received. We find that under 
these circumstances, an implied attorney-client relationship was 
formed, and respondent was entrusted with a legal matter, which he 
neglected. 
Id. at para. 11 (bracketed material added). See section 1.2:210.  
Other Rules imposing a duty to communicate with the client include: 
 Ohio Rule 1.5(e)(2), pursuant to which a division of fees by lawyers not in the same firm can 
be made only if the client has given written consent after full disclosure of the identity of each 
lawyer, that the fees will be divided, and that the division will be proportionate to services 
performed by each lawyer or that each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the 
representation. See, under the former OHCPR, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2003-3, 2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 6, 2003) (in all such cases, 
“each lawyer and client must sign a written disclosure of the terms of the division and the 
identity of all lawyers sharing in the fee.” Id. at *1). See section 1.5:800. 
 Ohio Rule 1.6(a) permits the lawyer to reveal information relating to the representation with 
the client’s informed consent, which, of course, posits communication by the lawyer 
sufficient to render the client’s consent informed. As is stated in ABA, Annotated Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 51 (5th ed. 2003) (commentary), “a lawyer’s duty to obtain 
client consent necessarily implies a duty to discuss the matter with the client.” See Lightbody 
v. Rust, 137 Ohio App.3d 658, 739 N.E.2d 840 (Cuyahoga 2000), and section 1.6:310. 
 Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [13] provides that if, in the course of seeking to protect confidential client 
information sought by court order, the lawyer receives an adverse ruling from the court, “the 
lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent required by 
Rule 1.4.” 
 Ohio Rule 1.7, in dealing with current-client conflicts of interest, permits the conflict to be 
waived by the client only upon giving informed consent, confirmed in writing (Rule 
1.7(b)(2)), provided the representation is not precluded, irrespective of waiver, by Rule 1.7(c). 
Cases decided under the Code include Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002 Ohio 4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, at para. 14 (for conflict waiver “informed 
consent by the clients must be obtained after full disclosure”); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Schwartz, 74 Ohio St.3d 984, 660 N.E.2d 422 (1996) (OH DR 5-105(C) violated where 
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attorney failed to advise clients possessing competing interests of any potentially adverse 
effects that might cause attorney to support for one client what his duty for other client 
required him to oppose). Compare Burton v. Selker, 36 F. Supp.2d 984 (N.D. Ohio 1999), 
aff’d, 30 Fed. Appx. 456 (6th Cir. 2002) (full disclosure and consent; waiver letter signed by 
client cured any conflict). Cf. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-3, 1993 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Apr. 16, 1993) (improper for creditor’s attorney to confess 
judgment pursuant to warrant of attorney in cognovit note unless warrant contained express 
waiver of conflict of interest or specified that creditor’s attorney could confess judgment). See 
sections 1.7:240 & :300. 
 
Note that the BCGD opined, under the Code, that where there are “interrelated multiple 
business transactions that impact the attorney-client relationship, the requirement of full 
disclosure and informed consent would be difficult to meet without the benefit of independent 
legal counsel for each client.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline Op. 2002-2, 
2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2, at *1 (Apr. 5, 2002). Note further that where former OH 
DR 5-101(A)(1) was intertwined with violations of disciplinary rules that did not provide any 
exception for client consent, such as former OH DR 2-103(B) (now Rule 7.2(b)) and 3-103 
(now Rule 5.4(b)), the consent exception was inapplicable. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 2002-1, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1, at *12 (Feb. 1, 2002) (since 
two of the four applicable disciplinary rules did not provide for client consent, “the ethical 
conflict cannot be alleviated through full consent and disclosure.”).  
 Ohio Rule 1.8(a) likewise requires informed consent in a writing signed by the client ((a)(3)) 
after full disclosure in writing ((a)(1)) before a lawyer can enter into a business transaction 
with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to the client. The client must 
also be advised in writing of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal 
counsel with respect to the transaction. Rule 1.8(a)(2). Pertinent authority under the former 
OHCPR includes Buttacavoli supra; Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Hovey, 78 Ohio St.3d 495, 
678 N.E.2d 1369 (1997) (respondent’s entering into business transaction with client, despite 
differing interests and without full disclosure, violated OH DR 5-104(A)); Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Hartke, 67 Ohio St.3d 65, 616 N.E.2d 186 (1993) (same; since client under 
disability, lawyer could not satisfy disclosure requirement without insisting that client receive 
independent legal advice). See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2004-8, 
2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 12 (Oct. 8, 2004) (attorney may acquire mortgage on 
client’s home to secure legal fee, but only after full disclosure and consent). 
 Ohio Rule 1.8(f)(1) provides that a lawyer shall not accept compensation for his legal 
services from someone other than the client, except with the informed consent of the client.  
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Linick, 84 Ohio St.3d 489, 705 N.E.2d 667 (1999) 
(former OH DR 5-107(A)(2) violated where in-house lawyer received payments from outside 
lawyers for client without client’s knowledge or consent, pursuant to kickback scheme); 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Schwartz, 74 Ohio St.3d 489, 660 N.E.2d 422 (1996) (former OH 
DR 5-107(A)(1) violated where respondent accepted compensation from client’s 
health-insurance carrier without full disclosure to, or informed consent by, client). And see Bd. 
of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-3, 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 
(June 7, 2001) (lawyer may obtain loan from third-party financial institution to pay expenses 
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of contingent-fee personal injury litigation, provided loan is not secured by client’s settlement 
or judgment; under OH DR 5-107(A)(2) lawyer should inform client that law firm is 
obtaining loan for purposes stated and obtain client’s consent thereto); Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2000-1, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 11, 2000) 
(ethically improper for lawyer to accept fee from financial-services group for referring clients 
in need of financial services; referral-fee arrangement created financial interest that would or 
reasonably might affect professional judgment of lawyer under OH DR 5-107(A)(1) & (2), 
and informed consent did not resolve conflict because another applicable rule (OH DR 
3-103(A)) provided no disclosure and consent exception); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 93-3, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Apr. 16, 1993) (improper under 
OH DR 5-107(A)(1) & (2) for attorney to accept legal fee from creditor for confessing 
judgment pursuant to warrant of attorney in cognovit note unless warrant contains express 
consent by debtor that confessing attorney may receive legal fee from creditor).  
 Ohio Rule 1.8(f)(4) provides that a lawyer compensated by an insurer to represent the insured 
under the policy must deliver a copy of the “Statement of Insured Client’s Rights” to the client, 
either in person at the first meeting with the client or by mail within ten days after the lawyer 
receives notice of retention by the insurer. The Statement of Insured Client’s Rights is set 
forth in full as a part of Rule 1.8(f)(4). See section 1.8:720. 
 Ohio Rule 1.8(g), prohibits aggregate settlements of civil claims of or against two or more 
clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo pleas, unless the 
settlement or agreement is subject to court approval or each client gives informed consent in a 
writing signed by the client. The lawyer’s disclosure must include the existence and nature or 
all claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement. Id. See 
Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Barr, 64 Ohio St.3d 20, 591 N.E.2d 1200 (1992) (failure to 
fully advise one client as to claims involved in proposed aggregate settlement on her and 
another client’s behalf and failure to obtain her consent in advance of settlement violated 
former OH DR 5-106(A)). See section 1.8:800. 
 Ohio Rule 1.15(d) requires that upon receiving funds or other property in which a client has 
an interest, a lawyer shall “promptly notify the client.” Under the Code, a lawyer’s failure to 
notify a client of funds received by the lawyer in settlement of a claim against an estate 
violated DR 9-102(B)(1), Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Walker, 28 Ohio St.3d 102, 502 N.E.2d 
646 (1986), as did the failure to notify the client of receipt of insurance proceeds, Bar Ass’n 
of Greater Cleveland v. Jaeger, 22 Ohio St.3d 39, 488 N.E.2d 216 (1986), or of funds 
received in payment of a judgment.  Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Cantagallo, 6 Ohio St.3d 10, 
451 N.E.2d 224 (1983). Among more recent cases finding violations of OH DR 9-102(B)(1), 
see Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Goldberg, 94 Ohio St.3d 337, 763 N.E.2d 119 (2002) 
(respondent, as attorney for estate, received checks payable to executor in excess of $740,000 
but failed to notify anyone connected with estate that he had received these funds); Toledo 
Bar Ass’n v. Slack, 88 Ohio St.3d 274, 725 N.E.2d 63 (2000) (respondent settled personal 
injury claim without client’s knowledge and then did not forward check and concealed fact of 
settlement from client for four years). See section 1.15:220. 
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 Ohio Rule 1.16(d) provides that upon termination of representation a lawyer shall take steps, 
to the extent reasonably practicable, to protect a client’s interest. This includes “giving due 
notice to [the] client.” Id. See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Keplar, 93 Ohio St.3d 134, 753 
N.E.2d 170 (2001) (closing office without notice to clients violated analogous Code provision, 
OH DR 2-110(A)(2)); cf. Trumbull County Bar Ass’n v. Donlin, 76 Ohio St.3d 152, 666 
N.E.2d 1137 (1996) (fact that notice to client of withdrawal was not in writing did not rise to 
level of OH DR 2-110(A)(2) violation). See section 1.16:500. 
 Ohio Rule 1.17(e) mandates that, prior to the completion of the sale of a law practice, both the 
selling and buying lawyer must provide written notice of the sale to the selling lawyer’s 
clients. (This is the obligation of the purchasing lawyer where the seller is the estate of a 
deceased lawyer or the representative of a disabled or disappeared lawyer. Ohio Rule 1.17(f)). 
See section 1.17:300. 
 See also Ohio Rule 1.2(a), which requires that a lawyer must “abide by a client’s decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the 
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued,” cited in Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2009-06, 2009 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (Aug. 14, 2009), 
with respect to such duty before outsourcing legal and support services to other lawyers or 
nonlawyers. Opinion 2009-06 is also cited infra at section 1.4:300. 
In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Clavner, 77 Ohio St.3d 431, 674 N.E.2d 1369 (1997), the 
Court publicly reprimanded a lawyer for failing to advise her clients to seek independent counsel 
before the clients signed a release exonerating the lawyer from further legal action against her. 
Although former OH DR 6-102 by its terms precluded such exoneration, the Supreme Court 
elaborated as follows: 
We do not read this rule so as to prohibit an attorney from ever raising a 
defense against or attempting to settle a malpractice action. However, 
this rule places an attorney on notice that when a client has a potential 
cause of action for malpractice, the attorney and the client are 
adversaries. . . . [C]ourts and professional ethics committees have said 
that a potential malpractice claim may be settled only if the client 
consents after full disclosure, the settlement is not unconscionable, 
inequitable, or unfair, and, most important, the client is advised to seek 
independent counsel before signing the agreement. [Citations omitted.] 
 . . . She [respondent] should have informed her clients of this 
adversarial relationship and their right to independent counsel before 
they signed the release. No good intentions on the part of respondent to 
spare the clients harm and no careful explanation of the terms of the 
release can excuse the violation of DR 6-102(A). 
Id. at 432, 674 N.E.2d at 1370. See Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Smith, 102 Ohio St.3d 10, 2004 Ohio 
1582, 806 N.E.2d 495, at para. 3.  
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Rule 1.8(h)(1) now provides that a lawyer may not prospectively limit malpractice liability (or 
require arbitration of claims against the lawyer) unless the client is in fact independently represented 
in making the agreement. See section 1.8:920. 
While it is ultimately the client’s right in a criminal case to decide on the plea to be entered and in a 
civil case whether to settle, to make this right meaningful counsel “must” convey to the client the 
substance of all proferred plea bargains and settlement offers. Ohio Rule 1.4 cmt. [2]. For a Code 
case in which, had the Rules of Professional Conduct been applicable, the misconduct would have 
violated Rule 1.4, see Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Hayes, 118 Ohio St.3d 336, 2008 Ohio 2466, 889 
N.E.2d 109 (failure to make client aware of plea offer in criminal case). See also section 1.2:320. 
1.4:300  Duty to Consult with Client 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.4(a) & (b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.4(a) & (b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  7.20, 7.22 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:501 
ALI-LGL §  20 
Wolfram §  4.5 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.20, 7.22 (1996). 
The outline for this treatise makes a distinction between the duty to “communicate” (section 1.4:200) 
and the duty to “consult” (section 1.4:300). This is based, in large part, on the pre-2002 amendment 
version of MR 1.4, pursuant to which a lawyer was required to keep the client “reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information” (MR 
1.4(a)) and to “explain” a matter so that the client could make informed decisions (MR 1.4(b)). While 
MR 1.4(b) is unchanged after the 2002 amendments, MR 1.4(a) (2002) now contains a to-do list that 
includes consultation, as well as merely providing information on the status of the case and the like. 
These provisions have been included in Ohio as Rules 1.4 (a)(1)-(5) and (b). This 1.4(a) listing, 
together with the explanation needed for informed client decisions mandated by Rule 1.4(b), 
provides a helpful checklist for Ohio lawyers in terms of the overall communication duty. Pursuant to 
1.4(a), the lawyer must: 
(1) inform the client of any decision requiring the client’s informed 
consent, 
(2) consult with the client about the means by which the client’s 
objectives are to be accomplished, 
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(3) keep the client informed about the status of a matter, 
(4) respond as soon as practicable to reasonable requests for 
information from the client, and 
(5) consult with the client about limitations on the lawyer’s 
representation when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance 
not permitted by the ethics rules. 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 2009-06, 2009 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (Aug. 
14, 2009), invokes Rule 1.4(a)(2) (together with numerous other rules) in opining that the (a)(2) 
obligation to consult with the client about the means of accomplishing the client’s objectives requires 
a lawyer, before outsourcing legal or support services to other lawyers or to nonlawyers, to disclose 
and consult with the client and obtain its informed consent.  See Kathryn A. Thompson, Do Tell, 
ABAJ, June 2010, at p. 26, discussing Opinion 2009-06 and the outsourcing issue generally. 
Failing to keep clients informed of the status of their matters and ignoring requests for information 
have resulted in violations of Rule 1.4(a)(3) & (4); see Disciplinary Counsel v. Siehl, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 78, 2009 Ohio 5936, 914 N.E.2d 192 (appointed to represent incarcerated client in 
postconviction proceedings, respondent did nothing on client’s behalf and ignored client’s requests to 
discuss case); Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Rozanc, 123 Ohio St.3d 78, 2009 Ohio 4207, 914 N.E.2d 
192 (estate proceedings), and Disciplinary Counsel v. Horan, 123 Ohio St.3d 60, 2009 Ohio 4177, 
914 N.E.2d 175 (divorce action). 
Ohio Rule 1.4(b) mandates that the lawyer “shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary 
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” Accord 1 Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  20(3) (2000). The first case of which we are aware to 
apply Rule 1.4(b) is Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Patterson, 124 Ohio St.3d 93, 2009 Ohio 6166, 
919 N.E.2d 206, where the respondent, as the designated lawyer selected by a foreclosure-avoidance 
operation, did not even meet with the client, much less provide the explanation necessary to permit 
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
As Professor Greenbaum advises: 
 Even in areas where decision-making authority rests with the 
lawyer, an attorney always has an obligation to exert his best efforts to 
insure that his client remains fully informed of all relevant 
considerations regarding the representation. 
Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.22 
(1996) (citing former OH EC 7-8 and Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-30, 
1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (Dec. 21, 1988)). Accord 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers §  20(1) (2000). Professor Greenbaum also stresses that “[b]road-based 
consultation between lawyer and client on both legal and non-legal considerations involved in the 
representation is encouraged.” Greenbaum at §  7.20. Note, however, that this encouragement does 
not go so far as to approve the lawyer’s serving in “‘a self-appointed role as a paraclete, comforter, 
helper, or hand holder, under the guise of legal services and at a lawyer’s compensation 
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rate.’“ Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Alsfelder, 103 Ohio St.3d 375, 2004 Ohio 5216, 816 N.E.2d 218 
(quoting from a Tennessee Supreme Court ethics decision; respondent “attempted to charge for his 
counsel in the manner that a therapist might, overlooking that an attorney, unless a qualified therapist, 
may no more engage in that profession than a therapist may practice law without a license.” Id. at 
para. 33). See further discussion at section 2.1:300. 
A detailed discussion by the Ohio Supreme Court of this duty of consultation, or “counseling” under 
the former OHCPR, is found in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Hardesty, 80 Ohio St.3d 444, 
687 N.E.2d 417 (1997). In Hardesty, the respondent yielded to the wishes of a number of his clients 
when he should have done otherwise. The Board found this to be a mitigating factor, but the Court 
disagreed. It proceeded to give a lecture on “hired guns,” who act “solely at the direction of their 
employers or clients . . . .”  Id. at 447, 687 N.E.2d at 419. This constitutes “neglecting their duty to 
counsel their clients”: 
Neither the position of an attorney as an employee, nor the pressure to 
retain a client in a competitive legal environment, can justify an 
attorney’s abdication of the duty of counseling. 
Id. Quoting extensively from former OH EC 7-8, the Supreme Court stressed the need to insure that 
client decisions are made only after the client is informed of the relevant considerations. Further, the 
lawyer should initiate the decision-making process if the client does not do so and should provide the 
client with advice on all aspects of the matter, not just purely legal considerations. This respondent 
did not do so; instead, he acted as a “hired gun” and “failed in his duty to counsel. We do not consider 
that a mitigating circumstance.” Id. Another lecture on counseling was given in Columbus Bar 
Ass’n v. Flanagan, 77 Ohio St.3d 381, 674 N.E.2d 681 (1997), where the Court was confronted 
with a situation in which the respondent allowed an untrained employee to advise clients with respect 
to bankruptcy matters and filings. In the words of the Supreme Court: 
 The counseling of a client in financial matters, particularly 
about his or her choice of remedies under the Bankruptcy Code . . . is a 
serious matter that deserves the attention of a qualified attorney. . . . 
* * * * 
 We expect that . . . respondent would at least interview and 
counsel his client before a course of action was chosen and the 
documents drafted. 
 We find respondent’s actions totally unprofessional and an 
abdication of his duty to his clients. We adopt the board’s finding that 
respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and 6-101(A)(3). 
Id. at 384, 674 N.E.2d at 683. Accord Akron Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 80 Ohio St.3d 6, 9, 684 N.E.2d 
288, 291 (1997) (“‘the lawyer’s job is not merely to supply whatever means are needed to achieve the 
client’s goals but also to deliberate with the client and on his behalf about these goals,”‘ quoting 
Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 132 (1993)). 
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The importance of consultation is also reflected in the criminal arena, in which a court’s denial of 
defendant’s right to employ and consult with counsel of choice may violate the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. See, e.g., Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1981) (writ of habeas corpus 
granted). 
 
1.4:400  Duty to Inform the Client of Settlement Offers 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.4 cmt. [2] 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.4 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:501 
ALI-LGL §  20 
Wolfram §  4.5 
As Ohio Rule 1.2(a) provides, the decision whether to settle a matter resides with the client. See 
section 1.2:320. To exercise that authority, the client must be informed of settlement offers. Ohio 
Rule 1.4 cmt. [2] leaves no doubt that an Ohio lawyer is obligated to transmit to the client 
information concerning settlement offers and that it is a disciplinary violation if he or she does not do 
so. Among the many decisions so holding under prior law were: 
 Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Slack, 88 Ohio St.3d 274, 725 N.E.2d 631 (2000) (settling case without 
client’s knowledge); 
 Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gunnoe, 79 Ohio St.3d 191, 680 N.E.2d 974 (1997) 
(settling without authorization from client violated former OH DR 7-101(A)(3)); 
 Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kornowski, 24 Ohio St.3d 50, 492 N.E.2d 833 (1986) 
(lawyer sanctioned for failure to communicate settlement offer); 
 Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Sigall, 14 Ohio St.3d 15, 470 N.E.2d 886 (1984) (lawyer 
sanctioned for entering into settlement without discussing with client). 
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1.4:500  Duty to Inform Client of Lack of Malpractice Insurance 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.4(c) 
Lawyers in Ohio are not required to carry malpractice insurance unless they practice “as part of a 
legal professional association, corporation, legal clinic, limited liability company, or limited liability 
partnership.” Ohio Rule 1.4 cmt. [8]. See also Gov Bar R III 4. Nevertheless, many in the public 
may believe that all lawyers carry such insurance.  Ohio Rule 1.4 cmt. [9]. In response to this 
concern, Rule 1.4(c) requires that a lawyer who does not carry a minimum amount of malpractice 
insurance ($100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in the aggregate), or whose malpractice insurance 
has been terminated, must so inform his clients at the time of engagement (or thereafter if the absence 
of such coverage occurs after engagement). A standard form of notice is appended to the Rule, as is a 
form of acknowledgement by the client that she has received the requisite notice. The lawyer must 
maintain a copy of the notice, as acknowledged by the client, for a minimum of five years after 
termination of the representation. Rule 1.4(c)(1). A lawyer involved in a division of fees under Rule 
1.5(e) must notify the client in accordance with Rule 1.4(c) before the client is asked to agree to the 
fee division. Rule 1.4(c)(2). The notice provision does not apply to either government or in-house 
lawyers. Rule 1.4(c)(3). 
Supreme Court decisions finding violation of the virtually identical former disciplinary rule, 1-104, 
where the respondent carried no malpractice insurance but failed to inform his clients of that fact as 
required, include, e.g., Akron Bar Ass’n v. Maher, 121 Ohio St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 356, 901 N.E.2d 
803, and Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Norton, 116 Ohio St.3d 226, 2007 Ohio 6038, 877 N.E.2d 964. In 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Trainor, 110 Ohio St.3d 141, 2006 Ohio 3825, 851 N.E.2d 505, the same 
rule was found to have been violated when the respondent failed to advise his client that his liability 
insurance had been cancelled. The sanction for this violation typically is a public reprimand, as it was 
in Trainor supra, but repetition can bring into play a more serious sanction. See Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Trainor, 129 Ohio St.3d 100, 2011 Ohio 2645, 950 N.E.2d 524 (24 month suspension with 
18 months stayed on conditions). (See also Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Engel, 105 Ohio St.3d 49, 2004 
Ohio 6900, 822 N.E.2d 346, where respondent was not charged with violation of OH DR 1-104, but 
his breach of it was considered by the panel as an aggravating factor in imposing a penalty.) In Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-3, 2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 6, 
2003), the Board opined that, in a division of fees by lawyers not in the same firm, each lawyer was 
responsible for providing the required written notice under former OH DR 1-104(A), and signatures 
of each lawyer and the client were required on the notice. This is consistent with Rule 1.4(c)(2), 
which was not contained in DR 1-104 (even though the Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.4 states 
that 1.4(c) “adopts the existing language in DR 1-104”). 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2007-6, 2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 
(August 10, 2007), opined that a court-appointed lawyer for an indigent defendant is not required to 
provide notice that the lawyer does not maintain professional liability insurance, since such a lawyer 
falls within the governmental entity exception in Rule 1.4(c)(3)(i). 
According to Richard Acello, Climate Change[:] States warm to the disclosure of liability 
coverage, ABAJ, Nov. 2009, at 29, 41, Ohio is one of seven states requiring disclosure regarding 
258
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.4 
 
malpractice insurance to clients; in addition there are 18 states that require a lawyer to disclose on her 
annual registration statement whether she carries malpractice insurance, and one state, Oregon, in 
which malpractice liability insurance is mandatory (and has been since 1977!). 
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1.5:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.5 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.5 
1.5:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.5(a) differs from MR 1.5(a) in the following respects: 
“illegal or clearly excessive fee” has been substituted for 
“unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses”. 
A new second sentence has been added. (Purporting to provide 
guidance as to when a fee is excessive -- i.e., it is excessive when a 
prudent lawyer would have the firm conviction that it is “in excess of a 
reasonable fee.”) 
Subdivisions (a)(1)-(8) are identical to MR 1.5(a)(1)-(8). 
Ohio Rule 1.5(b) differs from MR 1.5(b) in the following respects: 
In the first sentence, “nature and” has been added before “scope”; 
“unless” has been substituted for “except when”; “client whom the 
lawyer has regularly represented” has been substituted for “regularly 
represented client”; and “as previously charged.” has been substituted 
for “or rate.” 
In the second sentence, “changes” has been changed to “change”; “is 
subject to division (a) of this rule and” has been added after “expenses”; 
“promptly” replaces “also” after “shall”; and “, preferably in writing” 
has been added after “client”. 
Ohio Rule 1.5(c) differs from MR 1.5(c) in the following respects: 
In the opening sentence, “of this rule” has been added after “division 
(d)”. 
The remainder of MR 1.5(c) has been placed in new subdivision (c)(1). 
In the first sentence of subdivision (c)(1), “Each” has been substituted 
for “A”; and “and the lawyer” has been added after “client”. In the 
second sentence, “shall” has been substituted for “must”. The last 
sentence of MR 1.5(c) has been deleted. 
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A new subdivision (c)(2) (dealing with closing statements to the client 
when the lawyer is entitled to a contingent fee) has been added. 
Ohio Rule 1.5(d) differs from MR 1.5(d) in the following respects: 
In subdivision (d)(1), “spousal or child” has been substituted for 
“alimony or”; 
A new subdivision (d)(3) (dealing with “earned upon receipt” or 
“nonrefundable”, etc., fees) has been added. 
Ohio Rule 1.5(e) (dealing with division of fees between lawyers not in same firm) has been 
substituted for the text of MR 1.5(e) on the same subject. 
Ohio Rule 1.5(f) (dealing with resolution of fee disputes between lawyers) has no counterpart in MR 
1.5. 
1.5:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.5(a): DR 2-106(A) & (B). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.5(b): EC 2-18. 
The following are listed in the Correlation Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 
1.5(c): EC 2-18, R.C. 4705.15. 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.5(d): DR 2-106(C), EC 2-19. 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rules 1.5(e) & (f): DR 2-107. 
1.5:200  A Lawyer’s Claim to Compensation 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.5 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.5 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  2.112, 2.115-2.117, 
2.127, 2.129-2.130 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  41:101 
ALI-LGL §§  38-42 
Wolfram §§  9.1-9.6 
1.5:210  Client-Lawyer Fee Agreements 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.127 (1996). 
In general: Fee agreements may be structured in many different ways. The Rule requires that, 
regardless of the form of the fee arrangement, the fees be both legal and not clearly excessive. Ohio 
Rule 1.5(a). The distinction between reasonable and excessive fees is discussed in section 1.5:410. 
Illegal fees are addressed in sections 1.5:710-:730. The Rule sets forth the requirements for 
contingent-fee arrangements in 1.5(c), and for fee-splitting arrangements among lawyers who are not 
in the same firm in 1.5(e). See sections 1.5:600-:610 and 1.5:800, respectively. In addition to these 
provisions, fee arrangements are also regulated by statute and court rules. See, e.g., ORC 4705.15 
(contingency fees); OH Sup R 68(B), 69(B), 70(C), 71.  For an overview of fee agreements in Ohio, 
see Kenneth R. Donchatz, Fee Agreements: Who Needs Them?, Ohio Law. Nov./Dec. 2006, at 
19. 
Under the former OHCPR, if the lawyer and client entered into an express agreement as to fees, and 
the lawyer was not discharged before completion of the representation, that agreement controlled if 
otherwise proper.  Baer v. Woodruff, 111 Ohio App.3d 617, 676 N.E.2d 1195 (Franklin 1996). 
Quantum meruit was unavailable in such circumstances as an alternative measure of recovery. Id. 
Once an express agreement was entered into, it could not be unilaterally changed by the attorney.  
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Bell, 78 Ohio St.3d 88, 676 N.E.2d 527 (1997). 
If the lawyer was discharged, with or without just cause, the rule of Fox & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. 
Purdon, 44 Ohio St.3d 69, 541 N.E.2d 448 (1989) (see section 1.16:600), limited his or her claim to 
compensation to the reasonable value of the services actually rendered prior to the date of discharge -- 
quantum meruit recovery.  Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachick & Webster v. Lansberry, 68 
Ohio St.3d 570, 629 N.E.2d 431 (1994). Accord Harraman v. Howlett, 2004 Ohio 5566, 2004 
Ohio App. LEXIS 5025 (Morrow); Roberts v. Hutton, 152 Ohio App.3d 412, 2003 Ohio 1650, 
787 N.E.2d 1267 (Franklin). Any attempt in the retainer agreement to set in advance a reasonable 
value for services performed prior to termination was invalid if it did not reflect the true value of that 
work. Id. at para. 37 (finding invalid clause in contingent-fee contract that defined market value of 
discharged lawyer’s pre-termination services as 33⅓% of “last best offer” received before 
termination). 
A more complicated fee-issue case was Charles Gruenspan Co., L.P.A. v. Thompson, 2003 Ohio 
3641, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 3287 (Cuyahoga). There the court faced a situation in which a lawyer 
had two contracts with the client, each involving a separate matter, one for an hourly fee and the other 
on a contingency. In a fee dispute following discharge by the client in the litigation covered by the 
contingent-fee contract, the lower court lumped the fees together and evaluated them all on a quantum 
meruit basis. Reversing and remanding, the appellate court found that each contract should have been 
evaluated separately, providing hourly recovery on one and quantum meruit recovery on the other. 
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There is no reason to think that these pre-Rule decisions are not still good law. 
Interest charges: Ohio Rule 1.5 does not address explicitly whether an attorney may charge a client 
interest on delinquent accounts. Under the former OHCPR, the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline opined that a lawyer was allowed to charge interest, but only if the fee 
agreement between attorney and client included both the interest rates to be charged and the time 
periods when they would apply. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-12, 1991 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 18 (June 14, 1991). Accord Ohio State Bar Ass’n Formal Op. 35 
(Nov. 20, 1981). To support this position, the Board of Commissioners cited a Cleveland Bar 
Association ethics opinion suggesting that interest may be charged only if the client is advised and 
expressly agrees to pay interest. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 145 (Mar. 28, 1980). Interest charges 
must be in compliance with any applicable statutory requirements pertaining to interest rates and 
related charges, Op. 91-12, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 18, and cannot be “clearly excessive.” 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 82-1 (Mar. 10 1982). It is unsettled whether an interest charge 
that is in compliance with statutory requirements could nevertheless be found to be clearly excessive; 
one would think not. 
A somewhat different issue arises where a lawyer successfully sues a client in a fee dispute. Absent a 
superseding written contractual arrangement, the court may make an award of post-judgment interest.  
Ryan v. Terra Vista Estates, 108 Ohio App.3d 595, 671 N.E.2d 551 (Cuyahoga 1996) (applying 
ORC 1343.03). 
1.5:220  A Lawyer’s Fee in Absence of Agreement 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.112, 2.129 (1996). 
Under former law, in the absence of a fee agreement the lawyer’s right to compensation was 
determined by application of the doctrine of quantum meruit. Gioffre v. Simakis, 72 Ohio App.3d 
424, 594 N.E.2d 1013 (Franklin 1991). See Sonkin & Melena Co., L.P.A. v. Zaransky, 83 Ohio 
App.3d 169, 614 N.E.2d 807 (Cuyahoga 1992) (providing a good explanation of the doctrine of 
quantum meruit). As noted, under that doctrine, the lawyer is to be paid the reasonable value of the 
services rendered, based on the totality of the circumstances, in accordance with the guidelines set 
forth in former OH DR 2-106.  Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachik & Webster v. Lansberry, 68 
Ohio St.3d 570, 629 N.E.2d 431 (1994). See generally 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers §  39 (2000). 
Presumably, this application of quantum meruit will continue under the Rules, although its 
applicability will be restricted by the Rule 1.5(b) requirement of a fee agreement in all matters except 
those involving a regularly represented client charged on the same basis as previously charged. See 
section 1.5:500. 
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1.5:230  Fees on Termination [see 1.16:600] 
1.5:240  Fee Collection Procedures 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.130 (1996). 
Fee disputes often can be avoided if the lawyer and client have a clear understanding of the fee 
arrangement at the outset. See section 1.5:500. Even with such precautions, however, fee disputes 
still may arise. 
Under the former OHCPR, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline interpreted 
OH EC 2-15 (reasonable fees are necessary for the viability of the legal community) and OH EC 
2-22 (urging amicable resolution of fee disputes) together, not only to acknowledge the necessity of 
collecting reasonable fees, but also to encourage the lawyer to be amicable in the effort to do so. Bd. 
of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-16, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (June 
14, 1991). This might include requiring a lawyer to submit fee disputes to an appropriate bar 
association fee dispute committee, if the client so desires. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 92-1, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 20 (Feb. 14, 1992). See Rule 1.5 cmt. [10], 
discussed in section 1.5:250. 
While the explicit focus of former OH EC 2-22 was on avoiding fee controversies, the Board stated 
that similar concerns apply with respect to costs and expenses as well. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 87-001, 1987 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 28 (Oct. 16, 1987). To 
help avoid unnecessary disputes over these items, the Board encouraged attorneys to inform the client 
up front that the client is ultimately liable for costs and expenses incurred. Id. See section 1.8:610, 
discussing advancement of litigation expenses by the attorney and ultimate liability of the client for 
those expenses, unless repayment by the client of such expenses is made contingent on the outcome of 
the litigation. Ohio Rule 1.8(e)(1). For whatever reason, Ohio Rule 1.5(a) deletes the MR 1.5(a) 
language banning unreasonable expenses. See section 1.5:410, at “Expenses and the reasonableness 
requirement.” 
The decision to sue a client for fees or costs is a business decision, not a legal one. Op. 87-001, 1987 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 28. Before the attorney sues a client for delinquent fees, the attorney 
should be sure that the fee is reasonable and that every effort has been made by the lawyer to resolve 
the dispute in an amicable manner. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-16, 1991 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (June 14, 1991). If this fails, however, a lawyer may bring suit for 
unpaid fees, use a collection agency to collect delinquent bills, and/or employ a retaining lien. Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-8, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (Apr. 10, 
1992) (common-law right to retaining lien codified in former OH DR 5-103(A), now Rule 1.8(i)(1); 
see section 1.8:1130); Op. 91-16, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (approving use of a 
collection agency, but warning that former OH DR 4-101(C)(4) allowed an attorney to reveal only 
those secrets and confidences of the client necessary to collect delinquent fees). The applicable rule is 
now stated in Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(5). See section 1.6:340. See generally, as to limits on fee-collection 
methods, 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  41 (2000). 
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Finally, there are instances in the cases in which it would appear that the decision to sue a client for 
fees is a bad business decision.  E.g., Donald Harris Law Firm v. Dwight-Killian, 166 Ohio 
App.3d 796, 2006 Ohio 2347, 853 N.E.2d 364 (Erie).  In Donald Harris, the agreed upon fee was 
$450, of which the client paid $270.  Although it was made clear to the client that the firm would not 
go forward with the bankruptcy petition for which the firm had been engaged unless the fee was paid 
in full, the client thereafter decided she did not want to proceed with the bankruptcy.  The firm 
nevertheless sued the client for the balance ($180), plus interest, because it had prepared a 
“preliminary” petition.  The client counterclaimed for a refund of the $270, asserting that the firm told 
her that if she decided not to go forward, the firm would refund any payments already made.  The 
lower court ruled against the firm on its claim and for the client on her refund counterclaim.  The court 
of appeals affirmed.  One wonders how many dollars the firm spent chasing $180 and ending up 
having to pay $270.   
Bringing a suit for fees may also trigger a claim for malpractice in response. In fact such a 
counterclaim may be compulsory. Compare Climaco, Seminatore, Delligatti & Hollenbaugh v. 
Carter, 100 Ohio App.3d 313, 653 N.E.2d 1245 (Franklin 1995) (treating the two claims as so 
intertwined as to trigger the compulsory counterclaim rule in the ordinary case; here the original 
claim was for malpractice and the fee counterclaim would have been compulsory), with Ross v. 
Burns, No. 1996CA00190, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1023 (Stark) (finding that fee claim and 
malpractice claim on the facts of this case were not so linked as to make one a compulsory 
counterclaim to the other). 
1.5:250  Fee Arbitration 
Ohio Rule 1.5 cmt. [9] provides that if a mandatory procedure has been prescribed for settling fee 
disputes between a client and a lawyer, such as arbitration or mediation by a local or the state bar 
association, the lawyer must comply. The comment urges that the lawyer conscientiously consider 
submitting to such procedures, even where voluntary. 
When arbitration is agreed upon by the lawyer and client as the means to resolve a fee dispute, the 
lawyer ignores the arbitration award at his peril.  After failing to appear at the arbitration hearing, at 
which the client was awarded $10,000+, respondent’s failure to comply with the award resulted in a 
violation of DR 1-102(A)(6).  Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Kehn, 112 Ohio St.3d 547, 2007 
Ohio 809, 862 N.E.2d 92. 
While fee arbitration is a favored form of dispute resolution, it was opined under the former OHCPR 
that it would be improper to include in the engagement letter a requirement that the client submit all 
fee disputes to arbitration. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 96-9, 1996 WL 
734408 (Dec. 6, 1996). It is doubtful that this Board opinion survives under the new Rules. See ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 80 (6th ed. 2007), noting that the Comment [9] 
procedure “may be one upon which the parties agree before representation,” citing ABA Formal Op. 
02-425 (Feb. 20, 2002) (retainer agreement requiring arbitration of fee disputes permissible if client 
is fully apprised of pros and cons and gives informed consent). As the ABA opinion indicates, in any 
resolution procedure envisioned by Comment [9], mandatory or otherwise for the lawyer, the client 
would have to consent thereto, even though the comment does not expressly so state. See 1 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  42(1) & cmt. b(iv) (2000). 
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See section 1.5:800 at “Disputes between lawyers over fee splitting” for discussion of arbitration 
between lawyers of different firms in the fee-splitting context. 
1.5:260  Forfeiture of Lawyer’s Compensation 
In contrast to the lawyer’s right to quantum meruit compensation even if discharged by the client for 
cause (see section 1.16:600), a lawyer’s withdrawal from representation without just cause results in 
forfeiture of the fee; the lawyer may not recover for the services rendered either under the contract or 
on a quantum meruit theory.  W. Wagner & Co., L.P.A. v. Block, 107 Ohio App.3d 603, 669 
N.E.2d 272 (Erie 1995); Sandler v. Gossick, 87 Ohio App.3d 372, 622 N.E.2d 389 (Cuyahoga 
1993). 
It should be noted that one of the sanctions for conflict-of-interest violations is fee forfeiture, and at 
least one court in Ohio (a federal district court finding violations of the OHCPR), in addition to 
ordering disqualification, precluded the lawyer from recovering any fee.  Baker v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ohio 1995). See section 1.7:260. 
1.5:270  Remedies and Burden of Persuasion in Fee Disputes 
The material in this section is excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide 
to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.115-2.117 (1996). 
The rate to be charged for legal services depends a great deal on the standards of the legal community. 
A fee is considered “clearly excessive” and therefore improper under Ohio Rule 1.5(a) when, “after a 
review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction 
that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.” While this requirement suggests a high standard of proof 
in disciplinary cases before one is sanctioned for charging an excessive fee, the courts, under the 
identical language of former OH DR 2-106(B), usually have not relied explicitly on this standard. For 
the most part, it seems as though the court determines what a reasonable fee would be, and then if the 
fee charged is substantially in excess of that, treats the fee as clearly excessive. See, e.g., Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Curren, 39 Ohio St.3d 117, 529 N.E.2d 930 (1988) ($67,000 constituted 
excessive fee where Court found $30,000 to be reasonable); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Stinson, 25 Ohio St.3d 130, 495 N.E.2d 434 (1986) ($9,400 constituted excessive fee where $2,000 
found to be reasonable). 
To the extent questions of reasonableness arise in a contract dispute over payment of the fee, the 
burden of proof is on the attorney to show the fee’s reasonableness.  Heller v. McLaughlin, No. 
70072, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4179 (Cuyahoga Sept. 26, 1996). Accord Climaco, Seminatore, 
Delligatti & Hollenbaugh v. Carter, 100 Ohio App.3d 313, 653 N.E.2d 1245 (Franklin 1995). 
See Monastra v. D’Amore, 111 Ohio App.3d 296, 676 N.E.2d 132 (Cuyahoga 1996) (on need for 
expert testimony to refute reasonableness of attorney fees claim, unless issues are within 
understanding of layperson). See generally, as to a lawyer’s burden of proof in fee disputes, 1 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  42(2) (2000). 
If the contract between an attorney and a client bases the fee on an hourly rate and the exact number of 
hours to be worked is not specified, the attorney has the burden to show, in an action for the alleged 
fees due, that the hours charged were fairly and properly charged.  Jacobs v. Holston, 70 Ohio 
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App.2d 55, 434 N.E.2d 738 (Lucas 1980). To help meet this burden, an attorney should keep time 
records of the work done for each client.  In re Betts, 62 Ohio Misc.2d 30, 587 N.E.2d 997 (C.P. 
Ross 1991). In a case where the attorney failed to provide an itemized list specifying the time spent on 
each charge, the court, in its discretion in fixing a fee award for civil contempt, reduced the attorney’s 
estimated fee by one half.  Dayton Women’s Health Ctr., Inc. v. Enix, 86 Ohio App.3d 777, 621 
N.E.2d 1262 (Montgomery 1993). While an attorney has an implied duty to keep track of the time 
spent on a case to determine attorney fees, according to one Ohio appellate court time records are not 
mandatory, Cannell v. Bulicek, 8 Ohio App.3d 331, 457 N.E.2d 891 (Cuyahoga 1983). Nor are 
they expressly required by Rule 1.5. 
In establishing the reasonable value of services in the context of a statutory fee award, evidence of the 
novelty of the issue may need to be presented if novelty is asserted as a reason for increasing the fee.  
Moraine v. Baker, 34 Ohio Misc. 77, 297 N.E.2d 122 (C.P. Montgomery 1971) (where no 
evidence is brought to court’s attention establishing novelty or difficulty of legal issues involved, fees 
cannot be inflated based on such grounds). 
A disciplinary case in which the failure to produce billing records undercut the respondent’s argument 
with respect to work allegedly done for the client on a domestic relations matter is Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Carlson, 111 Ohio St.3d 281, 2006 Ohio 5707, 855 N.E.2d 1218 (respondent testified 
he had lost client’s file; fee charged found excessive).  The failure adequately to document time spent 
(or to be able to reconstruct it) was also fatal to respondent’s argument that his fee was not excessive 
in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Farmer, 111 Ohio St.3d 137, 2006 Ohio 5342, 855 N.E.2d 462.  
Underscoring that the burden of persuasion as to such matters is on the lawyer, the Court stressed that 
the respondent “still has not provided even the roughest estimate of how much time he devoted to 
each task.”  Id. at para. 34.  As a result, 
 [r]espondent has failed to provide any reliable explanation for 
charging the Martins nearly $9,000 in legal fees.  Absent this 
accounting, we can only conclude that his fees were clearly excessive. 
Id. at para. 35. 
1.5:300  Attorney-Fee Awards (Fee Shifting) 
Primary Ohio References 
ORC 119.092, 309.13, 2323.51, 2335.39, 4112.05(G) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.5 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  41:311 
Wolfram § 16.6 
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1.5:310  Paying for Litigation: The American Rule 
Under the American Rule, which has been adopted in Ohio, parties to litigation usually have to pay 
their own attorney fees and cannot recover them as costs from the other side if they prevail. E.g., 
Krasny-Kaplan Corp. v. Flo-Tork, Inc., 66 Ohio St.3d 75, 609 N.E.2d 152 (1993). Nevertheless, 
this general principle is subject to both common-law and statutory exceptions. 
 
1.5:320  Common-Law Fee Shifting 
While a party is usually responsible for its own attorney fees under the American Rule, the common 
law recognizes instances in which this responsibility can be shifted to the losing party in litigation. 
Perhaps most noteworthy is the so-called “bad faith” exception, which permits an award of attorney 
fees to the prevailing party when a court has determined that the opposing party has acted maliciously 
or in bad faith. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rose v. James, 57 Ohio St.3d 14, 565 N.E.2d 547 (1991); 
TOL Aviation, Inc. v. Intercargo Ins. Co., 2006 Ohio 6061, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6008 
(Lucas); McClure v. Fischer Attached Homes, 146 Ohio Misc.2d 67, 2008 Ohio 2676, 889 
N.E.2d 602 (C.P. Clermont). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held, as a matter of federal law, 
that the bad-faith exception does not permit an award of attorney fees based upon a party’s exercise of 
bad faith in the conduct giving rise to the underlying cause of action.  Shimman v. Int’l Union of 
Operating Eng’rs, 744 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Rather, the exception applies only 
where the losing party has demonstrated bad faith during the course of the litigation, or in the filing of 
the suit itself. Id. It appears that this rule is observed, at least implicitly, by Ohio state courts as well. 
See, e.g., Sorin v. Bd. of Educ., 46 Ohio St.2d 177, 347 N.E.2d 527 (1976); Vinci v. Ceraolo, 79 
Ohio App.3d 640, 607 N.E.2d 1079 (Cuyahoga 1992) (citing Shimman with approval). But see 
McClure supra, where the bad faith exception was invoked based on the underlying filing of an 
improper lien. For a case in which the bad-faith exception was found inapplicable, see Murphey, 
Young & Smith Co., L.P.A. v. Billman, Nos. 84AP-49, 84 AP-198, 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 11643 
(Franklin Nov. 20, 1984) (presentation of “colorable” defenses sufficient to preclude finding of bad 
faith). See also Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 119 F. Supp.2d 787 (S.D. Ohio 2000) 
(nothing in record from which ill-will, malice, or bad faith could reasonably be inferred). 
A second common-law exception to the American Rule permits a successful plaintiff to seek recovery 
of attorney fees as an element of compensatory damages if punitive damages are allowable and 
awarded under Ohio tort law. See, e.g., Zappitelli v. Miller, 114 Ohio St.3d 102, 2007 Ohio 3251, 
868 N.E.2d 968; Galmish v. Cicchini, 90 Ohio St.3d 22, 35, 734 N.E.2d 782, 795 (2000); Summa 
Health Sys. v. Viningre, 140 Ohio App.3d 780, 749 N.E.2d 344 (Summit 2000). Compare TOL 
Aviation supra (following rule; no finding below that prevailing insured entitled to punitive damage 
award in bad faith action against insurer; therefore award of attorney fees to insured reversed). 
However, a plaintiff’s right to recover additional attorney fees for services rendered on appeal in such 
cases has not been recognized in Ohio. See Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 744 F.2d 
1226 (6th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (applying state law regarding attorney fees to state-law assault and 
battery claim pendent to federal claims). And see ORC 2307.80(C)(1) & (D)(1), enacted as part of 
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Ohio’s Tort Reform Act, effective April 7, 2005. Those provisions insulate manufacturers from 
punitive damages if they have complied with government standards concerning the matter at issue. 
Note that the TOL court seems to come down on both sides of the interplay between the bad faith and 
punitive damages elements on the issue of awarding attorney fees. First, with respect to the 
underlying litigation, the court of appeals appears to hold that bad faith alone will support an attorney 
fee award as a part of compensatory damages, even if there are no punitive or other actual damages, 
citing, e.g., Vance v. Roedersheimer, 64 Ohio St.3d 552, 597 N.E.2d 153 (1992). But in the 
follow-up bad faith litigation against the insurer, despite a finding of bad faith, attorney fees were 
denied in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages, citing Zoppo v. 
Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397 (1994). The appellate court’s conclusory 
explanation in TOL was that in the underlying action the fees were compensatory, whereas in the 
follow-up suit the attorney fees “are not so much compensation to the insured as they are punishment 
to the insurer.” 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6008, at para. 88. 
The final class of common-law exceptions to the American Rule involves the creation of a common 
fund through a class-action recovery. Ohio law allows an award of attorney fees to a plaintiff who, at 
his own expense, files a suit that is successful in creating, enlarging, or protecting a monetary or 
property fund shared by members of a class. See, e.g., Smith v. Kroeger, 138 Ohio St. 508, 37 
N.E.2d 45 (1941); Wyser-Pratte v. Van Dorn Co., 49 F.3d 213 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 
1.5:330  Statutory Fee Shifting 
The American Rule is also sometimes altered by statute. A number of statutory provisions in Ohio 
allow prevailing parties to seek to recover some or all of their attorney fees from their opponents. 
Typical provisions allow an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party when: 
 The state’s position in initiating a lawsuit is not substantially justified, and the prevailing party 
has not engaged in any dilatory conduct that unnecessarily delayed the final resolution of the 
case. ORC 2335.39. See Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 
176 Ohio App.3d 678, 2008 Ohio 2845, 891 N.E.2d 352 (local school district was 
“prevailing eligible party” under statute for attorney fees purposes). The same holds true for 
adjudicative proceedings initiated by administrative agencies. ORC 119.092. 
 The opposing party has engaged in frivolous conduct, either through its actions during the 
course of litigation or by the commencement of the suit itself, and such conduct has adversely 
affected the prevailing party. ORC 2323.51. 
 A successful suit is filed by a taxpayer against a county government or agent, to prevent or 
enjoin the misapplication or illegal withdrawal of funds from the county treasury. ORC 
309.13. 
 A civil claim is brought under Ohio’s RICO statute, ORC 2923.31 et. seq. A prevailing 
plaintiff “shall” be awarded reasonable attorney fees, ORC 2923.34(G); a prevailing 
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defendant “may” be granted attorney fees. ORC 2923.34(H). See Bourke v. Carnahan, 163 
Ohio App.3d 818, 2005 Ohio 5422, 840 N.E.2d 1101 (Franklin). 
 The Ohio Civil Rights Commission has determined that an individual or entity has engaged in 
unlawful housing or lending discrimination. ORC 4112.05(G). 
 The consumer files or maintains in bad faith a groundless action under the Ohio Consumer 
Sales Practices Act, or the supplier knowingly violates the Act. ORC 1345.09(F). See Borror 
v. MarineMax of Ohio, Inc., 2007 Ohio 562, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 525 (Ottawa). 
 The relator newspaper confers a public benefit in successfully seeking records under the Ohio 
Public Records Act, ORC 149.43. See, e.g., State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ’g Co. v. 
Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741 N.E.2d 511 (2001). 
Closely related to statutes such as ORC 2323.51 are the various court rules that permit the assessment 
of attorney fees against an offending party or lawyer for frivolous or otherwise improper conduct. See 
OH Civ R 11, OH App R 23, and SCt Prac R 14.5(A). These provisions, as well as ORC 2323.51, 
are discussed in detail in section 3.1:300. 
In addition to the common-law (see section 1.5:320) and statutory exceptions, fee shifting may be 
provided for as a matter of contract. While the Court has chosen to distinguish and not overrule 
Miller v. Kyle, 85 Ohio St. 186, 97 N.E. 372 (1911), which remains the law “regarding the 
enforceability of attorney-fee provisions in connection with the enforcement of a debt obligation, 
including a foreclosure proceeding,” the new general rule is that such provisions are enforceable 
where equal bargaining power and lack of indicia of compulsion are present; these “are characteristics 
of agreements that are entered into freely” and “[i]n such instances, agreements to pay another’s 
attorney fees are generally ‘enforceable and not void as against public policy so long as the fees are 
fair, just and reasonable . . . .’” Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 121 Ohio St.3d 546, 2009 Ohio 306, 
906 N.E.2d 396, at paras. 16, 8 (the latter of which quotes from Nottingdale Homeowners’ Ass’n v. 
Darby, 33 Ohio St.3d 32, 514 N.E.2d 702 (1987) (syllabus)). Accord Worth v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 32 Ohio St.3d 238, 513 N.E.2d 253 (1987). As noted above, the touchstone of enforceability is 
one of an agreement to pay fees that “can fairly be said to be the product of a ‘free and understanding 
negotiation, . . .’ between ‘parties of equal bargaining power and similar sophistication.’” Vermeer of 
S. Ohio, Inc. v. Argo Constr. Co., 144 Ohio App.3d 271, 278, 760 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Hamilton 2001) 
(quoting from Worth, 32 Ohio St.3d at 243, 513 N.E.2d at 258, and from Newman v. Salamander 
Indus. Prods., Inc., Nos. C-970811, C-970843, C-970879, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1667, at 
*18-19 (Hamilton Apr. 16, 1999)). Accord Watson Gravel, Inc. v. Tri-State Serv. Station Maint. 
Inc., 190 Ohio App.3d 295, 2010 Ohio 6278, 941 N.E.2d 866 (Butler). 
 
1.5:340  Financing Litigation [see 1.8:600] 
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1.5:400  Reasonableness of a Fee Agreement 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.5(a), (d)(3) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.5(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.112-2.113, 
2.116-2.127 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  41:301 
ALI-LGL §  34 
Wolfram §  9.3.1 
1.5:410  Excessive Fees 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  2.112-2.113, 2.116-2.125, 2.127.1 
(1996). 
Fees - In general: The basic principle underlying the fees-for-legal-services provisions is that a 
“lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.” Ohio 
Rule 1.5(a). Excessive fees limit the availability of legal services to the public by making them less 
affordable, take advantage of the lawyer-client relationship, and cast the profession in a negative light. 
Reasonable fees, in contrast, enhance the availability of legal services by making them more 
affordable, and promote the provision of legal services by attorneys. Adequate compensation works 
to maintain the integrity and independence of the legal profession and to reduce the possibility that an 
under-compensated lawyer might be tempted to cut corners in representing a client or to take on more 
matters than the lawyer can handle effectively. If not for the possibility of collecting reasonable legal 
fees, there would likely be fewer and less-qualified lawyers to protect lay persons’ legal rights. 
The fee assessed ultimately must comply with the standards set forth in Ohio Rule 1.5(a). 
Disciplinary cases to date applying Rule 1.5(a) include Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Clovis, 125 Ohio 
St.3d 434, 2010 Ohio 1859, 928 N.E.2d 1078, Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Gottehrer, 124 
Ohio St.3d 519, 2010 Ohio 929, 924 N.E.2d 825, Disciplinary Counsel v. Schiller, 123 Ohio St.3d 
200, 2009 Ohio 4909, 915 N.E.2d 324, and Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Spector, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 271, 2009 Ohio 1155, 903 N.E.2d 637, all of which involved failure to return unearned 
retainers; Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 126 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010 Ohio 3287, 932 N.E.2d 323 
(depositing in his personal account $18,000 of client’s money that, pursuant to client’s instructions, 
was to be placed in trust; conduct also violated, inter alia, Rules 1.15(a) and (d)), Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Cantrell, 125 Ohio St.3d, 458, 2010 Ohio 2114, 928 N.E.2d 1100 (receiving attorney 
fees not approved by probate court), and Disciplinary Counsel v. Bursey, 124 Ohio St.3d 85, 2009 
Ohio 6180, 919 N.E.2d 198 (failing to pay over all settlement money to which client was entitled); 
Akron Bar Ass’n v. Carr, 131 Ohio St.3d 210, 2012 Ohio 610, 963 N.E.2d 802 (detailed 
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reiteration of relator’s expert witness’ testimony that respondent’s bills were excessive, based 
primarily on conclusion that time spent on various tasks was unreasonable. E.g., 2.8 hours billed for 
preparation of second set of interrogatories consisting of one question). In McClure v. Fischer 
Attached Homes, 146 Ohio Misc.2d 70, 2008 Ohio 2677, 889 N.E.2d 612, the court applied the 
1.5(a) criteria in awarding reasonable attorney fees. Another case applying Rule 1.5(a), In re Estate 
of Keytack, 147 Ohio Misc.2d 114, 2008 Ohio 3831, 892 N.E.2d 529, found that attorneys who had 
entered into 10% contingent fee contracts with their clients but had not obtained court approval of 
same as required by Sup R 70(C) and had done no legal work on the matter were not entitled to the 
fees requested: “the claimed fee is clearly excessive in the absence of proof of any legal services.” Id. 
at para. 10. In Board of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2009-6, 2009 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 6 (Aug. 14, 2009), the Board makes clear that in outsourcing legal or support services, 
lawyers must comply with the 1.5(a) mandate that the fees or expenses be reasonable and with that of 
1.5(b) that the basis or rate for the fee be communicated to the client.  
Judicial interpretations of the former disciplinary rule, identical to the OHRPC standard, arose not 
only in disciplinary cases, but also in cases involving lawyer-client fee disputes and cases involving 
court-awarded attorney fees in which the factors set forth in former OH DR 2-106(B) often were 
examined for guidance. See, e.g., Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143, 569 
N.E.2d 464 (1991) (in making attorney-fee award under the Consumer Sales Practices Act, the court 
should be guided by OH DR 2-106(B) factors);  In re J.F., 162 Ohio App.3d 716, 2005 Ohio 4258, 
834 N.E.2d 876 (reversing and remanding fee award because probate court failed to review appellant 
law firm’s agreement and services under the standards set forth in Sup R 71 and DR 2-106). 
In In re Thamann, 152 Ohio App.3d 574, 2003 Ohio 2069, 789 N.E.2d 654 (Hamilton), the court 
held that a probate court must hold a hearing before determining the reasonableness of a fee award. 
Thus, it was error to “automatically” set a fee award in a contingent-fee wrongful death matter, 
“without reviewing the reasonableness of the attorney fees as required by . . . [OH] DR 2-106.” Id. at 
para. 12. Accord  In re Thompson, 150 Ohio App.3d 98, 2002 Ohio 6065, 779 N.E.2d 816 
(Hamilton). 
Particular note should be made of the 2007 decision in Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 113 Ohio 
St.3d 344, 2007 Ohio 2074, 865 N.E.2d 873.  This important case, decided under former OH DR 
2-106(A) (identical to the first sentence of Rule 1.5(a)), is discussed at a number of points in this 
section infra. 
Activities proscribed - In general: To ensure proper behavior throughout the compensation process, 
Ohio Rule 1.5(a) specifically prohibits three types of conduct -- making an agreement for, charging, 
or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee. The case law under the identical language of former 
OH DR 2-106(A), however, typically did not distinguish between these types of conduct. E.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mathewson, 113 Ohio St.3d 365, 2007 Ohio 2076, 865 N.E.2d 891 
(failure to return unearned retainer; “charging or collecting” referenced, id. at para. 7). Nevertheless, 
examples can be found: 
In re Betts, 62 Ohio Misc.2d 30, 587 N.E.2d 997 (C.P. Ross 1991), provides an example of entering 
into an excessive contingency-fee arrangement. (The contract provided for 40% of amount recovered, 
unilaterally reduced by attorneys to 33%; court awarded 20% as reasonable fees in case involving 
personal injury to minors in which risk of nonrecovery was minimal.) 
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Illustrative of an attorney charging or attempting to charge an excessive fee are Toledo Bar Ass’n v. 
Sawers, 121 Ohio St.3d 229, 2009 Ohio 778, 903 N.E.2d 309, Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mishler, 
118 Ohio St.3d 109, 2008 Ohio 1810, 886 N.E.2d 818, Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Hare, 99 Ohio 
St.3d 310, 2003 Ohio 3651, 791 N.E.2d 966, and Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Pagac, 39 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 528 N.E.2d 948 (1988). In Sawers, respondent and another lawyer charged $10,000 for 
generic trust documents, without adaptation to the clients’ individualized legal needs. In Mishler, 
respondent charged his client $17,600 but was “unable to reliably account for the fees and expenses 
he charged” the client, id. at para. 23, thereby violating, inter alia, DR 2-106(A). In Hare, 
respondent charged his clients $50,000 in legal fees (including an improper nonrefundable retainer of 
$1,500, see section 1.5:430) for the adoption of twins, even though the evidence indicated that local 
adoption lawyers charged hourly rates of $125 to $150 for customary total fees of $2,000 to $3,000. 
On top of this, in his submissions to the probate court, respondent “had dishonestly and selfishly 
attempted to conceal the exorbitant fee he charged for these adoptions.”  Id. at para. 31. For this and 
numerous other OHCPR violations, respondent was disbarred. In Pagac, the attorney, who charged a 
flat fee of $3000 for each felony defense, attempted to charge the client an additional $15,000 for five 
additional felony charges that were “thrown in” to a plea-bargain offer that had to be accepted almost 
immediately. Because the defense of the extra felony counts required no extra services, the fee 
charged by the attorney was excessive, and the attorney was suspended for six months. See 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Mills, 109 Ohio St.3d 245, 2006 Ohio 2290, 846 N.E.2d 1253, where, in 
addition to one instance of double-billing and other aggressive billing practices, respondent filed a 
case in the wrong court and then “charged [the client] for her time in refiling the case and gave him no 
credit for her initial mistake.” Id. at para. 5. Accord Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 
490, 2002 Ohio 2490, 769 N.E.2d 816, in which respondent attempted to charge an excessive fee (fee 
payment later waived as part of a settlement agreement) and was found to have violated OH DR 
2-106(A). Id. at para. 10. 
A typical case in which the attorney is found to have collected an excessive fee is one in which the 
attorney, hired to represent an estate, withdraws more than a reasonable amount of funds from the 
estate account without the court’s, or the client’s, consent. See, e.g., Erie-Huron Counties Joint 
Certified Grievance Committee v. Meyerhoefer, 99 Ohio St.3d, 2003 Ohio 2467, 788 N.E.2d 
1073. This conduct often raised OH DR 9-102 concerns as well. Other cases involving collection of 
an excessive fee are Disciplinary Counsel v. McCord, 121 Ohio St.3d 497, 2009 Ohio 1517, 905 
N.E.2d 1182, where respondent, while suspended from the practice of law, helped himself to legal 
fees out of claimants’ workers compensation payments for work that he did not himself perform, and 
Akron Bar Ass’n v. Naumoff, 62 Ohio St.3d 72, 578 N.E.2d 452 (1991), discussed in section 
1.5:500 infra. 
Reasonable fees - In general: The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee requires a 
case-by-case analysis.  In re Guardianship of Rider, 68 Ohio App.3d 709, 589 N.E.2d 465 (Huron 
1990) (despite exorbitant amount of fees relative to size of estate, fees still may be reasonable because 
each case is unique). The Rule provides a nonexclusive list of eight factors to be considered in 
determining whether a fee is reasonable. Ohio Rule 1.5(a)(1)-(8). Once again, reference to cases 
decided under the identical language of former OH DR 2-106(B)(1)-(8) is instructive. 
Needless to say, padding a client’s statement by increasing the time billed over and above that 
actually worked is the epitome of an excessive fee and violated the reasonableness requirement of 
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OH DR 2-106(A). Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008 Ohio 3194, 891 
N.E.2d 324 (billing 45 hours as attorney for estate that were in fact attributable to successor counsel); 
Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Rogers, 116 Ohio St.3d 99, 2007 Ohio 5544, 876 N.E.2d 923 (“respondent 
billed clients for work he did not do and for work he had no sound reason for doing,” id. at para. 18); 
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Batt, 78 Ohio St.3d 189, 677 N.E.2d 349 (1997) (obtaining fees based on such 
conduct equivalent to misappropriation of client funds; disbarment ordered). Similarly, padding bills 
with “unnecessary and repetitive tasks” for 2½ years in which respondent represented elderly, 
mentally impaired sisters, violated 2-106(A). Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 113 Ohio St.3d 344, 
2007 Ohio 2074, 865 N.E.2d 873, at para. 3. Billing a client more than double the amount then 
owing violated 2-106(A), Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Gueli, 119 Ohio St.3d 434, 2008 Ohio 4786, 894 
N.E.2d 1231, as did removing $9,000 from a client trust account, when respondent could document 
having earned only $350 of it. Disciplinary Counsel v. Robertson, 113 Ohio St.3d 360, 2007 Ohio 
2075, 865 N.E.2d 886. Likewise, double billing, “which is the practice of ‘billing of fees and costs to 
more than one client for the same work or the same hours,’“ violated the disciplinary rule.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Holland, 106 Ohio St.3d 372, 2005 Ohio 5322, 835 N.E.2d 361, at para. 
21 (court-appointed counsel failed to apportion among his clients his per-hour in-court services; 
“[t]hat is, if respondent represented three clients in court in a single three-hour session, he would 
claim fees for three in-court hours in each case,” id. at para. 7). Cf. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Holzer, 78 Ohio St.3d 309, 677 N.E.2d 1186 (1997) (charging work done for one client to another 
client violated former OH DR 1-102(A)(4); see section 8.4:400).  
With Holland, compare Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006 Ohio 6510, 
858 N.E.2d 368, where, although a public reprimand was issued for “careless and sloppy timekeeping 
practice,” id. at para. 6, by a lawyer regularly serving as court-appointed counsel for indigent 
criminal defendants, the effect of the sloppiness was the opposite of that in Holland:  “One panel 
member noted that Agopian ‘wasn’t taking one hour … and turning it into three.  It looks to me like he 
was taking three hours and turning it into one.’“ Id. (ellipses in original). The Court in fact overruled 
the objection of Disciplinary Counsel to the Board’s recommendation that the 2-106(A) charge be 
dismissed.  While that is not surprising given the facts of the case, the panel found that respondent had 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4), the disciplinary rule prohibiting lawyer conduct “involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,” as well as 1-102(A)(6), and the Board adopted this finding. Since 
“there is no evidence of deceit,” id. at para. 6, the Agopian case seems an unlikely candidate for 
invocation of DR 1-102(A)(4). Granted, the respondent “admitted that he had approximated his 
actual time to perform these services but had nevertheless certified to the court the accuracy of the 
information,” id. at para. 5; however, it was clear that 
Agopian did all the work on each individual case but failed to 
accurately record the exact days of his appearances in court or the 
specific number of hours that he spent on each case. 
Id. at para. 6. In the panel’s words, he “routinely performs services far in excess of the time for 
which he submits payment requests.” Id. The Supreme Court reduced the sanction from a stayed 
one-year suspension to a public reprimand.  
Both Holland and Agopian were advanced with respect to the appropriate sanction in Toledo Bar 
Ass’n v. Stahlbush, 126 Ohio St.3d 366, 2010 Ohio 3823, 933 N.E.2d 1091. As one might expect, 
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the Court found Holland to be the more compelling precedent, inasmuch as the respondent in 
Stahlbush had inflated to an incredible extent the hours she submitted to the court as an appointed 
attorney:  e.g., on three days in 2007, she billed more than 24 hours; on five days in 2006, she billed 
more than 20 hours; for that year her total billed hours were an astounding 3,451.4. In addition to DR 
2-106(A), the respondent was found to have violated DR 1-107(A)(4), (5) and (6). 
If the matter involves an excessive fee-Rule 1.5(a) violation but there is “significant mitigating 
evidence,” the Court has “consistently issued public reprimands . . . .” Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. 
Martorana, 137 Ohio St.3d 19, 2013 Ohio 1686, 997 N.E.2d 486, at para. 12 (citing cases), 
whereas if the excessive fee carries with it “significant aggravating factors, most notably a failure to 
return the client’s money,” a harsher penalty will be imposed. Id. at para. 13 (citing cases). 
A rather unusual excessive fee violation occurred in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Stridsberg, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 69, 2009 Ohio 4182, 914 N.E.2d 183. The respondent in Stridsberg represented a client 
pursuing workers’ compensation claims. Through administrative error, the BWC issued checks 
representing an extra year of benefits to which the client was not entitled. Knowing of the 
overpayment, respondent nonetheless, at the client’s insistence, disbursed a portion of the 
overpayment to the client and paid himself a one-third contingency fee, which was found to violate 
DR 2-106(A). Another interesting aspect of Stridsberg is that in imposing a stayed six-month 
sanction, the Court’s review of mitigating factors notes that respondent had no prior disciplinary 
history, but made no mention of the fact that this unblemished record was compiled in a career 
spanning 60 years – Mr. Stridsberg was admitted to the bar in 1949! 
In Disciplinary Counsel v. Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 49, 2009 Ohio 5960, 918 N.E.2d 992, 
respondent, who, as a subordinate lawyer at the Chapman law firm, charged a contingent fee in 
circumstances when the applicable New York law precluded it, “stipulated that the fees paid by the 
Reigers were excessive but argues that Chapman was responsible for charging those fees.” 
Id. at para. 14. The Court was not impressed: 
 Although Chapman was the owner of the law firm, it was 
respondent who acted as the Reigers’ attorney. Respondent signed the 
contingent-fee agreement, he filed suit on the Reigers’ behalf, he 
submitted PIP [personal injury protection] claims on their behalf, he 
was the only attorney for the law firm that had any contact with them, 
and he prepared the disbursement sheets detailing their recovery and 
attorney fees. 
*     *     * 
 Respondent argues that he cannot be disciplined for his actions 
because Chapman had control of the fees and the firm’s checkbook. 
Even though Chapman was his superior, respondent has a 
responsibility to his clients. . . . A lawyer’s obligations under the ethics 
rules are not diminished by the instructions of a supervising attorney. 
Id. at paras. 15, 17. The Smith decision is further discussed in section 5.2:300. 
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Reasonable fees - Time, labor, and skill required: The first set of factors the Rule identifies as relevant 
in assessing the reasonableness of the fee is “the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of 
the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.” Ohio Rule 
1.5(a)(1). These factors are often of primary concern.  In re Betts, 62 Ohio Misc.2d 30, 587 N.E.2d 
997 (C.P. Ross 1991) (highlighting primacy of these factors in context of awarding attorney fees 
under ORC 2111.18 and applicable court rules).  
Of course, the service performed must be “legal service”; if the lawyer is spending his time in social 
discussions with the client, such hand-holding cannot be billed as lawyer’s time at a lawyer’s rate.  
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Alsfelder, 103 Ohio St.3d 375, 2004 Ohio 5216, 816 N.E.2d 218 
(violation of former OH DR 2-106(A)). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 106 Ohio St.3d 
418, 2005 Ohio 5411, 835 N.E.2d 707, at para. 25 (“respondent charged Lester legal fees for a 
variety of nonlegal services [such as picking up mail, paying bills, and arranging for lawn care]. This 
practice of overcharging violates DR 2-106(A),” citing Alsfelder), and Akron Bar Ass’n v. Watkins, 
120 Ohio St.3d 307, 2008 Ohio 6144, 898 N.E.2d 946, where the Court found a 2-106(A) violation 
in respondent’s charging $150.00 per hour for ordinary services: 
Most troubling were 137 entries, each for three quarters of an hour at a 
cost of $112.50, resulting in charges of $15,412.50 for having simply 
picked up [the client’s] mail. 
Id. at para. 5. One recent legal-fee-for-nonlegal-work case is Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Parisi, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 345, 2012 Ohio 879, 965 N.E.2d 268 (respondent’s billings “were replete with charges at her 
attorney rate [the amount of which is not disclosed but elsewhere described as “reasonable” for legal 
work] for nonlegal services like arranging and attending Greene’s doctors’ appointments, handling 
mundane tasks related to Greene’s cable-television and magazine subscriptions, researching local 
feline clubs, and arranging for the replacement of Greene’s watch battery.” Id. at para. 26). 
And of course, the work must be on behalf of the client. In finding that respondent charged an 
excessive fee in Disciplinary Counsel v. Summers, 131 Ohio St.3d 467, 2012 Ohio 1144, 967 
N.E.2d 183, the Court expressly noted that 
respondent had the temerity not only to charge Anthony [Bell] and his 
family $1,425 for preparing the motion to withdraw as Anthony’s 
counsel, but to then charge them for respondent’s work on his 
(Summer’s) complaint to a state agency claiming that the private 
investigator he hired [on the Bell matter] had acted unethically in her 
relationship with the Bells. 
Id. at para. 31 (emphasis by the Court; bracketed material added).  Perhaps worthy of a 
chutzpa-of-the-year nomination? 
While important as a starting point in computing a reasonable fee, something more than a mere 
multiplication of the base rate for the lawyer’s services by the hours that the lawyer worked on the 
representation is required. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Lax, 2005 Ohio 3261, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 
3011 (Portage) (failure to establish 2-106 reasonable or customary fees: “‘[a] simple multiplication 
of hours by a minimum hourly rate is not by itself a proper method to determine such charges,’“ id. at 
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para. 28 (citation omitted)); Perry v. LTV Steel Co., 84 Ohio App.3d 670, 618 N.E.2d 179 
(Cuyahoga 1992) (language of applicable fee-award statute indicated award should be based on 
“time and effort” expended, but court looked beyond multiplication of lawyer’s base rate by hours 
worked and reviewed factors similar to OH DR 2-106(B)(2)-(8)); Swanson v. Swanson, 48 Ohio 
App.2d 85, 355 N.E.2d 894 (Cuyahoga 1976) (because value of legal services may be greater or less 
than product of base rate and hours spent, multiplying hours spent by rate is deficient method for 
determining reasonable value for services). The theory, as expressed by the court in Betts supra, is 
that time alone should not be the determining factor because the more experienced lawyer can do the 
same work as the less-skilled lawyer can do in a shorter period of time. This explanation, however, 
seems to overlook the fact that the more experienced lawyer would be likely to charge more per hour 
for his services. While the product of the hours worked multiplied by the lawyer’s hourly rate in and 
of itself is not sufficient to determine a reasonable fee, if that computation provides a number 
substantially less than the amount charged, it may indicate that the fee charged is excessive.  Lake 
County Bar Ass’n v. Lillback, 41 Ohio St.3d 13, 535 N.E.2d 300 (1989) (charging $33,000 in fees 
for services that, if billed at an hourly rate would amount to approximately $3000 per hour, violated 
OH DR 2-106). 
The inadequacy of rate x time in and of themselves as determining factors of the reasonableness of a 
fee is strikingly illustrated by Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 113 Ohio St.3d 344, 2007 Ohio 
2074, 865 N.E.2d 873.  In Johnson, respondent represented two elderly, mentally impaired, sisters 
who had been swindled out of $800,000 by their previous attorney.  Respondent diligently (as it 
turned out, too diligently) sought to recover his clients’ lost assets.  He did in fact recover $197,000 of 
the misappropriated funds, but the problem was that he billed $159,000 in doing so.  There apparently 
was nothing wrong with his billing records, which showed 1200 hours billed in 1/10-hour increments.  
Nor was there any question raised about his hourly rate, which was $150.  But Johnson, irrespective 
of whether his time and efforts were producing any results for his clients, took a course of action that 
threatened to milk his clients dry, and he nearly succeeded in doing so. As respondent admitted, “he 
did not even consider a cost-benefit analysis.”  Id. at para. 71.  This state of affairs was graphically 
summed up by the Court in the following language: 
Respondent recovered the most significant assets, over $165,000, in 
the first six months of representation . . . and billed around $46,000 for 
his services.  During the remaining 25 months, however, respondent 
recovered only around $21,000 and yet billed over $100,000 in fees.  In 
all, he billed $159,452.95 to collect $197,683.45. 
Id. at para. 26.  The Court quoted with approval the expert testimony on behalf of the relator that 
“you can work very, very hard and lots and lots of hours, but if you’re not accomplishing anything, 
you can’t reasonably expect to be paid for it, particularly when you’re working as a fiduciary.  You’re 
the guardian.  You’re not dealing with somebody at arm’s length.”  Id. at para. 56. (Relator’s expert 
also “found questionable many of respondent’s hundreds of billing entries, and noted his serious 
concern over entries for preparing or reviewing a memo; in which the ‘memo’ was written on a post-it 
note,” id. at para. 68.)  Overall, the Court found the expert’s testimony persuasive: 
His remarks underscore a fundamental tenet:  attorney fees are not 
justified merely because the lawyer has charged his professional time 
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and expenses at reasonable rates; a legitimate purpose must also 
explain why the lawyer spent the time and incurred those costs. 
Id. at para. 71.  (The biggest “black hole” in the last 25 months of his representation revolved around 
the malpractice action Johnson filed against his clients’ former attorney, Bond.  The detail with 
respect to this effort is examined in this section infra, at “Reasonable fees - The amount involved and 
the results obtained.”) 
As Johnson demonstrates, even if a lawyer keeps time records, a court still may disagree with the 
attorney about whether the time spent was required to render the services in question. This was the 
case in Akron Bar Ass’n v. Carr, 131 Ohio St.3d 210, 2012 Ohio 610, 963 N.E.2d 802, in which 
the Court reviewed at length the testimony of relator’s expert, who enumerated a number of instances 
where respondent billed an unreasonable amount of time on the task at hand, including 13.1 hours in 
deposition preparation in a case in which no depositions were taken. And in Bittner v. Tri-County 
Toyota, Inc., 62 Ohio Misc.2d 345, 598 N.E.2d 925 (Fairfield Mun. Ct. 1992), the trial court had 
been asked on remand to state the basis for its determination of a statutory award of attorney fees. The 
court cited four reasons for finding the hours claimed by the attorney to be excessive: (1) conflicting 
time records, (2) duplication of effort by the two firms involved, (3) poor discovery practice (taking a 
deposition to prove a claim that was provable by other, more efficient means, such as requests for 
admissions), and (4) the fact that the original attorney had to bring in an expert attorney, which was 
evidence that the inexperience of the original attorney most likely caused an inordinate amount of 
time to be expended at the beginning of the trial. Davis v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. C-1-87-727, 1990 
WL 375612 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 1990), aff’d in part on other grounds, rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 6 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 1993), presented a similar case where an attorney fee request was 
limited because: (1) some of the time charged was spent on representation of another related case, (2) 
“legal research” and “trial preparation” notations are too vague to allow the court to determine the 
time spent working on any given issue, (3) two or more attorneys on the same phone call or at the 
same conference was a duplication of effort, (4) a lack of clear documentation indicated “padding” of 
the time records, and (5) the primary attorney being accompanied by another at all times indicated a 
duplication of effort. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that while hours spent in unnecessary or 
duplicative efforts should not be included in justifying the reasonableness of the fee charged, 
substantial discretion remains in assessing whether the time spent was in fact unnecessary or 
duplicative.  Freeman v. Crown City Mining, Inc., 90 Ohio App.3d 546, 630 N.E.2d 19 (Gallia 
1993) (in fee-award case, trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding hours spent by lawyers 
collaborating on a matter non-duplicative). 
Charging a client fees without rendering services therefor obviously is improper. E.g., Columbus 
Bar Ass’n v. Gueli, 119 Ohio 3d 434, 2008 Ohio 4786, 894 N.E.2d 1231 (retaining fees “despite 
doing nothing”); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Washington, 109 Ohio St.3d 308, 2006 Ohio 2423, 847 
N.E.2d 435 (billing multiple insurance-company clients of his firm over $91,000 for work he did not 
perform). If such conduct is undertaken in combination with other violations, the attorney may be 
subject to serious penalties, including permanent disbarment. See Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. 
Hildebrand, 127 Ohio St.3d 304, 2010 Ohio 5712, 939 N.E.2d 823 (multiple violations of multiple 
rules, including 1.5(a); disbarred), and, under the former OHCPR, Disciplinary Counsel v. Lord, 
114 Ohio St.3d 466, 2007 Ohio 4260, 873 N.E.2d 273 (permanent disbarment warranted where 
attorney with prior disciplinary record violated OH DR 2-106(A) by retaining fees for services not 
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performed, along with multiple violations of ten other disciplinary rules); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Griffith, 104 Ohio St.3d 50, 2004 Ohio 5991, 818 N.E.2d 226 (indefinite suspension; multiple 
violations, including acceptance of retainer to represent client on appeal of criminal conviction but 
then filing nothing on client’s behalf). 
The quality of the services required to fulfill the representation also is a crucial factor. This often turns 
on the novelty and difficulty of the underlying issues involved. The greater the skills required to 
perform the legal services in question, the higher the fee can be while still being considered 
reasonable.  Perry v. LTV Steel Co., 84 Ohio App.3d 670, 618 N.E.2d 179 (Cuyahoga 1992). See 
Barnes v. Univ. Hosps., 2006 Ohio 6266, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6251 (Cuyahoga) (award to 
prevailing plaintiff of attorney fees of over $1 million was fair and appropriate in extremely complex 
medical malpractice action requiring significant time and resources to litigate), aff’d in part on other 
grounds, reversed in part on other grounds, 119 Ohio St.3d 173, 2008 Ohio 3344, 893 N.E.2d 142. 
Conversely, if the issues involved are mundane and the services required are simple, the fee should be 
limited. Disciplinary Counsel v. McCauley, 114 Ohio St.3d 461, 2007 Ohio 4259, 873 N.E.2d 269 
(charging $20,000 (25% contingency fee) to liquidate retirement account; “routine” services did not 
justify fee); Disciplinary Counsel v. Carlson, 111 Ohio St.3d, 2006 Ohio 5707, 855 N.E.2d 1218 
(charging one-third contingent fee with respect to the client’s share of estate, the obtaining of which 
required no special effort on respondent’s part, constituted clearly excessive fee); Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n v. McNally, 109 Ohio St.3d 560, 2006 Ohio 3258, 849 N.E.2d 1022 (charging $5,000 to 
partition property, after telling client not to worry about fee because case would require only filing a 
short complaint and a few telephone calls, violated DR 2-106(A)). Cf.  In re Estate of York, 133 
Ohio App.3d 234, 727 N.E.2d 607 (Warren 1999) (probate court reduced amount of attorney fees 
under previously approved contingent-fee agreement, based on reasoning that case had not required 
significant preparation nor did it proceed to trial; case remanded, however, because probate court 
failed to hold hearing to evaluate the fee agreement under OH DR 2-106(B) standards, particularly 
time, effort, and skill and the results obtained). Another factor that may be considered in determining 
the difficulty of a case, according to one decision at least, is the eminence of the opposing counsel.  
Moraine v. Baker, 34 Ohio Misc. 77, 297 N.E.2d 122 (C.P. Montgomery 1971). 
In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Galinas, 76 Ohio St.3d 87, 666 N.E.2d 1083 (1996), a lawyer 
was sanctioned for, inter alia, charging $150,000 in attorney fees for work performed in representing 
the estate. In finding the fee charged clearly excessive, the Court commented: 
There was no litigation surrounding the estate, the estate was not 
particularly complex, and respondent provided no extraordinary 
services in representing the estate that could have conceivably justified 
a fee of that magnitude. 
Id. at 89-90, 666 N.E.2d at 1085-86. 
For an informative opinion involving reasonable-fee analysis where the underlying claim was 
difficult to maintain and prevail upon, see Goldauskas v. Elyria Foundry Co., 145 Ohio App.3d 
490, 763 N.E.2d 645 (Lorain 2001). In this personal injury action, law firm A, working on a 
contingent fee, commenced the action on behalf of plaintiff, did a substantial amount of work on the 
case, and then was discharged and replaced by law firm B, which likewise did significant work on the 
case. While defendant’s motion for summary judgment was pending, the case was settled by law firm 
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B for a significant, undisclosed sum. (The settlement amount was sealed.) Law firm A sought what it 
deemed its proper share -- one-half of the 40% contingent fee. The trial court awarded firm A 
$300,000 in quantum meruit; on appeal, the court found this amount to be unreasonable and an abuse 
of discretion and set A’s fee at $200,000. The court’s analysis was as follows: Both firms agreed that 
the case, an intentional tort action, was a difficult one to win. There was significant risk of an adverse 
verdict and likewise a significant risk of loss at the summary judgment stage. Firm A had valued the 
case as being worth $750,000 - $1,000,000, after trial. All of the testimony indicated that firm A 
would have taken far less prior to trial and “especially prior to summary judgment, which all believe 
is highly risky. Hence, we find the trial court’s determination of attorney fees to be unreasonable, as it 
gave . . . firm [A] the same amount as if, by its own estimation, it had pursued the cause through the 
perils of summary judgment and trial.”  Id. at 497, 763 N.E.2d at 651. (i.e., $750,000 x 40% = 
$300,000.) In recomputing the amount, the court of appeals took the high end of firm A’s after-trial 
estimate ($1,000,000), multiplied it by the 40% contingent fee percentage, and applied firm A’s 50% 
entitlement formula to arrive at $200,000 as the appropriate fee in quantum meruit. (While this seems 
a generous approach, the settlement amount for this truly gruesome accident, obtained by firm B prior 
to a ruling on defendant’s summary judgment motion was, according to the court, “far in excess” of 
firm A’s $1,000,000 valuation after trial, id., and thus firm B’s contingency fee was also presumably 
“far in excess” of the $200,000 fee awarded to firm A.) 
Reasonable fees - Forgone employment: The second factor used to determine the reasonableness of a 
fee under Ohio Rule 1.5(a) is “the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.” Rule 1.5(a)(2). This requires, 
first, that there be sufficient likelihood that accepting the case will preclude accepting other 
employment, which turns on how likely it is that another client willing to pay significantly higher fees 
would have hired the lawyer had the lawyer been available. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal 
Ethics §  9.3.1, at 519 (1986). Second, the potential sacrifice involved in accepting representation 
must be “apparent” to the client.  We are aware of no Ohio cases dealing with the 
apparent-to-the-client requirement. 
As a related matter under this provision, a lawyer may charge a reasonable fee to be kept on retainer 
by a client, thereby assuring that the lawyer will forgo other employment to be available should client 
needs arise, even if no services actually are performed. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 90-8 
(Oct. 31, 1990); Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 84-1 (Oct. 19, 1984); cf. Jacobs v. Holston, 70 Ohio 
App.2d 55, 434 N.E.2d 738 (Lucas 1980). The term “retainer” has several different usages. This and 
other retainer arrangements are discussed in section 1.5:420. 
Reasonable fees - Customary charge: “[T]he fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 
services” is the third guide given to determine a reasonable fee. Ohio Rule 1.5(a)(3). Cf. Hermann, 
Cahn & Schneider v. Viny, 42 Ohio App.3d 132, 137, 537 N.E.2d 236, 241 (Cuyahoga 1987) (in a 
fee dispute, “[t]estimony as to the necessary and reasonable value of services by an attorney engaged 
in a similar area of practice will corroborate an attorney’s claim for fees”). If the lawyer is a specialist, 
reference to the fee customarily charged by similar specialists in the community is appropriate.  
Freeman v. Crown City Mining, Inc., 90 Ohio App.3d 546, 630 N.E.2d 19 (Gallia 1993). If a 
service provided is unique, there may be no customary charge for a similar service.  In re Betts, 62 
Ohio Misc.2d 30, 587 N.E.2d 997 (C.P. Ross 1991). 
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One ambiguity in the Rule (and the identical language in the Code) is how to define the “locality” for 
which a customary charge is to be determined. This issue was confronted under the OHCPR by the 
Sixth District Court of Appeals in Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co. v. Perry, 124 Ohio App.3d 147, 705 
N.E.2d 731 (Ottawa 1997), a case involving court-awarded attorney fees to a prevailing-party 
insured in a declaratory judgment action filed by the insurer. Insured’s counsel argued that, given that 
it had a state-wide practice, a customary charge for a lawyer of similar expertise in Ohio would be 
appropriate. The insurer argued that the relevant locale was the eleven-county area of northern Ohio 
in which the action was brought. The trial court found the state-wide definition appropriate in this 
context, and the appellate court agreed: 
 We agree with the trial court that the evidence presented in this 
case shows that the locality to be considered in relation to DR 
2-106(B)(3) is the state of Ohio. Appellee’s attorneys presented 
evidence showing that they accept cases from all parts of Ohio and 
from states other than Ohio. They regularly conduct trials and appeals 
in all parts of Ohio. Their reputation as successful trial attorneys 
permits them to conduct a statewide practice from a law office located 
in Sandusky, Ohio. This court is not persuaded that the purpose of DR 
2-106(B)(3) is to compel attorneys who accept cases from various parts 
of a state (or from more than one state) to vary their hourly fees based 
upon the prevailing fees charged by other attorneys who do not conduct 
a statewide practice but who limit their practice to a smaller 
geographical area. 
Id. at 152, 705 N.E.2d at 734. (Cf. discussion of locality standard in context of malpractice duty of 
care, at section 1.1:330.) 
In attorney-fee-award situations, local rules have been used to establish what customary, and hence 
reasonable, charges would be. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Curren, 39 Ohio St.3d 
117, 529 N.E.2d 930 (1988) (reasonable guardianship fees set in Clinton County Probate Court by 
Local Rule 19; one-year suspension warranted for attorney who charged more than double what was 
reasonable under Rule 19). Former OH EC 2-17 suggested that fee schedules and economic reports 
of state and local bar associations provide some guidance as to customary charges. The effect of these 
publications is limited, though, by the finding of the United States Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. 
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), that such fee schedules, used inappropriately, may 
constitute price fixing. 
Reasonable fees - The amount involved and results obtained: The fourth guide in determining 
whether a fee is reasonable is “the amount involved and the results obtained.” Ohio Rule 1.5(a)(4). In 
applying this standard, it is important to recognize that “consideration of ‘results obtained’ is not 
synonymous with the monetary amount of the recovery; it encompasses the degree of success enjoyed 
by the prevailing party.” Freeman v. Crown City Mining, Inc., 90 Ohio App.3d 546, 556, 630 
N.E.2d 19, 26 (Gallia 1993) (considering identical language in DR 2-106(B)(4)). These factors serve 
as a rough estimate of the potential malpractice exposure of the lawyer and of the value of the case to 
the client. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  9.3.1, at 519 (1986) (discussing fees 
fixed as a percentage of the value of property). Consideration of the responsibility involved and the 
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results obtained may justify increased fees, even if the services rendered would have been identical to 
those services rendered for a less valuable case.  In re Betts, 62 Ohio Misc.2d 30, 587 N.E.2d 997 
(C.P. Ross 1991). Protecting the client’s interest, by winning the case or cases, allows the relative 
fees to increase.  In re Estate of Ziechmann, 63 Ohio App.3d 717, 580 N.E.2d 31 (Cuyahoga 1989) 
(fees amounting to 40% of estate found reasonable when services performed involved representing 
estate in many suits over period of six years and ultimately saved estate $100,000). There are limits, 
however, to the extent to which this factor figures into the determination of the fee deserved. For 
example, if a lawyer loses a case, it does not follow that no fees are due, unless there is a 
contingency-fee arrangement, but the amount deemed reasonable may be less. See Moraine v Baker, 
34 Ohio Misc. 77, 297 N.E.2d 122 (C. P. Montgomery 1971). See also Crary v. Goldsmith, 34 
N.W.2d 28 (Mich. 1948): 
It is true that the efforts of the attorney were abortive and failed to 
accomplish the desired result. While this cannot operate to deprive an 
attorney of compensation for services faithfully and intelligently 
performed, in good faith, it does have a bearing on the amount of 
compensation for the services rendered. 
Id. at 33. 
It would be hard to find a decision that better illustrates the application of the amount involved and 
results obtained criteria of 2-106(B)(4) than Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 113 Ohio St.3d 344, 
2007 Ohio 2074, 865 N.E.2d 873, where the respondent sought to obtain recovery on behalf of his 
clients in a malpractice action against the clients’ former attorney, Bond, who had stolen $800,000 
from them.  In that action 
[r]espondent established Bond’s malpractice, but her insurer succeeded 
in showing that Bond had stolen assets intentionally and that the policy 
did not cover theft.  [The clients] thus recovered nothing from the 
malpractice action. 
 Respondent’s law clerk had warned him as early as November 
1998 that the malpractice claim had little chance of success, and in 
January 1999, another attorney whom respondent consulted agreed 
with that conclusion.  Notwithstanding this advice, respondent 
continued to bill for his services in pursuit of malpractice-insurance 
proceeds through May 2000. 
Id. at paras. 9-10.  In doing so, respondent ignored what relator’s expert characterized as “‘Insurance 
Law 101,’ that ‘an insurance company does not have the duty of indemnification of [an insured’s] 
illegal act.’“  The expert further testified as follows: 
 “[H]e kept that lawsuit alive and kept churning the file creating 
events * * * to achieve billable hours on something that * * * no 
rational, competent, ethical lawyer would allow his client to do – He 
just went on and on and on, billing long after * * * there was nothing to 
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be accomplished with the malpractice case, or no realistic potential of 
collecting anything.” 
Id. at para. 64 (ellipses and brackets by the Court).  “To Murman [relator’s expert], respondent’s 
billing his clients an hourly rate to pursue the malpractice lawsuit against Bond’s malpractice insurer 
when there was no reasonable hope of recovery was respondent’s biggest ethical violation.”  Id.  at 
para. 68. 
Reasonable fees - Time limitations: The fifth factor listed in the Rule used to determine a reasonable 
fee is “the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.” Ohio Rule 1.5(a)(5). The 
Ohio courts and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline have not yet explicitly 
interpreted this factor, either in the new Rule or its predecessor, OH DR 2-106(B)(5). The idea seems 
to be that if the attorney is under a tight schedule, as a result of the demands of the client or the 
circumstances of the case, then a higher fee is warranted. On the other hand, if there are very few time 
pressures, this might be a reason to limit the fee. 
This factor can be distinguished from the first factor, the time and labor required, in that it includes 
cases where “the client’s demand for legal services requires a large infusion of staff that creates 
inefficiencies in the law office because a client’s needs bulk so large at times that other matters cannot 
be handled simultaneously.” Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  9.3.1, at 519-20 (1986). 
While the first factor simply considers the time spent in the representation, the fifth factor takes into 
account special time considerations that impact the reasonableness of fees. One hour of working 
“under the gun” is presumably more valuable than one hour of regular work. Furthermore, this factor 
seems to account for cases where there is no novel or difficult issue requiring special skill “to perform 
the legal services properly” under Ohio Rule 1.5(a)(1), but where the limit on time makes 
representation on a mundane issue more difficult. 
Reasonable fees - Professional relationship with the client: The sixth factor is “the nature and length 
of the professional relationship with the client.” Ohio Rule 1.5(a)(6). This factor also has received 
little or no interpretation by Ohio authorities. One commentator, with regard to the corresponding 
provision in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, has suggested that while a new client 
should be charged market rates, an established client might be charged less in gratitude for past fees. 
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  9.3.1, at 520 (1986). [Query whether this accurately 
assesses today’s legal marketplace.] 
Reasonable fees - Qualifications of the lawyer: The Rule’s seventh guide is “the experience, 
reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.” Ohio Rule 1.5(a)(7). 
Former OH EC 2-17 also mentioned the attorney’s experience, reputation, and ability as relevant in 
determining a reasonable fee. See Freeman v. Crown City Mining, Inc., 90 Ohio App.3d 546, 630 
N.E.2d 19 (Gallia 1993). These factors support increased fees for at least two reasons. First, the more 
highly qualified lawyer may simply do a better job for the client. The lawyer’s standing in terms of 
possessing unique skills and abilities, however, should be considered only in determining the 
reasonableness of a fee where such skills are required in the representation.  In re Betts, 62 Ohio 
Misc.2d 30, 587 N.E.2d 997 (C.P. Ross 1991). Second, when the fee is determined by an hourly rate, 
the lawyer’s qualifications interact with the first factor, the time and labor required for the 
representation. A more experienced attorney may be presumed to work more efficiently than a less 
experienced one. An increase in the fees charged takes this into account. 
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Reasonable fees - Nature of the fee: “[W]hether the fee is fixed or contingent” is the last factor set 
forth to be considered in determining a reasonable fee. Ohio Rule 1.5(a)(8). Each type of fee presents 
its own difficulties. 
The Rule’s approval of fixed fees is somewhat ambiguous. It clearly allows one to charge a fixed 
hourly rate for work performed. Also permissible, however, are fixed flat fees whereby a lawyer is 
paid a fixed fee on a per-matter or per-capita basis. See, under the former rule, Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 95-2, 1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 12 (Feb. 3, 1995); accord Bd. 
of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 96-4, 1996 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (June 14, 
1996) (approving per-matter fixed flat fees for criminal representation). In the per-capita situation, a 
lawyer is hired for a fixed fee to handle all of the cases that may arise in a particular area for the client, 
with the fee based on an estimate of the number of cases likely to arise. While fixed flat fees are 
permitted under the Rules, they do pose some danger. Because they are not linked directly either to 
the hours invested by the attorney on the case or the outcome achieved, they may encourage lawyers 
to slight the representation. Nevertheless, this does not create a per se barrier to their use as long as the 
other restrictions of the Rules -- barring excessive fees, requiring client responsibility for litigation 
expenses, and assuring competent and diligent representation -- are met. Op. 95-2, 1995 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 12. (The rule requiring client responsibility for litigation expenses has since been 
modified. See Rule 1.8(e) and section 1.8:610.) 
The Rule provides some insight with respect to the fixed-fee situation. Comment [6A] states that a 
flat [fixed] fee is a fee of a set amount for performance of agreed work, 
which may or may not be paid in advance but is not deemed earned 
until the work is performed. 
Ohio Rule 1.5 cmt. [6A]. Comment [5] warns that an 
agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer 
improperly to curtail services for a client or perform them in a way 
contrary to the client’s interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter 
into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a 
stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services will 
be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. . . . 
However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the 
client’s ability to pay. 
Ohio Rule 1.5 cmt. [5]. (It is also proper, under Rule 1.2(c), to limit the scope of the representation in 
any other reasonable way. See section 1.2:510). Note that with respect to the type of agreement 
counseled against in Comment [5], the example would appear to permit the very type of agreement 
counseled against, so long as “the situation is adequately explained to the client.” 
Special problems arise where a third party, such as an insurer, is paying the fixed fee for the lawyer’s 
representation of another, such as an insured. Here the risk of the fee structure undercutting the 
representation would be borne by one who did not control the fee arrangement. Nevertheless, this 
practice was approved in Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline Op. 97-7, 1997 
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Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (Dec. 5, 1997), as long as the fee agreement provides reasonable and 
adequate compensation and the insurer remains responsible for the expenses of litigation. 
If a fee is contingent rather than fixed, a higher fee may be justified because of the inherent risk of 
nonrecovery for the lawyer if the representation is unsuccessful. See generally 1 Restatement (Third) 
of the Law Governing Lawyers §  35 cmt. c (2000). The risk factor was given significant emphasis 
in the court’s fee analysis in Goldauskas v. Elyria Foundry Co., 145 Ohio App.3d 490, 763 N.E.2d 
645 (Lorain) (2001), discussed above in this section at “Reasonable fees - Time, labor, and skill 
required.” Compare, however, Borror v. MarineMax of Ohio, Inc., 2007 Ohio 562, 2007 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 525 (Ottawa), where the trial court’s enhancement of attorney fees under the Consumer 
Sales Practices Act – based in part on the fact that a portion of the fee was contingent, thereby 
implicating the risk factor – was reversed by the court of appeals in language critical of “the great 
weight given by the trial court to its conclusion that Borror’s counsel took a ‘risk’ by entering into the 
contingency fee arrangement.” Id. at para. 60. See also section 1.5:600 concerning contingent fees.  
The extent of the risk involved is a product of the degree of effort the lawyer will likely have to 
expend in pursuing the action, and the likelihood of ultimate recovery.  In re Betts, 62 Ohio Misc.2d 
30, 587 N.E.2d 997 (C.P. Ross 1991). Some doubt was cast on this basic description by Judge Ford’s 
concurring and dissenting opinion in Wilson v. Lynch & Lynch Co., L.P.A., 99 Ohio App.3d 760, 
651 N.E.2d 1328 (Geauga 1994). Judge Ford argued that the reasonableness of a contingency fee 
should turn solely on whether the percentage being charged is reasonable, without regard to the extent 
of the lawyer’s efforts. 
Regardless of the size of the award, the attorney is entitled to that 
agreed-upon percentage irrespective of the amount of time spent by 
that attorney on the file. The size of the fee is not subject to review as 
long as it is not unreasonable in proportion to the sum recovered by the 
client. In other words, as long as the percentage is reasonable, the size 
of the fee generated should not be questioned. 
Id. at 777, 651 N.E.2d at 1339 (emphasis added). 
For a penetrating analysis under general law, stressing the importance of the risk factor in determining 
the reasonableness of a contingent fee, see Judge O’Malley’s opinion in In re: Sulzer Hip Prosthesis 
& Knee Prosthesis Liability Litig., 290 F. Supp.2d 840, 850-56 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (“the obvious 
but critical characteristic of a contingent fee arrangement [is] the presence of risk. That is why the 
attorney’s fee is called ‘contingent.’“  Id. at 850.). 
It is per se unreasonable, however, to allow a lawyer to charge a fee whereby the client pays an hourly 
fee until a settlement or judgment is obtained, at which point the attorney has the option to keep the 
hourly fee or receive a contingency fee instead, whichever is higher. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 95-7, 1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 2, 1995). In reaching this 
conclusion, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline reasoned: “Under such 
circumstances, reasonableness is not a determinative factor and the contingency is illusory. By 
waiting until after settlement or recovery to choose the most advantageous fee, the attorney is assured 
of getting the larger of two fees without incurring any risk of nonrecovery.” Op. 95-7, 1995 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8, at *5 (acknowledging but rejecting a Michigan opinion approving the 
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practice). A variation on this theme was the contingent-fee contract that respondent had his clients 
enter into in Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. Levey, 88 Ohio St.3d 146, 724 N.E.2d 395 (2000); it 
“provided for an hourly charge if respondent was discharged ‘whether or not successful completion’ 
occurred.” Id. (emphasis in original). Such a contract was held to violate the excessive fee provisions 
of OH DR 2-106(A). Likewise violative of 2-106(A) was the lawyer’s conduct in Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson, 95 Ohio St.3d 364, 2002 Ohio 2222, 768 N.E.2d 617, where, 
after entering into a contingent-fee contract, respondent was discharged “and then attempted to obtain 
a fee based on an hourly rate” by suing his ex-client for $ 20,000 in attorney fees. Id. at paras. 3, 5. 
The violation of DR 2-106(B) in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 2008 Ohio 
3340, 891 N.E.2d 749, was similar: respondent took on a wrongful death action on a contingency 
basis but filed no lawsuit, and after six months the client fired him and asked for return of the file. 
Days later respondent’s associate sent the client a letter refusing to return the file unless the client paid 
an unspecified amount of legal fees. “Agreeing that his associate had tried to convert the contingent 
fee into an hourly fee, [respondent] admitted during the panel hearing to a violation of  DR 
2-106(B) . . . .” Id. at para. 29.  
Neither the Board’s opinion in Opinion 95-7 nor the Ohio Supreme Court’s case law directly 
addresses the propriety of a mixed fee in which a lawyer, without double billing, charges both a fixed 
fee and a contingent fee, but the Ohio State Bar Association’s general counsel reads the case law as 
implicitly finding mixed fees improper in Ohio. See Eugene P. Whetzel, Contingency Fee 
Arrangement in Civil Cases, Ohio Law., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 24, 28. Cf. Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Squire, 130 Ohio St.3d 368, 2011 Ohio 5578, 958 N.E.2d 914, referring, with seeming approval, to 
the “relator[’s] advis[ing] Squire that it is clearly excessive to charge an additional flat fee in a 
contingent-fee case . . . .” Id. at para. 51. But cf. Borror v. MarineMax of Ohio, Inc., 2007 Ohio 
562, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 525 (Ottawa), where the court noted without comment that Borror and 
his counsel had agreed at the outset of the litigation that fees would be paid on an hourly basis but 
shortly before trial negotiated a contingency fee arrangement from that point forward. 
Reasonable fees - Other “relevant circumstances”: Rule 1.5(a) states that reasonableness of the fee is 
to be determined by factors “includ[ing]” those set forth in subdivisions (a)(1)-(8). See Rule 1.5 cmt. 
[1]: “The factors specified in divisions (a)(1) through (8) are not exclusive.” 
One circumstance requiring special consideration, as set forth in former OH EC 2-15, may be 
whether the client is “unable to pay all or a portion of a reasonable fee.” Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-16, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (June 14, 1991). The 
Ethical Consideration advised that “reasonable fees should be charged in appropriate cases to clients 
able to pay them.” This suggests that on some occasions, based on the appropriateness of the case and 
the ability of the client to pay, even an otherwise reasonable fee should not be charged. Charles W. 
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  9.3.1, at 521 (1986) (“Courts have occasionally determined that 
a fee was excessive in part on the basis of the modest resources of the client”). 
A similar circumstance, mentioned in former OH EC 2-17, is the “commendable and longstanding 
[and now outmoded?] tradition of the bar” to consider specially the fees lawyers charge to other 
lawyers or their immediate families. Query whether this traditional, special consideration given to 
fellow lawyers and relatives under the Code should any longer be taken into account in determining a 
reasonable fee. If it were, then an attorney might be guilty of charging an excessive fee to fellow 
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lawyers and relatives, while the same fee for the same services would not be excessive if charged to 
other clients. 
An unusual application of former DR 2-106(A) occurred in Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 113 
Ohio St.3d 344, 2007 Ohio 2074, 865 N.E.2d 873. Respondent’s clients were paid $100,000 from 
the Client Security Fund, because their prior lawyer had misappropriated some $800,000 of their 
assets.  Respondent admitted “that he had charged for his help in securing money from the Client 
Security Fund . . . .”  Id. at para. 23.  Gov Bar R VIII (6)(B), however, states that unless authorized 
by the Board of Commissioners of The Clients’ Security Fund of Ohio (an exception not present 
here), 
[n]o attorney fees may be paid from the proceeds of an award made to a 
claimant under authority of this rule. 
Id.  Although respondent admitted that he had charged time in connection with the Security Fund 
recovery, he apparently did not in fact collect for that time:  “if his final bills had been paid, [he] 
would have consumed a substantial portion of the awards from the Client Security Fund.”  113 Ohio 
St.3d 344, at para. 71.  Nevertheless, even though not paid for the time charged in pursuing the 
awards, respondent was found to have violated the “[n]o attorney fees may be paid” language of Gov 
Bar R VIII 6(B), which in turn violated DR 2-106(A). 
A lawyer may enter into competitive bidding for legal work as long as the ultimate fee arrangement 
comports with the Rule 1.5(a) guidelines. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 77-4 (Apr. 6, 1977) 
(opining on former OHCPR). See generally Rees Morrison, Michael Roster & Jimmy Holland, 
Corporations Are Paring Use of Outside Counsel, Nat’l L.J., Apr. 17, 1995, at C12 (discussing 
corporations putting their legal work out for competitive bidding by law firms). See also section 
1.18:200, noting Ohio’s deletion of MR 1.18 cmt. [5], applicable in “beauty contest” situations. 
Expenses and the reasonableness requirement: Ohio Rule 1.5(a) addresses the reasonableness of 
lawyers’ fees. It does not, as does MR 1.5(a) & cmt. [1], address the reasonableness of other 
expenses and disbursements for which a lawyer may bill. It was opined under the OHCPR that the 
identical standards set forth in former OH DR 2-106(B)(1)-(8) should apply to these other billing 
matters as well. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 95-96-02 (n.d.). See also ABA Formal Op. 93-379 (Dec. 
6, 1963). 
As a related concern, care must be taken to assure that the client understands what expenses of the 
representation are to be billed separately. For example, secretarial and paraprofessional services 
typically are considered part of overhead to be recouped as part of the lawyer’s hourly rate or 
percentage fee. They may be billed for separately only if the client is informed of and agrees to the 
arrangement. See Ohio Rule 1.5 cmt. [2]. Absent that, separate billing for these services may result 
in charging a clearly excessive fee.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Brooks, 87 Ohio St. 3d 344, 721 
N.E.2d 23 (1999). 
It has been held, however, in the context of attorney fees awarded as sanctions under ORC 2323.51 
and OH Civ R 11, that a law clerk’s time can properly be included in the fee award, rather than as 
overhead. All Climate Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Zee Props., Inc., No. 01AP-784, 2002 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 1951 (Franklin Apr. 25, 2002). Accord Ron Scheiderer & Assoc. v. London, Nos. 
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CA95-08-022, CA95-08-024, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3296 (Madison Aug. 5, 1996) (paralegal’s 
hourly rates properly included in fee award; “[w]here expenses can be clearly and directly traced to 
the costs associated with a particular matter, those expenses are not properly considered as part of an 
attorney’s ‘overhead,’“ id. at *6), aff’d on other grounds, 81 Ohio St.3d 94, 689 N.E.2d 552 (1998). 
See also Borror v. MarineMax of Ohio, Inc., 2007 Ohio 562, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 525 
(Ottawa) (paralegal time included in trial court’s award of attorney fees and expenses to prevailing 
party in Consumer Sales Practices Act case; issue apparently abandoned on appeal). 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 95-96-02 (n.d.) commented on the propriety of a law firm’s adding 
mark-ups to charges it incurs or pays on the client’s behalf and passing on certain costs associated 
with after-hours work on a client’s behalf. The opinion addressed six hypothetical situations: (1) 
hiring an outside attorney to help on a matter and billing the client a higher hourly rate for the service 
than the attorney charged the firm; (2) hiring an expert witness to help on a matter and billing the 
client a higher hourly rate for the service than the expert witness charged the firm; (3) charging the 
client more for deposition transcripts than the firm was charged; (4) charging the client for overtime 
and the costs of transportation home for secretarial personnel; (5) charging the client for evening 
meals delivered to the office for lawyers working late; and (6) factoring in wear and tear into per page 
photocopy charges passed through to the client. In each situation, the bar association looked to the 
eight factors in former OH DR 2-106(B) as a guide.  
With respect to the mark-up of the hourly rate of an outside attorney used on a matter, the bar 
association felt the practice would be justified only if two conditions were met. First, the hourly rate 
charged, with the mark-up included, must remain reasonable in relation to the rates usually charged in 
the community for such legal services. See former OH DR 2-106(B)(3) (on the significance of local 
custom). Second, there must be some justification for the mark-up. The firm must have incurred some 
extra expense (such as the outside lawyer’s use of the firm’s facilities) or incurred some additional 
risk (such as covering the work of the outside lawyer on the firm’s professional liability policy) to 
justify the increase in fee. The bar association also advised that the rules pertaining to fee division in 
former OH DR 2-107 should apply to this situation. See section 1.5:800. 
Adding a mark-up to the fees charged by an expert witness presents a similar problem. Here, however, 
the bar association stressed that adding such a mark-up was not customary in the community and, as 
such, absent a clear justification, would be unreasonable, even if the amount charged was itself 
reasonable and the client knowingly consented to the mark-up. See former OH DR 2-106(B)(3) (on 
the significance of local custom). The bar association also warned that an unjustified mark-up of the 
expert’s fee might constitute fee splitting with a nonlawyer in violation of former OH DR 3-102(A). 
See section 5.4:200. 
Similarly, the bar association indicated that a mark-up of the amount charged for deposition 
transcripts would be unreasonable absent some economic justification for the increase. If the firm 
incurs photocopy expenses or delivery charges in connection with the handling of the transcripts, 
those charges actually incurred can be passed through to the client. See Ohio Rule 1.5 cmt. [2]. 
The bar association concluded that it was appropriate to charge a client for secretarial overtime and 
transportation, but only if the overtime and related travel expenses were occasioned by time limits 
imposed by the client or the circumstances. See former OH DR 2-106(B)(5). If they were, the client 
could be charged the direct costs associated with the overtime, plus an allocation of overhead 
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expenses. Whether the expenses incurred by the secretary for transportation home should be charged 
and, if so, in what amount depend on community practice. 
The propriety of charging a client for late meals turns on the reason the charges were incurred. If the 
attorneys are working late generally and happen to be working on a particular client’s matter, the 
charge would be inappropriate. If, in contrast, the exigencies of the client’s case necessitated the 
evening hours, passing through reasonable costs would be appropriate. See former OH DR 
2-106(B)(5). 
Finally, with respect to photocopy charges, the bar association was of the opinion that a lawyer could 
charge a client for the direct cost associated with the service plus a reasonable allocation of overhead 
expenses directly associated with the service, which includes wear and tear on the photocopy machine. 
As with any charge to a client, the overall charge must be reasonable. Under Ohio Rule 1.5 cmt. [2], 
reasonable in-house charges of this nature are permissible with client consent. 
 
1.5:420  “Retainer Fees:” Advance Payment, Engagement Fee, or Lump-Sum 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.126 (1996). 
As part of a fee arrangement, a lawyer and a client may enter into a retainer agreement. The term 
“retainer” has at least four very different meanings. First, it can represent a payment required to 
secure the lawyer’s agreement to handle a case, with separate fees charged for the work performed. 
Second, it sometimes describes an arrangement where the lawyer, for a fee, agrees to be available to 
the client for a specific period of time should the client need the lawyer’s services. Third, it can refer 
to a deposit of funds by the client from which the lawyer will draw necessary funds to cover fees and 
expenses. If the representation requires less than the full amount deposited, the remainder is remitted 
to the client. (See Rule 1.5 cmt. [4] obligating the return of any unearned portion of an advance fee 
payment.) The fourth use of the term “retainer” involves a nonrefundable prepayment for services to 
be rendered. 
Comment [6A] discusses advance-fee payments, including the “true” or “classic” retainer, which 
ensures the lawyer’s availability and precludes adverse representation. Continuing, the comment 
notes that 
[w]hat is often called a retainer is in fact an advance payment to ensure 
that fees are paid when they are subsequently earned, on either a flat fee 
or hourly basis. A flat fee is a fee of a set amount for performance of 
agreed work, which may or may not be paid in advance but is not 
deemed earned until the work is performed. An earned upon receipt fee 
[as to which see Rule 1.5(d)(3) and section 1.5:430 of the treatise] is a 
flat fee paid in advance that is deemed earned upon payment regardless 
of the amount of future work performed. 
290
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.5 
 
Ohio Rule 1.5 cmt. [6A]. See generally ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
79-80 (6th ed. 2007) (commentary). 
Retainers to secure availability have been approved, particularly where this potentially entails 
forgoing employment for a competitor or opponent of the client.  Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. 
Okocha, 83 Ohio St.3d 3, 697 N.E.2d 594 (1998); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Klos, 81 Ohio St.3d 
486, 692 N.E.2d 565 (1998). But where there is “no employment opportunity to lose,” charging a 
“lost opportunity” fee because of the inability to represent any other party in this 
termination-of-marriage case resulted in a clearly excessive fee, for “once Guldman [the client] had 
consulted respondent, respondent was ethically foreclosed from any other representation in the case 
because of the parties’ adverse interests and the fact that Guldman’s husband had his own lawyer.” 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Halliburton-Cohen, 106 Ohio St.3d 98, 2005 Ohio 3956, 832 N.E.2d 42, 
at paras. 6, 16. 
Retainers for security for fees and expenses (“advance payment to ensure that fees are paid when they 
are subsequently earned,” in the language of Comment [6A]) also have been approved. Okocha; Klos. 
However, failure to return the unspent portion of the retainer fee when the agreement so requires can 
constitute charging an excessive fee.  Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Lubitsky, 63 Ohio St.3d 669, 590 
N.E.2d 746 (1992). Accord Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Treneff, 98 Ohio St.3d 348, 2003 
Ohio 1011, 785 N.E.2d 434. Such behavior with respect to retainer fees was also found to violate 
former OH DR 9-102(B)(4), see Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Glatki, 88 Ohio St.3d 381, 726 N.E.2d 
993 (2000) (failure to return unearned portion of retainer upon request by client); accord Greene 
County Bar Ass’n v. Fodal, 100 Ohio St.3d 310, 2003 Ohio 5852, 798 N.E.2d 1082, and former 
OH DR 9-102(A), which required that all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than 
advances for costs and expenses, be paid into a separate bank account containing no funds belonging 
to the lawyer or firm. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zingarelli, 89 Ohio St.3d 210, 729 
N.E.2d 1167 (2000), where the client paid the lawyer a retainer, which the lawyer deposited in his 
office account containing personal and other business funds. The Court held: 
Since the agreed-upon fee had not yet been earned and was therefore 
refundable at the time respondent made the deposit, respondent 
violated DR 9-102(A) by commingling [the client’s] money with his 
own. Accordingly, we hold that harm to the client is not a necessary 
element for there to be a violation of DR 9-102(A). 
Id. at 219, 729 N.E.2d at 1175. See Ohio Rule 1.15(a) and section 1.15:200. 
With respect to the first meaning of “retainer” discussed above, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that 
a retainer charged simply for agreeing to undertake representation, coupled with a separate fee for 
services rendered, constitutes an improper, excessive fee.  Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Okocha, 
83 Ohio St.3d 3, 697 N.E.2d 594 (1998). See section 1.5:430. 
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1.5:430  Nonrefundable Fees 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.126 (1996). 
While there is disagreement nationally on this issue, nonrefundable or earned-upon-receipt retainers 
unrelated to legal services to be performed or forgone, were prohibited under the former OHCPR, 
e.g., Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Okocha, 83 Ohio St.3d 3, 697 N.E.2d 594 (1998); see Lake 
County Bar Ass’n v. Ryan, 109 Ohio St.3d 301, 2006 Ohio 2422, 847 N.E.2d 430, at para. 22 
(rejecting respondent’s claim to have legitimately charged such retainers; “except for limited 
circumstances not present here, this practice was declared unethical years ago,” citing Okocha). 
Accord Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Watterson, 103 Ohio St.3d 322, 2004 Ohio 4776, 815 N.E.2d 
386 (citing Okocha; reiterating that such retainers are improper except in limited circumstances not 
present here; charging nonrefundable retainer on top of contingent fee is excessive).  (In the related 
fee litigation, the court of appeals affirmed a judgment for the client for the amount obtained in 
settlement, to which the lawyer asserted he was entitled; since the lawyer had been discharged or had 
withdrawn, his compensation was to be measured by the quantum meruit doctrine; and since the 
lawyer had chosen not to appear for trial (“‘[appellant] will not be attending any trial in this matter’“) 
and thus presented no evidence as to the reasonable value of the services rendered, he could not prove 
entitlement to any of the settlement proceeds. Watterson v. King, 166 Ohio App.3d 704, 2006 Ohio 
2305, 852 N.E.2d 1278 (Stark).)  
The latest word under the Code was Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 121 Ohio St.3d 9, 2009 
Ohio 259, 901 N.E.2d 225. There, respondent was found to have violated DR 2-106(A) by charging 
a “flat rate retainer” of $4,500, plus a 20% contingent fee of any recovery on his client’s counterclaim. 
The Court summarized as follows: 
In finding violations of DR 2-106(A), we have generally disapproved 
of nonrefundable, earned-on-receipt legal fees absent a true “general” 
retainer agreement, one that secures the services of a particular attorney 
for any contingency and requires the lawyer to forgo employment by a 
competitor of the client. [citing Okocha]. We have cautioned against 
charging nonrefundable fees because DR 2-110(A)(3) and successor 
Rule 1.16(e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct require in all but 
narrow circumstances that upon withdrawal from representation, a 
lawyer must return fees that the client has paid in advance and that the 
lawyer has not earned. [citing, among other cases, Stark County Bar v. 
Watterson]. 
Id. at para. 7. 
Under the Rules, nonrefundable fees are controlled by the provisions of Ohio Rule 1.5(d)(3). 
Pursuant to division (d)(3), fees so denominated are still prohibited, consistent with the Code 
precedent discussed above, but with a caveat -- “[a] lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, 
charge, or collect” such fees 
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unless the client is simultaneously advised in writing that if the lawyer 
does not complete the representation for any reason, the client may be 
entitled to a refund of all or part of the fee based on the value of the 
representation pursuant to division (a) of this rule. 
Comment [6A] elaborates as follows: 
The reasonableness requirement and the application of the factors in 
division (a) may mean that a client is entitled to a refund of an advance 
fee payment even though it has been denominated “nonrefundable,” 
“earned upon receipt,” or in similar terms that imply the client would 
never receive a refund. So that a client is not misled by the use of such 
terms, division (d)(3) requires certain minimum disclosures that must 
be included in the written fee agreement. 
Rule 1.5 cmt. [6A]. 
Comment [4] states that “[a] lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return 
any unearned portion.” While it can be argued that this “obligation” and the fact that the client “may” 
be entitled to a refund of such fees under Rule 1.5(d)(3) and Comment [6A] are inconsistent, we think 
they are compatible and should be so read. Thus, to the extent an advance payment is “unearned” by 
the client (applying the tests of 1.5(a)(1)-(8)), to that same extent the client will be entitled to a refund, 
tested by the very same factors. To summarize, 
 “Nonrefundable,” etc., advance-fee payments are permitted only if accompanied by the 
written disclosure specified in division (d)(3); and 
 A refund to the client to whom such disclosure has been made would depend upon 
“application of the factors set forth in division (a).” In other words, the nonrefundable fee 
must be tested against the eight factors in division (a) used to determine its reasonableness; to 
the extent the nonrefundable fee is wanting in this regard -- i.e., not fully “earned” -- the client 
then will be entitled to a refund, which the lawyer is “obliged” to return. Rules 1.5 cmts. [4] & 
[6A]. 
The subject of “nonrefundable” fees, including a discussion of the possible tension between the Cook 
decision under the Code (decided in 2009 but the operative facts of which occurred prior to the 
effective date of the Rules) and Rule 1.5(d)(3), may be found in Lloyd Snyder, Earned Upon 
Receipt Flat Fees and Non-Refundable Retainers, Cleveland Metro. B.J., Dec. 2009, at 16. 
Nonrefundable fee cases decided under the Rules of Professional Conduct include Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Summers, 131 Ohio St.3d 467, 2012 Ohio 1144, 967 N.E.2d 183 (nonrefundable flat fee 
without compliance with 1.5(d)(3) written notice requirement); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Dearfield, 
130 Ohio St.3d 363, 2011 Ohio 5295, 958 N.E.2d 910 (nonrefundable retainer agreement without 
compliance with 1.5(d)(3) written notice condition violated Rule); Akron Bar Ass’n v. Freedman, 
128 Ohio St.3d 497, 2011 Ohio 1959, 946 N.E.2d 753 (charging $3,500 flat fee, without advising 
clients that they might be entitled to full or partial refund if representation not completed, violated 
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1.5(d)(3)). Other aspects of the interesting Summers case are discussed in sections 1.5:410 and the 
Introduction, both supra. 
 
1.5:500  Communication Regarding Fees 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.5(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.5(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.128 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  41.110 
ALI-LGL §  38 
Wolfram §  9.2.1 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.128 (1996). 
Fee disputes often can be avoided if the lawyer and client have a clear understanding of the fee 
arrangement at the outset. To this end, a full explanation of the proposed fee arrangement and the 
reasons for it is now required by Ohio Rule 1.5(b). Under 1.5(b), the lawyer “shall” communicate to 
the client, preferably in writing, at or within a reasonable time after the engagement, 
[t]he nature and scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the 
fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible . . . . 
This need not be done where 
the lawyer will charge a client whom the lawyer has regularly 
represented on the same basis as previously charged. 
Any change in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses is subject to division (a) and must promptly be 
communicated to the client, preferably in writing. Id. The ABA has opined that any such change 
under the Model Rule must be reasonable under the circumstances then existing and must be agreed to 
by the client. See ABA Formal Op. 11-458 (Aug. 4, 2011). 
The Rule 1.5(b) communication obligation can be satisfied, according to Comment [2], “with at least 
a simple memorandum or copy of the lawyer’s customary fee arrangements that states that the general 
nature of the legal services to be provided, the basis, rate or total amount of the fee and whether and to 
what extent the client will be responsible for any costs, expenses or disbursements in the course of the 
representation.” Rule 1.5 cmt. [2]. The client must agree in advance before the lawyer can seek 
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reimbursement for the reasonable cost of nonlegal services auxiliary to the representation (such as 
copying) performed in-house. Id. 
In two of the three cases that have found a violation of the 1.5(b) duty to communicate the nature and 
scope of the representation and the basis and rate of the fee, there was no written fee agreement. See 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mishler, 127 Ohio St.3d 336, 2010 Ohio 5987, 939 N.E.2d 852 (three 
separate instances), and Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 130 Ohio St.3d 368, 2011 Ohio 5578, 958 
N.E.2d 914, where the respondent, after charging (together with another attorney) the client a flat fee 
of $150,000 in defense of a criminal matter, “failed to discuss the basis or rate for legal services 
provided after Lay’s criminal trial, which he had completed on a flat-fee basis.” Id. at para. 36. In the 
third case, there was a written fee agreement, but it failed to disclose that at the time it was signed, the 
advertised free consultation period came to an end and the lawyer’s billing clock began to run. See 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Mezher & Espohl, 134 Ohio St.3d 319, 2012 Ohio 5527, 982 N.E.2d 657, 
at ¶21: “an attorney must inform the client when the representation and chargeable events 
commence.” 
Note that the general reference in Comment [2] to “whether and to what extent” the client will be 
responsible for expenses is, with respect to the specific category of litigation expenses, presumably 
trumped by Rule 1.8(e)(1), which provides that any litigation expenses advanced by the lawyer are 
ultimately to be borne by the client unless made contingent on the outcome of the litigation. See 
section 1.8:610. 
While a written agreement is not required for other than contingency-fee arrangements, reducing the 
terms of the required notice to a writing, is recommended. As stated in Comment [2]: 
 The detail and specificity of the communication required by 
division (b) will depend on the nature of the client-lawyer relationship, 
the work to be performed, and the basis of the rate or fee. A writing that 
confirms the nature and scope of the client-lawyer relationship and the 
fees to be charged is the preferred means of communicating this 
information to the client and can clarify the relationship and reduce the 
possibility of a misunderstanding. 
Ohio Rule 1.5 cmt. [2]. See section 1.5:610 for a discussion of the writing requirement for 
contingency-fee arrangements. To the extent compensation for the representation is to be paid by a 
third party, this must be fully disclosed to and consented to by the client. See Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [23]. 
Fee-sharing arrangements with lawyers in different firms also require written disclosure of the terms 
to the client and the client’s consent. Rule 1.5(e)(2). See section 1.5:800. 
The absence of a written fee agreement does not render the fee contract unenforceable as a matter of 
contract law. For example, in Cannell v. Rhodes, 31 Ohio App.3d 183, 509 N.E.2d 963 (Cuyahoga 
1986), the Eighth District Court of Appeals rejected a client’s claim that an oral contract for interest 
on attorney fees was unenforceable because it was not in writing. The new Rules likewise impose no 
ethical requirement of a written contract, provided the lawyer has complied with the notice provisions 
of Rule 1.5(b). Note, however, that in at least one place the comments refer to matters “that must be 
included in the written fee agreement.” Ohio Rule 1.5 cmt. [6A]. Despite this language in Comment 
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[6A], it is clear that Rule 1.5(b) does not impose a written fee-agreement requirement – rather, the 
lawyer must communicate to the client the matters set forth in division (b), “preferably in writing.” 
The failure to have a written fee agreement may nevertheless have evidentiary implications, should a 
fee dispute arise. In Akron Bar Ass’n v. Naumoff, 62 Ohio St.3d 72, 578 N.E.2d 452 (1991), the 
Court found that an attorney had violated DR 2-106(A) when he collected one-third of a settlement, 
based on an alleged contingent-fee agreement that had not been reduced to writing. (The case 
involved a nontort claim to which the ORC 4705.15 writing requirement did not apply.) The original 
agreement between the attorney and client called for fees to be charged on an hourly basis. The 
attorney claimed to have discussed the change to a contingent-fee arrangement with the seventy-five 
year old client. The client denied having been informed of the change. Because the contingent-fee 
arrangement was not in writing and the hourly-rate arrangement was, the Court recognized the latter 
as the fee arrangement between the attorney and the client. The $14,700 collected by the attorney, 
therefore, was clearly in excess of the $2,400 calculated under the hourly-rate contract.  
Even if the fee agreement is in writing, care in drafting is still required. In Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Klos, 81 Ohio St.3d 486, 692 N.E.2d 565 (1998), the Ohio Supreme Court relied on the general 
ambiguity of the contract as one of the factors leading to a conclusion that the contract called for an 
excessive fee in violation of former OH DR 2-106. See also Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 
(unnumbered) (June 3, 1999) (attorney, as fiduciary, has burden of proof when contract ambiguity 
arises). 
The contract or notice should also make clear the parties’ responsibilities with respect to expenses. 
See section 1.8:600. If a lawyer contemplates incurring extraordinary expenses, the lawyer should 
inform the client to secure the client’s consent or allow the client to seek other counsel.  Columbus 
Bar Ass’n v. Zauderer, 80 Ohio St.3d 435, 687 N.E.2d 410 (1997). Under Rule 1.5(b), a lawyer 
would now be obligated to inform the client of any such contemplated extraordinary expenses. 
 
1.5:600  Contingent Fees 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.5(c) 
ORC 4705.15 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.5(c) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  2.137, 2.139, 
2.142-2.144 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  41:901 
ALI-LGL §  35 
Wolfam §  9.4 
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The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  2.137, 2.139, 2.142 (1996). 
Contingency-fee agreements have long been recognized as acceptable fee arrangements for many 
types of civil litigation. As defined by statute, contingent-fee agreements make compensation to 
attorneys for legal services contingent “in whole or in part, upon a judgment being rendered in favor 
of or a settlement being obtained for the client and is either a fixed amount or an amount to be 
determined by a specified formula, including, but not limited to, a percentage of any judgment 
rendered in favor of or settlement obtained for the client.” ORC 4705.15(A)(1). 
The essential element of a contingent-fee arrangement is the risk that the attorney will not be paid 
because some designated result is not achieved. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  
9.4.1, at 526 (1986). Given this, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline opined 
that it was improper under the former OHCPR for a lawyer to charge a fee whereby the client pays an 
hourly fee until a settlement or judgment is obtained, at which point the attorney has the option to 
keep the hourly fee or receive a contingency fee instead, whichever is higher. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 95-7, 1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 2, 1995). As the 
Board reasoned: “It is not based upon the factors that determine reasonableness under the Code, nor is 
it based upon any degree of risk of nonrecovery. It is, on its face, based upon greed.” Id. at *3. The 
Board expressed no opinion on the propriety of a mixed fee in which an attorney charges both a fixed 
and a contingent fee. 
The use of contingent fees is regulated in the Rules by Ohio Rule 1.5(c) and Rule 1.5(d)(1) & (2). 
Pursuant to division (c), 
 [a] fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for 
which service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee 
is prohibited by division (d) of this rule or other law. 
Rules 1.5(c)(1) & (2) set forth the requisites for written contingent-fee agreements, which are 
mandatory, and for contingent-fee closing statements. Both are discussed in section 1.5:610. 
The prohibitions contained in Rule 1.5(d)(1) & (2) are reviewed in section 1.5:710-:720. 
Comment [3] addresses, in a very general way, the reasonableness standard of division (a) in the 
context of contingent fees: 
In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or 
whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer 
must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. 
Ohio Rule 1.5 cmt. [3]. See discussion in section 1.5:410 at “Reasonable fees - Nature of the fee.” 
Comment [3] goes on to note that other applicable law may place limits on contingent fees, such as a 
ceiling on the allowable percentage, or require that the lawyer offer an alternative basis for the fee. 
Rule 1.5(c) allows lawyers to enter into contingency-fee agreements as an exception to the general 
prohibition against acquiring a proprietary interest in a client’s cause of action. Accord Ohio Rule 
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1.8(i)(2) (recognizing exception for reasonable contingent fee in civil case). See section 1.8:1120. 
Such arrangements are particularly helpful where the client could not otherwise afford to hire an 
attorney to handle the claim. See 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  35 cmt. 
b (2000). 
In addition to Rule 1.5, special statutory provisions and court rules also will apply in certain 
circumstances to further regulate contingency-fee practices. See, e.g., ORC 4705.15(B); OH Sup R 
70(I). 
While contingent fees are typically associated with civil litigation matters, Rule 1.5(c) is not so 
limited (the “fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered”). 
Thus in Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Advisory Op. 2013-1 (Jan. 25, 2013), the bar association’s 
Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct Committee opined that the Rules of Professional Conduct “do 
not prohibit entering into a contingent-fee agreement where the lawyer represents the client in a 
transaction [here, negotiating an oil and gas lease on behalf of the client with the fee constituting a 
fixed percentage of possible royalties received by the client] and it is agreed that the lawyer’s 
compensation, if any, will come from revenue that the transaction will potentially generate,” so long 
as all of the applicable requisites for contingent-fee contracts as set forth in Rule 1.5(a), (b) and (c) 
are met. Id. at 1. 
There is commentary supporting the view that if there is any question as to whether a contingency fee 
is in the client’s best interest, one should discuss alternative fee arrangements and the implications of 
choosing any particular course. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  9.4.1, at 530 n.32 
(1986). See also 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  35 cmt. c (2000). 
Indeed, ABA Informal Op. 86-1521 (Oct. 26, 1986) states that in cases of doubt concerning the 
appropriateness of use of a contingent fee, the lawyer “must” offer the client the option of a 
reasonable fixed fee. Id. at 3. To the extent that the issue was addressed by case law under the 
OHCPR, Ohio’s approach seemed to be consistent with this commentary. See Akron Bar Ass’n v. 
Naumoff, 62 Ohio St.3d 72, 578 N.E.2d 452 (1991) (finding that alleged fee-contract modification 
was unenforceable when attorney admittedly failed to offer client choice between contingent-fee 
arrangement and flat fee and did not reduce contingent-fee arrangement to writing). But Ohio Rule 
1.5 cmt. [3] notes only that “[a]pplicable law . . . may require a lawyer to offer clients an alternative 
basis for the fee.” Moreover, Ohio follows the current version of the Model Rules in not including the 
sentence that stated a lawyer “should” offer alternative bases if there is any doubt about a contingent 
fee being in the client’s best interest. This language, formerly in MR 1.7 cmt. [3], was deleted by the 
ABA in 2002. 
 
1.5:610  Special Requirements Concerning Contingent Fees 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § §  2.143-2.144 (1996). 
Writing requirement: To be enforceable, ORC 4705.15(B) requires contingent-fee contracts in tort 
cases to be reduced to writing and signed by the client and the attorney, a copy of which “shall” be 
provided to the client by the lawyer. Tort actions are defined by the statute as a subset of civil actions, 
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namely those actions for damages due to injury, death, or loss to person or property. ORC 
4705.15(A)(2). Actions for breach of contract are not included in this definition. If the attorney fails 
to reduce the contingent-fee agreement to writing, the client may not be bound by it.  In re Betts, 62 
Ohio Misc.2d 30, 587 N.E.2d 997 (C.P. Ross 1991). But cf. Goldauskas v. Elyria Foundry Co., 
145 Ohio App.3d 490, 763 N.E.2d 645 (Lorain) (2001), where the court took the contingent-fee 
contract into consideration in determining whether the fee awarded by the trial court was excessive, 
even though the appellate court expressly noted that questions as to its validity were raised below and 
“no copy signed by any attorney at the . . . firm was produced as is mandated by R.C. 4705.15.”  Id. at 
497, 763 N.E.2d at 651. In addition to reducing the contract to writing, an attorney, if entitled to 
compensation under the contract, must prepare a closing statement to be given to the client prior to or 
at the time the attorney receives the compensation. ORC 4705.15(C). 
Rule 1.5(c)(1) makes a written fee agreement signed by the client and the lawyer obligatory in all (not 
just tort matters covered by ORC 4705.15(B)) matters in which contingent fees are permitted. This 
subdivision also sets forth the terms to be included in the written contract. They are: 
the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percent 
or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, 
trial, or appeal; 
litigation or other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and 
whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent 
fee is calculated. 
Rule 1.5(c)(1). The agreement must further “clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the 
client will be liable whether or not the client is the prevailing party.” Id. (This provision should be 
read in conjunction with Rule 1.8(e)(1), pursuant to which the client’s responsibility for litigation 
expenses can be made contingent on the outcome of the case. See section 1.8:610.) The first case of 
which we are aware finding a violation of the contingent fee writing requirement of Rule 1.5(c)(1) is 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Mishler, 127 Ohio St.3d 336, 2010 Ohio 5987, 939 N.E.2d 852; 
others are Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Sliwinski, 134 Ohio St.3d 368, 2012 Ohio 5640, 982 
N.E.2d 698; and Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Seibel, 132 Ohio St.3d 411, 2012 Ohio 3234, 972 N.E.2d 
594. Cf., under the OHCPR, Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Grieselhuber, 78 Ohio St.3d 373, 678 
N.E.2d 535 (1997) (lawyer disciplined for failure to disclose in contingent-fee advertisement that 
client could be liable for costs and expenses).  
Closing statement requirements: As in ORC 4705.15(C), Rule 1.5(c)(2) imposes the following 
duties: 
 If the lawyer becomes entitled to compensation under the 
contingent fee agreement and the lawyer will be disbursing funds, the 
lawyer shall prepare a closing statement and shall provide the client 
with that statement at the time of or prior to the receipt of compensation 
under the agreement. 
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After delineating what must be included in the statement (specifying the manner in which the 
compensation was determined under the agreement, costs and expenses deducted by the lawyer, and, 
if applicable, the actual division of fees with a lawyer not in the same firm), Rule 1.5(c)(2) mandates 
that the “closing statement shall be signed by the client and lawyer.”  Although not expressly so stated 
in the Rule (in contrast to MR 1.5(c)), it is obvious that the closing statement (“signed by the client 
and lawyer”) must be in writing. 
The first case to our knowledge involving a violation of Rule 1.5(c)(2) is Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Bursey, 124 Ohio St.3d 85, 2009 Ohio 6180, 919 N.E.2d 198 (failure to prepare and provide clients 
with closing statement at or prior to lawyer’s receipt of compensation). Accord Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Talikka, 135 Ohio St.3d 323, 2013 Ohio 1012, 986 N.E.2d 954 (three separate violations). 
Court approval of contingency-fee agreements: In certain circumstances involving fiduciaries, 
contingent-fee agreements must be pre-approved by the court. See OH Sup R 71(I). Failure to obtain 
court pre-approval could render the contract unenforceable. For example, in  In re Guardianship of 
Patrick, 66 Ohio App.3d 415, 584 N.E.2d 86 (Huron 1991), an attorney who assisted a guardian for 
a child in a personal injury suit was denied recovery on a contingency-fee contract because the 
contract had not been approved by the court prior to being entered into as then required by the Rules 
of Superintendence for Courts of Common Pleas (now OH Sup R 71(I)). The court instead awarded 
the attorney the reasonable value for the services rendered. In seeking approval, the attorney also 
must follow applicable local court rules. See, e.g., Cuyahoga County CP Probate R 71.1(D); 
Franklin County CP Probate R 71.8; Hamilton County CP Probate R 71.2. 
An exception to the general rule of unenforceability where required pre-approval has not been 
obtained may lie if the fiduciary agreed to the contingent-fee arrangement, the court actively 
participated in the negotiation and settlement of the matter governed by the arrangement, and the 
attorney’s representation did not prejudice the estate. See  In re Estate of Hamrick, 126 Ohio 
App.3d 624, 710 N.E.2d 1213 (Summit 1998) (recognizing that at least one court has found an 
exception under these circumstances, but finding that the circumstances were not met here). 
Even if the contingent-fee contract is pre-approved by the court, the court retains the authority to 
review any final fee for reasonableness and to alter the fee accordingly. OH Sup R 71(I); In re 
Estate of York, 133 Ohio App.3d 234, 727 N.E.2d 607 (Warren 1999) (applying former OH DR 
2-106(B)). 
 
1.5:700  Unlawful Fees 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.5(d) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.5(d) 
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Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  2.114, 2.138, 
2.140-2.141 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §§  41:914, 41:926 
ALI-LGL §  36 
Wofram §§  9.3.2, 9.4 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.138 (1996). 
Illegal or restricted fees are dealt with in Ohio Rule 1.5(d). Rule 1.5(d)(1) severely restricts the use 
of contingent fees in domestic relations cases. See section 1.5:720. Ohio Rule 1.5(d)(2) prohibits 
contingent-fee arrangements in criminal cases. See section 1.5:710. Rule 1.5(d)(3) regulates the use 
of “nonrefundable” and similar fee arrangements. See section 1.5:430. Other fees that are illegal 
regardless of the nature of the fee arrangement are discussed in section 1.5:730. 
 
1.5:710  Contingent Fees in Criminal Cases 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.140 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.5(d)(2) prohibits a lawyer from entering into an arrangement for, charging, or collecting 
a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case. The rationale underlying this 
prohibition is twofold. First, the contingency-fee arrangement usually is used in a situation where a 
successful suit will generate a res out of which the fee can be paid. Criminal defense representation 
provides no res out of which to pay the attorney if successful. See former OH EC 2-19 (identifying 
this as the primary reason public policy “condemns” contingency-fee arrangements in criminal cases). 
A second rationale concerns the special context involved. Ultimately, criminal defense representation 
is concerned with important issues of individual liberty. With the possibility of prison or even death 
involved, public policy demands that we avoid creating incentives for a lawyer to act contrary to the 
client’s best interest. If the fee in a particular case is contingent on the defendant’s exoneration from 
criminal charges, for example, an attorney might be less motivated to engage in plea bargaining on the 
client’s behalf. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  9.4.3, at 538 (1986). 
 
1.5:720 Contingent Fees in Domestic-Relations Matters 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.141 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.5(d)(1) precludes the use of contingent fees in a domestic-relations matter, if the 
payment or amount of the fee “is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of 
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spousal or child support, or property settlement in lieu thereof.” The primary rationale underlying this 
rule is to prevent lawyers from having an incentive to stand in the way of reconciliation, which, in 
turn, is grounded in the strong public policy favoring family and marriage. See Charles W. Wolfram, 
Modern Legal Ethics §  9.4.4, at 539 (1986). 
Unlike the former OHCPR, where the limitation was raised only in an ethical consideration, the 
prohibition against making fees contingent upon securing divorce or on the amount of spousal or 
child support in domestic relations matters is absolute. Thus, a case like Gross v. Lamb, 1 Ohio 
App.3d 1, 437 N.E.2d 309 (Franklin 1980), in which an Ohio court of appeals found a 
contingent-fee arrangement justified in a domestic-relations/divorce case when the client was unable 
to pay a reasonable fixed fee, is probably no longer good law. The OHCPR admonition against 
contingency-fee arrangements in domestic relations cases did not extend to actions to collect 
arrearages in post-divorce decree awards involving court-ordered child support, alimony, or property 
division. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 96-97-03 (Sept. 16, 1997); see also Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
Informal Op. 78-7 (Sept. 25, 1978) (approving contingency fee to collect child support). See, to the 
same effect under the Rules, Ohio Rule 1.5 cmt. [6]: Division (d) “does not preclude a contract for a 
contingent fee for legal representation in connection with recovery of post-judgment balances due 
under support or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy 
concerns.” 
 
1.5:730  Other Illegal Fees in Ohio 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.114 (1996). 
Under Rule 1.5(a), a fee that is “illegal” is prohibited, as it was under OH DR 2-106(A). Case law 
under the former provision indicated that a fee (whether contingent or not) might be illegal and 
therefore prohibited on grounds other than those now listed in Rule 1.5(d)(1)-(3). First, the fee 
charged must comply with all applicable state and federal laws. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Mbakpuo, 73 Ohio St.3d 292, 652 N.E.2d 976 (1995) (lawyer sanctioned for, inter alia, applying 
contingency-fee percentage to the personal income protection portion of settlement proceeds in 
contravention of applicable state law). See also Ethics Opinion, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Report, Oct. 
1985, at 8 (suggesting that fee agreements must be enforceable under law of contracts as well). The 
nature of the compensation of the fee is a second concern. Accepting illicit drugs in exchange for legal 
services, for example, constituted collecting an illegal fee.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Cockrum, 21 
Ohio St.3d 51, 487 N.E.2d 314 (1986) (accepting cocaine and marijuana as payment for legal 
services warranted a one-year suspension from practice of law). Third, charging a fee that otherwise 
violates the Rules of Professional Conduct also might fall into this category. This certainly seems to 
be the course taken by the Court in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Winkfield, 107 Ohio St.3d 360, 2006 
Ohio 6, 839 N.E.2d 924, where a suspended lawyer charging “clients for legal services that he was 
not authorized to provide and usually did not perform,” id. at para. 33, was found to have violated 
DR 2-106(A), with specific reference by the Court to the disciplinary rule’s prohibition against 
charging an “otherwise illegal fee.”  Id. at para. 34. 
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Another case that could be viewed as an “illegal” fee case is Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 113 
Ohio St.3d 344, 2007 Ohio 2074, 865 N.E.2d 873, where the respondent, in violation of Gov Bar R 
VIII 6(B), attempted to collect for time spent in obtaining an award from the Client Security Fund.  
The Court, however, analyzed the resulting 2-106(A) violation in terms of charging an “excessive,” 
rather than illegal, fee. 
An opinion of the BCGD advised that a lawyer’s securing of his legal fees with a mortgage on the 
client’s home was not an improper fee agreement under former OH DR 2-106(A), “[a]ssuming that 
the underlying fee is not excessive or illegal.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
2004-8, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 12, at *10 (Oct. 8, 2004). 
Finally, it should be noted that the Rule expressly recognizes that property may be used in payment of 
fees, with certain limitations. Thus, Comment [4] states: 
A lawyer may accept property in payment of services, such as an 
ownership interest in an enterprise [e.g., stock] providing [sic] this does 
not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or 
subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(i). However, a fee 
paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements 
of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a 
business transaction with the client. 
Rule 1.5 cmt. [4] (bracketed material added). 
 
1.5:800  Fee Splitting (Referral Fees) 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.5(e), (f) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.5(e) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  2.150-2.162 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  41:701 
ALI-LGL §  47 
Wolfram §  9.24 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  2.150-2.162 (1996). 
Fee splitting among lawyers - In general: Ohio Rule 1.5(e), which for the most part restates the 
provisions of former OH DR 2-107, regulates fee splitting among lawyers not in the same firm. The 
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rule attempts to accommodate competing concerns. On the one hand, allowing fee splitting simply for 
making a referral seems wasteful, since the referring lawyer provides no service to the client beyond 
making the referral itself. Allowing compensation for the referral may increase client costs without 
affording the client any additional benefit. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-1, 
1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 20 (Feb. 14, 1992). The practice also appears to some to demean 
clients by treating them as objects for barter. On the other hand, referrals are to be encouraged if they 
result in the representation being carried out by lawyers better able to provide the necessary services 
to the client than could the original lawyer working alone. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 91-5, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 25 (Feb. 8, 1991). See generally Charles W. 
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  9.2.4, at 510-11 (1986) (summarizing these policies). 
Ohio Rule 1.5(e) protects clients from the dangers of improper attorney referrals and prohibits fee 
payments to lawyers who have performed no services and accepted no responsibility for a matter. The 
Rule places four requirements on agreements for the division of fees between lawyers who are “not in 
the same firm.” Such a division of fees is acceptable only when all of the following have been 
satisfied: (1) the fees are divided in proportion to the services performed, or each lawyer assumes 
joint responsibility for the representation and agrees to be available for consultation with the client; (2) 
the client has given written consent, after full disclosure of the identity of each lawyer, that fees will 
be divided, and that the division will be in proportion to the services to be performed or that each 
lawyer will assume joint responsibility for the representation; (3) except where court approval of the 
fee division is obtained, the written closing statement in a contingent-fee case must be signed by the 
client and each lawyer and shall comply with subdivision (c)(2) of Rule 1.5; and (4) the total fee is 
reasonable. 
In a 2009 opinion, the Board noted that the requirements of Rule 1.5(e) are triggered when a 
plaintiff’s personal injury lawyer retains an outside firm to provide healthcare lien-resolution services 
in a settled matter and the outsourced fee is included as part of a contingent fee. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2009-9, 2009 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Dec. 4, 2009). 
(Fee splitting should be distinguished from the situation in which one lawyer withdraws or is 
discharged from the representation, which is then undertaken by another attorney, and the first lawyer 
seeks compensation for the work performed. Absent collusion by the attorneys involved, this issue is 
better thought of as a separate transaction involving lawyer and client than as a fee-splitting 
arrangement among the lawyers. See Goldauskas v. Elyria Foundry Co., 145 Ohio App.3d 490, 
763 N.E.2d 645 (Lorain) (2001) (discharged firm sought portion of settlement pursuant to 
contingent fee agreement; court determined reasonable quantum meruit fee to which discharged firm 
entitled; former DR 2-107(A) not mentioned). Compare Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Mason, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 2704, 889 N.E.2d 539 (lawyer A withdrew; lawyer B retained; settlement 
obtained by B; B found guilty of, inter alia, fee-splitting in violation of DR 2-107(A)(1)-(3) when, 
instead of deducting A’s percentage from B’s ⅓ contingent fee as had been agreed, B deducted A’s 
amount from client’s share of settlement proceeds.) 
Cases dealing with violations of the fee-splitting rule typically arise in two contexts: attorney 
disciplinary cases and contract enforcement actions between attorneys over employment contracts 
that divide fees. Occasionally, violation of the rule has been used to justify attorney disqualification. 
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See Baker v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (applying the 
OHCPR). 
Fee splitting among lawyers - Division of fees - In general: Ohio Rule 1.5(e)(1) allows fee division 
either in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, without regard to proportionality, 
where each lawyer assumes “joint responsibility” for the representation and agrees to be available for 
client consultation. 
Case law under the former OHCPR made clear that fee sharing without performing any service or 
assuming any responsibility violated OH DR 2-107(A) and was subject to sanction.  Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Linick, 84 Ohio St. 30 489, 705 N.E.2d 667 (1999) (no client consent; 
division not in proportion to work done (none); no assumption of responsibility). For further insight 
into the Linick case, see Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Zuckerman, 83 Ohio St.3d 148, 699 N.E.2d 40 
(1998), where in a disciplinary proceeding against the donor of one-half of his fees to Linick, who as 
in-house corporate counsel had referred a number of the corporation’s cases to Zuckerman, the 
Supreme Court stated that “Linick was required by DR 2-107 to actually have done some work or at 
least have assumed responsibility for the handling of the matters.” 83 Ohio St.3d at 149, 699 N.E.2d 
at 41. Zuckerman (the donor) also was held to have violated OH DR 2-107(A), “because he should 
have known” that Linick failed to comply with the 2-107(A) requisites. Id. Accord Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n v. Kanter, 86 Ohio St.3d 554, 715 N.E.2d 1140 (1999) (disciplinary proceeding against 
another outside counsel involved in kickback scheme with Linick). If a lawyer refers a case to another 
lawyer to avoid conflict-of-interest problems, the conflict prevents the referring lawyer from 
providing services or assuming responsibility for the representation. Thus, a fee division would not be 
proper. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 91-20 (n.d.). 
In Wilson v. Lynch & Lynch Co., L.P.A., 99 Ohio App.3d 760, 651 N.E.2d 1328 (Geauga 1994), 
Judge Ford, concurring and dissenting in part, expressed his belief that the work a lawyer performs to 
justify a portion of the fee-sharing arrangement could be based on work undertaken before the 
agreement was entered into, as well as post-agreement work performed. 
Fee splitting among lawyers - Division of fees - Division in proportion to services performed: As 
noted, one of the two approved methods of fee splitting under Ohio Rule 1.5(e)(1) is division “in 
proportion to the services performed.” Under the former OHCPR, the “services performed” standard 
required a case-by-case analysis, and in all probability that will continue under Rule 1.5(e)(1). An 
agreement that gave a lawyer a fee substantially out of proportion to the services the lawyer actually 
performed was not enforceable. See, e.g., Dragelevich v. Kohn, Milstein, Cohen & Hausfeld, 755 
F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (finding invalid under Ohio law fee division that gave 20% of the fee 
to an attorney who billed less than 4% of the total hours). Although exact proportionality was not 
required, some relationship had to be shown. As long as the quality or value of the work merited the 
division, however, the agreement was valid.  Waterman v. Kitrick, 60 Ohio App.3d 7, 572 N.E.2d 
250 (Franklin 1990). As the Waterman court stated, the “[r]elative value of services does not 
necessarily depend upon time spent but instead is based upon all factors that are appropriate in setting 
fees for legal services, including expertise, experience, benefit to the client, responsibility, expenses, 
et cetera.”  Id. at 11, 572 N.E. 2d at 255. Even if the lawyer was not entitled to the agreed-upon 
division, a reasonable fee for the services rendered remained appropriate.  Id., 572 N.E.2d at 254. 
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An interesting, if somewhat confusing, decision involving this prong of former OH DR 2-107(A) is  
In re Foster, 247 B.R. 735 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000). In Foster, attorney Vivyan represented the 
debtor in a claim against Medical Mutual. After finding that he could not manage the case by himself, 
he persuaded another firm, CPRS, to become co-counsel. In the words of the court: 
Both Vivyan and CRPS assumed responsibility for the representation 
and their identity and the fact of their agreement to share fees was made 
known to the client in writing. Although the exact terms of the sharing 
were not specified in the initial written agreement with the debtor, the 
oral agreement to divide the fees evenly was premised upon an 
understanding that an equal division would be approximately 
proportionate to the services performed by each. Under the facts of this 
matter, the Court finds that the agreement to share fees, as executed on 
April 1, 1998, is enforceable under Waterman v. Kitrick, 60 Ohio 
App.3d 7, 572 N.E.2d 250 (1990) . . . . 
247 B.R. at 738. The court then proceeded to evaluate the proportionate contribution by Vivyan and 
by CPRS and awarded fees accordingly -- 25% to Vivyan and 75% to CPRS, based on the fact that 
CPRS took the leading role in the case against Medical Mutual and ultimately obtained a very 
substantial settlement on behalf of the debtor. 
Alternatively, and somewhat inconsistently, the court reached the same result by finding 
that whatever understanding Vivyan and CPRS had for the division 
between them of fees, work and expense advancements, that agreement 
was repudiated by each of them. Therefore, the appropriate division 
must be made by the Court based on the Disciplinary Rule’s 
requirement of proportionality for services performed. 
247 B.R. at 738. 
See also the related case,  In re Foster, 247 B.R. 731 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000), in which another 
lawyer sought to share fees with Vivyan. The court there found the purported oral agreement 
unenforceable because the alleged one-third division was not proportionate to services performed and 
because the debtor was not informed in writing of the alleged fee-sharing agreement, as required by 
former OH DR 2-107(A)(2). 
Fee splitting among lawyers - Division of fees - Division based on assumption of responsibility: The 
other approved method for fee splitting under Rule 1.5(e)(1) is division of fees based on assumption 
of responsibility pursuant to which each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation 
and agrees to be available for consultation with the client. In accordance with Comment [7], “[j]oint 
responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation 
as if the lawyers were associated in a partnership.” Ohio Rule 1.5 cmt. [7]. 
The most recent Board pronouncement under the former OHCPR on this aspect of fee splitting, Bd. 
of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-3, 2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 6, 
2003), is consistent with the Rule and states as follows: 
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Because “assume responsibility” under DR 2-107(A) is undefined in 
the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, the Board takes the 
opportunity to address the meaning in this opinion. In advising upon 
the meaning of “responsibility” under the ABA Model Rule 1.5(e), the 
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the 
American Bar Association expressed the view that “responsibility” has 
the same meaning in the Code as in the Model Rules. 
The [ABA] Committee is of the opinion that assumption of 
responsibility does not require substantial services to be 
performed by the lawyer since assumption of responsibility is 
the alternative to a division of fees in proportion to services 
performed. The Committee is also of the opinion that 
assumption of “joint responsibility for the representation” 
includes assumption of responsibility comparable to that of a 
partner in a law firm under similar circumstances, including 
financial responsibility, ethical responsibility to the extent a 
partner would have ethical responsibility for the actions of 
other partners in a law firm in accordance with Rule 5.1 
[Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory 
Lawyers], and the same responsibility to assure adequacy of 
representation and adequate client communication that a 
partner would have for a matter handled by another partner in 
the firm under similar circumstances. 
ABA, Informal Op. 85-1514 (1985). 
This Board agrees that “assume responsibility” under DR 2-107(A) 
includes financial responsibility as well as ethical responsibility to 
assure adequate representation and adequate client communication. A 
lawyer who assumes responsibility should be available to both the 
client and the other fee-sharing lawyer as needed throughout the 
representation and should remain knowledgeable about the progress of 
the legal matter. “It is the ongoing protection of the client’s interests by 
the referring lawyer that justifies the referring lawyer receiving a fee 
that is beyond the proportion of the services actually provided by that 
lawyer.” Wisconsin Bar, Formal Op. E-00-01. 
Id. at *5-7 (bracketed material added by the Board). 
Fee splitting among lawyers - Client consent: The second requirement for fee-division arrangements 
permitted under Ohio Rule 1.5(e) is the prior written consent of the client after full disclosure. Rule 
1.5(e)(2). 
The requirement of client consent before another lawyer is associated on a case serves several 
interests. It reaffirms the client’s right to counsel of choice, protects the client’s interests in 
confidentiality, see section 1.6:310, and affords the client the opportunity to veto fee divisions that the 
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client feels are not in his or her best interest. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-1, 
1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 20 (Feb. 14, 1992). For consent to be meaningful, however, 
certain disclosures must be made. 
Fee splitting among lawyers - Full disclosure: The client’s consent to a lawyer’s fee division with 
another attorney from outside his or her firm must be preceded by full disclosure (1) of the identity of 
each lawyer, (2) that the fees will be divided, and (3) that the division will be in proportion to the 
services to be performed by each lawyer or that each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the 
representation. Rule 1.5(e)(2). 
Under the old rule (and presumably under the new), the burden of disclosure was on the attorney 
originally hired by the client. E.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zingarelli, 89 Ohio St.3d 210, 
729 N.E.2d 1167 (2000). Failure to make the required disclosure or to obtain client consent based on 
the disclosure was a disciplinary offense under the Code, e.g., Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Johnson, 121 
Ohio St.3d 226, 2009 Ohio 777, 903 N.E.2d 306 (lawyers not in same firm agreed to division of fees 
without notice to clients; DR 2-107(A) violated), Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Susco, 89 Ohio St.3d 79, 728 
N.E.2d 1053 (2000) (lawyer who did not notify clients of fee agreement with another firm, who did 
not obtain written agreement from clients concerning division of fees, and who failed to notify clients 
of identity of lawyers who would be sharing in the fee, violated 2-107(A)), and is likewise a violation 
of the Rule of Professional Conduct. Disciplinary Counsel v. Alexander, 133 Ohio St.3d 232, 2012 
Ohio 4575, 977 N.E.2d 633 (failure to obtain written consent from client to split fee with lawyer not 
in same firm violated Rule 1.5(e)(2)). 
Failure to make the requisite disclosure, while a disciplinary offense, does not (or at least did not, 
under the OHCPR) undercut the validity of the contract between the lawyers themselves. Failure to 
disclose the full terms of a fee-splitting agreement to the client served as no defense for the 
noncomplying attorney in an action by the other attorney involved to enforce their agreement.  King v. 
Housel, 52 Ohio St.3d 228, 556 N.E.2d 501 (1990). 
Fee splitting among lawyers - Division of fees - Writing requirement: The Ohio Code Comparison 
to Rule 1.5, sends conflicting messages with respect to subdivision (e)(2). According to the 
Comparison, 1.5(e)(2) “clarifies” former DR 2-107(A)(2) and BCGD Opinion 2003-3, 2003 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 6, 2003), “regarding the matters that must be disclosed in writing to 
the client.” With all respect, it does no such thing. Subdivision (e)(2) requires the client’s consent to 
be in writing, but does not require that the lawyer’s disclosure be in writing, even though former 
2-107(A)(2) did. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson, 127 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010 Ohio 5709, 
938 N.E.2d 1021 (violation found for failure to disclose in writing). Nor does it include the 
requirement of Opinion 2003-3 that the written disclosure must be signed by each lawyer and the 
client. Are these requirements intended to be carried forward in the new Rule? If so, subdivision(e)(2) 
(as well as Comment [7]) confuses, rather than “clarifies,” matters. 
The same ambiguity is present regarding the joint responsibility aspect of Rule 1.5(e)(1). The former 
rule required that such an approach to fee sharing be by written agreement with the client; there is no 
such requirement in 1.5(e)(1). Thus subdivision (e)(1) does not, as the Ohio Code Comparison says 
it does, “restate[] the provisions of DR 2-107(A)(1) . . . .” 
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Fee splitting among lawyers - Written closing statement: Subdivision (e)(3), setting forth a 
requirement not found in former OH DR 2-107, provides that except where a court approves the fee 
division, if the fee being split by lawyers not in the same firm is contingent, then a written closing 
statement in compliance with the terms of subdivision (c)(2) “shall be signed by the client and each 
lawyer.” 
Fee splitting among lawyers - Reasonable total fee: The fourth requirement is that “the total fee is 
reasonable.” Ohio Rule 1.5(e)(4). This requirement received little attention under the prior rule from 
either the Board or the courts in the context of fee division. Rule 1.5(a) provides a set of factors to be 
considered when deciding the reasonableness of a fee in general (see section 1.5:410); these factors 
should be used as a guide for interpreting this final requirement of Ohio Rule 1.5(e). Applying this 
standard, the fee charged to the client should be reasonable in light of the work done or responsibility 
assumed. Any increase in the fee charged to the client because multiple lawyers were involved, rather 
than one, must be predicated on an increased value in the service provided to the client. 
The one Code fee-splitting case that does find a violation of the 2-107(A)(3) reasonable total fee 
requirement is Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Mason, 118 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 2704, 889 N.E.2d 539. 
Mason clearly violated the principle that increased fees involving multiple lawyers must involve 
increase of value, in that respondent, instead of deducting the first lawyer’s 45% share of 
respondent’s 1/3 cut of a personal injury settlement, deducted it from the client’s share. As a result, 
the lawyers ended up with almost half of the total settlement proceeds. (In addition to DR 
2-107(A)(3), Mason also involved violation of the written disclosure and proportionate services 
provision of 2-107(A)(1) & (2).) 
Fee splitting among lawyers - Comment 7 and the “single billing” rule: Rule 1.5 cmt. [7], which 
defines “division of fee” as “a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who 
are not in the same firm,” played a significant role in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mishler, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 109, 2008 Ohio 1810, 886 N.E.2d 818, where the Court, contrary to the Board’s determination, 
held that DR 2-107(A) was not violated. Respondent in that case engaged an unaffiliated lawyer at an 
hourly rate to appear at the client’s deposition and at a mediation conference, all without the client’s 
consent.  In what is perhaps the most extensive discussion of the fee-splitting issue to date, id. at 
paras. 29-38, the Court reviewed its prior holdings in King v. Housel, 52 Ohio St.3d 228, 556 
N.E.2d 501 (1990), and Disciplinary Counsel v. Zingarelli, 89 Ohio St.3d 210, 729 N.E.2d 1167 
(2000), but found them not controlling, because 
this case differs fundamentally from King and Zingarelli. In neither of 
those cases did the lawyers deny that they had charged the client in a 
single billing for another unaffiliated lawyer’s work. In contrast, 
respondent insists that he did not charge Walton for the work of the 
“per diem” attorney or share with that lawyer part of his contingent fee, 
and this record contains no proof to contradict his claim. We therefore 
have no clear and convincing evidence upon which we can rely to find 
a “single billing” to Walton covering the “fee of two or more lawyers 
who are not in the same firm” in accordance with the definition in 
paragraph seven of the Comment to Prof.Cond.R. 1.5. Accordingly, we 
do not find a violation of DR 2-107. 
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 In sustaining respondent’s objection, however, we also 
admonish that his enlistment of, reliance on, and payment to a second 
lawyer to represent his client are not without ethical difficulty. 
Notwithstanding issues of improper fee-splitting, lawyers are 
cautioned against engaging unaffiliated counsel without the client’s 
consent. Such improprieties at least implicate a violation of an 
attorney’s duty to preserve client secrets and confidences and may also 
impinge on standards demanding an attorney’s undivided loyalty to the 
client. 
Mishler, at paras. 37-38. 
Defining “lawyers” and “same firm”: Ohio Rule 1.5(e) restricts fee sharing between “[l]awyers who 
are not in the same firm.” 
The first issue in applying this aspect of the Rule is what is meant by the term “lawyer.” At a 
minimum, it was opined under the identical language in former DR 2-107(A) that it includes 
individuals licensed to practice law who are on active status, including lawyers licensed in states other 
than Ohio. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-4, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 26 (Feb. 8, 1991). Attorneys who have been suspended may collect fees for services rendered 
prior to suspension pursuant to agreements formed prior to the suspension period. Bd. of Comm’rs 
on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-002, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Feb. 17, 1989). 
During suspension, however, the lawyer should be treated as a layperson and therefore, is ineligible 
for fee divisions of any kind. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 81-9 (Nov. 4, 1981). See section 
5.4:200. If a lawyer has been suspended, taken inactive or retired status, or failed to register, the 
lawyer is not eligible to practice law. The individual can no longer perform services or assume 
responsibility necessary to support a fee division for work performed after leaving active status. See 
generally Gov Bar R VI 2 (lawyer on inactive status cannot practice law in Ohio); Gov Bar R VI 
3(A) (lawyer 65 years or older who applies for and is granted retired status cannot practice law in 
Ohio); Gov Bar R VI 6(B) (lawyer summarily suspended for failure to register cannot practice law in 
Ohio). See also section 5.5:210. 
The second problem is determining what relationship among attorneys is required for them to be 
treated as “in the same firm.” Under Ohio Rule 1.0(c), “firm” or “law firm” 
denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional 
corporation, sole proprietorship, or other association authorized to 
practice law; or lawyers employed in a private or public legal aid or 
public defender organization, a legal services organization or the legal 
department of a corporation, or other organization. 
See Rule 1.0 cmts. [2]-[4A]. After noting that whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm for 
purposes of 1.0(c) “can depend on the specific facts,” Comment [2] provides examples: a lawyer who 
is of counsel to a law firm will be treated as part of that firm; on the other hand, lawyers sharing office 
space with an occasional consultation would not ordinarily be regarded as constituting a firm for 
purposes of Rule 1.5(e) fee division. Other factors to be considered are the terms of any agreement 
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between the lawyers or whether they have mutual access to client information. Finally, it is relevant to 
consider the underlying purpose of the rule involved. Rule 1.0 cmt. [2]. 
If Ohio attorneys were in a legal partnership operating in multiple states, the BCGD concluded that 
they still were considered to be “in the same firm” for purposes of the comparable definitions 
provision in the OHCPR. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-4, 1991 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 26 (Feb. 8, 1991). Splitting of fees with an “of counsel” likewise did not 
implicate former OH DR 2-107(A), Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2004-11, 
2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Oct. 8, 2004), and would not violate Ohio Rule 1.5(e) either, 
since “of counsel” lawyers are to be treated as part of the “firm.”) See Rule 1.0 cmt. [2]. The Board so 
opined as to Rule 1.5(e) in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-1, 2008 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 8, 2008), at *13. 
In contrast, attorneys who practiced in association with each other, such as by assisting each other in 
litigation or sharing office space or support staff, but who were not in a legal partnership with one 
another, were not considered “in the same firm,” and thus any fee-sharing arrangements made by such 
attorneys had to comply with OH DR 2-107(A).  Duff v. Gary, 87 Ohio App.3d 558, 622 N.E.2d 
727 (Lorain 1993); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-3, 2003 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 6, 2003). Resolution of the “same-firm” issue in these situations will now be 
guided by Comment [2], which indicates that, for purposes of fee division under Rule 1.5(e), such 
relationships generally do not constitute a “firm” and that resolution in other cases will depend upon 
circumstances such as the terms of any agreement between the lawyers, whether they have mutual 
access to client information, and, in doubtful cases, the underlying purpose of the Rule involved.  
Ohio Rule 1.0 cmt. [2]. 
Finally, under the former OHCPR (and presumably the new Rules as well), qualified lawyer referral 
services were considered neither “lawyers” nor a “firm.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 92-1, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 20 (Feb. 14, 1992). In accordance with this 
view, fees paid to such referral services would not need to comply with Rule 1.5(e). These practices 
would be governed instead by Ohio Rule 7.2(b)(3). See section 7.2:400. 
An opinion of the Eight District Court of Appeals, Hohman, Boukis & Curtis Co., L.P.A. v. Brunn 
Law Firm Co., L.P.A., 138 Ohio App.3d 693, 742 N.E.2d 192 (Cuyahoga 2000), confronted the 
question of the applicability of former OH DR 2-107(A) to a fee dispute between lawyers who had 
been, but no longer were, in the same firm. The trial court had ordered arbitration of the dispute under 
OH DR 2-107(B). Reversing on this point, the appellate court held the former disciplinary rule 
inapplicable, because, first, 2-107(B) (the arbitration provision) applied only if the dispute arose 
under 2-107(A). Second, 2-107(A) “specifically regulates lawyers who are not in the same firm. 
Although the appellants and the appellees are not presently in the same firm, they were at one time 
and it is out of this former relationship that this dispute arises.” 138 Ohio App.3d at 697-98, 742 
N.E.2d at 195. In one disciplinary case, the Supreme Court appeared to ignore the “not in the same 
firm” language altogether.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson, 107 Ohio St.3d 182, 2005 Ohio 6178, 
837 N.E.2d 764 (finding 2-107(A) violation with respect to client’s check with payee space left blank; 
after check negotiated client noticed “that the name of another lawyer in respondent’s office . . . had 
been written in as payee.” Id. at paras. 16-17.). 
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Comments [3]-[4A] deal with whether the “firm” label is applicable to the law department of an 
organization, Rule 1.0 cmt. [3] (ordinarily “no question” that it is); lawyers in legal aid and legal 
services organizations, Rule 1.0 cmt. [4] (it depends); and lawyers practicing in a governmental 
agency, Rule 1.0 cmt. [4A] (not included in the definition of “firm”). See section 1.0:103 for further 
discussion of “firm” as applicable (or inapplicable) to lawyers in these settings. 
Separation and retirement agreements: Former OH DR 2-107(C), like DR 2-107(B) of the ABA 
Model Code, provided that the restrictions on fee divisions among lawyers not in the same firm did 
not prohibit payments to former partners or associates pursuant to a retirement or separation 
agreement. Strangely, the ABA did not carry forward this provision from the Model Code to the 
Model Rules; nor is it found in the Ohio Rules. There can be little doubt, however, that this safe 
harbor survives under the new regime. The Lawyers’ Manual on Professional Conduct addresses the 
issue and states as follows: 
 Model Rule 1.5 does not contain similar language [to that in 
2-107(B)] . . . but there is no indication in the rule or its accompanying 
comment that a fundamental departure from DR 2-107(B) was 
intended by the deletion. 
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) §  41:710 (2001). In its provision on fee splitting, the 
Restatement similarly concludes that “[u]nder this Section, law firm members may also share fees in 
making payments to former partners or associates under a separation or retirement agreement . . . .” 1 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  47 cmt. g, at 334 (2000). See as well Ohio 
Rules 5.4(a)(1), pursuant to which payments can be made by a firm to nonlawyer representatives of a 
deceased lawyer, and 5.4(a)(3), pursuant to which fee sharing with nonlawyers through a 
compensation or retirement plan is permitted. These provisions would seem to make the propriety of 
payments to a retiring or departing lawyer an a fortiori case. Finally, see Ohio Rule 1.5 cmt. [8], 
which provides that division (e) “does not prohibit or regulate” future division of fees for work done 
by a lawyer previously associated with a firm. This seems to speak to the separation issue; if division 
on separation is permitted, surely doing so on retirement is permitted as well. 
Fee splitting with nonlawyers: See section 5.4:200. 
Disputes between lawyers over fee splitting: If a dispute arises between lawyers in different firms 
over a fee division, Ohio Rule 1.5(f) requires the lawyers first to submit their dispute for mediation or 
arbitration by a local bar association. Comment [10] emphasizes that this procedure is mandatory. 
Rule 1.5 cmt. [10]. Accord In re Estate of Southard, 192 Ohio App.3d 590, 2011 Ohio 836, 949 
N.E.2d 1049 (Franklin) (affirming probate court ruling that it had no jurisdiction over fee-sharing 
dispute between attorneys, inasmuch as DR 2-107(B) makes submission of such disputes to 
appropriate bar association for arbitration or mediation mandatory when, as here, DR 2-107(A) 
requirements are met). A case decided under the former OHCPR, Fred Siegel Co. v. Provident 
Mgmt., Inc., No. 72303, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5461 (Cuyahoga Nov. 19, 1998), held that this 
DR 2-107(B) requirement applied only if DR 2-107(A) (now Rule 1.5(e)), standards were met. If 
there is no local bar association available or it does not have procedures to resolve such a dispute, the 
dispute shall be submitted for mediation or arbitration to the Ohio State Bar Association. Rule 1.5(f). 
Under rules promulgated by the OSBA, the matter will be submitted to mediation if either party 
requests it. If no request is made, or if mediation fails to resolve the matter, the dispute will be 
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submitted to binding arbitration, which will result in a final determination subject only to limited 
judicial review. See ORC 2711.10 (limited court authority to vacate arbitration awards); ORC 
2711.11 (limited court authority to modify arbitration awards). 
The constitutionality of this binding arbitration provision has been challenged as violating the rights 
to trial by jury, equal protection, due process, and access to the courts, but, until recently, all of these 
issues remained unresolved. The Supreme Court’s decision in the Shimko case, discussed below, 
now provides a definitive answer with respect to the jury trial issue. 
In Shimko v. Lobe, 124 Ohio App.3d 336, 706 N.E.2d 354 (Franklin 1997), the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals upheld this provision from constitutional attack on due process, equal protection, 
and contract clause grounds. It remanded the case to the trial court for further consideration of the 
claim that the provision violates the state constitutional right to a jury trial. After remand, plaintiff 
voluntarily dismissed his case and then refiled his action in an essentially identical form. The trial 
court ruled that the binding arbitration provision of former OH DR 2-107 was a reasonable restriction 
on the practice of law and therefore not violative of the constitutional right to jury trial. The court of 
appeals affirmed.  Shimko v. Lobe, 152 Ohio App.3d 742, 2003 Ohio 2200, 790 N.E.2d 335 
(Franklin 2003). In reaching the conclusion that OH DR 2-107(B) was a reasonable restriction, the 
court of appeals relied heavily on the fact that, “[i]n being admitted to the practice of law in Ohio, 
plaintiff agreed to be bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility,” including OH DR 2-107(A) 
& (B). By agreeing to this provision, plaintiff waived the right to jury trial in fee disputes.  152 Ohio 
App.3d 742, 2003 Ohio 2200, 790 N.E.2d 335, at para. 32. Accord id. at paras. 35, 39. In support 
of this waiver analysis, the court cited Gov Bar R IV(1), which then stated in pertinent part that the 
Code [Rule IV 1 now references the “Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct”], “as amended, shall be 
binding upon all persons admitted to practice law in Ohio.” This line of reasoning raises an interesting 
question. Shimko was admitted to practice, and “agreed to be bound by the Code of Professional 
Responsibility,” in 1976. OH DR 2-107(B) was not added to the OHCPR until 1990, and the words 
“as amended” were not added to Gov Bar R IV(1) until 1993. Thus, the Code to which Shimko 
“agreed to be bound” contained no compulsory arbitration provision for division of fees between 
lawyers not in the same firm. On these facts, it could be argued that the court’s waiver analysis, based 
as it is on Shimko’s “agreement” made at the time he was admitted to the bar, may not have been the 
best means to the result reached. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision in Shimko v. Lobe, 103 Ohio St.3d 59, 
2004 Ohio 4202, 813 N.E.2d 669. The Supreme Court held (1) that an OH DR 2-107(B) arbitration 
award “is final, binding on the parties, and unappealable,” id. at syllabus one & para. 26, and (2) that 
the rule does not violate the right to jury trial under the Ohio Constitution. While the Court recognized 
that the jury trial right may be waived, id. at para. 29, it held there was no such right here: 
In the first place, DR 2-107(B) does not implicate the right of trial by 
jury, because that right does not exist in cases of fee disputes between 
attorneys. 
Id. at para. 47. In rejecting Shimko’s second argument -- that OH DR 2-107(B) creates an 
unauthorized tribunal and thus is an unreasonable restriction on the right to trial by jury -- the Court 
agreed with the court of appeals that the authority of mediators or arbitrators to resolve fee disputes 
flows from “Shimko’s obligation [not, in the court of appeals’ words, “agreement”] as a practicing 
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Ohio lawyer to abide by the Code of Professional Responsibility.” Id. at para. 65. The Supreme 
Court’s analysis, which emphasized this overriding obligation (and, in another part of the opinion, 
quoted Gov Bar R IV(1) and the oath of admission to abide by those rules, id. at para. 24), seems a 
more soundly grounded approach to the issue, rather than the reliance by the court of appeals on 
“agreement” and “waiver.” 
A distinction should be made between cases in which the lawyers are arguing about the amount of the 
fee or the percentage allocations, as opposed to whether there is an enforceable agreement at all. 
Under former OH DR 2-107(B), the prior questions required mediation or arbitration, but the latter 
question was a matter of general contract law actionable in court.  Schroeder v. DeVito, 136 Ohio 
App.3d 610, 737 N.E.2d 559 (Cuyahoga 2000) (DR 2-107(B) inapplicable); see Climaco, Climaco, 
Seminatore, Lefkowitz & Garofoli Co., L.P.A. v. Robert E. Sweeney Co., L.P.A., 123 Ohio 
App.3d 289, 704 N.E.2d 47 (Cuyahoga 1997) (DR 2-107(B) does not divest trial court of 
jurisdiction over breach-of-contract dispute between two law firms). Nevertheless, even if OH DR 
2-107 did not apply, the lawyers could still enter into a binding agreement to have the matter resolved 
by arbitration before a body with power to do so, such as an OSBA arbitration panel. Endicott v. 
Johrendt, No. 97 APE08-1122, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1888 (Franklin Apr. 30, 1998). There is 
no reason to think that these distinctions will not be honored under the new Rules. 
A nondisciplinary case in which the issue of waiver of arbitration under DR 2-107 was raised is 
Marks v. Swartz, 174 Ohio App.3d 450, 2007 Ohio 6009, 882 N.E.2d 924.  Marks was a contract 
dispute in which local counsel in asbestos litigation sued the lead lawyer for breach of their agreement 
to split fees 75/25.  After a recovery by local counsel in the trial court, defendant argued on appeal that 
the lower court had no jurisdiction because 2-107(B) mandated that the dispute go to arbitration.  The 
appellate court ruled that defendant had waived his alleged right to arbitration under the rule (even 
though he sought dismissal of the suit for this reason prior to filing his answer), because he had not 
moved for a stay under ORC 2711.02.  The reasoning seems to us suspect.  The waiver result 
depended on precedent holding that “in order for a potential defendant to preserve an alleged right to 
arbitrate a dispute, he or she must apply for a stay of the legal proceedings pending arbitration 
pursuant to R.C. 2711.02.”  Id. at para. 19.  But 2711.02 requires a court to stay the proceeding when 
the court is “satisfied that the issue involved in the action is referable to arbitration under an 
agreement in writing for arbitration . . . .”  So far as one can tell from the Marks opinion, there was 
no such “agreement in writing for arbitration”; if not, 2711.02 by its terms was inapplicable. 
It should be further emphasized that Rule 1.5(f) is a mechanism for resolving fee disputes between 
lawyers; it has no application to attorney-client fee disputes.  Putnam v. Hogan, 122 Ohio App.3d 
351, 356, 701 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Franklin 1997) (construing former DR 2-107(B)). As to arbitration 
of client-lawyer fee disputes, see section 1.5:250. 
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1.6:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.6(a) differs from the Model Rule in the following respects: After “a client,” the words 
“including information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law,” have been 
added. After “division (b)” the following has been added: “or required by division (c) of this rule.” 
Ohio Rule 1.6(b) differs from the Model Rule in the following respects: After “a client,” the words 
“including information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law,” have been 
added. After “necessary”, the words “for any of the following purposes” have been added. 
Subdivision (b)(2) changes the Model Rule language “to prevent the client from committing a crime 
or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services;” to “to 
prevent the commission of a crime by the client or other person;”. 
Subdivision (b)(3) is similar to MR 1.6(b)(3) with the following changes: rather than “to prevent, 
mitigate or rectify substantial injury”, subdivision (b)(3) is limited to “to mitigate substantial injury”. 
The subdivision also deletes “is reasonably certain to result or” after “property of another that”. Lastly, 
the words “an illegal or fraudulent act,” have been substituted for “a crime or fraud”. 
Subdivision (b)(5) is identical to MR 1.6(b)(5), except that “, including any disciplinary matter,” has 
been added after the words “any proceeding”. 
(Subdivisions (b)(1), (4), and (6) are identical to MR 1.6(b)(1), (4), and (6).) 
 
1.6:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.6(a): DR 4-101(A), (B) & (C)(1). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(1): None. 
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The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(2): DR 4-101(C)(3). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(3): DR 7-102(B)(1). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(4): None. 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(5): DR 4-101(C)(4). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(6): DR 4-101(C)(2). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.6(c): None. 
 
1.6:200  Professional Duty of Confidentiality 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.6 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.6 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  1.46, 4.3, 4.10-4.14, 
4.21-4.26 
Giannelli & Snyder, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice, Evidence §§  501.6-501.7, 501.14 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  55:101 
ALI-LGL §§  59-66 
Wolfram §§  6.1, 6.7 
  
1.6:210  Definition of Protected Information 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  4.10-4.12 (1996). 
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, Ohio lawyers were obligated to protect as confidential 
confidences (“information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law”) and 
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secrets (“other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held 
inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the 
client”). Former OH DR 4-101(A). Ohio Rule 1.6(a) protects from unauthorized disclosure 
“information relating to the representation of a client, including information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege under applicable law.” The Task Force indicates in its Ohio Code 
Comparison to Rule 1.6 that this language “generally corresponds” to the “confidences and secrets” 
language of OH DR 4-101(A), but that does not necessarily mean they are meant to be coextensive. 
Indeed, the Task Force itself seemed to recognize otherwise in its Report of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio Task Force on Rules of Professional Conduct (“Report”) at 7, which states that the 
formulation under the Rule protects “all” information regarding the representation, “including” 
confidences and secrets under the Code. This second formulation is more in line with the Rule itself, 
which on its face is broader than its OHCPR counterpart. Accord Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2007-1, 2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. 1, at *15 (Feb. 9, 2007) (emphasis in original) 
(1.6 protects against “disclosure of any information relating to the representation” not otherwise 
authorized). See also Deborah A. Coleman, New Ohio Ethics Rules, Cleve. B.J., Oct. 2006, at 8, 9 
(stating that such matters as the fact of representation and client identity would be protected 
information under 1.6). 
The term “secrets” was limited to information gained in the professional relationship that the client 
requested to be kept as such or where release of the information would likely be embarrassing or 
detrimental to the client. The Ohio Rule, in contrast, starts with a blanket protection for “information 
relating to the representation” and then lists a limited set of exceptions. It appears to be based on an 
assumption that the client wants all information to be kept confidential unless it falls under one of the 
exceptions. For example, information relating to the representation, the release of which would not be 
harmful to the client and about which the client has been silent, will still need to be kept confidential 
unless an explicit exception applies. 
The breadth of the definition of confidential information can sometimes create problems. When 
lawyer A moves from firm X to firm Y, there will (or should be) a conflicts check. Does such a check, 
which of course necessarily involves “information relating to the representation” (i.e., the persons and 
issues involved in the representation), violate Rule 1.6(a)? The ABA considered the issue in Formal 
Op. 09-455 (Oct. 8, 2009) and concluded that in the absence of client consent, even though the 
protected information does not fit neatly into any of the exceptions permitting disclosure, “disclosure 
of conflicts information during the process of lawyers moving between firms is ordinarily permissible” 
to enable the lawyers involved to comply with Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10, provided the disclosure is no 
greater than reasonably necessary to the conflicts check and so long as the attorney-client privilege is 
not compromised. Opinion 09-455 is discussed in Eileen Libby, Conflicts Check, Please, ABAJ, 
Jan. 2010, at 24. 
As stated, the protection provided by Rule 1.6 “applies not only to matters communicated in 
confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source.” 
Rule 1.6 cmt. [3]. The Rule also explicitly incorporates in its coverage material protected by the 
attorney-client privilege, which in Ohio includes both a common-law privilege and a statutory 
privilege. See 1 Paul C. Giannelli & Barbara Rook Snyder, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice, Evidence § 
§  501.6-501.7 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2009). This inclusion in Rule 1.6(a), together with its repetition 
in the disclosure provisions of Rules 1.6(b) and (c), would seem to indicate that where the Rule 
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authorizes disclosure, that authorization trumps both the ethical duty of confidentiality and the 
attorney-client privilege, except in circumstances in which the evidentiary privilege set forth in ORC 
2317.02(A) is applicable. Established Supreme Court precedent holds that this statutory privilege can 
be waived only in the manner expressly set forth in 2317.02(A). See sections 1.6:400, 1.6:520 & :530 
and, with regard to the tension between the ethical rule and the statutory privilege, the court of appeals 
and Supreme Court decisions in Squire Sanders v. Givaudan, discussed in detail in section 1.6:530.  
Information relating to the representation - What is “information”?: Both the former OHCPR and the 
Ohio Rules protect certain classes of “information.” Unfortunately, neither defines the term. In 
practice, under the Code the term was interpreted broadly, e.g., Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 
77-13 (Sept. 2, 1977), and, given the general expansion of protection under Ohio Rule 1.6, that will 
almost certainly continue. 
It was unclear whether all physical evidence was to be treated as “information” under the Code, but 
physical evidence that contained a distinct informational component was covered. See  In re Original 
Grand Jury Investigation, 89 Ohio St.3d 544, 733 N.E.2d 1135 (2000) (letter by defendant to 
defendant’s brother concerning plan to threaten a witness contained information detrimental to client 
and thus was client “secret” within the meaning of DR 4-101(A)). However, knowledge that a 
judgment entry contains a clerical error favorable to the client was not. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 99-8, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Dec. 2, 1999). 
Information relating to the representation - Confidences and secrets: Since the Ohio Rule 1.6 
protection encompasses information formerly classified as confidences and secrets, there is every 
reason to believe that the case law discussing matters classified as confidences and secrets under the 
previous disciplinary rule still provides good guidance. In contrast, however, since the definition of 
protected information has expanded, some cases declining to treat information as confidences or 
secrets may no longer apply. 
For a discussion of information protected by both Rule 1.6 and the attorney-client privilege (formerly 
“confidences”) see sections 1.6:400-:600. 
The term “secrets” encompassed a broader class of communications than those protected by the 
attorney-client privilege; it included any “other information gained in the professional relationship 
that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or 
would be likely to be detrimental to the client.” OH DR 4-101(A).  
An informative case on the scope of the term “secrets” under the Code is Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 
102 Ohio St.3d 307, 2004 Ohio 2835, 810 N.E.2d 426. The respondent in Holder disputed that he 
had disclosed “secrets” of his client (Wright), inasmuch as the information disclosed, Wright’s 
criminal record (and other negative information), was a matter of public record and Wright himself 
had revealed the information to others, including in deposition testimony. The Court was not 
persuaded: 
A client secret necessarily includes embarrassing or detrimental 
information that the client reveals [to the lawyer], but the term also 
extends to embarrassing or detrimental information that is available 
from other sources, such as witnesses or investigative research. . . . 
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 There being an ethical duty to maintain client secrets available 
from sources other than the client, it follows that an attorney is not free 
to disclose embarrassing or harmful features of a client’s life because 
they are documented in public records or the attorney learned of them 
in some other way. 
Id. at paras. 38, 39. 
Findlay/Hancock County Bar Ass’n v. Filkins, 90 Ohio St.3d 1, 734 N.E.2d 764 (2000), is an 
interesting disciplinary case dealing in part with whether the respondent had violated former DR 
4-101(B)(2) by misusing client confidences to the disadvantage of the client. The alleged 
“confidences” were found by the Court not to be confidences as that term was used in OH DR 
4-101(B)(2): 
the “confidences” [the client] identifies in her testimony are merely 
generic statements of her love for her children, which could apply to 
virtually any parent. Further, the fact that a client cherishes his or her 
child is hardly the sort of information that can be used in a custody case 
to the disadvantage of the client. Therefore, we decline to define the 
broad statements identified by [the client] as “confidences” for 
purposes of DR 4-101(B)(2). 
Id. at 11, 734 N.E.2d at 772. Nor could an argument plausibly have been made that such information 
was a client “secret” under the former rule. Parental love is not typically something a client would 
have his or her lawyer hold “inviolate”; disclosure of such love could not be considered 
“embarrassing” or “detrimental” to the client.  
Query, however, whether the information at issue in Filkins might not be within the protection of 
Rule 1.6. If it “relat[ed] to the representation,” it would be, subject to any of the enumerated 
exceptions, of which none would appear to be applicable. If protected, Rule 1.8(b) precludes a lawyer 
from using such information to the client’s disadvantage, absent the client’s consent. See section 
1.8:300. 
While the Task Force in its Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.6 states that Rule 1.6(a) “generally 
corresponds to DR 4-101(A) by protecting the confidences and secrets of a client under the rubric of 
‘information relating to the representation,’“ it seems reasonably clear that there is no longer an 
“embarrassing” or “detrimental” requirement under Rule 1.6. As a result, the distinctions drawn in 
such “secret” cases as Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 102 Ohio St.3d 307, 2004 Ohio 2835, 810 
N.E.2d 426 (even though public information, client’s criminal record was detrimental and/or 
embarrassing to client and therefore qualified as “secret”) and State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ’g 
Co. v. Bodiker, 134 Ohio App.3d 415, 731 N.E.2d 245 (Franklin 1999) (information as to money 
and time spent by Ohio Public Defender on case involving well-known criminal defendant not a 
“secret” under former 4-101(A), since client had not requested that information be kept inviolate and 
its release would not result in embarrassment or detriment to client) no longer exist. 
Information relating to the representation - Generally known information: As stated in ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 97 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary), with respect to 
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the “relating to the representation” language of MR 1.6(a) (identical to Ohio Rule 1.6(a)), 
Rule 1.6 contains no exception permitting disclosure of information 
previously disclosed or publicly available. 
(citing public record cases). Under this reading, Holder, despite the irrelevance under the Rule of the 
detrimental/embarrassing assessment there found controlling, would nevertheless come out the same 
way under Rule 1.6 because the public nature of the information would not take it out of the protected 
category of information relating to the representation. (Compare Ohio Rule 1.9(c)(1), prohibiting use 
of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of a former client except where, inter 
alia, the information is generally known.) 
Although the Restatement excludes “information that is generally known” from its definition of 
confidential information, see 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  59 (2000) 
(§  59 cmt. d makes clear that “generally known” includes material publicly accessible, such as public 
records), Hazard and Hodes concede that “Rule 1.6 does not exclude information ‘relating to a client’ 
that happens to be in the public domain or ‘generally known.’” 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. 
William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering §  9.15, at 9-65 (3d ed. Supp. 2012). 
Information relating to the representation - Timing or context of acquisition of such information: The 
Ohio Rule 1.6(a) protection attaches to any information “relating to the representation of a client,” 
not just information “gained in the professional relationship,” as was the case under the former 
disciplinary rule. As a result, information acquired other than in the professional relationship is 
protected under the new Rule, if it relates to the representation. Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [3]: 
 The confidentiality rule . . . applies not only to matters 
communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information 
relating to the representation, whatever its source. 
An interesting pre-Rule case raising issues as to the context of the lawyer’s acquisition of information 
allegedly relating to the representation is  In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Lynd, 2005 Ohio 
4607, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 4170 (Scioto). In Lynd, the lawyer refused to testify before a grand 
jury regarding conversations she had had with one Girdy, a prison inmate, dealing with the Lucasville 
prison riot in 1993. While it appears that Lynd may have had an attorney-client relationship with 
Girdy as to certain matters (such as enforcement of his plea agreement, the right to refuse a polygraph 
test, transfer to another institution, and, in a later interview, prison conditions), it is clear that Lynd 
was also seeking (and obtained) information from Girdy in an effort to obtain post-conviction relief 
for another of her clients, Skatzes, in connection with events occurring during the riot. This latter 
information was the focus of the grand jury inquiry. The court’s analysis in affirming the contempt 
order against Lynd for refusing to testify on attorney-client privilege grounds was as follows, in 
language that bears on the “information relating to the representation” test: 
Assuming that Lynd was representing Girdy on some matters, Lynd 
failed to prove that the statements she seeks to protect are connected 
with the matter for which she had been retained [by Girdy]. . . . None of 
these requests [enforcement of plea agreement, etc.] and none of the 
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services Lynd provided had anything to do with Girdy’s culpability for 
uncharged misconduct during the riot. 
 . . . The latter inquiry [about prison conditions] was not related 
to her professional relationship with Girdy but rather was designed to 
benefit Skatzes. No putative client could reasonably believe that 
statements Girdy made in the latter context [potentially helpful to 
Skatzes] would be used to advance his [Girdy’s] interest in any of the 
matters upon which Lynd was representing him. 
Id. at paras. 17-18 (bracketed material added). Given the court’s findings of failure to prove that the 
information was “connected with the matter for which she had been retained,” that none of her 
services for Girdy “had anything to do” with the information at issue, and that her inquiry about 
information helpful to Skatzes “was not related to her professional relationship with Girdy,” it could 
be argued with some persuasiveness that, even under the broader Rule 1.6 formulation, it was not 
“information relating to the representation” of Girdy, but rather to the representation of her other 
client, Skatzes. 
While neither Ohio Rule 1.6 or MR 1.6 speak directly to the issue of timing of the acquisition of the 
information, 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  59 cmt. c (2000) does so: 
 Information acquired during the representation or before or 
after the representation is confidential so long as it . . . relates to the 
representation. 
See also 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering 
§  9.15, at 9-64 (3d ed. Supp. 2012) (emphasis in original) (“all information ‘relating to’ a lawyer’s 
professional relationship with a client is presumptively confidential”). 
This means that opinions such as Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 84 (Apr. 27, 1973) (information 
obtained about former corporate client while serving in nonlegal capacity for corporation could be 
used without violating DR 4-101(B)) are no longer good law under the Rules. Another bar opinion 
decided under the Code is more problematical. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 80 (n.d.) opined that 
lawyer A, who shared office space with lawyer B, was bound by Canon 4 with respect to confidences 
of B’s clients shared with him by B. Query whether A had any such obligation under the Code to a 
nonclient. Under Rule 1.6, the information would be protected if B’s client later became a client of A 
and the earlier-acquired information related to A’s representation of the client. 
 
1.6:220  Lawyer’s Duty to Safeguard Confidential Client Information 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  4.3, 4.10, 4.13-4.14 (1996). 
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Duty to protect client information - The underlying rationale: Under Ohio Rules 1.6(a) and 1.8(b), a 
lawyer is prohibited from revealing (1.6(a)) or misusing (1.8(b)) “information relating to the 
representation of a client.” This duty flows in part from the fiduciary relationship between lawyer and 
client and in part from the needs of the legal system. Client trust is an essential element of the 
lawyer-client relationship. Such trust is fostered when the client knows that any information obtained 
by the attorney relating to the representation will be kept confidential. More broadly, however, the 
preservation of client confidentiality is essential to the operation of the legal system itself. The 
promise of confidentiality is necessary to encourage lawyers to seek, and clients to share, information 
fully. Only through the full and free sharing of information can the lawyer accurately assess how best 
to counsel the client in an attempt to lawfully accomplish the client’s goals. 
The differences between U.S. confidentiality/privilege and that existing in various European Union 
jurisdictions are surveyed in Terry Billups & David Millstone, Legal Privilege in the Age of 
Globalization, Clev. Metro. B.J., April 2012, at 30. 
Duty to protect client information - The scope of the duty: Confidentiality is at the heart of the 
client-lawyer relationship. To ensure that it is maintained, the Rule extends beyond a general 
prohibition against revealing information relating to client representation. It “also applies to 
disclosures by a lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected information but could reasonably 
lead to the discovery of protected information by a third person.” Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [4]. Similarly, 
even where the lawyer is permitted to reveal information relating to the representation of a client (see 
section 1.6:300), the lawyer may do so only to the extent the lawyer “reasonably believes . . . 
necessary” to meet the provisions of the exception. Ohio Rule 1.6(b). See Rule 1.6 cmt. [14]. 
While the duty to protect client information lies in the first instance as a check on lawyer disclosure, 
the lawyer must also act to assure that those under the lawyer’s supervision protect confidential client 
information as well. Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [16]. See section 5.3:200. 
Because of the duty to preserve client information, lawyers should attempt to avoid acting in ways 
that trigger disclosure required by law. For example, if a lawyer provides financial services to clients 
through his law firm, the information would be subject to state inspection unless the services are 
“solely incidental” to the practice of law. The Board of Commissioners indicated that for the law firm 
to offer financial services more broadly would be improper because of this confidentiality concern. 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2000-4, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 
(Dec. 1, 2000) (using this as an example of a more generalized concern over lawyer provision of 
law-related services that might expose client files to regulatory inspection). 
Duty to protect client information - Duty owed only to client: It is important to recognize that the duty 
here extends only to a client. Under the former OHCPR, for example, if a lawyer, through no 
wrongdoing, obtained in a public records search confidential information about a third party 
contained in an inadvertently disclosed document, the lawyer had “no express or implied duty to 
protect an opposing party’s confidences and secrets.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 93-11, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1, at *3 (Dec. 3, 1993). The lawyer could read the 
document and reveal its contents to the client, but had to notify the source of the document and return 
a copy of it if so requested. Id. The inadvertently-disclosed-document scenario is now controlled by 
Ohio Rule 4.4(b), discussed at section 4.4:300. 
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At times, ambiguity may arise concerning who is the client of the lawyer. In a shareholder derivative 
action, for example, brought by party A (a former outside counsel for the corporation and a present 
corporate director) who was represented by lawyer B (also a former outside counsel for the 
corporation), the assumed use of corporate information for the benefit of the shareholders was 
approved by the Cleveland Bar Association as consistent with former OH EC 4-5 because a 
shareholder derivative suit is ultimately for the corporation’s benefit and therefore the information 
was not being used by A “to the disadvantage of his [former] client” or “for his own purposes,” 
contrary to the admonition of the ethical consideration. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 84, at 3-4 (Apr. 27, 
1973). However, since B had also formerly represented members of the board of directors who were 
defendants in the present action, he could not represent plaintiff against the board members without 
breaching or appearing to breach DR 4-101(B). Compare the different (and perhaps more realistic) 
approach taken, with respect to who is the “client” in a shareholder derivative action, in  In re Dayco 
Corp. Derivative Securities Litigation, 102 F.R.D. 624, 630 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (no adversity for 
conflict-of-interest purposes where plaintiff’s counsel in derivative action had formerly represented 
party in suit against corporation; client in reality is adverse to the corporation and its management). 
As the Dayco court further noted, quoting from  In re International Systems & Controls Corp. 
Securities Litigation, 693 F.2d 1235, 1239 (5th Cir. 1982), “in derivative litigation, ‘[i]t is not 
reasonable to indulge in the fiction that counsel, hired by [corporate] management, is also 
constructively hired by the same party [i.e., the derivative named plaintiff] counsel is expected to 
defend against.’“ 102 F.R.D. at 630-31 n.7. Dayco is further discussed at section 1.9:220. Both 
Dayco and the Cleveland Bar opinion are also discussed at section 1.13:510. 
Duty to protect client information - Time period during which the duty applies: The protection for 
information relating to the representation attaches when a person consults a lawyer regarding legal 
representation, regardless of whether the lawyer is ultimately retained by the client. Ohio Rule 
1.18(b). This parallels the treatment given preliminary communications under the evidentiary 
doctrine of attorney-client privilege.  Taylor v. Sheldon, 172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961) 
(attorney-client privilege extends to preliminary communications made with respect to retaining 
attorney). See ORC 2317.021 (defining client for attorney-client privilege purposes as one who 
“consults an attorney for the purpose of retaining the attorney or securing legal service or advice from 
him in his professional capacity and who communicates with such attorney”). With this in mind, a 
lawyer must be careful in undertaking the initial interview of a prospective client since, even if the 
representation is ultimately declined, duties of confidentiality with respect to the information 
obtained may limit the lawyer’s ability to represent others concerning matters discussed in the initial 
interview. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 87-1 (June 22, 1987) (in screening and referring 
case to private attorney, Legal Aid Society obtained confidential information about client and thus 
could not represent opposing party without violating initial client confidences obtained); Cleveland 
Bar Ass’n Op. 101 (Sept. 11, 1973) (confidences and secrets disclosed between prospective client 
and attorney, in relatively brief initial interview that did not culminate in employment, were protected 
by 4-101(B)). Limiting the nature of the information obtained in the initial interview and securing a 
waiver of confidentiality and conflicts concerns arising from the initial consultation usually are 
advised as a way to minimize this problem. Unfortunately, Ohio has chosen to delete MR 1.18 cmt. 
[5], which provided for such a waiver, in Ohio Rule 1.18. See discussion at section 1.18:200. 
The protection for client confidences and secrets remains after any ongoing representation has 
terminated.  Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998). The 
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fear of breach of this continuing duty may contribute, at times, to a lawyer’s disqualification when the 
lawyer seeks to represent a party with interests adverse to a former client, and the former and current 
representations involve the same or substantially related matters. See sections 1.9:200 and 1.9:400. 
The duty survives the termination of the lawyer’s practice, whether by death, illness, or retirement. 
See, e.g., Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 00-02 (Apr. 25, 2000) (discussing obligations of 
attorneys representing deceased lawyer’s estate with respect to closed client files of deceased and 
closed files of her lawyer father, who ceased practice in 1936; “overarching concern” is protecting 
client confidences and secrets; opinion instructs attorneys to return files to client where possible; 
where not, proper disposition is shredding or incineration of all except original or important papers, 
which should be made available to local bar association or Office of Disciplinary Counsel). Special 
care must be taken to assure that client information is appropriately safeguarded in effectuating the 
termination, with the instructions and wishes of the client given dominant consideration in the 
process.  
It also survives the death of the client.  Kelley v. Buckley, 193 Ohio App.3d 11, 2011 Ohio 1362, 
950 N.E. 2d 997 (Cuyahoga). 
To the extent current clients are involved, the special provisions pertaining to safeguarding the 
interests of a client upon withdrawal apply. See section 1.16:500. With respect to protection of 
confidential client information in connection with the sale of a law practice, see section 1.17:300. 
Duty to protect client information - Protection against inadvertent disclosure: Assuming that 
protected client information is involved, the lawyer must take special care to assure that that 
information is not disclosed inadvertently. For example, any communication of protected client 
information must be conducted in a manner consistent with reasonable expectations of privacy. 
One area which has received substantial attention nationwide involves communications by cellular 
phone. See generally Eugene P. Whetzel, Cellular and Cordless Phones: Ethical Issues for 
Lawyers, 10 Ohio Law., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 26 (describing the national trends). Because such 
communications may be easily intercepted, communication through this medium can result in 
inadvertent disclosure of client information that, in turn, might result in both absence of 
attorney-client privilege protection and an ethics violation. See generally id. It is unclear how Ohio 
will finally resolve this issue. Cf. State v. Bidinost, 71 Ohio St.3d 449, 462, 644 N.E.2d 318, 328-29 
(1994) (in the context of finding that ORC 2933.52(A), which protects against unauthorized 
interception of telephone communications, applies to cordless telephone communications, the Court 
commented: “In any event, we seriously question the proposition that people communicating on 
cordless telephones have no legitimate expectation of privacy. Fundamental rights should not be 
sacrificed on the altar of advancing technology.”). Nevertheless, the better approach is to avoid 
discussing client confidences or secrets through this medium if at all possible, in order to provide the 
client’s interests the maximum protection. 
With respect to email, the Board of Commissioners issued an opinion advising that the use of 
unencrypted email does not violate the duty to preserve clients’ confidences and secrets, but that the 
lawyer must use professional judgment in determining whether its use is appropriate given the 
sensitivity of the information to be transmitted. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
99-2, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (Apr. 9, 1999). Cf. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
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Discipline Op. 99-9, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 10 (Dec. 2, 1999) (applying Opinion 99-2 in 
context of proposed use on law firm’s world-wide-web site of online intake form that would enable 
web-site visitors to email legal questions to the law firm and receive responses by email from firm 
attorney). See also John Travis, E-Mail Confidences and Privileges, Clev. B.J., Sept. 2006, at 26. 
These decisions, opinions, and articles, written under the former OHCPR, would seem to be 
generally compatible with the guidance offered in Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [17], which provides that the 
lawyer, in transmitting confidential information, “must take reasonable precautions to prevent the 
information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients.” The comment goes on to explain 
that 
[t]his duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special 
security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant 
special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of the lawyer’s expectation of confidentially include 
the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of 
the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality 
agreement. A client may require the lawyer to implement special 
security measures not required by this rule or may give informed 
consent to the use of a means of communication that would otherwise 
be prohibited by this rule. 
Id. In accord is ABA Formal Op. 11-459 (Aug. 4, 2011), which cautions the lawyer to warn clients 
where there is a risk of third-party access to confidential information – for example, a client-employee 
using her employer’s computer or cell phone to convey or receive such information. Further 
discussion of this issue, in the specific contexts of email and cellular phones, is found at ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 114-15 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). Another 
issue arising under the new technology is the propriety of extracting of metadata from electronically 
transmitted documents. Id. at 115-16.  See discussion in section 4.4:200. 
One aspect of the ever-expanding technological universe is explored in Ohio State Bar Ass’n Inf. 
Adv. Op. 2013-03 (July 25, 2013), in which the ethics implications arising from data storage in “the 
cloud” – storage on off-site computers, accessible via the internet, rather than on one’s own office 
computers. The issues, including preservation of confidentiality of client information, are aptly 
summarized in Karin E. Rubin, Blue Skies Above? Legal Ethics and Cloud Storage, Ohio 
Lawyer, Nov/Dec 2013, at 12. Rather than attempt to compose standards fitted to the latest in 
technology (which would be outdated very quickly), the message of the article and the advisory 
opinion is that existing rules can be readily applied to the new storage technology and are really no 
different from the principles applicable to storage of the client’s hard copy paper files off-site. Thus, 
due diligence, reasonableness, and professional judgment should always guide the lawyer’s specific 
practices in any particular situation, including cloud-data storage. 
In disposing of client papers, care must be taken to assure that they are disposed of in a way that 
prevents others from gaining access to them. Albert L. Bell, Recycling Confidential Paper, Ohio 
Law., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 29. Shredding or burning papers to be discarded is recommended. Ohio St. 
Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 00-02 (Apr. 25, 2000). A case in which respondent’s method of disposal of 
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client and former client files violated Rule 1.6(a) and 1.9(c)(2) is Disciplinary Counsel v. Shaver, 
121 Ohio St.3d 393, 2009 Ohio 1385, 904 N.E.2d 883. When the garage where respondent rented 
space and stored confidential client files was sold to a new owner, he returned to the garage to remove 
the files. But instead of safeguarding or properly disposing of all of the file boxes, he put some of the 
boxes in a nearby dumpster and “left approximately 20 other boxes beside the dumpster,” id. at para. 
4. He thereby “failed to ensure the proper disposal of client files, records, and related materials.” Id. 
at para. 7. 
Special complications may arise where lawyers with separate practices share office space and 
common support personnel. Under these circumstances, the chance of inadvertent disclosure of client 
confidences is more substantial. Although this type of sharing arrangement is permissible, special 
arrangements should be made to minimize inadvertent disclosure of client information. To this end, 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline instructed under the former OHCPR that 
attorneys with separate law practices in the same building must 
maintain filing systems separate from and inaccessible to other 
attorneys. Computer access to client files must be limited to the client’s 
attorney and staff in the absence of full disclosure to and consent of the 
client. 
It is proper for attorneys who maintain separate practices to share 
non-lawyer personnel provided that each attorney exercise reasonable 
care to prevent the employees from disclosing or using confidences or 
secrets of a client as required by OH DR 4-101. 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-9, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 21, at *1 
(Apr. 12 1991) (syllabus). Accord Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-13, 1992 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 19, 1992) (applying these principles to situation of assistant 
county prosecutor with part-time private practice sharing office space with another attorney whose 
practice included criminal-defense representation). If attorneys sharing office space and personnel 
serve as opposing counsel in a matter, the shared nonlegal personnel cannot work on both sides of the 
matter. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-005, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 12 (Feb. 17 1989); cf. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 90-9 (Oct. 31, 1990) (attorney 
who represents clients under contract with child-support agency cannot use agency support staff and 
investigators who also would work for other parties in proceeding). 
In contrast to the office-sharing situation, a lawyer is not allowed to be a member of, or be associated 
with, more than one law firm at a time. This is based, in part, on a concern that this more formal tie 
would create a greater potential for the disclosure of client information between various firms without 
the client’s consent. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-35, 1989 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 5 (Dec. 15, 1989). But see Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
2004-11, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Oct. 8, 2004) (permitting lawyer in Ohio firm to 
become “of counsel” to lawyer or firm in another state and vice-versa, provided applicable 
disciplinary rules not violated).  To the same effect under the Rules of Professional Conduct is Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-1, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 8, 
2008). Opinion 2008-1 is not limited to cross-border “of counsel” relationships, but broadly approves 
a lawyer in one firm being of counsel to another firm.  The opinion does not address confidentiality 
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issues. 
With respect to documents containing client information that one inadvertently sends to the other side 
(such as in response to a discovery request), see Rule 4.4(b), discussed in section 4.4:300, and section 
1.6:500 infra at “Inadvertent disclosure.” 
  
1.6:230  Lawyer Self-Dealing in Confidential Information 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  4.21-4.22 (1996). 
Former OH DR 4-101(B) identified three ways that confidential client information might be abused 
and prohibited lawyers from engaging in such conduct. Under that provision, a lawyer could not 
knowingly (1) reveal a client’s confidence or secrets; (2) use such information to the disadvantage of 
the client; or (3) use such information for the advantage of the lawyer or a third-party unless the client 
consented to such use after full disclosure. Even though the language of 4-101(B) prohibited only 
“knowing” improper revelation or use of a confidence or secret, there were instances in which 
sanctions were imposed under the former disciplinary rule even where the revelation “was 
inadvertent.” See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Yurich, 78 Ohio St.3d 315, 317, 677 N.E.2d 
1190, 1192 (1997). (A prime example of “knowing” disclosure and use under the former OHCPR is 
Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 102 Ohio St.3d 307, 2004 Ohio 2835, 810 N.E.2d 426, discussed this 
section infra at “Unauthorized disclosure and misuse.”) 
Under the Rules, a lawyer cannot disclose “information relating to the representation of a client . . ., 
unless the client gives informed consent,” Ohio Rule 1.6(a), or unless an exception to confidentiality 
applies under Rule 1.6(b). Nor can a lawyer use such information to the disadvantage of the client, 
unless the client gives informed consent. Ohio Rule 1.8(b). In accordance with Rule 1.8 cmt. [5], the 
use-to-disadvantage-of-client prohibition includes uses to the benefit of the lawyer or a third person 
(such as another client) if such uses also disadvantage the client. Use for the lawyer’s or another 
client’s benefit is not prohibited if it does not disadvantage the client. See section 1.8:300. 
In Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Stubbs, 134 Ohio St.3d 162, 2012 Ohio 5481, 980 N.E.2d 1012, 
respondent violated Rule 1.6(a) when she became embroiled in a dispute with a client, filed a 
criminal complaint against the client, and then provided the city attorney with recordings of the 
client’s voicemail messages, “containing client communications,” to respondent. This use would 
seem clearly to have violated Rule 1.8(b) as well, but a 1.8 violation was not charged. Stubbs, 
because of her violation of numerous rules in addition to 1.6, her extensive prior disciplinary record, 
multiple aggravating factors, and no mitigating factors, was disbarred. 
The Rules thus differ in at least three respects from former DR 4-101(B): First, the “knowingly” 
requisite is no longer present; second, informed consent is expressly included as an exception to the 
prohibition against use to the disadvantage of a client; and third, there is no longer a category 
prohibiting use to the benefit of the lawyer or a third party, separate from the disadvantage-to-client 
prohibition. These differences must be kept in mind in the course of reviewing the following 
summary of the precedents under the former disciplinary rule. 
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Revealing client information: DR 4-101(B)(1) was violated when a lawyer, without the clients’ 
knowledge or consent, disclosed financial information and their social security numbers to an 
out-of-state law firm with whom respondent had a contractual relationship to market and sell living 
trusts in Ohio. Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Willette, 117 Ohio St.3d 433, 2008 Ohio 1198, 884 N.E.2d 
581. Likewise under 4-101(B)(1), a lawyer was disciplined for knowingly revealing the contents of a 
client’s will to a beneficiary without the client’s authorization.  Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 
44 Ohio St.3d 134, 541 N.E.2d 607 (1989). Unauthorized disclosure informing an individual that he 
had been named as a successor trustee in a living trust also was found to violate this provision.  Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel v. Yurich, 78 Ohio St.3d 315, 677 N.E.2d 1190 (1997). A lawyer who 
represented an insured and obtained information that might have provided grounds for the insurance 
company to deny coverage could not reveal this information to the insurance company without 
violating the disciplinary rule. See, e.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 149 (July 22, 1983). See also 
sections 1.7:315, 1.7:410, and 1.8:720. Even if the lawyer believed that disclosure was in the client’s 
best interest, the information could not be revealed except under the limited circumstances set forth in 
DR 4-101(C). Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 86-10 (Mar. 13, 1986) (4-101(B) prohibited informing client’s 
relative, over client’s objection, of client’s intent to file for bankruptcy, even if lawyer believed 
disclosure to be in client’s best interest). 
With the Willette case supra, compare Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Jackel, 118 Ohio St.3d 186, 2008 
Ohio 1981, 887 N.E.2d 340, in which the parties stipulated to and the Court found a violation of DR 
4-101(B)(1) where the confidential information (lists of assets) was obtained, not by respondent, but 
by representatives of a company marketing estate-planning services. After this initial consultation, 
the company would subsequently send the customer’s file to respondent for preparation of the legal 
documents, in accordance with the working relationship between respondent and the company.  
Given the stipulation of violation, there may well be a violation here somewhere, but a knowing 
revelation of a client confidence or secret by respondent is difficult to find on the facts provided in the 
opinion. 
Misusing client information: See Ohio Rule 1.8(b), discussed in section 1.8:300. 
Unauthorized disclosure and misuse: While the former disciplinary rule spoke separately about the 
unauthorized disclosure of client information and the misuse of such information, it was not 
uncommon for the lawyer’s conduct to violate both concerns. See, e.g., Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 
102 Ohio St.3d 307, 2004 Ohio 2835, 810 N.E.2d 426 (all three subdivisions of former OH DR 
4-101(B) violated by respondent, who disclosed client’s criminal record and other negative 
information to another client and third parties, and misused it “in an effort to prevent [client’s] further 
involvement in the ECA project,” id. at para. 27); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Dye, 82 Ohio St.3d 64, 
694 N.E.2d 440 (1998) (revelation of former client’s psychological state, at federal court 
conflict-of-interest hearing to determine whether lawyer could continue to represent a co-defendant 
of former client, violated 4-101(B)(1), (B)(2), and (B)(3)); Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. 
Watkins, 68 Ohio St.2d 11, 427 N.E.2d 516 (1981) (attorney sanctioned under both 4-101(B)(1) and 
(B)(3) for revealing confidential information to client’s employer and threatening to disclose 
information to taxing authorities as part of attempt to coerce client into dropping disciplinary 
complaint). 
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Such dual use of the disclosure and use prohibitions (1.6(a) and 1.8(b), respectively) can be expected 
to continue under the Rules. 
A recent use-to-the-disadvantage-of-the-client decision under the Code is Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Cowden, 131 Ohio St.3d 272, 2012 Ohio 877, 963 N.E.2d 1303, where one of the respondents, 
Nagorney, after drafting a factoring agreement for his then client, debtor A, and then arranging for 
another law firm to represent creditor B in suing for breach of the agreement, violated DR 4-101(B)(2) 
by discussing with B’s counsel the contents of the agreement he had drafted for A; the result, 
premised on the cognovit provision in the agreement respondent prepared for A, was a judgment and 
lien against A. 
The former rule’s protection against unauthorized use or disclosure of information obtained in the 
lawyer-client relationship, or use of same to the disadvantage of a client, attached regardless of 
whether the lawyer sought to use or reveal the information as a lawyer or in a nonlegal capacity. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 88-2 (Jan. 29, 1988) (lawyer who also was freelance nonlegal private 
investigator could not, in investigation undertaken by him as investigator, reveal or use to client’s 
disadvantage information gained from client in his capacity as attorney). Given the comparable 
prohibitions in Rules 1.6(a) and 1.8(b), this should continue to be the law under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct as well, subject to the exceptions there set forth. 
Nondisciplinary remedies for abuse of client information: Disclosure of client information is not only 
a disciplinary offense, but also may be the basis for an action for money damages against the attorney 
for wrongful disclosure. See, e.g., Fellows v. Keating, No. 3913, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 797 
(Trumbull Mar. 11, 1988). Further, in appropriate circumstances, an attorney can be enjoined from 
revealing client confidences. See, e.g., American Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 
575 N.E.2d 116 (1991) (neither U.S. nor Ohio Constitution prohibits court from enjoining attorney’s 
dissemination of information protected by attorney-client privilege). Fear of potential disclosure or 
misuse of protected client information, or actual disclosure or misuse that has already occurred, is a 
common ground for lawyer disqualification. See, e.g., Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 81 
Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998) (side-switching attorney); Baker v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (breach of confidentiality by former in-house 
lawyer/employee and misuse of those confidences by counsel of record in case against employer; 
counsel of record disqualified). If the misuse takes the form of testimonial acts by the lawyer in 
litigation, such as the filing of affidavits containing protected information, which affidavits were 
potentially adverse to the interests of a former client, the improper material can be stricken from the 
record.  Dietz-Britton v. Smythe, Cramer Co., 139 Ohio App.3d 337, 743 N.E.2d 960 (Cuyahoga 
2000) (striking affidavits, containing information acquired during prior representation, prepared by 
former client’s lawyers and submitted in support of former client’s present adversary). 
Sale of a law practice: Confidentiality concerns in connection with the sale of a law practice are 
addressed in Ohio Rule 1.17(c). That Rule provides that the selling lawyer may not share with a 
prospective purchaser “information relative to client representation or confidential material contained 
in client files” until the purchaser signs a confidentiality agreement. Such an agreement binds the 
signator “to preserve information relating to the representation of the clients of the selling lawyer, 
consistent with Rule 1.6, as if those clients were clients of the prospective purchasing lawyer.” Id. 
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1.6:240  Use or Disclosure of Confidential Information of Co-Clients 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  4.23-4.26 (1996). 
Abuse of client information - The multiple-client problem - In general: Whenever a lawyer represents 
multiple clients, whether at the same time or at different times, it is possible that confidential client 
information obtained in one representation may be useful in another. The concern is that the lawyer 
may communicate information of client A to client B, or use client A’s information for the benefit of 
client B to the disadvantage of A. Such unauthorized disclosure or use violates Ohio Rule 1.6 
(disclosure) or 1.8(b) (use), unless an exception to the duty of confidentiality arises. With respect to 
the client consent exception, see, under the former OHCPR, Spivey v. Bender, 77 Ohio App.3d 17, 
601 N.E.2d 56 (Lucas 1991) (lawyer who represented client on vehicular-homicide charge may 
represent children of client against now-former client for civil liability arising from same accident, 
with former client’s consent). Id. 
These concerns also raise conflict-of-interest problems, discussed at sections 1.8:300 (use of 
current-client information) and 1.9:400 (use or disclosure of former-client confidences). 
Courts frequently apply a presumptive analysis in these situations -- that if the lawyer has relevant 
information from the first representation, the lawyer will use it in the second. See, e.g., Geauga 
County Bar Ass’n v. Psenicka, 62 Ohio St.3d 35, 577 N.E.2d 1074 (1991). In fact, the duty of 
loyalty to the second client may make it mandatory to do so. Psenicka supra; State v. Dillman, 70 
Ohio App.3d 616, 591 N.E.2d 849 (Huron 1990) (conflict between duty of confidentiality to one 
client and duty of loyalty to another precluded public defender’s office from representing two 
defendants with conflicting defenses charged with offenses stemming from the same transaction); 
Ussury v. St. Joseph Hosp., 43 Ohio App.3d 48, 49, 539 N.E.2d 700, 701 (Cuyahoga 1988) 
(lawyer with information obtained in representing client while at former firm, which information was 
pertinent to representation of different client at new firm, “has a professional duty to assist his new 
firm and their clients,” which may conflict with duty of confidentiality owed prior client); Cincinnati 
Bar Ass’n Op., reprinted in Ethics Opinion, Cincinnati Bar Rep., Oct. 1986, at 9) (attorney who 
formerly represented both Corporation A and a major shareholder thereof, who is now pursuing for 
A’s benefit derivative action involving matters touching upon prior representation, cannot, without 
full disclosure of potential conflict to both old and new clients and written consent from both to 
represent new clients, represent defendants in the derivative action, because it “would subject him 
either to charges by his former clients that secrets or confidences were revealed, or charges by his new 
clients that he was insufficiently vigorous in his defense of the action.”) 
In Psenicka, a lawyer who was discharged by the wife in a divorce action became husband’s counsel. 
Only hearsay evidence supported the assertion that the lawyer had revealed confidential information 
relating to the wife’s representation, and the lawyer denied that he had done so. Nevertheless, the 
hearing panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, noting the close 
relationship between the information shared by the wife with the lawyer and the extant issues in the 
dispute, concluded: 
“[I]t is difficult to imagine how at least some of the information 
confided to Respondent by the wife would not influence or at least 
331
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.6 
  
preclude Respondent from exercising his independent professional 
judgment in later representing the husband. The interests of one or the 
other, or both, are bound to be compromised.” 
* * * 
“[I]t would be impossible, in fully representing the husband, not to use 
information which was acquired from his former client.” 
62 Ohio St.3d at 36, 577 N.E.2d at 1074-75. The Ohio Supreme Court found this conduct violated 
DR 4-101(B)(2), 4-101(B)(3), and 5-105(A). 
The issues raised here sometimes are handled by the disciplinary process, but often are treated in the 
context of a motion to disqualify counsel. Courts have recognized that the disciplinary and 
disqualification standards are not identical, e.g., Phillips v. Haidet, 119 Ohio App.3d 322, 695 
N.E.2d 292 (Logan 1997); nevertheless, because they overlap substantially in fact, the 
disqualification cases provide valuable insight into how these issues should be resolved. 
Abuse of client information - The multiple-client problem - Acquisition of confidential client 
information: Questions arise at times concerning whether the lawyer gained confidential information 
in the first relationship, particularly when it involved only a single pre-employment interview to 
determine whether the client would retain the lawyer on the matter. In Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 101 
(Sept. 11, 1973), the bar association confronted a situation in which a lawyer held an initial interview 
with a wife concerning a possible divorce action. The wife later selected other counsel, and the 
husband retained the first lawyer. The wife complained about the husband’s representation by the 
lawyer. Although the lawyer maintained that he had received no confidences or secrets from the wife 
during their single interview, “[t]he salient fact is that the wife believes she disclosed confidences and 
secrets to Attorney H which might enable Attorney H to better represent the husband.” Id. at 6. The 
bar association concluded that this was enough to make the lawyer’s representation of the husband 
improper. 
If an individual lawyer receives confidential client information, it usually is presumed that all other 
lawyers at the firm do so as well, at least where the lawyers remain affiliated at the same firm. 
Compare Stevens v. Grandview Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 14042, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5092 
(Montgomery Oct. 20 1993) (an attorney’s knowledge is imputed to his firm absent a contrary 
showing), and Janis v. Castle Apartments, Inc., 90 Ohio App.3d 224, 228, 628 N.E.2d 149, 151 
(Summit 1993) (“The confidences, which are assumed to be disclosed in the attorney-client 
relationship, are also presumed to be disclosed to an attorney’s fellow associates.”), with Cincinnati 
Bar Ass’n Op. 90-91-08, at 2 (n.d.) (“absent direct proof to the contrary, an attorney would not be 
deemed to have shared confidential information relating to matters exclusively within the sphere of 
representation of another department of the same firm.”). Complicated imputed-disqualification 
issues that arise when lawyers change firms are addressed in Rules 1.9 and 1.10. See sections 1.9:310 
and 1.10:300. See also section 1.10:200. The leading Ohio case in this area is Kala v. Aluminum 
Smelting & Refining Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998), extensively discussed in 
sections 1.9:200 and 1.10:300. 
In contrast, where one lawyer merely consults another lawyer outside the firm in representing a client, 
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there is no presumption that the consulted lawyer has received confidential client information 
warranting disqualification should the consulted lawyer subsequently represent another against that 
client in a related matter.  Janis v. Castle Apartments, Inc., 90 Ohio App.3d 224, 628 N.E.2d 149 
(Summit 1993). Proof that such information was acquired is necessary. 
Abuse of client information - The multiple-client problem - Relevance of confidential client 
information: If confidential information was obtained by the lawyer in the first representation, the 
question then becomes whether that information is sufficiently relevant to the second representation 
that its being revealed or misused should be presumed. It is now settled that the applicable test in Ohio 
(as it is generally) is the “substantial relationship” test. See Ohio Rule 1.9(a), adopting that test as 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 
688 N.E.2d 258 (1998). The issue is discussed in detail at section 1.9:210. In a nutshell, a matter is 
substantially related if the matter involves “the same transaction or legal dispute or one in which there 
is a substantial risk that confidential factual information that would normally have been obtained in 
the prior representation would materially advance the position of another client in a subsequent 
matter.” Ohio Rule 1.0(n). If the answer to the substantial relationship inquiry is yes, then the lawyer 
cannot represent the client in the subsequent matter where the client’s interests are materially adverse 
to those of the former client, without the former client’s informed, written consent. Ohio Rule 1.9(a). 
See also 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  132(2) (2000). 
Abuse of client information - The multiple-client problem - Movant showing necessary to support 
disqualification: Where this issue arises on a motion to disqualify counsel based on the possibility that 
counsel may misuse information acquired in representing a former client, definitive resolution of this 
issue (at least in a “side-switching” case) is provided by Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining 
Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998). In a case of first impression, the Ohio Supreme Court 
articulated a three-part test to be applied to determine whether disqualification is required when a 
lawyer leaves a firm and joins another firm that represents an opposing party of a client of the former 
firm: 
 In ruling on a motion for disqualification of either an individual 
(primary disqualification) or the entire firm (imputed disqualification) 
when an attorney has left a law firm and joined a firm representing the 
opposing party, a court must hold an evidentiary hearing and issue 
findings of fact using a three-part analysis: 
 (1) Is there a substantial relationship between the matter at issue 
and the matter of the former firm’s prior representation; 
 (2) If there is a substantial relationship between these matters, is 
the presumption of shared confidences within the former firm rebutted 
by evidence that the attorney had no personal contact with or 
knowledge of the related matter; and 
 (3) If the attorney did have personal contact with or knowledge 
of the related matter, did the new law firm erect adequate and timely 
screens to rebut a presumption of shared confidences with the new firm 
so as to avoid imputed disqualification? 
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Id. at 1, 688 N.E.2d at 260 (1998) (syllabus). Thus, pursuant to the Kala syllabus, the movant’s 
initial burden is to demonstrate a substantial relationship, see section 1.9:210; if that is done, then the 
burden shifts to the lawyer to rebut the presumption by showing that he or she had no personal contact 
with or knowledge of the related matter. See section 1.9:200. If there was contact or knowledge, then 
the imputed disqualification issue under prong three comes into play. See sections 1.10:200-:300. 
Abuse of client information - The multiple-client problem - Illustrative situations: The potential abuse 
of client confidences may arise in a variety of multiple-client situations. One common situation in 
which problems arise is when a lawyer who worked for a client on a particular matter switches sides 
on the same or a closely-related matter. Again, Kala is the leading case in Ohio. See also, e.g., 
Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Psenicka, 62 Ohio St.3d 35, 577 N.E.2d 1074 (1991) (lawyer who 
represented wife in divorce action was discharged and became husband’s counsel); Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n Informal Op. 77-13 (Sept. 2, 1977) (lawyer who represented minor driver in juvenile court 
regarding traffic offense sought to represent passengers in action against driver for personal injuries 
arising from incident). See generally section 1.9:200. A conflict is present even though the migratory 
lawyer does not work on the matter after changing firms. See, e.g., Ussury v. St. Joseph Hosp., 43 
Ohio App.3d 48, 539 N.E.2d 700 (Cuyahoga 1988) (where member of law firm representing 
defendant was previously with law firm that represented plaintiff in same case, and where attorney 
reviewed materials and gave advice regarding plaintiff’s case at his previous firm, a trial court may 
disqualify attorney’s new law firm from representing defendants even though attorney has no direct 
responsibility for representing defendants). See section 1.9:300. The issues of imputation of the 
conflict to the lawyer’s new firm and removal of imputation by screening are discussed in detail in 
sections 1.10:200-:300. 
Similar problems can arise even if the current dispute does not involve the original client as a party. 
The Ohio State Bar Association cautioned a lawyer -- who had consulted with A (the ex-wife of B) 
regarding visitation problems with B, and later sought to represent B in a divorce action between B 
and C (B’s second wife) -- that the lawyer could undertake the representation only if the lawyer had 
learned no information from A during the course of the consultation “that might be used to benefit ‘B’ 
in the subsequent proceedings or which could result in some adverse effect on ‘A’ if used in any 
subsequent proceeding even though ‘A’ is not involved in the subsequent proceeding.” Ohio State 
Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 89-1, at 2 (Nov. 15, 1989). Similarly, the Cleveland Bar Association 
advised a lawyer to withdraw from representing a criminal defendant where a witness against the 
defendant had been a client of the attorney on an unrelated criminal matter, unless the witness 
consented to the use of the information or there was “no reasonable possibility that confidential 
information gained in the earlier representation will become involved.” Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 
150, at 1 (June 9, 1983). 
Complex problems also may occur when, in the context of joint representation, a potential claim 
arises between the jointly represented parties. For example, in Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 
88-6 (Oct. 27, 1988), a lawyer was employed by an insurance company to defend husband and wife 
insureds in an action against them arising out of an automobile accident. During the course of the 
representation, it became apparent that the wife had a potential personal injury claim against her 
husband, who was the driver of their automobile at the time of the accident, and his insurance 
company. Information regarding the situation had been communicated to a claims attorney employed 
by the insurer. The bar association concluded that conflict-of-interest concerns barred the lawyer’s 
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representation of the husband in defense of the wife’s claim, and the duty to protect client confidences 
barred the claims attorney from defending the husband as well. Id. at 6. While the claims attorney 
never formally represented the wife, the bar association analogized the claims attorney’s situation to a 
lawyer who receives information in an initial consultation with an attorney. See generally sections 
1.6:350 and 1.6:370. 
In 1986, the Cleveland Bar Association addressed a situation in which an attorney who represented a 
husband and wife on certain matters became concerned that the husband had become incompetent, 
and that the wife was mishandling certain separate assets of the husband in violation of their 
antenuptial agreement and the terms of a trust set up for the husband’s son and granddaughters from a 
previous marriage. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 86-5 (Dec. 19, 1986). Citing both the 
conflict-of-interest and client-confidence provisions of the OHCPR, the bar association concluded 
that the lawyer could not warn the son of the trust abuse, or originate commitment proceedings for the 
husband and oppose the appointment of the wife as guardian. In either situation, the lawyer would be 
relying, at least in part, on client confidences of the wife to her detriment. The opinion left open an 
alternative if the wife’s conduct constituted a fraud on the son or a prospective crime, instances in 
which disclosure was permitted under former OH DR 4-101(C). 
In Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 129 (Sept. 2, 1976), an attorney jointly represented three individuals (A, 
B, and C) in the formation of a new business to compete with the individuals’ current employer. Late 
in the representation, B dropped out of the new venture to remain with the original employer. In 
subsequent litigation by the employer against the defecting employees and others for unfair 
competition and violation of a trade secrets statute, the lawyer sought to represent the defendants. The 
bar association determined that because the lawyer had obtained from B confidential information that 
the lawyer could draw upon should B become a witness for the employer, the lawyer could not 
undertake the defense without B’s consent. 
With respect to former clients, there is no absolute rule that a lawyer can never represent a party 
against a former client. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-013, 1989 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 20 (May 30, 1989) (cautioning against reading of DR 4-101(B) that would lead to 
this result). However, the lawyer must be certain that the present representation will in no way require 
the disclosure or use of former client confidences or secrets. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 
80-5 (June 23, 1980) (authorizing lawyer to represent employee in wrongful discharge action against 
union the lawyer had represented, as long as these conditions were met); Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 
90-16, at 2 (July 18, 1990) (lawyer who formerly represented husband and wife could represent 
husband in their divorce action, unless during prior representation lawyer “had any attorney-client 
communications or received any confidential information which could be used against the wife or 
might jeopardize [the] representation of the husband”); Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 84-6, at 1 (Sept. 25, 
1984) (attorney who represented wife in restitution action against third party could represent husband 
in divorce action where lawyer “did not learn any confidence or secret from the wife which has any 
bearing on the current domestic action”). 
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In contrast to the situation of conflicting representations, it has been suggested that a qualified legal 
referral organization that refers clients to other attorneys may obtain confidential information from 
parties with conflicting interests as part of the screening process. The organization can refer those 
cases out to practicing attorneys, as long as the private attorney is given no access to the confidential 
information of the adverse party. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 87-1 (June 22, 1987). See 
section 7.3:500. 
Confidentiality and common representation: In those instances in which conflict-of-interest concerns 
do not preclude common representation of multiple clients in the same matter, confidentiality issues 
still need to be addressed. See Ohio Rule 1.7 cmts. [26] (emphasizing importance of effect on 
confidentiality and attorney-client privilege in determining appropriateness of common 
representation) and [27] (examining in some detail the duty of confidentiality in such circumstances). 
As a general matter, if one client asks that information relevant to the representation not be shared 
with another client, “continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate,” given 
the equal duty of loyalty to each client, and the right of each client to access to all information relating 
to the representation that might affect his or her interests. Thus, the lawyer must explain at the outset, 
as a part of obtaining the informed consent of each client, that information confidential to the 
common clients will be shared for the benefit of the common representation and that the lawyer will 
have to withdraw if one of the clients decides that information material to the representation must be 
kept from the other(s). In limited circumstances, it may be possible to proceed even if certain 
information of a common client must be kept from the other(s); if so, this must be established at the 
outset, as a part of the informed consent of all clients, and can be put in place only if such a limitation 
will not compromise the lawyer’s ability to represent effectively all of the clients involved. The 
example given in the comment is a joint venture representation in which the lawyer concludes that 
one client’s trade secrets need not be shared with the other joint venturer. Rule 1.7 cmt. [27]. 
Note, however, that while the underlying premise of the statements in Comment 27 would appear to 
be that in a multiple representation the sharing of information relating to the representation is the rule, 
ABA Formal Op. 08-450 (Apr. 9, 2008) stresses the other side of the equation: that “Model Rule 1.6 
requires that the lawyer protect the confidentiality of information relating to each of his clients.” This 
duty would conflict with the lawyer’s duty under MR 1.4 to provide the other client(s) with material 
information, with the result that, in the absence of prior informed consent, withdrawal from one or 
both representations would likely be required under MR 1.16. Opinion 08-450, in reaching this 
conclusion, nevertheless cites and quotes MR 1.7 cmt. 31, the Model Rule equivalent to Ohio Rule 
1.7 cmt. [27]. 
 
1.6:250  Information Imparted in Lawyer Counseling Programs 
The material in this section is excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide 
to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  1.46 (1996). 
As an aid to lawyers with substance abuse or mental health problems, the Ohio State Bar Association 
has established a statewide lawyers’ assistance committee to provide counseling in these matters. In 
the course of their work, lawyers who serve on this committee frequently obtain information about 
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individual attorneys that, if obtained in other circumstances, would have to be reported to disciplinary 
authorities under Ohio Rule 8.3(a). To encourage lawyers with substance abuse problems to seek the 
aid of lawyers’ assistance committees, Rule 8.3(c) provides that information obtained by a lawyer 
while serving on such a committee is privileged for purposes Rule 8.3 and thus need not be disclosed. 
The Rule provides bar associations flexibility in structuring their responses to substance-abuse 
problems by extending the privilege protection to members of a bar committee or subcommittee 
designed to assist lawyers with substance-abuse problems as well as to any member, employee, or 
agent of a nonprofit corporation established by the bar association for such purposes. 
 
1.6:260  Information Learned Prior to Becoming a Lawyer 
Pursuant to Ohio Rule 1.6(a), the prohibition against disclosure covers all information “relating to 
the representation of a client.” Unlike the former OHCPR, it need not be “gained in the professional 
relationship.” Since the confidentiality rule applies to any information “relating to the representation,” 
if that condition is satisfied, information acquired prior to becoming a lawyer would be protected 
under the Rule, unless an exception is applicable. See further discussion in section 1.6:210 at 
“Information relating to the representation - Timing or context of acquisition of such information.” 
  
1.6:300  Exceptions to Duty of Confidentiality -- In General 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.6 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.6 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  4.23, 4.34-4.38. 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  55:101 
ALI-LGL §§  59-66 
Wolfram §§  6.1, 6.7 
 
There are four bases set forth in Ohio Rule 1.6(a) pursuant to which the lawyer may (or must) 
disclose information relating to the representation of a client: First, where the client gives informed 
consent; second, where disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation; 
third, where the disclosure is permitted by division (b); and fourth, where disclosure is required by 
division (c). Section 1.6:310 treats the first two exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. Sections 
1.6:320-:370 deal with permissive disclosure under division (b), and section 1.6:395 discusses 
mandatory disclosure pursuant to division (c). 
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To the extent disclosure is permissive and falls under Ohio Rule 1.6(b), the comments to the Rule 
provide some guidance concerning how to evaluate that discretionary choice. Comment [15] suggests 
that one might consider “the nature of the lawyer’s relationship with the client and with those who 
might be injured by the client, the lawyer’s own involvement in the transaction and facts that may 
extenuate the conduct in question.” Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [15]. 
Although not discussed in the text of Ohio Rule 1.6, the comments also provide guidance in terms of 
how a lawyer can discuss work with others, even if the conversation does not clearly fall into a 
Rule-based exception -- for example, a discussion with a colleague or spouse about the day’s work. 
To this end, Comment [4] provides: “A lawyer’s use of a hypothetical to discuss issues relating to the 
representation is permissible so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able 
to ascertain the identity of the client or the situation involved.” Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [4]. See 1 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  9.15, at 9-67, 9-69 
through 9-71 (3d ed. Supp. 2012) (discussing “shop-talk”). 
 
1.6:310  Disclosure to Advance Client Interests or with Client Consent 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  4.34-4.35 (1996). 
Disclosure impliedly authorized as necessary to the representation: Ohio Rule 1.6(a) provides that a 
lawyer can reveal information relating to the representation of a client if “the disclosure is impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation.” As stated in Comment [5], 
a lawyer may be impliedly authorized to admit a fact that cannot 
properly be disputed or to make a disclosure that facilitates a 
satisfactory conclusion to a matter. Lawyers in a firm may, in the 
course of the firm’s practice, disclose to each other information relating 
to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular 
information be confined to specified lawyers. 
Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [5]. This is not a license to share client information indiscriminately within a firm, 
but an implicit authorization to do so to the extent it is helpful in carrying out the representation. 
(Compare the “shop-talk” exception,” discussed in section 1.6:300 above.) 
Presumably, the implied authorization set forth in 1.6(a) would also carry forward the approval in 
former OH EC 4-3 of sharing “limited information” with those outside the firm as “necessary” for 
accounting, printing and “other legitimate purposes,” as long as those to whom the information is 
revealed are carefully selected and warned to keep the information confidential. That this exception 
has its limits is well illustrated in the insurance situation where counsel for the insured is compensated 
by the insured’s insurance company. To control costs, the insurance company may ask the lawyer to 
submit detailed billing information as part of a legal audit of the bill. Compliance with such a request 
did not fall within the ambit of former OH EC 4-3. As the Board of Commissioners on Grievances 
and Discipline commented: 
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In this Board’s view, [E]thical Consideration 4-3 does not authorize 
disclosure of legal bills without client consent to an outside auditing 
company. The information sought in a legal audit often goes beyond 
“limited” information. Depending upon the information contained 
therein, a billing invoice might reveal client confidences and secrets. 
Revealing confidences and secrets of an insured to an outside audit 
company serves the economic advantage of the insurer. The economic 
benefit of an insurer is not considered a “legitimate purpose” under EC 
4-3. 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2000-2, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2, at 
*13-14 (June 1, 2000). 
Note further that in a 2009 opinion, the Board has opined with respect to outsourcing of legal or 
support services that while 
one might contend that revelation of information through outsourcing 
of services is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, such 
contention fails to pass ethical muster. 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2009-6, 2009 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 
(Aug. 14, 2009), at *9.  Thus, pursuant to Rule 1.6(a) (as well as 1.2(a) and 1.4(a)(2)), 
a lawyer is required to disclose and consult with a client and obtain 
informed consent before outsourcing legal or support services to 
lawyers or nonlawyers. 
Id. at *14-15.  Discussion of the outsourcing issue in general and of the Ohio ethics opinion in 
particular can be found in Kathryn A. Thompson, Do Tell, ABAJ, June 2010, at p. 26. 
In the estate-planning context, the Ohio Supreme Court held under the Code that a lawyer did not 
have implied authority to inform a person named a successor trustee in a living trust that he has been 
so named. To do so disclosed a confidence of the trustors/clients without their consent; moreover, it 
was done as a part of a marketing campaign by the lawyer to advance his own interests, not those of 
his clients.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Yurich, 78 Ohio St.3d 315, 677 N.E.2d 1190 (1997). 
In Hazard and Hodes’ view, the implied authorization exception is similar to the requisite of intended 
confidentiality under the attorney/client privilege (as to which see section 1.6:430 infra) and as such 
covers disclosure of confidential information to others when it is to the client’s advantage: 
 When that is the case, the information is clearly protected as 
confidential by Model Rule 1.6(a), but just as clearly disclosure is 
“impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.” Indeed, in most 
of the situations contemplated by this built-in “exceptions clause” in 
Rule 1.6(a), the whole point of the lawyer’s learning the information 
was so that it could be disclosed at the right time and in the most 
effective way, in order to advance the client’s interests. 
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1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering §  9.17, 
at 9-72 (3d. ed Supp. 2012). The authors provide examples, such as conveying to the court the 
client’s ability to go to trial as scheduled, conveying confidential information to a third party during 
negotiations, or assisting the client in making statements to a court or third parties, as in responding to 
discovery demands or filing forms with a regulatory agency. Id. at 9-66. The authors further note that 
in most of these situations the client has not issued instructions in the matter and may even oppose 
such disclosures if it had a choice in the matter. Id. Implied authorization is thus separate from 
disclosures made with client consent, the subject to which we now turn. 
Client consent: A lawyer always can reveal client information with the consent of the client, provided 
the consent is “informed.” Ohio Rule 1.6(a). Cf. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 101 (Sept. 11, 1973) 
(upholding implied consent to client’s former lawyer’s use of client confidences and secrets, 
apparently without any pre-consent “full disclosure” by the former lawyer, where the client’s current 
attorney fully advised her about situation and where former lawyer’s possession of relevant 
confidences and secrets was in doubt). If the information pertains to more than one client, each must 
authorize its release. 
With respect to “informed consent,” see Ohio Rule 1.0(f) & cmts. [6]-[7]. To the extent a lawyer 
seeks client consent to submit billing information to an insurance company for audit arising from 
representation of the company’s insured, “full disclosure includes informing the client of the type of 
information required by the insurer in the billing invoice, the type of supporting documentation, if any, 
required by the audit, and that waiver of attorney-client privilege might be raised as a consequence.” 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2000-2, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2, at 
*1 (June 1, 2000) (syllabus) (applying former OHCPR). 
At times, consent may be implied from a client’s failure to object to the lawyer’s conduct, such as 
where a lawyer represents a current client in an action against a former client and the former client 
fails to raise a timely objection to the representation. See, e.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 101 (Sept. 
11, 1973) (where lawyer (L) had single pre-employment interview with wife in divorce action, wife 
employed another attorney and husband employed L, wife’s tactical decision not to object 
immediately constituted implied consent and barred subsequent objection to L’s representation of 
husband). 
 
1.6:320  Disclosure to Prevent Death or Serious Bodily Harm 
Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(1) adopts the reasonably-certain-death-or-substantial-bodily-harm exception of 
MR 1.6(b)(1). As elaborated in Comment [6], “[d]ivision (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of 
life and physical integrity and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain 
death or substantial bodily harm. Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered 
imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such harm at a later 
date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the threat.” For example, 
a lawyer who knows that a client has discharged toxic waste into a 
town’s water supply may reveal this information to the authorities if 
there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water 
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will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer’s 
disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of 
victims. 
Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [6]. 
 
1.6:330  Disclosure to Prevent a Crime 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  4.36 (1996). 
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation in order to prevent the commission of 
a crime, whether by the client or another person. Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(2). Compare former DR 
4-101(C)(3), which limited such disclosure to potential crimes of a client. See, under the OHCPR, 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 86-2 (July 25, 1986) (where appeal of criminal conviction is terminated 
while client is free and client informs lawyer of intent not to report to authorities, lawyer may notify 
authorities of client’s intentions and whereabouts if the case is felony, because client’s failure to 
report would be crime, but may not do so if case is misdemeanor, because failure to report, in that 
situation, is not crime). As with the other subdivisions, Rule 1.6(b)(2) is permissive, not mandatory, 
although other provisions of law may make it mandatory. For example, a lawyer representing a 
spouse in a divorce action may learn from his client that the other spouse is physically abusive to the 
children. This information constituted a confidence or secret under DR 4-101(A), but if there was a 
risk of endangering a child under ORC 2912.22(A) and a lawyer reasonably believed his client would 
be violating that provision, then the attorney could, under DR 4-101(C)(3), report confidences or 
secrets indicating the crime of child endangerment. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 92-2 (July 17, 1992). 
Issues raised by Opinion 92-2 are examined in Carol Rogers Hilliard, Reporting v. Maintaining 
Confidentiality, Clev. B.J., Jan. 2006, at 10. 
The disciplinary rule was silent as to the level of certainty the lawyer must have about the client’s 
criminal intentions before the lawyer was authorized to speak, although most likely something more 
than a mere suspicion was required. In this regard, the Cleveland Bar Association stated that 
disclosure was appropriate only when the lawyer “possesses evidence indicating beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a crime will be committed.” Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 125, at 9 (Sept. 2, 1976). The 
present formulation is less demanding -- disclosure is permitted “to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes” it is necessary prevent the client or another from committing a crime. Rule 1.6(b)(2). 
It is important to recognize that this exception authorizes revelation of client information only with 
respect to crimes not yet committed, although that category may include continuing crimes as well as 
future ones. See Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 82-3 (Apr. 19, 1982) (if client’s theft of documents 
constitutes continuing crime, then lawyer may disclose information under 4-101(C)(3)). See also 
Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 91-21, at 2 (n.d.) (noting that client’s conduct in remaining out of state to 
avoid being subpoenaed as witness in criminal action might be considered continuing crime 
triggering the DR 4-101(C)(3) exception, but concluding that such argument was “far-fetched”). See 
generally Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  12.6.5, at 674 (1986) (discussing the 
confused state of the law on the continuing-crime question nationally). The exception does not 
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authorize the lawyer to reveal information pertaining to past crimes. (But see Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(3), 
discussed in section 1.6:340 below.) See also section 1.6:620. 
Even if a lawyer discloses confidential client information under Rule 1.6(b)(2), disclosure should be 
limited to alerting authorities of the intent of the client or other person to commit a crime and such 
information as is necessary to prevent it. Cf.  In re Original Grand Jury Investigation, 89 Ohio 
St.3d 544, 547, 733 N.E.2d 1135, 1138 (2000) (lawyer’s reading to authorities of entire contents of 
letter concerning client’s intent to commit crime “actually[] went beyond what DR 4-101(C)(3) 
allows” (comma deleted)). 
  
1.6:340  Disclosure to Prevent Financial Loss 
Under Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(3), disclosure of information relating to the representation may be made if 
the lawyer reasonably believes it necessary “to mitigate substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another that has resulted from the client’s commission of an illegal or fraudulent act, in 
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services.” Note that Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(3), unlike 
its Model Rule counterpart (MR 1.6(b)(3)), 
 
 substitutes “illegal” for “crime,” as the Ohio Rules do in numerous other places (Rules 1.2(d), 
1.16(b)(2), 4.1(b), 8.4(b)), a change that is discussed generally in section 1.2:600. 
With respect specifically to Rule 1.6(b), this change creates a potentially confusing 
dichotomy as to when certain of the division (b) exceptions apply. Thus, disclosure 
permitted under division (b)(2) is triggered when the lawyer reasonably believes such 
disclosure is necessary to prevent any person (including the client) from committing a 
“crime,” but division (b)(3) permits disclosure to mitigate substantial financial injury 
resulting from a client’s “illegal” or fraudulent act in which the client has used the 
lawyer’s services. 
The change in Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(3) is also another instance in which Ohio is outside 
the mainstream of Model Rule states: our research indicates that only Michigan uses 
“illegal” instead of “criminal” -- see its Rule 1.6(c)(3) (permissive disclosure to rectify 
consequences of illegal or fraudulent act by client), while New Jersey’s version of the 
same permissive-disclosure provision (its Rule 1.6(d)(1)) uses the formulation 
“criminal, illegal or fraudulent act.” 
 Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(3) looks backward only, at mitigating substantial financial injury “that has 
resulted” from a client’s past illegal or fraudulent conduct. In contrast, MR 1.6(b)(3) is 
directed to preventing, mitigating, or rectifying such injury “that is reasonably certain to result 
or has resulted” from client criminal or fraudulent conduct. (Compare MR 1.6(b)(2), directed 
toward preventing the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act reasonably certain 
to cause such injury.). 
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This difference between the Ohio and Model Rule approaches is lessened to some 
extent by Ohio’s Rule 1.6(b)(2), which deals with permissive disclosure necessary to 
prevent the client “or other person” from committing a crime (fraud is not mentioned) 
-- without regard to whether the consequences involve substantial financial injury to 
another -- and by Rule 4.1(b), pursuant to which the lawyer must disclose when 
necessary to avoid assisting the client in an illegal or fraudulent act. Concerning 
mandatory disclosure under Rule 1.6(c), see section 1.6:395. 
Division (b)(3) does not apply to a lawyer representing a client accused of illegal or fraudulent 
conduct or to a lawyer engaged by an entity to investigate alleged violations of the law by the client or 
one or more of its constituents.  Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [8]. 
The reader should also be aware of the provisions contained in the SEC rules (Part 205 of 17 CFR) 
promulgated under §  307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (15 USC §  7245 (2002)), concerning 
permissive disclosure of confidential information by a lawyer for a publicly traded company. See 17 
CFR § 205.3(d)(2).  
 
1.6:350  Disclosure to Secure Ethics Advice 
Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(4) (identical to MR 1.6(b)(4)) provides that 
 A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client . . . to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary: 
* * * * 
 (4)  to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance 
with these rules. 
Rule 1.6 cmt. [9] elaborates that “[i]n most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice 
will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation.” But even where it is not, 
“division (b)(4) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer’s compliance with the 
Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id. The Task Force’s Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.6 
states that this exception “codifies the common practice of lawyers to consult with other lawyers 
about compliance with these rules.” See also 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & 
Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering §  9.24 (3d ed. Supp. 2012). 
 
1.6:360  Disclosure in Lawyer’s Self-Defense 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  4.38 (1996). 
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A lawyer may reveal client information necessary to defend himself against accusations of wrongful 
conduct. Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(5). The requisites of this exception are that (1) the lawyer “reasonably 
believes” it necessary to (2) disclose “information relating to the representation” (including 
privileged information) in order (3)(i) “to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client,” such as a fee dispute, see Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-16, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (June 14, 1991); (ii) “to 
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which 
the client was involved,” see, e.g., Suravec v. LaCouture, 82 Ohio App.3d 416, 612 N.E.2d 501 
(Montgomery 1992) (malpractice defense); or (iii) “to respond to allegations in any proceeding, 
including any disciplinary matter, concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client.” See, e.g., 
Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 90-19 (Sept. 5, 1990). Circumstances (ii) and (iii) are not limited to claims, 
charges, or allegations by the client, so long as they are premised, respectively, on “conduct in which 
the client was involved” or “the lawyer’s representation of the client.” See ABA, Annotated Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 110 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). 
Readers of this section (and section 1.6:365 following) should be aware of both the court of appeals 
and the Supreme Court opinions in Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors 
Corp.  After the Eighth District Court of Appeals in 2009 cast considerable doubt on the reach of 
Rule 1.6(b)(5) in the context of information which it held was protected by the evidentiary 
attorney-client privilege statute, ORC 2317.02(A), the Supreme Court in 2010 eliminated that doubt 
by reversing the Eighth District. The Court confirmed that the self-protection exception is recognized 
in Ohio, and that pursuant thereto, evidence falling within the exception is not protected by the 
statutory or common-law attorney-client privilege. The Givaudan decisions are discussed in detail in 
section 1.6:530.  
 
1.6:365  Disclosure in Fee Disputes 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  4.38 (1996). 
A lawyer may reveal client information necessary to establish the fee owed. Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(5) & 
cmt. [11]. Cf. Ohio Rule 3.7(c)(2) (allowing lawyer in litigation also to serve as witness if “the 
testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case to the client 
by the lawyer or the firm”). Under the former OHCPR, the Board of Commissioners approved a 
lawyer’s sharing of client information with a collection agency hired to collect delinquent legal fees 
owed the lawyer, but only to the extent “necessary” to establish or collect the fee. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-16, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (June 14, 1991). In its 
opinion, the Board further defined the limits of permissible disclosure in this context: 
 This Board’s opinion is that the law firm may disclose to the 
collection agency the client’s name, billing address and the amount of 
money owed. However, since information regarding the nature of the 
legal services would not always be necessary to establish or collect the 
fee, it should not be revealed to the collection agency unless necessary. 
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Id. at *7. 
The fee-dispute exception, however, does not insulate a lawyer from being disqualified where he 
brings a lawsuit against former clients (and others), not only with respect to a fee dispute concerning 
the allocation of proceeds of a prior judgment obtained by the lawyer for the former clients (which 
prior representation necessarily involved disclosure to the lawyer of sensitive financial information 
and other confidences), but also various other claims, on behalf of his firm and a nonlawyer 
co-plaintiff, seeking, inter alia, to recoup on behalf of the co-plaintiff fees allegedly owing for 
financial and tax advisory services. “Thus, it is abundantly clear that the within complaint amounted 
to far more than an attempt by an attorney to collect a professional fee.” Thomas L. Meros Co., 
L.P.A. v. Grange Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 134 Ohio App.3d 299, 303, 730 N.E.2d 1063, 1066 
(Cuyahoga 1999) (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court’s grant of motion to disqualify based 
on confidentiality concerns; “the facts of this case go far beyond the narrow exception outlined in” 
former DR 4-101(C)(4), id. at 302, 730 N.E.2d at 1066). 
The Rule 1.6(b)(5) exception, in the context of collecting unpaid fees, is discussed in Thomas M. 
Horwitz, The Client Who Does Not Pay: Terminating Representation and Collection of Fees, 
Cleveland Metro. B.J. (Sept. 2009), at 30. 
  
1.6:370  Disclosure When Required by Law or Court Order 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  4.37 (1996). 
A lawyer may reveal client information when disclosure is reasonably believed by the lawyer to be 
necessary to comply “with other law or a court order.” Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(6). 
By its terms, Rule 1.6(b)(6) appears permissive; a lawyer “may” reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client in order to comply with law or court order. See Rule 1.6 cmt. [15], which 
states that division (b) “permits but does not require the disclosure” and that a lawyer’s decision not to 
disclose “does not violate this rule.” In fact, however, when disclosure is required by law or court 
order, and all defenses to disclosure are exhausted, the lawyer for all practical purposes must make the 
disclosure. See Rule 1.6 cmts. [12] & [13] (recognizing that disclosure may be compelled by other 
law or court order, but stating that in such circumstances Rule 1.6(b)(6) “permits” the lawyer “to 
make such disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law” or “with the court’s order”). See  In 
re Original Grand Jury Investigation, 89 Ohio St.3d 544, 733 N.E.2d 1135 (2000) (lawyer 
compelled to turn over to grand jury, in compliance with subpoena, incriminating and threatening 
letter written by client to his brother; “courts have interpreted provisions similar to [former] DR 
4-101(C)(2) in such a manner as to require disclosure.”  Id. at 547, 733 N.E.2d at 1138.). As is stated 
in ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 109 (6th ed. 2007) (commentary), 
“[u]ltimately . . . Rule 1.6 defers to a final order of the court.” See also Joseph N. Gross, Responding 
to Subpoenas and Search Warrants for Client Information, Clev. Metro. B.J., Feb. 2009, at p. 
10 (discussing Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(6)). 
345
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.6 
  
Sometimes the requirement to reveal client information derives from a statute, such as ORC 
2151.421(A)(2), requiring attorneys to report child abuse in certain circumstances. See Cleveland 
Bar Ass’n Op. 92-2 (July 17, 1992) (confidential communication by client/wife about abusive 
behavior by husband against both wife and their child; mandatory duty of lawyer to report protected 
information only if client under 18 years of age; here, “the client is the mother, presumably over 
eighteen years of age, and not the child.” Id. at 3.) Careful attention must be given to the statutory 
language to make sure that the provision actually requires disclosure. For example, a statute that 
requires the separate disposal of paper and other recyclables should not be read as requiring the 
disclosure of client information contained on the paper, since the statute can be complied with while 
still protecting client information through proper disposal techniques such as shredding. Albert L. 
Bell, Recycling Confidential Paper, 7 Ohio Law., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 29. 
With respect to disclosure arising from a court order to do so, see Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 86-2 
(July 25, 1986) (even though lawyer may not reveal client’s intent not to report to authorities when 
appeal of misdemeanor conviction is terminated, because that is neither fraud on tribunal or crime, 
lawyer may do so if so ordered by court). And where a prospective client has testified voluntarily 
about a communication with the attorney and thereby waived the statutory attorney-client privilege, 
the attorney can be compelled by court order to testify on the same subject. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-15, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 14 (June 14, 1991) 
(explaining implications of ORC 2317.02(A), concerning waiver of attorney-client privilege, and 
former DR 4-101(C)(2)). See also Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 78-5 (July 27, 1978) (lawyer 
is not in violation of ethical obligation to preserve client confidences if court determines that 
information at issue falls outside attorney-client privilege and orders lawyer to testify). Even though 
client “secrets” are involved, a subpoena duces tecum issued by a grand jury to a lawyer must be 
complied with, because the disclosure is “required by law or court order.”  In re Original Grand 
Jury Investigation, 89 Ohio St.3d 544, 733 N.E.2d 1135 (2000). In accord, as to the 
required-by-law-or-court-order point, is State v. Doe, 101 Ohio St.3d 170, 2004 Ohio 705, 803 
N.E.2d 777, discussed in section 1.6:500 infra. In all likelihood, this exception does not apply in the 
absence of an actual court order or other compulsion of law. See Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 
95-4 (Mar. 7, 1995), discussed this section infra. But see possible argument to the contrary in 
discussion of the Grand Jury opinion at section 1.6:380. 
In a matter of first impression in Ohio, the Supreme Court held that the analogous exception in DR 
4-101(C)(2) did not permit a monitor, appointed pursuant to a Supreme Court order in a disciplinary 
proceeding, to have access to confidential materials of the monitored attorney, including those 
protected by the attorney-client privilege, where the lawyer’s clients refused to waive the privilege.  
Allen County Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 95 Ohio St.3d 160, 2002 Ohio 2006, 766 N.E.2d 973. Noting 
that the few cases in other jurisdictions that have considered the issue require the monitor to respect 
the privilege, the Court found “no authority that DR 4-101(C)(2) covers the functions of a monitor 
who is attempting to help an attorney on probation from harming his clients.” Id. at para. 14. 
The monitor will not be authorized to examine respondent’s privileged 
client correspondence, or the matters discussed in client meetings and 
other communications, but only the consistency and promptness with 
which the respondent attends to client matters. 
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Id. at para. 16. 
One complex question that has arisen in this area is what to do when a client pays the attorney with 
$10,000 or more in cash. Pursuant to 26 USC §  6050I, the IRS requires that the transaction and the 
client’s identity be reported on Form 8300. Reporting the client’s identity, however, may subject the 
client to governmental investigation and the possibility that the client may be charged with a crime 
and ultimately convicted. In United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1994), the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the enforcement of an IRS summons to secure such information from a lawyer who refused 
to make the requisite filing. The court indicated that it, like the vast majority of courts, did not 
consider the information to be protected by the attorney-client privilege. Given Ritchie, it would 
appear, at a minimum, that a lawyer must disclose the information upon a court order enforcing the 
IRS summons. The tenor of the opinion’s attorney-client privilege discussion, 15 F.3d at 602, makes 
it likely that the court would have found disclosure consistent with DR 4-101(C)(2) as well. A prior 
advisory opinion to the contrary, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-04, 1990 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 11 (Apr. 20, 1990), was withdrawn by the Board in light of Ritchie. 
Another common problem is whether it is proper for an attorney to divulge to law enforcement 
authorities the whereabouts of the client. This issue has been addressed in a number of state and local 
bar association opinions in Ohio. The first question is whether the whereabouts of a client is, in and of 
itself “information relating to the representation” under Rule 1.6. (For a discussion of cases dealing 
with this issue in the context of attorney-client privilege, see section 1.6:450.) While opinion drafters 
often defer on this issue as a question of law outside their domain, the Ohio State Bar Association 
treated the question of a client’s whereabouts as confidential information, at least in the context in 
which the client had skipped out on a bond and the lawyer’s disclosure would have involved telling 
the police or bonding company when the client would be in the lawyer’s office. Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n Informal Op. 95-4 (Mar. 7, 1995). Even if the information is not protected, the Toledo Bar 
Association has advised that the lawyer “certainly [is] under no obligation to make any effort to 
ascertain the whereabouts” of a client, if the attorney is unaware of it. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 92-4 
(n.d.). 
Assuming information on the client’s location is considered protected client information, then it may 
not be disclosed by the attorney unless an exception to the confidentiality rules applies. If the client 
has not authorized disclosure under 1.6(a), the question would depend on whether disclosure is 
necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm, 1.6(b)(1), the commission 
of a crime, 1.6(b)(2), or is required by law or a court order, 1.6(b)(6), or, under Ohio Rule 1.6(c), is 
necessary to comply with another rule, such as 4.1(b). 
Arguably, various provisions of the Ohio Revised Code pertaining to law enforcement may require 
disclosure under Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(6). See Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 86-8 (Dec. 18, 1986) 
(raising this issue under former OHCPR but refusing to resolve it because it involved rendering an 
opinion on an issue of law). These provisions include 
 the failure to report a crime, ORC 2921.22, although ORC 2921.22(G)(1) exempts from the 
disclosure requirement information “privileged by reason of the relationship between attorney 
and client,” 
 the failure to aid law enforcement authorities, ORC 2921.23, and 
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 obstruction of justice, ORC 2921.32. 
Even if these statutory provisions do apply, the attorney should proceed with caution. For example, in 
a 1991 opinion, the Toledo Bar Association addressed a situation in which a wife informed her 
attorney that her husband, also a client, and another individual were out of state to avoid being 
subpoenaed as witnesses to a third party’s admission of guilt to murder. The opinion advised that, 
given that the prosecutor already knew that the murder itself had been committed, “[f]ailure to 
disclose that alleged fact is not necessarily tantamount to failure to report that a felony has been 
committed.” Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 91-21, at 2 (n.d.). If the law does not require disclosure, then the 
lawyer may not disclose the information unless and until the state secures a court order compelling the 
attorney to do so. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 95-4, at 5 (Mar. 7, 1995) (voluntarily 
revealing to police or bonding company that client who had skipped out on bond would be in the 
lawyer’s office would violate duty of confidentiality and undercut the client’s “time-honored right to 
consult counsel”). If there is an order compelling disclosure, the lawyer is duty-bound to raise the 
attorney-client privilege if it arguably applies. 
A 2008 opinion by the Board of Commissioners opined that if a lawyer has unclaimed client funds in 
his IOLTA account and the client’s identity or whereabouts is unknown, the lawyer does not violate 
the Rule 1.6 duty of confidentiality in reporting the client’s name if known and the amount owing; 
such disclosure falls within the authorized-by-law exception of Rule 1.6(b)(6). Bd of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-3, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Aug. 15, 2008) (lawyer 
in such circumstances has statutory duty to report unclaimed funds). 
 
1.6:380  Physical Evidence of Client Crime [see also 3.4:210] 
In a case of first impression in Ohio, the Supreme Court determined that physical evidence (a letter) of 
a client’s threatened crime must be turned over to the authorities.  In re Original Grand Jury 
Investigation, 89 Ohio St.3d 544, 733 N.E.2d 1135 (2000). This duty arose under former DR 
4-101(C)(2), which provided for disclosure whenever law or court order (in this case a grand jury 
subpoena) so required. (The comparable OHRPC provision is Rule 1.6(b)(6).) Affirming the court of 
appeals, the Supreme Court held 
that where an attorney receives physical evidence from a third party 
relating to a possible crime committed by his or her client, the attorney 
is obligated to relinquish the evidence to law-enforcement authorities 
and must comply with a subpoena issued to that effect. 
89 Ohio St.3d at 549, 733 N.E.2d at 1140. (The Court likewise agreed with the appellate court that 
the finding of contempt imposed by the trial court on the lawyer for refusing to relinquish the letter 
should be vacated, on condition that the lawyer comply with the subpoena. Id.) 
In accord with commentary nationally, the Supreme Court read DR 4-101(C)(2), which was couched 
in permissive terms (“A lawyer may reveal” . . . [c]onfidences or secrets when . . . required by law or 
court order), as imposing a mandatory duty. See 89 Ohio St.3d at 547, 733 N.E.2d at 1138-39. In the 
absence of a law or court order mandating disclosure, it would appear that disclosure of criminal 
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intent on the part of the client was permissive, pursuant to OH DR 4-101(C)(3) (now Ohio Rule 
1.6(b)(1)). This is not entirely clear, however, because the Court’s holding, quoted above, stated that 
“the attorney is obligated to relinquish that evidence [of threatened client crime] to law-enforcement 
authorities and must comply with a subpoena issued to that effect [rather than “when a subpoena is 
issued to that effect.”].” This probably is reading too much into the use of “and,” but the Court’s 
formulation makes the broader reading possible. In dissent with respect to this issue, Justice Pfeifer 
(joined by two other justices) argued that even the narrower reading was improper and that the 
attorney’s prior voluntary revelation of the contents of the letter to the authorities pursuant to 
4-101(C)(3) should have ended the matter. 
The Court’s opinion in the Grand Jury case also indicated that it looked with favor on those cases 
from other jurisdictions that require disclosure of physical evidence, whether it is evidence of a 
client’s crime or a fruit or instrumentality thereof. Id. at 548, 733 N.E.2d at 1139 (“In essence, the 
confidentiality rules do not give an attorney the right to withhold evidence.”). And, in distinguishing a 
decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ( Purcell v. Dist. Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436 
(Mass. 1997)) ruling against mandatory disclosure, the Ohio Court noted that in Purcell the evidence 
had come to the attorney directly from the client and thus involved attorney-client privilege concerns. 
Thus, the possibility exists that the Grand Jury mandatory disclosure rule might not apply to 
confidential information coming directly from the client. 
See further discussion of this case at sections 1.6:210 and 1.6:370. 
 
1.6:390  Confidentiality and Conflict of Interest 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  4.23 (1996). 
As a general matter, the conflict-of-interest rules prohibit a lawyer from directly opposing a current 
client on behalf of another current client, even in wholly unrelated matters, where confidential client 
information typically would not be threatened. Ohio Rule 1.7(a)(1). See Charles W. Wolfram, 
Modern Legal Ethics §  7.3.2 (1986). (The exception to this general rule is found in Rule 1.7(b), 
setting forth the limited circumstances, including informed consent of both clients, in which such 
directly adverse representation may go forward.) Of course, if the direct adversity occurs in the same 
case, where confidentiality would inevitably be jeopardized, Ohio Rule 1.7(c)(2) imposes an 
absolute ban, irrespective of client consent. (As stated by Wolfram, id., this situation resembles “Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde played as a lawyering comedy, except for the serious consequences involved,” 
citing an Ohio case, Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Gargiulo, 62 Ohio St.2d 239, 404 N.E.2d 1343 
(1980), where the respondent became embroiled in a foreclosure action in which he sued his own 
clients and filed claims on behalf of each of them against the other.) See sections 1.7:200-:310. 
Confidentiality concerns more often arise in disputes involving the interests of former clients (see 
section 1.9:400), or current clients jointly represented by the attorney (see section 1.6:240). Under 
these circumstances, the lawyer faces both conflict-of-interest and client confidentiality problems. 
Former-client cases raising both problems include Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 81 
Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998) (side-switching attorney case in which confidentiality concerns 
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discussed; see section 1.9:400); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Dye, 82 Ohio St.3d 64, 694 N.E.2d 440 
(1998) (lawyer sanctioned for revealing information about former client’s mental condition in 
conflict-of-interest hearing in federal court to determine whether lawyer could continue to represent 
former client’s co-defendant; conduct violated both client-confidences and conflict-of-interest rules); 
Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Psenicka, 62 Ohio St.3d 35, 577 N.E.2d 1074 (1991) (lawyer who 
was discharged by wife in divorce action and became husband’s counsel was sanctioned for violating 
both client confidence and conflict-of-interest rules); Ussury v. St. Joseph Hosp., 43 Ohio App.3d 
48, 539 N.E.2d 700 (Cuyahoga 1988) (where attorney who reviewed materials and gave advice 
relating to plaintiff’s case at former firm moved to firm representing defendant, trial court, in 
response to both client confidence and conflict-of-interest concerns, could disqualify attorney’s new 
firm from representing defendants, even though attorney had no direct responsibility in 
representation); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 90-91-08 (n.d.) (citing both concerns in analyzing 
creditors’ attorney’s proposed change in practice to representing debtors against his former clients). 
Similarly, confidentiality and conflict issues are present when a lawyer uses protected client 
information for the lawyer’s own personal interests to the disadvantage of the client. Ohio Rule 1.8(b) 
& cmt. [5]. See sections 1.6:230 and 1.8:300. 
  
1.6:395  Relationship with Other Rules; Mandatory Disclosure 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  4.37 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.6(c) provides that a lawyer must reveal client information relating to the representation, 
including information protected by the attorney-client privilege, when the lawyer reasonably believes 
disclosure is necessary to comply with Rules 3.3 or 4.1. (There is no provision comparable to Ohio 
Rule 1.6(c) in MR 1.6.) Ohio Rule 3.3(b) and (c) require that in representing a client in an 
adjudicative proceeding, an attorney having knowledge of past, present, or future criminal or 
fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding must take reasonable steps to remedy the situation, 
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal, even where it would require the disclosure of client 
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. See section 3.3:610. Nor may the lawyer knowingly fail 
to disclose material facts necessary to avoid assisting a client’s illegal or fraudulent act, even if it 
would otherwise be protected from disclosure by Rule 1.6. Ohio Rule 4.1(b) & cmt. [3] thereto. See 
section 4.1:300. Disclosure should be made, however, in a manner that protects client information as 
much as possible. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 82-3 (Apr. 19, 1982) (client theft of employer’s documents 
during course of representation was fraud that had to be corrected, but return of documents without 
disclosing their origin or fact of theft should be attempted, to protect client confidences).  
It should be noted in this connection that Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [15] contains information that is suspect.  
As is pointed out in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2007-1, 2007 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 1, at *16 (Feb. 9, 2007), an opinion dealing with the scope of the Rule 8.3 reporting 
duty, Comment [15] has been adopted from the Model Rule template without taking into 
consideration the substantive differences between the Ohio and Model Rules.  As a result, Ohio Rule 
1.6 cmt. [15] states, in language substantively identical to MR 1.6 cmt. [15], that “[s]ome rules 
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require disclosure only if such disclosure would be permitted by division (b).  See Rule 4.1(b), 8.1 and 
8.3.  Rule 3.3, on the other hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether 
such disclosure is permitted by this rule.”  But the Ohio terrain is significantly different:  As noted 
above, Ohio Rule 4.1(b) (in addition to 3.3) requires disclosure of information otherwise protected 
by 1.6 (see Rule 1.6(c)), whereas MR 4.1(b) expressly excludes from the disclosure duty information 
protected by MR 1.6.  With respect to 8.3, as stated by the Board in Opinion 2007-1, 
[t]he inference from Comment [15] is that Rule 8.3 requires disclosure 
of information only if such disclosure is permitted by Rule 1.6(b).  The 
Board rejects this interpretation because it is inconsistent with Ohio’s 
Comment [2] to Rule 8.3 which departed from the ABA Comment [2] 
to Rule 8.3. As already stated, Ohio chose to shield only privileged 
information from the Rule 8.3 reporting duty.  Ohio did not choose to 
shield from the reporting duty all of the information protected by Rule 
1.6. 
Id. at *16 (emphasis by the Board). See further discussion of Opinion 2007-1 and disclosure 
limitations under Rule 8.3 in section 8.3:400. 
 
1.6:400  Attorney-Client Privilege 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.6 
ORC 2317.02(A), 2317.021 
OH R Evid 501 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.6 
Ohio Commentary 
Giannelli & Snyder, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice, Evidence §§  501.8, 501.10 
Becker, Guttenberg & Snyder, The Law of Professional Conduct in Ohio §§ 7.01-7.11 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  55:301 
ALI-LGL §§  68-85 
Wolfram §§  6.3-6.5 
Introduction - Relationship between ethics obligation of confidentiality and attorney-client privilege: 
As is stated in Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [3]:  
 The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by 
related bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work-product 
doctrine and the rule of confidentiality established in professional 
ethics.  The attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply 
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in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a 
witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client.  
The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than 
those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of 
law. 
While there can be considerable overlap between the concepts of confidentiality under Rule 1.6(a) 
and the testimonial attorney-client privilege (in Ohio, both statutorily and common-law based, see 
discussion below), there are important differences. See, e.g., ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 96 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary): 
[T]he two are entirely separate concepts, applicable under different sets 
of circumstances and using different standards.  The ethical duty is 
extremely broad:  it protects from disclosure all “information relating 
to the representation,” and applies at all times.  The attorney-client 
privilege, however, is more limited:  it protects from compelled 
disclosure the substance of a lawyer-client communication made for 
the purpose of obtaining or imparting legal advice or assistance, and 
applies only in the context of a legal proceeding governed by the rules 
of evidence. 
Moreover, 
despite its narrow scope, the attorney-client privilege is nearly absolute 
in its application when it is properly invoked. 
*    *    *    *  
The attorney-client privilege is applicable only in formal legal 
proceedings, only in response to an attempt to compel testimony, and 
only where what is being compelled is testimony about 
communications passing between lawyer and client. By contrast, the 
professional rule of client confidentiality directs lawyers not to disclose 
– voluntarily or otherwise, unless an exception applies – information 
that the lawyer has learned about a client, no matter where or how the 
information was learned. 
1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering §  9.5, 
at 9-19, -20 (3d ed. Supp. 2012) (emphasis in original). Accord 24 Charles Alan Wright & 
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence §  5472 
(1986): 
The privilege is concerned with the question of when courts can 
compel the disclosure of confidential communications between an 
attorney and client; the duty of confidentiality imposes an obligation on 
the attorney to keep his client’s confidences, whether in or out of court. 
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Id. at 89-90 (emphasis added) and Supp. 2011, at 41-42. Wright and Graham make the further point 
that it is the communication between lawyer and client that is protected by the privilege, not the 
information or facts contained therein. Id. §  5484, at 320. Those facts, however, may be protected 
against disclosure under ethics confidentiality principles, if they constitute “information relating to 
the representation.” See Rule 1.6(a). 
Other statements of the privilege restrict its application to compelled testimony by the attorney. At a 
different point in their treatise, Hazard and Hodes, after noting the comprehensiveness of the 
professional duty of confidentiality, contrast the evidentiary attorney-client privilege, which 
is limited to attorney-client communications and protects only against 
compelled disclosure by either the lawyer or the client. 
1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering §  9.5, 
at 9-18 (3d ed. Supp. 2012) (emphasis in original).  
This view is consistent with the Ohio statutory attorney-client privilege against compelled lawyer 
testimony, as set forth in ORC 2317.02(A) (as to which see below), and the Ohio common-law 
privilege (also see below) protecting against compelled testimony of attorney-client confidential 
communications by others, such as the client.  In re Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N.E.2d 388 (1943) 
(syllabus six). 
In sum, confidential communications between attorney and client are protected by ethics 
confidentiality principles (Rule 1.6(a)), subject to any applicable exceptions in 1.6(b) or (c); such 
communications are also protected by the attorney-client privilege when the issue of their disclosure 
comes up in the context of compelled testimony. If the issue involves compelled testimony by a 
lawyer about privileged communications with his client or waiver of the statutory privilege, Ohio law 
holds that the provisions of ORC 2317.02(A) are controlling.  See Smith v. Smith, 2006 Ohio 6975, 
2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6935 (Hamilton) (reversing denial of plaintiff-executrix’s motion in limine 
to exclude, on grounds of statutory privilege, testimony of attorney who drafted trust for her deceased 
husband, where executrix refused to waive privilege). 
These generally accepted norms would appear to have been skewed to some extent in Ohio, at least on 
implied waiver issues, by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jackson v. Greger, 110 Ohio St.3d 488, 
2006 Ohio 4968, 854 N.E.2d 847. See discussion in section 1.6:530 at “Implied waiver of privilege 
by client.” Likewise, the court of appeals’ opinion in Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. 
Givaudan Flavors Corp., 2009 Ohio 2490 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 2102 (Cuyahoga), did not fit 
the mold set forth here, but on appeal the Supreme Court reversed, 127 Ohio St.3d 161, 2010 Ohio 
4469, 937 N.E.2d 533. See discussion of the Givaudan decisions infra, also at section 1.6:530.  
In general: A fundamental principle underlying the attorney-client relationship is that the attorney 
“shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client, including information protected 
by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law.” Ohio Rule 1.6(a). The purpose of any 
privileged communication, whether between doctor and patient or attorney and client, is to ensure that 
patient or client may reveal necessary information relating to the professional service being sought 
without fear that such information will reach the wrong people.  Hobbs v. Lopez, 96 Ohio App.3d 
670, 645 N.E.2d 1261 (Scioto 1994). 
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The first step in considering the attorney-client privilege in Ohio is to determine the nature of the 
privilege being asserted. If the privilege is asserted to preclude an attorney’s testimony regarding a 
confidential communication between attorney and client, the privilege is governed by the statutory 
testimonial privilege and the express waiver provisions set forth in ORC 2317.02(A). State ex rel. 
Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005 Ohio 1508, 824 N.E.2d 990, at para. 
18 (the statute, “by its very terms, is a mere testimonial privilege precluding an attorney from 
testifying about confidential communications.”); State v. McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 651 
N.E.2d 985 (1995) (syllabus) (“R.C. 2317.02(A) provides the exclusive means by which privileged 
communications directly between an attorney and a client can be waived.”). In all other matters, 
including testimony by the client or by the agent of an attorney, the common-law rules concerning 
attorney-client privilege will control. See  In re Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N.E.2d 388 (1943) 
(syllabus six) (client testimony). As the Supreme Court stated in State ex rel. Leslie, supra, at para. 
18: 
In Ohio, the attorney client privilege is governed by statute, R.C. 
2317.02(A), and in cases that are not addressed in R.C. 2317.02(A), by 
common law. 
(Once again, Jackson v. Greger, discussed infra at section 1.6:530, should be consulted concerning 
the applicability of the statutory privilege when waiver of the privilege is at issue.) 
As relevant here, the testimonial privilege set forth in ORC 2317.02(A)(1) states that an attorney 
“shall not testify” 
concerning a communication made to the attorney by a client in that 
relation or concerning the attorney’s advice to a client, except that the 
attorney may testify by express consent of the client or, if the client is 
deceased, by the express consent of the surviving spouse or the 
executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased client. However, 
if the client voluntarily reveals the substance of attorney-client 
communications in a nonprivileged context or is deemed by R.C. 
2151.421(A)(2) [pertaining to certain communications resulting in 
knowledge or suspicion of child abuse or neglect] to have waived any 
testimonial privilege under this division, the attorney may be 
compelled to testify on the same subject. 
The term “client,” as used in ORC 2317.02(A), is defined in ORC 2317.021: 
 “Client” means a person, firm, partnership, corporation, or 
other association that, directly or through any representative, consults 
an attorney for the purpose of retaining the attorney or securing legal 
service or advice from him in his professional capacity, or consults an 
attorney employee for legal services or advice, and who communicates, 
either directly or through an agent, employee, or other representative, 
with such attorney; and includes an incompetent whose guardian so 
consults the attorney in behalf of the incompetent. 
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In State v. McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 651 N.E.2d 985 (1995), the Supreme Court pointed out 
that the legislature has not similarly defined the term “attorney” as used in ORC 2317.02(A) to 
include communications with the attorney’s agent; as a result, the statutory bar against attorney 
testimony regarding privileged communications between attorney and client (ORC 2317.02(A)) does 
not extend to communications between a client and the attorney’s agent. Nonetheless, the Court 
confirmed the existence of a common-law privilege for such communications. McDermott also 
makes clear that the only exceptions to the statutory privilege are those expressly set forth in ORC 
2317.02(A): “The General Assembly has plainly and distinctly stated that the privileges of R.C. 
2317.02 are to be given effect absent specific statutory exceptions.”  Id. at 573, 651 N.E.2d at 987. 
See sections 1.6:420 and 1.6:520. 
The reference in ORC 2317.021 to consultation with “an attorney employee” presumably is intended 
to make clear that the statutory privilege applies to intra-organizational communications with a 
lawyer-employee of the organization, e.g., in-house corporate counsel. See 1 Paul C. Giannelli & 
Barbara Rook Snyder, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice, Evidence §  501.10, at 332 & n.103 (2d ed. 
2001). 
The common-law privilege remains applicable to prohibit the disclosure of attorney-client 
communications other than testimony by the attorney precluded by ORC 2317.02(A) (e.g., client 
testimony), and to certain attorney testimony that is not prohibited by the statutory privilege, such as 
communications between the client and the attorney’s agent.  State v. McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 
570, 651 N.E.2d 985 (1995). See Am. Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 348, 575 
N.E.2d 116, 120-21 (1991) (“The attorney-client privilege reaches far beyond a proscription against 
testimonial speech. The privilege protects against any dissemination of information obtained in the 
confidential relationship. Thus, allowing consultation and discussion (even without testifying) of 
privileged information would effectively emasculate the privilege.”). Accord State ex rel. Leslie v. 
Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005 Ohio 1508, 824 N.E.2d 990, at para. 26 
(introducing the Huffstutler reaches-far-beyond quote with the words “[t]he common-law 
attorney-client privilege, however,”); In re Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 101, 47 N.E.2d 388, 395 (1943) 
(client cannot be compelled to testify); Mid-American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. 
Co., 74 Ohio App.3d 481, 599 N.E.2d 699 (Wood 1991) (per curiam) (trial court correct when it 
stated, with respect to discovery request directed to client for counsel’s opinion letter, that ORC 
2317.02(A) “governs testimony by an attorney. It does not govern testimony by the client.” The latter 
is governed by the common-law privilege.  Id. at 486, 599 N.E.2d at 702 (emphasis by the court)). It 
is implicit in the Mid-American court’s analysis that: (1) responses to discovery requests are 
tantamount to “[testify[ing],” as that term is used in the statute, and (2) requests made of the client 
seek “client testimony,” even where the information sought constitutes advice by the client’s attorney. 
Both the common-law and statutory privileges, of course, are relevant to the ethical obligation of 
attorneys to protect information relating to the representation, “including information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege,” under Ohio Rule 1.6. See Rule 1.6 cmt. [3] and discussion at section 
1.6:210. 
 
1.6:410  Privileged Communications 
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Privileged communications generally: As noted in section 1.6:400, the language of ORC 2317.02(A) 
limits the statutory testimonial privilege, precluding testimony by the attorney, to communications 
made to the attorney by the client in that relation or the attorney’s advice to the client, and ORC 
2317.021 defines a “client” as including one who “consults an attorney for the purpose of retaining 
the attorney . . . .” 
According to one oft-quoted formulation, the privilege accorded communications between an 
attorney and her client at common law applies only if: (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or 
sought to be a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar 
of a court, or her subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication she is acting as a lawyer; 
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by her client (b) 
without the presence of strangers (c) for the purposes of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on 
law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of 
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.  
In re Original Grand Jury Investigation, No. L-98-1146, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3368 (Lucas 
July 23, 1999) (citing United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950) 
(Wyzanski, J.)), aff’d, 89 Ohio St.3d 544, 733 N.E.2d 1135 (2000)). Thus, in Kracht v. Kracht, 
Nos. 70005, 70009, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2412 (Cuyahoga June 5, 1997), a lawyer’s attempt, on 
privilege grounds, to keep out affidavits of former legal secretaries, documenting his knowing 
violation of proper service procedures, was rejected because, inter alia, “the affidavits contain no 
communication with the client, rather they contain statements about how [the lawyer] wanted service 
to be performed.” Id. at *25. 
(While there are cases stating that there is no material difference between the Ohio and the federal 
attorney-client privilege (e.g., MA Equip. Leasing I, LLC v. Tilton, 2012 Ohio 4668, 980 N.E.2d 
1072 (Franklin), at para. 20), and the classic formulation set forth above from the federal United 
Shoe case by Judge Wyzanski, repeated in In re Original Grand Jury, confirms that this is so in a 
general substantive sense, one must also be aware of the analytical distinctiveness of Ohio’s 
separation of the privilege into its statutory and common-law aspects, as discussed in section 1.6:400 
above.) 
The communication-to/from-client requirement was used by the court in Rock v. Sanislo, 2009 Ohio 
6913, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 5799 (Medina), to reject an argument seeking to reverse a Rule 3.7 
lawyer-witness disqualification.  Thus, “the testimony regarding Grubb’s [the lawyer’s] 
understanding of her representation of Rock [the client] or her testimony regarding her actions 
between June 2, 2005 and the March 7, 2006 refiling deadline would not be covered by the 
attorney-client privilege as it does not relate to any communications from Rock to Grubb or to any 
advice from Grubb to Rock” Id. at para. 16. This same requisite was lacking in MA Equip. Leasing 
I, LLC v. Tilton, 2012 Ohio 4668, 980 N.E.2d 1072 (Franklin), discussed in section 1.6:480 infra. 
And when a law firm becomes a defendant, its communications with its lawyers defending it are 
privileged. Sutton v. Stevens Painton Corp., 193 Ohio App.3d 68, 2011 Ohio 841, 951 N.E.2d 91 
(Cuyahoga). (“Some of the documents ordered disclosed in this matter are communications between 
Thompson Hine and its client Terex. Others are between Thompson Hine, as a defendant, and its 
internal counsel. These are attorney-client communications that are subject to the attorney-client 
privilege.” Id. at para. 18) 
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Attorney’s general impressions of client: In the absence of waiver, an attorney cannot testify as to a 
decedent’s competency, where the attorney’s opinion is based upon knowledge gained during the 
attorney-client relationship with the decedent and is related to the services he was retained to perform 
for the decedent.  Taylor v. Sheldon, 172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961) (syllabus five) 
(attorney cannot testify as to his deceased client’s mental condition based on observations made by 
attorney during attorney-client relationship, even if knowledge so gained was such as might have 
been available to any layman who had observed client). In Taylor, the Supreme Court also 
concluded: 
 Knowledge communicated to an attorney by his client during 
the attorney-client relationship, which knowledge relates to the 
services for which he was employed, whether it is gained from words 
or merely by observations made by the attorney, falls within the rule 
relating to privileged communications. 
Id. at 118, 173 N.E.2d at 893 (syllabus four). But see Heiselman v. Franks, 48 Ohio App. 536, 
194 N.E. 604 (Hamilton 1934), which held that at a trial contesting a will, the decedent’s attorney 
could opine regarding the sanity of the deceased client, based on his contact, communication, relation, 
and general business dealings with the client. Such general observations are of a non-confidential 
character; the privilege does not apply. [It is difficult to see how the Heiselman decision survives the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Taylor, even though it has been cited with approval as recently as 1994. 
See Weierman v. Mardis, 101 Ohio App.3d 774, 656 N.E.2d 734 (Hamilton 1994).] 
Communications with licensed attorney: It is the generally accepted view that the attorney-client 
privilege is confined to communications made to an attorney who has the authority to practice his 
profession in courts of record.  State v. Spirko, 59 Ohio St.3d 1, 570 N.E.2d 229 (1991) (finding no 
attorney-client relationship, and thus no attorney-client privilege, shielding communications between 
defendant and a former cell-mate who served as the defendant’s “jailhouse lawyer,” since the 
cell-mate was not a licensed attorney). But see Benedict v. State, 44 Ohio St. 679, 11 N.E. 125 
(1887) (exception to general rule on facts of case, where prisoner confided in one who practiced law 
before justices of peace but had not been admitted to the bar). 
Communications seeking representation: The statutory attorney-client privilege applies to 
communications with an attorney by a prospective client seeking representation.  Taylor v. Sheldon, 
172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961) (syllabus one). The rule is the same at common law.  King 
v. Barrett, 11 Ohio St. 261 (1860) (under Ohio common law, communications with an attorney for 
the purpose of receiving the attorney’s professional advice or assistance are generally privileged, 
even if the lawyer is not retained). 
In 1998 the Ohio Supreme Court reiterated the applicable rule: 
“Where a person approaches an attorney with the view of retaining his 
services to act on the former’s behalf, an attorney-client relationship is 
created, and communications made to such attorney during the 
preliminary conferences prior to the actual acceptance or rejection by 
the attorney of the employment are privileged communications.” 
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State ex rel. Nix v. City of Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 383, 700 N.E.2d 12, 16 (1998) (per 
curiam) (quoting Taylor v. Sheldon (syllabus one)). 
This view is now incorporated into the ethics rules at Ohio Rule 1.18(b). See section 1.18:200. 
Hospital incident reports: A hospital incident report, prepared for the hospital’s attorney, is subject to 
protection as an attorney-client communication privileged under ORC 2317.02(A) and therefore not 
discoverable from the hospital. Flynn v. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 172 Ohio App.3d 775, 2007 Ohio 4468, 
876 N.E.2d 1300. In Ware v. Miami Valley Hosp., 78 Ohio App.3d 314, 604 N.E.2d 791 
(Montgomery 1992), the trial court erred in treating the issue as one of “work-product,” and the fact 
that the incident report may have related to the care of a patient did not alter its status as a privileged 
communication. The Ware court relied on  In re Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E.2d 492 (1936), 
in support of view that the statutory privilege extends to the communication itself, even though 
plaintiffs were not seeking testimony of the attorney. [Query] An employee may, however, be 
required to disclose the existence of such reports.  Tyes v. St. Luke’s Hosp., No. 65394, 1993 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 5735, at *5 (Cuyahoga Dec. 2, 1993) (“Merely affirming or denying the existence of 
incident reports does not result in the disclosure of attorney-client communications or the content of 
such reports.”). [It would appear that such reports are more appropriately protected from discovery 
under the common-law privilege (or ethics confidentiality precepts), rather than the statutory 
testimonial privilege. See State v. McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 651 N.E.2d 985 (1995), 
discussed at section 1.6:520, and Grace v. Mastruserio, 2007 Ohio 3942, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 
3580 (Hamilton), discussed at section 1.6:530 infra.] 
Insurance reports: Statements concerning an accident, made by the insured to an agent of his insurer 
and provided by the insurer to insurer’s counsel, constitute communications from client to attorney 
and are privileged against production and discovery sought by the plaintiff in a suit against the insured. 
The seminal case espousing this view is  In re Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E.2d 492 (1936), 
where the casualty report by an employee of the insured was forwarded by the employer/insured to its 
insurance company and by the company to its counsel. In holding this report protected by the 
attorney-client privilege, the Supreme Court reasoned as follows: 
 Where an insurer receives a report from its insured concerning 
a casualty covered by its policy of insurance, such report becomes the 
property of the insurer and subject to its complete control; and, when 
the insurer transmits it to its counsel for the purpose of preparing a 
defense against a possible lawsuit growing out of such casualty, such 
report constitutes a communication from client to attorney and is 
privileged against production and disclosure under section 11494, 
General Code 
[now ORC 2317.02(A)]. 
Id. at 187, 5 N.E.2d at 492 (syllabus one) (bracketed material added). A critical distinction drawn by 
the Klemann Court was whether the document in question was a “‘document of the client existing 
before it was communicated to the attorney’“ or a “‘document which has come into existence as a 
communication to the attorney. . . .’“  Id. at 192, 5 N.E.2d at 494 (quoting Wigmore; emphasis by the 
Court). The former is not privileged; the latter is. Klemann can best be read as standing for the 
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proposition that the test is whether the document in question came into being in the ordinary course of 
business (not privileged) or as a document prepared for the attorney (privileged). Id. Underscoring 
this reading, the Court stated flatly that: 
 In order for a document to constitute a privileged 
communication, it is essential that it be brought into being primarily as 
a communication to the attorney. 
Id. 
Although dated, Klemann continues to be followed in Ohio.  A 2011 Supreme Court case citing 
Klemann and skating rather close to the privileged/nonprivileged line is State ex rel. Dawson v. 
Bloom-Carroll Local School Dist., 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011 Ohio 6009, 959 N.E.2d 524. In 
Dawson, the Court ruled that a letter written to the district by its insurance company, identifying the 
attorney who would represent the district in the Dawson lawsuit and copied to that attorney, was 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. The letter, according to the Court, 
evaluates Dawson’s claim and the extent to which the claim might be 
covered by the district’s insurance policy and instructs the district to 
cooperate with the insurance company and the attorney selected by the 
company to represent the school district to preserve its insurance 
coverage. 
Id. at para. 30. The Court seems to treat this as a client-to-counsel communication: “In effect, the 
insurance company stands in the shoes of the district,” id., and invokes the rule that communications 
made by the client during a preliminary conference with an attorney are protected, citing Taylor v. 
Sheldon, 172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961), as well as Klemann as a see also.  
Klemann progeny in the intermediate appellate courts include McGuire v. Draper, Hollenbaugh & 
Briscoe Co., L.P.A., 2002 Ohio 6170, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6003 (Highland) (report, regarding 
legal malpractice claim against law firm sent by firm to its insurer and forwarded to counsel retained 
by insurer to defend law firm, protected from disclosure; Klemann syllabus one followed); Breech v. 
Turner, 127 Ohio App.3d 243, 712 N.E.2d 776 (Scioto 1998). Accord Kraus v. Maurer, 138 Ohio 
App.3d 163, 740 N.E.2d 722 (Cuyahoga 2000) (reversing trial court order that nonparty insurer turn 
over its insured’s claims file to plaintiff in action against insured; claims file protected by both 
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine). The Kraus court noted that Ohio courts have 
traditionally permitted discovery of claims files only in instances where prevailing party seeks 
prejudgment interest or where bad faith is alleged [as to which see the Moskovitz (prejudgment 
interest) and Boone (allegation of bad faith) cases, discussed below]. With Breech, compare Dennis 
v. State Farm Ins. Co., 143 Ohio App.3d 196, 757 N.E.2d 849 (Mahoning 2001) (in insurance 
coverage litigation, order protecting insurer’s claims adjuster from deposition by insured not justified 
on work-product grounds), where the court distinguished the approach taken in cases such as that 
before it -- first-party contract dispute cases between the insured and insurer -- from that employed in 
cases such as Breech, where the discovery is sought by a third party in litigation with the insured. 
In another court of appeals case, Perfection Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., 153 Ohio App.3d 28, 
2003 Ohio 2750, 790 N.E.2d 817 (Cuyahoga), the court (in the course of ruling that the contested 
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documents were not protected by the attorney-client privilege and must be produced) distinguished 
Klemann in the following terms: 
 While we concede that, in accordance with Klemann, a 
communication prepared by an insurance carrier [the document in 
question in Klemann was prepared, not by, but for, the carrier] and 
transmitted to its attorney would arguably fall under the protections of 
the attorney-client privilege, we fail to perceive any similarities 
between the facts of Klemann and the instant matter. Here, 
Acordia[‘s]...privilege log...fails to provide any evidence that any of 
the contested documents were either prepared by an attorney, at the 
direction of an attorney or transmitted to an attorney. Accordingly, we 
find no application of the attorney-client privilege under the instant 
scenario or under the expanded coverage unique to Klemann. 
 Simply . . . Acordia provided no evidence that would indicate 
that the contested documents were prepared for Acordia’s insurer and 
subsequently transmitted to its attorneys to fall within the protections 
of the attorney-client privilege. Further, the evidence indicates that the 
contested documents were prepared before Acordia notified its insurer 
of any pending fear of litigation. Therefore, per Klemann “[a] 
document by the client existing before it was communicated to the 
attorney is not within the present privilege so as to exempt it from 
production.” Id. at 192, 7 O.O. 273, 5 N.E.2d 492. 
153 Ohio App.3d 28, 790 N.E.2d 817, at paras. 17-18. (bracketed material and ellipses added). The 
Perfection court went on to note that 
if this court were to follow Acordia’s contention, we would be 
endorsing the premise that any internal document generated by a 
company would in effect become privileged if later transmitted to an 
insurer. This misconstrued reading of Klemann is without merit 
because Klemann clearly stands for the proposition that the document 
does not become privileged until it is transmitted to an attorney. 
Id. at para. 18. This analysis, of course, begs the question --privilege does not attach merely because 
a document is “transmitted to an attorney”--it is entitled to protection only if it is prepared, not in the 
ordinary course of business, but for the attorney. (Although such a document, by the very nature of 
things, has to “exist[] before it was communicated to the attorney,” we believe the proper reading of 
this language is that it was in existence other than as a communication to the attorney.) That seems to 
be the case with respect to the documents at issue in Perfection -- they were prepared internally two 
years before any threat of litigation and, while later forwarded to Acordia’s insurer, there was no 
evidence that they were transmitted to an attorney in any event. 
On the insurance-report issue, language in ORC 2317.021 can be invoked in support of the Klemann 
result: it accords the privilege to communications by a client to the attorney “through an agent, 
employee, or other representative.” Accord 1 Paul C. Gianelli & Barbara Rook Snyder, Baldwin’s 
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Ohio Practice, Evidence §  501.8, at 326-27 (2d ed. 2001) (“The statute also provides that . . . 
communications by a client ‘through an agent, employee, or other representative’ are privileged,” 
citing, in addition to Klemann, other Supreme Court cases finding indirect communications 
privileged). 
McCormick supports the view that the privilege should be accorded from a policy standpoint, while 
admitting that the law is not yet entirely settled: 
And the law is in the making on the question whether a report of 
accident or other casualty, by a policy-holder or his agents to a 
company insuring the policy-holder against liability, is to be treated as 
privileged when the insurance company passes it on to the attorney 
who will represent both the company and the insured [citing in footnote, 
inter alia, Klemann as a case in which the privilege was accorded]. 
Reasonably the insurance company may be treated as an intermediary 
to secure legal representation for the insured, by whom the confidential 
communication can be transmitted as through a trusted agent. A report 
to a liability insurer can have no purpose other than use in potential 
litigation. 
1 Kenneth S. Brown, McCormick on Evidence § 96, at 436 (6th ed. 2006). 
Finally, whatever the merits of the Klemann analysis regarding privilege in the abstract, it seems 
reasonably clear that it should come under the common-law protection, not that of the statute, which 
by its express terms is limited to protecting privileged communications from disclosure by the 
attorney.  
Prejudgment-interest proceeding raising issue of lack of good faith effort to settle; insurer’s claim file: 
Pursuant to Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center, 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 639, 635 N.E.2d 331, 
334-35 (1994) (syllabus three), in a post-trial proceeding for prejudgment interest under ORC 
1343.03(C), “[t]he only privileged matters contained in the [insurer’s claims] file are those that go 
directly to the theory of defense of the underlying case in which the decision or verdict has been 
rendered.” The Court further stated that 
statements, memoranda, documents, etc. generated in an attorney- 
client relationship tending to establish the failure of a party or an 
insurer to make a good faith effort to settle a case contrary to the 
purposes of R.C. 1343.03(C) are not protected from discovery in an 
R.C. 1343.03(C) proceeding for prejudgment interest. Stated otherwise, 
if, through the lack of a good faith effort to settle, the purposes of R.C. 
1343.03(C) have been thwarted by a party and/or the attorneys 
involved in the case, a search for the truth of that fact cannot be 
hindered by claims of attorney-client privilege. Documents and other 
things showing the lack of a good faith effort to settle by a party or the 
attorneys acting on his or her behalf are wholly unworthy of the 
protections afforded by any claimed privilege. 
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Id. at 661, 635 N.E.2d at 349 (see also discussion of Moskovitz at sections 1.6:620, 1.6:710, and 
1.6:740). In Radovanic v. Cossler, 140 Ohio App.3d 208, 746 N.E.2d 1184 (Cuyahoga 2000), the 
court quoted extensively from and followed Moskovitz; it concluded that in Moskovitz “the 
Supreme Court has essentially found that otherwise privileged documents may lose their privilege for 
purposes of prejudgment interest discovery.”  Id. at 216, 746 N.E.2d at 1190. The Radovanic court 
also ruled that documents found in the file, such as physicians’ evaluations, witness credibility 
analysis, and comments regarding likelihood of success on the merits, are not documents that “go 
directly to the defense of the case; rather, the documents are the type of documents needed to indicate 
whether or not prejudgment interest is warranted.”  Id. at 217, 746 N.E.2d 1191. 
In addition to the material held not protected by the privilege in Moskovitz, the following have been 
held not to be privileged communications: 
Bad-faith insurance litigation; insurer’s claim file: In a case in which plaintiff alleged a bad-faith 
denial of coverage by the defendant insurance company, Boone v. Vanliner Ins. Co., 91 Ohio St.3d 
209, 744 N.E.2d 154 (2001), the injured plaintiff sought access to defendant’s claims file. Defendant 
Vanliner argued that certain of the claims-file documents were protected by the attorney-client 
privilege and/or the work-product doctrine. After an in-camera inspection, the trial court, applying 
Moskovitz, found that of the over one thousand documents in the file, 175 were protected from 
discovery. On appeal, Vanliner argued that the lower court had incorrectly ordered it to disclose 30 
protected documents. The court of appeals found Moskovitz inapplicable and held that Vanliner need 
produce only one document in its entirety, and that the other 29 were privileged in whole or in part. 
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Finding the Moskovitz rationale applicable, 
the Court ruled that “claims file materials that show an insurer’s bad faith in denying coverage are 
unworthy of protection.”  Id. at 213, 744 N.E.2d at 158. The Court distinguished documents created 
after the denial of coverage (protected by the privilege and/or work product) from those created 
before, since the conduct in question in a bad-faith denial claim necessarily occurred prior to the 
denial of coverage: 
Therefore, the only attorney-client and work-product documents that 
would contain information relating to the bad faith claim, and, thus, be 
unworthy of protection, would have been created prior to the denial of 
coverage. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that in an action alleging 
bad faith denial of insurance coverage, the insured is entitled to 
discover claims file materials containing attorney-client 
communications related to the issue of coverage that were created prior 
to the denial of coverage. At that stage of the claims handling, the 
claims file materials will not contain work product, i.e., things prepared 
in anticipation of litigation, because at that point it has not yet been 
determined whether coverage exists. 
Id. at 213-14, 744 N.E.2d at 158. (The syllabus tracks verbatim the language of the first sentence 
beginning “in an action” of the paragraph quoted immediately above.  Id. at 209, 744 N.E.2d at 154). 
The Court rejected Vanliner’s argument that Moskovitz was modified by the subsequent holding in 
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McDermott: “The flaw in Vanliner’s argument is that McDermott addresses client waiver of the 
privilege, whereas Moskovitz sets forth an exception to the privilege and is therefore unaffected by our 
holding in McDermott.”  Id. at 213, 744 N.E.2d at 157 (emphasis by the Court). See section 
1.6:520. Justice Douglas wrote for the majority in both Moskovitz and Boone.) 
In dissent, three justices criticized the “unworthy of protection” rationale applied in Moskowitz and 
Boone as unsupported by law, and noted that this rationale improperly equates the Moskowitz 
“exception” with the crime/fraud exception, but without the prima-facie showing required to invoke 
the latter, whereas a mere allegation of bad faith would be sufficient to invoke the exception 
recognized here.  Id. at 215, 744 N.E.2d at 159. 
The Second District Court of Appeals followed Boone in holding claims-file materials created prior 
to the denial of a claim not protected by the privilege in a bad-faith denial-of-claim case.  Garg v. 
State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 155 Ohio App.3d 258, 2003 Ohio 5960, 800 N.E.2d 757 (Miami). The 
court rejected the argument that the Boone holding of no privilege was limited to documents relating 
to coverage, as opposed to documents relevant to the bad-faith denial issue: 
Under Boone, neither attorney-client privilege nor the work-product 
doctrine protects materials in a claims file, created prior to the denial of 
the claim, that may cast light on whether the insurer acted in bad faith 
in handling an insured’s claim. 
Id. at para. 24.  The Boone decision and its progeny are discussed in Michael Brittain & Shelly K. 
Hillyer, Insurance Bad-Faith Litigation in the Post-Boone v. Vanliner Era, Ohio Law., 
Jan./Feb. 2006, at 16. 
In 2007, the General Assembly added ORC 2317.02(A)(2), which modified the Boone-Moscovitz 
rule by requiring the party seeking a ruling that the privilege has been waived to make a prima facie 
showing thereof and by directing the court to conduct an in camera inspection of the disputed 
communications.  
The Court’s language in Boone, quoted above, explicitly differentiates between exceptions and 
waivers of the privilege. This difference was again relied on in Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.C. 
v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio St.3d 161, 2010 Ohio 4469, 937 N.E.2d 533, at para. 27, to 
distinguish the waiver case of Jackson v. Greger, 110 Ohio St.3d 488, 2006 Ohio 4968, 854 N.E.2d 
487, from the exception issue before it in Givaudan. We therefore respectfully disagree with the 
analysis presented in Brian E. Roof & Lindsey Carr Siegler, Full Coverage? Insurer’s claims 
files and the attorney-client privilege, Ohio Law, July/Aug. 2012, at 11. Both Jackson and 
Givaudan are discussed in detail in section 1.6:530 below. 
Communication by attorney to agent regarding service: Where the evidence sought to be protected 
under the attorney-client privilege related solely to how an attorney wanted his agent to handle 
service of process, the court determined that such communications were not protected by the privilege 
because they were neither communications between attorney and client nor did they reveal privileged 
client communications.  Kracht v. Kracht, Nos. 70005, 70009, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2412 
(Cuyahoga June 5, 1997). 
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Communication by attorney to client regarding court settings: State v. Kemper, 158 Ohio App. 3d 
185, 2004 Ohio 4050, 814 N.E.2d 540 (Clark), held that communications by the lawyer to the client 
concerning such matters as providing the client with notice of a hearing date are not privileged 
communications because they are not “advice” as required by ORC 2317.02. Accord Antoine v. 
Atlas, 66 F.3d 105, 110 (6th Cir. 1995) (“an attorney’s message to his client concerning the date and 
time of court proceedings is not a privileged communication”). Hazard and Hodes describe such 
communications as ones involving the lawyer’s acting as a “conduit,” rather than a confidant. See 1 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering §  9.6.6, 
at 9-34 (3d ed. Supp. 2012). 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  69 cmt. i 
(2000) is to the same effect. 
Existence of attorney-client relationship: The creation or existence of the attorney-client relationship 
is not a privileged communication, as it is not a communication connected with the business for which 
the attorney has been retained. In re Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 103-04, 47 N.E.2d 388, 395-96 (1943). 
Furthermore, failure to reveal the relationship may undermine the assertion of attorney-client 
privilege with respect to other questions regarding the relationship and communications between the 
client and the attorney.  Id. at 105, 47 N.E.2d at 396. (For the view that the fact of representation is, 
however, information relating to representation protected by Rule 1.6, see Deborah A. Coleman, 
New Ohio Ethics Rules, Cleve B.J., Oct. 2006 at 8, 9.) 
“Loss prevention” communications: In a case of first impression, Magistrate Judge Kemp held that 
such communications by a lawyer seeking legal advice both with outside counsel and from other 
lawyers in her firm about a potential malpractice claim, including advice sought during the period of 
time when the underlying attorney-client relationship was still in existence, (1) are privileged and (2) 
Ohio, unlike the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue, would not recognize an 
exception to the privilege in such circumstances. Tattletale Alarm Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & 
Griswold, LLP, 2011 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 10412 (S.D. Ohio). 
Facts are not within the privilege: The attorney-client privilege applies only to communications and 
not to facts. E.g., 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of 
Lawyering § 9.6.5, at 9-31 (3d ed. Supp. 2012); 24 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, 
Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence § 5484, at 320 (1986) and Supp. 
2011, at 168. (Compare the broader protection provided by Ohio Rule 1.6(a) to “information relating 
to the representation.”) Thus, while inquiry into the communications between the attorney and the 
client is barred, it has been held that the facts themselves are not protected by the privilege and must 
be revealed by the attorney in response to an appropriate discovery request or question at trial.  
Hawgood v. Hawgood, 33 Ohio Misc. 227, 294 N.E.2d 681 (C.P. Cuyahoga 1973) (addressing 
only privilege issue). See State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ’g Co., 134 Ohio App.3d 415, 424, 731 
N.E.2d 245, 252-53 (Franklin 1999) (addressing both privilege and DR 4-101 in context of Ohio 
Public Records Act request). See further discussion of this issue and the Hawgood case in section 
1.6:430 below. 
Knowledge of negative information about the client gained from other than confidential 
communications is not within the privilege: An attorney’s knowledge of his client’s prior criminal 
record, which knowledge is not dependent upon confidential communications from the client, is not 
privileged.  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Nienaber, 80 Ohio St.3d 534, 687 N.E.2d 678 (1997) (per 
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curiam). (But it would be information protected under Rule 1.6(a) if “related to the representation.” 
See section 1.6:210.) 
Information about fees:  “Basic information about the fee agreement, such as the attorney’s ‘fee, the 
contract therefore [sic], and the amount thereof,’ are not privileged, but fee agreements and even 
billing statements may contain privileged information . . . .” Susan J. Becker, Jack A. Guttenberg 
& Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of Professional Conduct in Ohio § 7.07[2], at 7-23 (2009-10 ed.) 
(quoting from In re Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 104, 47 N.E.2d 388, 396 (1943), which in turn is 
quoting from Ruling Case Law). Accord State ex rel. Dawson v. Bloom-Carroll Local School Dist., 
131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011 Ohio 6009, 959 N.E.2d 524 (itemized attorney-fee bills protected by 
privilege “because the statements contained detailed descriptions of work performed by the district’s 
attorneys, statements concerning their communications to each other and insurance counsel, and the 
issues they researched.” Id. at para. 29). Muehrcke v. Housel, 2005 Ohio 5440, 2005 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 4917 (Cuyahoga). Note that in Dawson, the Court went on to push the envelope a bit: after 
the above-quoted language, it stated that the “withheld records are either covered by the 
attorney-client privilege or so inextricably intertwined with the privileged materials as to also be 
exempt from disclosure.” Id. at para. 29. 
Use of defense expert: Where the prosecution called a defense-retained expert to testify for the state, 
the Court refused to find a violation of attorney-client privilege. The testimony did not disclose or rely 
upon any confidential communication, and the expert based his testimony upon the physical evidence, 
reports, and photographs. Even had the privilege applied, the Court noted that the defendant waived 
its protection by not objecting to the testimony.  State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 595 N.E.2d 915 
(1992). (Since no attorney testimony was involved, presumably the Court was dealing with the 
common-law privilege.) On the necessity of raising an objection to preserve the privilege, see section 
1.6:510. 
See section 1.6:710 for a discussion of the term “privileged” as used in OH Civ R 26(B)(1) and (3).  
 
1.6:420  Privileged Persons 
In addition to clients, prospective clients are also entitled to attorney-client privilege protection with 
respect to communications with a lawyer seeking representation, irrespective of whether the lawyer is 
actually retained. Ohio Rule 1.18(b). This principle was recognized under the former OHCPR; see, 
e.g., State ex rel. Nix v. City of Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 700 N.E.2d 12 (1998) (per curiam). 
See sections 1.6:220, 1.6:410, and 1.18:200. 
Former corporate employer of agent of corporation’s counsel: An engineer, who during his 
employment with a motor vehicle manufacturer had attended law school and passed the Ohio bar, and 
who had worked closely with the company’s legal department and outside counsel for the company in 
product liability cases, was permanently enjoined from disclosing trade secrets, confidential 
information, and matters of attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that the employee had been, at a minimum, an agent acting on behalf of the company’s legal 
counsel and as such was subject to the same restrictions as a lawyer when leaving the company’s 
employment with confidential information. Thus, the company could invoke the privilege to prevent 
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the former employee from testifying against the company or providing assistance to opposing counsel.  
Am. Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 575 N.E.2d 116 (1991). (See further 
discussion of Huffstulter at section 1.6:475, in the context whether the voluntary disclosure of 
information at issue in Huffstutler should have been protected under the ethics confidentiality 
obligation, not the privilege). 
In another corporate privilege case, Shaffer v. OhioHealth Corp., 2004 Ohio 63, 2004 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 15 (Franklin), a former officer sued his corporation for wrongful termination. His complaint 
included allegedly privileged communications by and with the corporation’s in-house counsel. The 
corporation moved to strike the material and for a protective order precluding plaintiff from divulging 
other information covered by the privilege between the corporation and its counsel. The trial court 
denied the motions; the appellate court reversed. Prior to his termination, plaintiff had sought a legal 
opinion regarding proposed company action. The court of appeals held that as to this information, 
“the attorney-client privilege belongs to the company and not to its employees outside their 
employment capacity.” Id. at para. 10. While current executives may assert or waive the corporate 
attorney-client privilege if authorized to do so, “that authority ends with the termination of 
employment or other revocation of authority.” Id. The court accordingly held that the privilege 
extended to the documents and communications in possession of plaintiff, which information he had 
obtained in the course of his employment, where those materials were provided by company counsel, 
the company was the client, and plaintiff received such material in his capacity as an employee. Nor 
was there any indication of any intention of waiver by the company. Noting that ORC 2317.02 [sic 
2317.021] acknowledges that an entity can communicate with counsel only through agents or 
employees, the court reasoned that a holding of waiver based simply on allowing an executive to act 
as the agent of the company in dealing with legal counsel “would be to essentially eliminate the 
existence of attorney-client privilege for all collective entities, a result that the statute manifestly does 
not seek.” Id. at para. 11. (Once again, statutory privilege analysis seem inappropriate here; the 
corporation was seeking to prevent the voluntary disclosure by the nonlawyer plaintiff of privileged 
materials of the company.) 
 
Custodian of police records: A police chief, having custody and control of the police department 
records made in the detection and prevention of crime, had no privilege to refuse to disclose those 
records upon the taking of his deposition in a civil suit for wrongful death against two police officers. 
Nor do those records, if not otherwise privileged, become privileged merely because they may have 
been or would be turned over to the attorneys for the city, who were representing the officers in the 
wrongful death action.  In re Story, 159 Ohio St. 144, 111 N.E.2d 385 (1953). 
Witness receiving advice from lawyer: Absent the personal relationship of attorney and client relating 
to the matter, advice and counsel by an attorney to a witness or potential witness does not, in itself, 
establish an attorney-client relationship. Thus, the witness or potential witness will be unable to assert 
the protection of the attorney-client privilege set forth in ORC 2317.02(A) to prevent the attorney 
from testifying regarding these communications. State v. Perry, Nos. 97CA61, 98 CA5, 1998 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 6133 (Miami Nov. 25, 1998. 
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1.6:430  Communications “Made in Confidence” 
Intent: For the privilege to attach, the client must intend the communication to be of a confidential 
nature. If there is no such intent, there is no privilege.  Walsh v. Barcelona Assocs., Inc., 16 Ohio 
App.3d 470, 472, 476 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (Franklin 1984) (“By its very nature, a communication 
from a client to his attorney conveying authority to the attorney to act on his behalf as his agent in 
entering into an agreement with the opposing party, is a communication which is intended to be 
communicated to the opposing party. Because such a conversation is not intended to be confidential, 
it is not privileged.”). Accord Mid-American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 74 
Ohio App.3d 481, 599 N.E.2d 699 (Wood 1991) (per curiam) (affirming order compelling 
defendant to disclose opinion letter of defendant’s independent counsel on ground, inter alia, that 
language of earlier letter by defendant committing to let plaintiff know what independent counsel 
advises (“Upon receipt of the attorneys [sic] recommendations, we will advise you accordingly”) 
indicated that defendant did not intend to keep the opinion of independent counsel confidential.  Id. at 
487-88, 599 N.E.2d at 703-04 (bracketed material by court)); Lutz v. Carter, No. 2660, 1990 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 4342, at *12 (Ohio App. Clark Oct. 3, 1990) (negotiated lease agreement; privilege 
applies to “communications made by the client to their [sic] attorney with the intent that the 
communications remain confidential”; “[b]ased on the underlying principle of confidentiality, the 
attorney-client privilege excludes communications made to an attorney by his client when it is 
manifestly the client’s purpose that those matters communicated be relayed to the attorney 
representing the other parties involved”); Johndahl v. Columbus Trotting Ass’n, 104 Ohio App. 
118, 147 N.E.2d 101 (Franklin 1956) (syllabus eight) (client’s disclosures to attorney were not 
privileged, in view of fact that such communications were made, inter alia, with intention that facts so 
communicated would be included in application for incorporation and thus become public property). 
Compare State ex rel. Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Arnoff, L.L.P. v. City of Rossford, 140 
Ohio App.3d 149, 746 N.E.2d 1139 (Wood 2000) (decided under Ohio Public Records Act; portions 
of document drafts containing confidential information, sent to government client for review but not 
intended for public dissemination except to extent included in documents in final form, were not 
“public records” and were protected from disclosure by attorney-client privilege under ORC 
149.43(A)(1)(p) (now ORC 149.43(A)(1)(v))). For a case drawing the distinction between facts 
intended to be communicated to a third party (unprivileged) and the direct client-lawyer 
communication containing those facts (privileged), see Hawgood v. Hawgood, 33 Ohio Misc. 227, 
294 N.E.2d 681 (C.P. Cuyahoga 1973) (“attorney Kraus may not testify to any direct conversations 
he had with Mrs. Hawgood, his client, but he may be compelled to testify to the facts which resulted 
from those conversations which indicate her intention to enter into a separation agreement.”  Id. at 
233, 294 N.E.2d at 685. 
This distinction between the communication itself and the facts communicated is well-established 
(see, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981)) but can be tricky. Guidance on 
the issue is found in 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of 
Lawyering §  9.6.5 (3d ed. Supp. 2012). To begin, Hazard and Hodes repeat the “well established” 
understanding that the privilege does not directly protect against disclosure the substance of the 
underlying communication between lawyer and client, but only the content of the communication 
itself. As a result, a client could be compelled to testify about the underlying facts. Id. at 9-32. The 
lawyer, however, 
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generally may not be compelled to testify about the underlying facts, 
because in most situations the lawyer would not know the facts unless 
the client had communicated them to him. Thus, a lawyer’s statement 
about the facts is usually an implicit statement about what the client 
communicated about the facts, and is therefore usually privileged. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
Finally, in connection with the communication/underlying-fact distinction, is the aspect of “intended 
confidentiality”: 
Clients provide lawyers with a surprisingly large amount of 
information that is intended for transmittal to others; by definition such 
communications cannot fall under the protection of the attorney-client 
privilege. 
Id. at 9-28 (emphasis in original). Under the Hazard and Hodes analysis, the Walsh case and others 
discussed above, holding that the communication itself (“conversation”; “opinion letter”; etc.) is not 
privileged, because not intended to be confidential, are good law. The Hawgood case, holding that 
the lawyer could be compelled to testify about the underlying facts, but not about the client-lawyer 
communication itself, is more problematical. According to Hazard and Hodes, neither should be 
protected by the privilege, because the “communication” as to the client’s approval of the separation 
agreement was intended to be conveyed to the other side: In the words of the Hawgood court, “[t]his 
[approval] was in a confidential communication, but it was made for the purpose of advising opposing 
counsel that an assent to an agreement existed . . . .” 33 Ohio Misc. at 234, 294 N.E.2d at 685. 
Also instructive on this point is Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, 131 Ohio St.3d 302, 2012 Ohio 
977, 964 N.E.2d 427, where respondent defended his refusal to hand over to a detective from the 
sheriff’s office affidavits he had prepared for social acquaintances on the ground that he had an 
attorney-client relationship with the affiants. After noting the absence of any evidence that affiants 
retained respondent as their attorney, the Supreme Court, in response to Bunstine’s insistence that 
“the preparation of the affidavits implicitly gave rise to an attorney-client relationship,” responded as 
follows: 
Even if true, however, his refusal to surrender the affidavits ignores 
that (1) the documents were prepared specifically for the sheriff, (2) the 
documents contained the [affiants’] express consent to their release, 
and (3) respondent went to the sheriff’s office for the express purpose 
of giving those documents to a department representative. 
Id. at para. 14. 
Presence of nonagent third party: It has been held that the privilege does not apply to communications 
between attorney and client made in the known presence of a third party who is not an agent of the 
attorney or the client.  Whigham v. Bannon, 21 Ohio App. 496, 153 N.E. 252 (Scioto 1926), stating 
that the language in what is now ORC 2317.02(A) (“a communication made to the attorney by a 
client in that relation”) “refers only to communications made to him in a confidential manner, and that 
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such confidential manner does not exist where a third person, not the agent of either party, shares the 
confidence.”  Id. at 506, 153 N.E. at 255. Accord Village of Lakemore v. George, No. 13620, 1988 
Ohio App. LEXIS 4054 (Summit Oct. 12, 1988) (telephone conversation by client to attorney in 
known presence of police officers); see also  In re Estate of Eliker, 32 Ohio Law Abs. 465, 471 
(Darke 1940) (dictum: “If at the time that [her lawyer] talked to Mrs. Eliker respecting her wishes 
and directions as to the contents of her will Dr. Metcalf [nonagent third party] had been present and 
heard all of the conversation, it could not successfully be urged that these communications were 
privileged.”). 
The privilege does apply, however, when the third party is an agent of either the attorney or the client.  
Foley v. Poschke, 137 Ohio St. 593, 595, 31 N.E.2d 845, 846 (1941) (per curiam) (confidential 
communications in presence of agent of client held privileged under predecessor to ORC 2317.02(A): 
“The general rule that communications between an attorney and his client in the presence of a third 
person are not privileged, does not apply when such third person is the agent of either the client or the 
attorney.”). Where the third party is a close relative of the client, the privilege may still attach to the 
communications between attorney and client. See State v. Shipley, 94 Ohio App.3d 771, 641 
N.E.2d 822 (Licking 1994) (holding that presence of client’s brother did not operate as waiver with 
respect to privileged communications between attorney and client, citing Bowers v. State, 29 Ohio 
St. 542, 546 (1876) (communication in presence of minor client’s mother did not destroy the 
privilege; characterizing the mother as “being present and acting in the character of confidential agent 
of her daughter.”)). But see State v. Whitaker, No. CA97-12-123, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4838 
(Warren Oct. 12, 1998) (distinguishing Bowers because client in Whitaker was not a minor). 
Whigham involved attorney testimony and thus was decided under the statutory attorney-client 
privilege. The court of appeals construed the statutory words “communication made to him by a client 
in that relation” to mean “communications made to him in a confidential manner.” 21 Ohio App. at 
506, 153 N.E. at 255. 
This reading conforms to the accepted general rule that the privilege covers only communications 
intended to be confidential and therefore would not apply to communications in the presence of known 
nonagent third parties. See generally 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  71 
cmt. c & illus. 2 (2000). That would clearly be the result in Ohio at common law, in situations where 
the statutory testimonial privilege does not apply. See Mid-American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App.3d 481, 486, 599 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Wood 1991). 
Whether the outcome should be the same under the statutory privilege set forth in ORC 2317.02(A), 
as the court held in Whigham, is not clear. In terms of confidentiality, a certain amount of tension 
exists between (1) the absence of privilege, under the Wigham analysis of the statute, of 
communications made in the known presence of a nonagent third party, and (2) the existence of the 
statutory privilege, even though the client subsequently discloses the communication to a nonagent 
third party, as the Supreme Court held in State v. McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 573, 651 N.E.2d 
985, 987 (1995) (“The General Assembly has plainly and distinctly stated that the privileges of R.C. 
2317.02 are to be given effect absent specific statutory exceptions.”). (McDermott is discussed in 
detail at section 1.6:520.) See also Swetland v. Miles, 101 Ohio St. 501, 501, 130 N.E. 22, 22 (1920) 
(syllabi two & three). Indeed, one of the pre-McDermott cases involving subsequent disclosure to a 
third party (which disclosure McDermott held did not waive the statutory privilege) reasoned that 
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there was a waiver under the statute because “it was to all intents and purposes the same situation 
which would have attended had Dr. Metcalf [the third party] been present when Mrs. Eliker [the client] 
instructed Mr. Myers [the attorney] to prepare her will.”  In re Estate of Eliker, 32 Ohio Law Abs. 
465, 471 (Ohio App. Darke 1940). 
There are a number of Ohio Supreme Court decisions, however, containing general language 
consistent with the view that, separate and apart from the issue of subsequent waiver by the client, the 
privilege (whether statutory or common-law) does not attach in the first place unless the 
communication is confidential. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thomas v. Ohio State Univ., 71 Ohio St.3d 
245, 249, 643 N.E.2d 126, 130 (1994) (per curiam) (“the attorney-client privilege is based on the 
premise that confidences shared in the attorney-client relationship are to remain confidential”); Am. 
Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 348, 575 N.E.2d 116, 120 (1991) (“The 
attorney-client privilege reaches far beyond a proscription against testimonial speech. The privilege 
protects against any dissemination of information obtained [by the attorney] in the confidential 
relationship.”) Waldmann v. Waldmann, 48 Ohio St.2d 176, 177, 358 N.E.2d 521, 522 (1976) 
(per curiam) (applying ORC 2317.02(A)); Foley v. Poschke, 137 Ohio St. 593, 594, 31 N.E.2d 
845, 846 (1941) (per curiam) (“while Mr. Spooner [the attorney] testified to some matters which 
were not privileged, he also testified as to matters which were of a confidential nature”; admission of 
such testimony by trial court violated predecessor to ORC 2317.02(A)); Spitzer v. Stillings, 109 
Ohio St. 297, 299, 142 N.E. 365, 366 (1924) (applying predecessor to ORC 2317.02(A)); see also 
Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 688 N.E.2d 258, 261-62 (1998) (“A 
fundamental principle in the attorney-client relationship is that the attorney shall maintain the 
confidentiality of any information learned during the attorney-client relationship.”). As a matter of 
construction, it can fairly be argued that the statutory words “in that relation” [i.e., the attorney-client 
relation] are congruent with “the confidential relationship” referred to by the Court in Huffstutler, 61 
Ohio St.3d at 348, 575 N.E.2d at 120; if so, it would follow that any communication between 
attorney and client in the known presence of a nonagent third party, by definition not confidential, 
would not be within the protection of the statute to begin with. This is the Whigham analysis. On the 
other hand, ORC 2317.02(A) provides that an attorney “shall not” testify, subject only to the 
exceptions set forth in the statute, which do not include the client’s knowing acquiescence to the 
presence of a nonagent third party during communications with his or her attorney. Somewhat 
surprisingly, there appear to be no post-McDermott cases directly addressing this issue, although two 
subsequent Supreme Court opinions do reconfirm the exclusivity of the ORC 2317.02(A) provisions 
for waiver of the privilege concerning direct communications between attorney and client. Jackson v. 
Greger, 110 Ohio St.3d 448, 2006 Ohio 4968, 854 N.E.2d 487; Allen County Bar Ass’n v. 
Williams, 95 Ohio St.3d 160, 2002 Ohio 2006, 766 N.E.2d 973, at para. 9. The Jackson case is 
discussed in detail in section 1.6:530 at “Implied waiver of privilege by client.” 
Whether the Whigham view of the statutory privilege will ultimately be endorsed by the Supreme 
Court remains to be seen. In light of McDermott, we suspect not, given the absence of an express 
statutory waiver in ORC 2317.02(A) for statements made in the presence of nonagent third parties.  
Conversations by client and third party overheard by lawyer not privileged: The attorney-client 
privilege is not available with respect to conversations that an attorney overhears between his client 
and a third party.  State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App.2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 890 (Franklin 1974) (generally, 
attorney may not assert privilege to preclude testimony regarding statements made by his client to 
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attorney representing another party, but since record did not clearly indicate that invocation of 
privilege was objected to, and testimony of attorney would have been cumulative in any event, 
assignment of error premised on assertion of privilege overruled). 
 
 1.6:440  Communications from Lawyer to Client 
ORC 2317.02(A) prohibits attorneys from testifying concerning their advice to a client, subject to the 
statutory exceptions set forth therein. See section 1.6:400. Such communications are protected under 
the common-law attorney-client privilege as well. See generally 1 Kenneth S. Brown, McCormick 
on Evidence §  89, at 401 (6th ed. 2006). 
  
1.6:450  Client Identity, Whereabouts, and Fee Arrangements 
Billing information: The issue has been raised nationally whether a lawyer can disclose billing 
information to third parties. The issue most frequently arises in insurance representation where the 
insurer or its third-party auditor seek such information to determine if a billing is justified. A billing 
statement may describe the services provided the client in such a way as to disclose information 
relating to the representation and/or information protected by the privilege. According to ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 98-99 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary), the 
majority position is that a lawyer is impliedly authorized to give detailed billing information to the 
insurer if not adverse to the insured’s interests, but that she may not provide the information to a 
third-party auditor without the insured’s informed consent. 
There is at least one ethics opinion in Ohio dealing with this subject under the OHCPR, and it is 
consistent with the general view with respect to disclosure of billing information in connection with 
an audit of the lawyer’s statement by an insurance company’s outside auditors. See Bd. of Comm’rs 
on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2000-2, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (June 1, 2000) 
(advising that former EC 4-3 did not authorize disclosure to outside auditing firm of legal bills that 
might reveal client confidences and secrets without client consent). See further discussion of Opinion 
2000-2 at section 1.6:310. 
A case discussing the discoverability of fee agreements and billing records, where privilege and 
work-product objections were asserted, is Shell v. Drew & Ward Co., L.P.A., 178 Ohio App.3d 
163, 2008 Ohio 4474, 897 N.E.2d 201 (holding that trial court erred in ruling that those records 
should be produced in unredacted form, but that certain information, such as the agreement and 
billing dates, was relevant and not protected). 
Name or address generally not afforded privilege: Despite early precedent asserting a blanket rule that 
the attorney-client privilege included protection of the client’s name and address, see  In re Heile, 65 
Ohio App. 45, 49, 29 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Hamilton 1939), this is no longer the rule. Today, whether 
the privilege extends to a client’s identity or whereabouts will be determined by the circumstances of 
each case. First, is the client’s name or address one of the facts about which the client seeks legal 
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advice or assistance? Usually it is not, and thus identity and whereabouts are not privileged 
information. See Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 452 N.E.2d 1304 (1983). Even if identity or 
whereabouts are pertinent to the legal advice sought (or, as in Lemley, if the confidentiality of these 
facts is integral to the wrongful scheme the lawyers were furthering), public policy concerns may 
override the privilege. Pursuant thereto, the Court in Lemley, quoting with approval the language of 
the Appellate Division in Tierney v. Flower, 302 N.Y.S.2d 640, 643 (App. Div. 1969), concluded 
that disclosure is required if 
“injury would result to the proper administration of justice 
‘immeasurably greater than the benefit that would inure to the relation 
of attorney and client.’ * * * [Thus,] ‘when the attorney’s assertion of a 
privilege is a cover for cooperation in wrongdoing,’“ . . . . the names 
and addresses of appellants’ alleged clients are not entitled to the cloak 
of protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege. 
Id. at 265-66, 452 N.E.2d 1304, 1311-12 (citations for inner quotations omitted by Lemley Court). 
Applying this test, the Supreme Court in Lemley held that the attorneys could not conceal the identity 
and whereabouts of the alleged clients they were aiding in illegally adopting a child and affirmed the 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ordering the return of the child or, in the alternative, revelation of 
the child’s whereabouts. (Lemley is also discussed in section 1.6:620 at “Unlawful adoption.”) In 
contrast, the Court did find a client’s whereabouts to be privileged in the circumstances presented in 
Waldmann v. Waldmann, 48 Ohio St.2d 176, 358 N.E.2d 521 (1976) (per curiam). In reversing a 
contempt citation resulting from the attorney’s refusal to disclose the address of his client in a divorce 
action, the Court stated as follows: 
 The confidentiality of a client’s address in a domestic relations 
matter, especially a divorce action, can be a vital feature of the action; 
it is not uncommon for a spouse who fears for her or his safety to need 
assurance that their [sic] whereabouts will not be disclosed. If a client 
feels that confidentially divulged matters will not be protected, facts 
may be withheld which are necessary to competent representation. 
Id. at 177, 358 N.E.2d at 522 (footnote omitted; bracketed material added). See also Miller v. 
Begley, 93 Ohio App.3d 527, 639 N.E.2d 139 (Butler 1994) (affirming refusal to compel attorney’s 
disclosure of name of client who consulted attorney about client’s possible involvement in hit-skip 
automobile accident; revelation of identity would expose client to possible civil and criminal liability; 
thus client’s identity integrally involved in the matter about which he sought attorney’s advice);  In re 
Burns, 42 Ohio Misc.2d 12, 16, 536 N.E.2d 1206, 1209 (C.P. Hamilton 1988) (refusing to compel 
disclosure of identity of client who consulted with attorney regarding reporting of crime and possible 
discovery of client’s participation in it; “one of the matters about which the client conferred with 
Burns was whether to reveal his identity. It can hardly be argued that a client who consults an attorney 
about whether a criminal act has been reported, and whether the client’s connection with the criminal 
act has been discovered, is not consulting with the attorney regarding his name and identity.”). 
The Burns opinion provides an overview of this issue. After canvassing the Ohio name-and-identity 
cases, the court in Burns concluded that (1) name and identity are in most instances not one of the 
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facts about which the client seeks advice, but (2) if it is, then name and identity are confidential. (3) 
The privilege is lost if used in an attempt to hide the attorney’s cooperation in the client’s wrongdoing. 
Since “one of the matters about which the client conferred with Burns was whether to reveal his 
identity,” the court held that it was within the privilege and that the privilege was not lost because of 
cooperation in the client’s wrongdoing “because the crime or crimes were completed before the client 
consulted the attorney.” 42 Ohio Misc.2d at 13-16, 536 N.E.2d at 1207-09. [But query whether the 
Burns facts might be construed as the lawyer’s cooperation in a “cover-up.”] 
Even if not within the privilege, remember that client identity may be protected by Rule 1.6 as 
“information relating to the representation.” See Deborah A. Coleman, New Ohio Ethics Rules, 
Clev. B.J., Oct. 2006, at 8, 9. See also ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 98 
(7th ed. 2011) (commentary) (disclosure of client identity prohibited by MR 1.6 unless client 
consents, whereas it is not, as general rule, protected by attorney-client privilege). 
See also discussion of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege at section 1.6:620. 
  
1.6:460  Legal Assistance as Object of Communication 
If there is no intent to secure legal assistance from the attorney, there is no privilege: A 
communication is not privileged merely because it is made to an attorney. A client’s communications 
to the attorney must be made with the intent of securing legal assistance. See ORC 2317.02(A) 
(“concerning a communication made to the attorney by a client in that relation”); Ohio Rule 1.6(a) 
(“information relating to the representation of a client”). The attorney’s communications to the client 
must also be made with the aim of providing legal assistance or gaining sufficient knowledge of the 
facts relating to the representation to provide such assistance. See  In re Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 
103-04, 47 N.E.2d 388, 395-96 (1943). 
Thus, the privilege was denied where the accused, knowing that the attorney with whom he was 
speaking served as prosecutor for such cases before the police court, made statements to the 
prosecutor, not for the sake of hiring that attorney, but for the sake of “seeing what could be done” 
about the case. The attorney stated plainly that he could not represent the accused. The court 
determined that the accused did not make these statements to the attorney for the purpose of acquiring 
legal representation from the attorney and found the attorney’s testimony regarding the statements 
made to him by the accused admissible.  Whalen v. State, 26 Ohio App. 335, 159 N.E. 481 
(Cuyahoga 1927). 
See also Rule 1.18 (prospective clients). 
  
1.6:470  Privilege for Organizational Clients 
ORC 2317.021 defines “client” to include a “person, firm, partnership, corporation or other 
association.” It also provides that, where a corporation or association having the privilege has been 
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dissolved, the privilege shall extend to the last board of directors, their successors or assigns, or to the 
trustees, their successors or assigns. 
See Ohio Rule 1.13(a), which emphasizes that the “client” of an attorney employed or retained by an 
organization is the entity, not any of the constituents of the entity, such as officers, directors, or 
shareholders. Accord Shaffer v. OhioHealth Corp., 2004 Ohio 63, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 15 
(Franklin), discussed in section 1.6:420 supra. And see section 1.7:340 (conflict of interests in 
representing organizations). 
For a discussion of the special duties owed organizational clients by their lawyers, see sections 
1.13:200-:350. 
Communications for multiple organizations: Where a natural person, on behalf of two corporations, 
makes contemporaneous communications to an attorney, and the corporations later become opposing 
parties in a lawsuit, the attorney-client privilege does not preclude the attorney from testifying as to 
information pertaining solely to the corporation waiving the privilege.  Knowlton Co. v. Knowlton, 
10 Ohio App.3d 82, 460 N.E.2d 632 (Franklin 1983) (court so stated in its syllabus three, but actual 
holding was that trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering protective order precluding plaintiff 
corporation from deposing its former attorney where attorney in transaction at issue had also 
represented defendant spokesman and the other corporation, where no prejudice shown, and where 
unclear that attorney could testify as to communications made on behalf of plaintiff corporation 
separately from other corporations involved.) [Query whether there is any privilege vis-à-vis the two 
corporations (as opposed to third parties) in any event. See section 1.6:480.] 
Employee communications with counsel: “Communications made to an employer’s counsel by 
employees are encompassed within the attorney-client privilege. The privilege does not prevent 
disclosure by the employees of the underlying facts. It does, however, protect against compelled 
disclosure of the actual attorney-client communications made by employees when the 
communications are made in anticipation of litigation.” Tyes v. St. Luke’s Hosp., No. 65394, 1993 
Ohio App. LEXIS 5735, at *4 (Ohio App. Cuyahoga Dec. 2, 1993) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)). [Note that, contrary to the implication of the court’s language, there is 
no limitation of the protection of the privilege to communications made in anticipation of litigation.] 
See Ohio Rule 1.13 cmt. [2]: 
 When one of the constituents of an organizational client 
communicates with the organization’s lawyer in that person’s 
organizational capacity, the lawyer must keep the communications 
confidential as to persons other than the organizational client as 
required by Rule 1.6. 
Unless the lawyer for the entity is also representing the employee (which raises separate problems, 
such as conflict of interests), the privilege is that of the client -- the entity -- and is the entity’s to 
waive if it so chooses.  Shaffer v. OhioHealth Corp., 2004 Ohio 63, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 15 
(Franklin) (no waiver by corporation in allowing high-ranking employee to act as agent of company 
in relations with its legal counsel). See Jack A. Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of 
Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  4.2(A)(2), at 100 (1992). See also sections 1.13:200 and 
1.13:500. 
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1.6:475  Privilege for Governmental Clients 
Where the client is a governmental entity, the attorney-client privilege applies to communications 
between a government official and the government’s counsel in much the same way as it would were 
the government client a private individual. This is reflected in the statute requiring disclosure of 
public records and the case law thereunder. See, e.g., State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency, 
105 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005 Ohio 1508, 824 N.E.2d 990 (discussed in more detail below); State ex rel. 
Thomas v. Ohio State Univ. 71 Ohio St.3d 245, 251, 643 N.E.2d 126, 131 (1994) (per curiam) 
(“the attorney-client privilege applies to documents containing communications between members of 
the public entity represented about the legal advice given”). See also 1 Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers §  74 (2000). 
ORC 149.43, the Ohio Public Records Act, provides that “public records” are to be made available to 
any person at all reasonable times during regular business hours. The term “public record,” however, 
does not include some 26 different categories of documents (see ORC 149.43(A)(1)(a)-(z)), 
including records the release of which is prohibited under state or federal law (ORC 149.43(A)(1)(v)). 
A comprehensive review of this subject is found in the Court’s unanimous opinion in State ex rel. 
Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005 Ohio 1508, 824 N.E.2d 990. 
Leslie addressed a panoply of issues regarding the governmental attorney-client privilege and came 
down decisively on the side that government agencies and officials do indeed have the protections of 
the privilege. The wrinkle in Leslie was ORC 109.02, which provides that no state agencies, officers, 
etc., “shall employ or be represented by, . . . counsel or attorneys at law” other than lawyers in the 
state Attorney General’s office. While for the most part eliding the “employ” language, the Court 
concluded, properly we think, that in-house, non-Attorney General’s Office, government lawyers and 
their state organization clients are entitled to the protection of the privilege. See id. at paras. 31-42. 
As the Court noted, Leslie’s interpretation of the statute “might lead to the absurd result that his own 
employment as an attorney with the Department of Development was prohibited.” Id. at para. 42. 
Another interesting aspect of the Leslie case should be noted. One of Leslie’s arguments against the 
existence of the privilege with respect to the documents he had attached to his court filings was that 
ORC 2317.02(A) does not extend the privilege to government entities. The Court brushed this aside, 
saying that even if 2317.02(A) were inapplicable, the common-law privilege applied to the 
documents in question, precluding their unauthorized dissemination. The ORC 2317.02(A) issue is 
an important one, however, for two reasons. First, it would appear from a literal reading of the 
definition of “client” in ORC 2317.021 (“person, firm, partnership, corporation, or other association”) 
that, while a government official would qualify as a “person,” government entities are not included 
(subject to the rather unpersuasive argument that “other association” can be read expansively to 
encompass government agency or office). Second, query whether the Court’s invocation of the 
common-law privilege (also encompassing evidentiary privilege preventing compelled testimony in 
situations in which 2317.02(A) is inapplicable), reaches the voluntary dissemination of confidential 
documents at issue in the Leslie case. While Huffstutler, cited by the Court on the dissemination 
issue, does indeed say that the privilege protects against such dissemination, commentary rather 
persuasively suggests that the principle applicable in such cases is the ethics prohibition against 
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disclosure of confidential information, rather than the privilege (common-law or statutory) guarding 
against compelled testimony or discovery of attorney-client communication. E.g., 24 Charles Alan 
Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure, Federal Rules of 
Evidence §  5472 (1986 & Supp. 2013) (at 89-92 and 43-45, respectively); see 1 Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  86 (2000). This distinction was explained in X Corp. v. 
Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Va. 1992), which, like Leslie and Huffstutler, was 
not a case involving compelled disclosures. No one seeks to compel 
Doe to disclose privileged material against X Corp.’s invocation of the 
attorney-client privilege. Rather, this is a case of voluntary disclosure; 
Doe [as in Leslie and Huffstutler] voluntarily has disclosed or wishes 
to disclose a broad range of information X Corp. believes should be 
treated confidentially. Thus, applicable here is the broader duty of 
confidentiality . . . . 
Id. at 1310 (bracketed material added). 
Government attorneys’ confidential communications with government employees: Attorney notes of 
conversations between Cleveland Law Department attorneys and city employees named in a suit, as 
well as those employees’ requests to the law department for representation, were privileged under the 
state law prohibiting disclosure of communications between attorneys and their government clients 
and prospective clients. Disclosure of the records sought is not required under the Ohio Public 
Records Act (ORC 149.43) because subsection (A)(1)(p) (now subsection (A)(1)(v)) of that act 
excepts from the definition of “public records” those “records the release of which is prohibited by 
state . . . law.” The attorney-client privilege is such a law. State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio 
St.3d 379, 700 N.E.2d 12 (1998) (per curiam). The Court reached the same conclusion with respect 
to communications between a lawyer in the Ohio State University Office of Legal Affairs and 
nonlawyer OSU employees in State ex rel. Thomas v. Ohio State Univ., 71 Ohio St.3d 245, 249, 
643 N.E.2d 126, 130 (1994) (per curiam) (“Records of communications between attorneys and their 
state-government clients pertaining to the attorney’s legal advice are excepted from disclosure under 
[ORC 149.43(A)(1)(p), now ORC 149.43(A)(1)(v)], since the release of these records is prohibited 
by state law.”). Accord State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 535, 542, 721 
N.E.2d 1044, 1050 (2000) (per curiam) (“The attorney-client privilege, which covers records of 
communications between attorneys and their government clients pertaining to the attorneys’ legal 
advice, is a state law prohibiting release of these records.”). 
The most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the attorney-client privilege exception to 
the Ohio Public Records Act is State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Toledo-Lucas County Port Auth., 
121 Ohio St.3d 537, 2009 Ohio 1767, 905 N.E.2d 1221. The Court there held that the newspaper 
was not entitled to an investigative report prepared for the port authority by its law firm, because it 
came within the attorney-client privilege exception to disclosure under the Act. The Blade argued that 
factual investigative material is not protected by the privilege, but the Court held otherwise where 
“‘other legal advice or assistance was sought and … the investigation conducted was integral to that 
assistance.’ 1 Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States, at 76, Section 7:16.” (id. at 
para. 28; emphasis in original): 
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 After applying this test to the facts here, it is manifest that the 
factual investigation conducted by attorney Grigsby was incident to or 
related to any legal advice that the attorneys hired by the port authority 
would give concerning the mayor’s allegations of misconduct by the 
port authority president. 
Id. at para. 29. 
Court of appeals decisions to the same effect include State ex rel. Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & 
Arnoff v. City of Rossford, 140 Ohio App.3d 149, 746 N.E.2d 1139 (Wood 2000) (drafts of bond 
documents prepared by attorneys sent to governmental client for review but not intended for 
dissemination to public; held that such preliminary documents -- to extent they contained confidential 
information not included in final version of documents that would be disseminated to public -- are not 
“public records” subject to disclosure under ORC 149.43; such preliminary material protected by 
attorney-client privilege); Woodman v. City of Lakewood, 44 Ohio App.3d 118, 541 N.E.2d 1084 
(Cuyahoga 1988), (requiring attorney to disclose legal memorandum prepared for government client 
would violate common-law attorney-client privilege). 
City charter open-meetings provision: The Oxford, Ohio City Charter provided that all council 
meetings be open to the public. The city attorney was present at one such meeting; the city argued that 
in such circumstance the Court should recognize the statutory and common-law attorney-client 
privilege as exceptions to the charter, just as ORC 121.22(G)(3) and (5) recognize exceptions to the 
state’s sunshine law for certain attorney-client privilege matters. The Ohio Supreme Court held 
otherwise, since pursuant to Ohio’s Home Rule Amendment to the Constitution (Art. XVIII, §  3) a 
municipal charter controls over conflicting state law in matters of local self-government. State ex rel. 
Fenley v. Kyger, 72 Ohio St.3d 164, 166, 648 N.E.2d 493, 494-95 (1995) (per curiam) (“the city 
charter requirement that council meetings ‘shall be open to the public’ prohibits any meeting, 
regardless of its purpose, from being private.”). But cf. TBC Westlake, Inc. v. Hamilton County Bd. 
of Revision, 81 Ohio St.3d 58, 689 N.E.2d 32 (1998) (Sunshine Law does not apply to 
quasi-adjudicative BTA hearing; also, Ohio Public Records Act exception for records the release of 
which is prohibited by state or federal law includes attorney/hearing examiner’s report in accordance 
with common law “judicial mental process” privilege, as to which see United States v. Morgan, 313 
U.S. 409, 421-22 (1941)). 
 
1.6:480  Privilege of Co-Clients 
No privilege between co-clients in subsequent adverse proceedings: As stated in Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. 
[26], 
the prevailing rule is that, as between commonly represented clients 
[i.e., co-clients], the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be 
assumed that if litigation does later occur between the clients, the 
privilege will not protect communications made on the subject of the 
joint representation, while it is in effect, and the clients should be so 
advised. 
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This view is reflected in Ohio case law. Thus, when two clients sought the assistance of an attorney 
jointly, information provided by each client would not be privileged in a subsequent dispute between 
them, although the privilege remained in effect as to parties other than the joint clients. There was no 
privilege between the clients because, at the time each of them provided information to the lawyer, 
there was no intent to withhold that information from the other client.  Emley v. Selepchak, 76 Ohio 
App. 257, 63 N.E.2d 919 (Medina 1945). 
With respect to the existence and extent of the privilege “as to parties other than the joint clients,” the 
case of MA Equip. Leasing I, LLC v. Tilton, 2012 Ohio 4668, 980 N.E.2d 1072 (Franklin) is 
instructive. It espouses the generally accepted rule that when there is representation by a single 
attorney of two or more clients having a common interest, attorney-client communications shared 
within the client group are protected by the privilege vis-a-vis third parties. The joint client doctrine is 
not a privilege in and of itself, but rather an exception to the rule that disclosure to a third party is a 
waiver of the privilege. Thus, if the “third party” to whom disclosure is made is in fact a joint client 
having common interests, there is no waiver.  In Tilton, applying these rules in a corporate 
parent/subsidiary/affiliate context, plaintiff lessor sought discovery from the defendant parent and 
affiliates of the lessee (which was not a party to the litigation). The corporate entity defendants 
resisted, arguing privilege for intra-group communications between commonly-owned or controlled 
affiliates and counsel. But the trial court found, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the joint or 
co-client doctrine had no application here, because the parent and affiliates had not been represented 
at any time by the firm representing the lessee, and thus the doctrine was inapplicable on the facts 
presented. As summed up by the appellant court, 
appellants [parent and affiliates] and Waterworks [the lessee] were 
neither jointly represented by in-house counsel nor jointly represented 
by common outside counsel. 
*   *   * 
Waterworks did not raise the privilege, nor were the disputed 
communications between Waterworks and its attorneys; instead, 
appellants raise the privilege with respect to their own communications 
with Waterworks counsel. 
Id. at paras. 18, 40. 
In another case the insurer was obligated to defend any damage action brought against the insured by 
the terms of the liability policy between the parties. In such a damage action against the insured, the 
insured had been informed by the insurer’s counsel that he had the right to obtain personal counsel to 
represent him to protect against liability in excess of the policy limits, but the insured chose not to do 
so and relied upon the insurer’s counsel to represent him. In furtherance of such attorney-client 
relationship, the insured had several conferences with insurer’s counsel, attended a deposition with 
the insurer’s counsel, and reviewed the scene of the accident with the insurer’s counsel. In a 
subsequent action brought by the insured against the insurer, the court held that in the prior action 
both the insurer and the insured had been clients of counsel retained by the insurer, and, given the 
mutuality of interest, both were equally entitled to any and all information relating to the matter. 
Therefore the attorney-client privilege was not applicable to a letter that counsel for the insurer and 
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the insured had sent to the insurer, and the trial court erred in denying the insured’s motions for 
production of the letter.  Netzley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App.2d 65, 296 N.E.2d 550 
(Montgomery 1971) (citing the Emley case with approval). 
Note that the underlying rationale of the Netzley case -- that both the insured and the insurer are the 
clients in such circumstances -- is no longer the law. See Ohio Rule 1.8(f)(4) & cmts. [11] & [12A], 
which make clear that in Ohio the client is the insured. See as well the discussion at sections 1.7:410 
and 1.8:720. Despite this change, the result in Netzley in all likelihood would be the same, since both 
insured and insurer had a common interest in the underlying litigation. See section 1.6:490 below. 
This common-law joint representation exception to the privilege was recognized and relied upon by 
the Supreme Court in its holding that Ohio recognizes a lawyer self-protection exception to the 
privilege in Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio St.3d 161, 
2010 Ohio 5762, 937 N.E.2d 533 (citing both Emley and Netzley). 
 
1.6:490  Common-Interest Arrangements 
Emley and Netzley, discussed above in section 1.6:480, were co-client or common-representation 
cases -- that is, one lawyer jointly represented two or more clients in a matter. In a common-interest 
arrangement, the clients are separately represented but have a common interest or goal in one or more 
aspects of the matter and agree to exchange information with respect thereto. Compare 1 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  75 (2000) (co-clients), with id. §  76 
(common-interest arrangements). Disclosure of otherwise privileged information to less than all of 
those having a common interest remains privileged as to the others in the arrangement, as well as to 
third parties. In the co-client situation, it is presumed that all information will be disclosed to all 
co-clients, and thus there is no privilege vis-à-vis the co-clients. Compare id. §  75 cmt. d, with id. §  
76 cmt. e. In both the co-client context and a common-interest arrangement, there is no privilege with 
respect to such information in subsequent adverse proceedings between the clients, unless they have 
agreed otherwise. Id. §§ 75(2), 76(2). 
Both the joint representation and common interest (or community of interest) exception to the 
third-party waiver rule is examined in the context of corporate parent/subsidiary/affiliate 
relationships at paras. 25 and 26 in the MA Equip. Leasing case, cited and discussed in section 
1.6:480 supra. 
 
1.6:495  Duration of Attorney-Client Privilege 
As stated in sections 1.6:410 and 1.18:200, the protections of, and duties arising from, the 
attorney-client privilege can arise with respect to communications with a lawyer as early as the 
prospective-client stage. This obligation is a continuing one, whether or not the lawyer is engaged and, 
if engaged, continues even after the termination of the attorney’s employment. Ohio Rules 1.6 cmt. 
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[18] & 1.9(c); Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998). 
(Protection of the confidences of a former client is discussed in section 1.9:400.) 
Indeed, the attorney-client privilege does not expire with the death of the client.  Taylor v. Sheldon, 
172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961). In the words of the Restatement, the privilege may be 
invoked “at any time during or after termination of the relationship between client or prospective 
client and lawyer.” 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  77 (2000). 
 
 1.6:500  Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.6(a) 
ORC 2317.02(A), 2151.421 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.6 
Ohio Commentary 
Gianelli & Snyder, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice, Evidence §  501.13 
Becker, Guttenberg & Snyder, The Law of Professional Conduct in Ohio § 7.07[3] 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §§  55:401 
ALI-LGL §§  78-80 
Wolfram §  6.4 
The Ohio rule on waiver of privilege is unique. If the testimonial privilege of ORC 2317.02(A) 
(barring compelled testimony by the attorney as to direct attorney-client communications) is 
applicable, then it may be waived only in the manner stated in the statute -- by express consent of the 
client (or, if the client is deceased, by the surviving spouse or executor or administrator), by the 
voluntary testimony of the client on the same subject, or by deemed waiver under ORC 
2151.421(A)(3) with respect to certain communications giving rise to knowledge or suspicion of 
child abuse or neglect. The common-law waiver by disclosure to a third party is not recognized in the 
statute. See sections 1.6:430 and 1.6:520. (The addition of a second paragraph to ORC 
2317.02(A)(1), effective June 15, 2006, is not a waiver provision; it excludes certain attorney-client 
communications from the protection of the statutory privilege and is discussed infra at section 
1.6:610, “Exceptions for Disputes Concerning Decedent’s Disposition of Property.”) 
If the statute is inapplicable, common-law rules of privilege control, and the privilege may be waived 
by consent of the client, by the client’s voluntary testimony, or, by the client’s subsequent disclosure 
to a third party (who is not an agent of the attorney). 
Ohio Rule 1.6(a) recognizes client waiver in the form of informed consent to disclosure with respect 
to “information relating to the representation,” which includes information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege.  Id.  See section 1.6:310. 
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Only client may waive privilege: Since the privilege belongs to the client, Allen County Bar Ass’n v. 
Williams, 95 Ohio St.3d 160, 2002 Ohio 2006, 766 N.E.2d 973, at para. 9, the privilege may be 
waived only by the client.  Duttenhofer v. State, 34 Ohio St. 91 (1877); see Carver v. Deerfield 
Township, 139 Ohio App.3d 64, 742 N.E.2d 1182 (Portage 2000) (testimony of individual trustee 
as to what occurred at meeting of township board of trustees and its attorney does not waive privilege 
belonging to client, the board of trustees as a whole); State v. Shipley, 94 Ohio App.3d 771, 641 
N.E.2d 822 (Licking 1994) (privileged communications remain privileged when disclosed by any 
person who was not entitled or did not have the authority to waive the privilege). See also  In re Lott, 
424 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The privilege remains the client’s, and the client must take some 
affirmative act to waive it.”  Id. at 454). 
It should be noted, however, that ORC 2317.02(A) specifically provides that “the attorney may 
testify” as to otherwise privileged communications “if the client is deceased, by the express consent 
of the surviving spouse or the executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased client.” The 
“surviving spouse” waiver was at issue in State v. Doe, 101 Ohio St.3d 170, 2004 Ohio 705, 803 
N.E.2d 777. In Doe, the Court held that when the surviving spouse expressly waives the privilege of 
a deceased spouse in accordance with the statute, the attorney for the deceased spouse must obey the 
trial court’s order to answer grand jury interrogatories. In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the 
attorney’s argument that the statutory language--”the attorney may testify”--is permissive and allows 
the attorney to testify or not in his or her discretion: 
R.C. 2317.02(A) provides that an attorney may testify by the express 
consent of the surviving spouse as opposed to mandating that an 
attorney shall testify by the express consent of the surviving spouse, in 
deference to the trial court’s well-established role as the arbiter of the 
admission of evidence. 
Id. at para. 14 (emphasis by the Court). Accord Estate of Hohler v. Hohler, 185 Ohio App.3d 420, 
2009 Ohio 7013, 924 N.E.2d 419 (Carroll). The Doe Court further rejected the attorney’s argument 
that she was “ethically barred from answering the grand jury’s interrogatories.” Id. at para. 17. 
Quoting former OH EC 4-2 and DR 4-101(C)(2), the Supreme Court emphasized that the obligation 
to preserve client confidences and secrets did not preclude the lawyer from revealing such 
information “‘when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.’“ Id. at 
para. 21 (emphasis by the Court). This disclosure exception is recognized in the Rules at Ohio Rule 
1.6(b)(6) (“to comply with other law or a court order”). See section 1.6:370. 
As noted above, ORC 2317.02(A) also provides for “deemed waiver” under 2151.421, dealing with 
reporting of known or suspected child abuse.  Pursuant to this provision, an attorney must report any 
known or reasonably suspected abuse, but where the information comes from a confidential 
communication by the client, it need not be reported unless all of the following apply, in which case 
the client is deemed to have waived the privilege and the attorney is obligated to report: (1) the client 
is either under eighteen or, if mentally or physically impaired, under the age of twenty-one; (2) the 
confidential communication discloses the fact or threat of injury from child abuse or neglect; and (3) 
the abuse does not arise out of the client’s attempt to have an abortion without parental notification.  
ORC 2151.421(A)(3).  Compare, in contrast to this child-abuse statute, the legislation requiring that 
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attorneys report adult abuse of impaired adults age sixty and over, ORC 5101.61, which does not 
speak to privilege/waiver issues. 
Inadvertent disclosure: Although it is settled law that the privilege is the client’s and that any waiver 
of the privilege must be voluntary (see cases cited above), one must also deal with the cases 
addressing the matter of inadvertent disclosure of privileged information by a lawyer and the 
consequences thereof. While there is no easy resolution of this issue, the following provides some 
guidance. 
There are three lines of authority -- those cases holding that such disclosure results in waiver of the 
privilege; those holding that it does not; and those holding that the issue must be decided on a 
case-by-case basis, using a balancing test that takes into account five factors: (1) the reasonableness 
of the precautions taken by the producing party, (2) the time taken to rectify the error, (3) the scope 
and nature of the discovery proceedings, (4) the extent of the disclosure in relation to other discovery 
in the case, and (5) the overriding issue of fundamental fairness.  (The factors are variously described 
in the cases; this list is that given in the only Ohio state case addressing the issue, Miles-McClellan, 
discussed below.) In a case described by the court as “a matter of first impression in the state of Ohio,” 
the Tenth District Court of Appeals opted for the middle ground and ruled (somewhat 
presumptuously, for an intermediate appellate court) that 
the law in Ohio shall be that the trial court, in addressing inadvertent 
disclosure of allegedly privileged documents in the course of discovery, 
must hold a hearing considering the above-outlined factors before 
determining to what extent, if any, waiver has occurred with respect to 
the contested materials. 
Miles-McClellan Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Educ., 2006 Ohio 3439, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3366 
(Franklin), at paras. 12, 16 (lawyers for Board of Education, as authorized agent of client for 
purposes of litigation, voluntarily but unintentionally produced allegedly privileged documents in 
response to discovery request; reversing trial court finding that any voluntary disclosure results in 
waiver and remanding for hearing on issue). 
At least two Ohio federal decisions have applied the middle-ground balancing test -- one in finding 
waiver, the other no waiver, on the facts presented. In Evenflo Co. v. Hantec Agents Ltd., No. 
3-:05- CV-346, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74684 (S.D. Ohio 2006), the court, citing the 
Miles-McClellan case among others, found that each of the factors favored a finding of waiver and 
overruled the sender’s motion to compel return of the documents. At issue were a significant number 
of privileged documents out of over 10,000 produced in response to plaintiff’s document request. A 
particularly telling fact in the case, we believe, was that “[r]ather than attempting to identify the 
allegedly privileged documents itself, Hantec [the sender] asked Evenflo [the recipient] to identify 
and return the privileged documents, which of course, Evenflo should not and could not do.” Id. at 
*18. In its summary of conclusions with respect to the balancing test, the court held as follows: 
 All five factors weigh in favor of a determination that Hantec 
waived privilege on the documents to which privilege applies. Hantec 
did not take reasonable precautions to protect the Privileged 
Documents. The consequences of the disclosure of privileged 
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documents in general and the number disclosed in this case are both 
significant. No privilege log was provided at the time of disclosure. 
The Privileged Documents were disclosed to the opposing party and 
were complete documents. The precautions taken by Hantec to avoid 
disclosure and the measures taken to mitigate damages were not 
reasonable. Finally, the contents of some of the Privileged Documents 
may be relevant to the heart of the dispute between the parties and 
Hantec’s carelessness cannot be condoned. 
Id. at *19-20. In the no-waiver case, Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., No. 2:05- CV-688, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40461 (S.D. Ohio June 19, 2006), the court was presented with a situation in 
which, in an exchange of correspondence regarding the signing of medical releases by the plaintiff, a 
document protected by the work-product privilege was inadvertently attached by an administrative 
assistant employed by counsel for the defendant to a blank medical release. Magistrate Judge Kemp 
found that the leading decision on the issue was Lois Sportswear, USA v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 
F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), which held, in Judge Kemp’s words, that 
in order to decide whether the production waived the attorney-client or 
work product privileges, it should inquire, first, into the reasonableness 
of measures taken by the producing party to prevent privileged 
documents from being produced. The Court should also look at the 
effort taken by the party after the disclosure was discovered to correct 
the error, to the scope of the disclosure made, to the extent of other 
discovery taken in the case, and to balance fundamental concepts of 
fairness and upholding claims of privilege against the degree to which 
the party disclosing the document had been negligent. 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40461, at *4 (emphasis added). In applying this test, the Hawkins court 
found that the “privileged document was attached to other unrelated documents purely as a result of a 
clerical error which could not have been foreseen by the attorney who sent the correspondence. The 
Court . . . concludes that, under these facts, reasonable precautions were taken to avoid the disclosure 
of privileged documents.” Id. at *7. The court also found that Anheuser-Busch “immediately . . . 
made every effort to retrieve the document” – it promptly requested return of the document, attempted 
to resolve the matter extrajudicially, and moved for a protective order after exhausting extrajudicial 
efforts to resolve the issue. Noting that the scope of the disclosure was narrow – a single document – 
“the Court concludes that in fairness the document ought to be returned, and the information in it not 
used in this litigation. Consequently, the Court will grant the motion for protective order and direct 
return of the document.” Id. at *8. Judge Kemp also determined that it made no difference for 
purposes of resolution of the inadvertent disclosure issue whether the attorney-client or work-product 
privilege was involved -- “[a]n inadvertent disclosure is either a waiver or it is not . . . .” Id. at *7. See 
also Van Hull v. Marriott Courtyard, 63 F. Supp.2d 840 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (rejecting receiving 
party’s demand that party inadvertently sending privileged notes produce unredacted copy of those 
notes and all other privileged documents on same subject matter); Transp. Equip. Sales Corp. v. 
BMY Wheeled Vehicles, 930 F. Supp. 1187 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (receiving lawyer ordered to return 
inadvertently disclosed document without using or disseminating it; note that court relies on 
now-withdrawn ABA Formal Op. 368 (1992)). 
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The balancing-test approach has now been codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b), added 
September 19, 2008, which expressly provides that there is no waiver if the privilege holder took 
reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure and, once having knowledge of it, takes prompt 
measures to rectify the error.  30 Judith A. McMorrow & Daniel R. Coquillette, Moore’s Federal 
Practice § 809.03[1], at 809-24 (3d ed. 2013); Kristine L. Roberts & Mary S. Diemer, Rule of 
Evidence 502; Impact on Protective Orders and Subject Matter Waiver, Litig. News, Winter 
2009, at 8. See also Fed R Civ P 26(b)(5)(B), as amended in 2006 (if privileged or work-product 
information produced in discovery and recipient so notified, “a party must promptly return, sequester, 
or destroy the specified information and any copies it has and may not use or disclose the information 
until the claim is resolved.”). The Ohio analogue to the same effect is OH R Civ P 26 (B)(6)(b), 
adopted July 1, 2008.  
The only ethical obligation of a lawyer in receipt of inadvertently disclosed documents is to notify the 
sender. Ohio Rule 4.4(b).  In the words of the Staff Notes to the Rule 26 amendment adding 
subsection (B)(6)(b), it and Rule 4.4(b) “work in concert”: The ethical rule states what the recipient 
must do when she knows or should know that a document has been inadvertently sent; 26(B)(6)(b) is 
triggered by notice from the sender, upon receipt of which the recipient is obligated to follow the 
(B)(6)(b) strictures. Of course, Rule 26(B)(6)(b) is applicable only in the civil litigation context, but 
that is the context in which inadvertent disclosure typically occurs. See further discussion at section 
4.4:300, “Inadvertent disclosure – Waiver implications and court-imposed requirements.” 
For a view that these provisions are inadequate and that Model Rule 4.4(b) should be amended, see 
James M. Altman, Model Rule 4.4(b) Should Be Amended, 21 Prof. Law. No. 1, at 16 (2011). 
Waiver where client is represented by more than one lawyer: A noteworthy statutory waiver case 
decided by the Eighth District Court of Appeals is Lightbody v. Rust, 137 Ohio App.3d 658, 739 
N.E.2d 901 (Cuyahoga 2000). In Lightbody, a co-counsel fee-dispute case, both Lightbody and 
Rust had represented the client, Cooper. (Rust’s firm, Woodling, apparently still did.) The trial court 
had granted Rust’s motion to compel and ordered Lightbody to answer deposition questions that 
Lightbody contended called for privileged information. With his motion, Rust had submitted a sworn 
declaration of Cooper in which Cooper admitted that he disclosed privileged information to the two 
lawyers, but that the communications with Lightbody were “‘not separate and apart from Rust but 
with him as part of Rust’s legal support group.’“ 137 Ohio App.3d at 661-62, 739 N.E.2d at 843. 
Lightbody argued that the declaration did not contain a waiver of the testimonial privilege set forth in 
ORC 2317.02, and therefore he was precluded from answering the deposition questions. The court of 
appeals agreed. Citing a 1921 opinion ( Haley v. Dempsey, 14 Ohio App. 326, 328-29 (Hamilton 
1921)) as authority, the court stated that 
where the client has two attorneys who are partners [in the case at bar, 
the lawyers had been co-counsel, not partners], an express waiver of 
the testimonial privilege contained in R.C. 2317.02(A) as to one 
attorney does not result in a renunciation of all of the client’s rights 
regarding the communications and authorization to the second attorney 
to testify with respect to those communications. 
384
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.6 
  
137 Ohio App.3d at 663, 739 N.E.2d at 844 (bracketed material added). While one might wonder 
whether Cooper’s willingness to provide Rust with the declaration indicated a willingness to waive 
the privilege as to Lightbody, the Eighth District Court of Appeals saw it differently: 
Nothing in the record shows that Cooper expressly waived the 
testimonial privilege as it applies to Lightbody. Moreover, . . . . nothing 
in the record shows that Cooper consented to Woodling’s attempt to 
elicit such confidential information for its own “advantage” after full 
disclosure to Cooper that these now-revealed confidences and secrets 
either may or will become a part of the public record. See DR 
4-101(B)(3). Without an express waiver from Cooper, after full 
disclosure, as to all parties in this action, Lightbody and Woodling 
must preserve his confidences and secrets . . . . 
 The order effectively allowed Woodling, for the purpose of 
procuring discovery for its own advantage and without evidence of full 
disclosure to Cooper, to waive both Cooper’s testimonial privilege and 
each attorney’s ethical obligation to safeguard his confidences and 
secrets. As such, the disposition of the motion constitutes an abuse of 
discretion . . . . 
Id. at 664-65, 739 N.E.2d at 845 (emphasis by the court). Judge Rocco, dissenting on this issue, 
argued that “confidentiality is not breached by disclosure among the client’s co-counsel,” provided 
that protective orders are put in place to guard against disclosure to others.  Id. at 666, 739 N.E.2d at 
846. 
 
1.6:510  Waiver by Agreement, Disclaimer, or Failure to Object 
As stated in Ohio Rule 1.6(a), a client can waive the protection against attorney disclosure of 
information relating to the representation, including privileged information, by giving “informed 
consent” to the disclosure. “[E]xpress consent by the client” also allows the attorney to testify under 
the evidentiary privilege statute, ORC 2317.02(A). Other instances of waiver of the privilege may 
arise pursuant to statute or common-law precedent, as discussed below. 
Waiver by surviving spouse of deceased client: ORC 2317.02(A) provides that a surviving spouse or 
the executor or administrator of the deceased client’s estate can expressly consent to testimony by the 
deceased client’s lawyer concerning privileged attorney-client communications. See State v. Doe, 
101 Ohio St.3d 170, 2004 Ohio 705, 803 N.E.2d 777, discussed in section 1.6:500 above. 
Waiver by guardian: Where an incompetent is a party, the duly appointed guardian may waive the 
statutory privilege on behalf of his ward and allow the former attorney for the incompetent to testify 
as to his client’s incompetency.  Yancy v. Erman, 45 Ohio Op. 208, 99 N.E.2d 524 (C.P. 
Cuyahoga 1951). [Query whether this holding survives McDermott, since there is no 
waiver-by-guardian exception in ORC 2317.02(A). And cf. Swetland v. Miles, 101 Ohio St. 501, 
130 N.E. 22 (1920) (finding no exception to statutory privilege in will contest, even though personal 
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representative of the estate of the deceased client consented to attorney’s testifying). (The Swetland 
rule was later changed by the legislature. See section 1.6:610.)] Cf. Weierman v. Mardis, 101 Ohio 
App.3d 774, 656 N.E.2d 734 (Hamilton 1994), discussed at section 1.6:640. 
Corporate waiver of privilege: When the client is a corporation, the attorney-client privilege can be 
waived only by a decision of the management of the corporation.  Shaffer v. OhioHealth Corp., 
2004 Ohio 63, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 15 (Franklin) (“Current corporate executives and managers, 
if endowed with appropriate authority by their employer, may on behalf of the corporation either 
assert or waive the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at para. 10.); Stuffleben v. Cowden, 2003 Ohio 
6334, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 5676 (Cuyahoga) (purported waiver of corporations’ privilege by 
majority shareholder and chief executive officer of closely-held corporations ineffective where 
shareholder/officer sought to waive privilege, not on behalf of corporations, but on his own behalf, in 
malpractice litigation against corporations’ attorneys); State v. Today’s Bookstore, Inc., 86 Ohio 
App.3d 810, 621 N.E.2d 1283 (Montgomery 1993). Cf.  In re Estate of Irish, No. 50735, 1986 
Ohio App. LEXIS 7037 (Cuyahoga June 5, 1986) (upholding privilege of corporate executor; 
claimant sought privileged information from executor’s employee during employee’s deposition; 
when claimant suggested that executor could waive the privilege, executor’s counsel stated that 
executor did not choose to waive privilege). 
While there appears to be no Ohio case law dealing with the question of who has the authority to 
waive the privilege on behalf of the corporation other than the statements in OhioHealth and 
Today’s Bookstore that it is vested in those who manage the affairs of or run the corporation 
(typically, the officers and directors, see Brian D. Forrow, The Corporate Law Department: 
Counsel to the Entity, 34 Bus. Law. 1797, 1799 (1979)), there are other, comparable, formulations 
provided by the commentators. Thus, Guttenberg and Snyder talk in terms of those who are duly 
authorized to “speak for the corporation,” with respect to assertion of the privilege and waiver thereof. 
See Jack A. Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  
4.2(A) (1992 & Supp. 1998) (see, in particular, id. at 96, 100 & n.42, & Supp. p. 21). While there 
will be instances in which corporate employees are duly authorized to provide to the corporation’s 
lawyers information that will be protected by the corporation’s attorney-client privilege (see, e.g., 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)), the power to waive the privilege on behalf of the 
corporate client will typically come from an officer or other manager with authority to do so. See 
generally 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of 
Lawyering §  9.6.2, at 9-24 (3d ed. Supp. 2012); 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers § 73 cmt. j, at 563 (2000) (“The privilege for organizational clients can be asserted and 
waived only by a responsible person acting for the organization for this purpose.”). For a provocative 
and critical look at the waiver and other corporate privilege issues, see 24 Charles Alan Wright & 
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure (Evidence) §§  5476, 5484, 5487, 5496, 
5507 (1986 & Supp. 2013). 
Waiver by failure to object to the introduction of privileged testimony: Failure to raise a timely 
objection to the use by the prosecutor of testimony of a defense expert served to waive the privilege.  
State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 595 N.E.2d 915 (1992) (dictum; noting that, although privilege 
did not apply because expert disclosed no confidential information, defense waived any protection 
privilege might have offered by not objecting to testimony presented). 
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On the other hand, the exemption for privileged records in the Ohio Public Records Act (ORC 
149.43(A)(1)(v)) [and presumably under privilege law other than that to which the Records Act is 
applicable, although we found no Ohio case law so stating] is not an affirmative defense that must be 
raised in an answer to avoid waiver. State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 700 N.E.2d 
12 (1998) (per curiam) (the exemption remains fully applicable absent evidence that the public 
office having custody of the records had disclosed them to the public; no such disclosure here). See 
also Indiana Ins. Co. v. Hardgrove, No. 98 AP-910, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1699 (Franklin 
April 15, 1999), where the trial court had held that a company’s delay in filing a motion for a 
protective order covering privileged communications between lawyer and client, until after the trial 
court threatened sanctions for failing to comply with opposing counsel’s discovery request, acted as a 
waiver of the privilege. Reversing, the Tenth District Court of Appeals found the assertion of the 
privilege timely and proper, and stated that ORC 2317.02(A) provided the exclusive means for 
waiving the privilege. Inasmuch as the client’s conduct did not come within any of the waiver 
provisions set forth in the statute, the trial court’s finding of waiver was error. [Query whether this 
case, involving a request for production of documents directed to the client and a motion for 
protective order in connection therewith, rather than compelled testimony by the attorney, raised a 
question of waiver under the common-law privilege, as opposed to the statutory privilege. But see 
Jackson v. Greger, discussed at section 1.6:530 infra.] With respect to invocation of the privilege, 
see also section 1.6:660. 
 
1.6:520  Waiver by Subsequent Disclosure 
Client’s subsequent disclosure to third parties: Until the decision in Jackson v. Greger, discussed in 
detail in section 1.6:530 at “Implied waiver of privilege by client,” by far the most important Ohio 
case dealing with the issue of waiver of the privilege was State v. McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 
651 N.E.2d 985 (1995). McDermott also serves to underscore the unique nature of Ohio’s privilege 
law, which can produce two different results, depending on whether the statutory or common-law 
privilege is applicable. 
In McDermott, attorney Lawrence represented McDermott, who was charged with murder. At a 
post-indictment investigatory grand jury hearing, Lawrence’s brother testified that McDermott told 
him of a conversation McDermott had with Lawrence in which McDermott admitted the murder. The 
attorney was then ordered to testify on three separate occasions on the theory that McDermott had 
waived the privilege by subsequent disclosure to a nonagent third party of confidential 
communications with his attorney. The third instance arose during McDermott’s trial, where the 
prosecution called Lawrence to testify. Upon his refusal, based on the privilege, he was held in 
contempt and jailed for two days. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the privileged 
communication had not been waived by McDermott’s disclosure; the court relied on Swetland v. 
Miles, 101 Ohio St. 501, 130 N.E. 22 (1920), and, in distinguishing State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 
513 N.E.2d 754 (1987), held that Post necessarily applies only to those communications privileged at 
common law, not those covered by the statutory privilege. 
The Supreme Court affirmed. In doing so, the Court found its holding in Post to be overbroad and 
instead followed the Swetland case, “where this court held that the Ohio statute on privileged 
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communications [now ORC 2317.02] evinced the sole criteria for waiving the privilege: (1) the client 
expressly consents, or (2) the client voluntarily testifies on the same subject.” 72 Ohio St.3d at 572, 
651 N.E.2d at 987 (1995). In Post, “[t]his court found the client’s discussion with the polygraph 
operator [an agent of the attorney] privileged but also found that privilege waived when the client 
revealed the content of the privileged communication to a third party. At common law, the 
attorney-client privilege could be waived either expressly or by conduct implying waiver.”  Id. at 573, 
651 N.E.2d at 988. The McDermott Court concluded that the statutory privilege was not applicable 
in Post because the statute deals only with communications directly between the client and attorney. 
The Court did approve the “judicially created attorney-client privilege” for communications with the 
attorney’s agent and found that Post had “properly decided how that common-law attorney-client 
privilege could be waived [by disclosure to a third party]. The circumstances of waiver recognized in 
that case have no relationship to communications that fall squarely within the statutory privilege 
based on direct communications between attorneys and clients.”  Id. at 574, 651 N.E.2d at 988. 
The penultimate paragraph of the Court’s opinion in McDermott states as follows: 
 As we decline to add a judicially created waiver to the 
statutorily created privilege, we hold that R.C. 2317.02(A) provides the 
exclusive means by which privileged communications directly 
between an attorney and a client can be waived. Lawrence’s act of 
refusing to testify was not contemptuous because McDermott had not 
waived the attorney-client privilege -- he neither expressly consented 
to Lawrence’s testifying nor did he voluntarily testify on the same 
subject. 
Id. 
In sum, if the attorney-client privilege arises under ORC 2317.02(A), that statute provides the only 
bases by which the privilege may be waived. Accord Jackson v. Greger, 110 Ohio St.3d 488, 2006 
Ohio 4968, 854 N.E.2d 487 (syllabus one); Allen County Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 95 Ohio St.3d 
160, 2002 Ohio 2006, 766 N.E.2d 973. Since McDermott involved the question of compelled 
attorney testimony concerning direct communication between attorney and client, the statutory 
privilege was applicable. Because the statute provided no exception for subsequent disclosure by the 
client to third parties, there was no waiver of the privilege. The same conduct, however, does waive 
the common-law privilege, which Ohio law also recognizes when the statutory privilege does not 
apply. 
Disclosure must be voluntary: A confidential memorandum from the city’s chief prosecutor to the 
city’s law department was leaked to the media. The court held that the memo was protected by the 
attorney-client privilege, despite the disclosure, because (1) the memo was a communication between 
attorney and client with advice regarding conduct of litigation on the behalf of the client and (2) there 
was no evidence that the city voluntarily relinquished the memo; therefore, the city never waived the 
privilege.  State v. Today’s Bookstore, Inc., 86 Ohio App.3d 810, 621 N.E.2d 1283 (Montgomery 
1993). [Under the Supreme Court’s later decision in McDermott, a subsequent disclosure, whether 
voluntary or not, would not waive the statutory privilege. The Bookstore opinion correctly states the 
law with respect to the common-law privilege and waiver thereof.] See also  In re Grand Jury 
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Subpoenas Issued to Alice Lynd, 2005 Ohio 4607, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 4170 (Scioto) 
(upholding contempt finding against lawyer for refusal to testify; affirmance based in part on fact that 
“the trial court reasonably could have concluded that [the client] inculpated himself to help [other 
clients of Lynd] and knew that Lynd would disclose this information to third parties.” Id. at para. 18.) 
(bracketed material added); see also In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing, in habeas 
proceeding, trial court’s holding that assertion of innocence waived privilege; such a waiver is “a 
legal fiction if ‘waiver’ means a voluntary act.”  Id. at 452.). 
Partial disclosure: A partial disclosure by the client of privileged communications has been held to 
render discoverable all opinion letters on the subject written by counsel to the client. Thus, in 
Mid-American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App.3d 481, 599 N.E.2d 
699 (Wood 1991) (per curiam), in a coverage dispute between insured and insurer, the court held 
that the insurer waived any common-law attorney-client privilege when it reported part of the 
contents of its counsel’s opinion to the insured in a letter, thereby making the entire communication 
by the insurer’s counsel discoverable. The insurer was compelled to release all letters of opinion from 
its counsel to the insured concerning insurance coverage provided to the insured. Accord 
Hollingsworth v. Time Warner Cable, 157 Ohio App.3d 539, 2004 Ohio 3130, 812 N.E.2d 976 
(relying on Mid-American; finding the disclosure of communication in question voluntary, thereby 
waiving privilege as to all communications on same subject matter). Without any discussion of the 
issue, the Hollingsworth court rejected defendant’s argument that its disclosure was “inadvertent,” 
not voluntary. On the facts, the inadvertence argument seems disingenuous at best. Time Warner first 
had produced and used the document on its own behalf at an administrative hearing and then 
produced it again in discovery. One is hard pressed to find this conduct inadvertent. 
On the subject of a lawyer’s duty upon receipt of documents that the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know were sent inadvertently, see Ohio Rule 4.4(b) and section 4.4:300 of the treatise. 
Insured driver’s disclosure to opposing party: Where a written statement by the insured of his account 
of facts surrounding a car accident was given to the insurer’s agent and transmitted to the insurer’s 
attorney for use in prospective litigation, the document was privileged as a communication between 
client and attorney. But subsequent disclosure by the insured to third persons, including counsel for 
the opposing party in the original action, of a different version of the facts contained in the first 
statement, and insured’s voluntary testimony as to the matters recorded in the statement in a 
subsequent declaratory judgment action brought by the insurer against the insured, destroyed the 
insured’s privilege. Thus it was not error for the trial court to have allowed the insurer to introduce the 
insured’s written statement in evidence.  Travelers Indem. Co. v. Cochrane, 155 Ohio St. 305, 98 
N.E.2d 840 (1951) (syllabus four). [Travelers is suspect on a number of points. First, it seems to 
treat the case as one involving the statutory privilege, even though there was no attorney testimony 
involved; second, query whether it is a privilege case at all, since the statement at issue was being 
voluntarily put in evidence. Third, even if privilege principles were applicable, the case seems 
inconsistent with the general rule that the communication itself is privileged, even though the facts 
underlying the communication are not.] 
Subsequent disclosure of privileged information by one not authorized to do so does not waive the 
privilege: After a party communicated involvement in a fatal accident to his attorney for the purpose 
of receiving professional advice, the attorney disclosed this information to the police. The trial court 
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erred in admitting the attorney’s statements into evidence because the information was privileged, 
only the client can waive the privilege, and the driver had neither waived the privilege nor authorized 
his attorney to do so.  State v. Shipley, 94 Ohio App.3d 771, 641 N.E.2d 822 (Licking 1994); see 
also In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (no waiver of 
privilege by virtue of unauthorized publication of confidential material by newspaper). 
 
1.6:530  Waiver by Putting Assistance or Communication in Issue 
In addition to the client’s (1) agreement to waiver of the privilege or disclaimer of it, or failure to 
object to the opposition’s use of privileged testimony (see section 1.6:510), or (2) any subsequent 
disclosure to a third party (see section 1.6:520), waiver can also occur as a result of the client’s 
putting the subject of the privileged communication in issue in litigation, or by asserting that the legal 
assistance provided was ineffective, negligent, or otherwise wrongful. 
Waiver by voluntary testimony of client: In Spitzer v. Stillings, 109 Ohio St. 297, 142 N.E. 365 
(1924) (syllabus two), the Ohio Supreme Court held, under the attorney-client privilege statute, that 
if a party voluntarily testified as a witness in his own behalf, an attorney to whom communications 
may have been made by such party, in the relation of attorney and client, could be compelled to testify 
on the same subject concerning which the party has testified, even though no reference was made in 
the party’s testimony to any attorney-client communications having been made.  The same rule 
applied with respect to cross-examination of a party who had voluntarily testified on direct -- that is, 
the party could be compelled to testify concerning communications with his or her attorney, in that 
relation, on any pertinent subject testified to on direct, even though no mention was made of such 
communications during the direct testimony. Spitzer, id. (syllabus one). Accord Westervelt v. 
Rooker, 4 Ohio St.3d 146, 149, 447 N.E.2d 1307, 1310 (1983) (“where a party testifies in any trial, 
such party may be cross-examined by the opposing party concerning communication with his 
attorney on any subject pertinent to his claim or defense, even though the fact of communications that 
have passed between them has not been referred to by such party in direct examination,” citing 
Spitzer, syllabus one).  
A few Ohio cases concluded that Spitzer was overruled sub silentio by the Supreme Court’s later 
opinion in Foley v. Poschke, 137 Ohio St. 593, 31 N.E.2d 845 (1941) (per curiam), which held that 
it was error to allow the attorney to “testif[y] as to matters which were of a confidential nature and 
concerning which the defendant had not voluntarily testified.” See, e.g., Christophel v. McNeill, No. 
375, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 13006, at *20, 21 (Highland Dec. 24, 1980). The Supreme Court, 
however, didn’t seem to consider Spitzer overruled, as they followed Spitzer in one 
post-Christophel case (Westervelt, 4 Ohio St.3d 146, 447 N.E.2d 1307) and cited to it in the 
attorney-client privilege context in two others ( Moscovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 69 Ohio St.3d 
838, 635 N.E.2d 331 (1994), and Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 452 N.E.2d 1304 (1983)).  
The Spitzer rule has been criticized by more than one commentator; see 1 Paul C. Giannelli & 
Barbara Rook Snyder, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice, Evidence §  501.13, at 339-40 (2d ed. 2001); 
David B. Alden & Matthew P. Silversten, Voluntary Client Testimony as a Privilege Waiver:  Is 
Ohio’s Law Caught in a Time Warp?, 59 Clev.St.L.Rev 1 (2011). Not surprisingly, as the title of 
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the article indicates, the authors took a rather dim view of the state of the law as set forth in Spitzer, 
and urged that it be repudiated.  
This view has prevailed; pursuant to Amended Substitute House Bill No. 461, effective March 22, 
2013 (amending RC 2317.02), the “voluntary testimony” “same subject” waiver of the privilege, as 
reflected in Spitzer, has been abrogated: the statutory reference to a client who “voluntarily testifies” 
has been changed to “voluntarily reveals the substance of attorney-client communications in a 
nonprivileged context . . . .” This relegates the Spitzer rule to the dust bin of Ohio legal history. 
Voluntary testimony by the client concerning confidential attorney-client communications will serve 
to waive the common-law privilege as well. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Cochrane, 155 Ohio St. 
305, 98 N.E.2d 840 (1951) (client statement admissible; any privilege that attached was destroyed by 
client’s voluntary testimony on the subject). 
 
Implied waiver of privilege by client: If a client asserts a claim that puts otherwise privileged 
information at issue (typically from a previous representation), the question of implied waiver arises. 
In this connection, at least six Ohio decisions have utilized the three-part test articulated in Hearn v. 
Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975), in determining whether the attorney-client privilege 
was waived. [Be advised that the following discussion must be read in light of the decision in 
Jackson v. Greger, 110 Ohio St.3d 488, 2006 Ohio 4968, 854 N.E.2d 487, and cases following 
Jackson, set forth in detail below.] Pursuant to the Hearn test, the privilege is impliedly waived by 
the party asserting the privilege if the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) assertion of the 
privilege is the result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through 
this affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by making it relevant to 
the case; and (3) application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to 
information vital to its defense. See First Union Nat’l Bank v. Maenle, 162 Ohio App.3d 479, 2005 
Ohio 4021, 833 N.E.2d 1279 (multiple-count counterclaim in response to foreclosure action; all three 
prongs of Hearn satisfied; complete waiver of privilege), appeal allowed, 107 Ohio St.3d 1680, 
2005 Ohio 6480, 839 N.E.2d 402 (table), appeal dismissed and court of appeals opinion ordered 
not precedential, 110 Ohio St.3d 1240, 2006 Ohio 3820, 851 N.E.2d 507 (as to why nonprecedential, 
see discussion of Supreme Court opinion in Jackson v. Greger below); Jackson v. Greger, 160 
Ohio App.3d 258, 2005 Ohio 1588, 826 N.E.2d 900 (Montgomery) (malpractice suit; no waiver), 
aff’d on other grounds, 110 Ohio St.3d 488, 2006 Ohio 4968, 854 N.E.2d 487 (see discussion of 
Supreme Court opinion below).  Smalley v. Friedman, Domiano & Smith Co., 2004 Ohio 2351, 
2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 2076 (Cuyahoga) (legal-malpractice action; denial of protective order 
affirmed; attorney-client privilege argument rejected on Hearn waiver grounds); G. Rand Smith Co., 
L.P.A. v. Footbridge Capital, LLC, 2002 Ohio 2189, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 2198 (Union) 
(malpractice counterclaim; trial court granted counterclaimant’s motion to compel; in reversing, 
appellate court applied Hearn implied-waiver test and found third prong (vital to defense) not 
satisfied); Ward v. Graydon, Head & Ritchey, 147 Ohio App.3d 325, 770 N.E.2d 613 (Clermont 
2001) (malpractice suit; waiver); Frank W. Schaefer, Inc. v. C. Garfield Mitchell Agency, Inc., 82 
Ohio App.3d 322, 612 N.E.2d 442 (Montgomery 1992) (negligence and breach of contract suit by 
insured against insurer; no waiver -- second and third prongs of Hearn test not satisfied). Only 
information that is unavailable to the defense from any other source is “vital.” H&D Steel Serv. Inc. 
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v. Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, No. 72758,, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 3422 
(Cuyahoga July 23, 1998), at *9. See also Cuervo v. Snell, 232 B.R. 684 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999) 
(privilege waived where defense asserted in adversary proceeding is premised on advice of counsel, 
citing Hearn and Schaefer). 
The Ward court clearly thought it was applying the common-law privilege waiver rules (see 147 
Ohio App.3d at 331, 770 N.E.2d at 617-18); this appears to be the case in Smith as well, whereas 
Jackson and Schaefer seemed to be applying the statutory privilege (see 82 Ohio App.3d at 328, 
612 N.E.2d at 446), as did Smalley (see 160 Ohio App.3d 258, 826 N.E.2d 900, at paras. 11-15). 
H&D is silent on whether the court was applying the statutory or the common-law privilege. On the 
one hand, the opinion letter sought in H&D (and the documents and communications sought in 
Jackson) can be viewed as “attorney testimony,” to which the statute is applicable; on the other, since 
the discovery was sought from plaintiff, not its attorney, it may well be “client testimony,” to which 
common-law privilege rules are applicable, see Mid-American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App.3d 481, 486, 599 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Wood 1991) (per curiam). 
There is no such uncertainty as to First Union, Schaefer, Smalley, Smith and Ward -- since 
discovery of the attorney’s advice (Schaefer), files (Smalley), and testimony (First Union, Smith 
and Ward) was sought from the attorney, it was “attorney testimony.” Nevertheless, inasmuch as 
waiver under the statute (ORC 2317.02(A)) is restricted to the instances expressly set forth therein, 
State v. McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 651 N.E.2d 985 (1995) (discussed in section 1.6:520), it 
would seem that in all of these cases the implied waiver at issue (a waiver not set forth in ORC 
2317.02(A)) should be operative only in instances involving the common-law privilege. 
Although not using the Hearn test, at least one other Ohio case has recognized 
that the attorney-client privilege may indeed be waived when, as here, 
the client and attorney deliberately place the contents of such 
[attorney-client] communications in issue by presenting sworn 
statements and raising advice of counsel as a defense. 
Kremer v. Cox, 114 Ohio App.3d 41, 58, 682 N.E.2d 1006, 1017 (Summit 1996) (applying the 
statutory privilege -- appropriately so, it would seem, since it not only involved “attorney testimony” 
by affidavit, but also the client voluntarily “testified” by affidavit and the attorney’s affidavit, 
attached to a motion by the client, can fairly be deemed to have been made with the client’s express 
consent). The Kremer case also noted that the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that this waiver 
argument “would have merit if it [had been] addressed to the attorney-client privilege of R.C. 
2317.02(A),” rather than an OH Civ R 26(B)(3) exemption.  In re Election of Nov. 6, 1990 for 
Office of Atty. Gen., 57 Ohio St.3d 614, 615, 567 N.E.2d 243, 244 (1991) (opinion in chambers 
by Moyer, C.J.). (The Election case is also discussed at section 1.6:750.) 
The Hearn implied-waiver issue was placed in the sharpest possible focus by the opinions issued in 
Jackson v. Greger, 110 Ohio St.3d 488, 2006 Ohio 4968, 854 N.E.2d 487, decided October 11, 
2006. Jackson was a malpractice suit by a former client, Jackson, against her ex-lawyer, Greger, for 
allegedly giving the client advice to plead guilty to a resisting arrest charge. This had the result of 
precluding, on collateral-estoppel grounds, her subsequent civil-rights claim, with new legal 
representation, against the arresting officers. In the malpractice action, Greger sought from Jackson 
production of “all attorney-client communications and documentation related to the Section 1983 
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action.” Id. at para. 4. Jackson resisted production, and the trial court granted Greger’s motion to 
compel. On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals applied the three-pronged Hearn test and 
found the second and third prongs not satisfied. Thus there was no implied waiver and the trial court 
order was reversed. The Supreme Court granted review. 
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Moyer held that privileged communications directly between an 
attorney and client can be waived only by the means set forth in ORC 2317.02(A), purporting to 
follow State v. McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 651 N.E.2d 985 (1995) (as to which see section 
1.6:520). Since the case involved direct communications between attorney and client and since the 
Hearn implied-waiver test is not included in the statute, that test was inapplicable. Further, since 
neither of the grounds for waiver expressly stated in the statute -- express consent by or voluntary 
testimony of the client on the same subject -- was present, there was no waiver, and the trial court’s 
order to compel was therefore erroneous. 
This affirmance of the court of appeals, albeit on entirely different grounds, raises significant issues 
concerning the interplay between the statutory testimonial privilege of 2317.02(A) and the 
common-law privilege. Much of the Chief Justice’s reasoning is consistent with settled Ohio law. 
Thus, the statutory privilege can be waived only in the manner stated in the statute. Moreover, this 
statutory testimonial privilege and the exclusive means of waiver of it contained in the statute apply in 
discovery as well as at trial. The result is that Hearn-type waivers are inapplicable to attorney-client 
communications controlled by the statute. With respect to the body of Ohio law utilizing the Hearn 
rationale, the Court had this to say: 
[W]e are aware that several Ohio courts of appeal have applied the 
Hearn test [citing in footnote, inter alia, First Union, Ward, and 
Frank W. Schaefer]. We are nevertheless guided by the significant 
body of law from this court that has consistently rejected the adoption 
of judicially created waivers, exceptions, and limitations for 
testimonial privilege statutes. 
Id. at para. 13 (bracketed material added). 
The flaw in this analysis, subscribed to by four members of the Court, is that the applicable statute 
prohibits testimony by “an attorney” concerning privileged communications; in this case, it was an 
attorney who was seeking to compel his former client to divulge privileged information, a matter 
simply not covered by the statute. Indeed, the majority opinion confirms its own flaw in footnote, 
where the Court correctly states that the 2317.02(A) testimonial privilege “prevents an attorney from 
testifying . . . .” Id. at para. 7, n.1 (emphasis added). Only Justice Lanzinger picked up on this point; 
her opinion, concurring in judgment only, is right on the money. She wastes no time in pointing out 
that the statute “precludes an attorney from testifying on issues covered by the attorney-client 
privilege [quoting 2317.02(A)].” Id. at paras. 22-24 (emphasis in original). She continues: 
 The statute’s prohibition does not address the client. Nor does 
R.C. 2317.02(A) abrogate the common-law privilege. We recently 
noted in State ex rel Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 
261, 2005 Ohio 1508, 824 N.E.2d 990, that “R.C. 2317.02(A), by its 
very terms, is a mere testimonial privilege precluding an attorney from 
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testifying about confidential communications. The common-law 
attorney-client privilege, however, ‘reaches far beyond a proscription 
against testimonial speech. The privilege protects against any 
dissemination of information obtained in the confidential relationship.’ 
Am. Motors [Corp. v. Huffstutler (1991)], 61 Ohio St.3d [343] at 348, 
575 N.E.2d 116.” Id. at [para.] 26. 
Jackson at para. 25 (bracketed material, except the last, in original). Accord Grace v. Mastruserio, 
182 Ohio App.3d 243, 2007 Ohio 3942, 912 N.E.2d 608 (Hamilton), discussed below. Justice 
Lanzinger goes on to an equally telling point – that the majority’s reliance on McDermott is 
misplaced. She notes that McDermott is relied on for the proposition that “‘because this case 
involves communications directly between an attorney and a client, R.C. 2317.02(A) 
applies.’“ McDermott, “however, squarely considered whether an attorney could be compelled to 
testify without a statutory waiver.” Id. at para. 26. 
 This case is different. Greger did not seek to compel testimony 
of an attorney for trial or at deposition but sought the production of 
documents and answers to interrogatories from Jackson concerning her 
federal civil rights action. R.C. 2317.02(A) by its terms does not apply. 
Jackson’s claim of privilege arises not from statute but from common 
law. 
Id. at para. 27. Justice Lanzinger laments the implicit repudiation of the Hearn rule in Ohio; she 
disagrees that nontestimonial matters are covered by the statute and would approve and apply the 
“useful test of Hearn v. Rhay.” Id. at para. 31. 
Despite the persuasiveness of the Lanzinger opinion, in the majority’s view any effort to compel 
disclosure of direct attorney-client communications, whether from the attorney or the client or a 
former client, will be controlled exclusively by the provisions of ORC 2713.02(A). All of the 
well-considered pre-Jackson authority limited the application of the statute to compelled attorney 
testimony. (And see Grace and Professionals Direct, discussed below.) In this connection, there is 
no mention in Jackson of language in the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, which were approved 
by the Supreme Court in August 2006 (effective February 1, 2007), two months prior to its decision in 
Jackson. Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [3] states that 
[t]he attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply in 
judicial and other proceedings in which the lawyer may be called as a 
witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client.  
The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than 
those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of 
law. 
(Emphasis added.)  It is difficult to reconcile this language, which the Supreme Court blessed in 
August 2006, with its holding in Jackson two months later. 
A number of post-Jackson decisions have grappled with these issues, including the extensive 
discussion in Grace v. Mastruserio, 182 Ohio App.3d 243, 2007 Ohio 3942, 912 N.E.2d 608 
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(Hamilton). In Grace, the trial court in a malpractice action ordered  the plaintiff to comply with the 
defendant-lawyer’s discovery request to review the entire divorce case file (which included that of 
defendant’s successor, as well as that of defendant). The defendant-lawyer, Mastruserio, had 
represented plaintiff in the divorce proceeding.  (This procedural context is almost identical to that 
presented in Jackson). The court of appeals reversed, holding that the lower court in such 
circumstances must hold a hearing and review the case file for privileged materials, rather than 
issuing a blanket order, without hearing, compelling production of the file in its entirety. The news in 
the Grace case, however, is not so much this holding, but rather how the court got there.  The court’s 
analysis is instructive and, unlike Jackson v. Greger, provides a primer on the correct 
interrelationship between the statutory privilege and the common-law attorney-client privilege. The 
plaintiff argued that the privilege can be waived only by the means set forth in the statute and that 
there was no such waiver here. The court’s response was “[n]ot so,” for the reasons it proceeded to 
explain: First, the statutory privilege precludes “an attorney from testifying on issues covered by the 
attorney-client privilege.” Id. at para. 16 (emphasis by the court). In other words, the statute’s 
application by its terms is limited to instances in which “a party is seeking to compel testimony of an 
attorney for trial or at a deposition – as opposed to cases where a party is seeking to compel 
production of nontestimonial documents. . . . In cases that are not covered under R.C. 2317.02, the 
common-law attorney client privilege applies.” Id. at para. 17. Then, in a bit of judicial legerdemain, 
Judge Painter disposes of the Jackson ruling as follows: 
But the Jackson court expressly limited its holding to the case that was 
under consideration: “In the instant case, * * * we decline to add a 
judicially created waiver to the statutorily created privilege.” The 
abbreviated language used by the Jackson court left the decision 
whether the common-law implied-waiver doctrine applies to a 
particular set of facts to the sound discretion of the courts. As we have 
noted, Ohio appellate districts have favored application of the Hearn 
test.  And our reading of Jackson convinces us that the Ohio Supreme 
Court did not abrogate the common law, and that it sufficiently limited 
its holding to the facts of that case such that appellate districts may 
decide for themselves, on a case-by-case basis, whether the 
common-law doctrine of implied waiver as announced by Hearn is 
applicable. 
Id. at para. 22. The icing on the cake comes in the following words: 
Categorical judicial application of the bright-line statutory waiver 
followed by Jackson obstructs the trial court’s discretion in ruling on 
nontestimonial discovery matters, raises form over substance, is a clear 
misreading of the express language of R.C. 2317.02, and works an 
injustice on parties who are able to satisfy Hearn. 
Id. at para. 24.  In sum, the court holds that the statute protects against compelled attorney testimony 
and that the implied-waiver exception of Hearn is relevant to records and documents in those 
respects where the statute is inapplicable.  Thus in Grace, “Mastruserio sought compelled discovery 
of the entire case file [including the file of the plaintiff’s successor attorney, Collins], not Collin’s 
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testimony, as prohibited by R.C. 2317.02(A).” Id. at para. 26. “The common-law implied waiver 
exception to the attorney-client privilege survives R.C. 2317.02 and Jackson.” Id. at para. 27. The 
case was remanded for hearing and review by the trial court to determine the scope of the protection 
provided to the file by the privilege and the work-product doctrine. 
Apparently no attempt was made to have the Supreme Court review the Grace court’s reading of 
Jackson v. Greger. As is apparent from our own commentary on the Jackson case, set forth above 
and written for the most part prior to the decision in Grace, we believe that Judge Painter got it right. 
A Sixth Circuit decision finding Grace v. Mastruserio persuasive on this point is In re Prof’ls 
Direct Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 432 (6th
 
Cir 2009), where the court reasoned as follows: 
As the magistrate here recognized, by its terms § 2317.02(A) applies to 
attorney testimony, not documents held by defendants. State ex rel. 
Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005 Ohio 1508, 
824 N.E.2d 990, 996 (Ohio 2005) (“R.C. 2317.02(A), by its very terms, 
is a mere testimonial privilege precluding an attorney from testifying 
about confidential communications.”); Grace v. Mastruserio, 2007 
Ohio 3942, 2007 WL 2216080 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (“A plain 
reading of the statute clearly limits the statute’s application to cases in 
which a party is seeking to compel testimony of an attorney for trial or 
at a deposition – as opposed to cases where a party is seeking to compel 
production of nontestimonial documents.”). Because Wiles does not 
seek to compel attorney testimony, § 2317.02(A) does not apply. 
538 F.2d at 440-41. 
One other subsidiary, but nevertheless important, issue raised by the Lanzinger concurrence in 
Jackson is whether the statute is to be interpreted narrowly to apply only to testimony at trial or 
deposition. She so argued. Although Judge Painter in Grace joined Justice Lanzinger’s camp in 
reading the statutory privilege as exclusively “testimonial” (accord Leslie, Prof’ls Direct, both supra; 
Shell v. Drew & Ward Co., L.P.A., 178 Ohio App.3d 163, 2008 Ohio 4474, 897 N.E.2d 201 
(Hamilton) (documents, not testimony, at issue; therefore “we are concerned with the common-law 
attorney-client privilege,” id. at para. 17, citing Grace (but not Jackson)), that would not be the 
result under the Jackson majority opinion. If the waiver issue involves direct communication 
between attorney and client, it is controlled exclusively by ORC 2317.02(A), even if the issue 
involves compelled production from the client of nontestimonial evidence in the form of allegedly 
privileged documents. Query whether the Supreme Court’s rewriting of the Ohio privilege statute, 
which by its express terms is limited to precluding “an attorney from testifying,” will withstand 
subsequent analysis. Another intermediate appellate court opinion touching on this issue subsequent 
to Jackson likewise had doubts about the Jackson reading of 2317.02(A). See Air-Ride, Inc. v. 
DHL Express (USA), Inc., 2008 Ohio 5669, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4761 (Clinton), where, in 
footnote the court noted that while 2317.02(A) “seems solely to refer to a prohibition on attorney 
testimony,” the Supreme Court held otherwise in Jackson. 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4761, at n.4. 
Air-Ride therefore held, consistent with Jackson, that the statute’s exception for voluntary testimony 
on the same subject by the client (here, via affidavit) applied to nontestimonial information also 
sought from the client and the privilege was therefore waived. The broad reach of the statute under the 
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Jackson reading is also seen in Estate of Hohler v. Hohler, 185 Ohio App.3d 420, 2009 Ohio 7013, 
924 N.E.2d 419 (Carroll): “Thus [pursuant to Jackson], R.C. 2317.02(A) is applicable not only to a 
request to compel testimony but is also to a [discovery] request for attorney-client communications 
contained within the attorney’s file.” Id. at para. 39 (bracketed material added). 
One would have thought, even after Jackson (which dealt only with compelled client disclosure of 
privileged information to one outside the privileged relationship), that an Ohio attorney retains the 
right to reveal “information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary for any of the following purposes,” including that of 
establishing a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the 
client. Rule 1.6(b)(5). See section 1.6:630. Although the court of appeals in Squire, Sanders & 
Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 2009 Ohio 2490, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 2102 
(Cuyahoga), came to the contrary conclusion, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals at 127 
Ohio St.3d 161, 2010 Ohio 4469, 937 N.E.2d 533. 
At issue in Givaudan, a fee-collection case with a malpractice counterclaim by the former client, 
were the discoverability by the law firm of testimony and documents from the former client, and the 
propriety of the firm’s use of confidential information in its own possession to prosecute its case and 
defend itself against the counterclaim. The trial court had summarily ordered production; the court of 
appeals reversed and remanded for an in-camera hearing 
to evaluate all of the discovery at issue in accordance with the rules 
pertaining to testimonial (statutory) privilege and any waiver thereof, 
common law privilege and any waiver thereof, and work product 
privilege and exceptions thereto. 
2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 2102 at para. 1. 
The pertinent facts were these:  SS&D sued Givaudan for $1.8 million in fees for its work in 
defending product liability lawsuits. Givaudan counterclaimed on various grounds, including 
malpractice. SS&D served interrogatories and document requests. Givaudan objected to the 
discovery and moved for a protective order, citing, inter alia, attorney-client privilege and work 
product protection. During depositions of former and present general counsel of Givaudan, the 
company repeatedly invoked privilege and work product. The trial court denied Givaudan’s motion 
for protective order and granted SS&D’s motion to compel. In doing so, it distinguished Jackson v. 
Greger on grounds that Jackson “‘did not abrogate, alter or even address the traditional 
self-protection exception to privilege for communications between lawyers and former clients who 
are parties to a professional liability suit,’“ id. at para. 22; it also cited Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(5) for the 
proposition that lawyers may reveal protected information in order to establish a claim or defense. 
The court also held that documents in SS&D’s possession relating to the billing dispute could be used 
by it to “‘mount a defense in this case.’“ Id. 
On appeal, the Eighth District addressed the documents already in SS&D’s possession.  According to 
the court, the trial court erred in “summarily” concluding “without applying the law as to waivers, or 
exclusions,” that SS&D could use these documents, “if these documents contained communications 
intended to be confidential.” Id. at para. 30. The upshot of this part of the case was that all documents 
claimed to be privileged or work product must be reviewed by the trial court under applicable law. 
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The appellate court next turned its attention to the trial court’s granting of the motion to compel 
production of privileged documents and testimony from Givaudan’s present and former in-house 
counsel. First, examination of the statutory testimonial privilege set forth in ORC 2317.02(A) and the 
Jackson decision led to the not-surprising result that the testimonial privilege can be waived only by 
the means set forth in the statute. Nothing was said about exceptions to the privilege, even though the 
Supreme Court has distinguished the two in the past; see Boone v. Vanliner Ins. Co., 91 Ohio St.3d 
209, 744 N.E.2d 154 (2001) (“The flaw in Vanliner’s argument is that McDermott addresses client 
waiver of the privilege, whereas Moscovitz sets forth an exception to the privilege . . ., id. at 213, 714 
N.E.2d at 157 (emphasis by the Court)). Regarding Rule 1.6(b)(5), the appellate court concluded that 
it could “not read Rule 1.6(b)(5) as the preeminent and controlling authority in this matter; the correct 
analysis must focus chiefly upon the statutory and common law related to attorney-client privilege for 
each piece of evidence for which this privilege is claimed.” Id. at para. 69. 
The bottom line on the attorney-client privilege was that the court of appeals directed the trial court on 
remand to review the evidence to determine, first, if testimonial evidence is involved and, if so, has 
Givaudan met its burden in establishing privilege, or has the statutory privilege been waived per 
2317.02(A) and Jackson; and, second, whether the contested evidence involves nontestimonial 
evidence and if so, has Givaudan met its burden of establishing common-law privilege, or has there 
been a waiver thereof under the Hearn test. [The court apparently did not recognize that common-law 
privilege can encompass testimonial, as well as nontestimonial, evidence.] 
Accepting review, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, with all six justices (C.J. 
Brown not participating) voting for reversal. (Justice Lanzinger concurred in judgment only.) 127 
Ohio St.3d 161, 2010 Ohio 4469, 937 N.E.2d 533. In syllabus, the Court stated as follows: 
1.  Ohio recognizes the common-law self-protection privilege, which 
permits an attorney to testify concerning attorney-client 
communications where necessary to establish a claim for legal fees on 
behalf of the attorney or to defend against a charge of malpractice or 
other wrongdoing in litigation between the attorney and the client. 
2.  Attorney work product, including but not limited to, mental 
impressions, theories, and legal conclusions, may be discovered upon a 
showing of good cause if it is directly at issue in the case, the need for 
the information is compelling, and the evidence cannot be obtained 
elsewhere. 
With respect to the attorney-client privilege, Justice O’Donnell, writing for the Court, determined that 
the common-law self-protection exception to the privilege has been recognized both generally and in 
Ohio, citing Estate of Butler, 32 Ohio L.Abs.1 1939 Ohio App. LEXIS 491 (Franklin), aff’d, In 
re Butler’s Estate, 137 Ohio St 96, 28 N.E.2d 186 (1940). In doing so, the Court found inapplicable 
the Jackson v. Greger holding that waivers to the statutory privilege cannot be judicially created: 
Jackson is distinguishable on its facts because it dealt only with a 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege; we concern ourselves in the 
instant case with a common-law exception to the privilege, the 
self-protection exception. 
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*   *   *   *   * 
Unlike waiver, which involves the client’s relinquishment of the 
protections of R.C. 2713.02(A) once they have attached, an exception 
to the attorney-client privilege falls into the category of situations in 
which the privilege does not attach to the communications in the first 
instance and is therefore excluded from the operation of the statute. 
127 Ohio St.3d 161, at paras. 44, 47 (emphasis by the Court). 
 
The Court found additional support in Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(5), which also sets forth 
the self-protection exception. 
In conclusion as to the privilege, the Court held that “when the attorney-client relationship has been 
placed in issue in litigation between an attorney and a client, or a former client, the self-protection 
exception permits discovery of the evidence necessary to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the 
attorney.” Id. at para. 64.  
Justice Lanzinger, who believes “that common-law exceptions are really no different than 
common-law waivers” and that neither are abrogated by RC 2317.02(A), found unconvincing the 
majority’s distinguishing of the Jackson case based on the distinction between waivers and 
exceptions.  See id. at paras. 67-69.  
See also In re Prof’ls Direct Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2009) (drawing the same distinction as 
the Supreme Court did in Givaudan between waivers and exceptions in holding that the documents in 
question in the Professionals case were not protected by 2317.02(A) but were discoverable under a 
common-law exception to the privilege. 
And finally, in the interest of full disclosure, the reader should know that some of the contributors to 
this treatise are affiliated with Jones Day, the law firm representing SS&D in the Givaudan litigation. 
Filing of complaint insufficient: Filing of a domestic relations complaint, which contains the address 
of the plaintiff as required by court rule, does not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as 
to the client’s subsequent address. ORC 2317.02(A) provides the exclusive means by which the 
statutory privilege can be waived, and, inasmuch as the client neither consented or voluntarily 
testified on the subject itself, the subsequent address remained privileged, and it was error to hold the 
attorney, appearing as a witness pursuant to subpoena, in contempt for refusing to disclose the address.  
Waldmann v. Waldmann, 48 Ohio St.2d 176, 358 N.E.2d 521 (1976) (per curiam). 
Voluntary testimony of prospective client: Even when the client does not ultimately hire the lawyer, if 
the prospective client voluntarily testifies regarding his or her conversation with the lawyer, the 
lawyer may be compelled to testify on that subject in accordance with ORC 2317.02(A). In such 
circumstances, the lawyer may reveal confidences and secrets. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 91-15, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 14 (June 14, 1991) (syllabus).  
Attack on lawyer’s services: As a general proposition, communications otherwise privileged that are 
relevant to a contention by the client that the lawyer’s assistance was defective, can be analyzed under 
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the rubric of either waiver or exception. See, e.g., 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers §§  80(1)(b), 83 (2000). In Ohio, with its statutory testimonial privilege (ORC 2317.02(A)) 
and strict limits on waiver of the statutory privilege, it is now clear that evidence pertinent to lawyer 
self-defense is an exception to the privilege and that waiver analysis does not apply. See the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio 
St.3d 161, 2010 Ohio 4469, 937 N.E.2d 533, which is extensively discussed in this section supra at 
“Implied waiver of privilege by client.” 
 
 
1.6:600  Exceptions to Attorney-Client Privilege 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.6(b), (c) 
ORC 2317.02(A) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.6 
Ohio Commentary 
Giannelli & Snyder, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice, Evidence §§  501.11-501.14 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §§  55:901 et seq. 
ALI-LGL §§  81-85 
Wolfram §  6.4 
Ohio Rule 1.6 expressly includes privileged information within its definition of “information relating 
to the representation” that a lawyer shall not reveal unless permitted or required to do so under Rule 
1.6(b) or (c). As a result, all of these permitted or mandatory disclosures can be viewed as potential 
exceptions to the privilege in Ohio, to the extent they involve “information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege under applicable law.” It must be remembered, of course, that the 1.6(b) and 
(c) disclosures can have a broader reach than privileged information – they encompass as well 
information not protected by the attorney-client privilege, so long as it is “information relating to the 
representation.” The following discussion in sections 1.6:610-:670, most of which treat matters 
within the disclosure provisions of Rules 1.6(b) and (c), focuses on information protected by the 
privilege. Finally, when ORC 2317.02(A) is applicable, the privilege can be waived only in the 
manner set forth in the statute. 
  
1.6:610  Exception for Disputes Concerning Decedent’s Disposition of Property 
Since 1953, ORC 2317.02(A) has provided that when the client is deceased an attorney may testify 
with the express consent of the client’s surviving spouse, executor, or administrator. See 125 Ohio 
Laws 313 (1953). This amendment repudiated the holding in Swetland v. Miles, 101 Ohio St. 501, 
130 N.E. 22 (1920), that an action to contest the validity of a will is not an exception to the statutory 
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rule prohibiting an attorney from testifying as to confidential communications with the client, even 
though the client is dead at the time of the action and even though the client’s personal representative 
consents to the testimony. 
By amendment effective June 15, 2006, ORC 2317.02(A)(1) now also provides in a second 
paragraph that the statutory privilege does not apply with respect to communications between an 
attorney and a client, since deceased, if the communication is relevant to a dispute between parties 
claiming through the deceased client and if the dispute addresses client competency when the client 
executed a document that is the basis of the dispute, or whether, when executing such a document, the 
deceased client was the victim of fraud, undue influence, or duress. 
Attorney as subscribing witness: When a testator procures his attorney as a subscribing witness to a 
will, the testator thereby expressly consents, in accordance with the terms of what is now ORC 
2317.02(A), that the attorney may testify as any other subscribing witness regarding the capacity of 
the testator and any other fact affecting the validity of the will. In an action to construe the will, 
however, the lawyer who drafted the will is not competent to vary the terms thereof or to testify 
concerning communications between attorney and client regarding the estate itself, the objects of the 
testator’s bounty, or the meaning and effect of the provisions of the will.  Knepper v. Knepper, 103 
Ohio St. 529, 134 N.E. 476 (1921) (syllabi two & three); accord Nicholl v. Bergner, 76 Ohio App. 
245, 63 N.E.2d 828 (Lorain 1945) (in will-construction action, allowing attorney for testatrix to 
testify concerning declarations bearing upon intent, meaning, or effect of provisions in will, made by 
testatrix to attorney who drafted and was subscribing witness to will, was error; while there was no 
waiver of the statutory prohibition against such attorney testimony, the court found the error 
nonprejudicial given the totality of other evidence supporting the trial court’s decision). 
  
1.6:615  Exception to Prevent Death or Substantial Bodily Injury 
Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(1) permits a lawyer to disclose information otherwise protected by the 
attorney-client privilege if the lawyer reasonably believes disclosure is necessary “to prevent 
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.” See discussion at section 1.6:320. 
 
1.6:620  Exception for Client Crime or Fraud 
General considerations: A communication is excepted from the attorney-client privilege if the lawyer 
reasonably believes disclosure of the otherwise privileged information is necessary “to prevent 
commission of a crime by the client or other person.” Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(2). See discussion at section 
1.6:330. In the traditional parlance of attorney-client privilege law, this is the “crime-fraud” 
exception. Once again, note that the 1.6(b) exceptions (including 1.6(b)(2)) are not expressly stated as 
exceptions under ORC 2317.02(A). As a result, an attorney cannot be compelled to testify about such 
matters; the Rule 1.6(b) exceptions give him permission to disclose privileged information in the 
contexts there set forth. Rule 1.6(b)(6) (compliance with law or court order) is something of a special 
case, as to which see section 1.6:655. 
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A privileged communication may be a shield of defense as to crimes already committed, but it cannot 
be used as a sword or weapon of offense to enable persons to carry out contemplated crimes against 
society. State ex rel. Nix v. City of Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 700 N.E.2d 12 (1998) (per 
curiam). Kracht v. Kracht, Nos. 70005, 70009, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2412 (Cuyahoga June 5, 
1997) (“Communications otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege . . . are not protected if 
the communications are made in furtherance of crime, fraud, or other misconduct.” Id. at *26). But 
the mere fact that communications may be related to a crime is insufficient to overcome the 
attorney-client privilege. Nix supra; accord Sutton v. Stevens Painton Corp., 193 Ohio App.3d 68, 
2011 Ohio 841, 951 N.E.2d 91 (Cuyahoga) (for exception to apply, “the communications must be 
intended in some way to facilitate or to actively conceal a crime or fraud,” id. at para. 19). 
Note, however, under Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(3), that a lawyer may disclose privileged information 
regarding past illegal (including criminal) or fraudulent acts by the client, in furtherance of which the 
client has used the lawyer’s services, where the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary 
to mitigate substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another, resulting from such acts. 
Thus, in the limited circumstances of Rule 1.6(b)(3), the discretionary exception can include 
disclosure of otherwise privileged information relating to prior illegal or fraudulent acts by the client. 
See also section 1.6:620A. 
The related obligation to disclose past, present, or future crime or fraud related to an adjudicative 
proceeding (Rule 3.3(b)) is cross-referenced in the mandatory disclosure provision of Rule 1.6(c). 
See sections 1.6:395 and 1.6:670. 
 
Probable cause requirement for crime-fraud exception: The party invoking the crime-fraud exception 
must demonstrate that there is a factual basis for a showing of probable cause to believe a crime or 
fraud has been committed and that the communications in question were in furtherance of that crime 
or fraud. Absent such proof, an in camera inspection of the records of these communications is 
unnecessary. Compare State ex rel. Nix v. City of Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 700 N.E.2d 12 
(1998) (per curiam) (failure to introduce sufficient, credible evidence to overcome attorney-client 
privilege based on crime-fraud exception), with Euclid Ret. Vill., Ltd. P’ship v. Giffin, 2002 Ohio 
2710, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 2788 (App. Cuyahoga) (holding no abuse of discretion by trial court 
in finding that plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of presenting “factual evidence proving that it had 
a reasonable basis for believing that the documents contained evidence that Giffin sought Swetland’s 
counsel in furtherance of unlawful activity. Plaintiffs specified the unlawful activity was self-dealing 
and the unlawful transfer of partnership debt.” Id. at para. 34.). 
Unlawful adoption: Attorneys participating in the private placement for adoption of a minor child, in 
violation of the statutory adoption procedure, cannot utilize the attorney-client privilege to refuse to 
testify as to the name and address of the person or persons having possession of the child.  Lemley v. 
Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 452 N.E.2d 1304 (1983). While the court did not invoke the crime-fraud 
exception as such, the “wrongdoing” described in the opinion is punishable by criminal penalties (see 
ORC 5103.99(B)), and the case can fairly be read as one in which the attorneys were participating in 
an ongoing violation in attempting to conceal the whereabouts of the child. In such “egregious 
circumstances” ( id. at 266, 452 N.E.2d at 1311-12), the Court refused to extend the “cloak of 
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protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege.”  Id., 452 N.E.2d at 1312. See further discussion 
of Lemley at section 1.6:450. 
Lack of good faith effort to settle or in denying insurance coverage: “[I]t is beyond contradiction that 
the [attorney-client] privilege does not attach in a situation where the advice sought by the client and 
conveyed by the attorney relates to some future unlawful or fraudulent transaction.” Moscovitz v. Mt. 
Sinai Med. Ctr., 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 661, 635 N.E.2d 331, 349 (1994). Applying this standard to a 
proceeding for prejudgment interest where the issue was whether the defendant physician in a 
medical malpractice case had failed to make a good faith effort to settle in violation of ORC 
1343.03(C), the Court held that an insurer’s claim file was subject to discovery to the extent that it 
revealed a lack of good faith effort to settle.  Id. at 661, 635 N.E.2d at 349. “The only privileged 
matters contained in the file are those that go directly to the theory of the defense of the underlying 
case in which the decision or verdict has been rendered.”  Id. at 639, 635 N.E.2d at 334-35 (syllabus 
three). The Moskovitz case is also discussed at sections 1.6:410, 1.6:710, and 1.6:740. Following the 
Moskovitz rationale, in a case involving allegations of bad-faith denial of insurance coverage, is 
Boone v. Vanliner Insurance Co., 91 Ohio St.3d 209, 744 N.E.2d 154 (2001) (in such a case, 
insured is entitled to discover claims-file materials, containing attorney-client communications and 
showing bad-faith denial of coverage, that were created prior to denial). Boone is discussed in detail 
at section 1.6:410. 
Prior fraud of client on tribunal:  In Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-07, 1990 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 14 (Apr. 20, 1990), the Board considered this prior fraud issue.  While 
the opinion is not a model of clarity, it appears that (1) the lawyer was approached by a potential client 
to represent him in an administrative matter in which the agency was investigating the potential 
client’s conduct; (2) the potential client disclosed to the lawyer that he had, without the lawyer’s 
knowledge or participation, previously offered falsified records to the administrative agency.  The 
lawyer sought the Board’s opinion regarding his obligation to reveal the fraudulent records to the 
agency.  The Board opined that (a) the lawyer could not present the records to the agency if he took 
the case – to do so would violate DR 7-102(A)(6) (prohibiting presentation of evidence the lawyer 
knows to be false); (b) the information about the falsified records, provided as it was by a potential 
client, was revealed in the context of an attorney-client relationship and was therefore a confidence or 
secret protected by DR 4-101; and (c) the lawyer’s DR 4-101 duty of confidentiality with respect to 
that information superseded his duty to rectify client fraud on a tribunal under DR 7-102(B)(1). 
As to the third conclusion – our focus here – the Board’s opinion is troublesome in a number of 
respects.  First, query whether 7-102(B)(1) was implicated at all, since the disclosure obligation under 
that disciplinary rule required that the client fraud on the tribunal must have been perpetrated “in the 
course of the representation”; in Opinion 90-07, the facts indicate that the fraud occurred prior to any 
representation by the inquiring lawyer.  Second, even if 7-102(B)(1) were applicable, the Board 
agreed with the version of the rule as amended by the ABA, which version expressly excepted 
privileged communications from the disclosure duty; the Board did so despite acknowledging that 
Ohio did not adopt the “except when the information is protected as a privileged communication” 
language added in 1974 to the ABA Model Code.  Third, while the status of Opinion 90-07 is listed as 
“Current,” the Board had appended the notation “[but see, Disciplinary Counsel v. Heffernan, 58 
O.S. 3d 260 (1991) . . .],” a case in which the Supreme Court held that a lawyer’s failure to report 
upon learning of a client’s past fraud on a tribunal was a violation of DR 7-102(B).  It is unclear 
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whether this information was “gained in the professional relationship” by Heffernan, and the Court 
does not address any confidentiality issues.  (Between the status-list revision of August 4, 2006 and 
that of June 8, 2007 the introductory signal to the Heffernan reference was changed by the Board 
from “but see” to “See”; there is no explanation for the change.) 
Apart from its questionable validity under the Code, one would think that Opinion 90-07 should go 
the other way under the Rules, which provide that a lawyer, representing a client in an adjudicative 
proceeding and knowing that “a person, including the client,” has engaged in fraudulent conduct 
relating to the proceeding, must take reasonable measures to remedy the situation, including, if 
necessary, making disclosure to the tribunal.  Ohio Rule 3.3(b).  (Unlike 7-102(B)(1), Rule 3.3(b) 
requires neither that the fraud be perpetrated “in the course of the representation” nor that the 
perpetrator be a client.)  If necessary to satisfy the 3.3(b) duty, Rule 1.6(c) requires the lawyer to 
disclose information relating to the representation, including information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege.  See section 1.6:670.  A lawyer’s duty under Rule 3.3(b) (as well as further 
discussion of Heffernan) is set forth in detail at section 3.3:700. 
Ongoing fraud upon tribunal: See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 74 
Ohio Misc.2d 247, 660 N.E.2d 812 (C.P. Lucas 1995) (rejecting attempt by plaintiff to withhold as 
privileged a memo from plaintiff’s medical director to in-house counsel concerning industry 
knowledge of asbestosis, when plaintiff had defrauded court in previous Texas litigation with false 
interrogatory answers ignoring the contents of the memo and when exclusion of the memo in case at 
bar would perpetuate the original fraud on the Texas court). 
Past and ongoing fraud upon IRS: A lawyer serving as corporate counsel, who learned in the 
confidential relationship that the corporation had misrepresented certain facts to the Internal Revenue 
Service and as a result had received a favorable ruling from the IRS, would not be permitted to 
disclose same under former OH DR 4-101(B)(1) or 4-101(C), but had to withdraw from the 
representation if the corporation will not consent to disclosure of the fraud. In such circumstances, the 
lawyer “may not continue to aid or assist [the] client (the corporation) in allowing the Internal 
Revenue Service ruling, which was based on false information, to continue to benefit the corporation.” 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 87-10, at 4 (Sept. 17, 1987). In addition, the lawyer should 
determine whether the IRS would be considered a “person or tribunal” to whom disclosure would be 
required under former OH DR 7-102(B). If so, the lawyer should request the client to rectify the fraud, 
and if the client refuses, the lawyer must reveal the information to the IRS. Id. at 4-5. A comparable 
result would follow under Rule 3.3(b). 
With respect to ongoing crime or fraud generally, see 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers §  82 cmt. e (2000): 
The crime-fraud exception depends on a distinction between past client 
wrongs and acts that are continuing or will occur in the future. . . . 
 The exception does apply to client crimes or frauds that are 
ongoing or continuing. With respect to past acts that have present 
consequences, such as the possession of stolen goods, consultation of 
lawyer and client is privileged if it addresses how the client can rectify 
the effects of the illegal act -- such as by returning the goods to their 
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rightful owner -- or defending the client against criminal charges 
arising out of the offense. 
 . . . [But] [c]onfidential communications concerning the ways 
in which Client can continue to possess the stolen goods, including 
information supplied by Client about their present location, are not 
protected by the privilege because of the crime-fraud exception.  
Id. at 617-18. Again, this general guidance does not alter the disclosure obligations of the lawyer 
under Ohio Rule 3.3(b) with respect to a client’s past fraud on a tribunal. 
Compliance with IRS reporting requirements: The Internal Revenue Code requires that anyone 
engaged in a trade or business must file Form 8300 when that person receives more than $10,000 in 
cash. 26 USC §  6050I (2000). When an attorney receives such a payment from a client, the attorney 
must report the transaction and the client’s identity on Form 8300 (§  6050I(b)), unless the attorney 
can show that compliance with IRS Form 8300 would compromise confidential attorney-client 
communication.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Massey, 80 Ohio St.3d 605, 687 N.E.2d 734 
(1998) (per curiam) (suspending attorney for six months for conspiring with client to arrange 
payment of attorney’s fees in manner designed to avoid IRS reporting requirement). In Massey, 
respondent made no claim of privilege; if he had, it would have raised issues under the crime-fraud 
exception. See also United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1994), noting that federal case 
law holds that (1) the attorney-client privilege is not a barrier to enforcement of a summons 
compelling a lawyer to comply with his Form 8300 obligations and (2) client identity and payment of 
fees are not privileged information (but cf., as to identity, section 1.6:450). Ritchie is further 
discussed at section 1.6:370. 
 
1.6:620A  Exception to Mitigate Substantial Financial Injury Resulting from 
        Client’s Illegal or Fraudulent Act 
Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(3) permits a lawyer to reveal information otherwise protected by the attorney-client 
privilege if the lawyer reasonably believes disclosure is necessary 
to mitigate substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another that has resulted from the client’s commission of an illegal or 
fraudulent act, in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s 
services. 
Since this provision was not contained in the Code, there is at present no case law dealing with 
disclosure of privileged information in this context. See discussion at section 1.6:340. The aspect of 
Rule 1.6(b)(3) permitting disclosure of privileged information as to past illegal or fraudulent acts by 
the client is discussed in section 1.6:620. 
 
1.6:625  Exception to Obtain Advice on Compliance with Rules 
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Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(4) permits a lawyer to disclose information otherwise protected by the 
attorney-client privilege where the lawyer reasonably believes it necessary “to secure legal advice 
about the lawyer’s compliance with these rules.” See discussion at section 1.6:350. 
  
1.6:630  Exception for Lawyer Self-Protection 
Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(5) permits an attorney to disclose “information protected by the attorney-client 
privilege under applicable law” reasonably believed by the lawyer to be necessary 
to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy 
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal 
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which 
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding, 
including any disciplinary matter, concerning the lawyer’s 
representation of the client. 
Comment [10] addresses defending against claims of lawyer complicity in client conduct, or other 
lawyer misconduct. “Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal, disciplinary, or other proceeding and 
can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong alleged 
by a third person, for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client 
acting together.” Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [10]. Such a defense need not await the filing of a proceeding; 
the response can be made directly to the person making the assertion. Id. 
Comment [11] specifies that “a lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by division (b)(5) to prove the 
services rendered in an action to collect it.” Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [11]. 
Opinions under the former OHCPR relevant to Rule 1.6(b)(5) include: A former client had engaged 
attorney A (Reichard) in a law firm to handle his divorce action. He subsequently engaged attorney B 
of the same firm to change his will. In a malpractice action against the firm and attorney A, in which 
the client voluntarily testified, the client argued that any waiver of the privilege as to attorney A did 
not apply to the rest of the firm, and that knowledge possessed by such other members of the firm 
remained privileged. 
We think this argument fails. The appellant [client] did have a 
professional relationship with the firm . . . . [H]e brought his action not 
only against the individual members of the firm, but also the firm as a 
corporate entity. In our opinion, not only appellee Reichard but the law 
firm . . . was entitled to gather their resources from the knowledge 
contained within the firm in order to defend themselves against the 
accusation of malpractice and negligent conduct. Having sued the firm 
and the individual attorneys, the privilege, if any, as between the client 
and the several attorneys was waived. 
Surovec v. LaCouture, 82 Ohio App.3d 416, 419-20, 612 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Montgomery 1992) 
(citing former OH DR 4-101(C)(4) and the “voluntary testifies” exception in ORC 2317.02(A)). 
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A lawyer, who was listed as a creditor in his former clients’ (husband and wife) bankruptcy filing and 
who suspected that a fraudulent statement may have been made concerning the existence of an asset, 
could, despite the privileged nature of the attorney’s knowledge regarding the asset, investigate the 
truthfulness of the bankruptcy filing by the former clients and reveal client confidences regarding the 
existence and value of the asset in the bankruptcy proceeding to the extent necessary to collect his fee. 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 93-94-01 (n.d.). 
The viability of the self-defense exception was confirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court in Squire, 
Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio St.3d 161, 2010 Ohio 4469, 
937 N.E.2d 533, after it had been left in considerable doubt by the intermediate appellate opinion at 
2009 Ohio 2490, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 2102 (Cuyahoga).  The Givaudan litigation is 
extensively discussed in section 1.6:530 supra.  
These exceptions under Rule 1.6(b)(5) are also addressed in sections 1.6:360 and 1.6:365. 
 
1.6:640  Exception for Fiduciary-Lawyer Communications 
There is no exception for fiduciary-lawyer communications in Ohio Rule 1.6. As set forth in 1 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  84 (2000), this exception applies to an 
otherwise privileged communication between the trustee of an express trust (or similar fiduciary) and 
a lawyer retained to advise the trustee on trust administration if, in a proceeding in which the trustee is 
charged with breach of fiduciary duty by a beneficiary, the communication is relevant to the claimed 
breach. 
In the only Ohio case found that deals with the privileged status of fiduciary-lawyer communications, 
Weierman v. Mardis, 101 Ohio App.3d 774, 656 N.E.2d 734 (Hamilton 1994), the court held that 
the trial court did not err in ruling in a will contest that the contestor (the testator’s brother) could 
depose the lawyer for the guardian and successor guardian (the latter of which was also named 
executrix of the estate in the contested will) of the testator’s person and estate prior to his death. The 
court’s analysis is grounded in the application of regular discovery rules to privilege issues that arise 
in the discovery context. The court of appeals reasoned that since it could not be argued that every 
answer by the lawyer during the deposition would be privileged, the deposition could go forward: 
[W]e are unwilling to overturn the trial court’s order allowing the 
deposition of [the lawyer] simply because he may reveal information 
which the [executrix] deems privileged. [The lawyer’s] status as the 
attorney for the estate’s guardian, standing alone, is not sufficient to 
exempt him from the normal discovery procedures employed by the 
appellee. 
Id. at 777, 656 N.E.2d at 737 (bracketed material added). The court noted, however, that if a dispute 
should arise concerning specific questions during the deposition, the trial court could then determine 
whether the responses by the attorney constitute privileged communications. 
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In Weierman, the premise of the brother’s will contest suit was that the testator was of unsound mind 
and subject to undue influence and duress when, in executing a second will during the guardianship 
period, he made the contestor one of a number of beneficiaries, rather than the sole beneficiary. This 
fact pattern might well have brought the rule excepting certain fiduciary-lawyer communications (see 
Restatement §  84 above) into play, but the court gives no indication that this exception entered into 
its decision. Nor has any Ohio case been found that deals with the exception as set forth in 
Restatement §  84. 
  
1.6:645  Joint Representation Exception 
See section 1.6:480. 
 
1.6:650  Exception for Organizational Fiduciaries 
Pursuant to this exception, also not included in Ohio Rule 1.6, the privilege may be withheld in a 
dispute between the organization and constituents to whom the persons managing the organization 
owe fiduciary duties, if the court finds that (1) management is charged with breach of its obligation to 
the constituents or to the organization itself; (2) the communication in dispute occurred prior to the 
charge and directly relates thereto; and (3) the need for disclosure is sufficiently compelling and the 
threat to confidentiality sufficiently limited to justify withdrawing the privilege. See 1 Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  85 (2000) (stating the exception set forth in Garner v. 
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), and as applied on remand in 56 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ala. 
1972)). 
While no Ohio state cases were found, two federal cases from the Southern District of Ohio have cited 
and discussed Garner, the leading case setting forth this exception. See  In re Dayco Corp. 
Derivative Sec. Litig., 99 F.R.D. 616, 620-21 (S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 38 
B.R. 802, 805 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984). See also Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1992), 
where the Sixth Circuit adopted the Garner rationale in a direct (nonderivative) minority shareholder 
action against the defendant majority shareholder and CEO. Finding that the controlling shareholder 
owed the minority shareholders a fiduciary duty under Tennessee law, the court held that plaintiffs 
had established good cause under Garner and therefore the corporation (not a party to the action) 
could not rely on the privilege to prevent disclosure of the information sought in discovery. (It is 
unclear whether Fausek was a close corporation case, but under Tennessee law this distinction is 
apparently of no consequence on the fiduciary-duty issue. See Johns v. Caldwell, 601 S.W.2d 37, 41 
(Tenn. App. 1980) (close corporation case, but rule that majority shareholder has fiduciary duty to 
the minority stated generally). 
With respect to Ohio law on the existence of a fiduciary duty within organizations, see Crosby v. 
Beam, 47 Ohio St.3d 105, 108, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (1989) (“Generally, majority shareholders have 
a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders,” but that duty is “heightened” in the close corporation 
context). See Morrison v. Gugle, 142 Ohio App.3d 244, 255, 755 N.E.2d 404, 412 (Franklin 2001) 
(applying heightened-duty rule where one of two equal shareholders dominated close corporation). 
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See also the pre-Garner shareholder derivative case of Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd., v. 
Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1963) (“major” (largest single) shareholder in non-close 
corporation, as well as directors, stands in fiduciary relationship to corporation and its minority 
shareholders, citing, inter alia, Thomas v. Matthews, 94 Ohio St. 32, 43, 113 N.E. 669, 671 (1916) 
(directors “occupy a strictly fiduciary relation to the stockholders and are accountable to them on 
principles governing that relationship.”)), aff’d per curiam, 337 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1964). See 
further discussion of director/officer/majority shareholder fiduciary duty at section 1.13:220. 
  
1.6:655  Exception for Compliance with Law or Court Order 
Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(6) permits an attorney to disclose information relating to the representation, 
“including information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law,” in order “to 
comply with other law or a court order.” Subdivision (b)(6) is further discussed in section 1.6:370 
supra, with examples of disclosure in compliance with “other law or a court order.” 
The similar “required by law or court order” exception in former OH DR 4-101(C)(2) was under 
examination in Allen County Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 95 Ohio St.3d 160, 2002 Ohio 2006, 766 
N.E.2d 973. The Court there had previously imposed a disciplinary sanction; the order had included 
placing respondent on probation, during which respondent was to cooperate with a monitoring 
attorney appointed by the relator bar association “‘to ensure that [respondent] uses adequate 
procedures to communicate with his clients and keeps them well informed about their cases.’ Id. [92 
Ohio St.3d] at 106, 748 N.E.2d 1101.” 95 Ohio St.3d 160, 2002 Ohio 2006, 766 N.E.2d 973, at para. 
2. The monitoring attorney asked the respondent to obtain waivers of the attorney-client privilege 
from his clients for purposes of monitoring the conditions of respondent’s probation. Respondent was 
unable to do so; the monitoring attorney then asked the Supreme Court to rule that its order permitted 
respondent’s confidential files to be made available to the monitor, so that he might fulfill his 
monitoring duties. In denying the monitor’s request, the Supreme Court held that the “required by law 
or court order” exception to the prohibition against revelation of client confidences was inapplicable 
on the facts presented: 
[T]here is no authority that DR 4-101(C)(2) covers the function of a 
monitor who is attempting to help an attorney on probation from 
harming his clients. . . . 
* * * * 
 We therefore conclude that the monitoring attorney’s oversight 
in this case is limited to nonprivileged matters . . . . The monitor will 
not be authorized to examine respondent’s privileged client 
correspondence, or the matters discussed in client meetings and other 
communications, but only the consistency and promptness with which 
the respondent attends to client matters. 
Id. at paras. 14, 16 (emphasis added). 
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See section 1.6:370 for discussion of the mandatory/permissive aspect of Rule 1.6(b)(6). 
The interaction between Rule 1.6(b)(6) and ORC 2317.02(A) deserves special mention. As stated in 
section 1.6:370, this “permissive” disclosure provision is in fact mandatory if there is a court order or 
law mandating disclosure and the attorney has exhausted all objections. When the context is one 
controlled by ORC 2317.02(A), additional fine-tuning is required. ORC 2317.02(A) issues will 
invariably arise when the lawyer is “ordered” to testify. Presumably the “law or order” exception 
takes it out of the privilege category, but the appeals court opinion in the SS&D case, discussed in 
section 1.6:530, casts doubt on this conclusion. Again, stay tuned to see what the Supreme Court has 
to say about this issue.  
  
1.6:660  Invoking the Privilege and Its Exceptions 
As the language of Ohio Rule 1.6 indicates, a lawyer should act in a manner that preserves the 
attorney-client privilege. Moreover, the lawyer owes an obligation to advise the client of the privilege 
and to assert the privilege in timely fashion unless it is waived by the client. See section 1.6:210. 
Burden of proof: The party seeking to exclude testimony under the privilege bears the burden of 
proving (1) that an attorney-client relationship exists, and (2) that the communications at issue were 
connected with the business for which the attorney was retained.  In re Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 
N.E.2d 388 (1943). Accord Waldman v. Waldman, 48 Ohio St.2d 176, 358 N.E.2d 521 (1976); 
Shaffer v. OhioHealth Corp., 2004 Ohio 63, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 15 (Franklin).  
Client’s right to invoke privilege: Pursuant to the common-law rule, the client as witness cannot be 
compelled to disclose privileged communications that his attorney is not allowed to disclose. Further, 
a deponent has the right to refuse to answer a question when the answer would infringe any personal 
privilege (such as the attorney-client privilege) granted by the Constitution, state statutes, or any 
common-law rule recognized in the state.  In re Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N.E.2d 388 (1943) 
(syllabi six & seven). 
In camera inspection of evidence: In a civil case, upon assertion of the privilege, the trial court “shall” 
conduct an in camera inspection to determine which of the allegedly privileged documents are in fact 
protected.  Peyko v. Frederick, 25 Ohio St.3d 164, 165, 495 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1986) (syllabus two) 
(defendant’s “claims file”), followed in Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 663, 
635 N.E.2d 331, 351 (1994). Accord McHenry v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 104 Ohio App.3d 350, 
662 N.E.2d 51 (Cuyahoga 1995) (trial court obligated to provide in camera inspection before 
granting motion to compel production where issues of attorney-client privilege are raised). See Grace 
v. Mastruserio, 182 Ohio App.3d 243, 2007 Ohio 3942, 912 N.E.2d 608 (Hamilton) (when 
discovery of entirety of attorney case file sought, trial court must conduct evidentiary hearing or 
in-camera inspection of the materials). 
At least prior to the Potts decision, discussed in the next paragraph, in camera hearings were not 
automatic when the privilege was asserted in a criminal case. Before engaging in an in camera review 
to determine whether the privilege is applicable in such a case, it was held that the court “‘should 
require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person’ 
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that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence establishing an applicable privilege or that 
the privilege is outweighed by other rights.” State v. Hoop, 134 Ohio App.3d 627, 639, 731 N.E.2d 
1177, 1185 (Brown 1999) (quoting from United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989)). 
The landscape on this issue in criminal cases would appear to have been altered by the decision in  In 
re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Attorney Potts, 100 Ohio St.3d 97, 2003 Ohio 5234, 796 
N.E.2d 915; this is certainly so where privilege is raised with respect to documents subject to 
subpoena. In Potts, the trial court ordered the lawyer to appear and submit certain of the subpoenaed 
documents for an in-camera review. Potts appeared, but without the documents, and was found to be 
in criminal contempt. The trial court held the documents not privileged. On appeal, the court of 
appeals affirmed the order of in-camera inspection but reversed the contempt judgment because the 
lower court’s rejection of Potts’ privilege arguments, prior to any in-camera review, was premature. 
The Supreme Court held that upon a claim of privilege with respect to subpoenaed documents, the 
trial court “shall” conduct an in-camera review of the documents prior to ruling on the privilege claim. 
Syllabus two. In so concluding, it reasoned as follows: 
 The court of appeals held that assertions of privilege raise an 
issue best considered only after a trial court determines that each of the 
four criteria of the Nixon [United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974)] analysis have been met [in evidentiary hearing testing 
reasonableness of subpoena]. We agree with the court of appeals when 
it concluded that “the trial court’s rejection of [Potts’s] privilege 
arguments was premature and, perhaps, ill advised.” When a claim of 
privilege is raised, an in-camera inspection must occur in order that the 
trial court can determine the specific issue based upon its actual review 
of the records claimed to be privileged. 
Id. at para. 22 (emphasis and last bracketed material by the Court). 
Discovery of privileged communications: “Although the language of R.C. 2317.02(A) speaks only to 
the prohibition of testimony of privileged matters, it has nonetheless been stated that wherever a claim 
of privilege would be proper at the actual trial of the case, it is proper at the discovery stage. Because 
the same rules of privilege govern the scope of discovery as govern admissibility at trial, a party may 
obtain pretrial discovery of privileged materials only if such materials fall within some exception to 
the privilege or if the privilege will be waived at trial.” Frank W. Schaefer, Inc. v. C. Garfield 
Mitchell Agency, Inc., 82 Ohio App.3d 322, 612 N.E.2d 442 (Montgomery 1992) (citations 
omitted). For discussion of the facts of Schaefer and the court’s analysis in holding there was no 
waiver of the privilege with respect to the matters at issue (attorney’s files), see section 1.6:530. 
Must raise objection to assertion of privilege: Once an attorney-client privilege claim is raised, the 
party opposed to the invocation of attorney-client privilege must raise an objection in order to 
preserve the issue on appeal.  State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App.2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 890 (Franklin 1974) 
(noting that invocation of attorney-client privilege by the opposing party was not supported by law, 
but refusing to reverse on this ground, in part due to the fact that the trial record did not clearly 
indicate that an objection was raised). 
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Appeals of denial of privilege claim: R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) provides that such orders are final orders 
immediately appealable. See, e.g., Smalley v. Friedman, Domiano &  Smith Co., L.P.A., 172 Ohio 
App.3d 108, 2007 Ohio 2646, 873 N.E.2d 331 (Cuyahoga). The rule is otherwise under federal law. 
See Mohawk Inds., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 130 S.Ct. 599 (2009). These rules, as well as 
the questions of the applicable rule in diversity jurisdiction cases in which Ohio law is applicable, are 
explored in J. Philip Calabrese & Trevor G. Covey, Life After Mohawk: Protecting the 
Privilege in Ohio, Ohio Law., Nov./Dec. 2011, at 22. 
Injunction to prevent breach of duty by attorney: Where an attorney or an agent for an attorney 
violates the attorney-client privilege by disclosing confidential information of his former employer, 
an injunction against future violations may be as broad as necessary to avert the harm complained of 
by the former client.  Am. Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 575 N.E.2d 116 (1991) 
(upholding an injunction prohibiting an attorney/agent from using, to the detriment of the opposing 
party, privileged information gained while in the employ of the opposing party’s counsel). (See 
section 1.6:475 for a discussion whether confidentiality, not privilege, analysis should have been 
applied.) 
Contempt: Where counsel asserts a good-faith claim of privilege in an unsettled or untested area of 
professional ethics, penalties for contempt (violation of court order or rule – see sections 3.1:500 and 
3.5:400) are inappropriate. Cf.  In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Attorney Potts, 100 Ohio 
St.3d 2003 Ohio 5234, 796 N.E.2d 915 (criminal contempt imposed by trial court, reversed by court 
of appeals; Supreme Court, without expressly reversing the contempt conviction, affirmed that 
portion of appellate court judgment that provided basis for contempt reversal--that rejection of 
lawyer’s privilege arguments prior to conducting in-camera review was premature). Attorneys should 
not be forced to violate their duties to their clients as the price of avoiding punishment for contempt. 
See  In re Burns, 42 Ohio Misc.2d 12, 536 N.E.2d 1206 (C.P. Hamilton 1988) (lawyer held not 
required to disclose client’s name in response to grand jury question in context of crime already 
committed, where there was no existing court order or law requiring him to do so). See also 
discussion of  In re Original Grand Jury Investigation, 89 Ohio St.3d 544, 733 N.E.2d 1135 
(2000), at section 1.6:380. 
  
1.6:670  Mandatory Disclosure Obligation 
Ohio Rule 1.6(c), a provision not found in MR 1.6, obligates the lawyer to disclose privileged 
information 
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to comply with 
Rule 3.3 or 4.1. 
There is no comment pertaining to division (c); the Task Force’s Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 
1.6 states that division (c) 
makes explicit that other rules create mandatory rather than 
discretionary disclosure duties. For example, Rules 3.3 and 4.1 
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corresponded to DR 7-102(B), which requires disclosure of client fraud 
in certain circumstances. 
See Ohio Rules 3.3(b)-(c) & cmt. [10] and 4.1(b) & cmt. [3]. The mandatory disclosure obligation 
of Rule 1.6(c) is further discussed in section 1.6:395. 
  
1.6:700  Lawyer Work-Product Immunity 
Primary Ohio References 
ORC 149.43 
OH Civ R 26(B)(3) 
OH Crim R 16(B)(2), (C)(2) 
OH R Evid 612 
See Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [3] 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.6 
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Ohio Commentary 
Staff Notes to OH Civ R 26(B) 
Giannelli & Snyder, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice, Evidence §  501.15 
Guttenberg & Snyder, The Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  9.2(C) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  91:2201 
ALI-LGL §§  87-93 
Wolfram §  6.6 
 
1.6:710  Work-Product Immunity 
To encourage each side in litigation to prepare fully, some protection must be provided for these 
preparatory efforts. Lawyers need to proceed without undue fear that the results of their efforts or 
their mental impressions will have to be turned over to their opponents. Work-product immunity 
provides that protection. See, to similar effect, the statement of policy set forth in the first paragraph 
of OH Civ R 26(A), quoted below in this section at “Work-product requirements.” 
Work-product immunity applies in criminal as well as civil cases. E.g., State v. Today’s Bookstore, 
Inc., 86 Ohio App.3d 810, 820, 621 N.E.2d 1283, 1290 (Montgomery 1993) (citing OH Crim R 
16(B)). An important statutory provision having impact in both civil and criminal areas is the Ohio 
Public Records Act (ORC 149.43), which is discussed at various points below. Unlike the test for 
production of ordinary work-product under OH Civ R 26(B)(3) (see section 1.6:720), neither OH 
Crim R 16 nor the Ohio Public Records Act includes a “good cause” requirement -- material is either 
protected from, or subject to, disclosure without more, pursuant to the categories of protected and 
unprotected matter as set forth in the rule and the statute. 
Criminal actions: OH Crim R 16(B)(2) bars discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other 
internal documents made by the prosecuting attorney or by his or her agents in connection with the 
investigation or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by witnesses or prospective witnesses 
to state agents, except, on motion of defendant, as provided in OH Crim R 16(B)(1)(a), (b), (d), (f), 
and (g): 
(a) -- written statements, written summaries of oral statements, and 
recorded grand jury testimony, of the defendant or co-defendant; 
(b) -- defendant’s prior criminal record; 
(d) -- reports of physical or mental examinations and scientific tests or 
experiments made in connection with the particular case; 
(f) -- evidence favorable to the defendant; and 
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(g) -- prior statements of a witness inconsistent with the direct 
testimony of the witness at trial, which inconsistency is to be 
determined following the testimony by an in camera inspection by the 
court, with both the prosecuting attorney and defense attorney present 
and participating. 
In addition, a defendant is entitled, on motion, to documents or tangible objects (a) material to the 
defense, (b) intended for use by the prosecuting attorney as evidence at trial, or (c) obtained from or 
belonging to the defendant, OH Crim R 16(B)(1)(c), and to the names and addresses of the witnesses 
whom the prosecution intends to call at trial, subject to limitations on disclosure designed to protect 
the witnesses from harm. OH Crim R 16(B)(1)(e). 
If the defendant obtains discovery under OH Crim R 16(B)(1)(c), (d), or (e), the prosecution then has, 
on motion, a right to obtain the same categories of material from the defendant. See OH Crim R 
16(C)(1)(a)-(c). In addition, the prosecution is entitled, on motion, to an in camera inspection of prior 
statements of defense witnesses (other than the defendant), to determine the existence of 
inconsistencies between the direct testimony and the prior statement, with both the prosecuting 
attorney and the defense attorney present and participating. OH Crim R 16 (C)(1)(d). Defense 
reports, memoranda, or other internal defense documents, or statements made to the defense attorney 
or his agents by witnesses or prospective witnesses are not subject to discovery, except as provided in 
16(C)(1)(b) and (d). OH Crim R 16(C)(2). 
Civil actions: OH Civ R 26(B)(3) provides as follows: 
 Trial preparation: materials. Subject to the provisions of 
subdivision (B)(4) [OH Civ R 26(B)(4)] of this rule, a party may 
obtain discovery of documents and tangible things prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for 
that other party’s representative (including his attorney, consultant, 
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing of good 
cause therefor. A statement concerning the action or its subject matter 
previously given by the party seeking the statement may be obtained 
without showing good cause. A statement of a party is (a) a written 
statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the party, or (b) 
a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a 
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral 
statement which was made by the party and contemporaneously 
recorded. 
The Staff Notes to OH Civ R 26(B)(1) (see Page’s Ohio Rev Code Ann, Civil Rules, 265-67 
(2008)) discuss the effect of the discovery rule on the scope of the attorney-client privilege in Ohio. 
The Notes reiterate that the rule makes any relevant matter discoverable if it is “not privileged.” The 
Staff Notes further state that prior to the adoption of the Civil Rules in 1970, witness names and 
addresses, contained in reports turned over to an attorney for the prosecution or defense of an action, 
were held privileged. This line of cases began with  Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 
(1906), and continued with  In re Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E.2d 492 (1936); In re Hyde, 
149 Ohio St. 407, 79 N.E.2d 224 (1948); In re Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307, 85 N.E.2d 550 (1949); 
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In re Shoup, 154 Ohio St. 221, 94 N.E.2d 625 (1950) (per curiam); In re Tichy, 161 Ohio St. 104, 
118 N.E.2d 128 (1954) (per curiam); and  In re Bates, 167 Ohio St. 46, 146 N.E.2d 306 (1957) 
(per curiam). The Notes cite and quote from  In re Story, 159 Ohio St. 144, 147-48, 111 N.E.2d 
385, 387 (1953), to the effect that, other than the statute prohibiting an attorney from testifying (ORC 
2317.02(A)), there is no statutory or constitutional basis for the “Schoepf concept of privilege.” As the 
Staff Notes state: 
 Rule 26(B) [OH Civ R 26(B)] rejects Schoepf. Information, 
including witness names and addresses, turned over to an attorney for 
prosecution or defense of an action is not absolutely privileged. 
 The word “privileged” in Rule 26(B)(1) [OH Civ R 26(B)(1)] 
does not continue the Schoepf privilege since such an interpretation 
would drastically limit the intended scope of discovery. For example, it 
could be used to preclude the discovery of witness names and locations. 
A Schoepf interpretation of privilege is specifically rejected. 
Civil Rules, at 265. 
Unfortunately, the Staff Notes cite to many of these same cases and continue to use the term 
“privilege” in the subsequent discussion of trial preparation materials (OH Civ R 26(B)(3)). Thus: 
To be privileged a document must be originated after the facts which 
give rise to the litigation.  In re Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307 (1949) and 
Travelers Indemnity v. Cochrane, 155 Ohio St. 305 (1951). Privilege 
does not attach to a document or thing by merely giving it to an 
attorney.  In re Hyde, 149 Ohio St. 407 (1948). Records kept in the 
ordinary course of business are not privileged.  Keough, supra, In re 
Story, 159 Ohio St. 144 (1953), Dayton v. Smith, 109 Ohio App. 383 
(1959) and Parkhurst v. Cleveland, 36 Ohio Ops. 321 (C.P. Cuyahoga 
County 1947). 
 Under the rules trial preparation material may be privileged, but 
the privilege is conditional. 
Civil Rules, at 266-67. 
This “conditional privilege” is the work-product immunity for trial preparation materials, not the 
privilege for confidential communications between attorney and client. 
According to the Staff Notes, the work-product “privilege” developed by OH Civ R 26(B)(3) “is a 
very limited privilege. By definition, it applies only to ‘documents or tangible things’ prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial and it may be defeated by showing good cause.” Civil Rules, at 
267. (See discussion of ordinary work product at section 1.6:720.) The Rule does not, however, 
destroy the privacy of the attorney’s mental impressions or the concept that each side should prepare 
its case independently. Id. (See discussion of opinion work product at section 1.6:730.) 
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Work-product requirements: As stated in OH Civ R 26(B)(3), three conditions must be met in order 
for material to qualify for work-product protection. The material must (1) be a document or tangible 
thing; (2) have been prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial; and (3) have been prepared [by or] 
for a party or by or for his representative (including his attorney).  Woodruff v. Concord City Disc. 
Clothing Store, No. 10072, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 5914 (Montgomery Feb. 19, 1987) (citing  In 
re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 561 F. Supp. 1247, 1257 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)). For example, oral testimony 
would not qualify under the terms of 26(B)(3), since it is not a document or tangible thing. Nor would 
an attorney’s diary, containing a “few references” to his clients, constitute work product, as it was not 
prepared in anticipation of litigation.  Holmes v. Holmes, No. WD-89-40, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 
3288 (Wood Aug. 10, 1990). But see State ex rel. Nix v. City of Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 700 
N.E.2d 12 (1998) (per curiam) (attorney notes of trial proceedings, status reports concerning 
pending cases, and legal research conducted by city law department attorneys exempt from disclosure 
under ORC 149.43(A)(1)(g), where records specifically compiled in reasonable anticipation of 
defense of civil actions brought against city and city employees). 
Despite the language of the Civil Rule, it has long been recognized that attorney work product can 
also exist in intangible form, such as the attorney’s recollection of what witnesses told him, one of the 
matters at issue in the seminal case of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). This unrecorded 
work product is accorded protection fully comparable to that provided in the Rule to tangible work 
product, and, as noted in 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Civil §  2024, at 338 (2d ed. 1994), “since intangible work product 
includes thoughts and recollections of counsel, it is often eligible for the special protection accorded 
opinion work product.” Ohio recognizes the Hickman rule, see, e.g., Nelson v. Toledo Oxygen & 
Equip. Co., 63 Ohio St.3d 385, 387, 588 N.E.2d 789, 790-91 (1992); (quoting, in case where 
tangible material at issue, with approval the passage from Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511, referring to 
“mental impressions ... and countless other tangible and intangible ways” comprising lawyer work 
product), and has applied it in at least one case involving intangible work product.  Burgess v. 
Prudential Ins. Co., No. C-870225, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2867 (Hamilton June 29, 1988) 
(“Burgess attempted to elicit from Prudential’s corporate counsel testimony concerning strategy 
decisions made by the corporate counsel in the handling of Burgess’s claim. This information is 
clearly protected under Hickman and Upjohn.” Id. at *19.). Indeed, as stated in Staff Notes to Rule 
26 (1970), “[t]he initial paragraph of [Ohio Civil] Rule 26(A) . . . . is a restatement of Hickman.” Rule 
26(A) states: 
It is the policy of these rules (1) to preserve the right of attorneys to 
prepare cases for trial with that degree of privacy necessary to 
encourage them to prepare their cases thoroughly and to investigate not 
only the favorable but the unfavorable aspects of such cases and (2) to 
prevent an attorney from taking undue advantage of his adversary’s 
industry or effort. 
The Staff Notes further state with respect to Rule 26(B)(3) that, while section (B)(3) liberalizes 
discovery, it “does not destroy the privacy of the attorney’s mental impressions.” Hickman also is 
cited in this segment of the Notes. While the great majority of an attorney’s mental impressions end 
up in tangible form, such as memoranda the lawyer in Hickman may have made from the oral 
statements he took from witnesses, we have no doubt that Ohio would honor the other half of the 
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Hickman equation – unrecorded oral witness statements presently in the form of the lawyer’s mental 
impressions. Either way, in the language of the U.S. Supreme Court, “we do not believe that any 
showing of necessity can be made under the circumstances of this case so as to justify production.” 
329 U.S. at 512. 
Public Records Act - Trial preparation materials and investigatory work product: Pursuant to the Ohio 
Public Records Act (ORC 149.43), “trial preparation records” and “confidential law enforcement 
investigatory records” are excepted from disclosure by ORC 149.43(A)(1)(g) and (A)(1)(h), 
respectively. “Trial preparation record” is defined in ORC 149.43(A)(4) in terms that protect any 
record prepared in anticipation or defense of civil or criminal litigation, specifically including 
attorney thought processes. “Confidential law enforcement investigatory record” is defined in ORC 
149.43(A)(2)(a)-(d) as any record pertaining to a civil, criminal, quasi-criminal, or administrative law 
enforcement matter, but only to the extent the release of the record would create a high probability of 
disclosure of (a) the identity of a suspect who has not been charged; (b) the identity of a confidential 
source; (c) specific investigatory work product; or (d) information that would endanger a law 
enforcement officer, a witness, a victim, or a confidential source. (As previously noted, the “good 
cause” requirement for disclosure of ordinary work product under OH Civ R 26(B)(3) is not a part of 
the test for disclosure under ORC 149.43.) 
The trial-preparation and law-enforcement investigatory record work-product exemptions have been 
successfully invoked in a number of cases. The modern decision dealing most extensively with these 
exemptions is State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83 (1994). In 
Steckman, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, expressed his intent to clear away a large amount 
of previous clutter on these issues and held, in pertinent part, that (1) information not subject to 
discovery under OH Crim R 16(B), contained in the files of a prosecutor prosecuting a criminal 
matter, is specifically exempt from release as a trial preparation record pursuant to ORC 149.43(A)(4) 
(syllabus three), which exemption continues until all trials, actions, and/or proceedings have been 
completed (syllabus four); and (2), except as required by OH Crim R 16, information assembled by 
law-enforcement officials in connection with probable or pending criminal proceedings is excepted 
from disclosure by virtue of the work-product exemption found in ORC 149.43(A)(2)(c), as 
compiled in anticipation of litigation. This does not include ongoing routine offense and incident 
reports (including, but not limited to, driving under the influence reports and intoxilizer tests), which 
are subject to immediate release upon request. (syllabus five). Moreover, a convicted criminal 
defendant who has exhausted direct appeals may not invoke ORC 149.43 to support a petition for 
postconviction relief (syllabus six), because the trial-preparation and work-product exemptions in the 
statute preclude such a defendant from obtaining information other than that to which he or she would 
be entitled under OH Crim R 16, thereby avoiding the “anomalous” result of a defendant, whose 
postconviction proceeding was successful, having more information on retrial than in the original 
proceeding. See 70 Ohio St.3d at 432, 437, 639 N.E.2d at 92-93, 95-96. 
In so holding, the Supreme Court determined that certain of its prior decisions had been too liberal in 
allowing disclosure of records that were not properly subject to disclosure under the statute: “[A]ny 
and all cases (even though not specifically cited) that are contrary, in whole or in part, to today’s 
decision are of no further force or effect.”  Id. at 426, 639 N.E.2d at 88 (parenthetical by Court). 
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The Court did, however, review some of the prior case law. Justice Douglas commenced his analysis 
with a 1980 decision, State ex rel. Akron Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. University of Akron, 
64 Ohio St.2d 392, 415 N.E.2d 310 (1980), which held that university police “routine incident 
reports” were nonexempt public records.  Id. at 398, 415 N.E.2d at 315. According to Justice 
Douglas, the Court then made a “quantum leap” from this “narrow beginning” when it decided State 
ex rel. National Broadcasting Co. v. City of Cleveland, 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 N.E.2d 786 (1988). 
The NBC case cited only the Beacon Journal case for the proposition that “specific investigatory 
work product” refers only to material that reflects the mental impressions and thought processes of 
the investigator, even though the Beacon Journal case did not discuss the “specific investigatory 
work product” exemption. From this beginning, all of the cases listed for purposes of illustration at 70 
Ohio St.3d at 429-30, 639 N.E.2d at 90-91, are said to have construed the 1980 Beacon Journal 
case “too liberally” and “virtually . . . rendered meaningless” the trial preparation record and specific 
investigatory work-product exemptions.  Id. at 430, 431, 639 N.E.2d at 91, 92. The Steckman 
holding restored what the Court deemed to be the proper breadth of these two exemptions. 
The case law has continued to develop since Steckman. State ex rel. Master v. City of Cleveland, 
75 Ohio St. 23, 29, 661 N.E.2d 180, 186 (1996) (per curiam), held that the ORC 149.43(A)(2)(c) 
work-product exception did not apply to the records at issue because the evidence showed only that 
criminal charges were “possible”; “[t]here is no evidence that criminal charges against police officers 
or other individuals involved in the alleged wiretapping are either ‘pending’ or ‘highly probable’ as 
required for application of the work product exception,” citing Steckman and State ex rel. Police 
Officers for Equal Rights v. Lashutka, 72 Ohio St.3d 185, 188, 648 N.E.2d 808, 810 (1995) 
(which added the “highly” probable gloss to the test). However, in the subsequent case of State ex rel. 
Leonard v. White, 75 Ohio St.3d 516, 518, 664 N.E.2d 527, 529-30 (1996) (per curiam), the 
work-product exemption was held applicable to materials compiled by law enforcement officers in 
anticipation of a subsequent criminal proceeding, even though “no suspect has yet been charged,” 
“where it is evident that a crime has been committed.” This was sufficient to satisfy the “highly 
probable” criminal-charges standard.  Id., 664 N.E.2d at 529. This analysis was followed in the 
second Master case (Master II), 76 Ohio St.3d 340, 341-42, 667 N.E.2d 974, 975 (1996) (per 
curiam), where the Leonard decision was described as one in which the Court “clarified” Steckman 
syllabus five and the Police Officers decision. Since the records at issue in Master II clearly 
indicated that a crime had been committed, that was sufficient to protect the records as ORC 
149.43(A)(2)(c) work product from disclosure. Compare State ex rel. Ohio Patrolmen’s 
Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Mentor, 89 Ohio St.3d 440, 732 N.E.2d 969 (2000) (not clear that 
crimes had occurred; thus, criminal proceeding not “highly probable” and work-product exemption 
inapplicable). 
On a number of occasions since the Steckman decision, the Supreme Court has emphasized that 
nonexempt records do not become exempt merely because they are placed in a prosecutor’s file. E.g., 
State ex rel. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Petro, 80 Ohio St.3d 261, 685 N.E.2d 1223 
(1997) (per curiam); State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton County, 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 
378, 662 N.E.2d 334, 338 (1996) (per curiam) (“Once clothed with the public records cloak, the 
records cannot be defrocked of their status.”); State ex rel. Carpenter v. Tubbs Jones, 72 Ohio 
St.3d 579, 580, 651 N.E.2d 993, 994 (1995) (documents subject to disclosure under OH Crim R 
16(B) and other non-exempt records, such as “routine office and indictment reports” [sic?, citing 
Steckman, which refers to “routine offense and incident reports”], do not become trial-preparation 
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records simply because they are contained in the prosecutor’s file). Conversely, exempt work-product 
and trial-preparation records do not lose their exempt status as a result of disclosure in criminal 
discovery. State ex rel. WHIO-TV-7 v. Lowe, 77 Ohio St.3d 350, 673 N.E.2d 1360 (1997). 
Steckman expressly held that the trial-preparation-material exemption remains in effect until all 
proceedings are completed. The same conclusion with respect to the ORC 149.43(A)(2)(c) 
work-product exemption -- implicit in Steckman’s holding that this exemption remains applicable 
during a petition for postconviction relief -- was made explicit in State ex rel. WLWT-TV5 v. Leis, 
77 Ohio St.3d 357, 360, 673 N.E.2d 1365, 1369 (1997) (per curiam) (both of these exemptions 
remained applicable to records relating to the investigation and prosecution of various individuals, 
even though two of those individuals had already been convicted and sentenced, because there 
remained the possibility that they could be granted a new trial, and the third person had been charged 
but had not yet been tried.). 
Further refinement of the rule with respect to the length of time the work-product exemptions remain 
in effect was provided in State ex rel. Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 84 
Ohio St.3d 310, 703 N.E.2d 796 (1999). There, the Court held that the Steckman rule -- that the 
exemptions remained in effect until all criminal proceedings are completed -- is satisfied when the 
defendant had agreed not to pursue any further proceeding that might result in a new criminal trial, i.e., 
an appeal or petition for post-conviction relief. Justice Cook, joined by two other justices, filed an 
interesting dissent in which she noted that the defendant had not yet filed the affidavit confirming her 
prior “agreement” not to pursue further proceedings and that, even if she did so, she still had a 
statutory right to pursue such relief. Justice Cook further asks what the result would be, under the 
decision of the majority, if otherwise exempt information is released to a litigant who swears not to 
pursue a matter further and thereafter “is required to defend a criminal appeal or a civil proceeding on 
the subject?”  Id. at 313, 703 N.E.2d at 798 (emphasis in original). 
In an opinion applying Steckman and other Supreme Court opinions dealing with the Ohio Records 
Act, the court of appeals in State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Bodiker, 134 Ohio 
App.3d 415, 731 N.E.2d 245 (Franklin 1999), examined the “trial preparation records” exception. 
After concluding that time and financial records of the Ohio Public Defender’s Office were “routine 
office records” outside the scope of “trial preparation records,” the court went on to hold that in any 
event the trial preparation records exception did not apply where, as in the case before it, all 
proceedings in the matter were completed. There are, however, “rare” situations in which a continued 
exemption is justified, when release of the records would reveal specific trial techniques applicable in 
other pending cases in which the Defender’s Office was involved. Thus, the court ordered the 
Defender’s Office to submit in camera, and identify with particularity, any and all records that the 
Office contends would be applicable in cases other than the completed case at bar.  Id. at 427-28, 731 
N.E.2d at 254-55. 
Decisions confirming the Steckman rule that police incident reports are public records, not protected 
by the confidential law enforcement investigatory exemption of ORC 149.43(A)(1)(h) & (A)(2)(c), 
include State ex rel. Rasul-Bey v. Onunwor, 94 Ohio St.3d 119, 760 N.E.2d 421 (2002) (per 
curiam) (police incident reports not within the ORC 149.43(A)(2)(c) exemption for “trial 
preparation records”; peremptory writ granted compelling respondent to provide access to same); 
State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ’g Co. v. Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741 N.E.2d 511 (2001) (per 
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curiam) (“Incident reports initiate criminal investigations but are not part of the investigation”). 
Accord, as to 911 tapes, State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton County, 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 
662 N.E.2d 334 (1996) (per curiam). Accord, as to DOJ settlement proposal, State ex rel. 
Cincinnati Enquirer v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002 Ohio 7041, 781 N.E.2d 163. And see 
State ex rel. Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 82 Ohio St.3d 37, 693 N.E.2d 789 
(1998) (pursuant to Public Records Act, employee sought email allegedly containing racial slurs 
against her; this email did not meet the definition of “record” in ORC 149.011(G) because it did not 
document the department’s policies or procedures). The Court, however, rejected the department’s 
assertion that no public-office email could ever be a public record under ORC 149.43.  82 Ohio St.3d 
at 42 n.1, 693 N.E.2d at 793 n.1. 
The Court in Dupuis expressly stated that “‘any doubt is to be resolved in favor of disclosure,’“ and 
that exceptions “‘to disclosure must be strictly construed against the public records custodian,’“ 98 
Ohio St.3d 126, 2002 Ohio 7041, 781 N.E.2d 163, at PP 11, 16 (citations omitted). This trend was 
continued in State ex rel WBNS-TV v. Dues, 101 Ohio St.3d 406, 2004 Ohio 1497, 805 N.E.2d 
1116, in which the Court held that a sealed and confidential settlement agreement between private 
parties submitted to a probate court in resolution of wrongful death and survival claims in lieu of 
litigation was a public record that must be disclosed. While there was no argument in Dues that the 
records came within any of the statutory exceptions, the Court’s language in Dupuis in favor of 
disclosure could be read as reflecting an approach different from that announced in the Steckman line 
of cases. A later opinion, however, seems consistent with the Steckman approach in its application of 
the exception for confidential law-enforcement investigatory records. See State ex rel. Musial v. N. 
Olmsted, 106 Ohio St.3d 459, 2005 Ohio 5521, 835 N.E.2d 1243. 
Discovery in post-trial proceedings for prejudgment interest: In Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 
69 Ohio St.3d 638, 639, 635 N.E.2d 331, 334-35 (1994) (syllabus three), the Supreme Court held as 
follows: 
 In an R.C. 1343.03 proceeding for prejudgment interest, neither 
the attorney-client privilege nor the so-called work product exception 
precludes discovery of the contents of an insurer’s claims file. 
With respect to OH Civ R 26(B)(3), the Court concluded that the good-cause requirement is met if 
the material sought in discovery is “that which is appropriate to effectuate the General Assembly’s 
purposes in enacting [ORC 1343.03(C)] -- to encourage and bring about settlements.” 69 Ohio St.3d 
at 662, 635 N.E.2d at 350. Presumably, this means that in a prejudgment interest proceeding, from a 
work-product perspective, insurer’s claims files are discoverable, subject only to material constituting 
opinion work product -- “matters contained in the file . . . that go directly to the theory of defense of 
the underlying case . . . .” This case is also discussed at sections 1.6:410, 1.6:620, and 1.6:740. 
Common-interest exception: The common-interest exception to work-product immunity was found 
inapplicable to a coverage dispute between the insured and liability insurers; the court held that the 
common-interest doctrine applies only if the attorney actually represents both the insured and the 
insurer.  Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 Ohio Misc.2d 174, 660 N.E.2d 
765 (C.P. Lucas 1993). Consistent with the nomenclature used elsewhere in this treatise, the 
“common interest” described in OCF was actually a co-client or common-representation situation, 
rather than a common-interest arrangement, in which clients with common interests are separately 
421
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.6 
  
represented. See sections 1.6:480-:490. Regardless of whether the correct nomenclature was used, the 
underlying basis of the exception was not present in any event. As noted by the OCF court, there was 
no common goal, common interest, or common representation in the underlying lawsuits, because 
“the defendants [insurers] have neither represented nor indemnified OCF with respect to its 
underlying asbestos bodily injury lawsuits. Instead, it was “an embittered dispute over whether or not 
insurance coverage applies, . . . . rendering any reference to a ‘common interest’ somewhat laughable.” 
74 Ohio Misc.2d at 181, 660 N.E. 2d at 769. 
 
1.6:720  Ordinary Work Product 
Ordinary work product defined: Ordinary work product, sometimes referred to as “ordinary fact,” 
“unprivileged fact,” or “fact” work product, includes witness statements (but see Woodruff v. 
Concord City Disc. Clothing Store, No. 10072, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 5914 (Ohio App. 
Montgomery Feb. 19, 1987), discussed below at section 1.6:730), underlying facts, and written or 
oral information transmitted to an attorney and recorded as conveyed. Ordinary work product may be 
discovered upon a showing of “good cause” -- that is, “substantial need, that the information is 
important in the preparation of the [requestor’s] case, and that there is an inability or difficulty in 
obtaining the information without undue hardship.” State v. Hoop, 134 Ohio App.3d 627, 642, 731 
N.E.2d 1177, 1187 (Brown 1999). 
An Ohio court of appeals, noting that OH Civ R 26(B)(3) “only protects work-product, ‘in 
anticipation of litigation,’“ referred to claims-file material, prepared during an underinsured motorist 
carrier’s initial investigation of a claim made by one of its insureds prior to any anticipated litigation, 
as “the ordinary work-product” of the carrier, not protected by OH Civ R 26(B)(3). See Dennis v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., 143 Ohio App.3d 196, 203, 757 N.E.2d 849, 855 (Mahoning 2001) (relying 
on, inter alia, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Boone v. Vanliner Ins. Co., 91 Ohio St.3d 209, 744 
N.E.2d 154 (2001), to the effect that there is no work product at that stage of the investigation 
because it has not yet been determined whether coverage exists). While the Dennis conclusion of 
nonprotection is correct, the reference to the material as “ordinary work product” is odd; such 
material is not work product at all, because not prepared in anticipation of litigation, as the Boone 
case (which Dennis cites and quotes) and OH Civ R 26(B)(3) itself make clear. This is probably just 
a poor choice of words; most likely the court was intending to refer to the usual, everyday business 
records of the company. Compare Estate of Hohler v. Hohler, 185 Ohio App.3d 420, 2009 Ohio 
7013, 924 N.E.2d 419 (Carroll), at paras. 51-52, and the subsequent appeal in the same case, 197 
Ohio App.3d 237, 2011 Ohio 5469, 967 N.E.2d 219 (Carroll) (documents prepared by counsel in 
drafting prenuptial agreement were prepared in anticipation of future litigation and thus constituted 
work product). 
Without delineating whether the documents at issue were ordinary or opinion work product, the court 
in Garg v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 155 Ohio App. 3d 258, 2003 Ohio 5960, 800 N.E.2d 757 
(Miami), applied Boone in holding that asserted work-product documents in the claims file were 
subject to discovery in bad-faith denial-of-claim litigation, if created prior to the denial of the claim, 
even though they were created after the threat of litigation. 
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1.6:730  Opinion Work Product 
The Staff Notes to OH Civ R 26(B)(3) state that while OH Civ R 26(B)(3) “liberalizes discovery 
practice, it does not destroy the privacy of the attorney’s mental impressions or the concept that each 
side should prepare its case independently. It does not allow the lazy lawyer to automatically have the 
fruits of the work of the diligent lawyer.” Baldwin’s Ohio Rev Code Ann, Rules of Court, Civil, 
Rules 1 to 37, at 589 (2004). 
Opinion work product generally: Opinion work product is that which reflects the attorney’s mental 
impressions, opinions, conclusions, judgments, or legal theories. Because it concerns the mental 
processes of the attorney, not discoverable fact, a number of decisions can be cited for the proposition 
that opinion work product is afforded nearly absolute protection.  E.g., State v. Hoop, 134 Ohio 
App.3d 627, 731 N.E.2d 1177 (Brown 1999). Accord Estate of Hohler v. Hohler, 185 Ohio 
App.3d 420, 2009 Ohio 7013, 924 N.E.2d 419 (Carroll). 
But subsequent decisions, including one from the Ohio Supreme Court, have put this in proper 
context. Emphasizing that the privilege is a “qualified” one and not absolute, the Court in Squire 
Sanders, L.L.P., v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio St.3d, 161, 2010 Ohio 4469, 937 N.E.2d 
533, held that attorney work-product “including but not limited to mental impressions, theories, and 
legal conclusions, may be discovered upon a showing of good cause if it is directly at issue in the case, 
the need for the information is compelling, and the evidence cannot be obtained elsewhere.” Id. at 
para. 60. In Givaudan, the Court determined that the mental impressions of Givaudan’s in-house 
lawyers relating to the value and quality of the legal services provided by outside counsel (Squire 
Sanders) -- the “pivotal issues” in the lawsuit – were otherwise unobtainable and necessary to the law 
firm in determining the truth of the allegations made against it. Accord Estate of Hohler v. Hohler, 
197 Ohio App.3d 237, 2011 Ohio 5469, 967 N.E.2d 219 (Carroll) (holding that certain documents 
at issue in discovery dispute were opinion work product but were discoverable under the Givaudan 
standard); Sutton v. Stevens Painton Corp., 193 Ohio App.3d 68, 2011 Ohio 843, 951 N.E.2d 91 
(Cuyahoga) (internal emails at firm representing defendant, relating to surveillance of personal 
injury plaintiff by investigative firm hired by defense counsel, must be produced with respect to count 
added by personal injury plaintiff against defense counsel for invasion of right of privacy, inasmuch 
as emails contain information directly at issue, the need is compelling, and is otherwise unobtainable). 
Note that the court of appeals in the second Hohler appeal acknowledged that, in the prior appeal of 
the matter, it had repeated the maxim about opinion work product receiving “near absolute” 
protection, but made clear that the controlling test of what constitutes good cause is that set forth in 
the Givaudan syllabus. 
Attorneys’ and agents’ notes: Notes by an attorney or his agent that convey the impressions of the 
attorney or agent are protected as opinion work product, even when such notes are recording witness 
statements (which might otherwise be considered ordinary work product) because the notes reveal the 
agent’s or attorney’s thoughts. Hoop supra. Accord Woodruff v. Concord City Disc. Clothing 
Store, No. 10072, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 5914, at *10 (Ohio App. Montgomery Feb. 19, 1997) 
(stating that notes of conversations with a witness are “so much a product of the lawyer’s thinking and 
so little probative of the witness’ actual words that they are absolutely protected from disclosure.”) 
(quoting  In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976)). 
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Communications from attorney to expert: In a somewhat confusing opinion, the court in Helton v. 
Kincaid, 2005 Ohio 2794, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 2621 (Warren), held that letters from a party’s 
attorney to an expert witness for the party were protected work product. The court acknowledged that 
opinion work product receives near absolute protection in Ohio (citing Hoop), whereas fact work 
product may be discovered upon a showing of good cause. While such a letter would almost 
invariably contain mental impressions, opinions, and theories of the attorney, the court never squarely 
addressed the fact/opinion issue and proceeded to hold that such material is not discoverable absent a 
showing of good cause under Ohio Civ R 26(B)(3). Perhaps this was the unusual case where the letter 
contained only fact work product, for the successful appellant apparently argued only that appellees 
failed to show good cause for its production. See id. at para. 5. Compare Angelo v. Stack, No. 90 
CA00487, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1272 (Lorain March 27, 1991) (allowing cross-examination of 
plaintiff’s expert with respect to letters received from plaintiff’s attorney, where expert had received 
additional material from the attorney, re-assessed the situation, and changed his opinion; no abuse of 
discretion in allowing inquiry into content of letters, “[i]n light of the extraordinary circumstances 
surrounding this significant change of opinion,” id. at *10). 
A closely related issue was addressed in Stanton v. Univ. Hosp. Health Sys., 166 Ohio App.3d 758, 
2006 Ohio 2297, 853 N.E.2d 343 (Cuyahoga). In Stanton, plaintiff’s experts’ testimony at 
deposition raised the issue of whether and to what extent a nurse/paralegal employed by plaintiff’s 
counsel had assisted in preparing the expert reports. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed a 
trial court order compelling plaintiff to produce the paralegal for deposition on the narrow issue of 
how the expert reports were generated after telephone conversations between the paralegal and the 
experts concerning the substance of their reports. Although the court explicitly recognized that 
opinion work product “enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered only is very rare and 
extraordinary circumstances,” it concluded that “the trial court’s order of [the paralegal’s] deposition 
goes solely to the issue of how the reports were generated, protecting any intrusion into the mental 
processes that went into creating the reports.” Id. at paras. 11, 14.  See Harry D. Cornett, The 
Work Product Doctrine and Expert Witness Reports, Cleve B.J., July/Aug. 2006, at 18. 
(Although the Sixth Circuit ruled in 2006 as a matter of federal law that under Fed R Civ P 26(a)(2) 
opinion work product provided to testifying experts must be disclosed in discovery, Reg’l Airport 
Auth. v. LFG, LLC, 460 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 2006), under the federal rules as amended effective 
December 1, 2010, attorney communication with a testifying expert, including work product 
disclosed to the expert, are, with three limited exceptions, not subject to discovery. See Fed R Civ P 
26(b)(4)(C).) 
In addition to the foregoing cases, which focus on the effect of sharing work product with an expert 
witness, the case law has also raised the question whether a party may share its own documents 
(billing) with its expert in a billing dispute case. Thus, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. 
Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio St.3d 161, 2010 Ohio 4469, 937 N.E.2d 533, presented an 
instance in which the work-product protection (along with attorney-client privilege) was invoked by 
the client in an attempt to keep the plaintiff law firm from having the firm’s expert review its own 
billing files and other documents for the purpose of opining as to the reasonableness of the unpaid 
fees. The trial court ruled that SS&D could use its own documents bearing on the billing dispute, but 
the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court in turn reversed the court of appeals. The firm’s 
intent to provide its expert with its own documents in aid of its position on the billing dispute and the 
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client’s objection thereto, based on privilege and work-product grounds, were noted by the Court but 
not separately discussed as an issue in the decision. It did, however, seemingly endorse the trial 
court’s handling of the matter when, at the conclusion of its opinion, the Court instructed the trial 
court “to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion and its earlier journalized orders.” 
Id. at para. 66 (emphasis added). 
 
1.6:740  Invoking Work-Product Immunity and Its Exceptions 
Burden of proof: The party seeking to invoke work-product immunity bears the initial burden of 
demonstrating that the items it seeks to protect are documents and tangible things prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial.  Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Desprez, No. 52634, 1987 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 7167 (Cuyahoga Feb. 5, 1987) (citing Peyko v. Frederick, 25 Ohio St.3d 164, 495 N.E.2d 
918 (1986)). Likewise, under the Ohio Public Records Act (ORC 149.43) a governmental entity 
invoking an exception to disclosure (including the “trial preparation” exception set forth in ORC 
149.43(A)(1)(g) and (A)(4) and the “specific investigatory work product” exception set forth in ORC 
149.43(A)(1)(h) and (A)(2)(c)), bears the burden of proof that the contested records are exempt from 
disclosure. State ex rel. WLWT-TV5 v. Leis, 77 Ohio St.3d 357, 673 N.E.2d 1365 (1997); State ex 
rel. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 79, 526 N.E.2d 786, 786 (1988) 
(syllabus two). 
In camera inspection: Where the materials sought are arguably subject to the protection of 
work-product immunity, the party seeking protection may request an in camera inspection of the 
materials by the trial judge. In such circumstances, the trial court is obliged to conduct such an 
inspection prior to granting a motion to compel production.  McHenry v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 
104 Ohio App.3d 350, 662 N.E.2d 51 (Cuyahoga 1995). The court may then grant the adverse party 
access to those portions of the materials that it determines are not protected.  Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 
v. Desprez supra. 
Discovery on showing of good cause: Under OH Civ R 26(B)(3), a party may discover documents 
and tangible things prepared by or for another party in anticipation of litigation only upon a showing 
of good cause.  Frank W. Schaefer, Inc. v. C. Garfield Mitchell Agency, Inc., 82 Ohio App.3d 
322, 612 N.E.2d 442 (Montgomery 1992). The definition of “good cause” has been articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Greger, 110 Ohio St.3d 488, 2006 Ohio 4968, 854 N.E.2d 487, as 
“requir[ing] demonstration of need for the materials – i.e., a showing that the materials, or the 
information they contain, are relevant and otherwise unavailable.” Id. at para. 16. The “good cause” 
issue was further addressed by the Court in Squire, Sanders & Dempsey v. Givaudan Flavors 
Corp., 127 Ohio St.3d 161, 2010 Ohio 4469, 937 N.E.2d 533; this aspect of the Givaudan case is 
discussed this section infra at “Attorney’s conduct at issue.” 
Good-cause showing not required for own statement: A party has an absolute right to his or her own 
statement previously given concerning the action or its subject matter; a showing of good cause is not 
required. OH Civ R 26(B)(3). 
Good cause where witness is available: The statement of a witness ordinarily cannot be discovered 
where the witness is equally available to the party seeking discovery. Exceptions to the rule are 
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recognized where: (1) the witness is hostile to the party seeking discovery; (2) the length of time since 
the original statement makes that statement especially valuable as a nearly contemporaneous 
recollection; or (3) there are indications that the prior statement is inconsistent with a version given to 
the party seeking discovery.  Perry v. Dobbins, No. 589, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1400 (Jackson 
April 4, 1990). 
Discretion of trial court: The existence of protected work product and good cause are discretionary 
determinations to be made on a case-by-case basis by the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal 
absent a determination that the trial court abused its discretion.  Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Desprez, 
No. 52634, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 7167 (Cuyahoga Feb. 5, 1987) (citing Peyko v. Frederick, 25 
Ohio St.3d 164, 495 N.E.2d 918 (1986)). 
Attorney’s conduct at issue: Where defendant attorneys’ conduct in a matter is at issue in the 
proceeding (serious allegations of the attorneys’ ethical misconduct in intentionally misdirecting 
notice to plaintiff, backed up by affidavits by former secretaries of one of the attorneys, which 
affidavits were the subject of defendants’ assertion of attorney-client privilege), the work-product 
doctrine is inapplicable.  Kracht v. Kracht, Nos. 70005, 70009, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2412 
(Cuyahoga June 5, 1997) (citing Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the 
Work-Product Doctrine §  2(V)(C), at p. 388 (3d ed. 1997) [in the 5th ed. 2007, §  2(VI)(D), at 
1004]).  
The conclusion reached in Kracht as to the inapplicability of work-product protection in such 
circumstances was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. 
Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio St.3d 161, 2010 Ohio 4469, 937 N.E.2d 533, in which the 
Court, reversing the court of appeals in a case involving a claim for legal fees and a counterclaim for 
malpractice, reinstated the trial court ruling that testimony by the defendant’s prior and present 
general counsel concerning the value and quality of plaintiff’s legal services, as well as defendant’s 
documents related thereto, were not protected from discovery by the work-product doctrine. 
In so deciding, the Court held that good cause under Ohio Civil Rule 26(B)(3) was present because 
 [w]hen the attorney-client relationship has been put at issue by 
a claim for legal fees or by a claim that the attorney breached a duty 
owed to the client, good cause exists for the production of attorney 
work product to the extent necessary to collect those fees or to defend 
against the client’s claim. 
*   *   *   *   * 
 Thus, attorney work product, including but not limited to 
mental impressions, theories, and legal conclusions, may be discovered 
upon a showing of good cause if it is directly at issue on the case, the 
need for the information is compelling, and the evidence cannot be 
obtained elsewhere. 
 Here, attorney work product, including information sought 
from [Givaudan’s former and present in-house general counsel] . . . is 
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directly at issue, as the reasonable value of the legal services performed 
by Squire Sanders and the quality of its legal work are the pivotal 
issues in this lawsuit, and the need for this evidence is compelling. 
Id. at paras. 59, 60-61. Moreover Givaudan’s general counsels’ “mental impressions regarding the 
defense of the [underlying product-liability] litigation relate directly to and are necessary for 
determining the truth of [Givaudan’s] allegations . . . . This information is otherwise unavailable to 
Squire Sanders because it is in the exclusive possession and knowledge of Givaudan, King, and 
Garfinkel.” Id. at para. 62 (bracketed material added). As a result, the testimony and documents 
sought by Squire Sanders are not protected from discovery by the work-product doctrine. 
Post-trial proceedings for prejudgment interest: In Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 69 Ohio St.3d 
638, 639, 635 N.E.2d 331, 334-335 (1994), the Court held, in a rather novel interpretation of OH Civ 
R 26(B)(3) “good cause,” that “[i]n a prejudgment interest proceeding, the good cause requirement . . . 
is that which is appropriate to effectuate the General Assembly’s purposes of enacting R.C. 
1343.03(C) -- to encourage and bring about settlements.”  Id. at 662, 635 N.E.2d at 350. See 
Radnovic v. Cossler, 140 Ohio App.3d 208, 746 N.E.2d 1184 (Cuyahoga 2000), where, in 
applying the Moskovitz rule, the court held that documents in the claims file, including “analysis of 
the credibility of witnesses; comments regarding the likelihood of success on the merits; and ... 
comments on the interaction between the defendants” had to be produced, because “[t]his type of 
documentation does not go directly to the defense of the case; rather, the documents are the type of 
documents recorded to indicate whether or not prejudgment interest is warranted.”  Id. at 216-17, 746 
N.E.2d at 1190-91. The court of appeals recognized that under the Moskovitz holding that neither 
attorney-client nor “so-called” work-product privilege is applicable unless the material goes directly 
to the theory of defense in the underlying case, “the Supreme Court has essentially found that 
otherwise privileged documents may lose their privilege for purposes of prejudgment interest 
discovery.”  Id at 216, 746 N.E.2d at 1190. (See also section 1.6:410.) 
Bad-faith insurance litigation: In Boone v. Vanliner Insurance Co., 91 Ohio St.3d 209, 744 N.E.2d 
154 (2001), dealing with allegations of bad-faith denial of insurance coverage, the Supreme Court 
held that, as to contested documents created prior to the denial of coverage, there was no work 
product prepared in anticipation of litigation “because at that point it has not yet been determined 
whether coverage exists,”  id. at 214, 744 N.E.2d at 158, but that work-product protection was 
available with respect to documents created after the denial of coverage, inasmuch as such documents 
could not bear on the bad-faith denial issue.  Id. at 213, 744 N.E.2d at 158. (The attorney-client 
privilege aspect of the Boone decision is discussed in section 1.6:410.) Accord Garg v. State Auto. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 155 Ohio App. 3d 258, 2003 Ohio 5960, 800 N.E.2d 757 (Miami) (documents 
created after threat of litigation but before denial of claim “may contain attorney work product,” but, 
under Boone, all such pre-denial material is discoverable. Id. at para. 23.). See Dennis v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 143 Ohio App.3d 196, 757 N.E.2d 849 (Mahoning 2001) (order protecting insurer’s 
claims adjuster from deposition by insured not justified on work-product grounds; although case was 
an insurance-coverage contract dispute not raising tort of bad-faith denial, “the issue of [insurer’s] 
good faith or bad faith in denying coverage is certainly related to the subject matter of this action.”  Id. 
at 204, 757 N.E.2d at 856). 
  
427
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.6 
  
1.6:750  Waiver of Work-Product Immunity by Voluntary Acts 
Public disclosure: In State ex rel. WLWT-TV5 v. Leis, 77 Ohio St.3d 357, 673 N.E.2d 1365 (1997) 
(per curiam), a case involving the applicability of Public Records Act (ORC 143.49) exemptions to 
the prosecution’s work-product and trial-preparation materials, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
numerous media reports on the investigation did not destroy the effectiveness of the exemptions: 
“Absent evidence that respondents have already disclosed the investigatory records to the public and 
thereby waived application of certain exemptions, the exemptions are fully applicable.”  Id. at 361, 
673 N.E.2d at 1369-70. Accord State ex rel. Musial v. N. Olmsted, 106 Ohio St.3d 459, 2005 Ohio 
5521, 835 N.E.2d 1243, at para. 37 (forwarding police investigatory records to ethics commission 
did not constitute waiver because such action “did not disclose these records to the general public”). 
In another case, the Supreme Court quoted the above language from Leis in holding that an overbroad 
request for “all records” encompassed records exempt under the Ohio Public Records Act and that 
this exemption was not forfeited by the city’s earlier release of specified non-exempt police reports in 
response to a request by a local newspaper. State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman, 92 Ohio St.3d 312, 750 
N.E.2d 156 (2001) (per curiam). [The precedential value of this opinion is questionable, however, 
given that only three justices joined in this aspect of the opinion, with four justices concurring in 
judgment only.] Compare State ex rel. Zuern v. Leis, 56 Ohio St.3d 20, 564 N.E.2d 81 (1990) 
(voluntary disclosure of records at issue, during discovery in related civil litigation, constituted 
waiver of claim of exemption under ORC 149.43). 
Voluntary disclosure to government: There is at least one Ohio case addressing the waiver issue in the 
context of disclosure to the government. In In re Grand Jury, Nos. 93CA09, 93CA10 & 93 CA12, 
1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2567 (Washington June 1, 1995), the court assumed that a taped 
confession by a third party in the possession of the defendant’s lawyer was protected work product, 
but that the protection no longer existed: 
If a party from whom discovery is sought has disclosed such materials 
to third persons, including counsel representing interests adverse to 
such party from whom discovery is sought, the [work-product] 
privilege is destroyed as to such party. . . . It is undisputed in this case 
that Dunn [defendant’s lawyer] played the tape recorded confession 
made by Elkins to the Washington County Prosecutor while attempting 
to strike a “deal” for his client. This amounted to a clear waiver of any 
protection from disclosure afforded to that tape by the “work-product” 
doctrine. 
Id. at *49-50 (bracketed material added; O.Jur. 3d cites omitted). Compare Musial supra, where the 
police department’s decision “to forward its investigative records to the city ethics commission for its 
administrative review did not waive or otherwise affect the uncharged-suspect exemption” under the 
Ohio Public Records Act, because waiver is triggered by disclosure to the public and there was no 
such disclosure here.  106 Ohio St.3d 459, 2005 Ohio 5521, 835 N.E.2d 1243, at para. 37. 
For the somewhat more elaborate approach by federal courts to the work-product waiver issue see, 
e.g., Info. Res., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 999 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (no waiver in 
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sharing work-product with litigation ally; cases split on waiver where submission to government 
made under coercion; but waiver results from voluntary submission to government agency in order to 
persuade it to act against informant’s adversary, as in case at bar). 
Partial disclosure results in waiver: The rule that partial, voluntary disclosure of privileged 
attorney-client communication can result in loss of privilege for all other communications that deal 
with the same subject matter applies to partial disclosure of materials protected by the work-product 
doctrine as well.  Mid-American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App.3d 
481, 599 N.E.2d 699 (Wood 1991) (dictum; issue was privilege, not work product). But see the 
apparently contrary result under the Ohio Records Act in Dillery v. Icsman supra. (Compare, 
however, the result reached in the inadvertent-waiver context in Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40461 (S.D. Ohio June 19, 2006), discussed at the end of this section. 
But waiver of attorney-client privilege does not necessarily waive work-product immunity: As the 
federal district court case cited in Mid-American makes clear, a waiver of the privilege does not 
necessarily result in waiver of work-product immunity, because the attorney-client privilege is the 
client’s to waive, whereas the work-product immunity is that of the attorney, and thus may be waived 
only by the attorney. See Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977). The 
difference in waiver standards is also supported by the protection each provides. The attorney-client 
privilege protects the confidential nature of the lawyer-client communication. Once the 
communication is shared with a nonagent third party, confidentiality has been broken. The 
work-product doctrine, in contrast, exists to keep certain information from one’s adversary. The range 
of disclosures that can be made while still honoring that concern is much broader. 
In a contested election for the office of Attorney General of Ohio, the contestee (Fisher) moved for 
production from the contestor (Pfeifer) of certain notes taken by observers during the official ballot 
recount in Mahoning County. Pfeifer opposed the motion, arguing that the notes were protected as 
work product under OH Civ R 26(B)(3). The notes were prepared at the direction of counsel for 
Pfeifer and for counsel’s use. Fisher argued that the work-product immunity had been waived because 
(1) the observers had disclosed the notes to Pfeifer’s campaign manager and (2) the observers were 
deposed by Pfeifer and testified extensively on the subject covered by the notes. On these facts, Chief 
Justice Moyer held that the observers were acting as agents for Pfeifer’s attorney; as a result, Fisher 
had to show “good cause” for production. But since Fisher argued waiver principles applicable to the 
attorney-client privilege, but not applicable to OH Civ R 26(B)(3), Fisher failed to carry his burden 
of showing good cause. “[A] waiver of the attorney-client privilege does not necessarily constitute a 
waiver of exemption under [OH Civ R 26(B)(3)].”  In re Election of Nov. 6, 1990 for Office of Atty. 
Gen., 57 Ohio St.3d 614, 615, 567 N.E.2d 243, 244 (1991) (opinion in chambers by Moyer, C.J.). 
Accord Frank W. Schaefer, Inc. v. C. Garfield Mitchell Agency, Inc., 82 Ohio App.3d 322, 329, 
612 N.E.2d 442, 447 (Montgomery 1992). [Query whether, on the facts presented, the In re 
Election result is the correct one. It would appear that the opinion mixes the apples of work-product 
protection (absence of good cause) with the oranges of waiver of that protection; the subsequent 
disclosure of the information at depositions by the attorney’s agents arguably constitutes waiver of 
the work-product immunity of this information, irrespective of the absence of good cause. See section 
1.6:760.] 
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Inadvertent disclosure of work-product material: The only case of which we are aware presenting this 
issue in the context of work-product information is Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 40461 (S.D. Ohio June 19, 2006). In Hawkins, the court held that the test for 
inadvertent disclosure of attorney-client privilege and work-product was the same, and concluded that, 
in the circumstances presented, there was no waiver of the work-product privilege. For further 
discussion of the inadvertent waiver issue, see sections 1.6:500 and 4.4:300. 
 
1.6:760  Waiver of Work-Product Immunity by Use in Litigation 
Implied waiver - Placing prior litigation work product at issue in subsequent litigation: In insured’s 
action against insurance agent for negligence, documents of the attorneys for insured employer and 
for its employee, prepared in connection with the employee’s prior action against the insured, were 
protected by the work-product immunity from discovery by the insurance agent. Whether documents 
prepared for prior litigation are protected by the work-product doctrine must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis. The three elements to be considered are: (1) whether the work product prepared in 
anticipation of prior litigation is closely related to the present litigation; (2) whether permitting 
discovery in the subsequent case of work product from the prior case would result in a chilling effect 
on the performance of attorneys preparing for litigation; and (3) whether the past work product 
consists of material that is directly at issue in the present litigation. If the third factor (material directly 
at issue) is found to exist, this constitutes an implied waiver of the immunity and the material is 
discoverable, regardless of the other two factors.  Frank W. Schaefer, Inc. v. C. Garfield Mitchell 
Agency, Inc., 82 Ohio App.3d 322, 334-35, 612 N.E.2d 442, 450 (Montgomery 1992) (utilizing the 
three-part test of Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975); all three factors tilted 
toward protection -- cases “very closely related”; “might well be” chilling effect in such 
circumstances; and the past work product “was not directly at issue in this case, and therefore neither 
attorney should have been considered to have waived the protection of the work-product doctrine.”). 
Whether the Hearn approach will continue to be viable in Ohio, even as to work-product waiver, is 
unclear, given the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jackson v. Greger, 110 Ohio St.3d 488, 2006 Ohio 
4968, 854 N.E.2d 487. The court of appeals in Jackson (160 Ohio App.3d 258, 2005 Ohio 1588, 
826 N.E.2d 900) had followed Schaefer and used the Hearn waiver analysis with respect to both 
attorney-client privilege and work-product issues. Although the Supreme Court reached the same 
result in affirming the court of appeals, it rejected the Hearn analysis for privilege purposes (see 
further discussion of Jackson on this point at section 1.6:530), and it made no mention of Hearn on 
the work-product issue. Rather than Hearn/waiver, the Court’s work-product analysis was that Rule 
26(B)(3) requires a showing of good cause to obtain discovery of trial preparation materials, and that 
the relevant-and-not-otherwise-available test had not been met by the defendant law firm with respect 
to its efforts to discover the files of the attorney who had represented Jackson in the prior civil rights 
litigation. 
Introduction into evidence: Not surprisingly, introduction of work product into evidence waives the 
work-product protection. Since the doctrine provides a shield from having to disclose the material to 
an adversary, that shield is no longer relevant once the material is voluntarily disclosed by placing it 
in evidence. See generally United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-40 (1975). Cf. State ex rel. 
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Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton County, 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 377, 662 N.E.2d 334, 337 (1996) 
(per curiam) (applying concept in Public Records Act case). 
Document used to refresh witness’s testimony: Plaintiff’s counsel sought production of a document 
used by an assistant prosecutor to refresh his recollection as to the identity of participants at a meeting 
called to investigate allegations that one or more of the people present at the meeting had attempted to 
coerce a public official (defendant Cox, who had been the county coroner) into abusing his position 
by ceasing an investigation into the death of one of the patients of the present plaintiff, Kremer. The 
document was used by the prosecutor during his testimony at a hearing held during previous litigation 
brought by the present defendant, Cox, against Kremer. The trial court in the present action quashed 
the subpoena. On appeal, Kremer argued that OH R Evid 612 permitted him to examine a document 
used by an opposing witness to refresh his recollection. In rejecting this argument, the appellate court 
noted that the document in question was used to refresh the recollection of the witness, not in the 
present case, but in a prior lawsuit. The court further held that the document was protected by the 
exception set forth in ORC 149.43(A)(2)(a), which exempts from disclosure confidential 
law-enforcement records that, if released, might disclose the identity of a suspect who has not been 
charged with a crime.  Kremer v. Cox, 114 Ohio App.3d 41, 682 N.E.2d 1006 (Summit 1996). 
Does the use of a document to refresh recollection in pending litigation operate to waive 
work-product protection (or the attorney-client privilege)? Ohio R Evid 612 provides: 
Writing used to refresh memory 
  Except as otherwise provided in criminal proceedings 
by Rule 16(B)(1)(g) and 16(C)(1)(d) of Ohio Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, if a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the 
purpose of testifying, either: (1) while testifying; or (2) before 
testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the 
interests of justice, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing 
produced at the hearing. He is also entitled to inspect it, to 
cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those 
portions which relate to the testimony of the witness. If it is claimed 
that the writing contains matters not related to the subject matter of the 
testimony the court shall examine the writing in camera, excise any 
portions not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party 
entitled thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall be 
preserved and made available to the appellate court in the event of an 
appeal. If a writing is not produced or delivered pursuant to order under 
this rule, the court shall make any order justice requires, except that in 
criminal cases when the prosecution elects not to comply, the order 
shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court in its discretion 
determines that the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial. 
The Staff Notes to Rule 612 state that 
 Rule 612 vests discretion in the court to permit examination of a 
writing used to refresh recollection before testifying. This provision, 
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together with the basic limitation of the rule which restricts 
examination to those situations where the writing is used to refresh 
recollection for the purpose of testifying, serves to avoid the rule being 
used as an additional method of discovery, particularly as to work 
product and pretrial preparation. 
See State v. Cummings, 23 Ohio App.3d 40, 491 N.E.2d 354 (Cuyahoga 1985) (citing the Staff 
Report language in support of its decision affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s Rule 612 
request to inspect a police officer’s report that the officer reviewed prior to testifying). The Rule 
distinguishes between the seemingly absolute right to review the document when used to refresh 
recollection while the witness is testifying (OH R Evid 612(1)), and the trial court’s discretion to 
allow production of a document reviewed prior to testifying, if “necessary in the interests of justice” 
(OH R Evid 612(2)). 
According to Wright and Gold, most federal courts now use a balancing test in determining whether a 
privileged or work-product document used to refresh recollection must be disclosed under Fed R 
Evid 612, the language of which is in all material respects identical to the Ohio version. See 28 
Charles A. Wright & Victor J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure §  6188, at 488-90 (1993) 
& Supp. 2011, at 90 (setting forth the factors for and against production). One of the factors listed by 
the commentators in favor of work-product protection is “use of a writing to refresh memory before 
rather than while testifying.” Id. at 489. The authors go on to note that a balancing test is difficult to 
reconcile with the absolute right under Rule 612(1) to review of the document when memory is 
refreshed while testifying. Id. at 490-91. The House Judiciary Committee Report (H.R. Rep. No. 650, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7075, 7086), states that 
“[t]he Committee intends that nothing in the Rule be construed as barring the assertion of a privilege 
with respect to writings used by a witness to refresh his memory.” 
  
1.6:770  Exception for Crime or Fraud 
See Kracht v. Kracht, Nos. 70005, 70009, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2412 (Cuyahoga June 5, 1997), 
where the court, rejecting defendant/lawyers’ privilege argument with respect to affidavits by former 
employees of one of the lawyers, which affidavits implied that the lawyer had deliberately violated 
the civil rules, stated as follows: “Communications otherwise protected by the attorney-client 
privilege or work product doctrine are not protected if the communications are made in furtherance of 
crime, fraud, or other misconduct.” Id. at *26.   
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1.7:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.7 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.7 
 
1.7:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.7 differs significantly from the Model Rule: 
The introductory language of division (a) has been rewritten; the Model Rule’s 
“concurrent conflict” language has not been adopted. The new introductory sentence 
states as follows: “A lawyer’s acceptance or continuation of representation of a client 
creates a conflict of interest if either of the following applies:” 
In subdivision(a)(1), the word “that” replaces “one” after “of”. 
In subdivision(a)(2), “significant” has been replaced by “substantial”; 
the phrase “representation of one or more clients” has been deleted, and 
in its place the words “lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or 
carry out an appropriate course of action for that client” have been 
substituted. Also, “a personal interest of the lawyer” has been deleted; 
it has been replaced by “the lawyer’s own personal interests.” 
The introductory sentence of division (b) has been deleted and a new sentence, as 
follows, has been substituted: 
“A lawyer shall not accept or continue the representation of a client if a conflict of 
interest would be created pursuant to division (a) of this rule, unless all of the 
following apply:” 
In subdivision (b)(1), the words “the lawyer reasonably believes that” 
have been deleted. 
Subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Model Rule have been deleted. 
What was MR 1.7(b)(4) is now Ohio Rule 1.7(b)(2). 
Subdivision (b)(3) (referencing division (c) nonconsentable conflicts) 
has been added. 
Division (c) (nonconsentable conflicts) has been added. 
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1.7:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.7: DR 5-101(A)(1), DR 5-105(A), (B), & 
(C). 
 
1.7:200  Conflicts of Interest in General 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.7 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.7 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.3, 5.101-5.105, 
9.5-9.7 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:101 
ALI-LGL §§  121-124 
Wolfram §§  7.1-7.6 
The provisions of Ohio Rule 1.7: Before proceeding to the general conflict-of-interest principles set 
forth in sections 1.7:210-:280, we summarize the basic provisions of the current-client conflict rule, 
Ohio Rule 1.7: 
Pursuant to Rule 1.7(a), a conflict is present with respect to acceptance or continuation of 
representation if 
(1) the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another current client; 
[or] 
(2) there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend or carry 
out an appropriate course of action for that client will be materially limited by the 
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by the 
lawyer’s own personal interests. 
These two types of conflict (direct adversity and material limitation) can be overcome only if all of 
the factors set forth in division (b) are present: 
(1) the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each 
affected client; 
(2) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing; [and] 
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(3) the representation is not precluded by division (c) of this rule. 
Division (c) sets forth those conflict situations in which acceptance or continuance of the 
representation is prohibited, irrespective of the consent of affected clients: 
(1) the representation is prohibited by law; [or] 
(2) the representation would involve the assertion of a claim by one client against 
another client represented by the lawyer in the same proceeding. 
As stated in the Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.7, “[n]o change in the substance of the referenced 
Ohio rules on conflicts and conflict waivers [OH DR 5-101(A)(1) and 5-105(A), (B), & (C)] is 
intended, except the requirement that conflict waivers be confirmed in writing.” (Note, however, that 
the same paragraph makes the point that, “unlike DR 5-101(A)(1),” the Rule 1.7 analysis must be 
applied when the lawyer’s personal interests create a conflict.) Despite this statement of intent, there 
are a few instances (in addition to the 5-101(A)(1) reference) in which the result under the Rule will 
be different from that which obtained under the former disciplinary rules. Where these differences 
occur, we will attempt to point them out. 
 
1.7:210  Basic Prohibition of Conflict of Interest 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.3 (1996). 
The duty of loyalty owed by a lawyer to the client is central to the lawyer-client relationship. The 
lawyer must put the interests of the client above all else, whether the competing interest is personal to 
the lawyer or the interest of another. Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [1]. 
The duty of loyalty requires the lawyer to exercise professional judgment solely for the benefit of the 
client, with two important limitations. First, the lawyer’s duty of loyalty is limited to conduct that is 
within the bounds of the law. Second, while the lawyer is to exercise professional judgment solely for 
the benefit of the client, the lawyer still remains responsible for the judgment or decision itself. Other 
provisions of the Rules specifically address how the duty of loyalty should be exercised in particular 
instances. 
Conflicts are regulated primarily through disciplinary actions, malpractice complaints, 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, and disqualification motions. See discussion at section 
1.7:260. 
To avoid conflicts, a lawyer should adopt “reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of 
firm and practice,” to identify those conflicts. Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [3]. Ignorance occasioned by 
failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a conflicts violation. Id. 
For an instructive look at some of the many kinds of conflicts that can arise in trusts and estates work, 
see M. Elizabeth Monihan, Conflicts of Interest in a Trusts and Estates Practice, Cleveland 
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Metro. B.J., June 2010, at p. 30. 
 
1.7:220  Material Adverse Effect on Representation 
A finding of conflict of interest is predicated on there being a sufficient likelihood that the potential 
conflict could have a material adverse effect on the representation. See Ohio Rule 1.7(a)(1) 
(representation of client that will be directly adverse to another current client) and (a)(2) (substantial 
risk of material limitation of lawyer’s representation). As stated in 2 Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers §  121, at 244-45 (2000): “A conflict of interest is involved if there is a 
substantial risk that the lawyer’s representation would be materially and adversely affected by the 
lawyer’s own interests or by the lawyer’s duties to another current client, a former client, or a third 
person.” (Emphasis added.) 
If the lawyer’s judgment or representation is not affected “adversely,” there is no conflict. 2 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  121 cmt. c(i) (2000). The cases under 
former OH DR 5-105 in which a lawyer’s independent judgment could have been adversely affected 
typically involved conflicting multiple-client situations (see, e.g., Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. 
Schmelzer, 84 Ohio St.3d 382, 704 N.E.2d 243 (1999)), or circumstances in which the lawyer had a 
personal financial interest in the matter (see, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Schlosser, 74 Ohio St.3d 
174, 657 N.E.2d 500 (1995)), or both (see, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ewing, 75 Ohio St.3d 244, 
661 N.E.2d 1109 (1996)). 
There was little or no development under the former OHCPR of the “materiality” test, since it was 
not explicitly incorporated into the state’s ethics rules. One can surmise, however, even under the 
Code, that the existence of adversity having no bearing or impact on the lawyer’s judgment or 
representation (e.g., the lawyer was an Indians fan; the client couldn’t stand the Indians) would not 
have raised conflict-of-interest concerns, in Ohio or anywhere else. At the other end of the spectrum, 
the Ohio Supreme Court, in finding a lawyer’s professional judgment and his clients’ interests likely 
to be adversely affected in violation of former OH DR 5-105(B), stressed that the lawyer himself was 
on record as acknowledging that the interests of the two clients he represented in state court litigation 
involved “some very clear and distinct differences” in that litigation.  Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Mazer, 86 Ohio St.3d 185, 186, 712 N.E.2d 1246, 1247 (1999) (emphasis by the Court) 
(six-month suspension). See also Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ewing, 75 Ohio St.3d 244, 251, 661 
N.E.2d 1109, 1114 (1996) (indefinite suspension based on violations of, inter alia, former OH DR 
5-105(A) and (B) in accepting and continuing employment in which lawyer’s own interest and that of 
multiple clients adversely affected lawyer’s ability to exercise independent judgment; Court 
characterized respondent’s conduct as a “power play” that violated the trust of two of his clients 
(husband and wife); Court “appalled” by respondent’s “coercive tactics”). 
See, in contrast, the first case decided under Rule 1.7(a)(2), Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Schmalz, 123 
Ohio St.3d 130, 2009 Ohio 4159, 914 N.E.2d 1024. The respondent in Schmalz become sexually 
involved with a criminal defendant she was representing; the defendant filed a grievance in which he 
asserted that the relationship had caused respondent to fail to obtain a plea bargain for him. (Actually, 
respondent urged him to accept the plea bargain, but he declined.) In accepting the parties 
consent-to-discipline agreement in the form of a public reprimand, the Court explained that in the 
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spectrum of cases involving sexual misconduct, this one was at the “least egregious” end of the 
spectrum. “The parties stipulated that in spite of the improprieties, respondent effectively performed 
her function as attorney in the criminal representation and that a public reprimand for the stated 
violations will adequately deter her from further violations.” Id. at para. 9. Thus, despite the 
effective representation, there was still a violation of Rule 1.7(a)(2), presumably because such 
misconduct carries with it “substantial risk” that the representation would be compromised by the 
lawyer’s personal interest. Schmalz was also found to have violated Rule 1.8(j) (soliciting or 
engaging in sexual activity with client); that aspect of the case is discussed in section 1.8:200. 
For a 1.7(a)(2) case involving substantial risk of material limitation arising out of the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to a third person, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Mamich, 125 Ohio St.3d 369, 2010 
Ohio 1044, 928 N.E.2d 691, where the respondent, at a client’s request, represented the client’s 
daughter without the daughter’s knowledge or consent. [Note that the charges of violation of Rule 1.2 
and 1.4 were dismissed because there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and the 
client’s daughter. See id. at para. 13. Does not the same rationale apply to the violation of 1.7, which 
deals with conflicts of interest regarding a “lawyer’s acceptance or continuation of representation of a 
client . . . .”?] 
Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Parisi, 131 Ohio St.3d 345, 2012 Ohio 879, 965 N.E.2d 268, is a Rule 1.7(a) 
case decided in the context of a probate/guardianship proceeding involving a client of diminished 
capacity; it is extensively discussed in section 1.14:400. 
 
1.7:230  Perspective for Determining Conflict of Interest 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 9.5-9.7 (1996). 
Appearance of impropriety - In general: The “appearance-of-impropriety” standard has been 
“discarded” by the Model Rules (see ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 199 
(5th ed. 2003)); and by 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  121 (2000). As 
Restatement comment c(iv) and the reporter’s note thereto state: 
 The perspective for determining conflict of interest. This Section employs an 
objective standard by which to assess the adverseness, materiality, and substantially of 
the risk of the effect on representation. The standard of this Section is not the 
“appearance of impropriety” standard formerly used by some courts to define the 
scope of impermissible conflicts. That standard could prohibit not only conflicts as 
defined in the Section, but also situations that might appear improper to an uninformed 
observer or even an interested party. 
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2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  121 cmt. c(iv). 
Defining the appropriate standard by which to give an objective content to an 
appearance-of-impropriety standard has proved problematical. 
Id. at reporter’s note to cmt. c(iv). And see Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  7.1.4 
(1986) (strongly criticizing the appearance-of-impropriety standard). 
Pre-Rule, Ohio employed a low threshold to trigger conflict-of-interest protections. If the conduct 
raised even the appearance of impropriety, it was arguably improper. The extent to which the 
appearance-of-impropriety standard survives under the Rules is not entirely clear. Like the Model 
Rule, Ohio Rule 1.7 has abandoned any reference to appearance of impropriety. The complication 
arises from Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining, Inc., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998), 
a disqualification case, in which appearance of impropriety was heavily relied by the Court in 
reaching its decision, which is purportedly “codified” in Ohio Rules 1.9 and 1.10. See further 
discussion of this aspect of Kala in this section infra. See also OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Safeco 
Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82833 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (using appearance of impropriety in 
support of decision to disqualify). 
Under the former OHCPR, the Ohio Supreme Court invoked the “appearance of impropriety” in 
disciplinary actions only on rare occasion -- usually, although not exclusively, as an additional 
concern for conduct otherwise violative of the disciplinary rules. See, e.g., Miami County Bar Ass’n 
v. Thompson, 78 Ohio St.3d 103, 104-05, 676 N.E.2d 879, 881 (1997) (one-year suspension for 
failure to “avoid even the appearance of impropriety and the implication that his professional 
judgment on behalf of a client could be affected by the lawyer’s own interests”). The “appearance of 
impropriety” concern also was raised on occasion to justify disqualification of counsel, where the 
current representation bore a “substantial relationship” to a former representation. See Kala 
(discussed below). (See section 1.9:210 for discussion of substantial relationship test.) Most cases 
questioned its use as an independent factor requiring disqualification. E.g., Kitts v. U.S. Health 
Corp., 97 Ohio App.3d 271, 277, 646 N.E.2d 555, 559 (Scioto 1994) (“The appearance of 
impropriety, with nothing more, is, as a matter of law, insufficient to warrant disqualification.”); 
Hatfield v. Seville Centrifugal Bronze, 106 Ohio Misc.2d 10, 16, 732 N.E.2d 1077, 1081 (C.P. 
Medina 2000) (“This court can find no Ohio cases where disqualification of an attorney or a law firm 
was based merely on an appearance of impropriety.”). But cf. Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. 
Co. (In re Roger J. Au & Son, Inc.), 64 B.R. 600 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (simultaneous representation of 
corporation and its officers, coupled with admonition to “avoid even the appearance of impropriety,” 
led court to conclude that it need not find evidence of ethical violation before disqualifying counsel). 
More often, the broad concern for the avoidance of even the appearance of impropriety was invoked 
in advisory opinions assessing proposed lawyer conduct; they are reviewed below at “Appearance of 
impropriety-Improper conduct.” 
As noted above, the Supreme Court opinion in Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining, Inc., 81 
Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998), indicated that the “appearance of impropriety” standard was 
alive and well under the Code in the conflict-of-interest/disqualification context despite its 
condemnation by the commentators. No less than nine references to the appearance of impropriety 
appear in the course of the Court’s fourteen-page majority opinion. See 81 Ohio St.3d at 5, 9, 11, 14, 
688 N.E.2d at 262, 265, 266, 268. Detailed discussion of the Kala decision, a “classic” 
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side-switching case, can be found at sections 1.9:200, 1.9:400, and 1.10:300. Accord, on the 
appearance-of-impropriety point, Perin v. Spurney, 2005 Ohio 6811, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 6112 
(Franklin); the Perin court rejected plaintiff’s contention that disqualification could not be based on 
appearance of impropriety and reasoned as follows: 
[H]ere, as in Kala, Kelm and Dawson’s [plaintiff’s lawyers] disqualification is 
warranted through the underlying appearance of impropriety stemming from concerns 
that Kelm and Dawson had access to Honda’s confidences and secrets by representing 
and communicating with Doug Perin [plaintiff appellant’s husband and a Honda 
in-house counsel]. . . . 
* * * * 
 . . . Kelm and Dawson’s representation of both Doug Perin and appellant 
created on appearance of impropriety that Doug Perin aligned with appellant’s 
attorneys and abandoned Honda. . . . As an example, Doug Perin reviewed appellant’s 
complaint, and Doug Perin even testified that he believed that Honda retaliated against 
appellant, noting that “she was terminated shortly after presenting information to the 
company relating to these [hazardous material transportation] issues.” 
Id. at paras. 24, 26 (final bracketed material by the court). And see Winblad v. Deskins, 150 Ohio 
App.3d 527, 2002 Ohio 7092, 782 N.E.2d 160 (Montgomery), affirming disqualification based 
primarily on appearance of impropriety grounds with respect to preservation of client confidences. 
“‘These confidences are imputed to the entire firm [office-sharing arrangement, actually] and in the 
interest of avoiding the appearance of impropriety each attorney associated with the firm must be 
disqualified from the case.’“ Id. at para. 13 (quoting trial court; bracketed material added). Kala was 
cited in support. Winblad is further discussed at sections 1.7:260, 1.9:200, and 1.10:103. 
Because of Kala and its “codification” as noted above, conclusions regarding the viability of the 
appearance-of-impropriety standard will have to await interpretation under the Rules. (Interestingly, 
in one recent concurring opinion, Justice O’Donnell (joined by Justice Lundberg Straton) ended his 
opinion by reminding lawyers and judges of their obligation to adhere to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and the Code of Judicial Conduct “and to avoid the appearance of impropriety.” 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Stafford, 131 Ohio St.3d 385, 2012 Ohio 909, 965 N.E.2d 971. This 
suggests that even if no longer enshrined in the rules, the appearance-of-impropriety rubric may still 
be invoked as part of the disciplinary arsenal.) 
So far as we are aware, there are no advisory opinions under the Rules that invoke appearance of 
impropriety. Some ethics opinions decided under the Code touching on the subject are set forth 
below. 
Appearance of impropriety - Improper conduct: In numerous situations involving potential conflicts 
of interest, advisory opinions under the former OHCPR cautioned lawyers that their proposed 
conduct raised appearance-of-impropriety concerns. 
For example, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline relied on this general 
proposition to support its advice concerning the propriety of appearing before a particular judge 
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where the attorney and judge potentially were compromised by familial or work ties. See, e.g., Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-013, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 23 (June 17, 
1988). 
The Board applied the standard in other types of factual situations as well: 
 Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-4, 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 10 (Aug. 10, 2001) (selling annuities on commission basis to estate-planning clients); 
 Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 96-6, 1996 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 
(Aug. 9, 1996) (city-council member could not represent criminal defendants in city’s 
municipal court or clients in civil litigation adverse to city); 
 Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-7, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 
(Aug. 13, 1993) (spouses opposing one another in criminal matter); Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-22, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (Oct. 18, 1991) 
(siblings opposing one another in criminal matter). 
 Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-09, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 
16, at *5 (June 15, 1990) (lawyer for representative of estate could not act as realtor in selling 
estate property); 
 Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-005, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 12, at *4 (Feb. 17, 1989) (office-sharing lawyers on opposing sides of contested 
divorce). 
The Ohio State Bar Association and various local bar associations also employed a broad standard 
when deciding whether attorney conduct risked the appearance of impropriety. Sometimes the 
concern arose from lawyers acting in both legal and nonlegal capacities: E.g., 
 Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 88-2 (Jan. 29, 1988), (dual role of lawyer and 
nonlawyer freelance investigator of financial transactions); 
 Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 81-4 (Apr. 8, 1981) (county commissioner serving as 
defense counsel in same county); 
 Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 90-8 (Apr. 18, 1990) (voting as city council member on matters 
coming before counsel involving clients of council member’s firm). 
At other times, appearance-of-impropriety concerns were triggered by the representation of multiple 
clients on related matters, whether sequentially or concurrently. E.g., Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
Informal Op. 89-1 (Nov. 15, 1989). 
Other instances in which the appearance of impropriety was invoked included Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
Informal Op. 86-7 (July 28, 1986) (joining firm that is suing client of lawyer’s former partner); 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 80 (n.d.) (lawyer who learned confidential information about client of 
lawyer with whom he shared office space should withdraw). Compare Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-13, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 19, 1992) (assistant 
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county prosecutor in part-time private practice may share office space with attorney whose practice 
includes criminal defense work so long as appearance of impropriety is diminished by office 
procedures that maintain separateness of the two practices). 
Appearance of impropriety - Approved conduct: Taken to the extreme, the duty to avoid even the 
appearance of impropriety could be read as a mandate to avoid any behavior that a reasonable person 
might find questionable. While perhaps wise counsel, as a standard this is simply too restrictive. 
While not susceptible of precise definition, some guidance as to where the line should be drawn can 
be found by contrasting the opinions just discussed with those that expressly found the conduct in 
question did not raise appearance-of-impropriety concerns: 
 With respect to an attorney representing criminal defendants in private practice and serving as 
a court-appointed special county prosecutor in another county on an occasional basis, the 
BCGD commented that, given their limited nature, such appointments “[do] not create an 
appearance of impropriety that would outweigh the public’s interest in ensuring that offenses 
are prosecuted swiftly,” which the appointment of special prosecutors helps secure. Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 94-6, 1994 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9, at 
*8-9 (Apr. 15, 1994). Op. 94-6 was later modified to permit this practice “in the same county 
(and even in the same court) in which the attorney represents criminal defendants . . . .” Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-7, 2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7, at 
*1 (Dec. 5, 2003) (syllabus). 
 Attorneys who are salaried employees of an insurance company may pursue subrogation 
claims against tortfeasors and collect the deductibles incurred by the insureds without creating 
an appearance of impropriety. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 95-14, 
1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Dec. 1, 1995). See also section 1.7:410 (discussing how 
to resolve the potential conflict-of-interests problems in such an arrangement). 
 A prosecuting attorney can circulate a form letter to members of the bar soliciting 
contributions for a charitable organization without creating an appearance of impropriety, but 
the donor should make the contributions directly to the charity’s offices rather than through 
the prosecuting attorney. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 109 (Nov. 20, 1973). 
 An attorney did not create an appearance of impropriety by recommending a treating 
physician to a personal injury client upon the client’s request, where the client did not have a 
physician or the client’s physician refused to extend services to the client. Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n Op. 92 (Sept. 5, 1973). 
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1.7:240  Client Consent to a Conflict of Interest; Nonconsentable Conflicts 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.101-5.105 (1996). 
Client consent - In general: Ohio Rule 1.7 reflects the reality that, in some situations, 
conflict-of-interest problems may be more theoretical than real. In those situations, the parties’ right 
to counsel of choice takes precedence over conflict-of-interest concerns, and the client is allowed to 
waive the protections that the conflict rules provide. For the waiver to be effective, three conditions 
must be met: (1) the lawyer must be able to provide the requisite professional representation to each 
client; (2) all clients must give informed consent, in writing, to the multiple representation; and (3) the 
representation must not be precluded by division (c). Ohio Rule 1.7(b). 
Client consent - Adequate representation: While Rule 1.7(b) allows a conflict to be waived in limited 
instances, it retains substantial protection for client interests. The first protection is that client consent 
is effective only when “the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to 
each affected client.” Rule 1.7(b)(1). Comment [2] stresses that the lawyer has a duty to evaluate 
whether the prospect of multiple representation may impair his ability to competently and diligently 
represent all affected clients. Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [2]. If this test is not met, representation is improper, 
at least where current-client conflicts are concerned.  Coaker v. Geon Co., 890 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. 
Ohio 1995) (applying former OHCPR in disqualifying counsel from representing either 
co-defendant in age discrimination case, despite their knowing consent to the representation, where it 
was not obvious that lawyer could adequately represent interests of each, due to a conflict over 
whether one client, formerly a subsidiary of the other but now an independent entity, was subject to 
successor liability for the alleged discrimination); Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 91-18 (n.d.) (not obvious 
under former OH DR 5-105(C) that lawyer could adequately represent two clients in two unrelated 
medical claims against same doctor; conflict not curable by client consent). 
Client consent - Adequate disclosure: If the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent 
representation to each client, she also must consult with the affected clients and obtain the informed 
consent of each, confirmed in writing. Ohio Rule 1.7(b)(2) & cmt. [2]. A prerequisite to “informed 
consent” is that “the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the 
material risks and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” Ohio Rule 
1.0(f). See Rule 1.0 cmt. [6] for further details regarding the lawyer’s disclosure obligations in this 
context. 
As the obligation is put in Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [29]: 
 Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant 
circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that a conflict 
could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. . . . The information required 
depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved. When 
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information 
must include the advantages and risks of the common representation, including 
possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality, and the attorney-client privilege. 
Moreover, there may be instances in which sufficient disclosure to obtain consent is impossible 
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because of confidentiality obligations. “For example, when a lawyer represents different clients in 
related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to make an 
informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent.” Rule 1.7 cmt. [30]. 
“Full disclosure” under the former OHCPR included discussing “any potentially adverse effects 
which might cause [the attorney] to support for one client what his professional duty for the other 
required him to oppose.” Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Shillman, 61 Ohio St.2d 364, 367, 402 
N.E.2d 514, 517 (1980); accord Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Schwartz, 74 Ohio St.3d 489, 491, 660 
N.E.2d 422, 423 (1996) (quoting Shillman language with approval). Full disclosure also included 
discussion of the fact that communications made to the lawyer by one client may have to be shared 
with the other clients involved. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 94-2 (Sept. 8, 1994). 
Quoting a federal district court case, the Board of Commissioners in a 1988 opinion defined full 
disclosure in the following terms: 
 “Full disclosure means just that -- affirmative revelation by the attorney of all 
the facts, legal implication[s], possible effects, and other circumstances relating to the 
proposed representation. A client’s mere knowledge of the existence of his attorney’s 
other representation does not alone constitute full disclosure.” 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-021, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4, at 
*5 (Aug. 12, 1988) (quoting Fin. Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744, 771 (D.D.C. 
1981); bracketed material added to conform to Metzger quote). See also Burton v. Selker, 36 F. 
Supp.2d 984, 988 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that he was “uninformed” about 
nature of defendant-lawyer’s business relationship, when plaintiff had signed a detailed 
waiver-of-conflict letter sent to him by defendant; summary judgment for defendant granted), aff’d, 
30 Fed. Appx. 456 (6th Cir. 2002). Again, see Rule 1.0 cmt. [6] for discussion of these disclosure 
obligations under the Rules. 
It goes without saying that no disclosure fails the “full disclosure” test. See Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Mangan, 123 Ohio St.3d 250, 2009 Ohio 5287, 915 N.E.2d 651, where respondent attempted to 
represent a father, son, and daughter-in-law in a foreclosure action, but 
never communicated with either the son or the daughter-in-law, relying instead on the 
father’s assurances that the father was acting on behalf of his son and daughter-in-law. 
But in fact, the couple did not know of the foreclosure proceedings, 
id. at para. 6, until after the property was sold. “Because respondent failed to gain all the parties’ 
consent to the multiple representations and did not communicate at all with two of them,” id. at para. 
12, he violated DR 5-105(C). 
Instead of simply articulating abstract standards for full disclosure, a few bar opinions under the 
OHCPR discussed how the full disclosure requirement should be implemented in particular factual 
settings. 
For example, the Ohio State Bar Association addressed whether a lawyer trustee of the Ohio State 
Legal Services Association (OSLSA) could represent a client in a matter in which the OSLSA 
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represented the opposing party. Assuming that it was obvious that the trustee and the Association 
could adequately represent the interests of their respective clients, the bar association concluded that 
the representation may be permitted upon full disclosure and consent. Full disclosure would involve 
disclosing the existence of each relationship, the nature of the interests, the duties and responsibilities 
owed to each client, and the potential impact, if any, these might have on the lawyer’s exercise of 
independent judgment on behalf of each client. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 78-8 (Oct. 30, 
1978). 
In a 1992 opinion, the Toledo Bar Association addressed the issue whether a lawyer who was general 
counsel to an insurance company could also provide estate-planning representation to the insurance 
company’s clients, where the estate-planning advice might involve recommending the insurance 
company’s products. While questioning whether this situation could ever be one where it was 
“obvious” that the lawyer could exercise independent judgment for all concerned, the bar association 
nonetheless proceeded to discuss the full disclosure requirement. The attorney would have to tell the 
insurance company that he would not unduly promote the insurance company’s products and tell the 
estate-planning clients that, because of his relationship with the insurance company, the lawyer might 
be influenced to promote the insurance company’s product in lieu of an equal, better, or less 
expensive product of a competitor. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 92-8 (n.d.). 
Client consent - Informed consent confirmed in writing: The second half of the informed consent 
requirement is that, after being adequately informed, the client must consent and the consent must be 
confirmed in writing. Ohio Rule 1.7(b)(2). “Such a writing may consist of a document signed by the 
client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. . . . 
If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then 
the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.” Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [31]. 
Although the Rules do not expressly so state, it can safely be presumed that the burden of providing 
disclosure and obtaining consent rests with the lawyer, as it did under the former OHCPR. Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 88-021, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Aug. 12, 
1988). Thus, any doubts about the adequacy of disclosure or the actual existence of client consent 
would be construed against the lawyer. See White Motor Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., No. 
39295, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 13705 (Cuyahoga Jan. 10, 1980) (requiring that any waiver of 
conflict be a “‘clear and unequivocal waiver,’ not merely a waiver by implication,” id. at *21; the 
White Motor case is further discussed this section infra at “Client consent - Consent to future 
conflicts”). But when the evidence of full disclosure and consent is clear, waiver of the conflict will 
be enforced. E.g., Conforte v. LaSalla, 2002 Ohio 6052, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 5872 
(Cuyahoga): 
 Here, there is no dispute that Conforte was informed about any possible 
conflict, that Conforte was represented by legal counsel of his own choice, that 
Conforte understood the terms of the waiver, and that Conforte signed the written 
waiver of conflict. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in 
favor of defendants. 
Id. at para. 24. 
Particularly in the disqualification context, parties sometimes argue that delay in moving for a 
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disqualification may be evidence of an implied consent to waive the conflict. Here as well, courts 
under the former OHCPR were reluctant to find implied consent. See, e.g., Sarbey v. Nat’l City 
Bank, 66 Ohio App.3d 18, 583 N.E.2d 392 (Summit 1990); White Motor v. White Consol. supra. 
This was especially true where, on the facts, the lawyer opposing disqualification had failed to follow 
steps outlined in OH DR 5-105(C).  Sarbey supra (implied consent is equitable argument that can be 
raised only by one with clean hands, a prerequisite not met by a lawyer who fails to follow OH DR 
5-105(C)). As the Ninth District Court of Appeals stated: 
 Where dual representation is involved, the court should apply the implied 
consent or waiver remedy with caution. A motion to disqualify counsel for conflict of 
interest stemming from dual representation of adverse clients should be denied on the 
basis of implied consent or waiver only where there is substantial proof that the 
movant’s delay has resulted in serious prejudice to the opposing party, . . . or where it 
is clear that the moving party knowingly delayed the filing of the motion in order to 
cause such hardship or prejudice. 
66 Ohio App.3d at 29-30, 583 N.E.2d at 400. As to consent inferred by conduct under the OHRPC, 
see Rule 1.0 cmt. [7], which states that “a lawyer may not assume consent from a client’s . . . silence. 
Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client . . . who has reasonably adequate 
information about the matter.” 
In two Ohio federal cases decided under the Code, the courts held that the consent provision of OH 
DR 5-105(C) comes into play only if OH DR 5-105(B) [or, presumably, OH DR 5-105(A) as well] is 
violated. “[T]he analysis must start with whether there is a violation of OH DR 5-105(B) because if 
there is no violation, there is no need for consent.” SST Castings, Inc. v. Amana Appliances, Inc., 
250 F. Supp.2d 863, 870 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Pioneer-Standard Elecs., Inc. v. Cap Gemini 
America, Inc., No. 1:01 CV2185, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7120, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2002). 
A similar result would follow under the Rules if there were no violation of the provision analogous to 
5-105(A) & (B) -- Ohio Rule 1.7(a)(2). But if there is direct adversity under Rule 1.7(a)(1), there is a 
violation unless all of the requisites of 1.7(b), including informed consent, confirmed in writing, are 
satisfied. 
(For an interesting decision under the Code involving a waiver of direct adversity as to which there 
was no written evidence, see In re Estate of Knowlton, 2006 Ohio 4905, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 
4835 (Hamilton), discussed in section 1.7:330 infra at “Conflicts among current clients – Direct 
adversity.”) 
Client consent - Consent and former client conflicts: See section 1.9:200, at “Former-client conflicts 
and consent.” 
Client consent - Consent to future conflicts: The issue of consent to future conflicts is covered in 
Comment [33]. The key is the client’s understanding of the material risk that such a waiver entails. 
The more complete the explanation of representations that might arise and of the actual and 
reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of such representations, the more likely it is that the 
client will have the necessary understanding. Consents limited to a particular type of conflict with 
which the client is already familiar ordinarily will be effective as to that type of conflict. However, 
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[i]f the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be 
ineffective, except when it is reasonably likely that the client will have understood the 
material risks involved. Such exceptional circumstances might be presented if the 
client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed 
regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, particularly if the client is independently 
represented by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future 
conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation. 
Rule 1.7 cmt. [33]. 
The comment begins and ends with references to division (b) of Rule 1.7 -- first, by noting that 
whether a lawyer can properly request such a waiver is subject to “the test of division (b)”; last, by 
stating that advance consent cannot be effective “if the circumstances that materialize in the future are 
such as would make a waiver prohibited under division (b).” Id. The substantive language of 
Comment [33] is identical to MR 1.7 cmt. [22]. But MR 1.7 has only paragraphs (a) and (b), while 
Ohio Rule 1.7 has divisions (a), (b), and (c), the last of which enumerates representations that cannot 
be accepted or continued even with informed client consent - i.e., the circumstances making “a waiver 
prohibited” referred to in the final sentence of Comment [33]. Division (c) also seems the better fit at 
the outset of the comment - one would think a mere request to consent would be improper only if the 
consent is irrelevant in any event, as it is under division (c). See 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers §  122 cmt. d (2000) (“If the new conflict is not consentable . . ., the lawyer may 
not proceed.”) We therefore suspect that the Model Rule reference was used without noticing the 
difference between MR 1.7 and Ohio Rule 1.7 and that the references should be to Ohio Rule 1.7(c), 
not 1.7(b). 
The Ohio cases on consent to future conflicts are few and far between. In White Motor Corp. v. 
White Consol. Indus. Inc., No. 39295, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 13705 (Cuyahoga Jan. 10, 1980), 
Consolidated argued that Motor’s prior consent to matters related to the (unsuccessful) merger of the 
two parties “necessarily included all potential conflicts arising therefrom, including the possibility of 
future litigation,” id. at *20-21. Even though Motor was a sophisticated corporate party, the court 
rejected the argument and granted Motor’s motion for disqualification of Consolidated’s counsel in 
the damage action arising out of the failed merger. Compare ABA Formal Op. 05-436 (May 11, 
2005), approving consent to future conflicts if based on informed written consent in “appropriate 
circumstances” and withdrawing ABA Formal Op. 93-372 (Apr. 16, 1993). Pursuant to Opinion 
05-436, 
[g]eneral and open-ended consent is more likely to be effective when given by a client 
that is an experienced user of legal services, particularly if, for example, the client is 
independently represented by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is 
limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation. 
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Id. at 1.  Opinion 05-436 notes that MR 1.7 cmt. [22] expressly addresses this subject in terms 
consistent with the conclusions reached in the opinion. MR 1.7 cmt. [22] is replicated, with little or 
no substantive change, in Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [33]. 
See also City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio 
1976), aff’d, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977) (table), cited in Restatement §  122, reptr’s note to 
cmt. d, as an example of the rule approving and enforcing informed consent that reasonably 
contemplates later conflicted representation. The CEI case is discussed this section infra at 
“Nonconsentable conflicts - Governmental clients.” 
Nonconsentable conflicts - In general: The third requirement under Rule 1.7(b) is that the 
representation not be precluded under 1.7(c), which sets forth representations barred irrespective of 
consent. Thus, a lawyer shall not accept or continue a representation “[e]ven if each affected client 
consents,” where the representation is prohibited by law or the lawyer is asserting a claim on behalf of 
one client against another client in the same proceeding. Ohio Rule 1.7(c). See generally 2 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  122(2) (2000). To our knowledge, there 
have been no Ohio cases decided as yet under Rule 1.7(c)(2) (see, however, the two advisory 
opinions discussed below at “Nonconsentable conflicts – Representation prohibited by law” and “ – 
Asserting claim of one client against another client in same proceeding”). For examples of 
direct-adversity-in-the-same-case conflict under the Code, see Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Gargiulo, 
62 Ohio St.2d 239, 404 N.E.2d 1343 (1980) (discipline), and Clucas v. Vojtech, 119 Ohio App.3d 
465, 695 N.E.2d 809 (Summit 1997) (disqualification). 
(Restatement §  122 cmt. g(ii) adds another category -- conflicts involving governmental clients -- as 
to which the conflict is nonconsentable in a minority of states, including Ohio under the former 
OHCPR, at least in the criminal context. See this section infra.) 
Nonconsentable conflicts - Representation prohibited by law: Ohio Rule 1.7(c)(1). Examples given 
in the Comments include representation of both husband and wife in the preparation of a separation 
agreement and, pursuant to federal criminal statutes, certain representations by former government 
lawyers irrespective of the consent of the former client. Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [36]. But note that in Bd. 
of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2009-4, 2009 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (June 
12, 2009), the Board invoked (more appropriately, it seems to us) Rule 1.7(c)(2) (direct adversity in 
the same matter), rather than (c)(1), in opining that a domestic relations mediator cannot, subsequent 
to the mediation, represent both parties in the preparation of necessary legal documents. “Examples of 
these documents might be a Separation Agreement . . . .” Id. at *11. ORC 102.03(A)(1) prohibits a 
current or former public official from representing a client during his public employment or for a year 
thereafter on any matter in which he participated personally as a public official or employee in a 
decision-making capacity, such as a mediator, or in which he rendered advice, investigated, or 
engaged in other substantial exercise of administrative discretion. Accord Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2009-4, 2009 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (June 12, 2009). See also 
ORC 102.03(A)(2) (twenty-four month prohibition on representation of public utility, by former 
commissioner or attorney examiner of the PUC). And see ORC 120.39(A) (neither counsel appointed 
by the court to represent or assist in the representation of indigent criminal defendants nor any public 
defender or a member of any public defender’s office shall be a partner or employee of any 
prosecuting attorney, city law director, or similar chief legal officer).   
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Other instances in which a conflict is nonconsentable by virtue of the representation being prohibited 
by law (in these instances, by disciplinary rule) include: 
 The naming of the lawyer or any of various persons related or associated with the lawyer as a 
beneficiary in an instrument drafted by the lawyer. Under Ohio Rule 1.8(c), client gifts of this 
sort (unless the client is a family member) are prohibited and are not subject to client consent. 
See discussion at section 1.8:400. 
 Supplying the client with living and/or medical expenses. Ohio Rule 1.8(e). See discussion at 
section 1.8:620. 
 Agreeing with a client prior to the conclusion of the representation to acquire literary or media 
rights concerning information relating to the representation. Ohio Rule 1.8(d). See discussion 
at section 1.8:500. 
 Soliciting or engaging in sexual activity with a client, unless there was a preexisting 
consensual relationship. Ohio Rule 1.8(j) & cmt. [17]. See discussion this section infra at 
“Sexual relations with clients” and in section 1.8:210. 
Nonconsentable conflicts - Asserting claim of one client against another client in same proceeding: 
Under Ohio Rule 1.7(c)(2) the conflict that arises from representing multiple clients in the same 
proceeding where one client is asserting a claim against the other is nonconsentable. Comment [37] to 
the Rule notes that the term “proceeding” includes not only actions before a tribunal but also “in 
negotiations or mediation of a claim pending before a tribunal.” As stated above, Board Opinion 
2009-4 applied Rule 1.7(c)(2) in opining that a mediator in a domestic relations matter cannot 
subsequently represent both parties in preparing necessary legal documents, such as petitions, decrees, 
and ancillary documents.  
Interestingly, the Board of Commissioners, in addressing the import of Rule 1.7(c)(2), defined the 
term “proceeding” without reference to either cmt. [37] or Rule 1.0(o). According to the Board, “a 
proceeding includes acts and events before a tribunal, as well as acts and events before mediators, 
arbitrators, or other administrative bodies.”  Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
2007-4, Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4, at *1 (June 8, 2007) (syllabus).  At least on its face, this 
interpretation seems broader than that articulated in the Rules themselves.  It could be read to include 
under the 1.7(c)(2) prohibition activities that occur outside a tribunal or related negotiations and 
mediations. 
Another Board opinion that appears to stretch the meaning of Rule 1.7(c)(2) is Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-2, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (June 6, 2008).  The 
question raised in Opinion 2008-2 was whether the law firm of a lawyer-board member, who is not 
counsel to the corporation, could represent a client in a lawsuit against the corporation.  The Board 
opined that the firm and its other lawyers could not, because the material limitation conflict of the 
board member would be imputed to the firm under Rule 1.10(a).  For further discussion of this aspect 
of the opinion, and whether the affected client could waive the imputation pursuant to Rule 1.10(e), 
see section 1.10:500. 
As noted by the Board, analysis of the question raised starts with whether the lawyer director himself 
449
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.7 
 
 
could undertake the representation; if not, then the question becomes whether the conflict is imputed 
to his firm.  Rule 1.7(c)(2) was central to the Board’s opinion regarding the first aspect.  Stressing the 
director’s legal and fiduciary duties to the corporation, the Board found that the question presented 
posed a material limitation conflict under 1.7(a)(2).  Citing to Rule 1.7 cmt. [18], the Board explained 
that “[a] lawyer’s fiduciary duties as a corporate director may create a material limitation conflict on 
the lawyer’s professional duties to a client in the legal representation.”  Op. 2008-2, at *9.  The Board 
concluded that such a conflict existed here: 
It is a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(A) [sic] (2) for a lawyer who sits as a 
corporate director and not as corporate counsel to represent a client suing the 
corporation because the lawyer’s fiduciary duties to the corporation and the lawyer’s 
personal interest in serving as a corporate director would be a material limitation upon 
the lawyer’s ability to represent the client.  A significant risk would exist that the 
lawyer’s duties of loyalty and independence on behalf of the client would be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s fiduciary duties to the corporation and the lawyer’s 
own personal interest in serving as corporate director. 
Id. at *11-12.  So far, so good. 
The Board then turns to Rule 1.7(b) and (c).  According to the Board and without any analysis in 
addition to that set forth here, “[p]ursuant to Rule 1.7(c)” this conflict of interest “cannot be waived 
under Rule 1.7(b) because the client and the corporation are directly adverse in the same proceeding.  
The corporation is not technically a client of a lawyer director who is not corporate counsel, but a 
lawyer director cannot isolate the fiduciary duties owed to the corporation from his professional 
duties as a lawyer.”  Id. at *12. 
But under the express terms of Rule 1.7(c)(2), the directly-adverse-in-the-same-proceeding test 
posits the assertion of a claim “by one client against another client.”  How then does 1.7(c)(2) control 
when, by the Board’s own admission, the corporation is “not technically a client”?  The Board does 
not say, other than that the director cannot isolate his fiduciary duties to the corporation from his 
professional duties as a lawyer, which doesn’t quite seem to close the gap.  (The result under 1.10 is 
the same, because Rule 1.10(e) permits waiver under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7, and the Board 
has already opined that 1.7(c)(2) precludes waiver under 1.7(b).)  The nonwaiver conclusion is also is 
at odds with ethics opinions from other states cited by the Board in support of its conclusion that the 
conflict is imputed.  Thus, Virginia State Bar Ass’n LEO 1821 and Illinois State Bar Ass’n Op. 
02-01, while supporting the imputation result, both expressly state that this is so “absent disclosure 
and consent” and that it “may be cured” by consent.  In the words of the Illinois opinion, “the conflict 
is waivable by consent following disclosure,” a result which the Illinois opinion characterizes as the 
“majority rule,” citing ethics opinions from Oregon, Vermont, and California.  The Ohio Board 
recognizes in its own opinion the consent caveat contained in the Illinois and Virginia opinions, but 
for some reason this had no effect on its conclusion to the contrary that the conflict was nonwaivable.  
Overall, a problematic opinion. 
Nonconsentable conflicts - Governmental clients: Ethics opinions in some states, including Ohio 
under the OHCPR, have stated that, at least in the criminal context, the government lawyer’s client is 
the public, and the public cannot consent to a conflict. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 92-13, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 19, 1992); Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
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Informal Op. 87-5 (June 29, 1987). But see Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
93-7, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (Aug. 13, 1993) (assistant county prosecutor’s conflict in 
criminal context consentable; for further discussion of this opinion, see section 1.8:1000). Also 
contrary to the government-client-nonconsent rule is a civil antitrust case in which the Northern 
District of Ohio found that the plaintiff city could and did knowingly consent to an alleged conflict of 
interest; the city had previously requested the law firm to take on representation as special bond 
counsel, knowing full well that the firm had been and was general counsel in all litigation matters for 
the antitrust defendant and that the firm had represented the defendant against the city’s interests 
numerous times in the past.  City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 
193 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (disqualification motion denied), aff’d, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977) (table). 
The government-client category is not listed in Rule 1.7(c) as nonconsentable; it seems doubtful that 
it survives under the new Rules. The government-nonconsent doctrine is not mentioned by the Board 
in Opinion 2007-4, which deals with concurrent conflicts of a city law director. Further evidence that 
the government non-consent doctrine, at least on the civil side, does not survive under the Rules is 
found in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2009-3, 2009 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 3 (June 12, 2009), where the Board opined that a county prosecutor, directly or through 
different assistant county prosecutors, could represent multiple public entity clients in negotiations of 
a contract or memoranda of understanding, so long as the provisions of Rule 1.7(b)(1)-(3) were met. 
Rule 1.7(b)(2), of course, calls for informed client consent. Opinion 2009-3 goes on to state, 
consistent with the private practice application of Rule 1.7, that if the public entity clients are in the 
process of filing a lawsuit against one another, 1.7(c)(2) comes into play, and neither the prosecutor 
nor assistants properly screened may continue in the representation, inasmuch as the circumstance 
involves direct adversity in the same lawsuit, which is expressly prohibited by Rule 1.7(c)(2). 
Nonconsentable conflicts - Other circumstances involving lawyer conduct that was not curable by 
client consent under the OHCPR: 
 Representation of multiple criminal defendants in cases arising out of the same transaction, 
where the trial judge, in his or her discretion, concludes that the potential for conflict exists, 
see State v. Dillman, 70 Ohio App.3d 616, 591 N.E.2d 849 (Huron 1990) (per curiam) 
(upholding lower court’s disqualification of public defender and all members of his office 
from representing defendant, despite defendant’s consent, where another public defender in 
same office was representing second defendant, who was willing to testify against first 
defendant). The Dillman court relied on the analysis in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 
153, 163-64 (1988), where the U.S. Supreme Court similarly concluded that the trial court had 
the discretion to disqualify counsel, even though there was client consent, “where a potential 
for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses.”  
Id. at 163. As for how likely the development of an actual conflict must be, the Court shed 
some light on this in subsequent discussion, where it stated that the presumption in favor of 
defendant’s counsel of choice “may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual 
conflict but by a showing of a serious potential for conflict.”  Id. at 164 (emphasis added). See 
also section 1.7:320. 
A multiple criminal defendant disciplinary case under the Rules of Professional 
Conduct is Disciplinary Counsel v. Longino, 128 Ohio St.3d 426, 2011 Ohio 1524, 
945 N.E.2d 1040, where the Court disbarred respondent for her “extraordinary record 
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of misconduct” that included a violation of Rule 1.7 arising out of her attempt to 
represent both a husband and wife in related drug prosecutions, even though the 
assistant United States attorney who prosecuted the wife testified that 
she [the assistant U.S. attorney] had offered to seek a reduction of the 
husband’s mandatory life sentence if he would testify against his wife – 
an offer that remained open throughout respondent’s representation – 
and had expressed concern regarding respondent’s dual representation. 
Respondent rejected the offer and maintained that despite their 
differing interests, the couple had consented to the joint representation. 
In the wife’s case, however, the court issued an order disqualifying 
respondent and later rejected respondent’s challenge to that 
determination, stating that respondent “cannot adequately represent 
and defend [the wife] against those allegations while also representing 
[the husband].” 
Id. at para. 19 (first bracketed material added). 
 Representation of creditor of both respondent’s husband and husband’s ex-wife in collection 
suit against ex-wife. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 97 Ohio St.3d 500, 2002 
Ohio 6729, 780 N.E.2d 586 (“The panel further found that while respondent disclosed to 
Suzuki [the creditor] that she was married to Ronald, ‘the level of Respondent’s personal 
interest in the matter of [the Suzuki case] was so significant as to, in effect, make the 
provisions of DR 5-101(A)(1) non-waivable under the circumstances involved here.’“ Id. at 
para. 13 (first bracketed material added). 
 
 Sexual relations with clients. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Booher, 75 Ohio St.3d 
509, 664 N.E.2d 522 (1996) (court-appointed lawyer having sex with client in jail; Court 
notes that it makes no difference whether the sexual activity is initiated or consented to by the 
client). For two other cases in which lawyers were disciplined as a result of having consensual 
sex with the client (“consenting, romantic relationship”), see Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Moore, 101 Ohio St.3d 261, 2004 Ohio 734, 804 N.E.2d 423 (two counts of sexual 
misconduct, one of which was consensual; violation of OH DR 5-101(A)(1) (as well as OH 
DR 1-102(A)(6)) as to both counts); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. DePietro, 71 Ohio 
St.3d 391, 643 N.E.2d 1145 (1994) (lawyer conceded that personal relationship adversely 
impacted attorney-client relationship and that his conduct violated OH DR 5-101(A)). There 
are courts that have taken the view that “the professional relationship renders it impossible for 
the vulnerable layperson to be considered ‘consenting’“ with respect to sexual relations with 
her attorney.  Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Hill, 540 N.W.2d 43, 44 
(Iowa 1995). In Ohio, the Supreme Court has stated that even if such a “vulnerable layperson” 
does consent, the dominance of the attorney in the attorney-client relationship requires that the 
attorney be subjected to discipline for such conduct.  Booher supra, Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [22], 
and Rule 1.8(j) are in accord; as Rule 1.8 cmt. [17] states, “because the client’s own 
emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the client could give adequate informed 
consent, this rule prohibits the lawyer from having sexual relations with a client regardless of 
whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client, 
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unless the sexual relationship predates the client-lawyer relationship.” See section 1.8:210. 
For other circumstances in which ethics opinions reached the same result with respect to 
nonconsentability, see, e.g., 
 Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-4, 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 10, at *4 (Aug. 10, 2001) (although former OH DR 5-104(A) made provision for 
informed consent, “when the lawyer is legal counsel, estate planner, and seller of insurance 
products to fund the estate, the Board questions whether full disclosure and meaningful 
consent ever could be achieved”). 
 Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-10, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 
2 (Dec. 3, 1993) (under former OH DR 9-101(B), if former public employee had “substantial 
responsibility” for a matter while in public service, he or she may not engage in subsequent 
private employment on that matter; the conflict cannot be waived by consent of those 
affected); accord Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 94-1 (June 10, 1994); Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n Formal Op. 32 (n.d.). 
 Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 95-96-01 (n.d.) (irrespective of disclosure and consent, single 
public defender cannot represent both husband and wife at any stage of criminal proceedings 
arising out of domestic violence leading to the arrest of the couple; separate attorneys in the 
public defender’s office may do so independently). 
 
1.7:250  Imputation of Conflict of Interest to Affiliated Lawyers [see 1.10:200] 
 
1.7:260  Sanctions and Remedies for Conflicts of Interest 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.3 (1996). 
If not addressed in proper fashion by the lawyer, conflicts of interest can result in disciplinary 
violations, malpractice verdicts, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel findings, and/or disqualification, 
among other adverse consequences. See generally 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers §  121 cmt. f & reporter’s note thereto (2000). Every lawyer needs to have a 
conflicts-checking system in place in order to avoid these potential problems. Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [3]. 
See, e.g., under the former OHCPR, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-10, 1992 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 11 (Apr. 10, 1992) (discussing need for extensive record keeping to 
avoid conflicts arising from providing legal advice over the phone through a dial-a-lawyer 900 
service). See generally 1 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 2:9 (2012 
ed.) (providing guidance on implementing a conflicts-checking system and related procedural 
safeguards). 
Sanctions and remedies for conflicts of interest - Disciplinary proceedings: It goes without saying that 
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violation of the conflict-of-interest provisions of Ohio Rule 1.7 will give rise to disciplinary 
proceedings in which sanctions are imposed on the offending lawyer, just as they were under former 
OH DR 5-105(A) and (B). See, e.g., Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 112 Ohio St.3d 90, 2006 Ohio 
6506, 858 N.E.2d 356 (disbarment; numerous violations, including DR 5-105(A), coupled with 
extensive prior disciplinary record). 
Sanctions and remedies for conflicts of interest - Disqualification: As the Ohio Supreme Court 
explained in Morgan v. North Coast Cable Co., 63 Ohio St.3d 156, 160, 586 N.E.2d 88, 91 (1992): 
“We believe that an attorney’s obligations and responsibilities to a party, including the attorney’s 
financial, business or personal interests can, in appropriate circumstances, be a basis for 
disqualification.” In determining whether disqualification of counsel is proper on conflict-of-interest 
grounds, courts often looked to the former OHCPR for guidance, see, e.g., Kala v. Aluminum 
Smelting & Ref. Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998) (primary and imputed 
disqualification); Baker v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ohio 1995), and 
will no doubt do likewise with the respect the Rules. At least one court has held under the rules that “a 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 requires disqualification of the offending lawyer,” Carnegie Cos. v. 
Summit Props., Inc., 183 Ohio App.3d 770, 2009 Ohio 4655, 918 N.E.2d 1052, at para. 57 
(Summit; Dickinson, J.) (violation of 1.7(a)(1); “[i]t is appropriate for the net of disqualification to 
be cast at least as wide as that of attorney discipline for conduct that not only violates an ethical rule 
but also undermines the basic duty of undivided loyalty to one’s clients.” Id. at para. 56.). 
After remand, the trial court awarded attorney fees incurred by the party in its successful prosecution 
of the motion  to disqualify opposing counsel, based on opposing counsel’s bad faith, and the 
appellate court again affirmed. Carnegie Cos. v. Summit Props., Inc., 2012 Ohio 1324, 2012 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 1151 (Summit). The court of appeals stressed both the firm’s awareness of and 
apparent attempt to conceal its representation of a client in a matter directly adverse to another of its 
clients and its bypassing of opposing counsel in an effort to obtain a waiver of the conflict, even 
though aware that that client was represented. Id. at para. 22. This constituted “competent, credible 
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Ulmer & Berne acted in bad faith in failing to 
voluntarily withdraw from its representation of Summit in the Carnegie-Summit matter.” Id. at para. 
32. 
A trial court should keep several factors in mind in ruling on a disqualification motion. First, “[a]s a 
general rule, a stranger to an attorney-client relationship lacks standing to complain of a conflict of 
interest in that relationship.” Morgan, 63 Ohio St.3d at 156, 586 N.E.2d at 89 (syllabus). Accord 
Witchey v. Medina County Bd. of Comm’rs, 169 Ohio App.3d 214, 2006 Ohio 5135, 862 N.E.2d 
535 (Medina) (rejecting appellant’s argument that representation by county prosecutor’s office both 
of township, opposing annexation to city, and of county commissioners, the deciding body, was 
conflict of interest, because appellant had no standing absent attorney-client relation with any of 
prosecutors involved in matter, citing Morgan); Legal Aid Society v. W & D Partners I, L.L.C., 
162 Ohio App.3d 682, 2005 Ohio 4130, 834 N.E.2d 850 (member of limited-liability company did 
not have standing to bring motion to disqualify attorney for officer of company because no 
attorney-client relationship existed between party seeking disqualification and attorney sought to be 
disqualified); Kitts v. U.S. Health Corp., 97 Ohio App.3d 271, 277, 646 N.E.2d 555, 559 (Scioto 
1994) (attorney-client relationship with one co-defendant, who had been dismissed from litigation, 
did not give another co-defendant standing to raise dismissed defendant’s conflict-of-interest 
454
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.7 
 
 
concern). See also Sayyah v. Cutrell, 143 Ohio App.3d 102, 757 N.E.2d 779 (Brown 2001) 
(members of incorporated association sought, in legal malpractice action against association’s 
attorney, to disqualify attorney on conflict-of-interest grounds from representing water and sewer 
district in case brought against the district by association members; although rubric of lack of 
standing not used, trial court denial of disqualification affirmed on ground that there was no 
attorney-client relationship between association members and association’s counsel). [While the 
appellate court does not comment on the fact, this case may be one of a kind, in that the attempt by 
plaintiffs (acting pro se) to disqualify the attorney from representing the water and sewer district in 
the members’ suit against the district was made, not in the water and sewer district suit, but in the 
legal malpractice action against the lawyer, which in turn was based on his alleged conflict of interest 
in the water and sewer suit.] 
There is an exception to the no-standing rule. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Morgan, there 
are cases holding that even if the complaining party did not have an attorney-client relationship with 
the attorney in question, that party may still seek disqualification if the lawyer in question was “privy 
to information, confidential or otherwise that, if revealed, would have been adverse or detrimental to 
the complaining party’s cause.” Morgan, 63 Ohio St.3d at 160, 586 N.E.2d at 91. The Morgan 
exception was applied in Perin v. Spurney, 2005 Ohio 6811, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 6112 
(Franklin). Perin was a wrongful-termination case against Honda and various members of Honda 
management. The plaintiff-employee’s husband was an in-house counsel at Honda. After plaintiff 
included her husband on her witness list, Honda noticed him for deposition. At the deposition, 
plaintiff’s counsel stated that he was representing the husband for purposes of the deposition. 
Husband had also met with plaintiff’s counsel a number of times in connection with his wife’s claims. 
He had also reviewed her complaint. On the other side of the fence, husband was a member of 
Honda’s ethics committee and had provided Honda with legal advice concerning transport of 
hazardous materials, the issue about which plaintiff claimed she was terminated for her conduct. 
Finally, the husband testified at deposition that he had information supportive of his wife’s 
termination claim. Not surprisingly, Honda’s counsel moved to disqualify, and the motion was 
granted. The court of appeals affirmed. On the standing point, it stated as follows:  
Here, appellees have asserted that, by communicating with and representing Doug 
Perin [the husband], Kelm and Dawson [plaintiff’s lawyers] obtained, to appellee’s 
detriment, improper access to Honda’s confidential information. In this regard, 
appellees have standing to seek Kelm and Dawson’s disqualification. 
Id. at para. 16. Relying on Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 
N.E.2d 258 (1998), the appellate court affirmed the disqualification on appearance of impropriety 
grounds. See further discussion of Perin on this point at section 1.7:230. 
Second, the party moving for disqualification has the burden of proof and must show at least some 
“reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety actually occurred”; a mere 
allegation of an ethical violation is not enough.  Centimark Corp. v. Brown Sprinkler Serv., Inc., 
85 Ohio App.3d 485, 489, 620 N.E.2d 134 (Ashtabula 1993) (adopting this guideline from Kitchen 
v. Aristech Chem., 769 F. Supp. 254 (S.D. Ohio 1991)). Even then, the trial court has substantial 
discretion when trying to balance the need to protect the trial process from unethical attorney 
behavior with the need to protect the client’s right to counsel of choice. See, e.g., Centimark, 85 
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Ohio App.3d at 487, 620 N.E.2d at 136 (emphasizing trial court’s “wide discretion in the 
consideration of motions to disqualify counsel”). Courts often use such phrases as “significant risk of 
trial taint,” Spivey v. Bender, 77 Ohio App.3d 17, 22, 601 N.E.2d 56, 59 (Lucas 1991), or “truly 
egregious misconduct,” Grubb v. Hollingsworth, 69 Ohio App.3d 804, 806, 591 N.E.2d 1297, 
1299 (Preble 1990), to describe the severity of misconduct necessary to warrant disqualification. “In 
fact, a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility alone should not result in a 
disqualification, unless disqualification is found to be absolutely necessary.” Centimark, 85 Ohio 
App.3d at 488-89, 620 N.E.2d at 137; accord Kitts v. U.S. Health Corp., 97 Ohio App.3d 271, 646 
N.E.2d 555 (Scioto 1994). See Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 
1125-27 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (refusing to disqualify law firm representing plaintiff in unfair 
competition action for former OH DR 5-105(C) violation (failure to obtain consent), where conflict 
not created by firm, but rather by defendant’s business acquisition of one of firm’s existing clients, 
which it represented in various matters totally unrelated to present lawsuit). The Gould case is further 
discussed at section 1.7:310. But see Winblad v. Deskins, 150 Ohio App.3d 527, 2002 Ohio 7092, 
782 N.E.2d 160 (Montgomery) (disqualification of office-sharing attorney affirmed, based on 
perception of party moving for disqualification that his confidences may not have been preserved; 
“[a]ny doubts as to the existence of an asserted conflict of interest must be resolved in favor of 
disqualification in order to dispel any appearance of impropriety,” id. at para. 14, citing Kala). 
Pioneer-Standard Electronics, Inc. v. Cap Gemini America, Inc., No. 1:01 CV2185, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 7120 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2002), is an important federal case in which the court denied 
a motion for disqualification based on an alleged violation of former OH DR 5-105. In 
Pioneer-Standard, Shearman & Sterling represented the defendant, Cap Gemini, in litigation 
pending in the Northern District. It also, by virtue of merger with a German law firm that had been 
representing Pioneer, inherited Pioneer as a client in an unrelated regulatory matter pending before 
the European Commission. (After Pioneer refused to waive the conflict, Shearman & Sterling 
withdrew from the European representation of Pioneer, but Judge Gaughan rejected the unilateral 
termination by the firm and for purposes of the disqualification motion treated both Pioneer and 
Cap-Gemini as current clients. See further discussion of this aspect of the case in section 1.7:300 
infra.) Citing the Gould/Mitsui decision for the propositions that the trial court has broad discretion 
in ruling on motions to disqualify and that disqualification is a drastic measure to be used only when 
absolutely necessary, Judge Gaughan analyzed the issue pursuant to OH DR 5-105(B) (multiple 
employment cannot be continued if independent professional judgment adversely affected). The court 
agreed with Pioneer that the substantial relationship test applicable to former-client conflicts did not 
apply; instead, the court applied a rebuttable presumption against concurrent adverse representation. 
(The court expressly rejected Pioneer’s assertion that there is a per se rule against concurrent adverse 
representation.) The presumption is rebutted if the firm can show that it can represent each client with 
equal vigor and without using confidential information to the detriment of either client. Since there 
was no evidence that Shearman & Sterling, by virtue of its narrow representation of Pioneer on the 
wholly unrelated matter before the European Commission, had gained any information that could be 
used against Pioneer in defending Cap Gemini, and since its representation of Cap Gemini would not 
prevent Shearman & Sterling from pursuing the European Commission matter to the fullest, the 
presumption was rebutted, there was no violation of OH DR 5-105(B), and the motion to disqualify 
was denied. 
Relying heavily on Pioneer-Standard, a decision from the Southern District of Ohio likewise found 
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that the presumption against concurrent representation had been rebutted in SST Castings, Inc. v. 
Amana Appliances, Inc., 250 F. Supp.2d 863 (S.D. Ohio 2002). In SST, Dinsmore & Shohl 
represented SST in contract litigation. Thompson Hine represented the defendant. Thompson Hine 
had represented SST for many years, until a Thompson Hine partner left for Dinsmore & Shohl, 
taking substantially all of the SST legal work with her. One of the few cases retained by Thompson 
(as an accommodation to SST) was a small tax-refund claim being handled on a co-counsel basis by a 
Thompson partner in its Washington office and by the lawyer who had migrated to Dinsmore. The 
Thompson Washington partner “spent at most six hours for SST filling out forms for the tax refund 
complaint,”  id. at 865. SST argued that Thompson should be disqualified under OH DR 5-105 and 
OH DR 4-101 from representing the defendant when it was concurrently representing SST in the 
tax-refund case. Defendant argued that the refund representation was “very limited,” did not violate 
Thompson’s duty of loyalty to either client, and urged the court to adopt Judge Gaughan’s approach 
in Pioneer-Standard.  Id. at 869. Judge Spiegel did so. Quoting extensively from Pioneer-Standard, 
Judge Spiegel agreed with the defendant that the tax-refund case was a discrete matter, completely 
unrelated to the case at bar, and that it was therefore impossible for any confidential information 
theoretically possessed by Thompson to be used to the detriment of SST in the present litigation. The 
court concluded that 
the Thompson Hine attorneys can represent SST and Maytag [Amana] with equal 
vigor, without conflict of loyalties, and without using confidential information to the 
detriment of either client. Thompson Hine has therefore rebutted the presumption 
against concurrent representation. 
Id. at 872. SST further argued that Thompson Hine’s representation was improper under OH DR 
5-105(C) because it did not consent to Thompson’s representation. Again following and quoting 
Pioneer, the court concluded that the consent requirement came into play only if there was a violation 
of OH DR 5-105(B) and that there was no 5-105(B) violation where the lawyer’s independent 
professional judgment was not or was not likely to be adversely affected. 
Two other factors, present in both Pioneer and SST, are worthy of note. First, both courts, while 
finding the substantial-relationship test inapplicable in a case involving concurrent clients, did in fact 
make the point that the two matters in each case were “completely” or “wholly” unrelated. SST at 
870; Pioneer at *4. Second, both cases, in rejecting the no-consent argument, found that it was based 
on a “misreading” of OH DR 5-105 grounded on the decision in Picker Int’l, Inc., v. Varian Assocs., 
Inc. 670 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ohio 1987), aff’d, 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (prohibiting 
concurrent representation without consent). Both SST and Pioneer determined that the Picker court 
had relied on language in OH DR 5-105(B) that was no longer present; they concluded that the phrase 
“or if it would be likely to involve him in representing different interests” “has been removed from DR 
5-105,” and thus Picker was decided under an “outdated” version of OH DR 5-105. SST at 870-71; 
Pioneer at *3 n.2 (emphasis added by quoting courts). Although the district court in Picker expressly 
stated that any specific reference to the ethics rules “is to the Code of Professional Responsibility, 
which the Ohio Supreme Court adopted on October 5, 1970,” 670 F. Supp. at 1365 n.2, it was 
actually quoting language from ABA Model Code DR 5-105(B). Neither SST nor Pioneer caught 
the fact that the supposedly “removed” phrase never was a part of DR 5-105(B) as adopted in Ohio. 
Indeed, SST and Pioneer had it just backward when they stated that Picker was grounded on a 
“different, earlier version of the rule.” 250 F. Supp.2d at 870; see 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7120, at 
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*10 n.2. In fact, the version utilized by Picker was a later (and then current) version of the ABA Code 
Rule as amended in 1974. When Ohio adopted 5-105 in 1970, the phrase was not present, and Ohio 
never picked up on the 1974 amendment. This mistaken reading has been perpetuated in subsequent 
discussions of the issue.  See Carnegie Cos. v. Summit Props., Inc., 183 Ohio App.3d 770, 2009 
Ohio 4655, 918 N.E.2d 1052 (Summit), at para. 54. (See further discussion of the Pioneer, SST, 
and Carnegie cases, in the context of disqualification and the OHRPC, at section 1.7:310.) 
Where the conflict of interest arises from a concern about compromised confidentiality, at least one 
court has held that the motion to disqualify may be made at any time; delay will not result in waiver.  
Kitts v. U.S. Health Corp., 97 Ohio App.3d, 271, 277, 646 N.E.2d 555, 559 (Scioto 1994) (arguing 
in response to a delayed motion to disqualify for conflict of interest that “[c]onfidentiality is a 
paramount principle of the law, almost as basic as jurisdiction, and like jurisdiction, it ought to be a 
matter that can be raised at any time and one in which the doctrine of waiver is used sparingly”). 
Nevertheless, delay “goes to the weight of the claim” and should be considered by the court in 
evaluating the validity of the claim itself.  Id. Compare Perin v. Spurney, 2005 Ohio 6811, 2005 
Ohio App. LEXIS 6112 (Franklin) (rejecting argument that complaining party waived 
disqualification issue by waiting two months to file; issue must be raised in “timely” fashion, i.e., 
within a reasonable time; time frame found not unreasonable here). 
Finally, it should be remembered that disqualification issues premised on conflict of interest can also 
raise the threat of imputed disqualification of lawyers in the firm of the attorney personally 
disqualified. E.g., Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 
(1998). See Ohio Rule 1.10 and discussion at sections 1.10:200-:300. 
Sanctions and remedies for conflicts of interest - Malpractice actions: While violation of the 
conflict-of-interest disciplinary rules is not per se evidence of malpractice, Northwestern Life Ins. 
Co. v. Rogers, 61 Ohio App.3d 506, 573 N.E.2d 159 (Franklin 1989), the courts do look to the 
disciplinary rules for guidance. See, e.g., David v. Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Rock Co., 
L.P.A., 79 Ohio App.3d 786, 802, 607 N.E.2d 1173, 1183 (Cuyahoga 1992). 
As is true in malpractice actions generally (see section 1.1:310), in such cases premised on conflict of 
interest it is not enough to show a breach of duty owing by the lawyer to the client flowing from a 
conflict of interest; the plaintiff must also show that breach was the proximate cause of damage to the 
client. E.g., Northwestern Life v. Rogers, 61 Ohio App.3d at 511, 573 N.E.2d at 163 (summary 
judgment for defendant attorney affirmed); Burton v. Selker, 36 F. Supp.2d 984 (N.D. Ohio 1999) 
(applying Ohio law, court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment; no evidence that 
plaintiff client was damaged by lawyer’s alleged breach of duty), aff’d, 30 Fed. Appx. 456 (6th Cir. 
2002). It is equally clear that proof of the lawyer’s breach of duty will, as a general rule, require expert 
testimony, see, e.g., Murphy v. Redeker, No. 70868, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 115 (Ohio App. 
Cuyahoga Jan. 16, 1997) (per curiam) (see section 1.1:335), and that the conflict of interest can, in 
appropriate circumstances, be waived. See, e.g., Burton v. Selker, 36 F. Supp.2d at 988-91 (waiver 
letter to, and signed by, client cured any conflict of interest where attorney also represented other 
proposed joint purchaser of venture, and where his law firm owned an interest in the co-buyer’s 
business, all of which was disclosed in waiver letter). 
Other Ohio malpractice cases raising conflict-of-interest concerns include: 
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 Riley v. Clark, No. 98 CA2629, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5436 (Scioto Nov. 10, 1999) 
(summary judgment for defendant lawyers reversed where lawyer solicited clients to purchase 
at inflated price failing business that he represented and in which he had significant ownership 
interest, without informing clients of these facts; breach of duty and causation issues were, on 
such facts, within jury’s experience and understanding and did not necessitate expert 
testimony). 
 Master v. Chalko, No. 70527, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2420 (Cuyahoga June 5, 1997) 
(judgment against lawyer on jury verdict reversed; no evidence that lawyer’s representation of 
conflicting interests proximately caused any injury to plaintiff). 
 Dicus v. Laipply, No. 3-92-36, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6305 (Crawford Dec. 15, 1992) 
(summary judgment for lawyer reversed where lawyer, who, in defending both insurer and 
malpractice plaintiff/insured in automobile personal injury action, had failed to protect 
interest of insured once it became likely (as in fact happened) that verdict might be returned in 
excess of policy limits against malpractice plaintiff/insured. Despite attorney’s conflict of 
interest in representing both insured and insurer in the circumstances, lawyer did not advise 
insured of facts pertinent to causation and damages and failed to advise insured that he should 
retain independent counsel). 
 David v. Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Rock Co., L.P.A., 79 Ohio App.3d 786, 607 
N.E.2d 1173 (Cuyahoga 1992) (affirming jury verdict against defendant attorney where 
attorney consulted with plaintiff’s wife regarding facts relating to divorce action, agreed to 
assist her subsequently-engaged counsel regarding asset valuation, but then represented 
husband in divorce action). 
Sanctions and remedies for conflicts of interest - Ineffective assistance of counsel: On the criminal 
side, if lawyer conflicts of interest result in violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel, any conviction must be overturned. See State v. Gillard, 64 Ohio 
St.3d 304, 595 N.E.2d 878 (1992). Conflicts in criminal cases typically (but not exclusively) arise in 
cases in which one lawyer is attempting to represent more than one defendant. See discussion at 
section 1.7:320. For an ineffective assistance case involving conflict issues other than multiple 
representation of co-defendants, see State v. Johnson, 185 Ohio App.3d 654, 2010 Ohio 315, 925 
N.E.2d 199 (Hancock) (defendant’s lawyer had previously represented confidential informant in the 
case). 
Sanctions and remedies for conflicts of interest - Fee forfeiture: Generally, the law recognizes conflict 
of interest as a basis for fee forfeiture, see 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  
121 cmt. f & reporter’s note thereto (2000). As Judge Learned Hand stated in Silbiger v. Prudence 
Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1950): 
 Certainly by the beginning of the Seventeenth Century it had become a 
common-place that an attorney must not represent opposed interests; and the usual 
consequence has been that he is debarred from receiving any fee from either, no matter 
how successful his labors. 
Id. at 920 (footnotes omitted) (finding complete forfeiture unnecessary in corporate reorganization 
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context; ordering that fee be reduced by not less than one-third). 
The only conflict-of-interest case found in Ohio involving fee forfeiture is Baker v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (two lawyers, one of whom was a 
former staff attorney for defendant and not officially involved in the case at bar, and the other a 
co-counsel of record for plaintiffs in the case, were found to have “conjoined” in violating numerous 
Ohio disciplinary rules, including former OH DR 4-101(B), 5-105(A), and 2-107(A); co-counsel of 
record not only disqualified, but also precluded from recovering any of his fees or costs and ordered 
to reimburse plaintiffs for any additional costs incurred by them as a result of the disqualification 
proceedings). The Baker opinion, authored by Judge Bell, offers a penetrating and exhaustive 
analysis of the problems presented by this case, where the chief culprit, whose “Svengalian 
machinations” (893 F. Supp. at 1365) were eagerly received by the disqualified co-counsel, emerged 
unscathed (in the case, at least) -- solely because he was acting in the wings, not as counsel for the 
plaintiffs, and thus could not be subjected to sanctions in the case at bar. (Subsequently, however, 
both the co-counsel of record in Baker (John Hash) and the other, a former Firestone lawyer (Joseph 
Downs), were named as defendants in a disciplinary complaint filed by the North Carolina State Bar 
arising out of their conduct in, inter alia, the Baker case. Two months before the disciplinary hearing, 
held in early July 1997, Downs died. North Carolina State Bar v. Hash, No. 96 DHC 16, slip op. at 
1 (Aug. 13, 1997). As a result of the hearing, Hash was disbarred. Id. at 7.). The Baker case is 
equally unusual in that its grounding of sanctions was based primarily on the two attorneys’ 
misconduct occurring in a prior, substantially related case that had been pending before the same 
court before it settled. Baker is well worth reading in situations in which a former employee/lawyer is 
implicated in conflict-of-interest concerns. See also American Motors, Inc. v. Huffstulter, 61 Ohio 
St.3d 343, 575 N.E.2d 116 (1991), discussed below. 
Sanctions and remedies for conflicts of interest - Injunction: See American Motors, Inc. v. 
Huffstulter, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 575 N.E.2d 116 (1991) (lawyer/former employee permanently 
enjoined from utilizing former employer’s confidential information in testifying as witness, expert or 
otherwise, against former employer, and from utilizing former employer’s confidential information in 
assisting opposing counsel in product liability suits against former employer). See also Maritrans 
GP Inc., v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992). 
Sanctions and remedies for conflict of interest - Mandatory withdrawal: Under Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(1), 
a lawyer must withdraw from representation if “the representation will result in violation of the Ohio 
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.” Applying the comparable language from former OH 
DR 2-110(B)(2) in the conflicts-of-interest context, the Ohio Supreme Court found that a lawyer’s 
continuing to represent a client, after announcing an intent to withdraw in the face of an 
acknowledged conflict of interest, violated the former rule.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Mazer, 76 Ohio St.3d 481, 668 N.E.2d 478 (1996). 
Sanctions and remedies for conflicts of interest - Criminal sanctions: See ORC 102.99(B) (violation 
of ORC 102.03 (restrictions on representation by present or former government official or employee) 
constitutes first-degree misdemeanor, for which the penalty is imprisonment of not more than six 
months and fine of not more than one thousand dollars, ORC 2929.21(B)(1), (C)(1)). Comparable 
federal provisions (18 USC § §  207(a), 208(a)) can likewise implicate Ohio lawyers. See United 
States v. Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299 (6th Cir. 1986) (sentence of one-year imprisonment upheld for 
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violation of conflict-of-interest provisions of 18 USC §  208(a)). 
 
1.7:270  Positional Conflicts 
A “positional” or “issue” conflict is one in which a lawyer takes a legal position for one client that is 
contrary to that taken on behalf of another client “in a completely unrelated matter.” John S. 
Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 457, 460 (1993) (emphasis in 
original). 
Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [17] advises that a lawyer can ordinarily represent clients on different sides of a 
legal question in unrelated cases unless there is a “substantial risk” that advocacy for one client will 
“materially limit the lawyer’s effectiveness in concurrently representing another client in a different 
case.” This language (other than the substitution of “substantial” for “significant”) is taken from MR 
1.7 cmt. [24]. 
Ohio Comment [17] elaborates on “material limitation conflicts” as follows: 
[T]here is a material limitation conflict if a decision for which the lawyer must 
advocate on behalf of one client in one case will create a precedent likely to seriously 
weaken the position taken on behalf of another client in another case. Factors relevant 
in determining whether there is a material limitation of which the clients must be 
advised and for which consent must be obtained include: (1) where the cases are 
pending; (2) whether the issue is substantive or procedural; (3) the temporal 
relationship between the matters; (4) the significance of the issue to the immediate and 
long-term interests of the clients involved; and (5) the clients’ reasonable expectations 
in retaining the lawyer. 
Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [17]. The most significant variations between the Ohio and Model Rule language 
are the addition in Ohio of an express obligation to advise the clients and obtain their consent if the 
relevant factors show that a material limitation conflict exists; the Model Rule merely refers to these 
factors as being “relevant to determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk.” On the 
other hand, the Ohio comment does not include the further MR cmt. [24] language that if such a risk 
exists, “then absent informed consent of the affected parties, the lawyer must refuse one of the 
representations or withdraw from one or both matters.” Despite this difference in language, both the 
Model Rule and the Ohio Rule would seem to call for the same result. 
See generally 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  128 cmt. f (2000). See also 
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  7.3.3 (1986). 
ABA Formal Op. 93-377 (Oct. 16, 1993) examined the trial/appellate distinction (asserting 
antagonistic positions in different trial courts o.k., but may be improper to do so at appellate level) 
drawn in former MR 1.7 cmt. [9] and found it wanting; instead, it opined that the issue should be 
whether the circumstances would cause the lawyer in either case to “soft-pedal” arguments for one 
client so as not to damage the position of the other client. The opinion concludes that where a lawyer 
is litigating directly contrary legal positions on behalf of different clients in different and unrelated 
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cases in the same jurisdiction, the lawyer, absent consent by both clients after full disclosure, should 
refuse the second case if there is a substantial risk that the position taken on behalf of one client will 
create a precedent likely to undercut materially the other client’s position. Accord Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. 
[17] (material limitation conflict if decision advocated on behalf of one client “will create a precedent 
likely to seriously weaken” position of another client in another case). If the two cases are in different 
jurisdictions and there is no substantial risk that either representation will adversely affect the other, 
the lawyer can proceed with both. Op. 93-377, at 1. 
While the positional conflicts issue is typically addressed in situations involving current clients, it can 
arise in the former-client context as well. See, e.g., the T.C. Theatre case, discussed this section infra. 
In general, in the absence of a substantial relationship between the former and current matters, under 
the former-client conflict rule 
a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not 
precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that 
type even though the subject representation involves a position adverse to the prior 
client. 
Ohio Rule 1.9 cmt. [2]. Accord 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of 
Lawyering §  13.3, at 13-35 to 36 n.5; illus. 13-4, at 13-22 to 13-23 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-1). See 
further discussion of this Comment [2] language at section 1.9:210 infra. 
It is important to note (as is explicit in Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [17], MR 1.7 cmt. [24], and ABA Formal 
Op. 93-377, but is not in Restatement §  128 cmt. f) that the “different” cases must also be unrelated 
in order to present a pure positional-conflict issue. As will be seen below, most, if not all, of the 
decisions cited as positional-conflict cases also involve some significant relationship or adversity 
existing between the contested matters, thereby triggering application of more traditional conflicts 
analysis. (Our research indicates that positional conflicts have not been discussed in Ohio case law or 
ethics opinions.) 
The universe of cases regularly cited when positional or issue conflicts are discussed consists of 
Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978); Federal Defenders v. U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n, 680 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1988) (issue-conflict argument made but court not persuaded,  id. 
at 29-30 & n.3); Estates Theaters, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. 345 F. Supp. 93 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); and T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).   
Of these five cases, virtually every one involves something more than a “pure” positional or issue 
conflict. Thus, it is not surprising that the commentary on positional conflicts is long on hypotheticals 
and short on actual cases. See, e.g., 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of 
Lawyering §  10.10 (3d ed. Supp. 2004) (citing, at 10-48 Illustration 10-2 n.2, only one case, the 
Delaware decision in Williams v. State, discussed infra in this section). 
Fiandaca is cited by 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  128, reporter’s 
note to cmt. f (2000), in connection with its discussion of positional conflicts, but surely the conflict 
in Fiandaca ended up being more than positional. In Fiandaca, counsel for the plaintiff 
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female-prisoner class in case A sought improved facilities on equal-protection grounds. The same 
counsel represented in case B a class of mentally retarded residents at a state school. In case A, the 
state made plaintiffs an offer of settlement “on highly favorable terms,” 827 F.2d at 829, that 
included housing female inmates at a building at the state school. As the First Circuit noted, the class 
in case B “[q]uite understandably, vehemently opposes the idea of establishing a correctional facility 
for female inmates anywhere on the grounds of [the state school].” Id. The lawyers for the class in 
case A rejected the settlement because “‘plaintiffs do not want to agree to an offer which is against the 
stated interests of the plaintiffs in [case B].’“  Id. at 827. The court of appeals, in holding that the 
district court abused its discretion in denying the state’s motion to disqualify the plaintiffs’ lawyers in 
case A, analyzed the issue pursuant to pre-2002 amendment MR 1.7(b) -- material limitation conflict 
-- but it seems that pre-2002 amendment MR 1.7(a) -- “directly adverse” representation -- could have 
been used as well. See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 129 (7th ed. 2011) 
(commentary) (“Simultaneous representation of clients involved in different lawsuits can give rise to 
a conflict if the suits involve related matters.”) The First Circuit’s conflict holding in Fiandaca is 
criticized in Peter Margulies, Multiple Communities or Monolithic Clients: Positional Conflicts 
of Interests and the Mission of the Legal Services Lawyer, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2339, 2362 
(1999). 
Even Estates Theaters, the decision referred to by Wolfram as the “classic case on issue conflicts” in 
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  7.3.3, at 355 (1986), involved related matters. Thus, 
the lawyer representing the plaintiff in two antitrust suits was arguing in case A, on behalf of the 
owner of the Utopia Theatre, that his theatre-chain client in case B (United Artists, not named as a 
defendant in case A, but identified as a co-conspirator) was, with the named defendants, 
discriminating in favor of the Roosevelt Theatre, owned by United Artists, over the Utopia. Whereas 
in case B, the argument was that the defendants were favoring the Utopia at the expense of the 
Roosevelt. In disqualifying the lawyer from continued representation of the plaintiff in case A, Judge 
Weinfeld stated that “[t]he attorney cannot at one and the same time be prosecutor of plaintiff’s claim 
on behalf of Utopia and the defender of the target, [United Artists], as the owner of the Roosevelt.” 
345 F. Supp. at 99. 
The Westinghouse and T.C. Theatre cases likewise go beyond an abstract legal-issue conflict. See 
Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1312 (law firm was simultaneously representing, first (in lobbying 
context), oil companies that had provided confidential information concerning their involvement in 
the uranium industry, from which firm prepared report concluding that energy industries, including 
uranium, were competitive, and, second, uranium supplier as plaintiff in related antitrust suit charging 
uranium producers, including oil companies, with illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade in uranium 
industry; uranium supplier given option of dismissing oil companies as defendants or discharging law 
firm as its attorney in case); T.C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 266-67 (disqualification, in private 
treble-damage action arising out of government antitrust suit, of plaintiff’s lawyers who, in prior 
government antitrust litigation, had represented one of present defendants on appeal). 
The law-review commentary on positional conflicts is considerably more voluminous than the case 
law. Dzienkowski’s article (Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 457) is an exhaustive 
look at the issue, as well as a zealous brief for taking positional conflicts more seriously and treating 
them more comprehensively than did the Model Rules. (A portion of his criticism was absolved by 
ABA Formal Op. 93-377 (Oct. 16, 1993) and by the 2002 amendments to MR 1.7, including the 
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addition of MR 1.7 cmt. [24].) For a more recent analysis of the issue and some of the cases, see 
Douglas R. Richmond, Choosing Sides: Issue or Positional Conflicts of Interest, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 
383 (1999) (noting the paucity of cases and recognizing that each of the four cases analyzed there 
(Estates Theaters, Fiandaca, Westinghouse, and Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & 
Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992)) arguably contains elements that go beyond a pure positional 
conflict.  51 Fla. L. Rev. 383, 398-409). See also Norman W. Spaulding, Note, The Prophet and 
the Bureaucrat: Positional Conflicts in Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1395 (1998) 
(also recognizing the scarcity of case law). 
Dzienkowski’s February 1993 article has been cited in a judicial opinion only once. That lone citation 
is significant, however, because it does appear to be a true positional conflict case, unlike the cases 
typically cited on this issue. In Williams v. State, 805 A.2d 880 (Del. 2002), Bernard O’Donnell, the 
public defender representing a capital murder defendant, filed a motion to withdraw. He premised his 
motion on the facts that he was also representing a capital murder defendant in another, unrelated, 
case pending before the Delaware Supreme Court, that in the other case he had argued that the lower 
court erred in failing to give great weight to the jury’s 2-10 vote against imposing the death penalty, 
and that in the case at bar defendant has an arguable issue that the lower court erred when it concluded 
that it was required to give great weight to the jury’s 10-2 vote recommending the death penalty for 
Williams. The Supreme Court justice ruling on the motion agreed: 
[W]e find that O’Donnell has identified and demonstrated the existence of a 
disqualifying positional conflict. It would be a violation of the Delaware Rules of 
Professional Conduct for O’Donnell to advocate conflicting legal positions in two 
capital murder appeals that are pending simultaneously in this Court. Both the United 
States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution guarantee each of O’Donnell’s 
clients a right to the effective assistance of counsel in a direct appeal following a 
capital murder conviction. Given his clients’ disparate legal arguments, O’Donnell’s 
independent obligations to his clients may compromise the effectiveness of his 
assistance as appellate counsel for one or both clients, unless his motion to withdraw is 
granted. 
Id. at 881. 
Finally, it should be noted that while commentary on this issue is a fairly recent development, the 
positional conflict itself has been around for a while: A young lawyer named Abraham Lincoln, so the 
story goes, argued two cases involving the same issue of law the same day before the same judge. 
Lincoln represented the defendant in one case, the plaintiff in the other. After Lincoln won the 
morning case, the judge inquired during the afternoon case what had caused him to change his mind. 
“Your honor,” Lincoln said, “I may have been wrong this morning, but I know I am right this 
afternoon.” Nellie Revell, Right off the Chest 81-82 (1923). 
 
1.7:280  Relationship to Other Rules 
Conflict-of-interest issues are addressed in other portions of this presentation as well: 
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 Section 1.6:390 (confidentiality and conflict of interest; see Ohio Rule 1.6) 
 Sections 1.8:200-:1200 (conflict of interest: current clients: specific rules; see Ohio Rule 1.8) 
 Sections 1.9:200-:400 (conflicts involving former clients; see Ohio Rule 1.9) 
 Sections 1.10:200-:500 (imputed disqualification; see Ohio Rule 1.10) 
 Sections 1.11:200-:500 (successive government and private employment; see Ohio Rule 
1.11) 
 Sections 1.12:200-:500 (former judge or arbitrator; see Ohio Rule 1.12) 
 Sections 1.13:400-:500 (organization as client; see Ohio Rule 1.13(d) & (e)) 
 Sections 1.16:230 (terminating representation; see Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(1)) 
 Section 1.17:200-:300 (sale of law practice; see Ohio Rule 1.17) 
 Sections 2.3:200-:400 (evaluation for use by third persons; see Ohio Rule 2.3) 
 Sections 3.7:200-:300 (lawyer as witness; see Ohio Rule 3.7) 
 Section 5.4:200-:500 (professional independence of lawyer; see Ohio Rule 5.4) 
 Section 5.7:200 (applicability of ethics rules to ancillary business activities; see Ohio Rule 
5.7) 
 
1.7:300  Conflict of Interest Among Current Clients 
Primary State References 
Ohio Rule 1.7 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.7 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.86, 5.89-5.90, 
5.92-5.93, 5.95-5.97, 5.119-5.123 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §§ 51:101, 51:301 
ALI-LGL §§ 128-131 
Wolfram §§ 7.1-7.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
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Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.86 (1996). 
Conflicting interests between clients - Overview: Prior to dealing with specific current-client conflict 
situations in the succeeding sections, it may be helpful to state underlying principles at the outset. 
In a world of multiple clients, client interests can differ. Such differences implicate two important 
duties the lawyer owes each client, the duty of loyalty and the duty of confidentiality. 
If the conscientious pursuit of one client’s interests undercuts the lawyer’s ability to serve the other, 
the resulting conflict of interest may require the lawyer to decline prospective representation or to 
withdraw from an existing representation. Here the duty of loyalty is involved. The question is 
whether the lawyer’s obligations to one client prevent the lawyer from exercising independent 
professional judgment for the best interests of another client. 
Confidentiality concerns arise where a lawyer has confidential client information obtained from or 
regarding one client, which information that client wishes to remain confidential, but which the 
lawyer, if he were not subject to restraint, would use or disclose for the benefit of another client. The 
confidentiality concern arises out of conflicting interests between clients and often is discussed in 
tandem with the loyalty concern. See section 1.6:240. 
The clash of interests between clients can differ in levels of severity and the likelihood of occurrence. 
The more serious the conflict and the more likely it is to occur, the more pressing is the need to 
decline or withdraw from representation. 
Where there is a conflict of interest that would otherwise require the lawyer to decline representation 
or to withdraw from existing representation, the conflict can sometimes be waived by the clients 
involved by giving informed consent, confirmed in writing. Ohio Rule 1.7(b)(2). See section 1.7:240. 
This course is available, however, only if “the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent 
representation to each affected client.” Rule 1.7(b)(1). If there is doubt on this score, the lawyer 
probably ought not undertake the representation. In practice, however, particularly where fully 
informed client consent is obtained, a lawyer may be afforded a bit more leeway. See, e.g., Gould, 
Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1990), discussed at sections 
1.7:260 supra and 1.7:310 infra. 
Conflict-of-interest problems (other than those resulting from the lawyer’s own interests, as to which 
see sections 1.7:500 and 1.8:200) can arise in two settings. Sometimes the issues arise from potential 
or existing multiple representation of current clients. Sometimes the issues arise because a present 
representation creates a conflict with a former client. While the basic duties of loyalty and 
confidentiality are present in both situations, the duties owed a former client are thought to be less 
than those owed a current client. With respect to conflicts involving former clients, see sections 
1.9:100-:400. 
Because greater restrictions apply to conflicts arising from the representation of current clients than to 
conflicts arising from the representation of a current client and a former client, a lawyer faced with a 
current-client conflict may be tempted to drop one of the clients against the client’s will, transforming 
that client into a former client, while retaining the other. See Rule 1.7 cmt. [8], which appears to 
indicate that the lawyer may be able to continue to represent one or more of the clients, if he can 
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satisfy his duties both to the former client and adequately represent the remaining clients, together 
with obtaining client consent. Ohio courts, however, at least under the former OHCPR, have not been 
sympathetic to such maneuvering -- they believe that it poses too severe a threat to present-client 
conflict-of-interest rules.  Sarbey v. Nat’l City Bank, 66 Ohio App.3d 18, 583 N.E.2d 392 
(Summit 1990). Accord Henry Filters, Inc. v. Peabody Barnes, Inc., 82 Ohio App.3d 255, 261, 
611 N.E.2d 873 (Wood 1992) (“An attorney who is simultaneously representing two clients with 
differing interests cannot conform to the rules of ethics by merely discontinuing representation of one 
client after improperly initiating a lawsuit against the client.”) See also Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian 
Assocs., Inc., 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (applying former OH DR 5-105 to reject this practice 
where conflict arose out of merger of two law firms). 
Another Ohio federal case reaching the same conclusion on this issue is Pioneer-Standard 
Electronics, Inc. v. Cap Gemini America, Inc., No. 1:01 CV2185, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7120 
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2002). In Pioneer, a law firm inherited via merger representation of Pioneer in 
a regulatory matter before the European Commission. It was then asked to defend Cap Gemini, a 
regular client of some years’ standing, in a Northern District of Ohio suit brought by Pioneer. When 
Pioneer refused to waive the conflict, the law firm notified Pioneer that it was withdrawing from the 
European representation and then filed its appearance pro hac vice for Cap Gemini in the Northern 
District case. Pioneer sought to disqualify the law firm for violation of former OH DR 5-105, based 
on the firm’s concurrent adverse representation. The law firm argued that OH DR 5-105 was 
inapplicable because Pioneer was a “former” client; the court rejected the argument: 
[F]or purposes of determining the status of an attorney-client relationship within the 
context of adverse representation, courts will not honor an attorney’s unilateral 
termination of the relationship. . . . This principle has been coined the “hot potato” 
doctrine [citing the district court opinion in Picker, 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (N.D. 
Ohio 1987), aff’d, 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989)]. Pursuant to this doctrine, [law 
firm’s] termination of its relationship with Pioneer is ineffective because [law firm] 
terminated its attorney-client relationship with Pioneer only after it was asked to 
represent Cap Gemini in this litigation and Pioneer refused to waive the conflict. 
Id. at *6-7. (Nevertheless, the court ultimately concluded there was no violation of OH DR 5-105 
and denied the motion to disqualify. See further discussion at sections 1.7:260 and 1.7:310.) 
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An exception to the “hot potato” rule has been made where the law firm did not create the conflict, but 
“[r]ather, the conflict was created by an acquisition of the client for legitimate business reasons.” 
Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp 1121, 1127 (N.D. Ohio 1990) 
(endorsing “hot potato” rule, but finding facts justified exception; law firm therefore permitted to 
choose which client it would continue to represent). 
Note should also be made of Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 2011-02 (Dec. 2, 2011), wherein 
OSBA examined potential ethical problems that might arise if a law firm engaged a professional 
employer organization (“PEO”) to conduct human resource and personnel responsibilities for the 
firm’s lawyers and staff. With respect to Rule 1.7 (and 1.9 and 1.10), the Bar Association’s Ethics 
Committee opined as follows: 
[A] feature common to PEOs is that they act as co-employers of their customer’s 
employees. In the law-firm context, this characteristic does not, alone, raise conflict 
issues . . . . It is possible that multiple law firms may contract with the same PEO, 
including counsel for clients that are adverse to each other. However, each law firm 
would continue as the co-employer solely of its own lawyers, and there would be no 
sharing of lawyers between or among law firms contracting with a common PEO. In 
effect, each law firm and its lawyers would constitute its own “silo,” thus avoiding any 
inherent conflict issues. 
Id. at 3-4 (the OSBA goes on in footnote to contrast the lawyer-temp situation, where “lawyers 
working through the same placement agency may work for several different firms, including on 
matters in which the firms represent clients adverse to each other. That situation can raise conflict 
issues.” Id. at n.5) 
 
1.7:310  Representing Parties with Conflicting Interests in Civil Litigation 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.93, 5.95, 5.97, 5.122 (1996). 
Conflicts can arise in any sort of civil action. Some illustrative areas where conflicts questions are 
likely to arise are discussed below. 
Conflict among current clients - Direct adversity: As stated in Rule 1.7 cmt. [10], the “concurrent 
representation of clients whose interests are directly adverse always creates a conflict of interest” 
under Ohio Rule 1.7(a)(1). “Further, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one 
proceeding against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are 
wholly unrelated.” Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [11]. Accord 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers § 128(2) (2000). (Needless to say, a lawyer cannot both assert a claim on behalf of a current 
client and defend against that claim on behalf of another current client in the same proceeding, 
irrespective of consent by all concerned. Ohio Rule 1.7(c)(2).  As this absolute prohibition is put in 
Comment [11], “[a] lawyer may not represent, in the same proceeding, clients who are directly 
adverse.”  And note that Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-2, 2008 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (June 6, 2008), invokes Rule 1.7(c)(2) even though one of the litigants was 
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“not technically a client.”  See discussion in section 1.7:240, at “Nonconsentable conflicts - In 
general.”) 
While there are many permutations in which Rule 1.7(a)(1) is applicable, perhaps the classic, and 
most common, in modern legal practice is that in which Firm, on behalf of one of its long-standing 
clients, A, asserts a claim against, or defends against a claim brought by, B, who happens also to be a 
client of Firm (almost always a minor player as Firm’s clients go). There is no doubt that, absent 
consent under Rule 1.7(b)(2), Ohio Rule 1.7(a)(1) would be violated on such facts, and, in the first 
judicial opinion of which we are aware decided under the Ohio Rules, the federal district court so held 
in Cliffs Sales Co. v. Am. S.S. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74342 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2007) 
(defending client A against suit by wholly-owned subsidiary of client B while simultaneously 
representing B in unrelated matter; no consent; court rejects per se conflict test in such circumstances 
but rather looks to facts of each case to determine if representation is actually adverse to parent; so 
found here). Likewise under the former OHCPR, lack of consent was usually fatal in the disciplinary 
context. E.g., Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Godbey, 94 Ohio St.3d 416, 763 N.E.2d 1156 (2002) (violation 
of OH DR 5-105(B); new client not informed of existing violation of 5-105(B) conflicting 
representation); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Tolliver, 62 Ohio St.3d 462, 584 N.E.2d 670 (1992) (violation 
of 5-105(B); inadequate disclosure insufficient to provide informed consent under 5-105(C)). 
The first Ohio state court holding of which we are aware finding a violation of Rule 1.7(a)(1) is 
Carnegie Cos., Inc. v. Summit Props., Inc., 183 Ohio App.3d 770, 2009 Ohio 4655, 918 N.E.2d 
1052 (Summit), a case in which the would-be purchaser (Carnegie) in a failed real estate transaction 
lawsuit moved to disqualify the law firm representing the would be seller (Summit), because the firm 
was also simultaneously representing Carnegie in an unrelated matter.  The trial court granted the 
motion to disqualify and the Ninth District Court of Appeal affirmed, on 1.7(a)(1) grounds: 
 Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 provides that multiple representation creates a conflict of 
interest if the representation of one client is “directly adverse to another current client.” 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(1). In this case, one of Ulmer & Berne’s current clients 
[represented by the firm in an unrelated matter] sued another current client and Ulmer 
& Berne answered and counterclaimed on behalf of one client against another client. 
Thus, the trial court correctly held that Ulmer & Berne’s representation of the second 
client in this case created a conflict of interest under Prof.Cond.R. 17. 
Id. at para. 48 (bracketed material added).  In so deciding, Judge Dickinson considered and rejected 
the arguments of Summit that the Sarbey, Pioneer, and SST cases, decided under the Code, 
permitted the dual representation in the case at bar: 
 Prof.Cond.R. 1.7, however, contains two separate and independent ways of 
creating a conflict of interest involving two current clients. Not only does multiple 
representation create a conflict of interest if “there is a substantial risk that the 
lawyer’s [abilities for one client] will be materially limited by [his] responsibilities to 
another client,” but a conflict is also created under Prof. Cond. R. 1.7(a)(1) if “the 
representation of [one] client will be directly adverse to another current client.” This 
significant difference between DR 5-105 and Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 limits the utilizing of 
case law decided under DR 5-105 in cases applying Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 . . . As the Task 
Force points out in its comparison of Prof.Cond.R. 1.7, there are “many situations” 
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that require a lawyer to request client consent, “not only those in which an adverse 
effect on the lawyer’s judgment is patent or inevitable, as DR 5-105(B) can be 
interpreted to state.” 
Id. at para. 47 (bracketed material by the court). In so deciding, the Carnegie court chose not to 
make reference to another part of the Task Force’s comparison, which states that “[n]o change in the 
substance of the referenced Ohio rules on conflicts . . . is intended . . . .” But as we have pointed out in 
text above (see the final paragraph of section 1.7:200), there are differences in the Code and the Rules 
on conflict issues and the one pointed out by Judge Dickinson is a case in point.  
The court of appeals also rejected the conclusion of the federal district court in Cliff Sales Co. v. Am. 
S.S. Co. to the effect that violation of Rule 1.7 does not per se require disqualification. See Carnegie, 
at para. 55. But must a firm be disqualified in such circumstances? Carnegie obviously says yes (“a 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 requires disqualification of the offending lawyer,” id. at para. 57), but 
the cases are divided. There is substantial authority both in Ohio and elsewhere, to the effect that a 
violation of ethics conflicts rules does not translate into a per se rule of disqualification. (See, on this 
point, the pertinent language in para. 20 of the “Scope” section of the Rules – which was neither cited 
nor discussed by the court in Carnegie – to the effect that “violation of a rule does not necessarily 
warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification.”) The Cliffs case so holds under 
the Rules.  2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74342, at *17.  For cases decided under the Code, see, e.g., 
Centimark Corp. v. Brown Sprinkler Serv., Inc., 85 Ohio App.3d 485, 488-89, 620 N.E.2d 134, 
137 (Ashtabula 1993); Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F.Supp. 1121, 1124, 
1126 (N.D. Ohio 1990); cf. Kitchen v. Aristech Chem., 769 F. Supp. 254, 258 (S.D. Ohio 1991) 
(ethics violation not involving conflicts; disqualification motion denied). But see Henry Filters, Inc. 
v. Peabody Barnes, Inc., 82 Ohio App.3d 873 (Wood 1992) (no abuse of discretion in granting 
disqualification because “trial court has the authority and the duty to prevent a violation of the 
[OHCPR] involving conflicts of interest,” id. at 262, 611 N.E.2d at 877). 
The Gould decision is instructive on this issue. Actually, it is two decisions in one, because as to one 
current-client direct-adversity conflict, the firm obtained the informed consent of one of the adverse 
clients, Pechinay, and the court held that OH DR 5-105(C) was thereby satisfied. As to the other 
directly adverse representation of current clients, there was no consent, and the court found 5-101(C) 
violated (without stopping to determine whether there had been a violation of 5-105(B), as the 
Pioneer and SST courts, see below, did). Nevertheless, inasmuch as disqualification is “a drastic 
measure” to be taken only when “absolutely necessary,” 738 F. Supp. at 1126, the court concluded 
that the motion to disqualify should be denied. High on the court’s list of reasons, in addition to lack 
of any relation between the representations and absence of demonstration of prejudice and/or 
violation of confidential information,  id. at 1126, was the fact that this was a “thrust-upon” conflict: 
rather than through any affirmative act of the law firm, the second client had become adverse only by 
virtue of its acquisition by Pechinay. Rather than disqualification, the court ordered the firm to 
withdraw from its representation of Gould or IGT, the client acquired by Pechinay. See also 
discussion of Gould in the second paragraph below and at section 1.7:300. 
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Where do Pioneer-Standard Electronics, Inc. v. Cap-Gemini America, Inc., No. 1.01 CV2185, 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7120 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2002) and SST Castings, Inc. v. Amana 
Appliances, Inc., 250 F. Supp.2d 863 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (discussed above in section 1.7:260 at 
“Sanctions and remedies for conflicts of interest - Disqualification”), fit into this scheme of things? 
There is no doubt that they were correctly decided under the Code; there was no violation of OH DR 
5-105(B). We think the same result -- denial of the disqualification motion -- would have followed 
under the Rules, despite an arguable ethics violation of Rule 1.7(a)(1). Much of the courts’ analysis is 
consistent with a denial of the motion, despite any such violation. Thus, both courts emphasized: that 
disqualification is a matter of discretion for the court; that disqualification is an extreme step, to be 
taken only if absolutely necessary; that the matters were totally unrelated; and that there was no 
breach or risk of breach of confidentiality. Moreover, both cases involved large firms and 
sophisticated clients. For these reasons, we think it plausible that Judges Gaughan and Spiegel would 
have denied the disqualification motion, even if Rule 1.7 had been applicable, as did Judge Nugent 
for similar reasons in a case where Rule 1.7 was applicable and found to have been violated, Cliffs 
Sales Co. v. Am. S.S. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74342 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2007) (also 
emphasizing Pioneer-Standard analysis that law firm could represent both clients with equal vigor 
and without conflict of loyalties, id. at *14-15). Contrast, however, Judge Dickinson’s analysis in 
Carnegie Cos., Inc. v. Summit Props., Inc. 183 Ohio App.3d 770, 2009 Ohio 4655, 918 N.E.2d 
1052 (Summit), in which he concluded that a Rule 1.7(a)(1) violation required disqualification 
without further inquiry into equal vigor, etc. 
It is no doubt true that some ethics violations are more serious than others, and that a direct adversity 
conflict such as that in Carnegie may well be one that calls for per se disqualification, since, as Judge 
Dickinson noted in Carnegie, such a conflict is not only an ethical violation “but also undermines the 
basic duty of undivided loyalty to one’s clients.” Id. at para. 56. It will likely take time, and perhaps 
a Supreme Court decision or two, to determine whether there will be a bright-line rule or whether the 
issue should be decided case-by-case, depending on the factual situation presented. 
If, unlike the facts presented in both Pioneer and SST (no client consent), there has been informed 
consent in a directly adverse representation involving wholly unrelated matters and the lawyer or firm 
can provide vigorous representation to both clients, then the conditions of Rule 1.7(b) will have been 
satisfied, irrespective of Rule 1.7(a)(1). See, e.g., under the Code, Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & 
Smelting Co., 738 F.Supp. 1121, 1125 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (finding no ethical violation under 
OHCPR in bringing unfair competition action against party that firm represented on unrelated patent 
matters where informed consent and proper screening devices were in place). 
Where the conflict is indirect, the lawyer is given comparatively more latitude. In Grubb v. 
Hollingsworth, 69 Ohio App.3d 804, 591 N.E.2d 1297 (Preble 1990), decided under the Code, a 
trial court was reversed for disqualifying defense counsel based on conflict of interest in a wrongful 
death action. The only alleged conflict involved the fact that another lawyer in defense counsel’s firm 
represented, in an unrelated federal criminal matter, a potential witness for the plaintiff in the 
wrongful death action. 
Even indirect relationships could lead to impermissible conflicts under the OHCPR, however. In a 
1991 opinion, the Toledo Bar Association advised that a lawyer could not represent a party on a 
felony charge where the lawyer had reason to believe that the party might be concealing information 
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on an unrelated hit-and-run accident in which the lawyer represented the victim. This belief might 
cloud the lawyer’s exercise of independent judgment. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 91-19A (n.d.) (relying 
on OH EC 5-14 and 5-15). 
A lawyer who represented two clients in unrelated medical claims against the same doctor and 
discovered that the doctor’s insurance and assets might be insufficient to cover both claims, had a 
conflict of interest that could not be cured by consent; it was not obvious that the lawyer could 
proceed without conflict, because the lawyer might be influenced in settlement positions or in moving 
the pace of litigation along to favor one client over the other. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 91-18 (n.d). 
As the possibility of conflict becomes more remote, the permissibility of representation becomes 
clearer. If a lawyer’s practice concentrates on representation in a particular industry, for example, the 
lawyer often may represent competitors. The mere fact that the entities compete raises the possibility 
of potentially differing interests, but it is not improper to represent the competitors. See Rule 1.7 cmt. 
[17]: “Simultaneous representation, in unrelated matters, of clients whose business or personal 
interests are only generally adverse, such as competing enterprises, does not present a material 
limitation conflict.” But cf. Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 
1992) (injunction grounded on breach of fiduciary duty arising from representing competitors, which 
duty is independent of the ethics rules). With respect to representing clients having “positional” or 
“issue” conflicts, see section 1.7:270. 
Conflicts among current clients - Common representation: Ohio Rule 1.7 cmts. [25]-[28] deal with 
special considerations a lawyer needs to take into account in representation of multiple clients on the 
same side of a matter. As Comment [25] points out, the hazards can be so significant in terms of 
potentially adverse interests that such representation cannot be undertaken: 
For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where 
contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. 
Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly 
represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely 
that impartiality can be maintained [as when the relationship between the parties is 
antagonistic]. 
Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [25]. Comment [26] stresses the importance of the attorney-client privilege in 
assessing the appropriateness of common representation. Since the privilege does not attach between 
commonly represented clients, those clients should be advised that the privilege will not protect 
communications made on the subject of the joint representation. Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [26]. With 
respect to confidentiality, common representation will be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not 
to disclose to the other jointly represented client(s) information relevant to the common 
representation. Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [27]. Given the duty of loyalty to each client, each “has the right 
to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect the client’s interests and the 
right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client’s benefit.” Id. As a result, the 
lawyer should, in obtaining each client’s informed consent, advise each client that the information 
will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client insists that information material 
to the representation must be kept from another common client. Finally, any limitations on the scope 
of the representation must be fully explained, preferably in writing, to all clients at the outset of the 
representation, in accordance with Rule 1.2(c). Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [28]. 
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Conflicts among current clients - Multiple plaintiffs suing defendant of limited means: One common 
problem area for an attorney representing more than one party in a civil action involves joint 
representation of claimants where the defendant has limited funds and apportionment of damages is 
likely to be disputed. Under these circumstances, divided loyalty seems inevitable, and joint 
representation is therefore improper. See, e.g., Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Wallace, 42 Ohio St.3d 3, 535 
N.E.2d 655 (1989) (lawyer sanctioned for representing multiple parties in automobile accident, 
without full disclosure and consent, where clients had potentially conflicting interests due to limited 
funds available to be apportioned among them). For a discussion of the conflicts that may arise with 
aggregate settlements, see section 1.8:800. Nevertheless, the practice may be permitted where the 
parties can agree on an apportionment process and have consented to the representation after full 
disclosure of the possible conflict. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 92-10 (n.d.). If that agreement breaks 
down during the course of the litigation, withdrawal, at least as to the dissenting client(s), is required. 
Id. In the factual situation presented in Toledo Opinion 92-10, a lawyer represented the driver and 
five passengers injured in an automobile accident. A conflict arose when one of the clients 
subsequently had a falling out with the nonclient who it had been agreed would determine the manner 
of distribution; as a result, the dissenting client was no longer willing to have the nonclient make that 
determination. The bar association concluded that the lawyer could withdraw from the representation 
of the dissenting client and retain the rest, unless client-confidence problems arose that would provide 
an advantage against the former client in division of any recovery. 
Conflict among current clients - Multiple plaintiffs with claims against each other: Where the attorney 
represents both the driver and passengers involved in an automobile accident, another common 
problem -- separate and apart from limited funds and disputed apportionment of damages -- arises. 
Particularly where the driver and passengers are related, the desire for common representation is 
strong, and the locus of blame usually is directed at the driver of the other vehicle in the accident. The 
passenger, however, often has a separate right of recovery to pursue against the driver of the vehicle 
in which the passenger was riding. This creates a conflict that often makes such joint representation 
improper.  Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Gabriel, 57 Ohio St.3d 18, 565 N.E.2d 570 (1991) (lawyer 
disciplined for conflict arising from representation of both driver and passenger in automobile 
accident). 
As stated in Comment [6], the nature of a conflict can change during the representation, as in joint 
representation of the driver and her passenger against another driver. If investigation shows that the 
passenger may have a claim against the driver, then their interests are directly adverse in the same 
action; the joint representation cannot be continued. Rule 1.7 cmt. [6]. 
The Ohio State Bar Association addressed this problem under the Code in Informal Opinion 88-6. 
There, an insurance company hired a lawyer to defend its insureds, a husband and wife, against a 
claim arising out of a traffic accident. During the representation the lawyer informed the wife, the 
passenger, that she might have a cross-claim against her husband. Under those circumstances, the 
lawyer could not represent the husband in defending against the wife’s claim, even if it would be paid 
within the policy limits, due to conflict of interest. Even if the lawyer ceased to represent the wife, 
representation still would be improper because, as a former client, she still would deserve protection. 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 88-6 (Oct. 27, 1988). See also Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Fox, 74 
Ohio St.3d 585, 660 N.E.2d 1140 (1996) (lawyer who represented driver and passenger in personal 
injury action arising out of traffic accident was sanctioned for attempting to withdraw from 
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representation of driver to file cross-claim against driver on behalf of passenger); Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n Informal Op. 77-13 (Sept. 2, 1997) (recognizing conflict of interest in lawyer representing 
minor driver in juvenile court for traffic offense and representing vehicle passengers in subsequent 
suit against minor for personal injuries). 
A comparable situation was presented in Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Reid, 102 Ohio St.3d 402, 
2004 Ohio 3121, 811 N.E.2d 542. In Reid, respondent’s firm assigned him to pursue personal injury 
claims on behalf of two motorcyclists against the driver of a car that turned in front of their cycles. 
Subsequently, cyclist number two told respondent that he thought he had been struck by cyclist 
number one as well as by the car. Despite the obvious conflict, respondent continued to represent both 
cyclists, thereby violating OH DR 5-105(B). Because there were mitigating factors and no clear and 
convincing evidence that the conduct harmed the clients, a public reprimand was found appropriate. 
Conflicts among current clients - Divorce, dissolution, and related matters: Representing multiple 
parties in marital matters creates many conflict-of-interest possibilities. Most often the problem arises 
in the joint representation of a husband and wife in a divorce or dissolution proceeding. As a general 
rule, a lawyer may not represent both parties in a divorce or dissolution action because of the inherent 
conflict of interest of the parties. This is true even if the parties attest to common interests in 
resolution of the matter. This position was adopted in Ohio State Bar Ass’n Formal Op. 30 (May 
1975). The opinion addressed whether one attorney could represent both the husband and wife in a 
dissolution of marriage proceeding. Unlike a divorce, a dissolution is less adversarial and requires 
mutual assent to the final separation agreement. Further, former OH EC 5-15 and 5-17 allowed joint 
representation where the client’s interests vary “only slightly,” and OH DR 5-105(C) allowed it 
where it was obvious that the lawyer could adequately represent both and the lawyer obtains consent 
of the parties after full disclosure to them. The bar association concluded, however, that this is never 
the case in the termination of a marriage. Important societal interests are at stake and emotions often 
run high, even if below the surface. In a shared-counsel situation, the lawyer would not be able to 
explore these issues sufficiently to assure adequate representation. Hence, joint representation was 
improper: 
 The marriage relationship creates duties, rights and responsibilities. It can be 
and more often than not is an enriching and ennobling status. It also can and frequently 
does spawn displays of emotion, frustrations, personality traits, and interpersonal and 
intrapersonal psychological and psychiatric experiences which may plunge a spouse to 
depths of despair and, ofttimes, degradation. Fear and intimidation are then its 
hand-maidens. 
 Where a lawyer is asked to undertake the representation of both spouses in a 
dissolution of their marriage, the existence of fear and intimidation most often would 
be masked and not readily ascertainable. Revelation of the real problems and reasons 
prompting the action would not likely be made to the lawyer nor would a spouse 
readily repose in him confidences or secrets. Therefore, the professional obligation of 
the lawyer to obtain full knowledge of his client’s cause could not be adequately 
performed. In effect, the lawyer representing both spouses would be materially 
shackled in any effort to obtain the information essential to a truly professional 
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performance. Present the factors of custody, child support, visitation rights, alimony, 
and property division, or any one of them, and the differing interests are apparent. 
 It is recognized that EC 5-15, 16, would permit a lawyer to make a judgment as 
to whether differing interests “vary only slightly,” and that DR 5-105(C) would permit 
a lawyer to represent multiple clients if it is “obvious that he can adequately represent 
the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the 
possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent professional 
judgment on behalf of each.” But there is the rub. In a marriage dissolution situation 
pragmatics make it impossible for him to make a proper judgment as to the degree of 
variances in differing interests. 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n Formal Op. 30, at 5-6 (May 1975). This would appear to be true as well 
under the Ohio Rules and relevant case law. See Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Grelle, 14 Ohio St.2d 208, 
237 N.E.2d 298 (1968), and Rule 1.7 cmt. [36] (treating representation of both husband and wife in 
preparing separation agreement as nonconsentable conflict prohibited by law under Rule 1.7(c)(1); 
citing Grelle). (Inasmuch as the question put in Opinion 30 was “may an attorney represent both 
spouses in drafting a separation agreement,” it seems strange that the opinion did not even cite Grelle, 
even though Grelle was decided before the Code went into effect in Ohio.) 
Nevertheless, the bar association advised in the same opinion that a lawyer for one side could draft the 
separation agreement that the other spouse ultimately signs, as long as (1) the lawyer makes sure that 
the other spouse knows the lawyer does not represent him or her, (2) the other spouse has full 
opportunity to assess the need for personal counsel, and (3) each spouse agrees in writing to the 
arrangement. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Formal Op. 30. Further, a lawyer who served as a mediator in 
the divorce context could subsequently represent the parties in the presentation of the mediated 
agreement to the court, if certain conditions were met. See Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 82-2 
(Aug. 3, 1982). 
Where minor children are involved, a divorce or dissolution may affect the children’s interests in 
terms of the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities. Attempting to represent both a parent 
and a child in this setting may constitute a conflict of interest. Cf. Scholler v. Scholler, 10 Ohio St.3d 
98, 462 N.E.2d 158 (1984) (attorney who represented spouse in negotiation of separation agreement 
did not automatically represent interests of minor child as well; it cannot be said that interests of the 
client spouse to achieve a fair division of marital assets are concurrent with interests of child to 
receive support). 
Conflict of interest in the joint representation of parties in a divorce or dissolution also has been cited 
as part of the totality of the circumstances relied upon to find fraud on the court sufficient to reopen 
portions of the resulting property settlement under OH Civ R 60(B)(5).  Coulson v. Coulson, 5 Ohio 
St.3d 12, 448 N.E.2d 809 (1983); Longstreet v. Longstreet, 57 Ohio App.3d 55, 566 N.E.2d 708 
(Cuyahoga 1989); Payne v. Payne, No. CA-3594, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2175 (Licking May 3, 
1991) (interpreting Longstreet). 
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As in any area, past-client conflicts in the divorce context may also arise to make present 
representation improper.  Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Psenicka, 62 Ohio St.3d 35, 577 N.E.2d 
1074 (1991) (conflict arising from representing husband in divorce after having been discharged as 
counsel for wife previously in the divorce action). See Ohio Rule 1.9(a) and section 1.9:200. By 
engaging in such successive representation of the parties in a divorce action, the lawyer risks 
malpractice exposure as well.  David v. Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Rock Co., L.P.A., 79 
Ohio App.3d 786, 607 N.E.2d 1173 (Cuyahoga 1992). See section 1.1:300. 
Representation in a divorce action, once completed, also creates a former-client relationship that will 
limit subsequent representations. To the extent the termination of the marriage creates ongoing 
obligations flowing from one spouse to the other, such as spousal support, enforcement problems may 
later arise. Switching sides, by representing one spouse against the other spouse who is a former client, 
is, absent informed written consent, a prohibited former-client conflict. Ohio Rule 1.9(a). See, e.g., 
under the former OHCPR, Morford v. Morford, 85 Ohio App.3d 50, 619 N.E.2d 71 (Lawrence 
1993) (conflict resulted from representing husband in divorce and wife in action to enforce 
child-support order). 
Representation in class actions: Comment [12] speaks to class-action conflicts. Pursuant thereto, 
unnamed members of the class are not considered to be clients for purposes of applying division 
(a)(1): 
Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of an unnamed class 
member before representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, 
a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a class action does not typically need the 
consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an 
unrelated matter. 
Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [12]. 
Part-time government attorney’s representation of private civil clients: While most opinions 
concerning conflicts of interest and part-time government attorneys address the representation of 
criminal defendants by a part-time government lawyer (see section 1.7:320), similar concerns may 
arise in the civil context as well. Sometimes the conflict is fairly direct. For example, a lawyer who 
serves as a hearing officer at parole-revocation or parole-release hearings cannot represent victims of 
crime in actions against the state under the Crime Victims Reparation Act, ORC 2743.51-.72. To do 
so would be to represent an interest adverse to the lawyer’s employer in violation of former OH DR 
5-101(A). Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 95-2 (Feb. 21, 1995). However, conflicts that are far 
less direct also are sufficient to render representation improper. A legal advisor to a city and its 
departments, for example, could not represent a party opposing a rezoning application pending before 
the city planning commission and city council. Even though the interests were only potentially 
different, the chance that they could become more oppositional was sufficient to require that the 
representation be declined. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 81-11 (Nov. 17, 1981). Similarly, 
because of the potential conflict of interest involved, a lawyer/county commissioner should not 
represent a private client before a regional-planning agency in a matter that ultimately must be 
approved by the county commissioners. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 81-4 (Apr. 8, 1981). 
And a lawyer/city council member should not accept private employment on matters adverse to the 
municipality, or to its officials or employees. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
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96-6, 1996 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Aug. 9, 1996). 
Other: An unusual case presenting issues regarding representation of those having conflicting 
interests in civil litigation is Perin v. Spurney, 2005 Ohio 6811, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 6112 
(Franklin). The circumstances in Perin were that plaintiff’s lawyers in a wrongful termination case 
against Honda somehow thought it appropriate to represent plaintiff’s husband at a deposition of the 
husband by Honda (as well as generally consulting with the husband about the plaintiff’s claim; the 
husband even reviewed the complaint). All of this would be much ado about very little, except for the 
fact that husband was an in-house counsel for Honda, was on its ethics committee, and as a committee 
member had confidential information about the matter that allegedly resulted in plaintiff/wife’s 
termination. On such facts, it is hard to decide whose judgment was poorer – that of plaintiff’s 
attorney, for consulting with husband and representing him in deposition, or Honda lawyer/husband, 
who by his conduct was rather obviously breaching his duty of loyalty to Honda and who had 
confidential information that was at risk in his interaction with his wife and her lawyers. Even though 
the situation is difficult to pigeonhole in terms of just where it would fit under Rule 1.7, it seems 
indisputable that Honda had good reason to ask that plaintiff’s lawyers be disqualified. Perhaps this is 
an instance in which use of the much-maligned appearance-of-impropriety rule (which the court of 
appeals relied on in affirming the disqualification) was justified. 
 
1.7:315  Insured-Insurer Conflicts [see 1.7:410] 
 
1.7:320  Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Litigation 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.92, 5.119-5.121, 5.123 (1996). 
An area where conflict of interest is likely to arise is the representation of co-defendants in a criminal 
matter. Differing alibis for each client, the potential to shift the blame from one defendant to the other, 
the likelihood that the clients’ interests will be split by different plea bargains offered by the 
government, and other developments, make the lawyer’s task a difficult one. So “grave” is the 
potential for conflict of interest in this area that Comment [15] advises that “ordinarily a lawyer 
should decline to represent more than one co-defendant” in a criminal case. Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [15] 
(going on to note that common representation of parties with similar interests in civil litigation is 
proper if requisites of division (b) are met).  
A disciplinary case under the Code that explores one aspect of this problem is Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Rafidi, 114 Ohio St.3d 336, 2007 Ohio 3674, 872 N.E.2d 265, where the respondent had been 
retained by the Glenns in a bankruptcy matter.  A cousin staying with the Glenns was arrested on a 
drug change, based on a search of their house.  The DEA agents thereafter interviewed Mr. Glenn, 
who was left with the impression that he too was a suspect.  Believing that he should consult counsel 
and knowing of no attorney other than respondent, the Glenns engaged respondent for a modest fee on 
the potential criminal matter.  In his discussion with the Glenns, respondent learned about the 
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cousin’s predicament and asked whether the cousin had a lawyer.  After a telephone call to the 
cousin’s wife, respondent visited the cousin in jail and offered to defend him.  The cousin retained 
respondent for a fee of $20,000.  Respondent did not advise the cousin that he was already 
representing Mr. Glenn in the same matter.  On these facts, respondent was charged with and found to 
have violated, among other disciplinary rules, DR 5-105(A), requiring a lawyer to disclose potential 
conflicts before accepting employment likely to compromise the lawyer’s independent judgment.  As 
stated by the Court: 
Glenn’s and North’s (the cousin) status as suspects in the same DEA investigation was 
likely to adversely affect respondent’s professional judgment, since it posed an 
obvious conflict of interest because one suspect might implicate the other.  
Respondent had an obligation under DR 5-105(A) to fully disclose to Glenn and to 
North his dual representation and to obtain the consent of both clients before accepting 
employment. 
Id. at para. 20. The Court rejected the stayed six-month suspension recommended by the panel and 
the Board and imposed a six-month suspension without stay. 
While such conflicts raise obvious ethical concerns, and can be the source of disciplinary action as in 
Rafidi, the problem is more often addressed in terms of whether the conflict undercuts a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment protection against 
ineffective assistance includes a right to counsel untainted by conflict of interest. This right was first 
recognized in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). Accord  In re Burson, 152 Ohio St. 375, 
89 N.E.2d 651 (1949) (following Glasser). In resolving this question, Ohio courts sometimes turned 
to the OHCPR to help assess the situation. See, e.g., State v. Keenan, No. 57565, 1990 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5791 (Cuyahoga Dec. 27, 1990). 
In reviewing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims based on conflict of interest in multiple 
criminal-defense representation, an appellate court first must determine whether the trial court had a 
duty to investigate the potential conflict of interest. Trial courts in Ohio often investigate multiple 
representations regardless of whether there is a duty to do so. Even where not constitutionally 
required, the Ohio Supreme Court has recommended that trial courts explore joint representation 
issues concerning criminal co-defendants so represented.  State v. Manross, 40 Ohio St.3d 180, 532 
N.E.2d 735 (1988). An affirmative duty to investigate arises, however, when the trial court knows or 
reasonably should know of a lawyer’s potential conflict of interest in representing multiple criminal 
defendants. Manross (following Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)). For example, if any party 
raises an objection to joint representation, that gives the trial court sufficient notice to trigger its duty 
to inquire into the potential of a conflict of interest. In fact, defense counsel may have an ethical duty 
to advise the court when a conflict of interest arises during trial.  Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 
(1980) (finding such duty in part in DR 5-105 and in EC 5-15). A party’s objection is not required, 
however; if the possibility of a conflict is sufficiently apparent, the court’s duty attaches.  State v. 
Gillard, 64 Ohio St.3d 304, 595 N.E.2d 878 (1992). 
If the trial court has an affirmative duty to investigate but fails to do so, a 1978 U.S. Supreme Court 
opinion suggests that reversal is required, regardless of whether an actual conflict existed.  Holloway 
v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). Accord Harris v. Carter, 337 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2003). While 
citing this standard with approval, the Ohio Supreme Court, relying on a different U.S. Supreme 
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Court opinion ( Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981)), held that in these circumstances the case 
must be remanded to the trial court for an examination of whether an actual conflict of interest existed, 
and if so, the conviction must be overturned.  Gillard, 64 Ohio St.3d 304, 595 N.E.2d 878. If an 
actual conflict is present, prejudice will be presumed. 
In undertaking an investigation of the possible conflict of interest, the trial court must allow counsel 
to withdraw if the defendant objects to continued joint representation and shows that potential 
conflicts may affect his or her right to a fair trial. In Holloway, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the 
judge must “ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel.” Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 484. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980), the Court rephrased the 
issue, stating that the defendant “must have the opportunity to show that potential conflicts 
impermissibly imperil his right to a fair trial.” Even if the defendant is willing to waive the conflict, 
the trial court, in its discretion and in the interest of justice, still may disqualify defense counsel if it 
finds that a “serious potential for conflict” is present.  Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 
(1988). See, e.g., State v. Dillman, 70 Ohio App.3d 616, 591 N.E.2d 849 (Huron 1990) (citing 
Wheat). 
If the trial court did not inquire about a potential conflict of interest, and had no duty to do so, an 
appellate court responding to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict must 
determine whether an actual conflict of interest existed and whether it adversely affected the lawyer’s 
representation of his client.  State v. Manross, 40 Ohio St.3d 180, 532 N.E.2d 735 (1988) 
(following Cuyler v. Sullivan). See also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (applying this 
standard). If it did, the conviction cannot stand. The mere possibility that a conflict of interest existed, 
however, is insufficient to require that the conviction be overturned. Manross. 
Not every conflict of interest in criminal-defense representation involves multiple representation of 
co-defendants. In the disciplinary case of Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lukey, 110 Ohio St.3d 128, 2006 
3822, 851 N.E.2d 493, for example, respondent violated former OH DR 5-105(B) when he, while 
representing the grandparents with respect to an anticipated custody/dependency proceeding 
involving their thirteen-year old grandson, represented the grandson in connection with juvenile court 
proceedings against the grandson.  (He represented himself as counsel to the prosecutor and 
proceeded to negotiate a guilty plea to a second-degree felony (aggravated arson) on behalf of his 
client.) Since the grandparents didn’t want their grandson to return to their home, pleading guilty to 
such a serious charge certainly worked to their advantage, although hardly to respondent’s other 
“client.” In addition, although the Court does not comment directly on its credibility, respondent’s 
testimony seems dubious at best. Thus, “[r]espondent explained to the magistrate that he did not 
consider his advice to the grandson to be representation because the boy had already admitted guilt [in 
fact, a public defender had entered denials to the charges on the grandson’s behalf and respondent had 
not previously spoken to the boy before entering the guilty plea]. At the panel hearing, respondent 
asserted that he had taken on the grandson’s case to help his clients, without realizing the conflicting 
interests.” Id. at para. 11.  With all due respect, that excuse is a hard one to swallow, particularly 
coming from a practitioner of 40 years’ experience. As the Court stated in determining a sanction, 
[r]espondent completely disregarded the grandson’s right to competent independent 
counsel and impeded the magistrates’ efforts to safeguard that right. That a lawyer 
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would pose as counsel for an adverse party in any case is egregious, but such practice 
is unthinkable when a child’s interests are at stake. 
Id. at para. 22. Despite the lofty words and the fact that his misconduct violated four other 
disciplinary rules as well, respondent received only a two-year suspension with eighteen months 
stayed. 
And in State v. Pryor, Nos. 9-88-21, 9-88-22, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 2141 (Marion May 30, 
1990), the appellant alleged that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance because he 
simultaneously represented, in a divorce case, the father of one of the appellant’s alleged victims. 
Though the court admitted that certain elements of conflict of interest were inherent in the dual 
representation, it held that any conflict must be accompanied by some prejudicial impact on the 
conduct of the defense by counsel, and no such negative influence was present in the case. See also 
State v. New, No. 93- L-160, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5905 (Lake Dec. 23, 1994), a former 
client/witness case, discussed at section 1.9:210. 
State v. Lentz, 70 Ohio St.3d 527, 639 N.E.2d 784 (1994), recognized that a lawyer’s inherent 
personal conflict -- being in the position of having to argue on appeal the lawyer’s own incompetence 
in support of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel -- would be imputed to the lawyer’s firm. See 
section 1.10:200. 
With respect to conflict of interest, the most recent U.S. Supreme Court entry into the 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel lists is Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002). In a 5-4 decision 
that perhaps puts a somewhat different gloss on the Court’s prior ineffective-assistance/conflict cases, 
Justice Scalia held for the Court that where the trial judge failed to inquire into a potential conflict of 
interest about which it knew or reasonably should have known, the conflict arising from the defense 
attorney’s having formerly represented the victim (who was murdered by the lawyer’s client) did not 
provide grounds for habeas relief, in the absence of a showing by the defendant that the conflict 
adversely affected the lawyer’s performance. In Mickens, the Court reaffirmed that a defendant 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must, as a general rule, demonstrate that, but for counsel’s 
errors, the result would have been different.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The 
Court found that none of the exceptions to this general rule (such as Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 
425 (1978) (automatic reversal where counsel forced to represent concurrent multiple defendants 
having conflicting interests)) was applicable in the case at bar. The Court also rejected petitioner’s 
argument that the remand instruction in Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981), directing the trial 
court to grant a new hearing if it determined that “an actual conflict of interest existed,” established 
that a petitioner need show only that the lawyer was subject to a conflict of interest to obtain relief. 
According to Justice Scalia, the remand language in Wood was merely “shorthand” for the statement 
in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), that “‘a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest 
actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain 
relief.’“ 535 U.S. at 171 (emphasis by the Mickens Court). 
An interesting disciplinary case raising criminal multiple-representation (but not 
ineffective-assistance) issues is Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ross, 107 Ohio St.3d 354, 2006 Ohio 5, 
839 N.E.2d 918. Respondent Ross represented defendant Brown in a federal drug-trafficking case. 
Ross also represented defendant Hollins in an unrelated state-court drug charge. The U.S. attorney in 
the Brown case, however, had evidence that Hollins was Brown’s supplier. Both Brown and Hollins 
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denied this when confronted by respondent, and respondent continued to represent both -- in Brown’s 
case in the hope of obtaining a reduced sentence for his client in return for cooperation with the 
government. Respondent ultimately withdrew after it became clear that there would be no deal with 
the government unless Brown named Hollins as his supplier. On these facts, the Board found that 
there was not the necessary clear and convincing evidence that respondent had represented clients 
with conflicting interests in violation of DR 5-105, since Ross had “no specific proof that they were 
involved in criminal activity together.” Id. at para. 11. 
The Ohio Supreme Court held otherwise: 
 Respondent advised Brown to cooperate with authorities and name his supplier 
to obtain a reduction in sentence. Hollins, however, was the supplier that the 
government wanted Brown to incriminate, and the government refused to negotiate 
unless Brown proffered that information. Clearly, respondent could not recommend 
that Brown inform on Hollins without compromising one client’s interests at the 
expense of the other. 
 
Id. at para. 22. The Court was persuaded by relator’s argument 
that respondent’s judgment was thereby “ineluctably clouded by the fact that the right 
strategy for one client would necessarily have harmed his other client.” Thus, . . . 
relator claims that the situation presented such a great potential for conflict that it 
could not be obvious that respondent could represent both clients. Stated differently, 
even if respondent did disclose the risks of dual representation and did obtain his 
clients’ consent, . . . the DR 5-105(C) exception still did not permit respondent to 
defend both of these clients. 
 We agree. Respondent disregarded all cautionary guidance in continuing to 
represent Brown and Hollins. 
Id. at paras. 23-24. In agreeing with this analysis, the Court also found support (even though Brown 
and Hollins were not, technically, “codefendants”) in the language of ABA Model Rule 1.7 cmt. [23] 
(potential for conflict in representing multiple criminal defendants “so grave that ordinarily a lawyer 
should decline to represent more than one codefendant.”) Id. at para. 24. The identical language is 
now found in Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [15]. Finally, the Court quoted with approval from a New York 
Court of Appeals opinion the rule that “the availability of ‘a plea by one defendant in exchange for 
testimony against the other in the same matter is virtually certain to place lawyers involved in 
representing both in an untenable position.’“ Id. at para. 26. In sum, Ross was found to have violated 
DR 5-105(B) because he could not establish that he was “obviously” able adequately to continue to 
represent the adverse interests of both Brown and Hollins, as was required under the exception 
provided for multiple representation in DR 5-105(C). 
Government lawyers employed in an agency that represents multiple clients: One source of difficulty 
arises where the government attorney’s job is to represent private parties at the government’s 
expense--those employed in a public defender’s office, for example. In a position like this, the lawyer 
has numerous clients, and multiple-client conflicts can arise just as they do in the private setting. Such 
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conflicts often arise in the context of representation of multiple defendants by the same public 
defender’s office. See also section 1.10:200. For example, if a domestic-violence situation leads to 
the arrest of both husband and wife for their actions, the same public defender cannot represent both 
parties at any stage of the ensuing criminal action. There is an inherent conflict of interest that cannot 
be waived. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 95-96-01 (n.d.) (The same opinion also advised that two 
separate attorneys from public defender’s office may separately represent each client, provided that 
each acts independently and maintains confidentiality, secrecy, and the attorney-client privilege, but 
we doubt that this is still good law. The Board opined to the contrary on comparable facts in Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-4, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Aug. 15, 
2008); see section 1.10:200, at “Imputed disqualification in non-law firm settings.”) In contrast, a 
prosecutor represents only the state; the victim of a crime is not the prosecutor’s client. Given this, 
there is no inherent conflict of interest in different attorneys within the same prosecutor’s office 
simultaneously handling prosecutions of multiple family members charged with committing 
domestic violence against each other out of the same altercation. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 95-11, 1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Oct. 6, 1995). 
In Opinion 2008-4, the Board of Commissioners addressed multi-client conflicts in a public 
defender’s office under the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Board’s syllabus states that: 
 Pursuant to Rule 1.7(a) and (a)(2), an assistant county defender should not 
represent co-defendants at a preliminary hearing in a felony case due to the inherent 
risk of a conflict of interest that likely could not be ameliorated under Rule 1.7(b). 
2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4, at *1. (In the course of so concluding, the Board stressed the 
importance of each step in a criminal proceeding, including the preliminary hearing. See id. at 
*13-15.) Nor, for the same reasons, should the public defender represent one co-defendant in a felony 
case while simultaneously representing the other co-defendant in an unrelated misdemeanor case. Id. 
at *1. As noted above, the imputation-of-conflict issue aspect of the opinion is discussed in section 
1.10:200.  
Government attorneys representing criminal defendants: Conflicts of interest can also arise when a 
part-time government attorney represents private clients in a criminal matter. See, under the Rules, 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-5, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 
(Aug. 15, 2008) and Bd of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-6, 2008 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 6 (Dec. 5, 2008) (both addressing restrictions on city law director representing 
criminal defendants), further discussed this subpart infra. Comparable opinions under the Code 
include Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 96-6, 1996 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 
4 (Aug. 9, 1996) (discussing restrictions on lawyer/city council member representing criminal 
defendants in municipal court); Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 81-4 (Apr. 8, 1981) (discussing 
restrictions on part-time judges representing criminal defendants). 
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As a general rule, those charged with the authority to prosecute criminal actions are deemed to have 
the citizens of the state of Ohio as a client. Where that is the case, any criminal defense representation 
they undertake would create a direct conflict with that current client and cannot be accepted. E.g., 
Cain v. Calhoun, 61 Ohio App.2d 240, 401 N.E.2d 947 (Gallia 1979) (applying this limitation to 
county prosecutors and city solicitors); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-13, 
1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 19, 1992) (applying this limitation to assistant county 
prosecutors); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-008, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 28 (June 17, 1988) (applying this limitation to county prosecutors, assistant county 
prosecutors, city law directors, and city or municipal prosecutors). Even if the lawyer truly can 
exercise independent judgment on behalf of his clients in the matter -- a fact that would allow a 
lawyer with two private clients to represent both with their consent after full disclosure -- for the 
prosecutor, the disclosure and consent option is unavailable. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 92-13, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 at *4 (June 19, 1992) (in addition to 
unavailability of consent, Board also noted that “[i]t is not obvious [under former OH DR 5-105(C)] 
that a part-time county prosecutor could represent the public and also privately represent criminal 
defendants”). Ethics opinions typically hold that the public cannot give the necessary consent to 
waive a conflict. E.g., Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-13, 1992 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 19, 1992); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-008, 1988 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 28 (June 17, 1988). 
Initially, the Board opined that this prohibition against representation of criminal defendants by city 
or county prosecutors, as reflected in the above cases and Board decisions, is the law under the Rules 
of Professional Conduct as well. See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-5, 
2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (Aug. 15, 2008), which cites Cain v. Calhoun with approval 
and states in syllabus that a city law director or her assistant director cannot represent criminal 
defendants in cases in which the state is a plaintiff.  Given this legal precedent, the Board found that 
any such representation would run afoul of Rule 1.7(c)(1), barring representation where it is 
prohibited by law. Id. at *8.  However, in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-6, 
2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (Dec. 5, 2008), the Board modified Opinion 2008-5 to make 
clear that the prohibition applies only to city law directors (or village solicitors) who have a duty to 
represent the state of Ohio.  If they do not have such a duty, they (and their assistant law directors and 
solicitors) may represent criminal defendants in the following limited circumstances: 
1)  no city police officers from the city are involved; 2) the criminal charges are based 
solely on alleged violations of state law; and 3) the city is not otherwise directly or 
indirectly involved or affected. 
Id. at *1 (syllabus) (reaffirming this aspect of Board Opinion 88-008, which had been disavowed on 
this point in Opinion 2008-5). 
An interesting case under the Code was presented in Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Wick, 116 Ohio St.3d 
193, 2007 Ohio 6042, 877 N.E.2d 660. The respondent in Wick was the Mount Gilead village 
solicitor.  While so serving, he was permitted by the village to represent criminal defendants in courts 
other than the Mt. Gilead mayor’s court.  He agreed to represent such a defendant on two counts 
pending before the Morrow County Municipal Court.  Respondent did not know that the same 
defendant also had one related misdemeanor charge pending in the Mount Gilead mayor’s court.  
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When he found out, he filed a motion in mayor’s court to have that case transferred to municipal court.  
The motion was granted and thereafter respondent negotiated a resolution of the three cases with the 
municipal court prosecutor.  “After this transfer to the municipal court, respondent did not negotiate 
with or confer with the Mount Gilead police officers who had filed the misdemeanor charge against 
Belt in the mayor’s court where respondent served as the prosecutor.” Id. at para. 5.  On these facts, 
respondent acknowledged a violation of DR 5-105(B) and entered into a consent-to-discipline 
agreement recommending a public reprimand.  The panel and Board agreed, as did the Court, which 
stated that respondent “should not have represented a client on a criminal charge in a mayor’s court, 
where respondent served as a prosecutor.”  Id. at para. 9.  There were no aggravating factors and 
numerous mitigating factors.   
The underlying premise in Wick under the Code – that the village prosecutor could represent criminal 
defendants in certain circumstances – seems consistent with the conclusion in Opinion 2008-6 under 
the Rules.  
The Ohio State Bar Association has approved criminal defense representation by city solicitors in 
limited circumstances, but this approval may be limited to instances in which the city solicitor’s 
duties involve only civil matters and the representation takes place in a court where no city official 
serves as judge or magistrate. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 81-4 (Apr. 8, 1981). In addition, 
an attorney who is hired on a case-by-case basis by a prosecutor to handle civil matters for the county 
can accept private criminal representations so long as the client is fully informed and consents. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 81-7 (Aug. 19, 1981). 
The Board recognized another limited exception where a court appoints private counsel to act as 
special prosecutor in a particular case. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 94-6, 1994 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Apr. 15, 1994). This practice may be permitted as long as the lawyer 
does not represent criminal defendants in the court in which he or she serves as special prosecutor and 
as long as such appointments are accepted only infrequently. These limitations also satisfy any 
concerns about the appearance of impropriety under former Canon 9. The appointment by the court is 
recognized as consent by the public to the potential conflict. 
The exception recognized in Opinion 94-6 was broadened in 2003 to permit “an attorney to serve as a 
special prosecutor in the same county (and even in the same court) in which the attorney represents 
criminal defendants, if such appointment is only on an occasional basis and the appointee is 
competent to fill the special prosecutor position.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
2003-7, 2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7, at *2 (Dec. 5, 2003). 
As a related matter, restrictions also have been placed on those only indirectly involved in criminal 
prosecutions. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 81-4 (Apr. 8, 1981) opined that, although a 
county commissioner has no direct involvement in prosecuting criminal cases, the commissioner’s 
undertaking criminal defense representation still would be inappropriate. First, even though a county 
commissioner is not directly involved in the prosecution of criminal matters, the commissioner still 
represents the public by virtue of his public office. Representing a criminal defendant would place the 
commissioner in conflict with his other client, the public. It is not clear whether the 
lawyer-commissioner should be considered as having a lawyer-client relationship by virtue of his 
position as county commissioner, but the OSBA opinion presented the matter in those terms. Second, 
because the commissioner has fiscal responsibility for the operation of the prosecutor’s office, 
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sheriff’s department, and others that might be involved, it may give rise to conflicting interests if the 
lawyer accepted a criminal defense client in opposition to these entities. The opinion addresses this 
second concern, however, more as a problem of the appearance of impropriety under former Canon 9.  
(A comparable argument was rejected by the Sixth Circuit in Fautenberry v. Mitchell, 515 F.3d 614 
(6th Cir. 2008) (fact that defense counsel in murder prosecution was also trustee of township where 
one of bodies was found was not actual conflict rendering counsel’s assistance ineffective).) 
 
1.7:330  Multiple Representation in Nonlitigated Matters 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.89-5.90 (1996). 
Conflicts among current clients - Representing multiple clients involved in a business relationship: It 
is not unusual for a lawyer to represent multiple clients in a mutual business transaction. Often, when 
a lawyer identifies a need of one client, the lawyer knows of another client who could address that 
need, and the lawyer brings the clients together for their mutual benefit. Before undertaking the 
representation, however, the lawyer should explain fully to each client the implications of common 
representation and obtain their consent. See Ohio Rule 1.7 cmts. [13] & [16]. As noted in Comment 
[16], in addition to informed consent, the lawyer in such circumstances must consider whether he or 
she can competently and diligently represent each client in the matter and whether the disclosures 
necessary to secure the clients’ informed consent can be made. The comment also sets forth factors 
relevant in determining if there is a material limitation conflict; they include 
the nature of the client’s respective interests in the matter, the relative duration and 
intimacy of the lawyer’s relationship with each client involved, the functions being 
performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely 
prejudice to each client from the conflict. 
Rule 1.7 cmt. [16]. 
Conflicts among current clients - Direct adversity: Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [13] recognizes that direct 
adversity can occur in transactional and counseling practice as well as litigation: “For example, a 
buyer and a seller or a borrower and a lender are directly adverse with respect to negotiations of the 
terms of the sale or loan.” At times the interests of such clients will diverge as each seeks to maximize 
its interests at the expense of the other. A vivid illustration of such adversity under the former 
OHCPR, where a lawyer sought “for financial reasons” to maximize the interests of a corporate 
client at the expense of another, mentally-impaired client, is Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. 
Newman, 102 Ohio St.3d 186, 2004 Ohio 2068, 808 N.E.2d 375. In Newman, respondent 
represented both a shopping center and a disabled client in leasing space in the center to the disabled 
client for a laundromat, in a transaction that ultimately forced the disabled client into bankruptcy. 
Respondent even prepared to sue, on behalf of the shopping center, the disabled lessee. The extent of 
respondent’s violation of OH DR 5-105(A) and (C) is captured in the following excerpt from the 
Court’s opinion: 
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 Respondent also prepared the papers needed to incorporate the laundromat, 
and he arranged for them to be signed on or about the same day the parties executed 
the lease, security agreement, and sublease. Plus, in setting up the corporate structure 
for the laundromat, respondent agreed to be the company’s statutory agent for the 
purpose of accepting service of any complaint, an arrangement that graphically 
demonstrated the competing interests at stake. At the hearing, respondent conceded 
the possibility that had his disabled client not signed the lease and related documents 
in his personal capacity, respondent might have had to serve himself -- as the statutory 
agent for the disabled client’s corporation -- with the complaint he prepared for the 
shopping center’s suit. 
Id. at para. 16. 
Such conflict problems can of course arise in marital-property matters.  For example, in representing 
both prospective husband and wife in preparation of an antenuptial agreement, such conflicts may 
render the instrument unenforceable.  Rowland v. Rowland, 74 Ohio App.3d 415, 599 N.E.2d 315 
(Ross 1991) (presence of conflict of interest in joint representation undercuts finding good faith and 
fairness necessary to create an enforceable antenuptial agreement).  And in Akron Bar Ass’n v. 
Holder, 112 Ohio St.3d 90, 2006 Ohio 6506, 858 N.E.2d 356, respondent was disbarred under the 
Code for, among other violations, “representing a married couple considering divorce despite their 
divergent interests and without the informed consent of both spouses,” id. at para. 12, in violation of 
DR 5-105(A) & (B). The respondent in Disciplinary Counsel v. Taylor, 120 Ohio St.3d 366, 2008 
Ohio 6202, 899 N.E.2d 955, likewise was found to have violated DR 5-105(A) and (B) when, in 
representing a husband and wife, both of whom were infirm, he drew up papers to defeat the wife’s 
ownership of marital property for the benefit of the husband’s daughter and had the wife sign a deed 
giving away all of her interest in the couple’s home, “[w]hile purporting to act in a fiduciary capacity 
representing the potentially diverse interests of Juan and Piccola . . . . Respondent could not have had 
Piccola’s knowing consent, which would have required a translator and, in all likelihood, the 
appointment of a guardian.” Id. at para. 10. 
Even where there is no direct adversity at the outset of a multiple-client transaction, the potential for 
adversity is always present. This is illustrated by the case of Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Mills, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 245, 2006 Ohio 2290, 846 N.E.2d 1253, where one couple approached another couple about 
investing in the operation of their horse-boarding/training facility. The couples jointly asked 
respondent to prepare the necessary papers, and respondent ended up representing both couples, as 
well as the resulting owning limited-liability company and operating corporation. Disputes arose and 
a buyout by one of the couples of the other was effected, again with respondent representing all 
parties. Problems continued after the buyout, however. In civil litigation between the couples, 
respondent represented one of the couples until withdrawing after the other side, with new counsel, 
moved to disqualify her. Respondent was found to have violated former DR 5-105(B) (multiple client 
representation resulting in exercise of professional judgment on any client’s behalf likely to be 
adversely affected by representation of another client). 
In Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ewing, 63 Ohio St.3d 377, 588 N.E.2d 783 (1992) (six-month 
suspension; execution of discipline suspended on condition respondent be violation-free for three 
years), an attorney represented a farm family in bankruptcy. The attorney arranged for another of his 
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clients to refinance the loan on the farmers’ trailer and to pay off the FHA security interest in certain 
farm equipment. In carrying out these transactions, the lawyer neglected to take various steps a 
lawyer typically would take to protect the farmers’ interest. Finding that these omissions may have 
resulted from the conflict of interest between these clients, the Court concluded that the lawyer had 
violated OH DR 5-105(B). (Ewing is cited in Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [13].) 
Similarly, in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Herrold, 61 Ohio St.3d 542, 575 N.E.2d 796 (1991) 
(indefinite suspension imposed), a lawyer arranged both a loan and a property transfer between 
unsophisticated bankruptcy clients and an investment company that he represented and in which he 
held a controlling stock interest. He then failed to fully inform the bankruptcy clients of their rights 
before their property was transferred to the investment company, which omission benefited the 
investment company and harmed the bankruptcy clients. This conduct was found to violate OH DR 
5-105(A) and (B), and the lawyer’s ownership interest in the investment company raised separate OH 
DR 5-104(A) concerns. A comparable pattern of misconduct occurred in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Greenberg, 112 Ohio St.3d 138, 2006 Ohio 6519, 858 N.E.2d 400, where the respondent, on retired 
status, engaged in a number of transactions in which he was representing his company in various 
transactions with the other side, the unsophisticated principals of which reasonably thought 
respondent was representing them as well. While found to have violated former OH DR 
1-102(A)(3)-(6) and even though the obvious conflict of interest was mentioned more than once in the 
opinion, respondent was not charged with or found to have violated Code conflict-of-interest 
provisions. See also Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ewing, 75 Ohio St.3d 244, 661 N.E.2d 1109 (1996) 
(lawyer’s arranging with another client to buy property of financially strapped clients, without 
disclosing the lawyer’s and the other client’s interest until the Friday before the scheduled Monday 
closing, and related “coercive tactics,” violated OH DR 5-101(A), 5-105(A), and 5-105(B), among 
other provisions). 
For a lawyer serving as counsel to and executor of an estate, investing trust assets in another client’s 
business venture can cause conflicts where an independent attorney would not make similar 
investments. In Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Shillman, 61 Ohio St.2d 364, 402 N.E.2d 514 
(1980) (indefinite suspension imposed), a lawyer-executor channeled over two-thirds of the assets of 
an estate and a trust into another client’s business venture, which was of unproven viability and 
profitability, without arranging adequate security. Since the facts showed that the lawyer favored the 
interests of the business client over those of the estate for which he was a fiduciary, the representation 
of the estate was tainted by an impermissible conflict of interest. The Court found that the lawyer had 
been offered and accepted extraordinary privileges from the business client in apparent exchange for 
favoring that client over the interests of the estate. 
As a general matter, it is ethically improper for a lawyer to represent both a bankruptcy debtor and a 
creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding. This conflict was said to be absolute and not curable by consent 
in Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 81-006 (May 20, 1981). Such simultaneous representation 
seems particularly suspect when, in addition to representing a debtor in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy 
creditor that the lawyer is representing in the same proceeding is himself, as was the case in Akron 
Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 105 Ohio St.3d 443, 2005 Ohio 2695, 828 N.E.2d 621 (violation of DR 
5-105(A) & (B)).  
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That is not to suggest, however, that a lawyer may never represent both a debtor and creditor in a 
common transaction. Where authorized by law, for example, a debtor may sign a cognovit note (a 
written instrument authorizing an attorney to confess judgment against the debtor without notice or 
hearing if the debtor defaults on his obligations). In essence, the debtor agrees in advance that an 
uncontested judgment may be entered against him if he defaults. At times, the creditor’s attorney may 
later be the one to confess judgment under the cognovit. In doing so, the attorney may be viewed as 
representing the creditor, who seeks the judgment, and also the debtor, in whose name the confession 
is being entered. This raises a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the practice is permissible as long as 
the parties have consented after full disclosure. To assure this requirement is met, the warrant of 
attorney under which the confession takes place must contain either an express waiver of the conflict 
or specifically provide that the creditor’s attorney may confess judgment. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-3, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Apr. 16, 1993). 
But an impermissible conflict of interest exists where a lawyer represented both buyers and sellers in 
a complicated sale of a business and then subsequently represented the seller in an action against the 
buyers for failure to make scheduled payments due under the terms of the sale.  Stark County Bar 
Ass’n v. Ergazos, 2 Ohio St.3d 59, 442 N.E.2d 1286 (1982). (Ergazos is cited in Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. 
[13].) 
Ergazos was also cited in an ethics opinion concluding, under the OHCPR, that a law firm could not 
properly assist a buyer/investment group in locating a seller and simultaneously represent the seller 
(whether the seller was or was not a longstanding client of the firm). Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 2003-1, 2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Apr. 11, 2003). Noting that the issue 
whether this multiple-representation conflict of interest was one that could be waived was not 
addressed in Ergazos and had never before been considered by the Board, the Board concluded that 
in the circumstances presented it was not waivable. OH DR 5-105(A) provided that multiple 
representation had to be declined if independent professional judgment would be or was likely to be 
adversely affected, except as permitted under OH DR 5-105(C). Focusing on the 5-105(C) exception 
and pointing out that the interests of buyer and seller could diverge unexpectedly, even when most 
points were agreed upon, the Board determined that such simultaneous representation would be 
improper, “because it is not obvious as required under DR 5-105(C) that a lawyer would be able to 
adequately represent the interests of both the buyer and the seller of a business entity.” Id. at *1 
(syllabus). Since obviousness and consent after full disclosure both had to be present under OH DR 
5-105(C), the absence of obviousness rendered the conflict nonconsentable. Accord Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n Op. 97-98-03 (Apr. 21, 1998) (representing client and third-party lender where lawyer would 
be paid by both would violate “obviousness” requirement). 
An interesting court of appeals case raising conflict-of-interest concerns is In re Estate of Knowlton, 
2006 Ohio 4905, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4835 (Hamilton). Mr. Knowlton, a major shareholder in 
the Cincinnati Bengals, died in 2003; his will left nothing to his children or grandchildren.  Two of the 
children moved, for a variety of reasons, to have the co-executors removed.  The reason relevant here 
was that one of the executors, Lindberg “and his firm, Taft, Stettinius, and Hollister (‘Taft’), 
represented Knowlton in matters specifically relating to the Brown family and the Cincinnati Bengals 
while simultaneously representing the interests of the Brown family and the Bengals.” Id. at para. 9. 
In response, Lindberg argued that “Taft obtained informed consent from Knowlton and the Cincinnati 
Bengals to represent them simultaneously more than 30 years ago.  Also, Lindberg has testified that 
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Taft observed a ‘Chinese Wall,’ an ethical screening concept where lawyers assigned to Knowlton 
and the Bengals, respectively, did not share confidences or secrets regarding Knowlton or the Bengals 
with lawyers working for the other client.” Id. at para. 11. The magistrate and probate court ruled for 
Lindberg on the removal motion, and the appellate court, reviewing under an abuse-of-discretion 
standard, reluctantly affirmed.  The magistrate’s analysis focused primarily on the absence of 
evidence that Taft had failed adequately to represent  the interests of each client or that there was any 
disclosure of confidences of either to the other, and that Taft had met the screening requirements set 
forth in Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998). 
The author of the appellate court opinion, Judge Painter, however, could not resist commenting on the 
waiver issue; he noted that ‘[t]here exists not one scrap of paper to support the consent,” Knowlton, 
at para. 12, and added parenthetically that 
(The fact that a firm such as Taft, representing opposing parties in multimillion-dollar 
transactions, would obtain consent from both parties and erect a Chinese Wall, all 
without generating a single piece of paper evidencing a waiver, evidently did not pique 
the magistrate’s interest.) 
Id. at para. 34. 
Conflicts among current clients - Referring one client’s services to another: In some situations, 
current-client conflicts can arise where the lawyer refers or recommends the services of one client to 
another. See also sections 1.7:500 and 1.8:710. The permissibility of this practice under the former 
OHCPR was addressed in a number of settings: 
 Could a lawyer with a beneficial interest in a title insurance company that he also represented 
direct other clients to the title insurance company for title service? Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
Formal Op. 37 (July 3, 1989). 
 Could a lawyer who represented a college, and who also drafted wills for clients referred from 
a college-sponsored estate-planning presentation, recommend to the clients that they make 
charitable bequests to the college? Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 88-3 (Feb. 3, 1988). 
 Could a lawyer representing a company that offered securities, insurance, and commodities 
investments do estate planning for individual clients and recommend the company’s products 
to them? Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 79-6 (Sept. 20, 1979); Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 
92-8 (n.d.). 
In each of these situations, the answer was the same. The referral was acceptable if it was the product 
of independent judgment exercised on the client’s behalf (i.e., the lawyer would have made the 
recommendation if the lawyer did not have a lawyer-client relationship with the entity to whom the 
referral was made) and the client to whom the advice was given consented after full disclosure of the 
possible conflict. Proving that the lawyer’s independent judgment will not be affected, however, may 
be difficult, particularly where the lawyer’s primary relationship is with the client who will receive 
the referral. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 92-8 (n.d.). Technically, the former OHCPR prohibited 
representation if the lawyer’s exercise of independent professional judgment “will be or is likely to be 
adversely affected” by his duty to another client. OH DR 5-105(A)-(B). Consent could cure the 
possibility of conflict only if it was “obvious” that the lawyer could adequately represent the interest 
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of each client. OH DR 5-105(C). Regarding consent, see section 1.7:240. The tests of DR 5-105(A), 
(B) & (C) are now set forth in different language, not expressly incorporating the “obvious” 
requirement, but intending no change in substance (see Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.7), in 
Rule 1.7(a)(2) and (b)(1) & (2). (The Ohio Code Comparison further says that the former 
obviousness test with respect to representation is the same as that under Rule 1.7(b) and (c); we 
believe this should be (a) and (b), since there is no “test” under (c) -- it prohibits the representations 
there listed.)   
 
1.7:340  Conflicts of Interest In Representing Organizations 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.96 (1996). 
Conflicts among current clients - Corporate counsel conflicts: As Ohio Rule 1.13(a) makes clear, “[a] 
lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its 
constituents.” Such a lawyer “owes allegiance to the organization and not to any constituent or other 
person connected with the organization.” Id. No attorney-client relationship is formed with these 
others merely by the representation of the corporation itself. As a result, these individuals cannot sue 
the lawyer for malpractice should erroneous advice he or she provides to the corporation lead to 
personal liability for those acting pursuant to the advice. See, under the former OHCPR, Hile v. 
Firmin, Sprague & Huffman Co., L.P.A., 71 Ohio App.3d 838, 595 N.E.2d 1023 (Hancock 1991) 
(lawyers represented corporation, not board of directors, so board members could not sue lawyers for 
malpractice for failure to advise directors that they were personally liable if corporation failed to pay 
sales tax). 
Former OH EC 5-19 stated a similar rule, but, rather than “organization,” spoke only to 
representation of “a corporation or similar entity.” The Ohio Supreme Court expressly determined 
that this provision did not extend to partnerships.  Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 68 Ohio St.3d 453, 
628 N.E.2d 1335 (1994) (limited partnership is not “similar entity” to corporation because 
partnership is only aggregate of individuals, not separate legal entity). In that context, “the duty owed 
by an attorney to a partnership extends to the individual partners thereof,”  id. at 458, 628 N.E.2d at 
1339, and abuse of that duty can give rise to malpractice liability. 
Query whether the Arpadi no-entity rule survives under the Rules.  Ohio Rule 1.13 cmt. [1] states 
that “[a]n organizational client is a legal entity” and that “[t]he duties defined in this rule apply 
equally to unincorporated associations.”  Since a partnership is by definition an unincorporated 
association, ABA Formal Op. 91-361, at 2 (July 12, 1991) (construing same language in MR 1.13 
cmt. [1] and opining that a partnership is an organization within the meaning of MR 1.13), it seems 
clear that that result would follow under Ohio Rule 1.13 as well.  Moreover, ORC 1782.08(B), 
enacted in response to and in apparent repudiation of the Arpadi no-entity holding, expressly states 
that a limited partnership is an “entity.”  This view is confirmed by the enactment of ORC 
1775.01(G), effective October 12, 2006, defining “entity” as including both general and limited 
partnerships.  These statutory enactments, together with the language of Ohio Rule 1.13 cmt. [1], 
should be more than sufficient to overcome Arpadi on the entity issue. See section 1.1:410 for further 
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discussion of Arpadi, the subsequent statutory changes that arguably repudiate the Arpadi result, 
and post-amendment cases dealing with the Arpadi entity issue. 
The lawyer’s primary loyalty to the organization does not preclude the attorney from representing 
another person connected with the entity on an individual basis, but the lawyer may do so only 
“subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7.” Ohio Rule 1.13(e). See also Rule 1.13(d), which provides 
that in dealing with constituents, “a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the 
constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.” In such circumstances, the lawyer should advise the 
constituent that “the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to 
obtain independent representation.” Ohio Rule 1.13 cmt. [10]. See generally, under the former 
OHCPR, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-17, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 4 (Oct. 16, 1992) (general counsel to corporation that provided tax-consulting services could 
privately represent clients of corporation in legal proceedings before tax officials relating to issues on 
which corporation worked only if consistent with OH DR 5-101 and OH DR 5-105(C), and if 
numerous other ethics problems were avoided). Where differing interests were present, joint 
representation was improper. For example, joint representation of a shareholder in a close corporation 
and the corporation itself in a dispute against the other shareholder over ownership of the corporate 
assets would constitute an impermissible conflict. See Sturm v. Sturm, 61 Ohio St.3d 298, 300, 574 
N.E.2d 522, 524 (1991) (Brown, J., dissenting) (arguing, with respect to issue not reached by 
majority, that conflict should have led to disqualification of counsel in divorce action where 
ownership of close corporation assets was at issue). Representation of both the corporation and its 
majority shareholder, who is also an officer and director, is inappropriate in an action brought by a 
minority shareholder for mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty owed by the officer/director to 
the corporation. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 81-1 (Nov. 17, 1981). 
The question ultimately turns on a case-by-case assessment of the facts. In De Capite v. Cotton’s 
Garage, Inc., Nos. 45949, 45969, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 14740 (Cuyahoga July 21, 1983), for 
example, the court found that joint representation of a corporation and its majority 
shareholder/president in defense of an action brought by the other shareholder alleging wrongful 
termination of employment was permissible where (1) all consented and the litigation was in its early 
stages and (2) counsel’s role was primarily attempting to mediate an acceptable resolution of the 
controversy. The court noted that in later stages of the litigation conflict might arise making the 
representation impermissible, but that had not yet occurred. 
Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [19] addresses the issue whether the organization’s lawyer serving as a member 
of its board of directors constitutes a “material limitation” conflict: 
For example, a lawyer’s ability to assure the corporate client that its communications 
with counsel are privileged may be compromised if the lawyer is also a board member. 
Alternatively, in order to participate fully as a board member, a lawyer may have to 
decline to advise or represent the corporation in a matter. . . . Even with consent to the 
lawyer’s acceptance of a dual role, if there is a material risk in a given situation that the 
dual role will compromise the lawyer’s independent judgment or ability to consider, 
recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action, the lawyer should abstain 
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from participating as a director or withdraw as the corporation’s lawyer as to that 
matter. 
See further section 1.13:220. 
 
1.7:400  Conflict of Interest between Current Client and Third-Party Payor 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rules 1.7 and 1.8(f)(1)-(4) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.7 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.94 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:901 
ALI-LGL §  134 
Wolfram §  8.8 
 
1.7:410  Insured-Insurer Conflicts 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.94 (1996). 
Insured-insurer conflicts - The lawyer’s relationship with the insurer and the insured: The first 
question to address in representation of an insurance company and its insured is how to characterize 
the relationship among the parties. Is the insured the lawyer’s sole client and the insurer merely a third 
party paying the fees? Or does the lawyer represent both the insurance company and the insured? 
Substantial debate exists nationally on this issue, see Ronald E. Mallen, Legal Practice, Nat’l Law 
J., May 13, 1996, at B5 (discussing debate over this issue during the American Law Institute’s 
consideration of a draft provision for what is now the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers (2000)), and existed in Ohio as well under the OHCPR. In two Ohio cases, the lawyer was 
treated as having two clients, both the insurer and the insured.  Netzley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
34 Ohio App.2d 65, 79, 296 N.E.2d 550, 561 (Montgomery 1971) (“We hold that both Nationwide 
as well as Mr. Netzley, its insured, were clients of the legal counsel retained by Nationwide.”); 
Thornton v. Pers. Serv. Ins. Co., No. 2256, 1975 Ohio App. LEXIS 7114 (Lorain July 30, 1975) 
(following Netzley), rev’d on other grounds, 48 Ohio St.2d 306, 358 N.E.2d 579 (1976). Ohio 
ethics opinions, however, suggested otherwise. See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 94-95-04, at 1 (n.d.) 
(“It is noteworthy that the attorney-client relationship exists between the attorney and the insured, and 
not between the attorney and the insurance company, notwithstanding the typical arrangement 
whereby the insurance company selects the lawyer or law firm to represent the individual insured, and 
pays the fees.”). If the problem is characterized this way, the lawyer’s duties clearly are to the 
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client/insured rather than to the insurer. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
endorsed the Cincinnati Bar Association’s view in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
2000-3, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3, at *14 (June 1, 2000) (“This Board supports the view 
expressed by the Cincinnati Bar Association that ‘[t]he insured, not the insurance company, is the 
client of defense counsel.”). Accord Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 76-8 (July 20, 1976). And 
see Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp. v. Roetzel & Andress, 163 Ohio App.3d 336, 2005 Ohio 4799, 
837 N.E.2d 1215, at para. 15 (Summit), discussed immediately below in this section. 
Any lingering doubt on the issue has been removed by Ohio Rule 1.8(f)(4) & cmt. [12A]; it is now 
clear that in Ohio the insured is the client and the insurer is a payor third party. 
Insured-insurer conflicts - In general: The interests of the insured and the insurer are often congruent 
-- the client clearly is covered by the insurance policy and the case can be resolved within the policy 
limits. Sometimes, however, their interests conflict. Conflict can occur, for example, where questions 
arise over whether the insured’s conduct falls within the insurance coverage. See generally State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Pildner, 40 Ohio St.2d 101, 104, 321 N.E.2d 600, 602 (1974) (O’Neill, 
C.J., concurring) (discussing conflict for attorney where it is in the insurance company’s interest to 
have insured’s conduct found intentional, and hence outside the policy, and it is in client’s interest to 
have the conduct found negligent, and thus covered), overruled on other grounds by Preferred Risk 
Ins. Co. v. Gill, 30 Ohio St.3d 108, 507 N.E.2d 1118 (1987). It can also occur where the insurer and 
insured have differing interests with regard to a proposed settlement. This was the case in Swiss 
Reinsurance Am. Corp. v. Roetzel & Andress, 163 Ohio App.3d 336, 2005 Ohio 4799, 837 
N.E.2d 1215 (Summit), in which an insurance company attempted to sue a lawyer for malpractice. In 
the underlying medical-malpractice action, the doctor/insured and his lawyer (appointed and 
compensated by the doctor’s insurance company) wanted to settle the action, but the insurance 
company disagreed and wanted to try the case. As a result of this “clear conflict,” id. at para. 25, 
under long-standing rules of agency law the attorney could not represent principals with conflicting 
interests; this “negate[s] any claim by [the insurance company] that it was also [the lawyer’s] client” 
during the underlying medical-malpractice litigation. Id. at paras. 19-20. The appellate court 
therefore affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of the lawyer in the legal-malpractice 
case for want of standing on the part of the plaintiff insurance company because, among other reasons, 
it was not a client and thus failed to satisfy the general rule precluding lawyer malpractice liability to 
third parties based on conduct performed in good faith for the client, here the doctor/insured. This 
same conflict doomed the insurance company’s alternative argument that it fell within an exception to 
the general no-liability-to-third-parties rule because it was in privity with the client doctor. Privity 
requires a mutuality of interest, but here 
[t]he record reflects that Dr. Robinson’s interest was in having the matter settled 
within the policy limits to avoid personal exposure. In contrast, [the insurance 
company]’s interest . . . was to minimize payout at the expense of Dr. Robinson’s 
interests. 
Id. at para. 28.  Insurer-insured conflicts can also result in malpractice claims against the lawyer by 
the insured. See Dicus v. Laipply, No. 3-92-36, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6305 (Crawford, Dec. 15, 
1992) (summary judgment for lawyer reversed; question of fact whether lawyer negligent in, inter 
alia, not advising insured to seek own counsel after insurance company refused to settle within policy 
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Assuming such a conflict arises and informed consent of the insured confirmed in writing pursuant to 
Rule 1.7(b)(2) is not forthcoming, the lawyer must withdraw, and the insured should be directed to 
select other counsel. If the action is one that the insurance company has a duty to defend, then the 
insurance company’s responsibility for proper costs remains. In the words of Chief Justice O’Neill in 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Pildner, when an insurance company notifies an insured that it 
denies coverage, the insurer “should invite the insured to select his own counsel to represent him in 
the damage action.” 40 Ohio St.2d at 106, 321 N.E.2d at 603. 
This language suggests that the insured could decline the invitation and proceed with original counsel, 
presumably waiving the conflict. Such conduct would be allowed, however, only where “the lawyer 
will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client” (here, the 
insured), Rule 1.7(b)(1), and “there is no interference with the lawyer’s independent judgment or 
with the client-lawyer relationship.” Rule 1.8(f)(2). Under the former OHCPR, for example, with 
full disclosure and consent by both parties, a lawyer could undertake the representation where the 
insurer was proceeding under a reservation-of-rights letter, as long as the lawyer was not involved in 
determining the coverage issue. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 149 (July 22, 1983). See also Red Head 
Brass, Inc. v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., 135 Ohio App.3d 616, 735 N.E.2d 48 (Wayne 1999) 
(insured not obligated to pay for insured’s expense of private counsel, engaged after insurer issued 
reservation-of-rights letter, so long as insured satisfied its obligation to defend under the policy); 
Lusk v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 78 Ohio App.3d 11, 603 N.E.2d 420 (Franklin 1992) 
(rejecting argument by insured that reservation-of-rights letters by the two insurers breached duty to 
defend and created conflict necessitating that insured retain private counsel). 
If withdrawal is required, it was opined under the Code that a lawyer representing both insurer and 
insured could not subsequently represent either of the parties against the other. Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
Informal Op. 76-8 (July 20, 1976). Thus, the attorney could not represent the insurance company in 
a declaratory judgment action against the insured over coverage, or in proceedings regarding the 
judgment in the underlying action brought directly against the insurance company by the plaintiff and 
defendant-insured under ORC 3929.06. This is true even if counsel obtained no confidential 
information of relevance while representing the insured: 
But, irrespective of whether he may or may not have obtained information or 
confidences from the insured with respect to the controversy, either directly or 
indirectly, we are of the opinion that the lawyer owes a duty of loyalty to his former 
client, the insured, with respect to matters as to which the lawyer acted as counsel. 
That duty survives the formal conclusion of the lawyer-client relationship to the extent 
that, having undertaken representation of the insured in litigation, he may not 
thereafter represent the insurance company in an action against his former client 
arising out of or closely related to the same litigation. . . . It was precisely because of 
those conflicting loyalties that the lawyer withdrew from employment in the primary 
case when the question of coverage under the policy arose. 
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Op. 76-8, at 4. See Ohio Rule 1.8(f)(3), requiring protection of information relating to the 
representation pursuant to Rule 1.6. 
While the usual conflicts in the insured-insurer context arise out of questions of coverage or 
disagreements about settlement, these matters do not exhaust the conflict possibilities. For example, 
the Ohio Supreme Court held that an attorney representing a client in a personal injury action could 
not ethically accept legal fees from the client’s insurance carrier in exchange for the attorney’s efforts 
to collect reimbursement for the carrier of its payment of the client’s medical expenses, unless the 
client specifically consented to the dual employment after full disclosure.  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Schwartz, 74 Ohio St.3d 489, 660 N.E.2d 422 (1996). In this situation the clients were in obvious 
conflict -- “both were competing for shares of the settlement proceeds.”  Id. at 491, 660 N.E.2d at 
424. 
Conflicts of interest also can arise where an insurance company has paid out funds to an insured who 
was injured by another and the insurer now seeks to prosecute an action against the tortfeasor. In a 
1995 opinion, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline confronted this problem in 
addressing whether it was appropriate for in-house counsel of an insurance company to pursue 
subrogation claims against the tortfeasor and also to seek to recover, on the insured’s behalf, the 
insured’s deductible. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 95-14, 1995 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 1 (Dec. 1, 1995). See generally Robert J. Johnson, Note, In-House Counsel 
Employed by Insurance Companies: A Difficult Dilemma Confronting the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 945 (1996). The Board found no problem with the 
in-house counsel pursuing the subrogation claim since, in that context, the lawyer is representing only 
the insurer. By including a claim for the insured’s deductible, however, a joint representation 
situation was created. The conflict-of-interest rules barred joint representation where the lawyer’s 
professional judgment “will be or is likely to be adversely affected” by the joint representation, unless 
cured by client consent. OH DR 5-105(A)-(B). Consent, however, could be sought only where “it is 
obvious” that the lawyer could adequately represent the interest of each client. OH DR 5-105(C). In a 
1994 opinion, the Board had concluded that in-house counsel for an insurance company could not 
represent an insured in such an action, and outside counsel provided by the insurance company was 
required. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 94-9, 1994 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 
6 (Aug. 12, 1994). In the 1995 opinion, the Board repudiated its earlier opinion. While 
acknowledging that in-house counsel may be particularly likely to favor the insurer over the insured 
should a conflict of interest arise, the chance that a conflict would arise in this limited circumstance 
was slight. In securing client consent for this joint representation, the lawyer must first make full 
disclosure to the insured of the implications of the arrangement, which includes explaining to the 
insured counsel’s employment relationship with the insurer, offering the option of representation by 
outside counsel, and explaining the implications of statutory provisions pertaining to the deductibility 
of certain expenses from the insured’s potential recovery. 
The provisions of former OH DR 5-105(A), (B) & (C) cited in Opinion 95-14 are now contained in 
Rule 1.7. (The Task Force has stated that “[n]o change in the substance . . . is intended.” Ohio Code 
Comparison to Rule 1.7.) The “will be adversely affected” test is now phrased in terms of 
“substantial risk” that the lawyer’s ability to represent the client appropriately “will be materially 
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client . . . .” Rule 1.7(a)(2). The client’s consent 
must be informed and confirmed in writing. Rule 1.7(b)(2). In place of the former “obvious” test, the 
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Rule now states that, as a condition of representation where there is a conflict under division (a), “the 
lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client.” Rule 
1.7(b)(1). From Comment [15], it would appear that the facts in Opinion 95-14 would not constitute a 
“material limitation” conflict under the Rule. For that to occur, in the language of the comment, 
would require “a substantial discrepancy in the client’s testimony, incompatible positions in relation 
to another party, potential cross-claims, or substantially different possibilities of settlement of the 
claims or liabilities in question” -- none of which are present in the Opinion 95-14 scenario. Ohio 
Rule 1.7 cmt. [15]. See also Rule 1.7 cmts. [25]-[28], discussed in section 1.7:310 above. 
In addition to disciplinary and disqualification concerns, insurance-related conflicts may carry 
malpractice exposure as well.  Dicus v. Laipply, No. 3-92-36, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6305 
(Crawford Dec. 12, 1992) (lawyer was sued for malpractice for failure to inform insured of conflict 
of interest arising out of insurance company’s settlement position and that insured probably should 
retain independent counsel). Further, some conflicts may lead to claims by the insured against the 
insurance company, which, in turn, may seek indemnification from the lawyer involved.  Belcher v. 
Dooley, No. 10444, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 508 (Montgomery Feb. 16, 1988). 
Insured-insurer conflicts - The duty of communication: To the extent the lawyer, while representing 
the insured, has acquired information that might trigger a policy exclusion, is withdrawal sufficient to 
avoid the conflict, or must the lawyer also communicate the information to the insurer? The question 
has been quite controversial nationally, but the majority view appears to allow the lawyer to remain 
silent on this matter. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 149 (July 22, 1983). See generally 4 Ronald E. 
Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 30:8 (2008 ed.). It would seem that the duty of 
confidentiality to the insured should take precedence over any contractual duties to the nonclient 
insurer. 
Insured-insurer conflicts - Impermissible insurer-imposed controls on lawyer conduct: Under the 
Code, the Cincinnati Bar Association opined that it would be improper for an insurance company to 
retain a law firm for cases arising from its obligations to its insureds and to provide the firm a 
quarterly retainer, out of which all costs associated with the litigation must be met regardless of the 
number of claims or the requirements of the litigation involved. This cost-containment device created 
a conflict of interest, since the lawyer might make strategic judgments based on the financial impact 
of the choice on the lawyer rather than on what was best for the client, the insured. Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n Op. 94-95-04 (n.d.) (practice would violate OH DR 5-101(A), since the arrangement created 
personal conflict between lawyer and client; bar association considered insured, not insurance 
company, the client). 
In Board of Commissioners on Grievance & Discipline Op. 2000-3, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 3 (June 1, 2000), the Board considered the propriety of insurance company litigation- 
management guidelines in the representation of the insured, with respect to such matters as the 
necessity of prior approval before research is undertaken by the lawyer; allocation of work 
assignments among the lawyer, his associates, and paralegals; and prior approval before undertaking 
discovery, consulting with experts, or filing motions or other pleadings. In all of these instances the 
Board, citing and quoting former OH DR 5-107(B), opined that such restrictions were an interference 
with the attorney’s exercise of his or her professional judgment and therefore inappropriate. In so 
concluding, the Board stated as follows: 
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The disciplinary rules are unequivocal that it is the lawyer who directs and regulates 
his or her own professional judgment, not the persons or entities paying for the 
rendering of legal services to another. This is true regardless of whether an attorney 
represents one client or dual clients. One client cannot direct an attorney’s professional 
judgment with respect to another client. An attorney has a duty of loyalty to the 
insured and regardless of whether the insurer is considered a dual client or a third party 
payer, the attorney cannot allow the insurer to direct or regulate his or her professional 
judgment in legal services to the insured. 
2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3, at *14. For the reaction of the American Insurance Association 
to Opinion 2000-3, see Huck Qavanaugh, Association Defends Use of Litigation Guidelines, 
Ohio L. Wkly., July 24, 2000, at 1. 
Litigation-management guidelines of this sort by an insurance company receive a thumbs-down 
under the Rules as well. See Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [12A], which states: 
Insurance defense counsel may not permit an insurer’s right to control the defense to 
compromise the lawyer’s independent judgment, for example, regarding the legal 
research or factual investigation necessary to support the defense. 
See sections 1.8:710-:720. 
 
1.7:420  Lawyer with Fiduciary Obligations to Third Person [see 1.13:210] 
 
 
1.7:500  Conflict of Interest Between Current Client and Lawyer’s Interest 
              [see also 1.8:210-:220, :1000] 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.7(a)(2) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.14-5.17, 5.19-5.21, 
5.22-5.25 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:501 
ALI-LGL §§  125-127 
Wolfram §  8.11 
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The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.14-5.17, 5.19-5.20, 5.22-5.25 (1996). 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - In general: Conflicts of interest can undercut the lawyer’s 
duty of undivided loyalty to clients and lead to abuse of client confidences. Such conflicts can arise 
from many sources, including the personal interests of the lawyer. 
Ohio Rule 1.7(a)(2) recites the applicable rule -- that 
 [a] lawyer’s acceptance or continuation of representation of a client creates a 
conflict of interest if . . . : 
* * * * 
 there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or 
carry out an appropriate course of action for that client will be materially limited by . . . 
the lawyer’s own personal interests. 
There are two Board opinions dealing with the Rule 1.7(a)(2) material limitation conflict: The first, 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-2, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 
(June 6, 2008), is discussed in section 1.7:240 at “Nonconsentable conflicts – Asserting claim of one 
client against another client in same proceeding.” The second, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2011-1, 2011 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 11, 2011), found that a material 
limitation conflict would exist if a plaintiff’s lawyer, as a condition of settlement, agreed to indemnify 
the other side against third-person claims against the settlement funds: “there would be a substantial 
risk that the lawyer’s representation of the client would be materially limited by the lawyer’s concerns 
about having personal financial responsibility for known and unknown claims against the client.” Id. 
at *8. Moreover, “[e]ven if this conflict of interest could be ameliorated under Prof. Cond. R. 1.7(b), 
the agreement would still be improper under Prof. Cond. R. 1.15 and 1.8(e).” Id. at *8-9. 
The formerly applicable disciplinary rule, 5-101(A)(1), spoke in terms of “the lawyer’s own financial, 
business, property or personal interests.” All of these interests have now been telescoped under the 
rubric “the lawyer’s own personal interests.” See Ohio Rule 1.7 cmts. [20]-[22], grouped under the 
heading “Personal Interest Conflicts.” Note further that some personal interest conflicts are singled 
out for more extensive treatment in Rule 1.8. See sections 1.8:200-:220. 
Examples under the Code of cases in which the lawyer’s “financial” interests impeded his exercise of 
professional judgment on behalf of a client are Disciplinary Counsel v. Dettinger, 121 Ohio St.3d 
400, 2009 Ohio 1429, 904 N.E.2d 890 (continuing to represent client, from whom respondent had 
borrowed $25,000, and then the deceased client’s estate, violated 5-101(A)(1) and 5-104(A) “without 
first obtaining his client’s and the executor’s consent after explaining the attendant risks of their 
conflicting interests,” id. at para. 8); Disciplinary Counsel v. McNamee, 119 Ohio St.3d 269, 2008 
Ohio 3883, 893 N.E.2d 490 (lawyer who attempted to represent multiple clients with respect to a real 
estate development venture, in which the lawyer had “a significant financial interest,” violated DR 
5-101(A)(1), among other rules), and Disciplinary Counsel v. Rafidi, 114 Ohio St.3d 336, 2007 
3674, 872 N.E.2d 265 (soliciting more lucrative client without prior disclosure to existing client of 
his interest in new client for financial reasons violated this provision). See also Columbus Bar Ass’n 
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v. Willette, 117 Ohio St.3d 433, 2008 Ohio 1198, 884 N.E.2d 581 (failure to disclose to clients that 
respondent was obligated to use agents of the firm with whom he had contracted for trust-funding 
advice). Another 5-101(A)(1) case involving the lawyer’s financial-business-property interests is 
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 114 Ohio St.3d 108, 2007 Ohio 3253, 868 N.E.2d 973; the case is 
discussed in section 1.8:220.  
A case under the Code involving a personal interest conflict is Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Gueli, 119 
Ohio St.3d 434, 2008 Ohio 4786, 894 N.E.2d 1231. In Gueli, the respondent represented an estate 
and also was counsel for plaintiffs in the related wrongful death action. But the defendant in the 
wrongful death action was respondent’s brother. In a series of actions and inactions (such as failing to 
pursue his brother’s considerable assets beyond accepting the policy-limit check for $250,000 from 
his brother’s liability carrier), respondent, in the Court’s words, “despite a patent conflict of interest, 
undertook the Barnhill wrongful-death claim, using his position to protect his brother at the expense 
of the decedent’s children.” Id. at para. 21. (The Court also found a violation of DR 5-105(A), which 
prohibits representing clients with conflicting interest without informed consent. Consistent with this 
charge, the Court at one point talks in terms of respondent’s “jeopardiz[ing] the interests of the 
decedent’s children by concurrently representing the adverse interests of the decedent’s family and 
respondent’s own brother.” Id. at para. 17. But since respondent was suing his own brother, it seems 
most unlikely that he was also “concurrently representing” the brother’s interests, other than in the 
sense of “using his position to protect his brother at the expense of decedent’s children.” In any event, 
it is difficult to see how 5-105(A) comes into play on the facts presented.) 
It is important to keep in mind several caveats when applying the Rule. First, the conflict need not be 
actual for the prohibition to arise. Employment should be rejected if there is a “substantial risk” that 
the lawyer’s professional judgment may be affected. Rule 1.7(a)(2). Second, the protection this 
provision affords to the client may be waived through informed consent of each affected client, 
1.7(b)(2), so long as the other requisites of 1.7(b) are met. Where, however, Rule 1.7(a)(2) problems 
are intertwined with violations of rules that do not provide any exception for client consent, the 
conflict cannot be alleviated by consent. (This conclusion assumes that the line of BCGD opinions on 
this issue under the former OHCPR will continue to be followed under the Rules. See Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-1, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 15 (Feb. 1, 
2002) (conflict cannot be alleviated by consent where disciplinary rules applicable include those with 
no consent exception). Accord Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-1, 2003 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Apr. 11, 2003). 
It is not possible to catalog all of the potential lawyer “personal interests” that may adversely affect 
the exercise of professional judgment on behalf of the client. As noted above, personal-interest 
conflicts are treated in Comments [20]-[22]. Rule 1.7 cmt. [20] provides examples of types of 
personal interests that may have an adverse effect on the representation (e.g., lawyer’s own conduct is 
in question; seeking employment with opponent of lawyer’s client; referring clients to business in 
which lawyer has undisclosed financial interest); it also specifically notes that business transactions 
with clients are dealt with in Rule 1.8 (1.8(a) to be precise). This personal-interest conflict is 
discussed in section 1.8:220. Rule 1.7 cmt. [21] deals with lawyers related by blood or marriage 
opposing one another; this topic is discussed this section infra at “Conflicting interests of lawyer and 
client - Lawyer relatives opposing one another.” The subject of Rule 1.7 cmt. [22] is sexual 
relationship with clients; the applicable Rule is 1.8(j), discussed at section 1.8:210. It is not 
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uncommon for Rule 1.7(a)(2) to be invoked with 1.8(j) in sex-with-client cases. E.g., Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Siewert, 130 Ohio St.3d 402, 2011 Ohio 5935, 958 N.E.2d 946; Cincinnati Bar Ass’n 
v. Schmalz, 123 Ohio St.3d 130, 2009 Ohio 4159, 914 N.E.2d 1024. In addition to the conduct 
regulated by Rules 18(a) and (j), common instances of personal-interest conflicts arising in decisions 
and opinions rendered under the former OHCPR are treated in the paragraphs that follow. 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Conflicts arising from client allegations of lawyer 
misconduct: On occasion, clients who are dissatisfied with the representation provided by a lawyer 
raise allegations of lawyer misconduct. If this occurs and the employment continues, a question arises 
whether the lawyer’s personal interest in his own integrity will compromise his ability to exercise 
professional judgment on the client’s behalf. This issue often comes up in the context of the 
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel in criminal-defense representation. 
When a lawyer represents a criminal defendant both at trial and on appeal, the lawyer may, not 
surprisingly, feel constrained from arguing that his conduct at trial amounted to ineffective assistance 
of counsel, which omission may in turn lead to ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. This 
potential conflict, however, does not make such representation improper per se. State v. Otis, 73 
Ohio St.3d 39, 652 N.E.2d 195 (1995) (rejecting per se conflict argument in context of criminal 
defendant’s motion to reopen appeal). A case-by-case determination is required. 
When, in the context of a criminal-defense representation, the defendant files a grievance against his 
counsel with the disciplinary authorities and the lawyer seeks to withdraw on conflict-of-interest 
grounds, the trial court has an affirmative duty to inquire as to whether a conflict actually exists. State 
v. Smith, Nos. 94-CA-62, 94- CA-64, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4235 (Richland Aug. 28, 1995). 
See Rule 1.7 cmt. [20]. 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Conflicts arising from the attorney’s criminal exposure: 
Special problems arise where a criminal-defense attorney becomes the object of a criminal 
prosecution. Under these circumstances, the lawyer’s interest in currying favor with the government 
to secure more favorable personal treatment may color the advice he gives a client. For example, an 
attorney who was acting as a police informer, in an attempt to receive more favorable treatment in a 
bribery action brought against him, violated former OH DR 5-101(A) by continuing to handle new 
cases, since “as an informant, he was an agent of parties adverse to his clients.” Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Melamed, 62 Ohio St.3d 187, 580 N.E.2d 1077 (1991). 
Under certain circumstances, a lawyer may be tempted to dissuade a client from a particular course of 
conduct, where that conduct may have a negative impact on the lawyer’s own situation. For example, 
where an attorney defending a client against a homicide charge was himself on trial for drug 
trafficking arising out of having been paid by his client with cocaine that the client allegedly stole in 
the homicide, a conflict of interest could arise if the government offered an attractive plea bargain to 
the client in exchange for testimony against the attorney. Under these circumstances, the lawyer’s 
interest in the outcome of his own trial could lead him to discourage his client from taking what 
objectively was a favorable plea bargain. See State v. Bryant, No. L-84-249, 1985 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 8861 (Lucas Oct. 18, 1985) (in this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel case, court found 
conflict but concluded that, on facts, conflict did not adversely affect counsel’s representation of 
defendant because no such plea offer was ever made to defendant). 
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See Rule 1.7 cmt. [20]. 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Seeking new employment: Whenever a lawyer seeks to 
change jobs, the possibility arises that the lawyer might compromise the interests of a present client to 
curry favor with a future employer. To lessen such concerns, if the conflict is direct enough, the 
lawyer should disclose the future employment possibility to the present client and seek consent to 
continue in the representation. This issue was addressed under the OHCPR in the context of a county 
public defender running for the office of county prosecuting attorney in Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-002, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 34 (Feb. 12, 1988). The 
Board indicated that the lawyer need not resign or remove himself as a public defender, but he should 
disclose the candidacy to potential clients, since the exercise of his professional judgment reasonably 
might be affected by his personal interests in winning election to the new post. See, in connection 
with seeking new employment, discussion of the “side-switching” attorney case, Kala v. Aluminum 
Smelting & Refining Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998), at sections 1.9:200, 1.9:400, 
and 1.10:300. And see Ohio Rule 1.11(d)(2)(ii) (current government officer or employee), discussed 
at section 1.11:500, and Ohio Rule 1.12(b) (judge or third-party neutral), discussed at section 
1.12:300. 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Lawyer ownership interests affected by the representation: 
The lawyer’s ability to exercise independent judgment on behalf of a client could be compromised by 
the lawyer’s financial interest in an entity, if that interest might be affected by the outcome of the 
representation. The propriety of the representation turns on the severity of the potential conflict and 
whether the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. See Rule 1.7(a)(2) & (b)(2). 
Similarly, under the OHCPR, in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Allen, 91 Ohio St.3d 27, 740 
N.E.2d 1094 (2001), the Supreme Court adopted the conclusion of the Board that respondent had 
violated OH DR 5-101(A)(1) in representing the seller in a sale of assets to a company in which the 
lawyer and the person with whom they were negotiating each held a twenty-percent ownership 
interest, without disclosing these facts to the seller. And in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2002-1, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 1, 2002), the Board opined: 
A law firm that pays a real estate agency for promoting the services of the law firm as 
a recommended service provider has a business interest that may reasonably affect the 
lawyer’s independent professional judgment. The law firm may perceive subtle 
pressure to perform legal services to clients in a manner that pleases the real estate 
agency to avoid any risk of being excluded as a service provider. 
Id. at *10 (violation of OH DR 5-101(A)(1)). The same relationship ran afoul of OH DR 5-104(A) 
because, although the agreement on its face was with the real-estate agency, whose customers were 
eligible for discounted services from the law firm, the firm actually was circuitously entering into a 
business relationship with those customers as clients. Since the lawyer may have had business or 
financial interests that differ from those of the clients (i.e., the firm may have been influenced by its 
interest in receiving as many referrals as possible or in making enough money on the referrals to cover 
the annual membership fee paid by the firm to the agency), the clients’ expectation that the firm 
would exercise its independent professional judgment could be compromised. Id. 
A lawyer’s representation of a client in litigation against another party in which the lawyer has an 
ownership interest, for example, would give rise to a conflict of interest because a victory for the 
501
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.7 
client could reduce the value of the lawyer’s ownership interests. Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme 
Court found such conduct permissible where the lawyer had only an insignificant ownership interest 
in the adverse party and the client consented to the representation after full disclosure.  Morgan v. N. 
Coast Cable Co., 63 Ohio St.3d 156, 586 N.E.2d 88 (1992) (lawyers were limited partners with less 
than one percent of outstanding interests in limited partnership). Compare Stark County Bar Ass’n 
v. Hare, 99 Ohio St.3d 310, 2003 Ohio 3651, 791 N.E.2d 966 (former OH DR 5-101(A)(1) violated
where lawyer acquired interest in adoptions through improper payments to birth mother without 
disclosing these payments to his clients, the adoptive parents. 
In a 1987 opinion, the Cincinnati Bar Association addressed the ethical implications of a lawyer 
pursuing workers’ compensation cases against companies in which the lawyer owned stock. 
Plaintiff’s Attorney as Investor in Defendant Corporation, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Rep., 
Feb.-Mar. 1987, at 13. The opinion recognized that the extent of the conflict might vary depending 
on the size of the attorney’s holdings and the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the stock. 
Large holdings acquired by the attorney directly pose greater potential for conflict than smaller 
holdings acquired by an investment management company that exercises complete discretion over the 
stock purchases made on the lawyer’s behalf. Under any combination of these factors, however, there 
was at least the potential for the lawyer to place his personal financial interests over that of the client, 
as well as a potential appearance of impropriety, so full disclosure and client consent were required. 
A similar problem could arise if the lawyer represented a client in opposition to the lawyer’s former 
law firm in which the lawyer retained some post-termination financial interest. A prosecuting 
attorney, for example, who was receiving money from his former partnership could not prosecute 
cases where members of that partnership were on the other side, since his business and financial 
interests might compromise his independent professional judgment. Because his client was the public, 
full disclosure and consent were not available to waive the conflict. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 91-22, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (Oct. 18, 1991). 
Direct opposition to an entity in which the lawyer has a financial interest is not required to trigger this 
concern. For example, an ownership interest in a business that sold and provided house-arrest 
programs created a potential conflict of interest for a lawyer involved in criminal practice, since the 
lawyer could steer clients into sentences that would lead to use of those services. While such 
ownership was not barred, the client had to be given full disclosure and provide consent before the 
lawyer could undertake the criminal representation. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 92-6, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 15 (Feb. 14, 1992). 
In another ethics opinion, the Board found that former OH DR 5-104(A) governed where a lawyer 
acquired a mortgage on the client’s home to secure a legal fee. This is a business transaction in which 
the lawyer and client have differing interests; as a result, full disclosure by the lawyer and consent by 
the client are required. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2004-8, 2004 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 12 (Oct. 8, 2004) (because Board found OH DR 5-104(A) applicable, it found no 
need to consider the issue under 5-101(A)(1)). 
Although apparently there are no opinions on the subject in Ohio, the issue of the propriety of taking 
stock of the client in lieu of fees has been much discussed, particularly with respect to Silicon Valley 
clients and law firms following the dot-com collapse of 2000-2001. See, e.g., Ruth E. Piller, Taking 
Stock, ABA Lit. News, Jan. 2001, at 8. Two ethics opinions treat the topic, with similar results: It is 
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permissible, but the ethical perils are real and the steps that need be taken to ensure ethical propriety 
are substantial. See ABA Formal Op. 00-418 (July 7, 2000); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 
Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics Formal Op. 2000-3 (n.d.) (applying New York’s versions of 
DR 5-101(A) and DR 5-104(A), which are similar to, but more stringent than, former Ohio version of 
these two disciplinary rules; opinion also cites a number of ethics opinions from other states, none of 
which impose a per se prohibition on a stock-for-fees arrangement). 
In Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 72-4 (Aug. 10, 1972), the mere potential for conflict was not 
enough to raise former OH DR 5-101(A)(1) problems. The bar association opined that there was no 
per se conflict in a lawyer owning an interest in a tavern and acting as city solicitor in prosecuting 
OMVI cases. If employees of the tavern became involved in such a matter, however, recusal was 
appropriate, to avoid the appearance of impropriety. With respect to the appearance-of-impropriety 
standard, see section 1.7:230. 
See Rule 1.7 cmt. [20]. 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Lawyer relatives opposing one another: Ohio Rule 1.7 
cmt. [21] recognizes that a lawyer’s personal interests may affect the ability to exercise professional 
judgment on behalf of a client when lawyers related by blood or marriage represent different parties in 
a matter. See, under the former OHCPR, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-22, 
1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (Oct. 18, 1991) (siblings as opposing counsel) and Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-7, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (Aug. 13, 
1993) (spouses as opposing counsel). 
Pursuant to Comment [21], lawyers closely related to one another (e.g., parent, child, sibling, or 
spouse) cannot represent a client in the same or a substantially related matter where the related lawyer 
represents another party, “unless each client gives informed, written consent.” Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. 
[21]. (Note that the parties need not be opposing, as was the case in the cited Board opinions. Note 
also that, inasmuch as this conflict is personal, it is ordinarily not imputed to members of the lawyer’s 
firm. Id.) The comment is designed to ensure that client confidences will be protected and that the 
lawyer’s duty of loyalty and independent professional judgment will not be affected by the family 
relationship. Id. See Op. 93-7, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5. 
While the comment makes no distinction between private sector and government lawyers, ethics 
opinions under the former OHCPR were divided as to whether the personal conflict was waivable 
when one of the lawyers was a prosecutor. Compare Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 91-22, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (Oct. 18, 1991), and Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
Informal Op. 87-5 (June 29, 1987) (nonwaivable), with Op. 93-7, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 5 (conflict waivable with consent from both sides). This later opinion seems more in step with 
Comment [21]. 
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Under the former OHCPR, the concern that personal regard for opposing counsel may compromise 
the lawyer’s exercise of judgment for the client was not limited to situations where the lawyer was 
related to opposing counsel by blood or marriage. For example, where lawyers who simply shared 
office space represented opposing parties, the possibility existed that financial or personal interests 
arising from their business relationship might affect their independent professional judgment. Hence, 
disclosure and consent of the clients were required. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 89-005, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 12 (Feb. 17, 1989). Query whether this opinion 
survives under Rule 1.7 cmt. [21], which makes no mention of nonfamilial relationships. 
Nevertheless, obtaining written, informed consent from both clients may be in order as a cautionary 
measure. 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Lawyer ownership of or affiliation with nonlegal service 
providers: In many situations, lawyers may wish to refer their clients to nonlegal service providers in 
which the lawyer has some financial interest. While not improper per se, such arrangements run the 
risk that the lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment on behalf of the client may be affected by the 
lawyer’s relationship with the nonlegal service provider. The lawyer might be tempted to direct the 
client to the nonlegal service provider with which the lawyer is affiliated in instances where this 
would not be consistent with the exercise of independent professional judgment. Client consent after 
full disclosure is necessary before the lawyer may undertake arrangements of this kind. See, under the 
Code, the following bar opinions: 
 The practice of referring workers’ compensation and personal injury clients to a health facility 
in which the lawyer has an economic interest carries a potential conflict of interest. For 
example, if persons from the health facility were expected to testify on behalf of the client, and 
the lawyer profited therefrom, loyalty to the client might be diluted. The lawyer also might be 
tempted to counsel the client to accept an inadequate settlement to assure that the health 
facility’s charges are paid. Thus, the lawyer could engage in such referrals only upon full 
disclosure and consent. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 90-1 (May 4, 1990) (personal 
conflict was one of several potential ethical concerns arising from this conduct). 
 A lawyer accepted referrals from an insurance agency with which he had a close affiliation 
and provided estate planning services that could involve recommending products of the 
insurer. The situation presented a potential conflict of interest because the lawyer could be 
influenced to recommend the insurance company’s products, rather than others that the 
exercise of independent judgment might commend, to assure continued referrals. To 
undertake such representation, full disclosure and consent were required. Toledo Bar Ass’n 
Op. 92-8 (n.d.); see also Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 85-1 (Jan. 31, 1985) (raising like concerns 
where insurance company paid lawyer for preparing wills for insurer’s customers). Where the 
arrangement required the lawyer to use the insurer’s products, the conflict is even clearer. 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 92-93-01 (n.d.) (lawyer for insurance agency that put on seminars 
on living trusts, interviewed clients and prepared the relevant legal instruments, and had 
affiliated lawyers available to review the documents and handle the closing, violated number 
of provisions, including former OH DR 5-101(A), because lawyer did not exercise 
independent professional judgment in estate planning but simply facilitated course of action 
initiated by insurer). 
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Of course, where the lawyer himself seeks to play dual roles as both lawyer and nonlegal service 
provider, similar problems can arise. Under the OHCPR, 
 Respondent violated former OH DR 5-101(A)(1) and 5-104(A) when, acting in dual role of 
lawyer and financial planner, he failed to provide full disclosure and obtain informed consent 
from his clients concerning his financial interest (commission) in his investment 
recommendations, as to which additional compensation he misled the clients or at best failed 
to explain the matter clearly to them.  Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002 Ohio 4743, 775 N.E.2d 818 (because of mitigating circumstances, including 
fact that clients were fully compensated for their investment losses, respondent was given a 
stayed six-month suspension); 
 One who served both as an attorney for clients in trust and estate matters and as their insurance 
agent, and who steered clients to the products of the insurance company that employed him, 
would, without consent after full disclosure, violate OH DR 5-101(A) because the 
lawyer/insurance agent may be motivated by his own interest in commissions for life 
insurance sales, rather than the best interests of his clients.  Lillback v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
94 Ohio App.3d 100, 640 N.E.2d 250 (Montgomery 1994) (employment contract with 
insurer permitting this dual role void as matter of public policy and thus not enforceable by 
attorney against insurer); 
 A lawyer could, however, consistent with the former OHCPR, provide financial-planning 
services through his or her law firm to business and estate-planning clients of the firm when 
the financial-planning services were provided in connection with and related to the provision 
of legal services. In doing so, the lawyer should use a non-excessive fixed fee, flat or hourly. 
To avoid being subject to regulation as an “investment advisor,” the lawyer’s financial 
planning services should be “solely incidental” to the practice of law. See ORC 
1707.01(X)(2). And, to avoid conflict-of-interest problems under OH DR 5-101(A)(1), the 
lawyer should inform the client of availability of such services elsewhere and should inform 
the client of the fee, if any, for providing such services. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2000-4, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Dec. 1, 2000); 
 Citing and quoting both Opinion 2000-4 supra and Opinion 94-7 (as to which see next 
paragraph of regular text), the Board concluded that a law firm representing a seller of a 
business entity may provide law-related services in assisting the client by helping to locate a 
buyer, and, conversely, may help to locate a seller on behalf of a client/buyer. In both 
instances, a fee may be charged the client, so long as not illegal or excessive and so long as 
there is full disclosure to and informed consent by the client. If the client is the seller, the 
buyer should be clearly informed that the firm is representing only the seller, not the buyer, 
and vice versa. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-1, 2003 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 1 (Apr. 11, 2003); 
 But it was improper for a lawyer, who was also a licensed insurance agent, to sell annuities to 
estate-planning clients; the lawyer’s interest in selling annuities and the client’s interest in 
obtaining uncompromised independent legal counsel were differing interests under former 
OH DR 5-104(A). Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-4, 2001 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (Aug. 10, 2001). 
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Ownership of an ancillary business that provides law-related services is permissible, as long as it is 
operated in a way that is consistent with basic ethical guidelines. See generally Ohio Rule 5.7 and 
section 5.7:200. Opinions under the Code included Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 94-7, 1994 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 17, 1994) (comprehensively setting forth 
requirements to be followed). Accord Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-1, 
2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Apr. 11, 2003). To the extent a client of the business is in need 
of legal services, the lawyer may provide them, but must fully disclose his interest in the ancillary 
business and obtain client consent to the representation before proceeding. See generally Stephen R. 
Ripps, Law Firm Ownership of Ancillary Business in Ohio - A New Era?, 27 Akron L. Rev. 1 
(1993). 
See Rule 1.7 cmt. [20]. With respect to the status of the multidisciplinary-practice issue in Ohio, see 
section 5.5:300. 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Conflicting property interests: Sometimes the 
conflicting-property-interests issue involves a lawyer and client who have interests in common 
property. In other instances, although they lack a common interest, the lawyer’s ownership of 
property may affect property of the client. While such arrangements are not improper per se, they 
become improper if there is a substantial risk that the arrangement will materially limit the lawyer’s 
exercise of professional judgment on behalf of the client. In either situation, the lawyer should decline 
employment if such a risk exists, or withdraw if the problem comes to light after the employment 
begins, unless the conflict is cured by informed client consent, confirmed in writing. 
The problem of conflicting property interests is addressed not only by Ohio Rule 1.7(a)(2), but also 
by Rule 1.8(a), which provides that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client 
unless (1) the transaction is fair and reasonable and the terms are disclosed, (2) the client is told in 
writing to seek independent counsel, and (3) the client gives informed, written, consent. See section 
1.8:220.  
A violation of Rule 1.7(a)(2) (and 1.8(a)(1), (2) and (3)) was found in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Peterson, 135 Ohio St.3d 110, 2012 Ohio 5719, 984 N.E.2d 1035, where the respondent created for 
a client a limited liability corporation, the bank account of which had both the client and the 
respondent as signatories. Peterson used the account for personal matters and without authorization 
paid himself $1,200 a month from the corporate account. (In addition to the above violations, his 
misappropriation of the funds of the corporate client violated Rule 8.4(b), (c) and (h).) Under the 
Code, see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Tomlan, 118 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008 Ohio 1471, 885 N.E.2d 
895 (placing elderly client’s assets in joint and survivorship accounts in client’s and respondent’s 
names without informed consent of client violated DR 5-101(A)(1)); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Hartke, 67 Ohio St.3d 65, 616 N.E.2d 186 (1993) (compromise of debt owed by lawyer to client on 
terms highly favorable to lawyer violated former OH DR 5-104(A); in circumstances, lawyer could 
not comply with full-disclosure requirement without insisting that client obtain independent legal 
advice concerning the compromise). 
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The interplay of these former Code provisions was well illustrated by the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Gunnoe, 64 Ohio St.2d 172, 413 N.E.2d 842 (1980). In Gunnoe, 
the attorney represented a client in the sale of a business. Ultimately, the lawyer formed a corporation, 
in which he was the majority stockholder, to purchase the business. When the client expressed 
reservations about certain aspects of the deal, including the lack of a down payment or personal 
liability on the note by the purchasers, the lawyer assured the client that he would provide his own 
personal note and mortgage as additional security for payment, but did not do so. Throughout the 
transaction, the client reminded the lawyer that she was relying on him to represent her interests. At 
no time did the lawyer advise her that their interests might be adverse or that she should contact 
another attorney to review the documents. The Court found this conduct to violate OH DR 5-101(A), 
because the lawyer accepted employment on a matter in which his professional judgment might be 
affected by his own interests; 5-104(A), because the lawyer, with the client, entered into a business 
transaction in which the client relied on the lawyer’s independent professional judgment while the 
lawyer harbored interests differing from those of the client; and 5-105(B) [erroneously cited by the 
Court as 5-104(B)] because the lawyer was engaged in multiple employment that affected his 
representation of the client. By failing to make full disclosure to the client of his adverse interests, 
client consent would not be sufficient to excuse the conduct. See also Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ewing, 
75 Ohio St.3d 244, 661 N.E.2d 1109 (1996) (lawyer’s arranging with another client to buy property 
of financially strapped client, without disclosing the lawyer’s and other client’s interest until the 
Friday before the scheduled Monday closing, and related “coercive tactics,” violated OH DR 
5-101(A), 5-105(A), and 5-105(B), among other provisions). 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 90-3 (Jan. 18, 1991) addressed the question whether a law firm could 
purchase the uncollected debts of a client if the firm was not representing the client on that particular 
collection matter. The opinion found that such conduct would create a conflict of interest because the 
market value of uncollected debts would be affected by the level of recovery in represented actions. 
“The firm’s interest in obtaining debts at a favorable discount is directly at odds with its duty in 
gaining higher recoveries on the dollar for its client.” Id. at 4. 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Lawyer named fiduciary in an instrument: Lawyers often 
are named by clients as trustees, executors, or the like. Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [18] notes that a lawyer’s 
duties of loyalty and independence may be limited by “the lawyer’s responsibilities to other persons, 
such as . . . persons to whom the lawyer, in the capacity of a trustee, executor, or corporate director, 
owes fiduciary duties.” Former OH EC 5-6 urged that a lawyer “should not consciously influence” a 
client to name the lawyer for such a role. In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Slavens, 63 Ohio 
St.3d 162, 586 N.E.2d 92 (1992), a lawyer was disciplined for, among other reasons, drafting a will 
for an incompetent client in which the lawyer was named a co-executor. 
If, in the absence of improper influence, the client independently desires to name the lawyer as 
executor or trustee, the lawyer can accept the appointment but, at a minimum, should explain to the 
client the potential conflict of interest that could arise from the lawyer accepting the position. For 
example, under the Code, the Board opined that before agreeing to be named executor in a will, the 
lawyer should disclose that the lucrative practice of probating wills may color the lawyer’s judgment 
in advising the client in the preparation of the will and that the lawyer may need to withdraw as 
executor if called upon to testify in a proceeding involving the estate. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-014, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 21 (May 30, 1989). See 
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also OH DR 5-101(B) and 5-102 (now Ohio Rule 3.7) and sections 3.7:100-:300 (lawyer as 
witness). 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Co-counsel arrangements: A lawyer should not permit his 
personal interests to influence his position on whether co-counsel should be employed on a particular 
matter. The lawyer must exercise his independent professional judgment in presenting the case for or 
against affiliation with co-counsel. 
Under the former OHCPR, where co-counsel were involved in a case but could not agree on an 
important issue, the disagreement should be explained and presented to the client for resolution, and 
the client’s decision should then control. OH EC 5-12. If the co-counsel relationship became too 
strained, withdrawal from the representation was an option. OH DR 2-110(C)(3). See section 
1.16:300. 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Client solicitation: Conflict-of-interest concerns can 
influence how a lawyer solicits new clients, even where the underlying interests of the new clients and 
existing clients do not conflict. This problem was presented under the Code in a Cincinnati Bar 
Association opinion, where a lawyer, representing a client in an action against a car dealer and finance 
company, alleged that the dealer filled in a price on the retail installment contract higher than the 
advertised price. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 95-96-04 (n.d.). The lawyer wanted to send a letter to 
other purchasers involved with that dealer and finance company, in order to secure their testimony 
concerning their experiences in this regard. In addition, the lawyer intended to advise them that they 
might have causes of action of their own and to solicit their business should they wish to pursue them. 
The bar association found that the use of a single letter to secure both of these ends would be improper. 
To meet the solicitation rules, the text of the letter and the envelope in which it is mailed would have 
to have printed upon them, in red ink, “ADVERTISEMENT ONLY.” See OH DR 2-101(F)(2)(e); 
the comparable provision in the Rules is Ohio Rule 7.3(c)(3). If the documents were so labeled, 
however, they might be ignored by the recipients, which would jeopardize the goal of identifying 
potential witnesses for the client’s case. For this reason, among others, the practice of using a single 
letter to achieve these two goals was disapproved. 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Part-time government employment: Numerous 
bar-association opinions under the OHCPR addressed the propriety of part-time employment as a 
lawyer for the government. While the practice often is permissible, there are numerous ethical pitfalls 
to be avoided. Among them is a concern that multiple employment may create personal or financial 
interests that may come into conflict with full and effective client representation. 
 While there is no per se prohibition against serving as both a city police officer and an 
assistant county prosecutor in the same county, the practice is not permitted if one of the 
positions acts as a check on or is subordinate to the other position, or if conflict arises in a 
particular case. At that point, the prosecutor should withdraw from the case. Bd. of Comm’rs 
on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-23, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 29 (Aug. 18, 
1989). 
 A lawyer who is retained on a case-by-case basis to represent a county on certain non-criminal 
matters may undertake private criminal defense representation in the county. However, full 
disclosure to and consent from the client should be obtained. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal 
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Op. 81-7 (Aug. 19, 1981). 
While many opinions focus on the lawyer who works part-time for the government, others focus on 
the effect that a part-time employee may have on the government lawyer employing her: 
Nothing in the [OHCPR] specifically prohibits a prosecuting attorney from appearing 
before a part-time municipal-court judge who employs the prosecutor’s assistant in his 
or her private practice. However, if the prosecutor’s professional judgment will be or 
reasonably may be affected by the assistant’s conflict of interest then he or she should 
not appear before the judge. The prosecutor should also avoid the appearance of 
impropriety. 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-013, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 23, at 
*1 (June 17, 1988) (syllabus). With respect to the appearance-of-impropriety standard, see section 
1.7:230. 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Money-back guarantees: Such arrangements, here with 
respect to the outcome of intellectual property litigation matters, would violate former OH DR 
5-101(A)(1), because if the agreed-upon outcome is not reached, the lawyer has a “strong financial 
incentive” to take the position that the client failed to comply with the conditions of the guarantee and 
therefore is not entitled to the refund. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-2, 
2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2, at *1 (Apr. 11, 2003). 
Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Client gifts to lawyer: See section 1.8:400. 
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1.8:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.8(a) is identical to the Model Rule, with the following exception: 
In division (a)(1), the words “and transmitted” following “disclosed” 
have been deleted and the words “to the client” have been added. 
Ohio Rule 1.8(b) is identical to the Model Rule, except that the “Except as permitted or required by 
these rules” language is placed at the beginning, rather than the end of the division. 
Ohio Rule 1.8(c) differs significantly from the Model Rule. Unlike the Model Rule, Ohio division (c) 
contains an absolute prohibition against the lawyer’s preparation on behalf of a client of an instrument 
giving, not only to the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer, but also to “the lawyer’s partner, 
associate, paralegal, law clerk, or other employee of the lawyer’s firm, [or] a lawyer acting ‘of 
counsel’ in the lawyer’s firm . . . any gift” (the MR refers to “substantial gift”), unless the lawyer or 
other recipient is related to the client. (The rule against soliciting a substantial gift from a client tracks 
the Model Rule except that it deletes the words “including a testamentary gift,”.) 
Subdivision (c)(1) is substantially the same as the text of the Model 
Rule, except that “related persons include” has been replaced with 
“‘person related to the lawyer’ includes”, and the word “sibling,” has 
been added after “grandparent,”. 
Subdivision (c)(2) adds the language “‘gift’ includes a testamentary 
gift.” 
Ohio Rule 1.8(d) is identical to the Model Rule. 
Ohio Rule 1.8(e) is substantively identical to the Model Rule. 
Ohio Rule 1.8(f) is substantively identical to the Model Rule, except that a new subdivision (4) has 
been added, dealing with lawyers compensated by an insurer to represent an insured; such a lawyer 
must deliver a copy of the Statement of Insured’s Rights to the client, which Statement is set forth in 
full as part of subdivision (4). 
Ohio Rule 1.8(g) is substantively identical to the Model Rule, with the exception of the addition, after 
“unless”, of the following language: “the settlement or agreement is subject to court approval or”. 
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Ohio Rule 1.8(h) is substantively identical to the Model Rule, with the following exceptions: 
In subdivision (h)(2), the words “with an unrepresented client or 
former client” after “liability” and the words “that person” after “unless” 
have been deleted. The remainder of the subdivision has been broken 
into subparts; subpart (h)(2)(i) is new and states “the settlement is not 
unconscionable, inequitable, or unfair”. Subpart (h)(2)(ii) retains the 
language from MR 1.8(h)(2), except that the words “the client or 
former client” have been added prior to the words “is advised”. Finally, 
new subpart (h)(2)(iii) (requiring informed consent by the client or 
former client) has been added. 
Ohio Rule 1.8(i) is substantively identical to the Model Rule. 
Ohio Rule 1.8(j) differs from the Model Rule, in that the word “have” after “not” has been deleted 
and the words “solicit or engage in” have been inserted at the same point, and, more significantly, the 
word “relations” has been deleted after “sexual” and “activity” substituted therefor. 
Ohio Rule 1.8(k) is substantively identical to the Model Rule. 
 
1.8:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following are listed in the Correlation Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 
1.8(a): DR 5-104(A), Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Hartke (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 65. 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.8(b): DR 4-101(B)(2). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.8(c): DR 5-101(A)(2) & (3). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.8(d): DR 5-104(B). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.8(e): DR 5-103(B). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.8(f)(1), (2) & (3): DR 5-107(A) & (B). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.8(f)(4). None. 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.8(g): DR 5-106. 
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The following are listed in the Correlation Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 
1.8(h): DR 6-102, Disciplinary Counsel v. Clavner (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 431. 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.8(i): DR 5-103(A). 
The following are listed in the Correlation Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 
1.8(j): Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Feneli (1996), 86 Ohio St.3d 102 & Disciplinary Counsel v. Moore 
(2004), 101 Ohio St.3d 261. 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.8(k): DR 5-105(D). 
 
1.8:200  Lawyer’s Personal Interest Affecting Relationship 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.8(a), (j) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.8(a), (j) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.21, 5.43-5.49 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 51:501 et seq. 
ALI-LGL § 126 
Wolfram §  8.11 
 
1.8:210  Sexual Relations With Clients 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.21 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.8(j) provides that a 
lawyer shall not solicit or engage in sexual activity with a client unless 
a consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the 
client-lawyer relationship commenced. 
Rule 1.8 cmt. [17] makes a number of important points with respect to this prohibition. First, the 
comment emphasizes the fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client: “The relationship is 
almost always unequal; thus, a sexual relationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair 
exploitation of the lawyer’s fiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer’s basic ethical obligation not to 
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use the trust of the client to the client’s disadvantage.” Second, the emotional involvement of such a 
relationship runs the risk of the lawyer being unable to carry out the representation without 
impairment of independent professional judgment. Third, it impacts negatively on attorney-client 
confidences, since the “blurred line between the professional and personal relationships” may result 
in client confidences being imparted in other than the attorney-client relationship, in which case they 
are unprotected. Fourth, the prohibition applies irrespective of consent and regardless of absence of 
prejudice to the client. 
The first case decided under Rule 1.8(j) fairly reflects each of these criteria. In Cincinnati Bar Ass’n 
v. Schmalz, 123 Ohio St.3d 130, 2009 Ohio 4159, 914 N.E.2d 1024, the respondent became 
sexually involved with her client, a criminal defendant. Included in the misconduct, according to the 
Court, was respondent’s requesting and/or engaging in telephonic sex with her client. Consistent with 
Comment 17, respondent was found to have violated 1.8(j), even though “respondent effectively 
performed her function in the criminal representation”; given that her case “dwells at the end of the 
spectrum representing the least egregious cases of sexual misconduct,” she was given a public 
reprimand only. Id. at para. 9. The reprimand sanction in Schmalz was followed (and Comment [17] 
was quoted in full) in Allen County Bar Ass’n v. Bartels, 124 Ohio St.3d 527, 2010 Ohio 1046, 
924 N.E.2d 833, where “respondent’s isolated violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) in an otherwise 
unblemished legal career had no adverse impact upon her representation of the client and was not part 
of a larger pattern of ethical misconduct.” Id. at para. 12. Citing Schmalz, the Court summarized its 
position on such facts in Disciplinary Counsel v. Detweiler 127 Ohio St.3d 73, 2010 Ohio 5033, 
936 N.E.2d 498, at para. 5:  “We have publicly reprimanded attorneys for having sexual 
relationships with clients when the relationships are legal, consensual, and have not compromised the 
clients’ interests.” For further comment on the Schmalz case, see Brian F. Toohey, Golf, A 
Mother’s Love, and Why You Should Not Have Telephone Sex with Clients, Cleveland Metro. 
B.J., April 2010, at p. 26. 
Comment [19] further notes that if the client is an organization, division (j) prohibits an inside or 
outside lawyer for the organization “from having a sexual relationship with a constituent . . . who 
supervises, directs or regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the organization’s legal matters.” 
Rule 1.8 cmt. [19]. (A pre-Rule case that fits the Comment 19 template is Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Kodish, 110 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006 Ohio 4090, 852 N.E.2d 160, where the respondent entered into a 
consensual sexual relationship with “Edwards, the clients’ representative and a principal of both 
corporations, while representing Triangle and T.D.I.” Id. at para. 65. The Court found violations of 
former DR 1-102(A)(6) and 5-101(A)(1). 
As the language of the Rule and the comments indicate, Ohio makes sexual “activity,” in the context 
of a sexual “relationship” that did not exist prior to the lawyer-client relationship, a violation. The 
Model Rule (along with every other Model Rule state of which we are aware except Florida (“sexual 
conduct”)) makes sexual “relations,” not activity, the trigger. The Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 
1.8 notes that division (j) is “consistent with” authority under the OHCPR. 
Much more important, and informative, is the statement in the Summary of Post-Comment 
Revisions to the Proposed Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct. The Summary states, at p. 3, that 
the change from “sexual relations” to “sexual activity” was made “since the latter term is defined in 
R.C. 2907.01(C).” 
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ORC 2907.01 provides a detailed (and graphic) definition of “sexual activity.” (This is, incidentally,  
a textbook illustration of “bright-line” criminal provisions.) Pursuant to division (C), “‘[s]exual 
activity’ means sexual conduct or sexual contact, or both.” These terms are defined in ORC 
2907.01(A) & (B). At the risk of offending some readers, they are set forth here in full: 
 (A) “Sexual conduct” means vaginal intercourse between a 
male and a female; and intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between 
persons regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, 
however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or 
other object into the vaginal or anal cavity of another. Penetration, 
however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse. 
 (B) “Sexual contact” means any touching of an erogenous zone 
of another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, 
pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of 
sexually arousing or gratifying either person. 
ORC 2709.01(A) & (B) leave little to the imagination and also leave at least some of the former 
OHCRP “sex” cases beyond the pale of the new Rule. (Needless to say, such conduct, even though 
not included within 1.8(j), may well violate other provisions of the Rules.) Thus, in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Freeman, 106 Ohio St.3d 334, 2005 Ohio 5142, 835 N.E.2d 26, the respondent had his 
client pose for nude photographs; he also bought her a bra-and-panty set on the way home from a 
court hearing. He solicited the same person to perform sex for money, but only after the 
attorney-client relationship had terminated. Such conduct would not violate Rule 1.8(j). In Freeman, 
the respondent was found to have violated former OH DR 1-102(A)(6) (fitness to practice) and 
5-101(A)(1) (professional judgment affected by personal interests); those findings would likely be 
replicated under Rules 8.4(h) and 1.7(a)(2). Another pre-Rule case that would be beyond the reach of 
Rule 1.8(j) (with the exception of occasional “touching”) is Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Linnen, 111 
Ohio St.3d 507, 2006 Ohio 5480, 857 N.E.2d 539, where the respondent, dubbed the “Naked 
Photographer” for his penchant for surprising women and photographing their reaction to his 
appearing in the buff, was found to have violated OH DR 1-102(A)(3) and (A)(6); it is likely that 
under the Rules those same provisions (8.4(b) & (h)) would be invoked on comparable facts. 
Although involving outlandish unprofessional conduct of a sexual nature (for which the lawyer 
received no actual suspension), one aspect of Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Moore, 101 Ohio 
St.3d 261, 2004 Ohio 734, 804 N.E.2d 423, would likewise not transgress the sexual activity ban in 
Rule 1.8(j). In Moore, there were two counts of misconduct, the second of which involved a 
consensual sexual relationship with a married twenty-two year old while representing her in child 
custody matters. This aspect would, of course, violate Rule 1.8(j). As to the first count, respondent 
was appointed to represent a woman charged with various traffic offenses. At their first meeting, on 
the day of the client’s arraignment, respondent commented on the size of his penis and various sexual 
positions that he said women preferred. Not surprisingly, the “client felt shocked and violated by 
respondent’s unsolicited sexual remarks.” Id. at para. 4. Their next meeting was recorded, and 
“respondent again persisted in asking about his client’s sexual experiences and preferences . . . .” Id. 
at para. 5. The panel found that respondent had violated OH DR 5-101(A)(1) (as well as DR 
1-102(A)(6)) as to both counts, but because of mitigating circumstances, particularly his “own 
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expressions of sorrow and regret,” id. at para. 8, recommended a stayed one-year suspension with 
conditions, plus one year of probation after the stayed suspension. The Board recommended that 
respondent be suspended for six months, with no stay. Before the Supreme Court, respondent argued 
that a public reprimand was the appropriate sanction, citing various consensual sexual relation cases, 
such as DePietro, discussed below. The Court found this unpersuasive, since only count two was 
consensual. Nevertheless, despite “denounc[ing] the misconduct in which he engaged,” id. at para. 
18, the Court proceeded to find that the mitigating circumstances -- respondent’s remorse, his 
assurances that it would never happen again, and testimonials from judges and prosecuting attorneys 
-- justified a stayed one-year suspension. Chief Justice Moyer was not convinced. In dissent, he 
agreed with the Board that respondent’s conduct toward the client in count one constituted sexual 
harassment and noted that the record reflected that this was not an isolated incident. Despite Chief 
Justice Moyer’s persuasive dissent as to sanctions, Moore’s indiscretions in count one, as noted, 
would not violate the Rule 1.8(j) prohibition regarding sexual activity, although it certainly could be 
argued that respondent’s remarks amounted to solicitation. 
A case under the Rules involving conduct somewhat similar to that in the first count in Moore is 
Akron Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 130 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011 Ohio 4412, 955 N.E.2d 359.  There is little 
doubt that in Miller the evidence reflected “solicit[ing] sexual activity” – the respondent suggested 
during a telephone call that his client perform oral sex on him, but the only violation charged was of 
Rule 8.4(h). The Court noted the absence of a Rule 1.8(j) charge, but did not elaborate further. 
A decision in which facts comparable to those in Miller did give rise to a Rule 1.8(j) charge and 
violation is Disciplinary Counsel v. Detweiler, 135 Ohio St.3d 447, 2013 Ohio 1747, 989 N.E.2d 
41 (soliciting oral sex in a text message). There were other incidents of “sexting” as well, including 
sending nude photos, but “[a]t no time did the client have sex with Detweiler or even meet with him 
socially.” Id. at para. 8. Detweiler is one of a growing number of cases in which the new technology, 
coupled with sexual aggressiveness, has gotten lawyers in trouble. See, e.g., Dayton Bar Ass’n v. 
Greenberg, 135 Ohio St.3d 430, 2013 Ohio 1723, 988 N.E.2d 559, discussed in section 8.4:300. 
The first advisory opinion by the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, Opinion 2011-1 (no 
specific date given), provides a detailed look at Rule 1.8(j), including advice regarding the 
“solicitation” aspect of the rule. In the bar association’s opinion, the solicitation requisite should be 
tested from the client’s, not the lawyer’s, point of view and should be both objective and subjective. 
Thus, 
for a “solicitation under Rule 1.8(j) to be made, the client must have 
actually regarded the lawyer’s words and actions as a solicitation and a 
reasonable person in the client’s position would have also regarded 
them as a solicitation.” 
Id. at pp. 2-3 (emphasis in original). The Court’s opinion in Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, 136 
Ohio St.3d 276, 2013 Ohio 3681, 995 N.E.2d 184, relies on the client’s subjective judgment that she 
was being solicited, but there also would seem to be little doubt that any objective observer would 
reach the same conclusion as a result of respondent’s offering to make “other arrangements” 
regarding the fee and suggesting that he come to the client’s home and that she answer the door 
naked.[!] As aptly put by the client, “‘[w]hat else would [Bunstine] be wanting to do, having me come 
to my door naked?’” Id. at para. 21. Indeed. 
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A Code case that would satisfy the “sexual contact” aspect of the sexual activity definition (as well as 
solicitation) is Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Lockshin, 125 Ohio St.3d 529, 2010 Ohio 2207, 929 
N.E.2d 1028, where the respondent was indefinitely suspended for multiple violations of DR 
1-102(A)(6) flowing from his pattern of touching, kissing, playing “footsie” with clients (and others), 
together with sexually oriented conversations and propositions. 
Numerous pre-Rule cases other than Moore found violations of the OHCPR resulting from sexual 
conduct with clients. The most recent is Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Williamson, 117 Ohio St.3d 
399, 2008 Ohio 1196, 884 N.E.2d 55, finding a violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) & (6); because of 
significant aggravating factors, as well as a separate violation of Gov Bar R V 4(G), respondent was 
given an indefinite suspension. In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Paxton, 66 Ohio St.3d 163, 
610 N.E.2d 979 (1993), a lawyer received a public reprimand for engaging in a consensual romantic 
relationship with a client while representing her in a divorce action. The lawyer conceded that his 
personal and financial interests stemming from this relationship may have affected his exercise of 
professional judgment on the client’s behalf in violation of former OH DR 5-101(A). Accord Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel v. DePietro, 71 Ohio St.3d 391, 391, 643 N.E.2d 1145, 1145 (1994) 
(public reprimand issued for two instances of entering into “consenting, romantic relationship[s]” 
with clients, which in each instance led to OH DR 5-101(A) conflict of interest and DR 1-102(A)(6) 
violations); Disciplinary Counsel v. Engler, 110 Ohio St.3d 138, 2006 Ohio 3824, 851 N.E.2d 502 
(same; citing Moore, Depietro, and Paxton). In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Booher, 75 Ohio 
St.3d 509, 664 N.E.2d 522 (1996), however, a court-appointed criminal-defense counsel received a 
one-year suspension for having sexual relations with his incarcerated client. Several factors 
influenced the Court in imposing this harsher punishment. First, the Court recognized that the 
lawyer-client relationship in a criminal matter is inherently unequal, with the lawyer dominant and 
the client dependent and vulnerable, thus heightening the lawyer’s responsibility: 
The more vulnerable the client, the heavier is the obligation upon the 
attorney not to exploit the situation for his own advantage. Whether a 
client consents to or initiates sexual activity with the lawyer, the burden 
is on the lawyer to ensure that all attorney-client dealings remain on a 
professional level. 
Id. at 510, 664 N.E.2d at 522. Second, the Court was influenced by the fact that the sexual act took 
place in the jail under the guise of a private lawyer-client conference. Exploiting one’s position as an 
officer of the court to secure access to a private place for illicit sexual activity clearly offended the 
Court. 
Citing Booher, the Supreme Court in 1999 imposed an 18-month suspension (with the final six 
months stayed) on a lawyer who engaged in sex with his client and subsequently proposed to reduce 
the fees owing in exchange for sexual acts.  Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Feneli, 86 Ohio St.3d 102, 712 
N.E.2d 119 (1999) (violation of OH DR 1-102(A)(6)). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Krieger, 
108 Ohio St.3d 319, 2006 Ohio 1062, 843 N.E.2d 765 (two-year suspension with one year stayed; 
citing Booher and Feneli precedents, among others). See Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Sams, 41 Ohio St.3d 
11, 535 N.E.2d 298 (1989) (six-month suspension; solicitation of sexual favors in payment of fee). It 
should be noted that in Sams it was the client who first suggested this arrangement, which the lawyer 
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was “interested in.”  Id. at 11, 535 N.E.2d at 299. Nor was the client in Feneli exactly uncooperative: 
“According to respondent, the client suggested to him several times that she had certain ‘other 
methods of payment that [he] would certainly enjoy more than money.’” 86 Ohio St.3d at 102, 712 
N.E.2d at 120. But, as the Court made clear, in situations such as this “[w]hether the client or [the 
lawyer] initiated the discussion that resulted in the . . . meeting [at which the lawyer proposed the 
reduction in fees] is immaterial.”  Id. at 103, 712 N.E.2d at 121. Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Bunstine, 136 Ohio St.3d 276, 2013 Ohio 3681, 995 N.E.2d 184 (rejecting respondent’s argument 
that client had initiated inappropriate conversation, citing Booher). 
In Akron Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 104 Ohio St.3d 317, 2004 Ohio 6588, 819 N.E.2d 677, the Court 
found respondent’s misconduct “more egregious” than that in Moore: “Not only did respondent take 
[sexual] advantage of a vulnerable client, he lied under oath to hide his misdeeds.” Id. at para. 15. As 
a result, Williams was suspended for two years with the last 18 months stayed on condition. Again, 
Chief Justice Moyer in dissent found the sanction inadequate, as he had in Moore. Citing Feneli, 
where the sexual misconduct resulted in an 18-month suspension with only six months stayed, the 
Chief Justice noted that 
[t]he lawyer in Feneli did not lie to conceal his misconduct and still he 
received a more severe sanction than the one the majority imposes 
upon respondent in this case. 
 I would sanction respondent’s exploitive and deceitful behavior 
by suspending him from the practice of law for two years with only one 
year stayed on the conditions imposed by the majority. 
Id. at paras. 20-21. A more severe sanction for similar conduct was imposed in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Sturgeon, 111 Ohio St.3d 285, 2006 Ohio 5708, 855 N.E.2d 1221. Respondent 
Sturgeon engaged in numerous sexual encounters with clients and then “lied repeatedly” about his 
misdeeds during the disciplinary process. Id. at para. 27. Because the aggravating factors “‘outweigh 
if not overwhelm’ the mitigating factors, the Court imposed disbarment (rather than indefinite 
suspension, as recommended by relators, the panel, and the Board) for multiple violations of former 
OH DR 1-102(A)(5) and 5-101(A)(1). The Court’s displeasure is reflected in the following 
comments: 
Respondent preyed on women who were in vulnerable legal and 
financial circumstances, and he tried to seduce them for his own selfish 
gratification. 
 . . . By repeatedly initiating sexual conduct with clients, 
respondent called into serious doubt his commitment to a profession in 
which the clients’ interests must always come first. 
*     *     * 
 . . . Respondent’s dishonesty about his misconduct and his 
willingness to blame his clients rather than accept responsibility for his 
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own actions demonstrates that he is no longer fit to practice a 
profession grounded on candor, integrity, loyalty, and fairness. 
Id. at paras. 24, 25, 27. 
Another Supreme Court case underscored the fact that under the Code the personal interest affecting 
the lawyer’s judgment was not dependent on there being an ongoing sexual relationship with the 
client. In Disciplinary Counsel v. Cirincione, 102 Ohio St.3d 117, 2004 Ohio 1810, 807 N.E.2d 
320, respondent had sex once with a woman who thereafter became his client and as to whom 
“respondent developed a romantic obsession . . . although they did not continue any sexual 
relationship.” Id. at para. 3. For violation of OH DR 1-102(A)(6), 5-101(A)(1) and other OHCPR 
provisions, respondent was suspended for one year, with six months stayed. The Cirincione case is 
further discussed in sections 1.8:620, 3.3:310, and 3.3:610. Cirincione would present no ethical 
violation under Rule 1.8(j), inasmuch as the sexual relationship predated the commencement of the 
attorney-client relationship. It would, however, in all likelihood implicate Rules 1.7(a)(2) and 8.4(h). 
A series of cases have imposed a six-month stayed suspension where the evidence indicated 
involvement with one client only, cooperation by the respondent in the investigation, and either no 
prior violations or significant mitigating factors. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Hines, 133 Ohio St.3d 
166, 2012 Ohio 3929, 977 N.E.2d 575; Disciplinary Counsel v. Siewert, 130 Ohio St.3d 402, 2011 
Ohio 5935, 958 N.E.2d 946; Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Burkholder, 109 Ohio St.3d 443, 2006 Ohio 
2817, 848 N.E.2d 840. Further, as the Court notes in Hines, the appropriate sanction in Rule 1.8(j) 
cases involving consensual relationships with clients is typically a public reprimand “when the 
relationships do not compromise the clients’ interests.” Id. at para. 14. 
For an extensive look at this issue, see Abed Awad, Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 22 J. Legal 
Prof. 131 (1998) (stating the case for a per se rule prohibiting attorney-client sex and canvassing the 
jurisdictions, ten of which at that time had adopted ethics rules expressly dealing with attorney-client 
sexual relations,  id. at 137-48. See also section 1.7:240. 
 
1.8:220  Business Transactions with Clients 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.43-5.49 (1996). 
In general: Lawyers and their clients often engage in mutually beneficial business transactions. 
Nevertheless, this is an area where the threat of lawyer overreaching is real. In many instances the 
lawyer’s training and skill may give the lawyer an advantage in any dealing with the client in which 
each has an independent financial interest. Further, the existence of the client-lawyer relationship 
may have created a bond of trust and confidence between them that could lead the client to be less 
protective of his or her own interests than the client would be in an arms-length transaction. Ohio 
Rule 1.8 cmt. [1]. Ohio Rule 1.8(a) strikes a compromise in this regard. The Rule, which addresses 
the propriety of a lawyer entering into a business transaction with a client or “knowingly acquiring an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to the client,” does not ban such 
practices outright. Rather, it allows them if three conditions are met: First, the transaction and terms 
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must be “fair and reasonable” to the client and fully disclosed in writing; second, the client must be 
advised in writing of the desirability of seeking independent legal advice; and third, the client must 
give informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. Rule 1.8(a)(1)-(3).  Each of these requisites 
is discussed more fully later in this section. 
As the comments make clear, the Rule extends to a wide range of business transactions between 
attorney and client, such as loans, sales, investments, or purchasing property from an estate the lawyer 
represents. It includes fee agreements, otherwise governed by Rule 1.5, if the fee involves the 
lawyer’s acceptance of an interest in the client’s business or receipt of other nonmonetary payment. 
The Rule must be complied with when the lawyer offers collateral services, such as title insurance or 
investment services, to existing clients of the lawyer’s legal services. Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [1]. 
The Rule applies whenever a lawyer enters into a business transaction with a current client, even if the 
subject of the representation is completely separate from and unrelated to the business transaction. Cf. 
Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [1]. Where the client expects the lawyer to represent the client’s interests in the 
transaction itself, the risks to the client are greatest. While the same rule applies, more may be 
required to meet its terms, such as greater disclosure as to the lawyer’s role, and the heightened risk of 
the lawyer’s subordinating the client’s interests to those of the lawyer. Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [3]. 
Excluded from the Rule are standard business transactions that the client enters into with a lawyer in 
which the lawyer is just another customer. Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [1]. As there stated, “the rule does not 
apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services 
that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical 
services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities’ services.” See Petersen 
Painting & Home Improvement, Inc. v. Znidarsic, 75 Ohio App.3d 265, 599 N.E.2d 360 
(Geauga 1991) (in home renovation company’s action against lawyer arising out of contact to 
remodel lawyer’s home and resulting dispute as to balance due on job, fact that lawyer had 
occasionally represented company and its president insufficient to create attorney-client relationship 
with respect to remodeling job, which was “outside their attorney-client relationship,”  id. at 269, 599 
N.E.2d at 362). That job, to use the language of Rule 1.8 cmt. [1], was a classic example of “standard 
commercial transaction[]” in which the home owner/lawyer clearly was not acting as a lawyer for the 
remodeler/sometimes client and to which the new Rule would be inapplicable. Rule 1.8 cmt. [1]. 
What if it is the lawyer who does the remodeling for the client? This rather unusual state of affairs was 
presented in Akron Bar Ass’n v. Gibson, 128 Ohio St.3d 347, 2011 Ohio 628, 944 N.E.2d 228, 
where the respondent entered into an oral agreement to perform painting and maintenance services for 
a client whom she was representing in a divorce proceeding. Because respondent did not disclose the 
terms in writing, or inform the client of the advisability of seeking independent counsel, or obtain the 
client’s informed written consent, the parties stipulated and the Board and Court found that she had 
violated Rule 1.8(a)(1), (2) & (3). 
It also should be noted that the concerns of the Rule are not limited to transactions between lawyer 
and client. Any transaction in which the lawyer acquires “an ownership, possessory, security or other 
pecuniary interest adverse to a client” also is covered. Ohio Rule 1.8(a). So, for example, if a 
third-party holds the mortgage on the client’s home and the lawyer seeks to purchase the mortgage 
from the third party, compliance with Ohio Rule 1.8(a) would be required. 
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The Rule significantly broadens the transactions subject to special control. OH DR 5-104(A), which 
formerly governed this issue, applied only when the lawyer and client had “differing interests” in the 
business transaction and the client expected the lawyer to exercise professional judgment for the 
client’s protection in the matter. Neither of these limitations is retained in the new Rule. 
If the business transaction would involve the lawyer’s accepting employment by the client and if the 
lawyer’s personal interest may then affect his ability to exercise independent judgment on behalf of 
the client, the conduct could violate Ohio Rule 1.7(a)(2) as well. Cf. Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [3]. See 
generally section 1.7:500. To the extent multiple clients are involved in the matter, a separate basis 
for violation of Ohio Rule 1.7(a)(2) may exist. See generally section 1.7:330. 
The Rule’s application is largely self-explanatory. As a threshold requirement the transaction and its 
terms must be objectively fair and reasonable. Ohio Rule 1.8(a)(1). To minimize the possibility that 
inadvertent misunderstanding might arise about these points, the Rule requires that the transaction 
and its terms must be fully disclosed to the client in writing in a manner that can be reasonably 
understood by the client. Id. 
Because of the risks of lawyer overreaching in business transactions with the client, it may well be 
appropriate for the client to obtain independent counsel in the matter. While independent counsel is 
not required, it is encouraged. To this end the lawyer involved in the transaction must advise the client 
in writing of the “desirability” of seeking the advice of independent counsel and provide the client a 
reasonable opportunity to do so. Ohio Rule 1.8(a)(2). 
Securing outside counsel will, in turn, alter the application of the Rule in several respects, as outlined 
in Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [4]. First, it is relevant in subsequent evaluations whether the transaction and 
its terms were fair and reasonable. If independent counsel advised the client on the matter, we are 
more likely to believe the deal met this standard. Second, the full-disclosure requirement concerning 
the transaction and its terms can be satisfied either by the lawyer who is the party to the transaction or 
by the independent attorney representing the client in the matter. (Should the client be represented in 
the matter, the duty in division (a)(2) suggesting such representation obviously no longer applies.) 
Finally, the representation is proper only if the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by 
the client, “to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the transaction, including 
whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.” Ohio Rule 1.8(a)(3). 
Like all of the 1.8 prohibitions other than sexual activity with a client, 1.8(j), the business transaction 
rule of (a) applies firm-wide. Thus partner A’s conduct can violate the rule even if his or her 
transaction is with a client of partner B. See Rule 1.8(i) & cmt. [20] and section 1.8:1200 infra. 
Other than Gibson, discussed above, all of the disciplinary cases decided thus far under Rule 1.8(a) 
involved a lawyer who sought and obtained a “loan” from one of his clients. Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Wickerham, 131 Ohio St.3d 205, 2012 Ohio 2580, 970 N.E.2d 932; Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Squire, 130 Ohio St.3d 368, 2011 Ohio 5578, 958 N.E.2d 914; Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Kiesling, 
125 Ohio St.3d 36, 2010 Ohio 1555, 925 N.E.2d 970. In Kiesling, the respondent asked his client if 
he could borrow the funds after the fact; he had already used the money for his own personal benefit. 
The Court affirmatively found that respondent did not satisfy the requirements of 1.8(a)(1) (full 
disclosure in writing) or (a)(2) (advising client in writing of desirability of seeking advice of 
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independent counsel); moreover, there is no indication that he made any effort to obtain the client’s 
informed consent in writing as required by (a)(3). This conduct was also found violative of Rule 
8.4(b), among other provisions.  
Cases decided under the Code analog to Rule 1.8(a) (OH DR 5-104(A)), may be instructive as to 
how the Supreme Court and ethics opinions will approach the Rule. A discussion of these authorities 
follows. 
Attorney involvement in business ventures with client: Lawyers often are involved in the day-to-day 
operations of the business clients they represent. At times, however, the lawyer’s conduct goes 
beyond mere representation to that of participation in the business venture itself. As the lawyer’s 
conduct shifted into the latter mode, OH DR 5-104(A) problems were more likely to arise. If the shift 
occurred without conscious planning by the parties, unanticipated conflicts could surface without the 
lawyer having secured the necessary client consent after full disclosure as the former rule required.  
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Warren, 66 Ohio St.3d 334, 612 N.E.2d 1223 (1993). 
At other times, the lawyer quite consciously entered into a business transaction with a client. Such 
transactions often were facilitated by the previous professional and possibly personal relationships of 
the parties. Those ties, coupled with the client’s reliance on the lawyer for advice on the transaction 
itself, presented significant opportunities for lawyer overreaching and resulting violation of OH DR 
5-104(A).  Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Osborne, 1 Ohio St.3d 140, 438 N.E.2d 114 (1982) 
(attorney, social friend, and confidant of his incompetent client, violated OH DR 5-104(A), among 
other provisions, by entering series of unfair business transactions with client, involving sale of 
client’s business and home to attorney or attorney’s significant other). Accord Medina County Bar 
Ass’n v. Carlson, 100 Ohio St.3d 134, 2003 Ohio 5073, 797 N.E.2d 55 (respondent, who was hired 
to represent mentally-ill client concerning litigation involving client’s property, bought property at 
fraction of its value and then attempted to cover up self-dealing with affidavit for client’s signature 
that gave appearance that client consented after full disclosure: “When an attorney enters into a 
business transaction with a client in violation of the [OHCPR], the closer the attorney’s misconduct 
is to deliberate deceit and misrepresentation, the more severe the sanction it requires,” id. at para. 31; 
two-year suspension imposed rather than Board’s recommended six months). 
The most recent DR 5-104 business transaction/conflict case is Disciplinary Counsel v. Cowden, 
131 Ohio St.3d 272, 2012 Ohio 877, 963 N.E.2d 1303, in which the two respondents, partners in a 
law firm, were sanctioned for their role in a series of complicated financial transactions involving 
multiple clients, where the lawyers and the clients had differing interests and there was no client 
consent after full disclosure. DR 5-101(A)(1) (professional judgment affected by lawyer’s personal 
interest) and 5-105(A) (must disclose conflicts that may compromise independent judgment) were 
also found to have been violated. As summarized by the Court, 
Cowden and Nagorney failed to adequately disclose potential conflicts 
of interest that were likely to compromise their independent judgment 
and failed to obtain their clients informed consent with respect to their 
representation of Old TSI, New TSI, and the multiple entities [in one of 
which, a venture capital firm, Cowden was a partner] involved in 
restructuring and financing those companies. 
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Id. at para. 17 (bracketed material added). 
 
The business venture in Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Marosan, 119 Ohio St.3d 113, 2008 Ohio 3882, 
892 N.E.2d 447, was a real estate trust created by respondent. The two other partners in the venture 
were clients of the respondent; one of those clients, Martin, put up all of the capital to purchase 
property in Pennsylvania for the trust. Respondent, who continued to represent Martin as well as the 
trust, did not suggest that Martin seek independent counsel or advise him of the risks attendant to this 
dual representation. Instead, respondent and the other client took excessive profit distributions on sale 
of the trust parcels and failed to reimburse Martin therefor. As a result, “[i]nstead of receiving 
one-third of the profits, Martin was the only one of three beneficiaries of the 3M Land Trust who lost 
money on the Pennsylvania property.” Id. at para. 9. “With respect to the above misconduct that 
allowed respondent to profit at the expense of Martin, the Board found that respondent had violated 
DR 5-104(A) . . . ,” id. at para. 10, and, given the presence of significant aggravating factors 
(including having been disciplined twice before) and the absence of mitigating factors, respondent 
was disbarred. 
Another conflict-of-interest case decided the same day as Marosan is Disciplinary Counsel v. 
McNamee, 119 Ohio St.3d 269, 2008 Ohio 3883, 893 N.E.2d 490, where respondent first entered 
into a joint venture with a client and then prevailed upon other clients to enter into a joint venture with 
the first client, without recommending that the second clients retain independent counsel or advising 
them of the potential conflicts such a simultaneous representation arrangement entailed, all in 
connection with a real estate development project in which respondent had “a significant financial 
interest.” Id. at para. 33. As in Marosan, respondent violated DR 5-104(A) (transacting business 
with a client if they have differing interests, without obtaining informed client consent), but was also 
found to have violated 5-101(A)(1) and 5-105(B), which prohibit, other than with informed client 
consent, entering into employment where professional judgment may be affected by the lawyer’s own 
interest, or continuing to represent two or more clients who themselves have conflicting interests. In 
the words of the Court, “[r]espondent continued to represent all sides to the Summer Brooke 
development despite obvious conflicts of interest which he never disclosed to his clients and which 
they never waived, despite repeated calls for his disqualification . . . .” Id. at para. 32. 
The seeming ultimate in horror stories of this sort is found in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 114 Ohio 
St.3d 108, 2007 Ohio 3253, 868 N.E.2d 973. The Cook case involved one client, a 90-year old 
woman who lived alone on her $275,000 farm and had no relatives.  Respondent prepared and had the 
client execute a series of estate-related documents (living trust, will, durable power of attorney, etc.) 
that put respondent in the driver’s seat in each instance.  Without going into the lurid detail contained 
in the Court’s opinion (altering and misdating deeds, forging signatures and so on), respondent 
became by gift the grantee, first as trustee and then unilaterally changed by respondent to herself 
individually, of the farm, which she then deeded to the client’s church (allegedly pursuant to her 
client’s wishes), for which respondent took, for five years commencing in tax year 2000, charitable 
deductions on her individual tax return in the total amount of $225,000.  One of the many problems in 
respondent’s executing this scheme was that, in the words of the Court, 
respondent took advantage of her client’s assets by claiming 
deductions for the year 2000 and afterward for a charitable contribution 
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that we can only conclude occurred sometime after May 8, 2001 [when 
respondent opened the case file for this client]. 
Id. at para. 31.  Respondent claimed that the gift actually occurred on Christmas Day 2000, but as the 
Court notes, “[o]ddly, however, that date precedes the July 12 and September 10, 2001 recording 
dates of Deeds A and B, the deeds from which respondent supposedly obtained her personal interest 
in the farm.”  Id. at para. 23.  Among the many instances exposing respondent’s duplicity, we think 
this one particularly telling: 
 Respondent eventually admitted that May 20, 1998, was not the 
date on which Deed A was actually executed.  She had no alternative.  
The notary public who authenticated the deed did not receive her 
commission until 2000. 
Id. at para. 13.  As the Court succinctly summed it all up, “she gamed the system,” id. at para. 32, 
and for doing so was disbarred. 
This sort of overreaching and unfairness was not required to find a violation, however. All that was 
required was that lawyer and client had “differing interests” in the business transaction, the client 
expected the lawyer to exercise professional judgment for the client’s protection in the matter, and the 
lawyer failed to receive the client’s consent to proceed after full disclosure. See Akron Bar Ass’n v. 
Markovich, 117 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008 Ohio 862, 883 N.E.2d 104, at para. 15. Thus a violation of 
DR 5-104(A) could occur even though “‘[t]here was no evidence of deceit or misrepresentation by 
Respondent [or] that the client *** suffered any resulting harm.’” Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Corbin, 109 
Ohio St.3d 241, 2006 Ohio 2289, 846 N.E.2d 1249, at para. 22 (quoting panel) (purchase of real 
estate from client at client’s request, with payment to be made by respondent’s proceeds from 
mortgaging property; unbeknownst to respondent, client had mental-health problems at time of deal 
and, later, criminal-law problems; respondent decided to go through with transactions because of 
client’s financial distress, exacerbated by legal representation expenses arising from the criminal 
charges; because of extraordinary mitigating circumstances, particularly his entering into the 
transactions in order to help his client, public reprimand imposed instead of six-month suspension 
agreed to by parties). In Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Gunnoe, 64 Ohio St.2d 172, 413 N.E.2d 842 (1980), a 
lawyer was sanctioned for arranging the sale of a client’s business to a corporation of which the 
lawyer was the majority shareholder, where the lawyer did not disclose his interest in the transaction 
until the closing. By delaying the disclosure, the lawyer represented a client with differing interests 
than his own, without consent after full disclosure, in violation of OH DR 5-104(A). Accord Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel v. Allen, 91 Ohio St.3d 27, 740 N.E.2d 1094 (2001), discussed at section 
1.7:500. 
Client investment in attorney-owned enterprises: Clients often seek investment advice from their 
attorneys. Sometimes this involves investment of the client’s existing capital; other times it involves 
funds recently received, such as proceeds from settled estates or concluded litigation. Clients who 
have recently received money to invest may be particularly likely to rely on the attorney for advice, 
either because of the stress of the underlying matter now resolved, or because of their often 
comparative unfamiliarity with financial matters. 
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In this setting, the lawyer may wish to direct the client’s investment to an enterprise in which the 
lawyer has an interest. In such circumstances, the lawyer as owner and the client as investor may have 
the same desired outcome. But pursuant to Rule 1.8(a), such a business transaction with a client is 
prohibited, unless all of the provisions of Ohio Rule 1.8(a)(1)-(3) are met. 
While former OH DR 5-104(A) technically was violated whenever a transaction, involving differing 
interests and client expectation that the lawyer was acting to protect the client’s interest, proceeded 
without the required disclosure and consent, the reported cases typically involved more, such as a 
client loss on the investment, Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Ramsayer, 50 Ohio St.3d 129, 552 
N.E.2d 932 (1990) (attorney persuaded client to invest settlement money in corporation of which 
attorney was sole stockholder; corporation ultimately ceased operations, resulting in loss of client’s 
investment), or a broader pattern of attorney wrongdoing in handling the investment and related 
matters.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. McCoy, 28 Ohio St.3d 96, 502 N.E.2d 642 (1986) (attorney, 
without disclosure of his own interests, induced several clients to invest in company in which lawyer 
was involved, and then failed to provide to clients expected return or to answer client inquiries about 
their investments); Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Zarka, 24 Ohio St.3d 157, 493 N.E.2d 1363 (1986) 
(one-year suspension of attorney who convinced clients to invest funds in various corporations and 
partnerships with him; degree of disclosure of the lawyer’s interest was unclear, and he failed to 
provide full documentation of the investment or to return funds upon request; lying and deceit also 
involved). This pattern of damage to the client being a typical, but not required, element in such cases 
will probably continue under Rule 1.8(a). 
Loans between attorney and client: Unauthorized taking of client funds as a loan clearly violated not 
only 5-104(A), but also various other provisions of the former OHCPR.  Bar Ass’n of Greater 
Cleveland v. Cook, 18 Ohio St.3d 149, 480 N.E.2d 436 (1985) (borrowing $10,000 from estate and 
placing it in personal bank account where it was attached by creditors violated numerous disciplinary 
rules, including OH DR 5-104(A)); cf. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Hock, 36 Ohio St.3d 177, 
522 N.E.2d 543 (1988) (unauthorized withdrawal of funds from estate’s bank account or use of 
guardian’s funds as collateral for personal loan violated, inter alia, OH DR 5-104(A)). See also 
sections 8.4:400 and 1.15:200. 
The special role of OH DR 5-104(A), however, was in the regulation of consensual loan 
arrangements between attorney and client. It did not matter whether the loan was from the client to the 
lawyer, Disciplinary Counsel v. Shaw, 126 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010 Ohio 4412, 935 N.E.2d 405, 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Dettinger, 121 Ohio St.3d 400, 2009 Ohio 1429, 904 N.E.2d 890, or from 
the lawyer to the client.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Herrold, 61 Ohio St.3d 542, 575 N.E.2d 796 
(1991) (attorney, as trustee for investment company for which he controlled all stock by power of 
attorney, arranged for company to make loans and engage in property transfers with other 
unsophisticated clients of attorney without complying with OH DR 5-104(A)). In either situation, 
their positions as lender and borrower constituted “differing interests,” as set forth in the rule. If the 
client expected the lawyer to be acting on its behalf, then full disclosure by the lawyer and consent by 
the client were required. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Robertson, 113 Ohio St.3d 360, 2007 Ohio 
2075, 865 N.E.2d 886 (DR 5-104(A) violated by obtaining loans from elderly, nursing-home client 
without urging client to seek independent counsel or obtaining client consent after full disclosure; 
indefinite suspension imposed, even though misappropriation did not involve DR 1-102(A)(4) 
violation. “We have not tolerated such self-dealing from this profession.” Id. at para. 14.); 
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Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Rothermel, 112 Ohio St.3d 443, 2007 Ohio 258, 860 N.E.2d 754 
(persuading brain-damaged client to loan respondent $15,000, “ostensibly to finance expansion of his 
practice,” id. at para. 6, without collateral and without paying off loan by due date, violated 5-104(A); 
given extensive prior history of violations and other aggravating circumstances, respondent 
disbarred). 
Even if the initial loan was permissible, any restructuring or compromise of the loan again invoked 
OH DR 5-104(A) concerns.  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Hartke, 67 Ohio St.3d 65, 616 N.E.2d 186 
(1993) (applying 5-104(A) to transaction involving compromise of loan). 
In Hartke, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the nature of the full-disclosure requirement. An 
attorney who had received a loan from a client in 1976 contacted the client in 1989 to compromise the 
loan, in a context where the client clearly considered him to be her attorney. The compromise was 
highly favorable to the lawyer and was done in part to shield assets from the Ohio Department of 
Mental Health, which was seeking payment for treatment provided the client during a period of 
involuntary commitment, for which the client did not want to pay. Under these circumstances, 
“respondent could not comply with the full disclosure requirement in former OH DR 5-104(A) 
without insisting [the client] receive independent legal advice about the compromise” and “without 
sufficiently explaining that he would represent his own, rather than [the client’s], interests.”  Id. at 68, 
616 N.E.2d at 187 (violations of OH DR 1-102(A)(4) and 7-102(A)(7) also found). 
See also Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2004-8, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 12 (Oct. 8, 2004) (acquiring mortgage on client’s home to secure legal fee is business 
transaction involving differing interests governed by OH DR 5-104(A), as to which transaction full 
disclosure and consent were required). 
Attorney provision of nonlegal services: Some lawyers practice multiple professions, serving not 
only as lawyers but as real estate agents, insurance agents, and the like. If the lawyer plays multiple 
roles for a client, the lawyer’s provision of nonlegal services may be considered a business transaction 
with the client, in which they have differing interests. If the client expected the lawyer to exercise his 
professional judgment as a lawyer on the client’s behalf in the provision of these nonlegal services, 
OH DR 5-104(A) applied, and full disclosure and consent were required. (This conduct more often 
was regulated as a OH DR 5-101(A) concern. See section 1.7:500.) 
The mere fact that conduct is permissible, with full disclosure and consent, does not make it advisable. 
For example, the Ohio State Bar Association addressed the question whether a lawyer involved in 
estate planning could also become a registered salesperson for a company selling securities and 
commodities and sell those products to his clients. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 79-6 (Sept. 
20, 1979). While acknowledging that the conduct would be permissible with consent after full 
disclosure, the OSBA warned “nonetheless, we are of the opinion that such transactions between 
lawyer and client are so risky and so fraught with the danger of overreaching the client by the lawyer 
either intentionally or unintentionally that such transactions should be avoided.” Id. at 6. See also 
Ethics Opinion, Cincinnati Bar Rep., Dec. 1986/Jan. 1987, at 7, 10 (“[W]hile the receipt of 
income from the sale of commodities or services to legal clients by an attorney engaged in a second 
occupation is not expressly prohibited, the dual practitioner bears a very high burden, and the 
concomitant risk, of complying with the Code of Professional Responsibility in such circumstances, 
and in particular of maintaining the requisite independence of judgment.”). 
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Attorney referrals for nonlegal services to enterprises in which the attorney has an interest: While 
seemingly not directly on point, OH DR 5-104(A) was cited in a number of cases addressing whether 
a lawyer could invest in a nonlegal enterprise and refer clients to that enterprise. A lawyer who had a 
financial interest in a real-estate brokerage business, for example, might refer clients who needed 
such services to that business. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 80-2 (Feb. 13, 1980) (referrals to 
real-estate agent spouse or employment of spouse to make appraisals needed for lawyer’s clients); 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 76-7 (July 16, 1976) (referrals to real-estate brokerage 
company in which lawyer had financial interest). Representing a client and making such referrals was 
permitted as long as the lawyer fully disclosed his financial interest in the enterprise. Should a dispute 
arise between the client and the brokerage firm, however, the lawyer would have to withdraw as 
counsel to the client on that matter. Id. 
General business dealings with a client - Other: Not all business transactions neatly fall within the 
categories outlined above. Nevertheless, they still could come within the ambit of former OH DR 
5-104(A). 
The Board of Commissioners, for example, opined that it would be improper under a number of 
OHCPR provisions, including OH DR 5-104(A) (and OH DR 5-101(A)(1), see section 1.7:500), for 
a law firm to enter into a business agreement to pay an annual fee to a real estate agency and offer 
discounted legal services to the agency’s customers, in exchange for the agency’s promoting the firm 
as a service provider. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-1, 2002 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 15 (Feb. 1, 2002). The Board found this arrangement to be “[c]ircuitously, . . . 
entering into a business relationship with clients.” Id. at *11. 
The Toledo Bar Association addressed whether a lawyer could purchase a judgment lien that the 
client could not presently satisfy and through which a third party threatened to foreclose on the 
client’s home. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 91-9 (n.d.). This act, while benefiting the client by preventing 
immediate foreclosure, would place the lawyer and client in adversary positions in the long run. The 
opinion approved the conduct as long as the client consented after full disclosure. It described the 
necessary disclosure in the following terms: 
The disclosure should be in writing and should encompass all aspects 
of the transaction. The client should be advised whether she is signing a 
cognovit, and if so, the connotation of such an act. She should be 
advised that the property may deteriorate and that later a deficiency 
judgment, if any, would be greater than that at the present time. All 
other aspects of the transaction should be fully and clearly disclosed in 
writing by the attorney to the client. 
Id. at 1. 
In Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Nesbitt, 69 Ohio St.2d 108, 431 N.E.2d 323 (1982), the 
Supreme Court found that a lawyer violated OH DR 5-104(A) by arranging for a client to make a loan 
to a third party without advising the client that the lawyer was to be paid a finder’s fee by the third 
party. 
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And in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-1, 2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 1 (Apr. 11, 2003), the Board opined that it would be improper for a law firm to accept a fee, 
based on the size of the transaction, from a lender for introducing the seller of a business entity to the 
lender: 
The agreement between the lawyer and lender for such a referral fee 
compromises the lawyer’s exercise of independent professional 
judgment and involves the lawyer and law firm in improper business 
relationships with the lender, the buyer, and the seller. 
Id. at *1 (syllabus). 
Finally, the Board issued an opinion stating that it was ethically improper for a lawyer to accept a fee 
from a financial services group for referring to the group clients in need of financial services. Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievance & Discipline Op. 2000-1, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 11, 
2000) (syllabus). In its ruling, the Board found that such an arrangement involved an improper 
business relationship with clients and nonlawyers under former OH DR 3-103(A) and 5-104(A). 
Further, the referral fee agreement created a financial interest that could affect the professional 
judgment of the lawyer under OH DR 5-101(A)(1) and 5-107(A)(1)-(2). Because of the joint 
application of these rules and because OH DR 3-103(A) did not contain a full disclosure and consent 
exception (even though the other applicable rules did), the full disclosure and consent exception did 
not apply. 
In the course of its opinion, the Board reasoned as follows: 
If during the legal representation, a lawyer ascertains that a client needs 
financial services, the lawyer has a fiduciary duty to refer a client to 
appropriate resources. These referrals are part of the attorney’s practice 
of law. The lawyer’s duty of loyalty demands that the referral be made 
in the client’s best interest, free of compromise and conflict. A lawyer 
should not make these referral decisions based on financial incentives 
that a particular company may offer the lawyer. 
* * * 
. . . A referral fee is a financial interest that will or reasonably may 
affect a lawyer’s professional judgment under DR 5-101(A). The more 
referrals, the more money made. 
Op. 2000-1, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1, at *7. 
 
1.8:300  Lawyer’s Use of Client Information 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.8(b) 
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Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.8(b) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  55:2001 
ALI-LGL §  60 
Wolfram §  6.7 
Ohio Rule 1.8(b) precludes a lawyer from using information relating to the representation “to the 
disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent,” “[e]xcept as permitted or 
required by these rules.” For example, if a lawyer learns that a client wants to acquire certain property, 
and that information relates to the representation of the client, the lawyer cannot use that information 
to purchase the land in competition with the client or to recommend that another client make such a 
purchase, absent the client’s consent. Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [5]. 
A number of important points should be noted: While use of such information to benefit the lawyer or 
a third party often goes hand-in-hand with disadvantage to the client (as in Comment 5 above), the 
exclusive trigger is client disadvantage. If use of such information benefits the lawyer or another 
without disadvantage to the client, there is no violation of Rule 1.8(b), as there was a violation of 
former OH DR 4-101(B)(3), absent client consent.  See Rule 1.8 cmt. [5] (division (b) “does not 
prohibit uses that do not disadvantage the client,” “whether or not the information is used to benefit 
either the lawyer or a third person”). And unlike former OH DR 4-101(B)(2) (which, read literally, 
imposed an absolute prohibition against use to the client’s disadvantage, irrespective of client 
consent), the Rule 1.8(b) prohibition against such use does not apply if the client gives informed 
consent. 
Further, the opening clause of division (b) (“Except as permitted or required by these rules”) refers to 
instances in which a lawyer may or must use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the client irrespective of the Rule 1.8(b) prohibition.  See Rule 1.8 cmt. [5], which, 
with reference to the “permitted or required” exceptions, lists “Rules 1.2(d), 1.6, 1.9(c), 3.3, 4.1(b), 
8.1 and 8.3.”  We believe this list to be both erroneous and confusing.  First, as a general matter, the 
subject here is use of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client; a 
number of the listed rules (1.6, 3.3, 4.1(b), 8.1, 8.3) deal with permissive or mandatory disclosure of 
such information, not use.  (Admittedly, disclosure would often seem to be a “use” as well, but the 
Rules distinguish between the two.  Compare Rule 1.6 (“revealing” such information) with 1.8(b) 
(“using” such information).)  Second, even if both use and disclosure provisions are considered, Rule 
1.2(d) deals with neither.  Third, with respect to Rule 8.3, it imposes a reporting duty regarding 
“unprivileged knowledge.”  According to the Board of Commissioners, this means that some, but not 
all, information relating to the representation must be reported; such information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege need not be.  Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2007-1, 
2007 Ohio Griev Discip LEXIS 1 (Feb. 9, 2007).  There is no indication in the Board’s opinion that 
presence or absence of detriment to the client is a relevant factor.  Opinion 2007-1 is also discussed in 
section 8.3:400. 
The former disciplinary rule addressed the problem of misuse of client information in two respects: (1) 
read literally, it prohibited using the information “to the disadvantage of the client,” irrespective of 
client consent, OH DR 4-101(B)(2), and (2) it also prohibited the use of the information for the 
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advantage of the lawyer, or a third person other than the client, unless the client consented after full 
disclosure. OH DR 4-101(B)(3). See, e.g., as to the former, Disciplinary Counsel v. Cowden, 131 
Ohio St.3d 272, 2012 Ohio 877, 963 N.E.2d 1303 (discussed in section 1.6:230 at “Misusing client 
information”), Disciplinary Counsel v. Kimmins, 123 Ohio St.3d 207, 2009 Ohio 4943, 915 
N.E.2d 330 ((B)(2) violated by respondent’s “misuse of Steiner’s confidential information to his 
disadvantage to solicit the support to Steiner’s children for the [property] cleanup operation, which he 
knew Steiner would oppose,” id. at para. 15), and as to the latter, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Robertson, 113 Ohio St.3d 360, 2007 Ohio 2075, 865 N.E.2d 886 (exploiting position with client to 
own financial advantage). Violation of both 4-101(B)(2) & (3) was found in Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Baumgartner, 100 Ohio St.3d 41, 2003 Ohio 4756, 796 N.E.2d 495, where respondent 
threatened to reveal client trade secrets to competitors if her demands for payment for nonexistent 
professional services were not met. 
At least one court declined to apply 4-101(B)(2) as written, which made it a violation to use client 
information to the client’s disadvantage even if the client consented to such use. See Spivey v. 
Bender, 77 Ohio App.3d 17, 601 N.E.2d 56 (Lucas 1991) (reversing disqualification where former 
client, after full disclosure, agreed to “use” by the lawyer of confidential information that may have 
been to former client’s disadvantage in subsequent litigation against him). And in Dietz-Britton v. 
Smythe, Cramer Co., 139 Ohio App.3d 337, 743 N.E.2d 960 (Cuyahoga 2000), the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals used former OH EC 4-5 to the same end. Even though EC 4-5, like DR 4-101(B), 
drew a clear distinction between use of information to the disadvantage of the client (no provision for 
client consent) and use for the lawyer’s own purposes (provision for consent): 
 A lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of 
the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client and a 
lawyer should not use, except with the consent of his client after full 
disclosure, such information for his own purposes, 
the court quoted EC 4-5 as if it made provision for client consent in instances of use to the client’s 
disadvantage. In the Dietz-Britton court’s “revised version,” EC 4-5 looked like this: 
“A lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of the 
representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client, except with 
the consent of his client after full disclosure, * * *” 
id at 353, 743 N.E.2d at 972 (ellipsis in original). See also Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal 
Ethics §  6.7.6, at 305 & n.88 (1986) (strongly disapproving of literal reading and agreeing with 
result in cases such as Spivey and Dietz-Britton). 
This issue has now been resolved by Rule 1.8(b), which expressly provides that a lawyer can use 
information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client, so long as the client gives 
informed consent. 
Examples of the unauthorized use of client information by lawyers arise in numerous contexts. Some 
involve business dealings with the client. See, e.g., under the former OHCPR, Stark County Bar 
Ass’n v. Osborne, 1 Ohio St.3d 140, 438 N.E.2d 114 (1982) (lawyer misused client confidences for 
his own advantage (and disadvantage of client) in business dealings with client). See generally Rule 
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1.8(a) (limiting business transactions with client). See also section 1.8:220. As the Court stated in 
Findlay/Hancock County Bar Ass’n v. Filkins, 90 Ohio St.3d 1, 11, 734 N.E.2d 764, 772 (2000): 
“It is virtually axiomatic that where an attorney who represents himself and his client in a business 
deal, and the client loses money on the deal, a presumption arises that the attorney used client 
confidences to his client’s disadvantage.” In other instances the lawyer exploits client confidences to 
obtain leverage in disputes with the client. See, e.g., Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Watkins, 
68 Ohio St.2d 11, 427 N.E.2d 516 (1981) (attorney disciplined for threatening to disclose 
confidential information to taxing authorities as part of attempt to coerce client to drop disciplinary 
complaint). Each of these three cases would run afoul of Rule 1.8(b). 
With respect to unauthorized use of confidential information and secrets in litigation, see Lightbody 
v. Rush, 137 Ohio App.3d 658, 665, 739 N.E.2d 840, 845 (Cuyahoga 2000) (reversing order 
granting law firm’s motion to compel deposition answers of former co-counsel; order “effectively 
allowed [law firm], for the purpose of procuring discovery for its own advantage and without 
evidence of full disclosure to [client], to waive both [client’s] testimonial privilege and each 
attorney’s ethical obligation to safeguard his confidences and secrets,” citing former OH 
4-101(B)(3)). The Lightbody case is discussed in greater detail at section 1.6:500. 
For discussion of prohibitions on a lawyer’s use of protected client information in the context of 
conflict of interests, see sections 1.6:230 (lawyer self-dealing in confidential information); 1.6:240 
(abuse of confidential information in multiple-client settings); 1.6:390 (confidentiality and conflicts 
of interest generally); and 1.9:400 (use or disclosure of former client’s confidences). 
 
1.8:400  Client Gifts to Lawyer 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.8(c) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 5.18 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.8(c) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:601 
ALI-LGL §  127 
Wolfram §  8.12 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.18 (1996). 
In general: Because lawyers and clients often develop close relationships, it is not uncommon for a 
client to want to make a gift to a lawyer. Yet, given their fiduciary relationship, the fear is that such a 
gift may be the product of lawyer overreaching, or at least that it may appear to be so. 
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In response to these concerns, Ohio Rule 1.8(c) does not prohibit all client gift-giving to lawyers, but 
it does place limits on the process. Thus, division (c) provides that a lawyer “shall not solicit any 
substantial gift from a client.” Comment [6] makes clear that the lawyer may accept an unsolicited 
gift from a client, even a substantial one, “although such a gift may be voidable by the client under the 
doctrine of undue influence, which treats client gifts as presumptively fraudulent.” Ohio Rule 1.8 
cmt. [6]. Soliciting, as opposed to accepting, a substantial gift is precluded, unless the lawyer is 
related to the client. Id. Ohio’s rewrite of the Model Rule language in the introductory paragraph of 
division (c) makes this related-to-the-client exception with respect to solicitation less than clear, but 
the comment’s interpretation seems a reasonable one. With respect to drafting of instruments making 
gifts to the lawyer, see below. 
Lawyer-beneficiary prohibitions: One area where this problem frequently arises concerns the client 
who wants to have his or her lawyer, or one closely associated with the lawyer, named as a 
beneficiary in the client’s will or in some other instrument, such as a trust. This conduct has 
implications both for lawyer discipline and for the validity of the instrument itself. 
Until amended in 1996, former OH DR 5-101(A) did not speak to this issue directly, but only through 
the general prohibition against allowing the lawyer’s personal interests to interfere with 
representation of the client. Former OH EC 5-5 admonished the lawyer that absent “exceptional 
circumstances [the] lawyer should insist that an instrument in which his client desires to name him 
beneficially be prepared by another lawyer selected by the client.” Even these protections were 
subject to waiver by client consent after full disclosure. 
Effective May 1, 1996, OH DR 5-101(A) was amended both to make explicit and to strengthen the 
prohibition in this area. Amended subsection OH DR 5-101(A)(2) provided that “a lawyer shall not 
knowingly prepare, draft, or supervise the preparation or execution of a will, codicil, or inter vivos 
trust for a client” in which the lawyer, an affiliated lawyer or employee, or a close relation of any of 
the above was named as a beneficiary. With but one exception (gifts made by relatives), the 
prohibition was absolute and could not be cured by client consent. 
Ohio Rule 1.8(c) largely continues these absolute prohibitions with respect to lawyer-beneficiary 
gifts. In the words of the Rule: 
 A lawyer shall not prepare on behalf of a client an instrument 
giving the lawyer, the lawyer’s partner, associate, paralegal, law clerk, 
or other employee of the lawyer’s firm, a lawyer acting as “of counsel” 
in the lawyer’s firm, or a person related to the lawyer any gift 
[including a testamentary gift, see subdivision (c)(2)] unless the lawyer 
or other recipient of the gift is related to the client. 
Although implicit in division (c), Comment [7] expressly states that with respect to such gifts by an 
instrument such as a will or conveyance, “the client should have the detached advice that another 
lawyer can provide. The sole exception to this rule is where the client is a relative of the donee.” Ohio 
Rule 1.8 cmt. [7]. Consistent with division (c), this must be read as requiring that “the detached 
advice that another lawyer can provide” includes the preparation of such instruments. 
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For purposes of division (c), a related person includes a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, 
sibling “or other relative or individual with whom the lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial 
relationship.” Ohio Rule 1.8(c)(1). 
Under the OHCPR, even gifts from relatives were not beyond the reach of the disciplinary authorities, 
if the lawyer’s conduct smacked of overreaching. In Akron Bar Ass’n v. Parker, 52 Ohio St.3d 262, 
557 N.E.2d 116 (1990), for example, an attorney drafted a will and trust agreement for his failing 
98-year-old father and named himself as trustee of the estate’s assets with unfettered discretion in 
their use. This superseded a will drafted six months earlier by independent counsel. The earlier will 
had made specific bequests to the testator’s four children. In a 4-3 opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court 
found that this conduct violated former OH DR 5-101(A) and suspended the respondent for one year. 
While such a gift would pass muster under a literal reading of Rule 1.8(c), it is highly likely that such 
behavior would run afoul of other provisions, such as Ohio Rule 1.7(a)(2). 
In the first Supreme Court decision discussing amended OH DR 5-101(A), Toledo Bar Ass’n v. 
Cook, 97 Ohio St.3d 225, 2002 Ohio 5787, 778 N.E.2d 40, respondent in 1998 prepared a will for 
her client giving most of the marital trust assets to a corporation owned by respondent’s siblings. 
“This transaction effectively donated approximately $ 300,000 to respondent’s siblings’ corporation.” 
Id. at para. 4. After the testator’s children retained counsel to contest the will, respondent resigned as 
trustee of the trust, and the corporation disclaimed any interest in the estate. The Court noted that the 
panel had found a number of mitigating factors, including the resignation and the fact that “all of the 
assets that were bequested to Advanced Living [the siblings’ corporation] were given to the client’s 
children.” Id. at para. 8. The Court further noted, interestingly, that: 
As an aggravating factor, the panel was concerned that respondent, a 
prominent attorney in estate planning, had not been aware of applicable 
ethical standards, particularly the absolute prohibition in DR 
5-101(A)(2)(e) against preparing a will or trust naming the attorney’s 
siblings. 
Id. Respondent was given a one-year suspension with six months stayed. The sanction aspect is more 
fully discussed this section infra, at “Sanctions for violation of lawyer-beneficiary prohibitions.” A 
subsequent case, following Cook and meting out the same sanction for similar conduct, is 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelleher, 102 Ohio St.3d 105, 2004 Ohio 1802, 807 N.E.2d 310. Both of 
these decisions were cited in the most recent invocation of DR 5-101(A)(2), Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Shaw, 126 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010 Ohio 4412, 935 N.E.2d 405 (preparing for elderly unrelated client 
trust in which respondent’s five children were named as beneficiaries; two-year suspension with one 
year stayed on conditions). (The further adventures of lawyer Cook, resulting in disbarment, are 
recounted in section 1.8:220; see Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 114 Ohio St.3d 108, 2007 Ohio 3253, 
868 N.E.2d 973.) 
In the only ethics opinion found that applied the amended version of OH DR 5-101(A), the Ohio 
State Bar Association opined that an attorney/stepson could prepare for his stepmother legal 
documents, including a trust, in which he was named a beneficiary, without violating the OHCPR. 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 97-6 (Oct. 10, 1997). 
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Sanctions for violation of lawyer-beneficiary prohibitions: Prior to the 1996 amendment, typical 
sanctions imposed for misconduct in this area involved suspensions ranging from one year to 
indefinite duration, where overreaching was involved, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Clark, 71 Ohio 
St.3d 145, 642 N.E.2d 611 (1994), with a public reprimand possible where it was not. See 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Bortz, 74 Ohio St.3d 207, 658 N.E.2d 252 (1996). Heightened sanctions 
were thought particularly appropriate where the lawyer acted with full knowledge that the conduct 
was wrong but proceeded because he calculated that the risk of detection and substantial sanction was 
sufficiently small compared to the economic benefit the testamentary bequest would afford.  Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Galinas, 76 Ohio St.3d 87, 666 N.E.2d 1083 (1996). 
After the amendment to the disciplinary rule made the prohibition clear and absolute, an actual 
suspension was warranted even where signs of overreaching were absent. The Cook case, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 225, 2002 Ohio 5787, 778 N.E.2d 40, bears this out. In Cook, the respondent was given a 
one-year suspension, with six months stayed, where there was no evidence of overreaching: 
[E]ven with the best of intentions, an attorney risks the possibility of 
exploiting his client when their interests become so intertwined. We 
therefore reconsidered the ethical propriety of the situation and 
resolved that these risks are untenable. Thus, effective May 1, 1996 we 
amended the Code of Professional Responsibility to specify that there 
are no circumstances under which an attorney may prepare a will or 
trust in which the attorney, the attorney’s family, or the attorney’s 
affiliates are named beneficiaries, unless the beneficiary is related to 
the client. . . . Today we hold that a violation of DR 5-101(A)(2) 
requires an attorney’s actual suspension from the practice of law. 
Id. at para. 11 (emphasis by the Court). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelleher, 102 Ohio St.3d 
105, 2004 Ohio 1802, 807 N.E.2d 310. 
Effect in will-contest proceeding of violation of lawyer-beneficiary prohibitions: In Krischbaum v. 
Dillon, 58 Ohio St.3d 58, 567 N.E.2d 1291 (1991), the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the impact, in 
a will-contest proceeding, of a lawyer drafting for a client a will naming the lawyer as a beneficiary: 
 A presumption of undue influence, rebuttable by a 
preponderance of the evidence, arises when (i) the relationship of 
attorney and client exists between a testator and an attorney, (ii) the 
attorney is named as a beneficiary in the will, (iii) the 
attorney/beneficiary is not related by blood or marriage to the testator, 
and (iv) the attorney/beneficiary actively participates in the preparation 
of the will. 
Id. at 58, 567 N.E.2d at 1292 (syllabus one). 
The rebuttable presumption applies only to the bequest to the lawyer and does not affect the validity 
of other portions of the will.  Id. at 65, 567 N.E.2d at 1298. The Krischbaum Court identified 
several reasons for this presumption -- primary among them the special fiduciary relationship of 
attorney and client and the heightened need for trust in the estate context. First, a client is particularly 
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in need of privacy and is especially vulnerable when contemplating his or her own mortality. Second, 
because the discussions are so inherently private and because the testator, by definition, will not be 
available after death to assure that his or her wishes are met, the client is unusually dependent on the 
lawyer.  Id. at 62-63, 567 N.E.2d at 1296. 
Finally, the Court addressed the role of the former OHCPR in the will-contest proceeding. While the 
OHCPR, by its terms, was intended only as a source of controlling conduct through the disciplinary 
process, it was relevant here as well. Ultimately, the question was not simply whether the lawyer 
influenced the testator in making the bequest, but rather, whether the influence was “undue.” This 
turned on what conduct was reasonable under the circumstances, and the standards in the OHCPR 
helped to establish what a reasonable attorney would have done.  Id. at 68-69, 567 N.E.2d at 1300-01. 
(For the disciplinary proceeding arising out of the attorney’s conduct in Krischbaum, see Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Dillon, 28 Ohio St.3d 114, 502 N.E.2d 637 (1986).) 
In a cogent opinion premised on facts predating the 1996 amendment to OH DR 5-101(A), the 
Eleventh District Court of Appeals, in a nondisciplinary context, analyzed Krischbaum with respect 
to inter vivos trust agreement amendments drafted by a lawyer/grandson who had previously been 
named trustee by the grantor and who, by virtue of the amendments, was given a slightly larger 
remainder interest in fee simple.  Lah v. Rogers, 125 Ohio App.3d 164, 707 N.E.2d 1208 (Lake 
2000) (declaratory-judgment action by the lawyer-relative to determine rights of trust beneficiaries). 
In Lah, the trial court imposed the Krischbaum rebuttable presumption of undue influence on the 
lawyer/grandson, who then rebutted it by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court further 
concluded that the appellant (another grandchild of the grantor) had failed to prove undue influence 
by the clear and convincing evidence required. In affirming, the court of appeals held: 1) that the trial 
court erred in imposing the rebuttable presumption of undue influence on the lawyer/grandson, 2) that 
the error was non-prejudicial, inasmuch as the lower court had found the presumption rebutted, and 3) 
the trial court correctly found that appellant failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of undue 
influence. The appellate court specifically held that the Krischbaum presumption rule is limited to 
situations in which the attorney/beneficiary is not related to the testator (or, here, grantor) by blood or 
marriage. The court of appeals further noted and repeated the Krischbaum holding that the norms of 
behavior expressed in the OHCPR were directly relevant to the issue of undue influence by an 
attorney.  125 Ohio App.3d at 173 n.5, 707 N.E.2d at 1213 n.5. Under Ohio Rule 1.8(c), the lawyer 
in Lah, because of his blood relationship to the grantor, would not be prohibited from drafting the 
trust and in all likelihood his conduct would pass muster under the other Rules of Professional 
Conduct as well, given the absence of evidence of undue influence or overreaching in the case. 
 
1.8:500  Literary or Media Rights Relating to Representation 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.8(d) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.50 
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Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.8(d) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 51:701 
ALI-LGL § 36 
Wolfram § 9.3.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.50 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.8(d) prohibits a lawyer, prior to conclusion of the representation, from “mak[ing] or 
negotiat[ing] an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based 
in substantial part on information relating to the representation.” 
Several aspects of Rule 1.8(d) merit discussion. First, unlike the former disciplinary rule (OH DR 
5-104(B)), which was phrased in terms of prohibiting a lawyer from entering into “any arrangement 
or understanding with a client or prospective client,” division (d) prohibits the lawyer from making or 
negotiating an agreement; there is no limitation stated concerning with whom such agreement can be 
made or negotiated. In one respect the prohibition seems narrower than the former rule -- from its 
context (“[p]rior to the conclusion of representation of a client”), it appears not to cover agreements 
with prospective clients, although this is by no means clear. On the other hand, the prohibition, read 
literally, would encompass agreements with a publisher or other media representative, as well as with 
clients. Second, from a temporal standpoint, the prohibition is applicable only during the 
representation, whereas the former rule covered agreements made “[p]rior to the conclusion of all 
aspects of the matter giving rise to . . . employment,” even if the employment had ended. Third, it 
applies only to portrayals or accounts “based in substantial part on information relating to the 
representation.” Fourth, unlike the former rule, it applies not just to publication rights, but more 
broadly to “literary or media rights.” Fifth, the ban applies to “mak[ing] or negotiat[ing]” a 
media-rights agreement; the former entering into an “arrangement or understanding” language has 
been deleted. Thus, under the new Rule, negotiating with respect to such an agreement during the 
representation, even if the transaction is not consummated until after the representation ends (or is not 
consummated at all), would be improper. 
The rationale for this provision is set forth in Comment [9]. The basic concern is that if the lawyer has 
a pre-established media or literary rights agreement, the lawyer may conduct the representation in a 
way that would enhance the story – and hence, the value of the agreement – rather than in a way that 
best serves the client’s interests. Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [9]. 
 
1.8:600  Financing Litigation 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.8(e) 
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Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.35-5.37 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.8(e) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 51:801 
ALI/LGL § 36 
Wolfram § 9.2.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.35 (1996). 
In the course of representing a client in litigation, the lawyer may be asked to provide financial 
assistance to the client. Such assistance might be necessary to underwrite the living expenses of a 
client while the client awaits the outcome of litigation, or it might be required to subsidize expenses 
directly related to the conduct of the litigation itself. 
Two concerns arise from such assistance. First is a fear that lawyers might stir up frivolous litigation 
if they were allowed to offer financial inducements, such as the payment of expenses, to secure clients. 
See Rule 1.8 cmt. [10]. Second is a fear that the more financially involved a lawyer becomes in the 
litigation, the more the lawyer will feel pressed to pursue what is in his own financial interest, rather 
than that which is in best interests of the client. Id. For example, a lawyer might settle a claim 
prematurely in order to guarantee the recovery of expenses. 
In response to these concerns, Ohio Rule 1.8(e) prohibits financial assistance to a client unless the 
assistance involves payments for matters properly treated as litigation expenses, and limitations are 
placed on this practice as well. 
The limitations of Rule 1.8(e) apply when the lawyer is representing “a client in connection with 
pending or contemplated litigation.” Hence, a lawsuit need not have been filed for the prohibitions to 
apply; contemplated litigation is sufficient. Rule 1.8 cmt. [10] further makes clear that the prohibition 
applies to subsidizing expenses relating to “administrative proceedings” as well as lawsuits in court. 
Query whether it extends to arbitration or other ADR procedures. 
In the first disciplinary case decided under Rule 1.8(e), Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Pheils, 129 Ohio St.3d 
279, 2011 Ohio 2906,  951 N.E.2d 758, respondent argued that there was no violation of the rule 
because loans to a client were made, not by respondent, but by his wife. Rejecting this contention on 
the facts presented, the Court reasoned that 
respondent, realizing that he could not lend money to Robinson [the 
client], arranged loans from his wife. Respondent suggested to his wife 
that she lend the money to his client telling her that the client ‘had a 
judgment’ and that assigning the client’s rights in that judgment to her 
‘would be enough that it would cover up to a $15,000 loan.’ Clearly, 
respondent’s wife relied on this advice, because she made loans to 
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Robinson even though she did not know him. Furthermore, Robinson 
received the check from the first loan on the same day that he requested 
the loan. 
 Under these circumstances, we find that respondent 
significantly influenced his wife to make the loan to Robinson. 
Respondent’s personal relationship with his wife and his professional 
relationship with Robinson in the context of these loans placed him in a 
unique position to use financial leverage to influence Robinson’s 
litigation of the Royal Homes case. This is precisely the type of 
financial assistance that Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(e) was intended to prevent. 
Id. at paras. 17-18 (bracketed material added). The Court went on to find that the arrangement 
promoted maintenance and/or champerty – the common-law basis for Rule 1.8(e) – because the wife, 
“who had no interest in the Royal Homes case, lent money to Robinson, and in return Robinson 
assigned to her his rights in the Royal Homes case. Clearly, this agreement promoted maintenance 
and/or champerty.” Id. at para. 21. 
The Court’s lengthy exposition to reach the 1.8(e) conclusion seems a bit surprising, inasmuch as 
Pheils was also charged, in connection with the loans, with violation of a Rule 8.4(a) prohibition 
against a lawyer’s violation of the Rules “through the act of another.”  
In the second 1.8(e) decision, the Court recognized that certain types of financial assistance do not fall 
within the prohibition of the rule. Lorain County Bar Ass’n v. Stuart, 135 Ohio St.3d 117, 2012 
Ohio 5687, 984 N.E.2d 1041, involved a respondent who contributed one-half of a $10,000 
settlement by his client. The Court held that the 1.8(e) count had been “properly dismissed”: 
In regard to that count, both the official comments and the case law 
recognize that the rule is designed to prohibit financial assistance in the 
context of promoting lawsuits that might not be pursued apart from the 
attorney’s financial interest. As the panel stated, “[T]he prohibition is 
aimed at preventing a conflict of interest between the attorney and a 
client whose best interests might not be served in pursuing litigation.” 
[citing cases, including Pheils] Because Stuart’s representation of 
Gerber did not pose the type of conflict of interest that the rule was 
designed to prevent, the panel and the board recommend dismissal of 
the count charging him with that violation. 
Id. at para. 12. 
An innovation in the marketplace a few years back, involving financing by other than a lawyer for his 
client and supposedly designed to help parties fund litigation, was the appearance of 
litigation-financing companies. The Ohio Supreme Court examined the activities of such companies 
under the former OHCPR in Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St.3d 121, 
2003 Ohio 2721, 789 N.E.2d 217, at syllabus (“Except as otherwise permitted by legislative 
enactment or the Code of Professional Responsibility, a contract making the repayment of funds 
advanced to a party to a pending case contingent upon the outcome of that case is void as champerty 
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and maintenance.”). The Court’s invitation to the General Assembly to enact legislation was accepted; 
the result was ORC 1349.55, effective August 27, 2008, which authorizes and regulates 
“non-recourse civil litigation advances.” Rancman and ORC 1349.55 are discussed in Eugene P. 
Whetzel, Champerty and Maintenance Permitted, Ohio Law., Sept./Oct. 2008, at 36. See also 
Barbara Rose, Law:  The Investment, ABAJ, Sept. 2010, at 42. 
The latest entry in this discussion is the advisory opinion in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2012-3, 2012 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Dec. 7, 2012), which discusses both 
Rancman and ORC 1349.55 in the course of opining that “Ohio lawyers may inform clients of the 
non-recourse civil litigation advances that are offered by alternative litigation finance (ALF) 
providers and regulated by R.C. 1349.55. If a client pursues such an advance, the lawyer must 
recognize the following ethical obligations the transaction creates:” 1) client communication and 
provision of competent, candid advice about the transaction and its terms (Rules 1.1, 1.4, 2.1); 2) 
insuring that the ALF provider does not interfere with the lawyer’s “1.4” (sic 2.1) duty to exercise 
independent judgment; 3) revealing information relating to the representation to the ALF provider 
only with the client’s informed consent, per 1.6, which consent can be obtained only after explaining 
the risks of disclosure, including potential waiver of attorney-client privilege; and 4) obtaining the 
client’s informed consent before providing a case evaluation to an ALF provider, because the 
evaluation may materially and adversely affect the client’s interests, pursuant to Rule 2.3(b). Id. at 
*1-2. Finally, the Board acknowledged that “[i]f a lawyer . . . becomes an active participant in the 
transaction itself,” the lawyer must consider the strictures of Rule 1.8(a) (limits on business 
transactions with clients). Id. at *17-18. 
1.8:610  Litigation Expenses 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.37 (1996). 
Legal responsibility for litigation expenses: Former OH DR 5-103(B) permitted a lawyer to advance 
or guarantee litigation expenses, defined as including “court costs, expenses of investigation, 
expenses of medical examination, and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence.” While the 
disciplinary rule originally stated that the client remained ultimately liable for such expenses (see Bd. 
of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 94-8, 1994 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (June 17, 
1994)), it was amended, effective June 14, 1999, to provide that the repayment of such expenses “may 
be contingent on the outcome of the matter.” I.e., if the litigation is successful, the client must repay 
the expenses; if it is not, the client is not liable for them. See Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 
01-01 (Jan. 3, 2001), discussed this section infra. 
This provision has been carried over, in slightly different language, into the Ohio Rules. Rule 1.8(e)(1) 
allows a lawyer to “advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be 
contingent on the outcome of the matter.” Comment [10] makes clear that, as was spelled out in the 
Code rule, expenses of litigation “includ[e] the expenses of medical examination and the costs of 
obtaining and presenting evidence.” Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [10]. The “expenses of investigation” 
language was not brought forward from the former disciplinary rule, but there is no reason to think 
that this litigation expense is not covered as well. 
In a related development under the former OHCPR, not specifically covered by the amended OH DR 
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5-103(B), the Board of Commissioners opined that a law firm could finance such contingent-fee 
litigation expenses through borrowing, provided that various conditions were met. See Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-3, 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (June 7, 
2001). In addition to the various writings, disclosures, and client consent required by ORC 4705.15 
(B) & (C), former OH DR 2-102(E)(1)(c) and 5-104(A), a factor essential to such an arrangement 
was that the loan obtained by the law firm be secured by the firm, not by the client’s settlement or 
judgment. See 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9, at *5. Opinion 2001-3 also stated, in a separate 
part of the opinion, that “[i]nterest fees and costs of a loan obtained by a law firm are a client’s 
‘expenses of litigation.’ . . . not the law firm’s ‘costs of doing business.’” Id. at *8. 
If there is no contingency arrangement with respect to litigation expenses, the client remains legally 
responsible for them, except in the indigent-client circumstances set forth in subdivision (e)(2) (as to 
which see this section infra at “Indigent client”), irrespective of the outcome of the litigation. See Bd. 
of Comm’rs Op. 94-8 (lawyer may not co-sign for loan for client to cover litigation expenses 
because lawyer became ultimately responsible for debt, along with client). The degree to which the 
lawyer attempts to seek reimbursement where the client remains ultimately liable, however, is “a 
legal or business decision for the individual lawyer to make.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievance & 
Discipline Op. 87-001, 1987 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 28, at *9 (Oct. 16, 1987). Accord Bd. of 
Comm’rs Op. 94-8. In Opinion 87-001, the Board found some indirect support for this position in 
former OH EC 2-22, which provided that lawyers should avoid fee controversies and “not sue a client 
for a fee unless necessary to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client.” The Board indicated that 
the provision should apply to costs and expenses as well as fees. Nevertheless, absent a contingency 
arrangement, telling clients at the outset that the lawyer never seeks reimbursement might violate the 
rule. Bd. of Comm’rs Op. 87-001 (citing  In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 93 F.R.D. 
485, 490 (D. Md. 1982), to this effect). 
If a lawyer attempted to collect litigation expenses owed by the client, the lawyer could settle for an 
amount less than that actually owed without violating former OH DR 5-103(B), as long as the 
representation had ended at the time of settlement. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
94-5, 1994 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 14 (Apr. 15, 1994). In reaching this conclusion, the Board 
reasoned that 5-103(B) sought to assure that the lawyer would exercise professional judgment on 
behalf of the client, unaffected by a proprietary interest in the litigation. After the conclusion of the 
representation, this concern was no longer present, so post-representation assumption of 
responsibility for such expenses was permissible. 
These basic rules apply regardless of the nature of the litigation or the client. The need for lawyer 
advancement of litigation expenses, however, is greatest in class-action litigation and cases in which 
the client is poor. The Board had suggested that the former disciplinary rule should be interpreted in 
these settings to facilitate the provision of legal services. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievance & 
Discipline Op. 87-001, 1987 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 28 (Oct. 16, 1987). Both the 1999 
amendment to DR 5-103(B) and Rule 1.8(e)(1), allowing repayment to be contingent on the outcome 
of the litigation, facilitated and facilitates the provision of legal services in these contexts, as does 
Rule 1.8(e)(2) with respect to indigent clients. 
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The disciplinary rule was in any event subject to a de minimis exception. A lawyer could participate, 
for example, in a validation program for transportation expenses whereby the parking, taxi, or bus 
expenses of client coming to the firm were paid by the lawyer without violating OH DR 5-103(B), 
see Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 108 (Nov. 20, 1973), irrespective of the absence of a contingency 
arrangement. 
At this writing, we are unaware of any judicial opinions dealing with Rule 1.8(e) or with the provision 
in former DR 5-103(B) as amended, allowing arrangements whereby the client’s obligation to repay 
litigation expenses is contingent on the successful outcome of the matter. The Ohio State Bar 
Association, however, issued an opinion that dealt with the amended version of the disciplinary rule. 
In Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 01-01 (Jan. 3, 2001), the OSBA was asked whether a lawyer 
may be ultimately responsible for litigation costs. In response, the Association opined that under the 
amended disciplinary rule, an attorney could provide that repayment of litigation expenses by the 
client is contingent on the successful outcome of the case -- in other words, “a successful outcome of 
the case should result in the client being responsible for these expenses . . . .” Id. at 2. (Just as, in 
answer to the question posed, an unsuccessful outcome under such an agreement pursuant to amended 
OH DR 5-103(B) (and Rule 1.8(e)(1)) should result in the lawyer being ultimately responsible for 
them.) 
Attorney liability to third parties for litigation expenses when client refuses to pay them: A related 
problem arises when the client refuses to pay litigation expenses owed a third party. To what extent is 
the lawyer obligated to pay those expenses? Would doing so violate Rule 1.8(e)? Under the OHCPR, 
in numerous pre-amendment cases, lawyers were held liable to third parties for litigation expenses 
incurred on behalf of a client. See, e.g., Janet’s Reporting & Video Serv. v. Rauchmann, No. 
CA89-10-150, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 2142 (Butler May 20, 1990) (attorney liable for 
court-reporting services provided at depositions ordered by attorney on behalf of client); Blake v. 
Ingraham, 44 Ohio App.3d 38, 540 N.E.2d 759 (Medina 1989) (attorney liable for trial transcript 
attorney ordered on behalf of client). While most of the cases involve attorney liability for court 
reporting services, the attorney’s liability was not limited to costs of this kind. As the Sixth District 
Court of Appeals commented, in Vascular Surgery of Nw. Ohio, Inc. v. Jacobs, No. L-86-197, 
1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 6085, at *3 (Lucas Mar. 13, 1987): 
 Appellee argues that cases involving costs relative to court 
reporting services or stenographic services are distinguishable from 
other expenses, such as a physician’s deposition fee. We disagree. The 
rule does not fluctuate depending upon the nature of the expense. 
The basic argument for imposing liability on the lawyer appears to be that, because of the lawyer’s 
responsibility for making tactical decisions in the context of litigation, including decisions such as 
ordering trial transcripts and the like, third parties assumed, even under the old rule, that they were 
dealing with the lawyer, not the client, and could turn to the lawyer for payment.  Sommer v. French, 
115 Ohio App.3d 101, 104, 684 N.E.2d 739, 741 (1996) (expert-witness fee; “‘We consider it 
equitable that, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, court officials and persons 
connected with the progress of the litigation may safely regard themselves as dealing with the 
attorney’” (quoting from Blake v. Ingraham supra). If anything, this assumption has even more 
validity under Rule 1.8(e), since now (as was the case under the amended disciplinary rule) the client 
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may or may not be ultimately liable, whereas under the pre-amendment disciplinary rule the client 
was always primarily liable for such expenses. 
There were two exceptions to the imposition of liability on the attorney for third-party expenses, 
which exceptions presumably will be available under 1.8(e) as well. First, if the lawyer clearly 
indicated to the third party at the outset that responsibility for payment lies solely with the client 
rather than the lawyer, the lawyer was not bound, John E. Foster & Assocs. v. La Cour, No. 93 
APG10-1408, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2470 (Franklin June 9, 1994) (expert fee; notice that client 
is responsible was sufficient; express agreement by the parties not required); if the lawyer failed to do 
so, he was bound. Allen v. Donlin, No. 95- T-5194, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 508 (Trumbull Feb. 
16, 1996) (absent express agreement or express notice that client responsible, attorney liable for 
expert-witness fee). Second, to the extent that the expenses arose in the context of court-appointed 
indigent representation, and the provider was aware that funds to cover the services in question were 
to be paid out of a limited court authorization, the provider could not seek recourse from the lawyer 
involved for expenses incurred in excess of court limits.  D.R.P. Sec., Inc. v. Kane, No. 65688, 1994 
Ohio App. LEXIS 3107, at *3 (Cuyahoga July 14, 1994) (“Implicit in contracts for services for an 
indigent defendant is the understanding that funding for the indigent’s defense will be provided by the 
state and subject to court limits and approval.”). 
Indigent client: There is a new, express exception to the general Rule 1.8(e) prohibition; it too deals 
with indigent clients, but cuts the other way from the second circumstance discussed in the previous 
paragraph. Under subdivision (e)(2), the lawyer now “may” pay court costs and expenses of litigation 
for indigent clients, presumably including amounts owing to third parties, without any repayment 
obligation on the part of the client, irrespective of the outcome of the case or the nature of the fee. 
Ohio Rule 1.8(e)(2). This exception had no antecedent in prior Ohio ethics rules. As restated in 
Comment [10], “an exception allowing lawyers representing indigent clients to pay court costs and 
litigation expenses regardless of whether these funds will be repaid is warranted.” Rule 1.8 cmt. [10]. 
 
1.8:620  Living and Medical Expenses 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.36 (1996). 
With respect to expenses other than court costs and expenses of litigation, Ohio Rule 1.8(e) prohibits 
a lawyer from providing financial assistance to a client in connection with contemplated or pending 
litigation. This includes “making or guaranteeing loans for living expenses,” Rule 1.8 cmt. [10], or 
“personally guarantee[ing] the payment of [the client’s] medical bills and accept[ing] responsibility 
for her outstanding medical liens.” Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 137 Ohio St.3d 112, 2013 
Ohio 4006, 998 N.E.2d 427, at para. 8. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2011-1, 
2011 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 11, 2011), applied Rule 1.8(e) in opining that, as a 
condition of settlement, a plaintiff’s lawyer cannot agree (nor can defendant’s counsel propose that 
plaintiff’s counsel do so – that would violate Rule 8.4(a)) to indemnify the defendant for any 
third-person claims to the settlement fund. It noted that neither of the exceptions built into the rule 
(court costs and litigation expenses with repayment contingent on outcome, and court costs and 
litigation expenses for indigent clients) was applicable to the question presented. (The Board also 
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found that such an agreement by plaintiff’s lawyer would violate Rule 1.7(a)(2).) Accord Ohio State 
Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 2011-1 (Feb. 9, 2011). 
Cases applying the comparable OHCPR predecessor rule (DR 5-103(B)) include: Cleveland Metro. 
Bar Ass’n v. Podor, 121 Ohio St.3d 131, 2009 Ohio 358, 902 N.E.2d 488 (acceding to client 
request to advance $19,800 for living expenses during pendency of case); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Berk, 114 Ohio St.3d 478, 2007 Ohio 4264, 873 N.E.2d 285 (providing modest financial assistance 
to help with housing costs and other personal expenses); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Crossmock, 111 Ohio 
St.3d 278, 2006 Ohio 5706, 855 N.E.2d 1215 (respondent violated 5-103(B) in paying client’s 
medical and health-insurance expenses); Disciplinary Counsel v. Ross, 107 Ohio St.3d 191, 2005 
Ohio 6179, 837 N.E.2d 773 (advancing cash to client and writing check to cover cost of client’s 
purchase of new car); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth, 93 Ohio St.3d 173, 176, 754 N.E.2d 
219, 224 (2001) (advancement of $ 6,000 to client; client testified funds could be used “in any way he 
chose”; respondent testified funds were for living expenses; either way, violation of OH DR 
5-103(B)). Under the Code, the OSBA opined that it would be improper to guarantee the payment of 
medical treatment expenses of a client being represented in a suit arising from her injuries. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 86-6 (July 23, 1986). 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s most extensive discussion of this issue came in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. 
McGill, 64 Ohio St.3d 669, 597 N.E.2d 1104 (1992). In McGill, the Court addressed the propriety 
of guaranteeing loans from a local bank to personal-injury clients in connection with contemplated or 
pending litigation. The loans were made only to existing clients who needed the funds to withstand 
delays in litigation, and the ultimate responsibility for the loan repayment was that of the client. In 
none of the cases was the lawyer’s independent professional judgment affected by the arrangement. 
While every member of the Court agreed that the conduct violated OH DR 5-103(B), which clearly 
prohibited guaranteeing financial assistance other than litigation expenses to a client, the Court 
imposed only a public reprimand and suggested a willingness to re-examine the propriety of the rule 
itself. The Court stated: “[W]e find some merit in respondents’ assertion that DR 5-103(B) should 
perhaps be re-examined.” 64 Ohio St.3d at 671, 597 N.E.2d at 1106. As an example of a possible 
alternative course, the Court cited a Minnesota provision allowing loans to clients if (1) the client 
demonstrates financial hardship that would result in being forced to accept an inadequate settlement 
without the loan; and (2) the lawyer does not advertise loan availability. Three members of the Court 
dissented, finding that a willingness on the Court’s part to reconsider the propriety of the rule in the 
future did not justify reducing the penalty on the two lawyers involved for their clear violation of an 
extant rule. 
Subsequently, in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mineff, 73 Ohio St.3d 281, 652 N.E.2d 968 (1995), the 
Court issued a public reprimand to a lawyer who, over a period of time, gave his client $ 5,300 for 
living expenses while the client -- hungry, disheveled, and unable to pay his rent -- awaited the 
outcome of his workers’ compensation claim and related personal-injury action. The majority of the 
Court termed the violation “technical and not willful” in justifying the public reprimand, while two 
dissenting justices argued for a six-month stayed suspension. 
OH DR 5-103(B) was also applied in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Nusbaum, 93 Ohio St.3d 150, 753 
N.E.2d 183 (2001), where the lawyer advanced funds to his client during personal-injury litigation, 
because the severity of the client’s injuries rendered him unable to work. The lawyer was publicly 
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reprimanded. In addition to the usual items offered in mitigation (no prior violations, laudatory 
letters), the panel further noted that the client was not harmed but helped by the loans (he paid them 
back in full after his case was settled) and that the grievance was filed by respondent’s ex-wife. One 
of the letters submitted was by the client, who stated that his injuries required twenty operations and 
that he would not have been able to survive without the help provided by the loans in obtaining the 
basic necessities of life. He also claimed that without respondent’s assistance, he would have been 
forced to settle earlier for a lesser amount, a fact picked up on by Justice Lundberg Stratton, 
“reluctantly” concurring separately, who surmised that the loan’s enabling the client to hold out for a 
larger settlement “is perhaps one of the justifications for the rule.”  Id. at 151, 753 N.E.2d at 184. 
Despite the majority’s reference to possible reexamination of the rule in McGill, the result in these 
hardship cases remains unchanged under Ohio Rule 1.8(e) -- the only exceptions to the prohibition 
against providing financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated 
litigation relate to court costs and expenses of litigation. See section 1.8:610. 
 
1.8:700  Payment of Lawyer’s Fee by Third Person 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.8(f) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.8(f) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.138-5.139, 5.145 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:901 
ALI-LGL §  134 
Wolfram §  8.8 
 
1.8:710  Compensation and Direction by Third Person [see also 1.7:410] 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.138-5.139, 5.145 (1996). 
In general: The lawyer’s duty to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client is 
at the heart of the attorney-client relationship. To the extent the lawyer receives compensation from 
anyone other than the client, in connection with representation of the client, there is a chance that the 
lawyer’s undivided loyalty to the client may be compromised. 
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Additional problems may arise where the lawyer is employed by an organization to provide legal 
representation to others. The concern is that the organization may attempt to influence the lawyer’s 
conduct in ways that would interfere with the lawyer’s exercise of independent professional judgment 
on the client’s behalf. This problem is exacerbated to the extent that laypersons, who may not be as 
sensitive to the lawyer’s ethical responsibilities as lawyers are, have some input in the 
decision-making process. 
Third-party compensation: In numerous situations, attorney compensation is provided by a third party 
rather than directly by the client. See Rule 1.8 cmt. [11]. Thus, a parent may cover the legal expenses 
of a child. An employer may cover the legal expenses of an employee. An insurer may cover the legal 
expenses of an insured. 
Ohio Rule 1.8(f) controls the attorney’s acceptance from a third party of “compensation” for legal 
services. Rule 1.8(f)(1)-(3) recognizes this practice and condones it, as long as (1) the client gives 
informed consent, (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment or 
the attorney-client relationship, and (3) information related to the representation is protected as 
required by Rule 1.6. If a lawyer representing an insured is compensated by the insurer, the 
provisions of Rule 1.8(f)(4) also must be satisfied. See section 1.8:720. 
The operative language under the former OHCPR was “consent after full disclosure,” OH DR 
5-107(A). This translates to the “informed consent” requirement under Rule 1.8(f)(1). See Ohio Rule 
1.0(f). Many decisions and ethics opinions under the former rule can be cited, including  In re 
Adoption of Infant Girl Banda, 53 Ohio App.3d 104, 559 N.E.2d 1373 (Franklin 1988) (payment 
by adoptive parents of birth mother’s legal fees in adoption proceeding may be permitted under ORC 
3107.10 and OH DR 5-107(A) when accompanied by full disclosure to and consent by birth mother); 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-22, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Oct. 
12, 1990) (attorney who provided advice to client in connection with bank’s small-trust program 
could, with client consent after full disclosure, be paid by bank a percentage of trustee fee client pays 
to bank). An attorney who received payment from a title company for services rendered for a client 
had to fully disclose the situation to the client. Merely crediting the client’s bill with the amount 
received from the third party was not sufficient. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 112 (Dec. 17, 1974). 
If the arrangement took place without the client’s knowledge and consent, disciplinary action was 
warranted.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.3d 36, 553 N.E.2d 1082 (1990) 
(lawyer sanctioned for accepting compensation from collection agency, without disclosing to referred 
clients for whom he filed collection actions that agency was paying for representation). See also 
Lillback v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 94 Ohio App.3d 100, 640 N.E.2d 250 (Montgomery 1994) 
(attorney/life insurance agent sold life insurance and investments for insurance company to his clients 
and offered those clients free will and trust drafting; since he was compensated for his legal services, 
if at all, by his insurance company employer, his conduct may have violated OH DR 5-107(A)). 
While third-party payment requires informed consent under subdivision (f)(1), the lawyer must also 
be sure that he is providing independent professional judgment to the client, uncompromised by the 
lawyer’s relationship to the third party payor. Ohio Rule 1.8(f)(2). At the least, the prospect of undue 
influence suggests that the lawyer exercise caution before entering into a third-party payment 
arrangement. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 87-8 (July 16, 1987) (recognizing threats to 
independent judgment arising from lawyer’s provision of wills as part of funeral director’s prepaid 
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funeral services, where lawyer was compensated by funeral director rather than clients whose wills he 
drafted). 
Although the typical disciplinary case involved payment of some or all of the lawyer’s fee by a third 
party, OH DR 5-107(A) was not limited to those situations. In addition to accepting “compensation” 
for legal services, DR 5-107(A)(1), it also applied if the lawyer accepted from a third party “any thing 
of value related to [the] representation.” OH DR 5-107(A)(2). Thus, where a collection agency 
provided clerical services for a lawyer to assist the lawyer’s collection efforts on behalf of creditor 
clients of the agency, the lawyer had accepted a thing of value related to the representation from a 
third party and could do so only with client consent after full disclosure. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 
90-91-10 (n.d.). 
Former DR 5-107(A)(2) was applied in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Linick, 84 Ohio St.3d 
489, 705 N.E.2d 667 (1999), where the Supreme Court imposed a one-year suspension on the 
respondent lawyer. In Linick, respondent was a senior corporate counsel. In that capacity, he referred 
eight cases for the corporation to outside counsel A and three cases to outside counsel B. Counsel A 
made a gift to respondent of one-half of his fees billed to and paid by the corporation; counsel B gave 
respondent gifts constituting slightly more than one-quarter of the fees he collected from the 
corporation. The corporation was unaware of these gifts. The Supreme Court adopted the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline’s findings and conclusions, which determined that this 
conduct violated DR 5-107(A)(2) (acceptance of any thing of value from other than the client without 
client’s informed consent). For further discussion of the Linick decision in the context of fee-splitting, 
where both the lawyer making the gift and the recipient were held to have violated OH DR 2-107(A), 
see section 1.5:800. 
While it may be a bit of a stretch to call the Linick gifts “compensation” under Rule 1.8(f), the Ohio 
Code Comparison to Rule 1.8 states that subdivisions “(f)(1), (2), and (3) use different terms, but are 
virtually identical to DR 5-107(A) and (B).” At a minimum, one can conclude from this statement that 
the term “compensation” is to be read broadly. Whether it encompasses what were two separate 
categories under the former rule (“compensation” and “accept[ing] any thing of value,” DR 
5-107(A)(1)&(2)) is not entirely clear; we suspect that it does. 
The third aspect of division (f), Rule 1.8(f)(3), requires protection of information relating to the 
representation pursuant to Rule 1.6. While the protection of confidences and secrets was not an 
express part of DR 5-107(A), it was required by former OH DR 4-101. 
Finally, Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [12] reminds that if the third-party-payment arrangement creates a 
conflict of interest for the lawyer, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.7. 
Third-party direction of the lawyer’s legal judgment: See section 5.4:400. 
Practice with a nonlawyer: See sections 5.4:300 & :500.  
Membership in an employee organization: See section 5.4:520. 
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1.8:720  Insured-Insurer Conflicts [see also 1.7:410] 
Ohio has added a new subdivision, 1.8(f)(4), dealing specifically with third-party payment situations 
involving a lawyer compensated by an insurer to represent an insured. Subdivision (f)(4) requires 
such a lawyer to deliver to the client (the insured) the “Statement of Insured Client’s Rights” that is 
set out in full as a part of the subdivision. Comment [12A] speaks further to the insured-defense 
situation -- an “[i]nsurance defense counsel may not permit an insurer’s right to control the defense to 
compromise the lawyer’s independent judgment, for example, regarding the legal research or factual 
investigation necessary to support the defense.” Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [12A]. Nor may the lawyer 
permit the insurer’s right to receive information “to result in the disclosure to the insurer, or its agent, 
of confidences of the insured.” Id. 
The insured/insurer situation is further discussed at section 1.7:410. 
1.8:730  Lawyer with Fiduciary Obligation to Third Person [see 1.13:210] 
 
1.8:800  Aggregate Settlements 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.8(g) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.128 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.8(g) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:375 
ALI-LGL §  128 
Wolfram §  8.15 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.128 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.8(g) addresses the lawyer’s involvement in the aggregate settlement of claims or pleas 
involving multiple clients. The provision focuses on a “lawyer who represents two or more clients” 
participating in an aggregate settlement “of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an 
aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas.” Thus, if the lawyer for a single defendant 
offers an aggregate settlement to multiple plaintiffs represented by the same attorney, the Rule has no 
effect on the conduct of the defendant’s lawyer, since he is not representing multiple clients, but it 
does apply to the plaintiff’s lawyer, since he has multiple clients. See Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
Informal Op. 87-6 (July 2, 1987). The concern is that an aggregate settlement may be to the 
advantage of some of the clients and to the disadvantage of others. In such circumstances, the 
lawyer’s independent duty of loyalty to each individual client would be jeopardized because he 
should encourage some clients to accept the proposed settlement, but he should counsel others to 
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reject it. 
The Rule nevertheless recognizes that aggregate settlements are a fact of life in complex matters. As a 
result, division (g) does not ban them entirely. Aggregate settlements are permitted if the settlement 
or agreement is subject to court approval or if the lawyer secures the informed consent of each client, 
in a writing signed by the client, to the arrangement. To do so, the lawyer first must advise each client 
of two things: (1) the existence and nature of all claims or pleas involved in the proposed settlement, 
and (2) the participation of each person in the settlement or agreement. Ohio Rule 1.8(g). As 
Comment [13] explains, this means that each client must be informed of all material terms, including 
“what the other clients will receive or pay if the settlement or plea offer is accepted.” Rule 1.8 cmt. 
[13]. Accord, under the former OHCPR, Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 87-6 (July 2, 1987). 
Second, after the disclosure, the lawyer must secure the written consent of each client to the 
settlement or agreement. Ohio Rule 1.8(g). Failure to complete both steps will subject the lawyer to 
discipline. See, e.g., under the former OHCPR, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mazer, 86 Ohio 
St.3d 185, 712 N.E.2d 1246 (1999) (neither of the consents obtained by lawyer with respect to other 
aspects of representation of two clients “applied to the state court litigation’s $900,000 settlement 
option.”  Id. at 188, 712 N.E.2d at 1248); Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Barr, 64 Ohio St.3d 20, 591 
N.E.2d 1200 (1992) (lawyer disciplined for securing aggregate settlement of personal-injury claims 
of husband and wife in traffic accident without full disclosure to wife). (A comprehensive list of 
information that, “at a minimum,” must be disclosed in order to satisfy the comparable 
informed-consent requirement of MR 1.8(g) is set forth in ABA Formal Op. 06-438, at 4-5 (Feb. 10, 
2006)). 
Regarding the court-approved exception (not found in the Model Rule), Comment [13] notes that 
“where a settlement is subject to court approval, as in a class action, the interests of multiple clients 
are protected when the lawyer complies with applicable rules of civil procedure and orders of the 
court concerning review of the settlement.” Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [13]. The Summary of 
Post-Comment Revisions to the Proposed Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct adds that 
“[b]ecause prompt client consent may be impossible to obtain where a lawyer is representing several 
clients in a class action matter, Rule 1.8(g) is modified to exclude from application of the rule those 
situations where settlement is subject to court approval.” Summary at 2. 
Misconduct involving aggregate settlements often gave rise to multiple violations under the OHCPR. 
In Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Kaigler, 57 Ohio St.3d 197, 566 N.E.2d 673 (1991), for example, an 
attorney’s insistence that he would negotiate only an aggregate settlement of his clients’ claims 
arising out of a traffic accident violated former OH DR 5-105(B) (continuing multiple employment if 
doing so will likely adversely affect the representation of another client); 5-106(A) (entering into an 
aggregate settlement of claims without the clients’ consent); and 7-101(A)(3) (causing prejudice or 
damage to a client). 
Violation of former OH DR 5-106(A) also could have consequences outside the disciplinary context. 
In Black v. Bell, 20 Ohio App.3d 84, 484 N.E.2d 739 (Cuyahoga 1984), the lawyer’s insistence on 
an aggregate settlement eliminated his clients’ statutory right to prejudgment interest, because 
good-faith settlement negotiation by the parties prior to judgment was a condition to receiving 
prejudgment interest. As the court explained: 
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 In this case, our disagreement with the necessary findings for 
prejudgment interest under R.C. 1343.03(C) is heightened by plaintiffs’ 
counsel’s insistence on a joint settlement. Counsel representing 
multiple parties should seldom, if ever, condition settlement with one 
client on negotiations with another. Cf. DR 5-105(B) and 5-106(A) of 
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Insistence on a “package 
settlement” obstructs good faith settlement negotiations on any claim 
individually. It also confuses any determination whether individual 
plaintiffs made good faith settlement efforts or whether the defense 
failed to do so for individual claims. 
Id. at 89, 484 N.E.2d at 744. See also Hanratty v. Huron Rd. Hosp., No. 52525, 1987 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 8329 (Cuyahoga Aug. 13, 1987) (agreeing that insistence on joint settlement for multiple 
unrelated parties constitutes failure to negotiate in good faith (citing Black v. Bell), but finding no 
evidence of counsel’s insistence on joint settlement). With these two cases, compare Berdyck v. 
Shinde, 128 Ohio App.3d 68, 713 N.E.2d 1098 (Ottawa 1998), in which the court held that 
plaintiff’s request for a package settlement involving both defendant physician and defendant hospital 
did not demonstrate a lack of good faith effort to settle, where defendant physician, more so than 
plaintiff, insisted on a joint settlement and plaintiff did in fact separately settle with the physician 
prior to trial. The Berdyck court distinguished Black as being a case in which the court was 
concerned with ethical considerations -- specifically conflict of interest -- where a single lawyer is 
representing multiple plaintiffs and demands an aggregate settlement. In contrast, in Berdyck 
plaintiff’s counsel did not represent multiple plaintiffs; “to the extent he did request a joint settlement, 
Berdyck’s counsel did not have a conflict of interest, but engaged in a reasonable tactic to protect his 
client’s interest.” 128 Ohio App.3d at 85, 713 N.E.2d at 1109. 
 
1.8:900  Agreements Involving Lawyer’s Malpractice Liability 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.8(h) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.8(h) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  6.21 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:1101 
ALI-LGL §  54 
Wolfram §  5.6.7 
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1.8:910  Prospective Limitation of Malpractice Liability 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  6.21 (1996). 
As Ohio Rule 1.8(h)(1) declares, a lawyer shall not “make an agreement prospectively limiting the 
lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice or requiring arbitration of a claim against the lawyer 
unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement.”  
The concern underlying the rule regarding prospective limitation of malpractice liability is twofold. 
First, as a general matter, lawyers should avoid malpractice and be subject to liability if they do not. 
Second, there is the fear that naive clients might be convinced to waive malpractice liability 
prospectively when it would be against their interests to do so. See Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [14]. 
Nevertheless, there may be instances, such as representation in a particularly complex and uncharted 
area, where the risk of possible malpractice exposure might dissuade lawyers from undertaking 
representation in the area absent some check on that exposure. Thus, the Rule reaches a compromise, 
permitting prospective limitation of malpractice exposure, but only when the client is independently 
represented in making the agreement. 
It is important to recognize that the test is not that the client be encouraged to seek outside counsel and 
be given the opportunity to do so, as some other rules (e.g., Rule 1.8(h)(2), see section 1.8:920) 
provide. Rather, such independent representation must actually take place, both as to prospective 
agreements to limit malpractice liability and prospective agreements to arbitrate any claim against the 
lawyer. Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [14]. The Summary of Post-Comment Revisions to the Ohio Rules of 
Professional Conduct muddies the waters just a bit -- while it emphasizes that, “unless the client has 
been represented independently in making the agreement,” a lawyer cannot “forc[e]” a client to agree 
to arbitrate, it states the restriction in terms of arbitration of “a malpractice claim.” Id. at 3. Comment 
[14] however, makes clear that the restriction applies to prospective agreements to arbitrate “any” 
claim, malpractice or otherwise. (The Rule itself refers merely to “a claim”; presumably the 
comment’s gloss will control.) 
With respect to prospective agreements to arbitrate, compare, under the former OHCPR, Thornton v. 
Haggins, 2003 Ohio 7078, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6440 (App. Cuyahoga) (prospective agreement 
to arbitrate malpractice claims, without providing for advice of independent counsel with respect to 
advisability of entering into such agreement, unenforceable), with Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 96-9, 1996 WL 734408 (Dec. 6, 1996) (disapproving prospective agreements to 
arbitrate such disputes; client should have opportunity to consider facts and circumstances of dispute 
after it arises and to consult, if desired, independent counsel at that time). 
Attorneys may organize their practices as limited-liability companies or partnerships, but this does 
not limit a lawyer’s liability for his own malpractice. Gov Bar R III 3(C). See Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. 
[14]. Finally, Comment [14] advises that agreements under Rule 1.2 limiting the scope of the 
representation are not prohibited by this division, “although a definition of scope that makes the 
obligations of representation illusory will amount to an attempt to limit liability.” Id. 
Agreements directly limiting liability: As noted, under Rule 1.8(h)(1) a lawyer may prospectively 
limit malpractice exposure by securing from the client an agreement that the lawyer will not be held 
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liable for negligent work, but only if the client is independently represented in making the agreement. 
In contrast, former OH DR 6-102 made no provision for independent advice, and the bar on such 
attempts at exoneration or limitation of liability was absolute, “except as permitted by DR 2-111(C)” 
(sale of law practice). [No such permission existed in 2-111(C) (now Rule 1.17(d)), which listed 
items that had to be or could be included in the sales agreement, including terms that “reasonably 
limit the ability of the selling lawyer to reenter the practice of law . . . .” DR 2-111(C)(3) (now Rule 
1.17(d)(3)). OH DR 2-111(E) (now Rule 1.17(i)), however, did repeat the no-exoneration rule and 
required that the sales agreement incorporate the DR 6-102 prohibition, but allowed provision for 
indemnification or other contribution arising from a malpractice claim. A review of the “legislative 
history” of 2-111 reveals that, as originally proposed, what became division (E) was indeed once 
division (C). As relettering occurred within 2-111, the revisers neglected to change the reference in 
the DR 6-102 introductory language from 2-111(C) to 2-111(E). It thus would appear that the “except 
as permitted” language in 6-102 was intended to be a reference to the sentence in DR 2-111(E) 
allowing indemnification or contribution.] 
Cases under former DR 6-102 can be divided into three categories:  Those that involve attempted 
avoidance of malpractice liability; those that apply the disciplinary rule more broadly to other 
instances where a lawyer attempted to limit or avoid other exposure; and those that seek to evade 
disciplinary exposure.  These categories will be examined below. 
Attempts to avoid malpractice exposure: Like Rule 1.8(h)(1), former DR 6-102 spoke in terms of 
limiting prospective exposure to “malpractice.” Cases under the Code in which respondents tried to 
extricate themselves from potential liability for malpractice include Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Berk, 
114 Ohio St.3d 478, 2007 Ohio 4264, 873 N.E.2d 285 (paying clients to enter into settlement 
agreement including waiver of rights clients might have had arising out of respondent’s neglect), and 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Clavner, 77 Ohio St.3d 431, 674 N.E.2d 1369 (6-102 violated by 
negotiating release with clients, who agreed they would “refrain from taking legal action against” 
respondent, whose neglect had resulted in default judgment against clients; Court stressed adversarial 
context and need of lawyer to advise clients of adversity and right to independent counsel before 
signing releases of potential claims against lawyer). And in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Willette, 117 
Ohio St.3d 433, 2008 Ohio 1198, 884 N.E.2d 581, the Court found that respondent had violated 
6-102 when he offered a partial refund of fees paid “in exchange for a full release . . . .’ The board 
found that respondent’s request for a ‘full release’ constituted a request by respondent that the Trotts 
release all potential claims – including malpractice claims – against him in exchange for a partial 
refund.” Id. at para. 34. Compare Disciplinary Counsel v. Beeler, 105 Ohio St.3d 188, 2005 Ohio 
1143, 824 N.E.2d 78, where the respondent negotiated an agreement in which the clients/heirs in a 
probate matter agreed to execute a release in favor of respondent with respect to any malpractice 
claims arising from his representation of the estate; strangely, DR 6-102 was neither charged nor 
found.  See also Montali v. Day, 2002 Ohio 2715, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 2812 (Cuyahoga) 
(summary judgment for lawyer in malpractice case reversed; question of fact existed as to whether 
prior release barred future claims that were basis of malpractice action; Clavner rule applied; failure 
to advise client to seek independent counsel before signing release). 
Attempts to avoid other exposure: DR 6-102, however, was applied to attempts of exoneration from 
liability other than malpractice per se.  Thus, in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Kodish, 110 Ohio St.3d 162, 
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2006 Ohio 4090, 852 N.E.2d 160, proposing a confidential settlement agreement in which payments 
to the client were contingent on client’s promise, inter alia, not to initiate criminal proceedings 
against respondent violated DR 6-102.  Likewise in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Dzienny, 96 Ohio St.3d 
144, 2002 Ohio 3611, 772 N.E.2d 627, the respondent was found to have violated 6-102 when he 
drafted inter vivos trusts in which he was named as a beneficiary and included in the agreements a 
provision that the client-trustor “would hold respondent harmless as to any further claims arising out 
of the arrangement,” id. at para. 4.  And in Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Rockmael, 92 Ohio 
St.3d 20, 748 N.E.2d 27 (2001), 6-102 was violated by requiring the client to release the respondent 
from any liability with regard to his misappropriation of client funds as a condition of returning the 
funds.  See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-6, 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 7 (Dec. 7, 2001) (unethical under 6-102 for prosecutor to negotiate, and criminal defense 
attorney to advise his client to enter into, plea agreement that waived defendant’s appellate or 
post-conviction claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel).  It is unclear 
whether such expansive readings will continue under Rule 1.8(h), although the Code provision (DR 
6-102) applied in these opinions also talked only in terms of “malpractice” liability. 
Attempts to avoid disciplinary exposure: With respect to attempts to evade disciplinary proceedings, 
see Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Kates, 78 Ohio St.3d 69, 676 N.E.2d 512 (1997), finding no violation 
of OH DR 6-102 where the lawyer, as part of settlement of a malpractice case, sought to insulate 
himself from disciplinary proceedings. “Disciplinary proceedings are not actions for malpractice.”  Id. 
at 70, 676 N.E.2d at 514. (The Court pointed out that the conduct may have violated former DR 
1-102(A)(2) (circumvention of disciplinary rule through actions of another), but the lawyer was not 
so charged.  Id. at 70-71, 676 N.E.2d at 514.) But more recent Supreme Court precedent appears to 
go the other way.  In the Kodish case, 110 Ohio St.3d 162, cited above, the respondent had the client 
promise to forgo, not only criminal proceedings, but also any grievance asserting professional 
misconduct.  This violated DR 6-102 (as well as 1-102(A)(5) & (6)). And in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Smith, 108 Ohio St.3d 146, 2006 Ohio 413, 841 N.E.2d 773, the Court found that 6-102 had been 
violated when the respondent offered to represent the client at no charge if the client would withdraw 
the grievance she had filed. Accord Akron Bar Ass’n v. Markovich, 117 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008 
Ohio 862, 883 N.E.2d 1046 (respondent’s offer to refund filing fee to client if client would drop 
grievance violated rule). There was no mention of Kates in any of these decisions. Whether Kodish, 
Smith, and Markovich continue to be good law under Rule 1.8(h), which, like 6-102, speaks in 
terms of making agreements limiting the lawyer’s liability for “malpractice,” also remains to be seen, 
but we are unaware of anything in the “legislative history” indicating a desire to change this more 
expansive interpretation. 
Some (but not very much) light was shed on this situation by Akron Bar Ass’n v. Wittbrod, 122 
Ohio St.3d 394, 2009 Ohio 3549, 911 N.E.2d 901. In Wittbrod, respondent was found guilty of 
violating DR 6-102 “or” Rule 1.8(h)(2). The Court recognized that 6-102 “did not specifically 
prohibit a lawyer from negotiating with a client for the dismissal of a grievance pending before 
disciplinary authorities”; rather it (like 1.8(h)(2)i)-(iii)) focused on negotiations to limit malpractice 
liability. Id. at para. 12. But the parties in Wittbrod, similar to the situation in Markovich, had 
stipulated to a violation based on respondent’s proposal, as a term of settlement in the malpractice 
claim, that the client’s pending grievance be dismissed. Since the parties in Wittbrod (like 
Markovich) did not dispute the violation, the Court accepted the result here as well. But, the Court 
left itself room to maneuver: In a footnote it quotes the Kates language cited above (“Disciplinary 
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proceedings are not actions for malpractice”) and its suggestion that DR 1-102(A)(2) might be the 
more appropriate rule to apply in such circumstances.  
Yet another word on the subject is found in the advisory opinion in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 2010-3, 2010 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 11, 2010), where the Board 
concluded that a lawyer’s requiring a client or former client to withdraw, or refrain from filing, a 
grievance, as part of the settlement of a malpractice claim, violates Rules 8.4(d) and (h), as well as 
Rule 8.1(a) and (b), since the attempts to avoid discipline “hinder the disciplinary process.” The 
Board’s conclusions that the conduct violated 8.4(d) and (h) is premised on Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Chambers, 125 Ohio St.3d 414, 2010 Ohio 1809, 928 N.E.2d 1061, “the first disciplinary case to 
consider the conduct of avoiding discipline, since the adoption of the Ohio Rules of Professional 
Conduct, effective February 1, 2007.” Bd. Op. 2010-3, at *3. While there is no reason to question 
that such conduct would violate these rules, the more interesting question is whether it might also 
violate 1.8(h), as it did DR 6-102. Rule 1.8(h) is limited to conduct directed toward clients or former 
clients; the adversary involved in the settlement attempt in Chambers, unlike that in the Board’s 
advisory opinion, was neither. Thus 1.8(h), whether read expansively to include avoidance of 
disciplinary exposure or as narrowly limited to avoidance of “malpractice” exposure only, could not 
have been involved in Chambers in any event. It remains to be seen whether the rule will be 
applicable on the facts set forth in Op. 2010-3. 
The most recent, but certainly not the final, word is found in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Dearfield, 130 
Ohio St.3d 363, 2011 Ohio 5295, 958 N.E.2d 910, which seems to raise more questions than it 
answers. In Dearfield, the respondent entered into an agreement with his former client, who had filed 
a grievance against him, that he would refund a portion of the retainer in exchange for “full and 
complete satisfaction” of all claims, including “any and all claims such as legal malpractice, ethical 
violations, or other complaints to overseeing bodies including the Ohio Supreme Court, the Ohio 
State Bar Association, the Cincinnati Bar Association or any other applicable entitles.” Id. at para. 8. 
This is similar to the “full and final settlement” language that the Court found violated Rule 1.8(h)(1) 
and (2) in the Mishler case, discussed in the next paragraph. The client’s grievance resulted in 
multiple violations of the Rules, but not 1.8(h). And, even though the Court specifically recognized 
this conduct, it made no mention of the Rule or the Mishler case, but instead found the conduct to 
constitute the aggravating factor of failure to cooperate in the investigation: 
[W]e also agree that Dearfield’s act of having Hallet sign a document 
that purported to release any disciplinary action pending against 
Dearfield is an aggravating factor under BCGD Proc. Reg. 
10(B)(1)(e). . . .[An earlier case] Holder [102 Ohio St.3d 307] put 
Dearfield on notice that his use of such a release could at least be an 
aggravating factor . . . . 
Id. at para. 18 (bracketed material added). Thus, we still do not have definitive word whether Rule 
1.8(h) will be interpreted expansively, as was DR 6-102 in Kodish, Smith, and Markovich, or more 
literally, as in Kates and in the footnote in Wittbroad. 
Indirect attempts to limit liability: Decisions under the former OHCPR often found that indirect 
attempts to limit liability violated DR 6-102. Unless the client is independently represented, these 
decisions in all likelihood will survive under 1.8(h)(1). Such misconduct typically transgressed other 
553
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.8 
 
provisions as well. For example, a lawyer who filed suit after the statute of limitations ran and then 
lied to the client about the reason for the suit’s dismissal, in order to avoid a malpractice action, 
violated not only OH DR 6-102, but 1-102(A)(4) (now Ohio Rule 8.4(c)) as well.  Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n v. Droe, 84 Ohio St.3d 143, 702 N.E.2d 407 (1998). In Disciplinary Counsel v. Manning, 
111 Ohio St.3d 349, 2006 Ohio 5794, 856 N.E.2d 259, both of these Code provisions (among others) 
were violated when respondent fabricated a settlement agreement purportedly in favor of his client 
and in connection therewith had them sign a “Release and Confidentiality Agreement”; respondent 
admitted that these documents were created “to avoid being sued by them for legal malpractice,” id. 
at para. 7, after he had failed to file medical malpractice action on their behalf. In accord, under the 
Rules, is Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Mishler, 127 Ohio St.3d 336, 2010 Ohio 5987, 939 
N.E.2d 852, where respondent’s addition in two instances of language over the endorsement line that 
respondent’s check to the client was in “full and final settlement of all claims” violated both Rule 
1.8(h)(1) and (2), since the client was not independently represented regarding the limitation of 
liability ((h)(1)) and was neither advised of the desirability to seek the advice of independent counsel 
regarding settlement nor gave informed consent to same ((h)(2)). 
It was also held under the former rule that a lawyer could not file for bankruptcy to avoid repaying 
client funds converted to his own use or to avoid a judgment for malpractice. E.g., Columbus Bar 
Ass’n v. Blankenship, 74 Ohio St.3d 586, 660 N.E.2d 1141 (1996) (attorney’s repeated attempts to 
file for bankruptcy to avoid and delay malpractice judgment against him violated OH DR 6-102, 
among other rules). 
And in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ewing, 75 Ohio St.3d 244, 661 N.E.2d 1109 (1996), a lawyer, 
seeking to purchase clients’ property, used coercive tactics in an attempt to secure the clients’ consent 
to the purchase, and to obtain a promise from the client not to denigrate the lawyer’s conduct. (The 
lawyer attempted to get the clients to agree that “[they] have carefully considered these facts and after 
considerable thought do not believe that [respondent] is ‘taking their farm’ and represent that they 
will not make any such statements to anybody period.”  Id. at 249, 661 N.E.2d at 1113. The Court 
treated this as a violation of 6-102). 
 
1.8:920  Settlement of Legal Malpractice Claim 
Ohio Rule 1.8(h) does not prevent an attorney from attempting to settle a malpractice action. It does, 
however, impose limitations on the lawyer’s doing so. Thus, any malpractice settlement must satisfy 
three conditions -- (1) it must not be “unconscionable, inequitable, or unfair,” (2) the client or former 
client must be advised in writing of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal counsel 
and must be given a reasonable opportunity to do so, and (3) the client or former client must give 
informed consent. Ohio Rule 1.8(h)(2)(i)-(iii) (incorporating conditions set forth in Clavner, below). 
See also Rule 1.8 cmt. [15]. 
The Supreme Court focused on the second and third of these prerequisites in finding that respondent 
had violated Rule 1.8(h)(2) in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 122 Ohio St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 2371, 907 
N.E.2d 1172, the first case applying this Professional Conduct Rule. See id. at para. 14. 
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Entering into settlement negotiations with a client who, inter alia, has not been advised to retain 
independent representation would violate Rule 1.8(h)(2), just as it violated former OH DR 6-102.  
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Clavner, 77 Ohio St.3d 431, 674 N.E.2d 1369 (1997) (citing 
non-Ohio courts and ethics committees to the effect that “a potential malpractice claim may be settled 
only if the client consents after full disclosure, the settlement is not unconscionable, inequitable, or 
unfair, and, most important, the client is advised to seek independent counsel before signing the 
agreement.”  Id. at 432, 674 N.E.2d at 1370). In Barnes v. Ricotta, 142 Ohio App.3d 560, 756 
N.E.2d 218 (Cuyahoga 2001), the appellate court reversed a summary judgment for defendant 
attorneys where the attorneys, as part of the settlement of their client’s claim and after admitting 
malpractice in missing the statute of limitations, had procured a release from liability predicated on 
the payment made by the insurance company to the client in settlement of the underlying tort case. 
Thus, the release violated the second prong of the Clavner test – that the settlement not be 
unconscionable, inequitable, or unfair – even though the seeking-independent-counsel prong was 
found satisfied. While no mention was made of OH DR 6-102 in the Barnes opinion, which was 
decided on contract grounds (failure of consideration), it seems that on these facts, in a disciplinary 
context, the disciplinary rule would have been violated. 
Although not citing the Clavner language on settlement of malpractice claims, the Supreme Court 
reached the same result in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Smith, 102 Ohio St.3d 10, 2004 Ohio 1582, 806 
N.E.2d 495 (6-102 violated where, in conducting “the settlement negotiation . . . with her own client” 
with respect to conceded malpractice, respondent “did not advise her client prior to their negotiations 
to seek independent counsel.”  Id. at paras. 12, 3.). 
 
1.8:930  Recapitulation of DR 6-102 and Rule 1.8(h) 
Ohio Rule 1.8(h) clarifies the lawyer’s obligations with respect to prospective limitation of 
malpractice liability and prospective agreements to arbitrate (1.8(h)(1)) and settlement of claims or 
potential claims of malpractice liability (1.8(h)(2)). Other than the exception relating to sale of a law 
practice, OH DR 6-102 was couched in absolute terms, and some cases (e.g., Rockmael) so applied it. 
Others (e.g., Clavner) added a gloss permitting settlement or releases if the lawyer advised the client 
to seek independent counsel and if certain other conditions were satisfied. Still other cases (e.g., 
Dzienny) referred to the need to advise the client to consult independent counsel with respect to the 
overall document(s) (here trust agreements), but did not directly tie this obligation to the 
hold-harmless aspect of the trusts. Moreover, since the disciplinary rule made no apparent distinction 
between prospective exoneration/limitation and settlement, these two situations were often conflated 
in the decisions (see, e.g., Clavner, Montali, Barnes). This potentially confusing case law has been 
superseded by a rule that clearly states the independent representation prerequisite for attempts 
prospectively to limit malpractice liability (and to arbitrate claims against the lawyer) (1.8(h)(1)) and 
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1.8:1000  Opposing A Lawyer Relative [see 1.7:500] 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [21] 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.7 cmt. [11] (Comment [11] was formerly MR 1.8(i), which was deleted by the 
2002 amendments.) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.21 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:1301 
ALI-LGL §  123 
Wolfram §  7.6.6 
Since this provision was moved from MR 1.8(i) to MR 1.7 cmt. [11] during the 2002 Model Rule 
amendment process (the same Ohio Rule 1.7 comment is numbered [21]), this subject is now treated 
in section 1.7:500 at “Conflicting interests of lawyer and client - Lawyer relatives opposing one 
another.” 
 
1.8:1100  Lawyer’s Proprietary Interest in Subject Matter of Representation 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.8(i) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.8(i) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.32-5.34 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §§  41:901, 41:2101 
ALI-LGL §§  43, 125 
Wolfram §§  8.13, 9.6.3 
 
1.8:1110  Acquiring an Interest in Subject Matter of Representation 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.32 (1996). 
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As a general rule, a lawyer may not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject 
matter of litigation the lawyer is handling for a client. Ohio Rule 1.8(i). (The two exceptions, set forth 
in subdivisions (i)(1) (liens authorized by law) and (i)(2) (reasonable contingent fees), are discussed 
below in sections 1.8:1120 and :1130.) See, under the former OHCPR, Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-2, 2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (Apr. 11, 2003) (offer of 
money-back guarantee in intellectual property matter gives lawyer proprietary interest in cause of 
action). A primary concern underlying this limitation is the potential for a conflict of interest to arise. 
If the lawyer has an ownership interest in the claim itself, the lawyer might cease to exercise 
independent professional judgment in the client’s interest if their personal desires diverge. The 
provision is intended as a preventive measure, to guard against the possibility of conflict inherent in 
such arrangements. It also recognizes that as a practical matter such ownership interests might 
compromise the client’s absolute right to discharge the attorney. Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [16]. Under the 
former OHCPR, lawyers were sanctioned for violating the provision even where the client ultimately 
benefited from the arrangement, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Baldwin, 74 Ohio St.3d 592, 
660 N.E.2d 1145 (1996), and, of course, where the client did not so benefit.  Medina County Bar 
Ass’n v. Carlson, 100 Ohio St.3d 134, 2003 Ohio 5073, 797 N.E.2d 55 (“flagrant” violation of OH 
DR 5-103(A) (and 5-104(A), see section 1.8:220), where respondent “unabashedly arranged to buy 
the farm of his mentally ill client, which was the subject matter of the litigation for which the client 
had hired respondent, for a small fraction of its worth,” id. at para. 27). 
Rule 1.8(i) expressly restricts (as did former DR 5-103(A)) the lawyer only from acquiring an interest 
in a matter that is the subject of litigation. Acquiring an interest in a client’s business, for example, 
where the lawyer represents the business, is not prohibited by this Rule; other provisions regulate 
such conduct. See section 1.7:500. 
Nevertheless, this litigation limitation was often ignored in cases under the former OHCPR. In Bar 
Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Nesbitt, 69 Ohio St.2d 108, 431 N.E.2d 323 (1982), for example, 
the Ohio Supreme Court found that a lawyer violated DR 5-103(A) by arranging for a client to make 
a loan to a third party without advising the client that the lawyer was to be paid a finder’s fee by the 
third party. Applying the same provision, the Court found that borrowing money from an estate when 
the lawyer represented the executor of the estate violated the DR 5-103(A) prohibition against 
acquiring a proprietary interest in a cause of action.  Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Cook, 18 
Ohio St.3d 149, 480 N.E.2d 436 (1985). Acquiring an interest in the uncollected debts owed to a 
client also violated this provision.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.3d 36, 
553 N.E.2d 1082 (1990). See also Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 90-3 (1991) (relying on this provision 
to advise lawyer that it would be impermissible to acquire either part or full interest in uncollected 
debts owned by client, which lawyer would then attempt to collect). So too did purchasing at auction 
client property that was the subject of partition litigation in which the lawyer was playing a minor role 
as co-counsel. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Baldwin, 74 Ohio St.3d 592, 660 N.E.2d 1145 
(1996). 
In Sauer v. Greene, 62 Ohio App.3d 22, 574 N.E.2d 542 (Montgomery 1989), the Second District 
Court of Appeals upheld the disqualification of an attorney representing tenants in an eviction action 
where the attorney was also a resident of the property involved. The court concluded that the lawyer’s 
interest in continued residence created a sufficient proprietary interest in the subject matter of the 
action to constitute a violation of DR 5-103(A). 
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1.8:1120  Contingent Fees 
The material in this section is excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide 
to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.34 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.8(i)(2), as did OH DR 5-103(A)(2), expressly provides that a lawyer may contract with 
a client to handle a civil case on a reasonable contingent-fee basis, even though this, in effect, gives 
the lawyer an ownership interest in the litigation. The benefits of this type of fee arrangement, which, 
as a practical matter, oftentimes allows individuals to bring claims they otherwise could not afford, 
simply outweigh the risks. See generally section 1.5:600. 
 
1.8:1130  Lawyer Liens 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.33 (1996). 
As one of the two exceptions to the general restriction against acquiring a property interest in a 
client’s litigation, Ohio Rule 1.8(i)(1), like OH DR 5-103(A)(1) before it, permits a lawyer to 
“acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer’s fees or expenses.” As stated in Comment [16], 
lawyer liens authorized by law “may include liens granted by statute, liens originating in common law 
and liens acquired by contract with the client.” Rule 1.8 cmt. [16]. But see discussion in section 
1.16:500 infra of the less-than-encouraging language concerning use of lawyer’s liens in Bd. Of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2010-2, 2010 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (April 9, 
2010). 
Case law in Ohio recognizes two types of liens available to lawyers for this purpose, the retaining 
(general) lien and the charging (special) lien. The retaining lien lies against all papers, property, 
documents, and monies of the client coming into the attorney’s possession during the course of the 
representation as security for fees and expenses due the attorney in connection with the representation.  
Foor v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 27 Ohio App.3d 76, 499 N.E.2d 1297 (Franklin 1986); accord 
McGuire v. Draper, Hollenbaugh & Brisco Co., L.P.A., 2002 Ohio 6170, 2002 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 6003 (Highland) (relying on Foor) . The charging lien, on the other hand, lies against 
judicially-recognized monetary judgments obtained by the attorney. See Goldauskas v. Elyria 
Foundry Co., 145 Ohio App.3d 490, 494, 763 N.E.2d 645, 648 (Lorain 2001); Fire Prot. Res., Inc. 
v. Johnson Fire Prot. Co., 70 Ohio App.3d 205, 594 N.E.2d 146 (Lucas 1991). Essential to the 
assertion of a charging lien is the existence of a “fund-creating” event, whether it be judgment, 
settlement or otherwise. See, e.g., Petty v. Kroger Food & Pharmacy, 165 Ohio App.3d 16, 2005 
Ohio 6641, 844 N.E.2d 869. While older decisions use language that could be read as limiting 
charging liens to judgments, see Cohen v. Goldberger, 109 Ohio St. 22, 141 N.E. 656 (1923) 
(syllabus) (referring to the “right of an attorney to payment of fees earned in the prosecution of 
litigation to judgment,”  id. at 23, 141 N.E. at 656), it now seems settled that such a lien may be 
asserted against a settlement amount as well, or any other fund-creating event. See Petty supra, citing 
other modern decisions to the same effect, including Mancino v. City of Lakewood, 36 Ohio 
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App.3d 219, 523 N.E.2d 332 (Cuyahoga 1987). (But the costs must have been incurred in creating 
the fund in question; thus a lawyer cannot assert a charging lien against a client out of a settlement in 
case A for costs incurred or amounts owing from that same client in case B. Hill, Hardman Oldfield, 
L.L.C. v. Gilbert, 190 Ohio App.3d 743, 2010 Ohio 5733, 944 N.E.2d 264 (Summit).) 
In construing former DR 5-103(A)(1), the Cleveland Bar Association determined that the language of 
the Disciplinary Rule permitting acquisition “of a lien granted by law” should be interpreted broadly. 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 151, at 5 (May 11, 1983). Thus, under the former OHCPR, a lawyer 
representing a client in a property dispute could secure payment of the fee by obtaining from the client 
a mortgage on the property that is the subject of the litigation.  Jamestown Village Condo. Owners 
Ass’n v. Market Media Research, Inc., 96 Ohio App.3d 678, 645 N.E.2d 1265 (Cuyahoga 1994) 
(OH DR 5-103(A)(1) exception applicable). Accord Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 2004-8, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 12 (Oct. 8, 2004). The Jamestown Village opinion 
cautioned that given the possible ethical difficulties that might arise, such an arrangement should be 
entered into only after exhausting all other alternatives, and further, the court in which the underlying 
action is pending should be informed of the arrangement. Note, however, with respect to mortgages 
and other security interests acquired by contract in property other than that recovered through 
litigation, “such an acquisition is a business or financial transaction with a client and is governed by 
the requirements of division (a).” Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [16]. 
While Ohio Rule 1.8(i)(1) approves of the use of retaining and charging liens by attorneys, other 
provisions of the Rules can be seen as being in conflict, to the extent they require a lawyer to return to 
a client during the representation (Ohio Rule 1.15(d)) or upon withdrawal from it (Ohio Rule 
1.16(d)) the funds, papers, and other property in the attorney’s possession to which the client is 
“entitled.” This conflict may be more apparent than real. Because the duty of return applies only to 
items to which the client is entitled, it can be argued that, in the face of an outstanding lien, the client 
is no longer entitled to the items; thus, exercising a lien would create no conflict. See Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n Op. 104 (Nov. 12, 1973). Even if this argument is rejected, Rule 1.8(i)(1) can still be read as 
trumping Rules 1.15(d) and 1.16(d) by providing a limited exception to the duties to return property 
to clients. 
Another approach to the problem under the former OHCPR posited that the lawyer, confronted with 
conflicting obligations, must balance these competing concerns. This approach was clearly the thrust 
of the Board and bar association opinions available on the subject. See Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-8, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (Apr. 10, 1992); Toledo 
Bar Ass’n Op. 92-16, at 1 (n.d.) (describing provisions in Canon 2 and 9 as “impos[ing] obligations 
that can restrict the use of retaining and charging liens” and finding that permissibility of exercising 
attorney’s lien turns on balancing of interests); Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 104, at 4 (Nov. 12, 1973) 
(“fine line” between non-prejudice to client by returning client papers and preservation of lawyer’s 
lien rights by withholding papers; issue is one of balancing prejudice to client from withholding with 
preservation of lien rights); Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 92-16 (n.d.) (warning that whether exercising an 
attorney’s lien is an ethics violation varies by the circumstances). These opinions discouraged the use 
of such liens because of the potential harm to the client and suggested that if exercising the lien would 
be sufficiently prejudicial to the client, then exercising that legal right might constitute a violation of 
former OH DR 2-110(A)(2). Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-8, 1992 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (Apr. 10, 1992). [It seems strange indeed that the exercise of a “legal right” 
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could violate a disciplinary rule, but that’s what the opinion said.] These sources advised that 
attorney’s liens should be used only as a last resort. Id. Compare Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2004-8, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 12, at *9 (Oct. 8, 2004): “The assertion of 
a legally permissible lien is ethical under the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility.” 
It should be noted that at least with respect to the retaining lien, any harm to the client can be 
mitigated by the client’s own actions. A court may require the lawyer to turn over the client’s papers 
to the client in response to a subpoena duces tecum, as long as the client puts up alternative security 
for the disputed fees or expenses.  Foor v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 27 Ohio App. 3d 76, 499 
N.E.2d 1297 (Franklin 1986). See also Tracy v. Selley, No. 93 AP-326, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 
3098 (Franklin June 17, 1993) (requiring attorney to turn over documents, without client posting 
security, found to be reversible error). In this way, both the need of the lawyer for security with 
respect to the disputed fees owed and the need of the client for his papers and other items are protected. 
If the client is unable to provide security, this attempt to accommodate competing interests will not be 
available, and the chance for undue prejudice to the client is more likely to arise, although the court 
might provide a summary proceeding to resolve the underlying fee dispute.  Foor, 27 Ohio App. 3d 
76, 499 N.E.2d 1297. At the other end of the spectrum, a former client cannot complain of prejudice 
where its own action (or inaction) has exacerbated any prejudice caused by a retaining lien. See 
Liberte Capital Group, LLC v. Capwill, No. 5:99 CV 818 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2000) (former 
client’s motion to require law firm to return files denied, where movant owed law firm unpaid fees 
and movant’s new counsel refused offer of law firm to permit inspection of the files). 
Even in instances in which attorney’s liens are available, they still must be properly invoked. In a 
1995 case, a lawyer was held subject to a suit for conversion for summarily converting, to cover 
outstanding legal fees, a settlement check received on the client’s behalf without first contacting the 
client in an attempt to secure payment of the debt. The court was not persuaded by the lawyer’s 
assertion that by this conduct he was simply invoking the right to an equitable attorney’s lien.  
Okocha v. Fehrenbacher, 101 Ohio App.3d 309, 655 N.E.2d 744 (Cuyahoga 1995). (For a related 
disciplinary case, in which Okocha was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, based in part 
on his treatment of the Fehrenbachers, see Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Okocha, 69 Ohio St.3d 
398, 632 N.E.2d 1284 (1994)). See also Putnam v. Hogan, 122 Ohio App.3d 351, 701 N.E.2d 774 
(Franklin 1997) (lawyer’s notice of lien against assets of estate, in effort to recover fees allegedly 
owing from former client, was neither retaining lien nor charging lien; further, lawyer released his 
lien in exchange for former client’s placing disputed amount in escrow pending resolution of fee 
dispute, which trial court had erroneously referred to binding arbitration under former OH DR 
2-107(B); 2-107(B) applicable to fee disputes between two or more attorneys, not fee disputes 
between client and lawyer). 
In Charles Greenspan Co., L.P.A. v. Thompson, 2003 Ohio 3641 (App. Cuyahoga), an attorney 
sought recovery pursuant to an attorney’s lien against an amount that accountants had agreed to pay 
his former clients in settlement of an accounting malpractice case. The court of appeals agreed that 
the lawyer had an equitable lien against his former clients for unpaid fees for work performed before 
the clients terminated him, “but he could not hold [the accountants] liable for paying settlement 
proceeds to the [former clients].” Id. at para. 53. Accord Meros v. Rorapaugh, No. 77611, 2000 
Ohio App. LEXIS 5477 (Cuyahoga Nov. 22, 2000) (lawyer’s remedy in enforcing equitable lien is 
through his client, not through parties releasing funds to client). Compare McGuire v. Draper, 
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Hollenbaugh & Briscoe Co., L.P.A., 2002 Ohio 6170, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6003 (Highland), 
where law firm A had represented McGuire, a former K-Mart employee, in a wrongful-discharge case. 
Firm A missed the statute of limitations, and its malpractice carrier referred the defense of the 
potential claim against firm A to law firm B. A malpractice suit was filed by McGuire, first against 
firm A and, in an amended complaint, against firm B as well. One of the contentions on appeal was 
that firm B had wrongfully withheld McGuire’s file. The court of appeals held that firm B (appellees) 
had “possessed a good faith belief that an attorney’s retaining lien existed on the file that entitled them 
to withhold appellant’s file until the outstanding fees [owing to firm A] were paid.” Id. at para. 78. 
Not surprisingly, McGuire claimed that the assertion of an attorney’s lien was not valid (presumably 
because firm B did not represent McGuire, but rather firm A). Nevertheless, the court held that 
“whether appellees’ assertion of an attorney’s retaining lien was valid according to law is not the 
question. Rather, the question is whether appellees possessed a good faith belief that such a lien 
existed.” Id. at para. 79. 
Finally, with respect to a charging lien the amount of which is in dispute, a hearing must be held so 
that the disputants can submit evidence to support their claims. Thus, in First Bank of Marietta v. 
Roslovic & Partners, Inc., 138 Ohio App.3d 533, 741 N.E.2d 917 (Franklin 2000), the court of 
appeals reversed a trial court’s granting of a lawyer’s charging lien against a judgment awarded a 
former client in a case in which the lawyer (Holliker) had been involved. The trial court did so without 
holding a hearing or taking any evidence, even though the former client disputed the amount allegedly 
owing. In such circumstances, the appellate court held that the lower court abused its discretion: 
 When a former client challenges the right to attorney fees or 
disputes the amount of fees claimed, a trial court cannot summarily 
award attorney fees. The trial court must first make a determination 
that the attorney fees are reasonable and such determination can only 
be made through the evidentiary process. . . . Under the facts presented 
here, the trial court’s summary award of attorney fees was tantamount 
to denying First Bank an opportunity to present evidence opposing 
Holliker’s claims. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
grant a judgment lien to Holliker for attorney fees without conducting a 
hearing to determine the reasonableness of those fees. 
Id. at 545, 741 N.E.2d at 926-27. 
For the latest chapter in the Roslovic litigation, see First Bank of Marietta v. Roslovic, 2004 Ohio 
2717, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 2401 (Franklin) (holding trial court erred in finding charging lien in 
favor of lawyer because lawyer’s efforts could not be said to have “created fund” from which lien to 
be paid, as required by syllabus rule in Cohen v. Goldberger, 109 Ohio St. 22, 141 N.E. 656 (1923)). 
This most recent Roslovic decision contains a thoughtful mini-treatise on the subject of charging liens, 
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1.8:1140  Retention of Files to Collect Fees [see 1.8:1130] 
 
 
1.8:1200  Imputation of (a) through (i) Prohibitions to Other Members of Firm 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.8(k) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.8(k) 
Ohio Rule 1.8(k) (substantively identical to MR 1.8(k), newly added to the Model Rules in 2002) 
imputes conduct by a lawyer in a firm violative of divisions (a)-(i) to all other members of the firm. 
As stated in Comment [20]: 
 Under division (k), a prohibition on conduct by an individual 
lawyer in divisions (a) to (i) also applies to all lawyers associated in a 
firm with the personally prohibited lawyer. For example, one lawyer in 
a firm may not enter into a business transaction with a client of another 
member of the firm without complying with division (a), even if the 
first lawyer is not personally involved in the representation of the client. 
The prohibition set forth in division (j) [sexual relationship with client] 
is personal and is not applied to associated lawyers. 
Ohio Rule 1.8 cmt. [20]. 
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1.9:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.9 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.9 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.124-5.125, 
9.19-9.20 
  
1.9:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.9 is substantively identical to the Model Rule. 
  
1.9:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following are listed in the Correlation Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 
1.9: DR 4-101(B), Kala Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1. 
  
1.9:103  Overview of Ohio Rule 1.9 
With respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interests involving former clients, Ohio Rule 1.9(a) 
continues the “substantial relationship” test applicable under the former OHCPR. Thus, without 
informed consent by the former client, confirmed in writing, a lawyer who has formerly represented a 
client in a matter cannot represent another person in “the same or a substantially related matter” where 
that person’s interests are “materially adverse” to the interests of the former client. Rule 1.9(a). 
Comment [1] states that “[c]urrent and former government lawyers must comply with this Rule to the 
extent required by Rule 1.11.” Ohio Rule 1.9 cmt. [1]. 
Pursuant to Rule 1.0(n), a 
 “[s]ubstantially related matter” denotes one that involves the 
same transaction or legal dispute or one in which there is a substantial 
risk that confidential factual information that would normally have 
been obtained in the prior representation of a client would materially 
advance the position of another client in a subsequent matter. 
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As the Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.9 states, the comments to the Rule are consistent with prior 
Ohio intermediate appellate court decisions, as well as with 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers §  132 (2000), on the substantial-relationship issue. As the Comparison also 
notes, conflict waivers must now be “confirmed in writing,” which is a change from previous Ohio 
law. 
Ohio Rule 1.9(a) applies to migrating and nonmigrating lawyers alike; there is no migration or 
side-switching prerequisite. 
Subject to the former client’s informed consent, confirmed in writing, Ohio Rule 1.9(b) prohibits a 
lawyer’s knowing representation of a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a 
firm with which the lawyer was associated had represented a client whose interests are materially 
adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer gained material information protected by Rules 1.6 
and 1.9(c). Thus, unlike Rule 1.9(a), which applies irrespective of whether the lawyer changes firms, 
Rule 1.9(b) is operative only with respect to a migrating lawyer. The “knowingly represent” 
requirement also distinguishes 1.9(b) from 1.9(a). 
Comment [5] states that a lawyer is disqualified under 1.9(b) “only when the lawyer involved has 
actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c)” -- without that knowledge the 
prohibition is inapplicable, even if the interests of the former firm client and the new client in the 
same or related matter are in conflict. Ohio Rule 1.9 cmt. [5]. This is yet another difference between 
divisions (a) and (b). When the former client was directly represented by the affected lawyer (1.9(a)), 
the Rule does not require an analysis whether the lawyer had acquired protected information; it is 
presumed. In contrast, when the affected lawyer did not directly represent the former client (1.9(b)), 
inquiry concerning whether the affected lawyer obtained protected information is required. 
Comment [6] notes that in making the determination under 1.9(b), “the burden of proof should rest 
upon the lawyer whose disqualification is sought.” Ohio Rule 1.9 cmt. [6]. 
Ohio Rule 1.9(c) precludes a lawyer and her present or former firm, who or which has formerly 
represented a client in a matter, from thereafter (1) using information relating to that representation to 
the disadvantage of the former client, unless permitted or required by the Rules with respect to a client, 
or when the information has become generally known; or (2) revealing such information unless 
permitted or required by these Rules with respect to a client. The 1.9(c) prohibition applies “whether 
or not a subsequent representation is involved.” ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 174 (7th ed. 2011). With respect to consent under 1.9(c) (which, unlike divisions (a) and (b), 
does not mention consent), Comment [9] notes that the provisions of Ohio Rule 1.9 are for the 
protection of former clients; as such they can be waived by informed consent, which consent must be 
confirmed in writing under 1.9(a) and 1.9(b). In other words, the language in 1.9(c), providing an 
exception to use or revelation of information relating to the prior representation “as these rules would 
permit or require with respect to a client,” makes nonwritten informed consent effective if it would be 
effective when given by a current client, as it is for disclosure (Rule 1.6(a)) and for use (Rule 1.8(b)). 
See section 1.9:400. 
Finally, Ohio Rule 1.9(c), like 1.9(a) but unlike 1.9(b), applies to both migrating and nonmigrating 
lawyers; unlike either 1.9(a) or (b), it also applies to the lawyer’s present or former firm, and, as noted 
above, whether or not there is any subsequent representation. 
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1.9:200  Representation Contrary to Interest of Former Client - In General 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.9(a) 
Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.9(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.98-5.99, 5.105 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:201 
ALI-LGL §  132 
Wolfram §  7.4 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.98-5.99, 5.105 (1996). 
Duties to former clients: Once an attorney-client relationship has been established, the duties of 
confidentiality and loyalty attach. These duties continue even after the relationship terminates. See 
section 1.6:220; Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 88-6, at 5-6 (Oct. 27, 1988) (“The duty of 
loyalty owed by a lawyer to his client with respect to matters as to which the lawyer acted as counsel 
survive the formal conclusion of the lawyer-client relationship to the extent that, having represented a 
party to a transaction, a lawyer may not thereafter represent the other party in an action against his 
former client arising out of or closely related to the transaction.”). Nevertheless, the duty of loyalty in 
particular is diminished after the relationship is terminated. For example, while opposing a present 
client on another matter unrelated to the representation of that client creates a conflict under Ohio 
Rule 1.7, see section 1.7:310, this is not true for a former client. The basic distinction was 
summarized by Sixth District Court of Appeals in a pre-Rule case: 
 Where an attorney seeks to represent a client with interests 
adverse to a former client, the attorney will be disqualified only where 
the present litigation bears a “substantial relationship” to the prior 
representation. . . . However, where an attorney undertakes 
employment against a current client, the rule is much more strict. 
“Where the relationship is a continuing one, adverse representation is 
prima facie improper, * * * and the attorney must be prepared to show, 
at the very least, that there will be no actual or apparent conflict in 
loyalties or diminution in the vigor of his representation.” [quoting 
Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 
1976)]. 
Henry Filters, Inc. v. Peabody Barnes, Inc., 82 Ohio App.3d 255, 262, 611 N.E.2d 873, 877 
(Wood 1992) (emphasis in originals; citations, other than Cinerama, omitted); accord Sarbey v. 
Nat’l City Bank, 66 Ohio App.3d 18, 583 N.E.2d 392 (Summit 1990). 
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The “substantial relationship” test is further discussed in section 1.9:210. Determining whether 
interests are sufficiently adverse to raise a conflict is discussed in section 1.9:220. 
When does a client become a “former client”?: In many instances, there is a clear indication, such as a 
termination letter, that the client’s representation has come to an end, thus making the client a former 
client. In other instances, however, the termination may be less clear. Compare Hatfield v. Seville 
Centrifugal Bronze, 106 Ohio Misc.2d 10, 732 N.E.2d 1077 (C.P. Medina 2000) (court held that 
where lawyer providing annual advice and services to a client took no action formally to notify client 
that representation had ceased, client remained current client of the lawyer for the following year for 
conflicts purposes), with Artromick, Int’l, Inc. v. Drustar, Inc., 134 F.R.D. Supp. 226 (S.D. Ohio 
1991) (even though lawyer’s last bill remained unpaid and disputed, where lawyer had not performed 
services for client for more than one year and client was using new lawyer, movant was “former client” 
and therefore could not disqualify lawyer from representing opposing party in subsequent unrelated 
matter). 
Related to this issue is the “hot potato” situation, where a lawyer drops one client in order to accept 
another, more desirable, client adverse to the first client. This effort to turn an existing client into a 
“former” client is seldom successful. See, e.g., Pioneer-Standard Elecs., Inc. v. Cap Gemini Am., 
Inc., No. 1:01 CV 2185, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7120 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2002) (refusing to 
recognize ploy: “for purposes of determining the status of an attorney-client relationship within the 
context of adverse representation, courts will not honor an attorney’s unilateral termination of the 
relationship”). See also 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  132 cmt. c 
(2000). In contrast, when through actions of a client, such as a corporate merger or acquisition, a 
conflict is created between two existing clients, some courts have given lawyers latitude and have 
allowed the lawyer to drop one client, which becomes a former client, and retain the other as a present 
client. E.g., Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1127 (N.D. Ohio 
1990), discussed in section 1.7:300 at “Conflicting interests between clients - Overview.” See 2 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  132 cmt. j (2000). 
Former-client conflicts and consent: Where a conflict involving a former client arises, it can be cured 
under the Rule by informed consent from the former client, which, under Ohio Rule 1.9(a) and (b), 
must be confirmed in writing. 
Does the consent of the current client need to be obtained as well? No and, in limited circumstances, 
perhaps yes. The general rule clearly is that current-client consent need not be obtained. See Ohio 
Rule 1.9(a) & (b) and cmt. [9] (“The provisions of this rule are for the protections of former clients 
and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing 
under divisions (a) and (b).”). The writing requirement was added to MR 1.9 by the 2002 ABA 
amendments and “reflects a judgment . . . that both lawyers and their former clients benefit when the 
lawyer is required to secure the former client’s informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a 
representation that is materially adverse to the former client in the same or a substantially related 
matter.” Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, Aug. 2001. See 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. 
William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  13.2, at 13-4 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-1): 
In Rule 1.9 as elsewhere in the law of lawyering, the chief device for 
“curing” conflicts of interest is full disclosure to the affected clients – 
here former clients – followed by informed client consent to 
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continuation of the otherwise problematic representation. 
(Consistent with the Hazard and Hodes analysis and the express language of Rules 1.9(a) & (b), the 
reference in Comment [1] to the lawyer’s obtaining informed consent of “all affected clients” in a 
situation where the lawyer had represented multiple clients but ended up representing one of the 
clients against the other (now former) clients should be read as requiring the consent of the former 
clients as the ones “affected.” This reading is further bolstered by the cross-reference in Comment [1] 
to Comment [9], quoted above.) Compare 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  
132 (2000) (requiring the consent of both former and present clients). See also Hazard and Hodes, 
noting this difference from the Model Rule. 1 The Law of Lawyering §  13.3, at 13.9. 
The one instance in which consent of the current client might be required arises when Ohio Rule 
1.7(a)(2) is implicated, and the lawyer’s ability competently to represent the current client is at 
significant risk of being materially limited because of the lawyer’s “responsibilities to . . . a former 
client . . . .” In such case, the representation cannot go forward unless, inter alia, “each affected client 
gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.” Ohio Rule 1.7(b)(2). In these circumstances, the 
current client is obviously an “affected client.” 
Because of constitutional implications, the consent rules are somewhat different in the criminal arena. 
In State v. Turner, No. 18554, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2214 (Montgomery May 18, 2001), the 
state filed a motion to disqualify the public defender’s office’s representation of the defendant 
because the office had on three prior occasions represented the victim in the current case. Defendant’s 
lawyer stated to the court that his client was fully apprised of the situation and wanted counsel to 
continue to represent him. The trial court denied the motion. Reversing, the appellate court held that 
counsel’s representations were insufficient; on remand, the trial court must inquire directly of the 
defendant as to his knowledge of the potential conflict and whether he wishes to waive the conflict. 
And, even if the defendant does waive the conflict, in the criminal context the trial court has the 
discretion to disqualify where a potential conflict of interest exists. See State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio 
St.3d 133, 689 N.E.2d 929 (1998) (no abuse of discretion in disqualifying defendant’s lawyers, who 
had previously represented another defendant in prosecution arising from same set of facts; “it is 
irrelevant that both [defendants] waived their right to conflict-free counsel.”  Id. at 137, 689 N.E.2d 
at 937). [Curiously, the Court made no reference to the appearance of one of the disqualified counsel 
as counsel to Keenan in his appeal to the Supreme Court. See  id. at 136, 689 N.E.2d at 936.] These 
decisions are consistent with federal constitutional law applicable in criminal cases, pursuant to 
which consent is not necessarily dispositive; a court may disallow the subsequent representation even 
if both former and current clients consent. As the Supreme Court held in Wheat v. United States, 
486 U.S. 153 (1988), the existence of a serious potential for conflict of interest can overcome the 
Sixth Amendment presumption in favor of the defendant’s right to select counsel of choice. See ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 172 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). 
The Kala decision - Side-switching and former-client conflicts: The major case in Ohio on 
side-switching and former-client conflicts is Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., 81 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998). 
Kala was a wrongful termination case. The plaintiff was represented by lawyer A. Trial resulted in a 
directed verdict for the employer. While the case was pending on appeal, taken by lawyer A on 
plaintiff’s behalf, and after lawyer A had obtained an extension of time within which to file plaintiff’s 
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appellate brief, lawyer A announced his intention to leave his firm and join the firm representing the 
defendant. 
Before lawyer A joined defendant’s firm, that firm acted promptly to put screening devices in place. 
These included erecting an ethical screen, sending the trial documents to off-site storage, where they 
were accessible only if the requesting lawyer signed for them, and making the appellate file available 
only through the lawyer handling the appeal for the defendant. Lawyer A submitted an affidavit 
stating that he had discussed the case with no one at his new firm and that no one at the new firm had 
discussed it with him. Plaintiff’s lawyers filed a motion with the court of appeals to disqualify 
defendant’s firm on conflict-of-interest grounds. The appellate court granted the motion without 
opinion, and the Supreme Court allowed defendant’s discretionary appeal. 
In a case of first impression in Ohio, the Supreme Court affirmed the disqualification: 
 The issue before the court is whether a law firm should be 
automatically disqualified from representing a party when an attorney 
leaves his or her former employment with a firm representing a party 
and joins the law firm representing the opposing party, or whether that 
law firm may overcome any presumption of shared confidences by 
instituting effective screening mechanisms. 
Id. at 3, 688 N.E.2d at 261. The Court’s answer was that the presumption is rebuttable (syllabus), but 
that in the particular circumstances of this case -- which involved lawyer A, while the case was 
pending on appeal, negotiating for a job with the opposing law firm without informing his client -- no 
screening devices could be deemed adequate. 
In commencing its analysis, the Court looked to ethical considerations and stressed the importance of 
the obligation to preserve client confidences (former OH DR 4-101), which obligation continues 
after termination of representation. The Court further looked to former OH DR 5-105, which “speaks 
to imputed disqualification,” 81 Ohio St.3d at 4, 688 N.E.2d at 262 (quoting OH DR 5-105(D)): 
“If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from 
employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm 
may accept or continue such employment.” 
Id. at 5, 688 N.E.2d at 262 (emphasis by the Court). 
After tracing the history of disqualification motions and the development of modern standards of 
disqualification, the Court set forth the applicable tripartite test -- whether there is a substantial 
relationship between the two matters; if so, whether the presumption of shared confidences at the 
former firm is rebutted by evidence that the migrating attorney had no knowledge of the matter; and, 
if the lawyer did have confidential information, whether the new firm erected effective screens to 
rebut the presumption of shared confidences at the new firm. 
As to the first two aspects of the test, the Court had little difficulty deciding that the matters were 
substantially related (indeed, it was one and the same case) and that the presumption of shared 
confidences at the former firm could not be rebutted, inasmuch as lawyer A was the lead lawyer on 
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the case for the former client.  Id. at 13, 688 N.E.2d at 268. 
With respect to the third part of the test, the Supreme Court decided that since lawyer A must have 
been negotiating for employment with defendant’s law firm while he was actively pursuing the appeal 
on behalf of plaintiff, without informing plaintiff of these facts,  id. at 14, 688 N.E.2d at 268, 
 [t]he appearance of impropriety is so strong that nothing that 
[defendant’s] firm could have done would have had any effect on 
[plaintiff’s] perception that his personal attorney had abandoned him 
with all of his shared confidences and joined the firm representing his 
adversary while the case was still pending. No steps of any kind could 
possibly replace the trust and confidence that [plaintiff] had in his 
attorney or in the legal system if such representation is permitted. This 
is the classic “side-switching attorney” case. 
 We find that under this set of egregious facts, the appearance of 
impropriety was so great that the attempts by [defendant’s firm] to 
erect a Chinese wall were insufficient to overcome the appearance of 
impropriety. 
Id. (bracketed material added). 
The resulting syllabus (which stated the controlling law under the reporting rules then in force), 
joined in by five of the seven justices, is as follows: 
 In ruling on a motion for disqualification of either an individual 
(primary disqualification) or the entire firm (imputed disqualification) 
when an attorney has left a law firm and joined a firm representing the 
opposing party, a court must hold an evidentiary hearing and issue 
findings of fact using a three-part analysis: 
 1) Is there a substantial relationship between the matter at issue 
and the matter of the former firm’s prior representation; 
 2) If there is a substantial relationship between these matters, is 
the presumption of shared confidences within the former firm rebutted 
by evidence that the attorney had no personal contact with or 
knowledge of the related matter; and 
 3) If the attorney did have personal contact with or knowledge 
of the related matter, did the new law firm erect adequate and timely 
screens to rebut a presumption of shared confidences with the new firm 
so as to avoid imputed disqualification? 
81 Ohio St.3d at 1, 688 N.E.2d at 260 (syllabus). 
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While both the syllabus and the opinion clearly state that the presumption of shared confidences at the 
new firm is rebuttable (this is “the fairer rule in balancing the interests of the parties and the public,”  
id. at 10, 688 N.E.2d at 265-66), the actual holding of the Court, as noted, was that the facts of this 
case were so “egregious” that the timely and apparently effective screening devices by the new firm 
could not overcome the appearance of impropriety.  Id. at 14, 688 N.E.2d at 268. Interestingly, while 
the Court drew heavily on the well-developed Seventh Circuit law in this area, and even cited 
Cromley v. Bd. of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059 (7th Cir. 1994), in support, the Kala result is difficult to 
reconcile with that reached in Cromley. The Cromley court found screening mechanisms 
comparable to those in Kala to be adequate to rebut the presumption of shared confidences at the new 
firm and to prevent imputed disqualification of the new firm, even though Cromley, like Kala, was a 
“classic ‘side-switching attorney’ case” involving a lead lawyer. Once again, the undisclosed 
negotiations by Kala’s lawyer with the opposing law firm may have been the distinguishing factor. 
See also Legge Assocs., Inc. v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 1235, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 
8702 (6th Cir. 1997) (table) (movant for disqualification argued (in language similar to that used by 
the Kala Court) that where lawyer for movant joins (via merger) firm representing opponent in same 
case “‘[n]o “Chinese Wall” can be constructed that can eliminate this obvious impropriety,’“ 1997 
U.S. App. LEXIS 8702, at *9, but Sixth Circuit, relying on Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, 
Dklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988), disagreed and held that where lawyer ceases his old 
representation before joining new firm, firm is not disqualified so long as it can show that no client 
confidences had been shared and screening mechanisms were in place to prevent any future 
disclosure). 
Relationship between Kala and Ohio Rule 1.9: According to the Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.9, 
the first two prongs of the Kala test are reflected in Ohio Rule 1.9(a) and (b). (The third prong is 
treated in Ohio Rule 1.10(c) and (d). See section 1.10:300.) 
Kala and Rule 1.9(a): In the words of the Ohio Code Comparison, 
 Division (a) restates the substantial relationship test, which 
extends confidentiality protection to clients the lawyer has formerly 
represented. This test presumes that the lawyer obtained and cannot use 
information relating to the representation of the former client in the 
same or substantially related matters, the first prong of the Kala test. 
Put another way, “In Kala, the Court extended the confidentiality protection of DR 4-101 to former 
clients by creating a presumption of shared confidences between the former client and lawyer [Rule 
1.9(a)].” Id.  (Bracketed material in original.) 
With respect, these statements do not accurately reflect either the substance of Ohio Rule 1.9(a) or 
the first prong of the Kala test. To take the last first, the first prong of the Kala test is limited to the 
question whether there exists “a substantial relationship between the matter at issue and the matter of 
the former firm’s prior representation.” Period. Presumptions are not operative. Second, and at least 
as important for present purposes, Ohio Rule 1.9(a) likewise contains no reference to “presumptions.” 
If there is no former-client consent, the Rule is absolute: a lawyer “shall not” thereafter represent 
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of a client that the lawyer had formerly represented. Period. Stated 
differently (if one wants to talk in terms of presumptions), the “presumption” of shared confidences 
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between the former client and the lawyer is irrebuttable under Rule 1.9(a). See 1 Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  13.5, at 13-16 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-1) 
(noting that MR 1.9 cmt. [3] employs this analysis). The irrebuttability of the “presumption” of 
shared confidences under Ohio Rule 1.9(a) stands in contrast to the rebuttable presumption under the 
second prong of the Kala rule. 
The first case of which we are aware that applies the provisions of Rule 1.9(a) is Litig. Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Bourgeois, 182 Ohio App.3d 742, 2009 Ohio 2266, 915 N.E.2d 342 (Cuyahoga). In Litig. 
Management, the plaintiff, LMI, sued former employees for violation of noncompete agreements 
and misappropriation of trade secrets, among other claims. A lawyer for some of the defendants in the 
action had formerly worked as an associate for the firm representing LMI. The evidence was that she 
was privy to confidential LMI information and that she had done research and analysis regarding 
LMI’s potential claims at her prior firm. According to a partner in the plaintiff’s firm, the associate’s 
“‘work on this matter was the cornerstone of the decisions that were made’” and that the “claims 
asserted by LMI in the present lawsuit are the same claims that Somich [the associate] researched and 
analyzed . . . .” Id. at paras. 8-9. Based on these facts, the trial court found after hearing that the 
matters were substantially related and the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed. Citing Rule 
1.9(a) and Kala, the appellate court found that there was a “commonality of issues and a clear 
connection between the subject matter of the former representation and that of the subsequent 
representation.” Id. at para. 18. As a result, the Eighth District affirmed the disqualification of 
Somich. (The court of appeals applied all three prongs of the Kala test, including that relating to 
screening, and found no evidence of screening. Under Rule 1.9(a), the “substantial relationship” 
between the two matters was sufficient, without more, to preclude Somich from representing 
defendants.) 
Kala and Rule 1.9(b): The Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.9 states that division (b) 
applies where the lawyer’s [former] firm (but not the lawyer personally) 
represented a client, and requires that the former client show that the 
lawyer in question actually acquired confidential information, the 
second prong of the Kala test. 
(Bracketed material added.) The Comparison elaborates that the Kala presumption of shared 
confidences (which is described as being “between the former client and lawyer”; actually, for 
purposes of the second prong of Kala, it is “within the former firm,” Kala (syllabus)) “could be 
rebutted by evidence that the lawyer had no personal contact with or knowledge of the former client 
matter [Rule 1.9(b)].” (Bracketed material in original.) 
With regard to 1.9(b) and the above statements, the following comments are in order: Division (b) 
does not expressly address the question of burden of proof on the issue whether the lawyer had actual 
knowledge. Kala clearly puts on the lawyer for the former client the burden of rebutting the 
presumption of shared confidences, and this is consistent with the second of the summations of 1.9(b) 
set forth above. The first articulation -- that the burden is on the former client -- is in error and 
inconsistent with Kala, the second prong of the syllabus of which expressly recognizes that there is a 
presumption of shared confidences and goes on to state that the question is whether this presumption 
within the former firm is “rebutted by evidence that the attorney had no personal contact with or 
knowledge of the related matter.” (Obviously, that evidence would come from the lawyer, not the 
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former client.) This reading is likewise consistent with Ohio Rule 1.9 cmt. [6], which states that the 
burden should rest on the lawyer. 
Kala and Rule 1.9(c): As the Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.9 sets forth, division (c) provides 
that in prior representation by either the lawyer or the lawyer’s past or present firm, 
the prohibitions against use [Model Rule 1.8(b)] and disclosure (Model 
Rule 1.6) that protect current clients also extend to former clients. This 
is the foundation of the Kala opinion, which extended the prohibitions 
against use or disclosure of client confidences or secrets in DR 4-101(B) 
to former clients. 
(Brackets in original.) The Comparison further notes that Kala “clarified that the DR 4-101(B) 
prohibition against using or revealing client confidences or secrets without consent applied to former 
clients [Rule 1.9(c)].” (Brackets in original.) (The Rule 1.9(c) prohibition applies to use or revelation 
of “information relating to the representation,” not just confidences or secrets. Id. See Ohio Rule 1.6 
cmt. [3].) 
Impact of Ohio Rule 1.9 on the Kala decision: Rule 1.9 resolves a number of issues that had not been 
authoritatively settled by the pre-Rule cases decided before and after Kala. First, the Rule applies to 
both criminal as well as civil matters. See Ohio Rule 1.9 cmts. [1] & [2]. Under pre-Rule precedent, 
most (but not all) cases agreed that Kala applied in the criminal as well as civil context. E.g., State v. 
Wiles, 126 Ohio App.3d 71, 709 N.E.2d 898 (Portage 1998) (assuming without discussion, as do 
virtually all of the court of appeals opinions so holding, that the Kala rule was applicable to criminal 
matters). 
Second, Rule 1.9 confirms the affirmative result reached in a number of pre-Rule cases on the 
applicability of the Kala test both to moves from private practice to government lawyering (e.g., 
State v. Edighoffer, Nos. 96 CA 161, 96 CA 162, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6191 (Mahoning Dec. 
16, 1998)), and to moves from the public defender’s office to the prosecutor’s office (e.g., Wiles). 
Comment [1] expressly notes that “[c]urrent and former government lawyers must comply with this 
rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11.” Ohio Rule 1.9 cmt. [1]. The “extent required” by former 
government lawyers is compliance with “all applicable laws and Rule 1.9(c).” Ohio Rule 1.11(a)(1). 
See further discussion of this issue at section 1.11:200. Ohio Rule 1.11(d)(1) (current government 
lawyers) tracks the Model Rule in requiring compliance with “Rules 1.7 and 1.9.” 
Another important question not resolved prior to adoption of the Ohio Rules was whether the Kala 
syllabus rule was limited in application to side-switching cases only, or whether it applies more 
broadly to other former-client conflict cases. [In one sense, a lawyer is “switching sides” whenever he 
or she sues, or otherwise shows up in an adversary position to, a former client. As used here, however, 
the term refers to a lawyer moving from one side to the other in the same case (or, more improbably, 
the same transaction).] While there are aspects of Kala that are peculiar to side-switching cases (e.g., 
the refusal to recognize the effectiveness of screening in “egregious” side-switching situations), it is 
reasonably clear from the language used by the Court in Kala that the rule there stated was intended 
to apply to all migratory-lawyer disqualification cases, not just to side-switching cases. There is no 
doubt that the facts of Kala presented a side-switching case, and the syllabus deals with a situation in 
which “an attorney has left a law firm and joined a firm representing the opposite party.” But it is also 
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clear that the Court thought its three-part test applicable in a broader category of disqualification 
settings as well. At one point in its opinion, it said just that: “We believe this test adequately covers 
many different scenarios and will give the courts of Ohio guidance on disqualification issues.” 81 
Ohio St.3d at 8, 688 N.E.2d at 264. At least one commentary reads the case this way. See 2 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  124 reporter’s note to cmt. c, at 307 
(2000) (“trial court has discretion to find that screening removes imputed disqualification in almost 
all instances, including those in which lawyer switches firms in same matter”) (emphasis added). 
Further underscoring such a reading is the fact that, of the opinions cited by Kala with approval in its 
exposition of the development of the test it adopts, some are not side-switching cases. E.g., LaSalle 
Nat’l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983) (migrating lawyer, but not same case); 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-013, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 20 
(May 30, 1989) (migrating lawyer; opinion covers both same and different (but substantially related) 
cases). See also Green v. Toledo Hosp., No. L-97-1457, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3590, at *5 
(Lucas Aug. 11, 2000) (noting that the Court in Kala established a test for “trial courts to employ in 
ruling on pretrial motions to disqualify counsel,” and that the Kala test allows, “in all cases,” a 
rebuttable presumption of shared confidences), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 94 Ohio 
St.3d 480, 764 N.E.2d 979 (2002) (migrating nonlawyer case). In any event, Ohio Rule 1.9 is 
controlling with respect to personal disqualification flowing from lawyer/former-client conflicts 
generally, including but not limited to side-switching in the same matter. It must be noted, however, 
that the provisions dealing with imputation of a lawyer’s personal conflict to his new firm in a 
same-case side switch (Rule 1.10(c)) are different from those dealing with imputation in all other 
instances in which a lawyer changes firms. (Rule 1.10(d).) These differences are explored in detail in 
section 1.10:300 infra. 
A related issue is whether Kala is internally inconsistent. This is not merely an academic exercise, 
inasmuch as Ohio Rule 1.9 (and 1.10) purport to be an effort to restate or “codify” the Kala rule. Just 
what, then, is the Kala rule? The tension arises from the syllabus (issued at a time when the syllabus 
was “the” law of a non-per curiam Ohio Supreme Court decision) and the actual holding as it 
impacted on the parties. Thus, the Court states in the syllabus that the presumption of shared 
confidences of the former client by the side-switching lawyer with his or her new firm is rebuttable, 
but in its holding on the facts declares that there is nothing the new firm could have done to repair the 
damage, given the “egregious” side-switching facts.  81 Ohio St. at 14, 688 N.E.2d at 268. In other 
words, in this particular case, given the side-switching lawyer’s negotiating for a job with the 
opposition without disclosing it to his client, for whom the lawyer was in the midst of an appeal, it 
would appear that the presumption was, in effect, irrebuttable, despite the new firm’s extensive and 
timely screening mechanisms. Id. at 2-3, 688 N.E.2d at 260-61. (This issue, together with Ohio 
Rules 1.10(c) and (d), is addressed in detail in section 1.10:300.) 
One requirement covered by Kala that is not treated by Rule 1.9 is the necessity of an evidentiary 
hearing in resolving the disqualification issue in side-switching cases. In all likelihood, the courts will 
continue to look to Kala on this issue.  E.g., Dickens v. J&E Custom Homes, Inc., 187 Ohio 
App.3d 627, 2010 Ohio 2634, 933 N.E.2d 291 (Montgomery) (side-switching associate; reversal of 
order issued after in camera hearing resulting in disqualification of defendant’s firm based on sealed 
record to which firm denied access; remanded for evidentiary hearing in which disqualified firm to be 
given opportunity to participate, as required by Kala and Rule 1.10); Fletcher v. Greater Cleveland 
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Transit Auth., 2007 Ohio 5338, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4698 (Cuyahoga) (reversing and 
remanding order of disqualification without hearing; claim of side-switching; hearing required under 
Kala). 
Rule 1.9 and post-Kala precedent under the former OHCPR: To date, the only noteworthy discussions 
of the Kala imputation/disqualification rule in subsequent full Ohio Supreme Court decisions are the 
opinion in Green v. Toledo Hospital, 94 Ohio St.3d 480, 764 N.E.2d 979 (2002), involving 
side-switching nonattorneys, and Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Parisi, 131 Ohio St.3d 345, 2012 Ohio 879, 
965 N.E.2d 268, involving counsel in a probate matter representing both the ward and proposed 
guardian. (Kala was also cited in Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 102 Ohio St.3d 307, 2004 Ohio 2835, 
810 N.E.2d 426, in support of the proposition that maintenance of confidentiality is a fundamental 
principle in the attorney-client relationship, and in the dissent in Biddle v. Warren General Hospital, 
86 Ohio St.3d 395, 412, 715 N.E.2d 518, 531 (1999), on the point that a lawyer’s duty to preserve 
confidences survives termination of the attorney-client relationship.) In Green, the Kala test was 
altered a bit for side-switching nonlawyers; the result under the new test was no disqualification of the 
side-switching secretary’s new law firm. Pursuant to the Green syllabus, “on a motion to disqualify a 
lawyer based on that lawyer’s employment of a nonattorney once employed by the lawyer 
representing an opposing party, a court must use the following analysis:” 
 (1) Is there a substantial relationship between the matter at issue 
and the matter of the nonattorney employee’s former firm’s 
representation? 
 (2) Did the moving party present credible evidence that the 
nonattorney was exposed to confidential information in his or her 
former employment relating to the matter at issue? 
 (3) If such evidence was presented, did the challenged attorney 
rebut the resulting presumption of disclosure with evidence either that 
(a) the employee had no contact with or knowledge of the related 
matter or (b) the new law firm erected and followed adequate and 
timely screens to rebut the evidence presented in prong (2) so as to 
avoid disqualification? 
Id. at 481, 764 N.E.2d at 980 (syllabus two). Thus, under the Green nonattorney rule, the second 
Kala step is reversed; there is no presumption of shared confidences and the movant for 
disqualification must present evidence of shared confidences. If that is done, then under the third step, 
the challenged attorney may rebut that evidence with contrary evidence or by evidence of screening. 
Since the Court concluded that any evidence that the secretary had confidential information at her 
former firm had been rebutted, it had no occasion to reach the lower courts’ conclusion of adequate 
screening. The Green case is discussed in Karen E. Rubin, Court Approves Ethical Screens for 
Nonlegal Personnel, Ohio Law., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 8. 
The Green rule for nonlawyers is not directly impacted by Ohio Rule 1.9, which is limited to lawyer 
conduct. But see Ohio Rule 1.10 cmt. [4], discussed in section 1.10:200. 
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As previously noted, Kala makes clear that a hearing is required on a disqualification motion 
involving a side-switching lawyer. But is a hearing required on all motions for disqualification? The 
most recent answer from the Court, in the Parisi case, is “no.” In Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Parisi, 131 
Ohio St.3d 345, 2012 Ohio 879, 965 N.E.2d 268, in a probate proceeding the respondent was 
removed by the probate court as counsel for both the ward and the proposed guardian. Parisi argued in 
the disciplinary proceeding, in which she was found to have violated, inter alia, Rules 1.7 and 1.14, 
that she could not be disqualified in the probate matter without first being afforded an evidentiary 
hearing. Citing to Kala for the proposition that a court must hold such a hearing when “an attorney 
has left a law firm that represents one party to an action and has joined a firm that represents an 
opposing party [side-switching],” id. at para. 15, the Court went on to state: 
But we have never held that a court must hold an evidentiary hearing 
before ruling on every motion for disqualification. Nor are we willing 
to impose such a requirement when an attorney has admitted that she 
represents two clients, it is apparent that those clients have inherently 
conflicting interests, and the entire basis of the legal action is to 
determine that one of those clients [the ward] is incompetent to handle 
his or her personal affairs – incompetence that would presumably 
render the client unable to give informed consent to the conflict. 
Id.  
Thus, while a hearing is mandatory in side-switching disqualification cases, a hearing is not 
mandatory prior to ruling on all motions for disqualification. Whether there are other such 
motions that will require a hearing remains to be decided. 
Numerous subsequent court of appeals decisions under the former OHCPR cited or discussed Kala. 
In addition to the eight opinions reported in Ohio App. 3d, there are dozens of references to Kala in 
electronically reported cases. 
The eight opinions reported in Ohio App. 3d are Dickens v. J&E Custom Homes, Inc., 187 Ohio 
App.3d 627, 2010 Ohio 2634, 933 N.E.2d 291 (Montgomery) (discussed below in section 
1.10:300); Litig. Mgmt., Inc. v. Bourgeois, 182 Ohio App.3d 742, 2009 Ohio 2266, 915 N.E.2d 
342 (Cuyahoga) (discussed in this section above at “Kala and Rule 1.9(a)” and below in section 
1.10:200); Amos v. Cohen, 156 Ohio App.3d 492, 2004 Ohio 1265, 806 N.E.2d 1014 (Hamilton); 
State v. Condon, 152 Ohio App. 3d 629, 2003 Ohio 2335, 789 N.E.2d 696 (Hamilton); Winblad v. 
Deskins, 150 Ohio App.3d 527, 2002 Ohio 7092, 782 N.E.2d 160 (Cuyahoga), Lightbody v. Rust, 
137 Ohio App.3d 658, 739 N.E.2d 840 (Cuyahoga 2000), State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 133 Ohio 
App.3d 57, 726 N.E.2d 1052 (Cuyahoga 1999), and State v. Wiles, 126 Ohio App.3d 71, 709 
N.E.2d 898 (Portage 1998). 
The Wiles case is instructive on the relationship between Kala and Rules 1.9 & 1.11. Citing Kala, 
the principal opinion in Wiles (one judge concurred separately and the third concurred in judgment 
only) held that in a situation in which the defendant’s former attorney in the same case (while on 
direct appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court) “switched sides” from the public defender’s office to the 
prosecutor’s office, there was a rebuttable presumption that the lawyer shared information with the 
prosecutor’s office relevant to defendant/appellant’s claim for post-conviction relief, and that, 
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pursuant to Kala, the trial court “must” hold a hearing on appellant’s motion to disqualify the entire 
prosecutor’s office. Therefore, the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s motion for post-conviction 
relief without such a hearing was reversed and remanded. (Note again that the Kala mandatory 
hearing requirement is not addressed in Rule 1.9.) The court assumed, without discussion, that Kala 
was applicable in the criminal context and to switches to a governmental position. In her separate 
concurrence, Judge Christley questioned whether Kala should be dispositive on the facts before the 
court: “Specifically, I am still not convinced that when a government attorney is involved, there is the 
same presumption [of shared confidences] that applies when there is a private attorney, as in Kala.” 
126 Ohio App.3d at 85, 709 N.E.2d at 907. As it turns out, Judge Christley’s position has been 
vindicated; disqualification is now limited to the particular government lawyer involved in the prior 
representation. Despite the absence of imputation, screening is nevertheless advised as “prudent” 
practice. See Ohio Rule 1.11(d)(1) & (2)(i) & cmt. [2]. (State v. Condon is also consistent with 
Judge Christley’s position.) 
In our attempt to synthesize Kala and its officially and electronically reported progeny with Rule 1.9, 
the following ground rules emerge: 
 Kala by its terms applies to all civil cases involving a side-switching lawyer, see, e.g., Bailey 
v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., No. 2001 CA 00147, 2001 WL 1913832 (Ohio App. 
Stark Nov. 5, 2001). See also Ussury v. St. Joseph Hospital, 43 Ohio App.3d 48, 539 
N.E.2d 700 (Cuyahoga 1988), a civil pre-Kala side-switching disqualification case, and 
Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Psenicka, 62 Ohio St.3d 35, 577 N.E.2d 1074 (1991), a 
disciplinary action in which violation of former OH DR 4-101(B)(2) & (3) and 5-105(A) was 
premised upon side-switching in a divorce action. 
Ohio Rule 1.9(a) now controls in this situation. 
 Kala has also been applied in side-switching criminal cases, in which the lawyer moved from 
the defense to the prosecution. See State v. Britton, No. 9-99-81, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 
2521 (Marion June 14, 2000)); State v. Wiles, 126 Ohio App.3d 71, 709 N.E.2d 898 
(Portage 1998). These two cases further stand for the proposition that Kala applies to lawyers 
migrating to a government legal position from private practice (Britton) or from the public 
defender’s office (Wiles). A quartet of criminal cases decided the same day by the Third 
District Court of Appeals is in accord.  State v. Schramm, No. 13-01-018, 2001 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5120 (Seneca Nov. 15, 2001); State v. Frederick, No. 13-01-16, 2001 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5118 (Seneca Nov. 15, 2001); State v. Hoschar, No. 13-01-15, 2001 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5119 (Seneca Nov. 15, 2001); State v. Adams, No. 13-01-13, 2001 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5116 (Seneca Nov. 15, 2001) (Kala applied to move from public defender’s office to 
prosecutor’s office). Migration the other way -- from government to private practice -- is also 
covered.  Randal S.D. v. Tammy M.R., 2004 Ohio 6469, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 5904, 
(Huron).  (While a ruling granting a motion to disqualify in a civil case is a final appealable 
order, an order disqualifying defense counsel in a criminal case is not.  State ex rel. Keenan v. 
Calabrese, 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 631 N.E.2d 119 (1994); State v. Whaley, 2006 Ohio 490, 
2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 404 (Trumbull).) 
Under Ohio Rule 1.9 cmt. [1], current-government-lawyer conflicts are governed by 
Rule 1.11(d), in conjunction with the provisions of Rule 1.9 (and 1.7). 
577
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.9 
  
 The Kala substantial-relationship test has been held to control as well in those cases in which 
a migrating lawyer or his or her new firm opposes a former client in a case different than that 
involved in the prior representation. See State v. Edighoffer, Nos. 96 CA 161, 96 CA 162, 
1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6191 (Mahoning Dec. 16, 1998) (prosecutor in present child-abuse 
criminal case had represented defendant in DUI case four years prior; Kala applied, no 
substantial relationship found; denial of disqualification affirmed). Pre-Kala, see Margiotta 
v. McClaren (In re McClaren), 115 B.R. 922 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (imputed disqualification of 
merged firm avoided by effective screening of lawyer for, and files of, former client from firm 
lawyers representing client against former client in different matter where prior representation 
was, in part, substantially related to current representation); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 89-013, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 20 (May 30, 1989) (analysis 
applicable to same or different (but substantially related) cases adverse to former client; 
opinion cited with approval in Kala). Cf. Randal S.O. v. Tammy M.R., 2004 Ohio 6469, 
Ohio App. LEXIS 5904 (Huron) (inadequate protective devices insulating lawyer at new 
firm in case substantially related and adverse to child-custody work lawyer performed while 
lawyer for Child Support Enforcement Agency; disqualification affirmed; this case is further 
discussed in section 1.11:200). See also LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 
252 (7th Cir. 1983) (substantial relationship found; lawyer and new firm disqualified; case 
cited with approval by Kala). 
Ohio Rule 1.9(a) applies here as well. 
 Citing, inter alia, Kala, the court in Friedman v. Kalail, No. 20657, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 
1509 (Summit Apr. 3, 2002), held that there was no substantial relationship between prior 
representation in estate-planning matters for present defendant by others in lawyer’s former 
firm and the current matter to domesticate a default judgment, in which lawyer represented the 
plaintiff. 
This pattern (former client of lawyer’s former firm) is now controlled by Rule 
1.9(b). 
 The Green variation on the Kala test is applicable in cases involving side-switching 
nonattorneys, such as secretaries and (presumably) paralegals.  Green v. Toledo Hosp., 94 
Ohio St.3d 480, 764 N.E.2d 979 (2002), discussed this section supra; see Latson v. 
Blanchard, No. 18867, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4619 (Summit Sept. 20, 1998) (pre-Green 
case involving side-switching paralegal). 
As noted above, Ohio Rule 1.9 is inapplicable to the situation presented in Green 
(and Latson), but with respect to imputation, see Ohio Rule 1.10 cmt. [4] and section 
1.10:200. 
 All of the other post-Kala decisions under the Code are those in which there was no migrating 
lawyer, but the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm opposed a former client in a different but 
substantially related case. See Stokes v. Mills, 2006 Ohio 6233, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 
6210 (Licking); Campbell v. Indep. Outlook, Inc., 2004 Ohio 6716, 2004 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 6248 (Franklin); Harsh v. Kwait, No. 76683, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4636 
(Cuyahoga Oct. 5, 2000); Brant v. Vitreo-Retinal Consultants, Inc., No. 1999- CA-00283, 
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2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1494 (Stark Apr. 3, 2000); Majestic Steel Serv., Inc. v. DiSabato, 
No. 76540, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4919 (Cuyahoga Oct. 21, 1999). See also the pre-Kala 
cases of Hollis v. Hollis, 124 Ohio App.3d 481, 706 N.E.2d 798 (Cuyahoga 1997); Phillips 
v. Haidet, 119 Ohio App.3d 322, 695 N.E.2d 292 (Logan 1997); Stevens v. Grandview 
Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 14042, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5092 (Montgomery Oct. 20, 
1993). 
This situation is now controlled by Ohio Rule 1.9(a) and/or 1.9(c). As previously 
noted, the 1.9(c) prohibition against use or revelation of information is not limited 
to subsequent substantially related matters -- there need be no subsequent “matter” 
or representation at all. 
 In Majestic, the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the disqualification of defendant’s 
lawyer and his firm in an employment-contract/noncompete dispute, where they had 
previously worked on similar matters for the present plaintiff against parties other than the 
present defendant. In rejecting the defendant’s argument that the trial court had erred in not 
holding the evidentiary hearing that Kala says “must” be held on the motion to disqualify (81 
Ohio St.3d at 1, 688 N.E.2d at 260), the court of appeals concluded as follows: 
Appellant argues that although Kala was clearly intended to apply to 
“side-switching” cases, and the three-part test announced therein is 
specific to such cases, the opinion represents a modification of the 
three-part test announced in Dana regarding consideration of a motion 
for disqualification and should be applied, by implication, to require a 
hearing on all motions to disqualify. We see no reason to adopt this 
reasoning. There is nothing in Kala to suggest that an evidentiary 
hearing is necessary on all motions to disqualify counsel. 
1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4919, at *12. Accord, on the hearing point, Shawnee Assoc., 
L.P. v. Village of Shawnee Hills, 2008 Ohio 461, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 
391(Delaware) (prior negotiation substantially related to present litigation; Kala read 
as requiring hearing only in side-switching cases); Stokes v. Mills, 2006 Ohio 6233, 
2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6210 (Licking) (substantially related cases); Luce v. Alcox, 
2005 Ohio 3373, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 3116 (Franklin). Although not expressly 
addressing the hearing issue, the court in Brant cited Majestic in support of its 
conclusion that the Kala test “specifically applies to ‘side-switching attorney’ cases.” 
2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1494, at *5. 
As Parisi supra makes clear, a hearing is not required on every disqualification motion, 
and was not required in that case where the respondent was simultaneously 
representing two clients with inherently conflicting interests. 131 Ohio St.3d 345, at 
para. 15. 
As previously noted, Ohio Rule 1.9 does not deal with the question of the necessity 
of an evidentiary hearing. 
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 There is another aspect of the interplay between Kala and the Majestic line of cases that 
should be mentioned. Because the lawyer whose disqualification was sought in Majestic had 
himself represented the former client, the court held that there was an irrebuttable 
presumption that the lawyer had obtained from the former client confidential information he 
could make use of in his representation in the related current case against the former client.  
1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4919, at *7 (relying on Stevens v. Grandview Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 
No. 14042, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5092 (Montgomery Oct. 20, 1993), and language from 
City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio 1976), 
aff’d, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977) (table)). Accord Shawnee Assoc., L.P. v. Village of 
Shawnee Hills, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 391, at paras. 30-31; Indep. Outlook, 2004 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 6248, at paras. 14-15. At first blush, this seems inconsistent with the Kala rule 
that the presumption of shared confidences at the former firm (in Majestic the “former” firm 
was the same firm) is rebuttable, but the two cases are reconcilable. When the lawyer is the 
lead lawyer (or actively involved) in the prior matter (as in both Kala and Majestic), it is a 
given that he or she had access to confidential information. The Kala Court held as much 
when, in considering the “rebuttable” shared-confidences-with-his-prior-firm presumption, 
said merely that the lawyer “possessed client confidences, as he was the lead attorney on 
Kala’s lawsuit.” 81 Ohio St.3d at 13, 688 N.E.2d at 268. Thus, where the lawyer is suing a 
former client, whether in a side-switching or otherwise substantially related matter, and was 
the principal or a significant lawyer for the former client in the prior matter, his or her 
knowledge of the former client’s confidences is, in effect, irrebuttable -- practically speaking, 
such a lawyer will be unable to make the showing necessary to rebut the presumption. 
Once again, 1.9(a) is now controlling and reaches the same result without resort to 
presumptions. 
 Finally, if the situation involves a matter in which the lawyer had participated personally and 
substantially while a public officer or employee, Ohio Rule 1.11(a)(2) prohibits the lawyer 
from accepting employment on that matter in private practice, unless the appropriate 
government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing. See section 1.11:200. 
 
1.9:210  “Substantial Relationship” Test 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.100 (1996). 
Even if a lawyer does not switch sides, he must still decline representation or withdraw, absent the 
informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation by the lawyer’s former client, where the 
interests of the former and current clients are materially adverse (see section 1.9:220) and the matters 
involved are “substantially related.” Ohio Rule 1.9(a) & (b). The first case dealing with the 
substantial relationship test under the Rules is Litig. Mgmt., Inc. v. Bourgeois, 182 Ohio App.3d 
742, 2009 Ohio 2266, 915 N.E.2d 342 (Cuyahoga), discussed in section 1.9:200 at “Kala and Rule 
1.9(a)” supra.  
See, under the former OHCPR, Shawnee Assoc., L.P. v. Village of Shawnee Hills, 2008 Ohio 461, 
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2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 391 (Delaware) (“to have a substantial relationship, there must be a 
commonality of issues between the prior and present representations, and the factual contexts of the 
two representations must be similar or related,” id. at para. 21; substantial relationship found where 
plaintiff’s lawyer, in suit seeking right to use village sanitary sewer system, had previously 
represented village in negotiations with Columbus and Dublin regarding sanitary sewer service for 
village); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-013, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 20 (May 30, 1989) (syllabus). Compare Campbell v. Indep. Outlook, Inc., 2004 Ohio 
6716, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 6248 (Franklin) (suit on buyers’ promissory note and guaranty, given 
as consideration for sale of partnership business; plaintiff, one of selling partners, moved to disqualify 
buyers’ lawyer, who had represented selling partners in deal; court held substantial relationship 
existed between note/guaranty now at issue and sale agreement that buyers’ lawyer had reviewed on 
behalf of sellers), and Brant v. Vitreo-Retinal Consultants, Inc., No. 1999 CA00283, 2000 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 1494, at *11 (Stark Apr. 3, 2000) (law firm, representing plaintiff in present action 
attacking noncompete agreement, had previously drafted another noncompete agreement for present 
defendants; substantial relationship found, since present case involved “essentially the same 
noncompete clause [law firm] drafted for appellees which [law firm] now seeks to find invalid on 
behalf of appellant”; disqualification affirmed), with Hollis v. Hollis, 124 Ohio App.3d 481, 706 
N.E.2d 798 (Cuyahoga 1997) (no substantial relationship between present divorce action, in which 
lawyer represented husband, and prior workers’ compensation matter, in which same lawyer had 
represented wife three years before marriage; disqualification reversed). 
Although the substantial-relationship test is an integral part of the syllabus rule set down by the 
Supreme Court in Kala, the Court had no need to elaborate on the parameters of the substantial 
relationship test itself, inasmuch as the former and current “matters” were one and the same case. The 
Court made clear, however, that “[i]f there is no substantial relationship, then no ethical problem 
exists.”  81 Ohio St.3d at 8, 688 N.E.2d at 264. 
Extensive guidelines with respect to what constitutes a “substantially related” matter are provided in 
Ohio Rule 1.9 cmt. [3]. After referencing the definition of “substantially related matter” in Rule 
1.0(n), quoted in section 1.9:103 supra, the comment goes on to provide examples; thus, a lawyer 
who had represented a shopping center client in securing environmental permits would not be able to 
represent neighbors of the center seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of 
environmental considerations. (Comparable examples from prior Ohio case law would be the 
Shawnee case, discussed above, and Stevens v. Grandview Hospital & Medical Center, No. 14042, 
1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5092 (Montgomery Oct. 20, 1993), where the court, noting that lawyer 
“must” have acquired confidential information in his role as trial defense counsel for hospital for 15 
years in similar actions and lawyer’s admission of knowledge of hospital’s policies and procedures, id. 
at *18, disqualified plaintiff’s lawyer in a medical malpractice action against the hospital). But that 
same shopping-center lawyer would not be precluded from defending a tenant of the shopping center 
in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. The comment further advises that a lawyer’s general 
knowledge of an organizational client’s policies and practices will not ordinarily preclude 
representation, but knowledge of specific facts from the prior representation, if relevant to the 
subsequent matter, usually will. (E.g., Harsh v. Kwait, No. 76683, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4636 
(Cuyahoga Oct. 5, 2000) (law firm disqualified where it had previously drafted for corporation 
articles of incorporation containing an indemnification provision that law firm’s present client sought 
to enforce against corporation).) Finally, a former client need not disclose the confidential 
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information in order to demonstrate substantial risk; rather, an objective test is used: 
A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based 
on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and 
information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer 
providing such services. 
Ohio Rule 1.9 cmt. [3]. 
Clarification is in order here about a sentence appearing in Ohio Rule 1.9 cmt. [2] (verbatim from 
MR 1.9 cmt. [2]) that “a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not 
precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even 
though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client.” This language 
seems at odds with the other provisions of Rule 1.9 and its comments (as well as with the Stevens 
case, noted above). The sentence posits the existence of adversity and, although not addressing the 
issue directly, could be read as encompassing matters that are substantially related as well. We are 
aware of no explanation of it elsewhere in the Rule, the comments, or the ABA Annotation to MR 
1.9. One could argue that it is intended to reject the “playbook” theory, whereby, as a result of the 
prior representation, a lawyer’s knowledge of the former client’s internal thought processes and 
tactical approach to litigation is enough to disqualify. See 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William 
Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  13.7 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-1) (criticizing the pure playbook 
approach to disqualification as “unwarranted”). Accord ABA Formal Op. 99-415 (Sept. 8, 1999) 
(opining that fact that in-house lawyer had gained “a general knowledge of the strategies, policies, or 
personnel of the former employer is not sufficient by itself” to disqualify the lawyer under MR 1.9(a). 
Id. at 8.). The ABA Opinion also states, in language bearing more than a passing resemblance to the 
sentence in Comment [2], that 
 [t]he fact that the lawyer had represented his former employer 
in similar types of matters . . . is not sufficient by itself to establish a 
substantial relationship between the current matter and matters in the 
legal department at the organization for purposes of Rule 1.9(a). 
Id. (emphasis added). We think Opinion 99-415 provides a key to accommodating the sentence in 
Comment [2] to the rest of the Rule. Thus, the sentence can be read as stating a no-disqualification 
result on the facts as stated, without more. But if the fact of substantial relationship is added, the rule 
is otherwise - i.e., “a lawyer . . . is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually 
distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involve a position adverse to 
the prior client,” unless the matters are substantially related as well as adverse. Only in this way, it 
seems to us, can the sentence be reconciled to the rest of Ohio Rule 1.9. Further support for this 
reading is found in Hazard and Hodes’ suggestion that the Comment [2] sentence was designed to 
keep the playbook rationale from extending to “positional conflicts of interest in the former client 
context.” 1 Hazard & Hodes §  13.7, at 13-21. Since positional conflicts involve a lawyer’s being on 
different sides of an issue in “completely unrelated matter[s],” see section 1.7:270, this interpretation 
is congruent with our reading that the sentence speaks to situations other than those in which the 
matters are substantially related. And see Hazard & Hodes §  13.3, at 13-35 to 13-36 n.5 (positional 
conflict not “substantially related” in sense required by former-client conflict rules). 
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The only case of which we are aware that confronts the “substantial relationship” issue under the Ohio 
Rules is the federal district court case of OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 82833 (S.D. Ohio 2008). There the court disqualified a lawyer for one of the defendants, who 
had represented the plaintiff insurance company in prior insurance coverage cases raising the same 
issues, because the present and prior actions were substantially related. Despite “[s]ignificant 
difference . . . in policy type, text, term and coverage,” 
the two cases certainly appear to involve a dispute over essentially the 
same legal issue. 
Id. at *14. Even more compelling to the court was a letter written by the lawyer in question (Bechtold) 
to a representative of his former client in which he asserted that the insurance company’s 
interpretation of the policies in the case at bar was “inconsistent” with the insurer’s “understanding 
and intent” in the prior cases in which the lawyer had represented the insurer. The court found that this 
letter could be interpreted to 
Insinuate that his insider’s knowledge of OneBeacon’s inner workings 
should motivate OneBeacon to change its position in deference to his 
new client’s adverse one. 
Id. at *16 (rejecting the argument that this was not confidential information but rather, at best, 
knowledge of the insurance company’s “playbook”). In the court’s words, the letter  
presents one of the rare instances in which direct evidence is available 
to show that “factual information . . . obtained in the prior 
representation of a client” actually was used in an attempt to 
“materially advance the position of another client in a subsequent 
matter.” Ohio R. Prof. Cond. 1.0(n). 
Id. at *15. The Rule 1.9 cmt. [2] issue, discussed above, apparently was not raised and in any event 
the comment is not cited by the court. (Note that the motion to disqualify the disqualified lawyer’s 
law firm was denied. Instead, the client can choose whomever it wishes to represent it “except 
Bechtold.” If it chooses Bechtold’s firm to continue and OneBeacon again moves to disqualify, the 
client will be given the opportunity to rebut the presumption that confidences were shared by 
Bechtold with the firm lawyer who enters his or her appearance in the case.) 
There are a number of Ohio federal cases, decided under the former OHCPR, that are instructive on 
the substantial relationship issue. Many employ the three-part test from Dana v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Mut., 900 F.2d 882, 889 (6th Cir. 1990), for the disqualification of counsel: “(1) a past 
attorney-client relationship existed between the party seeking disqualification and the attorney it 
seeks to disqualify; (2) the subject matter of those relationships was/is substantially related; and (3) 
the attorney acquired confidential information from the party seeking disqualification.” Id. at 889. In 
addition to Dana, see, e.g., SST Castings, Inc. v. Amana Appliances, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 863 
(S.D. Ohio 2002) (movant for disqualification failed to satisfy second and third prongs of Dana test; 
“[t]he simple fact that a law firm has represented a client in garden-variety contract disputes, does not 
mean that when the client chooses representation by another firm, the client has veto power to block 
its former firm from representing an adverse party in yet another garden-variety contract dispute,” id. 
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at 868). (It should be further noted that where there is no migrating attorney as there was in Kala, 
numerous Ohio decisions also follow the tripartite Dana test in ruling on disqualification motions.  
See, e.g., Estate of Grilli v. Smith, 2008 Ohio 3126, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 2648 (Fairfield) 
(denial of disqualification motion affirmed); Sachs v. Phillips, 2006 Ohio 5100, 2006 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5022 (Lucas) (disqualification reversed); Campbell v. Indep. Outlook, Inc., 2004 Ohio 
6716, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 6248 (Franklin) (disqualification affirmed).) 
Another informative federal case decided under the OHCPR was Berger McGill, Inc. v. Capozolli 
(In re Berger McGill, Inc.), 242 B.R. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1999). In Berger McGill, the court held, in a 
close corporation context, that the law firm employed by the bankruptcy trustee to represent the 
corporation in an adversary proceeding against a creditor of the corporation could not do so, because 
the same law firm had represented the creditor (then the debtor’s controlling shareholder) with respect 
to alleged preferential transfers made by the debtor to the creditor, which transfers were at issue in the 
adversary proceeding. “Consequently, there is a clear connection between the subject matter of the 
former representation of [creditor by the law firm] and that of the Trustee’s preference action that he 
seeks to employ [the law firm] to prosecute.”  Id. at 423. Since during the former representation the 
creditor provided the law firm with confidential information that was substantially related to the 
Trustee’s current action, the law firm was not permitted to represent the Trustee. Id. 
So long as the substantial relationship requirement is satisfied and the interests are adverse, there is 
nothing in Rule 1.9 that limits application of the Rule’s prohibition to situations in which the former 
client is an opposing party in the current client’s representation. See, e.g., under the former OHCPR. 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 89-1 (Nov. 15, 1989) (legal-aid lawyer who spoke to A, ex-wife 
of B, about visitation problems with B cannot later represent B in divorce action against the current 
wife, C, if confidences gained in the earlier relationship with A might be used in subsequent 
proceeding to benefit B or to the detriment of A; prohibition against using the confidences obtained 
from A would result in the lawyer being inhibited in the exercise of independent professional 
judgment on behalf of B, in violation of former OH DR 5-105(A)). In Stark County Bar Ass’n v. 
Phillips, 45 Ohio St.3d 286, 544 N.E.2d 237 (1989), an attorney received a public reprimand for 
representing a nursing home against the estate of a former client in an action in which the nursing 
home alleged that the former client had misrepresented his assets and thereby secured a reduced rate 
for the nursing home’s care. Such representation violated former OH DR 5-105(B), because the 
lawyer had had access to the former client’s financial information that might be relevant in the dispute, 
but which he would be barred from using for his current client due to confidentiality concerns. The 
action underlying the disciplinary proceeding in Phillips was not directly against the former client, 
and in disqualifying the lawyer, the trial court had premised its ruling on the fact that the lawyer was 
representing interests adverse to his former client and could have obtained information from the 
former client detrimental to the estate in the lawyer’s representation of the nursing home. And see 
State v. New, No. 93- L-160, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5905 (Lake Dec. 23, 1994) (petition for 
post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel because of conflict; lawyer’s 
previous representation of criminal defendant’s former wife on charges of shooting 
husband-defendant during marital dispute created potential for conflict in representing the 
husband-defendant in felonious rape and sexual penetration charges involving two minors, where the 
former client/ex-wife testified against defendant as to comments made by him during the marital 
relationship; trial court erred in not holding hearing to determine whether failure to cross-examine 
former wife was affected by lawyer’s prior attorney/client relationship with this witness): “Without 
584
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.9 
  
holding a hearing on this issue, we are unable to understand how the court was able to conclude that 
[the lawyer’s] decision not to cross-examine [the witness] was merely a trial tactic and that his 
representation of appellant was unhindered by any conflicting representation.” Id. at *5. 
The United States Supreme Court dealt with a former-client conflict in the post-conviction relief 
context in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002). Mickens is discussed in section 1.7:320. 
 
 1.9:220  Material Adversity of Interest 
Because the concern is one of conflict of interest, the ethical constraints imposed on lawyers with 
respect to former clients typically come into play only if the interests involved in the current and 
former representations are “materially adverse.” Ohio Rule 1.9(a) & (b). The exception is found in 
Rule 1.9(c), pursuant to which protection of information relating to the former representation is the 
primary focus. As a result, there need be no subsequent representation (much less representation of 
adverse interests) for the 1.9(c) ban on use or revelation of such information to apply. See section 
1.9:400. 
The pre-Rule precedent in Ohio on material adversity was generally in accord with Rule 1.9. (Once 
again, Kala had no occasion to treat the “materially adverse” issue; such adversity was a given in the 
side-switching case presented.) See Bd. of Commr’s on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-013, 1989 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 20, at *1 (May 30, 1989) (syllabus) (lawyer prohibited from 
representing client against former client if, in addition to matters being substantially related, interests 
of former and current clients are “adverse in some material respect”). See Vinci v. Ceraolo, 79 Ohio 
App.3d 640, 647, 607 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 (Cuyahoga 1992) (current representation precluded if past 
and present representations are both “adverse” and “substantially related”). Compare State v. Dillon, 
74 Ohio St.3d 166, 167, 657 N.E.2d 273, 275 (1995) (trial counsel did not represent “competing 
interests” in representing two defendants accused of similar crimes, where one defendant was in jail 
when crimes for which second defendant was charged were committed, and second defendant was not 
suspect in crimes for which first defendant was charged). See also City of Cleveland v. Cleveland 
Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 207-08 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (where the two representations 
did not give rise to potentially differing interests between the parties, “the required adversity of 
representation necessary to support disqualification,” based on alleged former-client conflict, was not 
present; federal law applied; court also looked to ABA Model Code provision), aff’d, 573 F.2d 1310 
(6th Cir. 1977) (table). 
Thus a present representation, whether or not involving a matter substantially related to a previous 
matter for a former client, is permitted where the clients’ interests are not adverse. Compare 
Rosenblum v. Robbins, No. 15171, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 359 (Summit Jan. 29, 1992) (no 
showing that former representation of husband and wife in acquiring title to, and preparing escrow 
letter for, property that lawyer knew was to be placed in wife’s trust was adverse to current 
representation, asserting invalidity of trust on behalf of husband in suit against trustee; 
disqualification order reversed; Cleveland v. CEI test applied), with Stevens v. Grandview Hosp. 
& Med. Ctr., No. 14042, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5092 (Montgomery Oct. 20, 1993) (former 
representation, defending medical malpractice suits against hospital, was adverse to current 
representation, bringing malpractice suits against hospital; disqualification order affirmed; 
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Cleveland v. CEI test applied). See also  In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Securities Litigation, 102 
F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Ohio 1984), which provides a cogent analysis of the adversity issue in the 
derivative-action context. In Dayco, plaintiffs were suing the corporation both individually and 
derivatively, and the corporation moved for disqualification of counsel for one of the plaintiffs 
because that lawyer had previously represented an employee against the corporation in a state 
wrongful-termination suit arising out of the same events giving rise to the federal suit. The court 
noted that the test requires that the former and current representations be both “adverse” and 
“substantially related.”  Id. at 628. As the “real-party plaintiff” in the derivative action, the 
corporation argued that plaintiff’s counsel was representing interests adverse to his prior 
representation of the employee in the wrongful-termination case. “Generally, the test of adversity is 
premised on whether or not the interests of the former and current clients are differing.” Id. The court 
held that the interests represented in counsel’s prior and present representations were not adverse, 
because it is recognized that one counsel can represent a plaintiff both individually and derivatively 
against a corporation and that, even though the corporation is technically the “real” party plaintiff in 
the derivative action, thereby creating a “theoretical conflict of interest,”  id. at 630, the true 
alignment of parties is normally otherwise. Quoting Judge Frankel’s opinion in Heilbrunn v. 
Hanover Equities Corp., 259 F. Supp. 936, 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the Dayco court noted that the 
“surface duality” of joining individual and derivative actions and thus being both “friend” and 
“enemy” to the corporation is in fact a “routine” matter in the courts and that antagonism between the 
derivative plaintiff and the corporation and its management is a “common phenomenon.” 102 F.R.D. 
at 630. Since there was no adversity in plaintiff’s counsel’s having formerly represented the 
employee against the corporation in the wrongful-termination suit and there being no actual, as 
opposed to theoretical conflict, the court denied the motion to disqualify. 
While the material-adversity requirement is uniformly stated, it is seldom discussed or analyzed. The 
term “materially adverse interests” is mentioned in Rule 1.9 cmt. [2], but it is neither defined nor 
discussed in the Rule or its comments. A “materially adverse interest” certainly includes an interest 
that is directly adverse (see ABA Formal Op. 99-415 (1999); the Restatement formulation depends 
upon whether the scope of the interests involved in the new representation overlaps that of the prior 
representation and (presumably) is potentially harmful to or inconsistent with the former client’s 
interests. 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  132 cmt. e (2000) (“The scope 
of a client’s interests is normally determined by the scope of the work that the lawyer undertook in the 
former representation.” Id. at 382.). See also ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 171-72 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary); Lisa G. Lerman & Philip G. Schrag, Ethical 
Problems in the Practice of Law 359-60 (2005). 
  
1.9:230  Relevance of “Appearance of Impropriety” Standard [see also 1.7:230] 
The appearance-of-impropriety standard has been abandoned by the Model Rules and criticized by 
the commentators (see section 1.7:230), but it played a key role in the Ohio Supreme Court’s seminal 
opinion on former-client conflicts, Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 
N.E.2d 258 (1998) (in side-switching disqualification case, Court referred to appearance of 
impropriety nine times). While numerous other cases have cautioned that the appearance of 
impropriety, standing alone, is insufficient basis for ordering disqualification, e.g., State v. Condon, 
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152 Ohio App.3d 629, 2003 Ohio 2335, 789 N.E.2d 696 (Hamilton); Kitts v. U.S. Health Corp., 
97 Ohio App.3d 271, 646 N.E.2d 555 (Scioto 1994), Kala holds that if the appearance of 
impropriety is sufficiently strong, disqualification will be required. Other post-Kala cases have 
continued to use the appearance-of-impropriety concern in support of decisions to disqualify. E.g., 
Perin v. Spurney, 2005 Ohio 6811, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6112 (Franklin) (expressly holding 
that disqualification can be grounded on appearance of impropriety, id. at para. 28), appeals not 
accepted for review, 109 Ohio St.3d 1457, 2006 Ohio 2226, 847 N.E.2d 6; Winblad v. Deskins, 
150 Ohio App.3d 527, 2002 Ohio 7092, 782 N.E.2d 160 (Cuyahoga). The Ohio Rules contain no 
reference to the appearance-of-impropriety language contained in the former OHCPR (e.g., OH DR 
9-101 (title); OH EC 5-6). Does its absence trump the significant reliance upon that formulation in 
Kala? Probably, but the answer is unclear and is further complicated by the Task Force’s view that 
Rules 1.9 and 1.10 codify Kala. 
  
1.9:300  Client of Lawyer’s Former Firm 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.9(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.9(b) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:2007 
ALI-LGL §§  123-124, 132 
Wolfram §  7.6 
This section treats the situation in which the migratory lawyer did not represent the former client, but 
his former firm did. The applicable Ohio Rule is Rule 1.9(b). It provides that a migratory lawyer 
cannot knowingly represent a client at his or her new firm in the same or a substantially related matter 
if the interests of the former firm’s client are materially adverse to the lawyer’s current client and if 
the migratory lawyer has acquired material information about the former firm’s client, which 
information is protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Ohio Rule 1.9(b)(1) & (2). In at least one pre-Rule 
Ohio case, the former-client conflict issue came up in the context of a former client of the lawyer’s 
former firm.  Friedman v. Kalail, 2002 Ohio 1501; 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1509 (Summit), found 
no substantial relationship between the present action to domesticate a foreign default judgment, in 
which lawyer A represented plaintiff, and a prior representation of the present defendant years before, 
primarily in estate planning matters, by other lawyers in the firm with which A was once associated. 
Note that, unlike Ohio Rule 1.9(a), division (b) applies only if the lawyer “knowingly” represents a 
current client in a manner otherwise prohibited by the Rule. Presumably this different treatment flows 
from the difference in relationship each subdivision addresses. Division (a) deals with a former client 
who had been directly represented by the lawyer. We assume the lawyer knows or should know who 
the lawyer’s former clients are and the subject matter of those representations. Division (b), in 
contrast, addresses the duty a lawyer owes to one the lawyer did not represent, but who was 
represented by the lawyer’s former firm. Here the assumption that the lawyer knows or should know 
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about the client and the subject matter of the representation is not justified. Rather than imposing a 
burden to uncover such information, the Rule instead is limited to situations where the lawyer has 
“knowledge” that the current representation presents a prohibited former-client conflict. 
  
1.9:310  Removing Imputed Conflict of Migrating Lawyer 
Under Ohio Rule 1.9(b), if a lawyer had no actual knowledge of protected information concerning 
the client represented by the lawyer’s former firm, there is no primary disqualification of the lawyer, 
and thus there is nothing to impute to the lawyer’s new firm. See Ohio Rule 1.9 cmt. [5]. Accord 
Kala, 81 Ohio St.3d at 9, 688 N.E.2d at 265. If, however, the lawyer does have such information 
and the other elements of substantial relationship and material adversity are present, then the 
disqualification, and any imputation flowing therefrom, can be removed by the former client’s giving 
“informed consent, confirmed in writing.” Ohio Rule 1.9(b). If such consent is not forthcoming, then 
the imputation of knowledge can be prevented, if at all, only if the lawyer is timely and effectively 
screened from the other lawyers in the new firm. See section 1.10:300. The Restatement’s 
formulation on imputation and removal of imputation is set forth in 2 Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers § §  123-124 (2000). (Restatement §  124(1) notes that if the affiliation 
between the personally prohibited lawyer and the affiliated lawyer(s) is terminated, there is no further 
restriction on the affiliated lawyer(s), provided that no material confidential information of the 
affected client has been communicated to the affiliated lawyer(s); see section 1.10:400.) 
  
1.9:320  Former Government Lawyer or Officer [see 1.11:200] 
  
1.9:400  Use or Disclosure of Former Client’s Confidences 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.9(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.9(c) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  55:301 
ALI-LGL §  132 
Wolfram §  7.4 
While former OH DR 4-101 spoke in terms of preservation of the confidences and secrets of “the 
client,” former OH EC 4-6 noted that the obligation to preserve confidences and secrets continued 
after the representation had terminated. Whatever tension may have existed between the disciplinary 
rule and the ethical consideration, it is now clear, under both Ohio Rule 1.9(c) and the Supreme 
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Court’s opinion in Kala, 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258, that these protections extend to a former 
client as well as a current client. See sections 1.6:200 and 1.9:200. In addition to Kala, other pre-Rule 
case law is in accord. E.g., Lightbody v. Rust, 137 Ohio App.3d 658, 664, 739 N.E.2d 840, 844-45 
(Cuyahoga 2000); see also Hamrick v. Union Township, 79 F. Supp.2d 871, 876 (S.D. Ohio 1999) 
(reading OH DR 4-101(B)(2) obligation as running to former clients). Moreover, Ohio Rule 1.9(c)(1) 
precludes (except where allowed or required under “these rules”) either the use of “information 
relating to the representation” to the disadvantage of the former client (unless the information has 
become generally known), or revelation of “information relating to the representation.” Former OH 
DR 4-101 was more narrowly drawn to protect “confidences and secrets” only. See Ohio Rule 1.6 
cmt. [3]. The “generally known” exception to the “use” prohibition certainly includes information 
that has “become public knowledge.” See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
168 (6th ed. 2007) (commentary) (1.9(c) prohibits use of “nonpublic” information). The exception 
may also include information readily accessible, see 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers §  59, cmt. d (2000). The issue is discussed in Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s 
Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform, 16 Geo. J. L. Ethics 259, 
309-10 (2003).  
The “generally known” exception was also explored in Bd. of Comm’rs of Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 2013-4, 2013 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Oct. 11, 2013), where the Board opined on the 
issue whether a public defender representing a client in a criminal proceeding may cross-examine a 
prosecution witness who was a former client of the defender. The analysis first notes that an attack on 
the witness’s credibility could be based on his or her prior conviction—“information relating to the 
representation”—which would be a use to the “disadvantage” of the former client. If, however, the 
information to be used has become “generally known,” then it is within one of the 1.9(c) exceptions, 
the existing precedent suggests that a prior criminal conviction is generally known because it is a 
matter of public record. Moreover, it may be generally known as well by virtue of the prosecution’s 
eliciting the fact on direct as a matter of trial strategy. In sum, the Board’s view on this point “is that as 
long as the public defender’s cross-examination of the former client is limited to the existence of the 
prior conviction for impeachment, the public defender can satisfy the ‘generally known’ exception in 
Prof. Cond. R. 1.9(c)(1).” Id. at * 15. (Note, however, that outside the context of record of a criminal 
conviction, the fact that information is of public record does not necessarily mean that the information 
is generally known—it depends on all the facts and circumstances presented. Id. at * 16.) Opinion 
2013-4 expands on the Board’s summary answer to the effect that the representation is not prohibited 
so long as the public defender does not violate the use or disclosure of information protections of 
1.9(c), in Bd. of Comm. on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-4, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 4 (August 15, 2008), which is further discussed this section infra. 
The limitations of Ohio Rule 1.9(c) on use or revelation of information relating to the former 
representation apply not only to the lawyer but also to the lawyer’s “present or former firm” that 
formerly represented a client in a matter.  Phillips v. Haidet, 119 Ohio App.3d 322, 695 N.E.2d 292 
(Logan 1997), provides an example decided under the Code of a matter in which the contested prior 
representation was by the lawyer’s present firm. The Haidet court reversed the disqualification of 
plaintiff’s lawyer in a defamation/right of privacy action because the prior representation of the 
defamation defendant by plaintiff’s lawyer’s firm, in prosecuting a “wholly discrete” personal injury 
claim, involved no commonality of issues or clear connection between the two matters. Note, 
however, that while the result under Rule 1.9(c) might be the same as that in Haidet, the analysis 
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would be significantly different: Under 1.9(c), there is no substantial relationship test; indeed there 
need be no subsequent matter. All that is required to trigger the prohibition is use of information not 
generally known relating to the prior representation to the disadvantage of the former client or 
revelation of information relating to the representation. 
Pursuant to a literal reading of former OH DR 4-101(B), under (B)(1) “revealing” a confidence or 
secret of the lawyer’s client (or former client) was subject to client (or former client) consent under 
OH DR 4-101(C)(1), but “use” of such confidences or secrets was subject to client (or former client) 
waiver only if the use was for the advantage of the lawyer or a third person ((B)(3)); a “use” to the 
disadvantage of the client was nonconsentable ((B)(2)). There is case law, however, indicating that a 
(B)(2) disadvantageous “use” was consentable. See Spivey v. Bender, 77 Ohio App.3d 17, 20, 601 
N.E.2d 56, 57 (Lucas 1991) (reversing disqualification of counsel for plaintiffs in wrongful death 
action against defendant, whom plaintiffs’ counsel had previously represented in criminal 
proceedings arising out of accident giving rise to both suits, where present defendant had given 
knowing waiver after full disclosure; his formal waiver included acknowledgment that “use” of such 
information “may be contrary to my interests.”). See also Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal 
Ethics §  6.7.6, at 305 & n.88 (1986). Wolfram persuasively argues that there is “no intelligible 
reason” for the literal-reading distinction “(reveal versus use)” to have been drawn by the drafters of 
the Code. He underscores his point by positing a case much like Spivey, and clearly supports the 
conclusion reached by the Spivey court -- that, with full disclosure and consent of the client or former 
client, use of information to the disadvantage of the client or former client should be permitted.  Id. at 
n.88 (emphasis in original). 
This point is now of historical interest only -- under Ohio Rule 1.9(c)(1), informed consent by the 
former client will permit the use of information to the disadvantage of the former client so consenting. 
See Ohio Rule 1.9 cmt. [9]: “The provisions of this rule are for the protection of former clients and 
can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under 
paragraphs (a) and (b).” It is at first glance curious that the general blessing under Rule 1.9 of waiver 
by the former client upon informed consent (which consent under (a) and (b) must be confirmed in 
writing) finds explicit expression in the Rule itself only in divisions (a) and (b), but not (c). The 
problem as to division (c)(1) “use” is solved by the language “except as these rules would permit . . . 
with respect to a client,” which in turn picks up Rule 1.8(b); it expressly states that the prohibition 
against “use of information to the disadvantage of the client” may be waived by the client’s giving 
“informed consent.” Waiver of the division (c)(2) “revelation” prohibition is similarly covered by the 
provision for informed consent in Rule 1.6(a). See also 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers §  122 cmt. g(iv), at 275 (2000) (emphasis added): “The professional rules and 
court decisions indicate that informed consent will always suffice with respect to a former-client 
conflict of interest.”). Finally, the remark about the Kala decision in the Ohio Code Comparison to 
Rule 1.9 is consistent with this reading: “[Kala] clarified that the DR 4-101(B) prohibition against 
using or revealing client confidences or secrets without consent applied to former clients [Rule 
1.9(c)].” (Emphasis added; second bracketed material in original.)  
As noted above, the Board stated in Op. 2008-4 that representation by a public defender of a criminal 
defendant when a former client represented by the defender in an unrelated matter will be a witness in 
the criminal case 
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is not prohibited under the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, as long 
as the assistant county public defender does not use or reveal 
information of the former client that is protected from disclosure under 
Rule 1.9(c). 
2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 at *21. Although the Board does not discuss the informed 
consent issue in its opinion, presumably the analysis set forth above would apply: if the witness gives 
his or her informed consent to the use or revelation of information relating to the former 
representation otherwise “protected from disclosure under Rule 1.9(c),” then the 1.9(c) prohibition 
would not apply. (Nor would it apply to prevent “use” of such information if “the information has 
become generally known.” Rule 1.9(c)(1)). 
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1.10:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.10 
 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.10 
 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.124-5.125 
 
1.10:101  Model Rule Comparison 
In Ohio Rule 1.10(a), “knowingly” has been deleted before “represent a client when” and the 
following has been added after “when”: “the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that”. In 
February 2009, MR 1.10(a) was amended by adding subdivision (a)(2), which provides for screening. 
The Ohio screening provision is found in Rule 1.10(d). 
In Ohio Rule 1.10(b), “is no longer associated” has been substituted for the Model Rule language 
“has terminated an association”; “no lawyer in that firm shall thereafter represent” has been 
substituted for “the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing”; and “if the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that either of the following applies:” has been substituted for “unless:” 
In subdivision (b)(1), the words “the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which” have 
been deleted at the outset, and the words “in the same or a substantially related matter;” have been 
added at the end after “client”. 
New divisions Ohio Rule 1.10(c) and (d), dealing with side-switching and screening, have been 
added; as a result, MR 1.10(c) and (d) have become Ohio Rule 1.10(e) and (f). One word in MR 
1.10(c) has been changed in Ohio Rule 1.10(e): the word “required” has been substituted for 
“prescribed” after “disqualification”. 
 
1.10:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following are listed in the Correlation Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 
1.10: DR 5-105(D), Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1. 
1.10:103  Definition of “Firm” 
In the terminology section of the Ohio Rules, Rule 1.0(c) states that “firm” or “law firm” denotes a 
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lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other 
association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a private or public legal aid or public 
defender organization, a legal services organization, or the legal department of a corporation or other 
organization. Government agencies are not included in the definition of “firm.” Ohio Rule 1.0 cmt. 
[4A]. (Note that Ohio Rule 1.10 cmt. [1] does not reflect the addition in Ohio to the MR 1.0(c) 
definition -- “lawyers employed in a private or public legal aid or public defender organization.” See 
also Ohio Rule 1.0 cmt. [4].) 
One pre-Rule Ohio decision that applied the imputed-disqualification rule to a lawyer not formally in 
a firm with another lawyer, but where the public could reasonably have viewed the office-sharing 
arrangement as a “firm,” was Winblad v. Deskins, 150 Ohio App.3d 527, 2002 Ohio 7092, 782 
N.E.2d 160 (Cuyahoga). A similar set of facts is set forth in Ohio Rule 1.0 cmt. [2]. See also 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  123(3) (2000). Under the Rules, resolution 
of the “firm” issue in such circumstances “can depend on the specific facts.” Ohio Rule 1.0 cmt. [2]. 
 
1.10:200  Imputed Disqualification Among Current Affiliated Lawyers 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.10(a) 
 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.10(a) 
 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.106-5.110, 5.123 
 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:2001 
ALI-LGL §  123 
Wolfram §  7.6 
 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.106-5.110, 5.123 (1996). 
Imputed disqualification - In general: Under the doctrine of imputed disqualification, if an individual 
lawyer in a firm would be disqualified from handling a matter, then the entire firm is disqualified as 
well. Pursuant to the terms of Ohio Rule 1.10(a), none of the lawyers in a firm shall represent a client 
when “the lawyer knows or reasonably should know” that any one of them practicing alone would be 
prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7 or 1.9, “unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of 
the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation 
of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.” 
Several justifications have been advanced to support the doctrine of imputed disqualification. 
Imputed disqualification has been supported by the theory that any client of a lawyer is also a client of 
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the firm with which the lawyer is affiliated. Thus, each lawyer in the firm owes the client a duty of 
loyalty. It can also be explained by a presumption of shared confidences. All lawyers at a firm are 
presumed to have access to the confidences and secrets of any firm client and a corresponding duty to 
protect those confidences and secrets. Ohio Rule 1.10(a) reflects these bases for imputed 
disqualification. See Rule 1.10 cmts. [2] & [3]. 
Comment [3] elaborates on these values and on the exception relating to prohibitions based on a 
personal interest of the disqualified lawyer in the following terms: 
 The rule in division (a) does not prohibit representation where 
neither questions of client loyalty nor protection of confidential 
information are presented. 
Rule 1.10 cmt. [3]. On the personal-interest point, two rules need to be consulted. For personal 
conflicts addressed in Ohio Rule 1.8, imputation is covered by Ohio Rule 1.8(k), discussed in 
section 1.8:1200, rather than Ohio Rule 1.10. See Ohio Rule 1.10 cmts. [3] & [8]. For the 
imputation of other personal conflicts, Ohio Rule 1.10 controls. Comment [3] provides that there is 
no imputation if “the usual concerns justifying imputation are not present.” Thus,  
where one lawyer in a firm could not effectively represent a given 
client because of strong political beliefs, for example, but that lawyer 
will do no work on the case and the personal beliefs of the lawyer will 
not materially limit the representation by others in the firm, the firm 
should not be disqualified.  
“On the other hand,”  
if an opposing party in a case were owned by a lawyer in the law firm, 
and others in the firm would be materially limited in pursuing the 
matter because of loyalty to that lawyer, the personal disqualification 
of the lawyer would be imputed to all others in the firm.   
Ohio Rule 1.10 cmt. [3]. 
Imputed disqualification - Parsing the language of Ohio Rule 1.10(a): The primary sticking points in 
Rule 1.10(a) are “the lawyer” (which lawyer? any lawyer in the firm? probably) and what that lawyer 
“knows or reasonably should know.” From a disciplinary point of view, there would seem to be little 
quarrel with a reading of the Rule that limits an ethics violation to a lawyer in the firm who has the 
requisite knowledge concerning a prohibited conflict involving any lawyer in the firm and 
nevertheless proceeds in the face of that conflict. Accord 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William 
Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering §  14.10, at 14-38 (3d ed. Supp. 2010). (“In the 
disciplinary context, the rule applies only to ‘knowing’ violations.”) The difficulty arises when, as is 
often the case, the ethics rules (particularly those addressing conflicts of interest) are used in deciding 
disqualification motions in litigation. In such a context, would it be consistent with the policies 
underlying the conflicts rules (loyalty, confidentiality) to permit Lawyer A to represent a client that 
Rule 1.7 or 1.9 would prohibit his partner, Lawyer B, from representing, merely because Lawyer A 
did not have actual or constructive knowledge of Lawyer B’s conflict? Such a result seems 
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inconsistent with the general rule that confidences known by a lawyer in a firm are presumed shared 
with all other lawyers in the firm. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile with the “none of them shall 
represent” language in the Rule and would, we think, threaten the principles of loyalty and 
confidentiality calling for firm-wide imputation (absent consent and/or effective screening) in the 
circumstances. Again, Hazard and Hodes support this distinction. See id. (“In the disqualification 
context, a firm may be disqualified even if the conflict remained inadvertent, because the purpose of 
disqualification is protection of the former client, not punishment or deterrence.”) There is 
disqualification case law in which the knowledge factor allegedly was absent, at least for a time, the 
most notable of which is probably Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 
1321 (7th Cir. 1978). See further discussion of the comparable problem arising under Rule 1.10(b), 
at section 1.10:400. 
Imputed disqualification where conflict arises within one firm: This situation is now covered by Ohio 
Rule 1.10(a), subject to the waiver/consent provisions of Rule 1.10(e). See discussion of Rule 1.10(a) 
supra. See also discussion of “consent screens” in section 1.10:300 infra.  The first Ohio case to our 
knowledge to discuss and apply Rule 1.10(a) is Carnegie Cos. v. Summit Props., Inc., 183 Ohio 
App.3d 770, 2009 Ohio 4655, 918 N.E.2d 1052 (Summit), in which a law firm was disqualified 
where one of its lawyers was representing Summit in a lawsuit brought by Carnegie while another of 
its lawyers in a different office was representing Carnegie in an unrelated matter.  “The evidence 
supports the imputation of the conflict to Laven because he either knew or should have known that 
Karl [who represented Carnegie in the unrelated matter] would be prohibited from representing 
Summit against Carnegie, making him also unable to represent Summit against Carnegie in this 
lawsuit.  See Prof.Cond.R. 1.10(a).”  Id. at para. 38 (bracketed material added). (On a subsequent 
appeal, the same court affirmed an award of attorney fees against the disqualified firm, based on its 
bad faith. Carnegie Cos. v. Summit Props., Inc., 2012 Ohio 1324, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1151 
(Summit). This aspect of the litigation is further discussed in section 1.7:260 supra and section 
4.2:200 infra.) 
Imputed disqualification involving a nonlawyer: Ohio Rule 1.10 cmt. [4] states that  
division (a) also does not prohibit representation by others in the law 
firm where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a 
nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal secretary. Nor does division (a) 
prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from acting because 
of events before the person became a lawyer, for example, work that 
the person did while a law student [e.g., as a summer law clerk at a 
firm]. Such persons, however, ordinarily must be screened from any 
personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others 
in the firm of confidential information that both the nonlawyers and the 
firm have a legal duty to protect. See Rules 1.0(l) and 5.3. 
(bracketed material added).  
Imputed disqualification where lawyer changes firms and brings client to new firm: This is also 
controlled by Ohio Rule 1.10(a), subject to 1.10(e). 
Imputed disqualification where lawyer changes firms, but does not bring client to new firm: When a 
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lawyer changes firms, those clients choosing to continue to be represented by the old firm, rather than 
moving with the lawyer to the new firm, become former clients of the migratory lawyer. As in any 
former-client situation, the lawyer’s duties to a former client may generate a disqualifying conflict 
with a current client. See sections 1.9:200-1.9:400. Thus, in moving to a new firm, the lawyer carries 
with him or her duties to former clients that have the potential to generate conflicts with clients of the 
new firm, as well as imputed disqualification of the new firm in matters involving former clients of 
the migratory lawyer. 
The leading Ohio case is Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 
N.E.2d 258 (1998), extensively discussed in sections 1.9:200 and 1.10:300. Ohio now deals with this 
situation in two different divisions of Ohio Rule 1.10 -- (c) and (d) -- depending on the circumstances. 
Pursuant to 1.10(c), if a lawyer migrating to a new firm had substantial responsibility in a matter for a 
former client at the former firm, then no lawyer at the new firm shall knowingly represent, in the same 
matter, a person whose interests are materially adverse to those of the lawyer’s former client. 
According to the Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.10, this is intended to codify the holding of the 
Kala case. Under Rule 1.10(c), same-case side switching by a lawyer who had “substantial 
responsibility” for the matter at the former firm calls for imputation of the migrating lawyer’s conflict 
under Rule 1.9 to the entire new firm, without any opportunity to cure the imputation by screening. 
The first sentence of Comment [5B] expressly so states:  
 Screening is not effective to avoid imputed disqualification of 
other lawyers in the firm if the personally disqualified lawyer had 
substantial responsibility for representing the former client in the same 
matter in which the lawyer’s new firm represents an adversary of the 
former client. 
Ohio Rule 1.10 cmt. [5B]. The comment adds the rather obvious conclusion that “[a] lawyer who 
was sole or lead counsel for a former client in a matter had substantial responsibility for the matter.” If 
the lawyer was not lead counsel, the comment advises that substantial responsibility is to be 
determined by consideration of such factors as “the lawyer’s level of responsibility in the matter, the 
duration of the lawyer’s participation, the extent to which the lawyer advised or had personal contact 
with the former client and the former client’s personnel, and the extent to which the lawyer was 
exposed to confidential information of the former client likely to be material in the matter.” Id. 
The second situation involving a lawyer moving to a new firm but not bringing the client along is 
dealt with in division (d). Division (d) covers all such cases except those covered by division (c). Thus, 
if the migrating lawyer did not have “substantial responsibility” in the prior matter, and/or the prior 
matter is not the “same matter,” then any imputation to the new firm can be removed if the firm timely 
screens the disqualified lawyer and that lawyer is apportioned no part of the fee in the matter (Ohio 
Rule 1.10(d)(1)) and written notice is provided to any affected former client, Ohio Rule 1.10(d)(2). 
[As noted in section 1.10:300, in the final version of the Rule, 1.10 cmt. [5A] added that the notice 
may be given to the former client’s lawyer, even though this option was at the same time deleted from 
division (d)(2) itself.] According to Comment [5D], the notice that screening procedures have been 
employed should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent, but 
reasonable delay may be justified when disclosure is likely to injure the current client. Ohio Rule 
1.10 cmt. [5D]. The screening aspect of division (d) is further discussed in section 1.10:300. 
597
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.10 
  
The first case interpreting Ohio Rule 1.10(c) & (d) is Litig. Mgmt., Inc. v. Bourgeois, 182 Ohio 
App.3d 742, 2009 Ohio 2266, 915 N.E.2d 342 (Cuyahoga), also discussed above in section 1.9:200 
at “Kala and Rule 1.9(a).” First, as to Rule 1.10(c), the court found that Somich, the associate now 
working for the firm (Ogletree) representing some defendants, had “substantial responsibility” in the 
prior matter while working as a first-year associate for the firm now representing plaintiffs. In the 
words of the Eighth District, “[o]ur review of the record reflects that Somich was personally involved 
in the former representation of LMI to an important, material degree in the investigative or 
deliberative process.” Id. at para. 27. Moving on to Rule 1.10(d), the LMI court noted that “even 
had we found that the record did not support a finding that Somich had substantial responsibility, 
disqualification of the Ogletree firm would still be required pursuant to Rule 1.10(d),” id. at para. 29, 
because the record revealed not only an absence of evidence of screening but affirmative evidence 
that Somich reviewed the pleadings in the case while at Ogletree, as well as discussed with an 
Ogletree partner the contents of a billing invoice to LMI relating to the former matter. 
Imputed disqualification when nonlawyer changes firms:  Inasmuch as the imputation rule of 1.10(a) 
does not apply where the personally disqualified individual in a firm is a nonlawyer, see Rule 1.10 
cmt. [4], quoted above, it should follow that the same nonimputation result applies when a nonlawyer 
changes firms, even though this issue is not directly addressed in the Rule.  Such prohibited 
nonlawyers will typically be those who move from a firm representing interests adverse to those 
represented by the new firm.  The Comment [4] result is comparable to that reached pursuant to the 
more elaborate test for migrating nonlawyers set forth in Green v. Toledo Hospital, 94 Ohio St.3d 
480, 764 N.E.2d 979 (2002) (side-switching secretary), discussed in section 1.9:200. In a nutshell, 
there should be no imputation under Rule 1.10 to the lawyers in the new firm in such circumstances, 
but screening of the prohibited nonlawyer is nevertheless advisable to ensure protection of 
confidentiality interests.  See generally 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. 
Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 14.11 (3d ed. Supp. 2010). 
Imputed disqualification in non-law firm settings: Most imputed disqualification cases focus on 
lawyers affiliated in a law firm. Whether the same principles apply to lawyers affiliated in other 
entities, such as a legal aid or public defender organization, or a corporate legal department, is 
resolved by Ohio Rule 1.0(c) -- such entities are included in the definition of “firm.” See section 
1.10:103. Disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government lawyers 
is controlled by Rule 1.11, not Rule 1.10. See Rule 1.10(f). 
These aspects of Rules 1.10 and 1.11 were further explored in Board Opinions 2008-4 and 2008-5. 
First, in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-4, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 4 (Aug. 15, 2008), the Board opined that two different assistant public defenders in the same 
office should not separately represent two co-defendants at a preliminary hearing in a felony case, 
“because the conflict of interest of one assistant public defender is imputed to the other pursuant to 
Rule 1.10(a) and Rule 1.9(c).” Id. at *1. For the same reason, a second public defender should not 
represent a felony co-defendant in an unrelated misdemeanor case, when the other co-defendant is 
being represented in the felony case by another public defender from the same office. (Imputed 
disqualification under Rule 1.11 of the members of a law firm with which a part-time city law 
director is associated is treated in Opinion 2008-5; it is discussed at the end of section 1.11:410.) 
What if the public defenders are from different offices?  In its most recent pronouncement in this area, 
the Board concluded that assistant state public defenders in the defender’s central appellate office in 
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Columbus and defenders in the state’s four trial branch offices in different counties are not 
automatically considered lawyers associated in a firm for purposes of  imputing conflicts under Rule 
1.10(a): 
 If an appellate state public defender does not provide assistance 
to a trial branch state public defender in a trial matter, there is no ethical 
reason to impute a conflict of interest when an appellate attorney is 
asked to conduct a merit review, prosecute an appeal, or pursue a 
postconviction remedy asserting ineffectiveness of counsel in that 
matter.  The appellate state public defenders are not associated with the 
trial branch state public defenders in that matter. 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. No. 2010-5, 2010 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 
(Aug. 13, 2010), at *1 (emphasis in original).  Conversely, if the appellate defender does provide trial 
assistance, the conflict would be imputed when the appellate attorney is asked to conduct a review, 
appeal, or such postconviction relief on ineffectiveness of counsel grounds: “The appellate state 
public defenders are associated with the trial branch state public defenders in that matter.”  Id. at *2 
(emphasis in original).  Further, the conflict analysis under Rule 1.7(a)(2) in such circumstances will 
depend upon whether there is a substantial risk that the appellate lawyer’s ability to serve the client is 
limited by her responsibilities to others or by her own personal interest.  Thus, 
 
[i]f an appellate assistant state public defender in the central office has 
a significant close personal relationship [with] or unyielding 
institutional loyalty to the trial assistant state public defender, it is 
likely that there is a substantial risk of a material limitation on the 
appellate representation in that matter. 
Id. at *2-3 (bracketed material added).  The same result under 1.7 would follow if the appellate 
defender assisted at the trial, because of the same substantial risk of material limitation on the 
representation arising from “the appellate lawyer’s own personal interest arising from involvement in 
the trial matter . . . .”  Id.  
 
The obvious question that jumps out from Opinion 2010-5 is, how can this result be reconciled with 
Ohio Rule 1.0(c), which rather clearly states that “firm” “denotes . . . lawyers employed in a . . . 
public defender organization . . . .”  This language is not present in the Model Rule definition; nor is it 
present in the North Dakota analog, N.D. Rule 1.0(d).  (Nor, so far as we can ascertain, is it present in 
the “firm” definition set forth in any other state’s ethics rules.)  We mention the North Dakota rule 
because the Ohio Board relies on a North Dakota ethics opinion (Op. 06-07) advising that three 
separate public defender offices in that state were not a “firm” for N.D. Rule 1.10(a) purposes.   
 
With respect to Ohio Rule 1.0(c), the Board reasons as follows: 
 
 Although the ethical rules define a public defender organization 
as a law firm, that definition alone is not dispositive as to whether all of 
the state public defender’s lawyers are considered lawyers associated 
in a firm for purposes of imputation of conflicts of interest, 
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id. at *8, citing Rule 1.0, cmt. [2], which states that whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm 
can depend on the specific facts, and cmt. [4], which, in addressing legal aid and legal services 
organizations (but not public defender organizations) stresses the importance of structure in 
determine whether “the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or 
firms for purposes of these rules.”  Id. at *9.  The separate structure of the Ohio public defender’s 
offices convinces the Board that 
 
given the structure of having a central appellate office in the capital city 
and separate trial branch offices located in different counties, 
imputation of conflict of interest, between the state assistant public 
defenders in the trial branch offices and the state assistant public 
defenders [presumably, in the central appellate office] is not 
automatically required under Prof.Cond.R. 1.10(a). 
Id. at *11 (bracketed material added).  The result in the case of separate offices of a traditional law 
firm would, of course, be otherwise.  See Carnegie Cos. v. Summit Props., Inc., 183 Ohio App.3d 
770, 2009 Ohio 4655, 918 N.E.2d 1052 (Summit) (imputation of conflict of Ulmer Berne lawyer A 
to lawyer in another Ulmer & Berne office).  As a result, it is difficult to conclude other than that in 
Ohio – at least in the Board’s view – there are “law firms” and then there are “law firms.”  
 
A 2013 opinion by the Board is consistent with Opinion 2008-4 on the imputation issue involving 
public defenders in the same office. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2013-4, 2013 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Oct 11, 2013). That opinion addressed the conflict questions arising 
when a public defender is representing a client in a criminal matter and a former client is a witness for 
the prosecution, subject to cross-examination by the defender. The Board, citing the definition of 
“firm” in Rule 1.0(c), as including public defender organizations, opines that: 
 
Accordingly, even when a different public defender in the same office 
represented the former client/adverse witness, if that public defender 
would be prohibited by Prof. Cond. R 1.7 or 1.9 from representing the 
current client, all of the public defenders in the office are disqualified 
under Prof. Cond. R. 1.10. See also Advisory Opinion 2008-4. 
Id. at * 24. Other aspects of Opinion 2013-4 are addressed in section 1.9:400. 
 
 
1.10:300  Removing Imputation By Screening 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.10(c) & (d) 
Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998) 
 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.10(a)(2) 
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Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.111 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:2001 
ALI-LGL §  124 
Wolfram §  7.6 
 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 5.111 (1996). 
One solution to the problem of imputed disqualification is to screen the lawyer with the conflict from 
the other lawyers in the firm, and allow those lawyers unaffected by and screened from the conflict to 
proceed with the representation. Although the former OHCPR did not mention this option, both Ohio 
case law (see below) and ethics opinions of the Board of Commissioners (see Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-013, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 20 (May 30, 1989); Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-020, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Aug. 12, 
1988)) made clear that screening was an available alternative in Ohio under certain circumstances. 
But cf. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-10, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 
2, at *9 (Dec. 3, 1993) (refusing to decide issue since it called for judicial determination, but noting 
that in instances of simultaneous representation, “Chinese walls have generally not been favored.” 
(citing Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) §  51:106 (1990))). Most, if not all, of the Ohio 
cases dealing with screening mechanisms involve former-client conflicts. The circumstances under 
which screening is available in Ohio under the Rules of Professional Conduct are set forth in Rule 
1.10(d), discussed in detail in this section infra. (After trying and failing in two prior attempts, the 
proponents of screening finally were victorious in the ABA House of Delegates at the February 2009 
midyear meeting. New ABA Model Rule 1.10(a)(2) is similar but not identical to the Ohio Rule. For 
comment on MR 1.10(a)(2), see generally George A. Kuhlman, Follow the Middle Road, ABAJ, 
May 2009, at 23. The text of amended MR 1.10 can be found at 
http://abajournal.com/files/109Revised.pdf.) 
The leading case in Ohio on ethical screening with respect to former-client conflicts is the opinion of 
the Supreme Court in Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 
258 (1998). 
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As is more fully set out in section 1.9:200, Kala was a side-switching attorney case in which the 
Court found the circumstances (lawyer was negotiating for employment with firm representing other 
side -- without telling client -- while lawyer was pursuing client’s appeal) so “egregious” that no 
amount of protective devices by the lawyer’s new firm would have been adequate to keep its lawyers 
from being disqualified by imputation. 
One of the many reasons the Kala opinion is of interest is that, on the imputed disqualification/ 
screening point itself, the actual holding of the Court on the facts is not acknowledged in the general 
rule of law set forth in the syllabus. The long-standing rule in Ohio was that, with respect to Supreme 
Court opinions other than those decided per curiam, the syllabus, not the text, stated the law of the 
case. Although the Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions (S Ct Rep R) were amended 
effective May 1, 2002 to eliminate the syllabus rule (the law of the case is now stated in both the 
syllabus and the text, S Ct Rep R 1(B), a result which is confirmed in the most recent revision of the 
reporting rules, effective July 1, 2012; see Rep Op R 2.2), the Supreme Court Clerk’s Office has 
informally advised that the syllabus rule will continue to apply to all Supreme Court opinions 
rendered prior to May 1, 2002. Pursuant to this advice, the old regime would apply to Kala, and thus 
its syllabus states “the controlling point or points of law decided in and necessarily arising from the 
facts of the specific case before the Court for adjudication.” Former S Ct Rep R 1(B). (For a more 
detailed discussion of the 2002 and 2012 reporting rules, see section 3.3:400.) 
On the facts presented in Kala, which indicated timely and effective screening by the new firm (prior 
to lawyer joining new firm, it erected screen, sent trial documents to off-site storage, and made 
appellate file available only through lawyer handling appeal), there was “nothing the [new] firm 
could have done” to cure the former client’s perception that he had been abandoned by his lawyer, and 
“[n]o steps of any kind could possibly replace the trust and confidence that [plaintiff] had in his 
attorney and the legal system if such representation is permitted.” 81 Ohio St.3d at 14, 688 N.E.2d at 
268. As a result, “the appearance of impropriety was so great that the attempts made by the [new] firm 
to erect a Chinese wall were insufficient to overcome the appearance of impropriety. Accordingly, we 
affirm the disqualification ruling of the court of appeals.” Id. 
The Kala syllabus, on the other hand, contains no indication that matters can be so “egregious” that 
even “adequate and timely screens” will not work to avoid imputed disqualification. Instead, the third 
part of the three-part syllabus inquiry to be used in ruling on a motion for disqualification “when an 
attorney has left a law firm and joined a firm representing the opposing party [i.e., a side-switching 
attorney]” is: 
If the attorney did have personal contact with or knowledge of the 
related matter [at his or her former firm], did the new law firm erect 
adequate and timely screens to rebut a presumption of shared 
confidences with the new firm so as to avoid imputed disqualification? 
81 Ohio St.3d at 1, 688 N.E.2d at 260 (syllabus).  In the course of adopting this 
rebuttable-presumption rule in the syllabus, the Supreme Court rejected plaintiff Kala’s implication 
that the presumption of shared confidences “should be irrebuttable,” id. at 9, 688 N.E.2d at 265 
(emphasis by the Court). Instead, the Court concluded “that the fairer rule in balancing the interests of 
the parties and the public is to allow the presumption of shared confidences with members of the new 
firm to be rebutted” by the implementation of timely and effective screening mechanisms.  Id. at 10, 
602
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.10 
  
688 N.E.2d at 265-66. Nevertheless, the rebuttable presumption recognized both in the syllabus and 
in the body of the opinion was seen as irrebuttable on the “egregious” facts presented. 
Because of the groundbreaking decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Kala recognizing in syllabus 
(and text) that screening can avoid imputed disqualification, Ohio Rule 1.10 incorporates the 
screening mechanism into Rule 1.10(d)(1) -- thereby, according to the Task Force’s Ohio Code 
Comparison, “codify[ing] the rule in Kala.” [But see discussion below.] 
At this point, the basic structure of the Kala “codification,” as reflected in the two divisions added to 
the Ohio version of MR 1.10, should be reiterated. 
Ohio Rule 1.10(c) is directed at same-case side-switching: When a lawyer who had “substantial 
responsibility” in a matter for a former client subsequently becomes associated with a new firm, “no 
lawyer in the new firm shall knowingly represent, in the same matter, a person whose interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of the former client.” 
Ohio Rule 1.10(d) states that “[i]n circumstances other than those covered by Rule 1.10(c), when a 
lawyer becomes associated with a new firm, no lawyer in the new firm shall knowingly represent a 
person in a matter in which the newly associated lawyer is personally disqualified under Rule 1.9 
unless both of the following apply: 
1) the new firm timely screens the personally disqualified lawyer from any 
participation in the matter, and that lawyer is apportioned no fee from that 
matter; [and] 
 
2) written notice is given as soon as practicable to any affected former client. 
 
Comments [5A] and [5B] elaborate on the rules set forth in Rule 1.10(c) and (d). Pursuant to Ohio 
Rule 1.10 cmt. [5A], divisions (c) and (d) “address imputation to lawyers in a new firm when a 
personally disqualified lawyer moves from one law firm to another.” The comment further provides 
that under division (c), the conflict of a lawyer personally disqualified is imputed to all lawyers in the 
new firm, which is prohibited from representation of a client “in the same matter” in which the 
disqualified lawyer “has had substantial responsibility” “if the client’s interests are materially adverse 
to those of the former client.” Under division (d), the imputation is removed when the personally 
disqualified lawyer is “properly screened from participation in the matter and the former client or 
client’s counsel is given notice.” [Note that in the final amendments, the “or client’s counsel” 
language was added to Comment [5A], even though comparable language was deleted from 
1.10(d)(2).] 
Comment [5B] expressly states that screening will not avoid imputed disqualification in those 
circumstances covered by division (c) -- where the disqualified lawyer had “substantial responsibility” 
in the same matter at the former firm for the other side. Ohio Rule 1.10 cmt. [5B]. (Note that the new 
Model Rule screening provision, 1.10(a)(2), contains no such limitation on its use.) 
As noted above, divisions (c) and (d) “are added to codify the rule in Kala.” Ohio Code Comparison 
to Rule 1.10. The Summary of Post-Comment Revisions to the Proposed Ohio Rules of 
Professional Conduct further emphasizes that these changes were made “to conform more closely to 
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the Supreme Court’s syllabus and holding in Kala.” Do they? According to Comment [5B], screening 
is never effective in a same case side-switch by a lawyer who had substantial responsibility for the 
matter at the former firm. But this is precisely the irrebuttable-presumption approach that the 
Supreme Court rejected in syllabus in Kala, where the lawyer in question certainly satisfied the 
“substantial responsibility” test – he was the lead lawyer in the case for the former client. Moreover, it 
seems strange indeed that the Supreme Court would have gone to the lengths it did in approving the 
screening mechanism if it never applies in a same case side-switch by such a lawyer, which is 
precisely the circumstance that was presented to the Kala Court. Nor would there have been any need 
for the Court to zero in on the secret negotiations by the migrating lawyer with his soon-to-be new 
firm, while representing his soon-to-be former client on appeal, in concluding that screening was 
ineffective on “this set of egregious facts.” 81 Ohio St.3d at 14, 688 N.E.2d at 268. All of this would 
have been superfluous if the Court had intended to lay down a flat no-screening rule in such cases.  
Other commentators as well have read Kala as permitting screening “in almost all instances, 
including those in which lawyer switches firms in same matter.”  2 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governance Lawyers § 124, reporter’s note to cmt. c, at 307 (2000); see Laws. Man. On Prof. 
Conduct (ABA/BNA) §§ 51:2028-29 (2007) (reading Kala as permitting screening in general, but 
that egregious facts necessitated disqualification result in case at bar). Be that as it may, Kala is seen 
by the Task Force as stating just such an absolute-imputation rule; it is reflected in 1.10(c), which has 
passed muster with the Supreme Court.  Regarding this tension between the Kala decision, the Task 
Force’s intent to “codify” Kala, and the actual language of Rule 1.10(c) and (d), the Second District 
Court of Appeals perceptively noted in Dickens v. J&E Custom Homes, Inc., 187 Ohio App.3d 
627, 2010 Ohio 2634, 933 N.E.2d 291 (Montgomery), that despite the indication in the “Official 
Comment” [presumably a reference to the “Comparison to former Ohio Code of Professional 
Responsibility”] that Rule 1.10 is consistent with or codifies Kala on imputed disqualification, “[t]he 
specific standards for disqualification in Prof.Cond.R. 1.10 nevertheless supersede those announced 
in Kala, which are slightly different.” Id. at para. 4. 
In contrast, the Michigan Supreme Court on November 14, 2006 amended its ethics rules to make 
clear that a same-case side switch is controlled by Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 
1.10(b), not 1.10(a) as the Sixth Circuit had previously held in Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Alticor, 
466 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2006) (side-switching lawyer’s new firm disqualified; new firm “cannot 
avoid imputed disqualification by ‘screening’ Egan from this matter, no matter how diligently.”  Id. 
at 459). In repudiation of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Alticor, Michigan’s Rule 1.10(b) 
unambiguously provides that screening may be used to avoid imputation, not only in substantially 
related matters, but in the same matter as well (see MRPC 1.10(b)(1)), which is consistent with our 
reading of the Kala syllabus rule.  The staff comment appended to the amendment makes no bones 
that it was “prompted by” the Alticor decision of October 18, 2006, cited above, which, according to 
the staff, badly misread what “was the intent of the rule and has been the practice since the rule was 
adopted . . . .”  The Sixth Circuit granted rehearing and applied the amended rule, but still found a way 
to disqualify the targeted firm, this time for failure to comply with the notice requirement of MRPC 
1.10(b)(2).  Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Alticor, 472 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2007). 
Wisconsin, on the other hand, has recently adopted new ethics rules that include a provision 
comparable to Ohio Rules 1.10(c) and (d).  (See WRPC 1.10(a)(2).) (Of the 24 states permitting 
screening, a slight majority (13) follow the Michigan/Model Rule model; in the other 11, screening 
can be used to avoid imputation in limited circumstances, a la Ohio and Wisconsin.) See Laws. Man. 
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On Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 51:2004-07 (2007).  
In those instances in which imputation can be removed, the prerequisites for doing so are set forth in 
Ohio Rule 1.10(d)(1) & (2). Subdivision (d)(l) provides that the personally disqualified lawyer must 
be “timely screen[ed]” by the new firm, and the personally disqualified lawyer apportioned no part of 
the fee from that matter. Rule 1.10 cmt. [5C] refers to Ohio Rule 1.0(l), where the requirements for 
effective screening procedures are stated. These are “isolation” of the lawyer from participation in the 
matter by timely imposed procedures that are “reasonably adequate” to assure that confidential 
information known by the isolated lawyer remains protected. Steps that may appropriately be taken, 
depending on the circumstances of the particular case, are set forth in Ohio Rule 1.0 cmt. [9]. A 
screen is “timely,” as required by Rule 1.10(d)(1), only if “implemented as soon as practical [sic] 
after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening.” Ohio 
Rule 1.0 cmt. [10]. 
Comment [5E] emphasizes that screening will be ineffective if not “timely undertaken” or if there is 
“insufficient assurance that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer will 
remain unprotected.” Ohio Rule 1.10 cmt. [5E]. The comment goes on to enumerate the factors to be 
considered in determining the effectiveness of a screen: (1) firm size and structure, (2) likelihood of 
contact between the personally disqualified lawyer and the lawyers involved in the current 
representation, and (3) the existence of safeguards preventing the disqualified lawyer from access to 
information relevant to the current representation. Id.  [One would think that safeguards keeping the 
lawyer(s) involved in the current representation from having access to such information as may be in 
the possession of the disqualified lawyer would be equally, if not more, important.] 
Subdivision (2) of Ohio Rule 1.10(d) sets forth the other prerequisite to avoiding imputation -- notice. 
In accordance with (d)(2), written notice must be given to the affected former client. But given by 
whom? Prior drafts of the Rule made it clear that the notice was to be given by the screening firm. 
While this is probably still correct, the deletion introduces an unnecessary ambiguity. Although the 
content of the notice is not stated in division (d)(2), Ohio Rule 1.10 cmt. [5D] provides that the notice 
required is that “of the screened lawyer’s prior representation and that screening procedures have 
been employed.” This information should be given “as soon as practicable after the need for screening 
becomes apparent,” subject to the possibility of reasonable delay if disclosure is likely to significantly 
injure the current client. Id. 
While it has been opined that screening by a firm may not successfully avoid imputed disqualification 
arising from conflicts among current clients, see Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
93-101993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2, at *9 (Dec. 3, 1993) (recognizing that “in situations 
involving simultaneous representation, Chinese walls have generally not been favored”), the practice 
of “consent screening” of current clients by firms is not uncommon, both in Ohio and nationwide.  
See, e.g., In re Estate of Knowlton, 2006-Ohio-4905, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4835, at paras. 11, 
25, 34 (Hamilton).  “Consent screens” should be differentiated from the “notice screens” regarding 
former clients contemplated by Rule 1.10(d). Under the notice-screen procedure, effective screening, 
with notice to the affected former client, is sufficient. Id. Consent is not required. But this device is 
unavailable where conflicts arise among current clients. In the latter situation, current client conflicts 
can be cured by the informed consent of the affected parties. Ohio Rule 1.10(e). In securing that 
consent, a client may want the protection that screening affords. Providing this additional protection 
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is completely consistent with the Rules. Thus, pursuant to a “consent screen,” a firm obtains consent 
from an existing client, after full disclosure, to the firm’s taking on a representation that is adverse to 
the client, provided that a screen be put in place. (Typically, the adverse representation is in an 
unrelated matter.) The screen must effectively insulate information regarding the existing client, as 
well as the lawyers and firm personnel working on the existing client matter or matters, from the 
lawyers and personnel working on the new, adverse matter, and vice versa. 
Research discloses no litigated Ohio cases dealing with the issue of consent screens, but commentary 
provides a framework into which such devices comfortably fit. Under the Restatement, conflicting 
simultaneous representation is permissible, pursuant to informed consent of the affected clients (other 
than a claim by one client against the other in the same litigation, or where it is objectively not likely 
that the lawyers can provide adequate representation to one or more of the clients), see 2 Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  122(2) (2000). It follows that such consent coupled with 
adequate and timely screening should pass muster a fortiori. Particularly is this so where the matters 
are unrelated -- on such facts, “it would only be in unusual circumstances that a lawyer could not 
provide adequate representation with consent of all affected clients.” Id. cmt. g(iv), at 275. Consent 
screening with respect to government lawyers moving to private practice has been sanctioned for 
many years -- see discussion in ABA Formal Op. 342 (Nov. 24, 1975) (reprinted in ABA Standing 
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal and Informal Opinions at 110 (1985)) 
(“whenever the government agency is satisfied that the screening measures will effectively isolate the 
individual lawyer . . . the government may waive the disqualification of the firm under DR 5-105(D).” 
Id. at 121.). And see Ohio Rule 1.11(b) (approving screening of former government lawyer, with 
notice to appropriate government agency). See also Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 88-020, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Aug. 12, 1988) (suggesting that screening devices 
might be used to allow county commissioner’s partner to handle, in county’s court of common pleas, 
cases that commissioner could not handle because of conflict of interest between his role as county 
commissioner and subject matter of the representation). 
Nor is screening alone sufficient to cure a former-client conflict where the firm, rather than a lawyer 
moving to it, represented the former client; the Ohio Rules do not provide for screening in such 
circumstances. See Rule 1.10(a). In those instances, consent to the screening approach, after full 
disclosure, would have to be sought from the former client. Cf. 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. 
William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  14.10, at 14-31 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-1). Client consent 
under Rule 1.10 is covered in division (e). See section 1.10:500. 
Whether the screening devices used are sufficient in situations where screening is permitted is 
ultimately a case-by-case determination. In addition to the guidance provided in Rule 1.0(l) & cmt. 
[9], Rule 1.10 cmt. [5E], and Kala, further helpful information can be found in the Sixth Circuit’s 
opinion in Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988), a 
decision heavily relied upon by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline in its 
approval of screening as a device to avoid imputed disqualification. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 89-013, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 20 (May 30, 1989). In Manning, the 
court quoted with approval from Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983), as 
follows:  
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“Such a determination [that screening rebuts the presumption of shared 
confidences] can be based on objective and verifiable evidence 
presented to the trial court and must be made on a case-by-case basis. 
Factors appropriate for consideration by the trial court might include, 
but are not limited to, the size and structural divisions of the law firm 
involved, the likelihood of contact between the “infected” attorney and 
the specific attorneys responsible for the present representation, the 
existence of rules which prevent the “infected” attorney from access to 
relevant files or other information pertaining to the present litigation, or 
which prevent him from sharing in the fees derived from such 
litigation.” 
849 F.2d at 225-26. 
The burden is on the proponent of screening to demonstrate that the procedures in place are timely 
and sufficient. See 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  124, cmt. d(i) (2000). 
In accord was the pre-Rule case of Ussury v. St. Joseph Hosp., 43 Ohio App.3d 48, 539 N.E.2d 700 
(Cuyahoga 1988) (firm seeking to avoid imputed disqualification failed to demonstrate how it would 
successfully screen side-switching lawyer). 
The Supreme Court in Kala cited and commented favorably on both Manning and Board Op. 
89-013. Manning is cited, 81 Ohio St.3d at 5, 6-7, 8, 9, 688 N.E.2d at 263, 263-64, 264, 265, and is 
quoted, 81 Ohio St.3d at 6-7, 688 N.E.2d at 263-64. In adopting the rebuttable presumption of 
shared confidences, the Court expressly agreed with Opinion 89-013, which “laid out the substantial 
relationship test and the use of institutional screening mechanisms.” 81 Ohio St.3d at 10 n.5, 688 
N.E.2d at 266 n.5. And, in response to plaintiff’s reliance on Ussury, the Kala Court noted that 
“Ussury impliedly sanctioned screening devices by finding that the new firm had failed to prove the 
existence of screens to protect confidential information.” 81 Ohio St.3d at 10 n.7, 688 N.E.2d at 266 
n. 7. 
An example of the successful use of screening devices pre-Rule was provided in Margiotta v. 
McLaren (In re McLaren), 115 B.R. 922 (N.D. Ohio 1990), a bankruptcy case applying the 
OHCPR and Sixth Circuit authority. In McLaren, a former-client conflict arose when two firms 
merged. A lawyer from one of the firms formerly had represented an individual who became the 
debtor in a bankruptcy action in which the other firm represented the plaintiff-creditor. To avoid 
imputed disqualification, a number of screening measures were timely instituted: Prior to the merger, 
the affected lawyers were verbally instructed not to discuss the matter, and the debtor’s files were 
segregated from the files of the merged firm and locked up to restrict access to them by anyone other 
than the debtor’s former lawyer. In addition, the debtor’s former lawyer and the lawyer for the 
plaintiff worked in different departments within the merged firm and had offices in different buildings, 
thus making it less likely that inadvertent communications about the debtor might take place. The 
court rejected the argument by the debtor that these measures were insufficient. While acknowledging 
that the additional measures the debtor suggested -- requiring written instructions to the firm at large 
banning communications about the matter among affected lawyers, as well as placing written notices 
of quarantine on the restricted-access files and imposing a sign-out procedure to control access to 
those files -- might be useful, the court found them not indispensable; the methods used were 
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sufficient to avoid imputed disqualification on the facts presented. Another pre-Rule law-firm merger 
case in which screening was held adequate to avoid imputed disqualification is Legge Associates, Inc. 
v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 1235, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17567 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(table).  
Finally, it is interesting to speculate how a case like Ussury v. St. Joseph Hosp., 43 Ohio App.3d 48, 
539 N.E.2d 700 (Cuyahoga 1988), would be decided under Rule 1.10. According to evidence before 
the trial court, the side-switching lawyer in that civil action, against a hospital and physicians 
(presumably a medical-malpractice case but never so stated),  
reviewed materials and gave advice relating to the plaintiff’s case 
while at his former firm. . . . 
 The trial court could reasonably conclude that the lawyer 
received protected confidences or secrets while his former firm 
represented the plaintiff. 
Id. at 48-49, 539 N.E.2d at 701.  Did the lawyer have “substantial responsibility” for the matter while 
he was at his former firm?  While he was not sole or lead counsel, Comment [5B] provides that in 
other circumstances determination of substantial responsibility involves consideration of factors such 
as the level of his responsibility, the duration of his participation, the extent to which he advised or 
had personal contact with the former client, and the extent to which he was exposed to confidential 
information material to the matter.  Ohio Rule 1.10 cmt. [5B].  Ussury doesn’t say what the level of 
the lawyer’s responsibility was or the duration of his participation.  But it does tell us that he gave 
advice on the case and likely received confidential information, although not the extent thereof.  
These facts would seem to put the case right on the edge between divisions (c) and (d); if he did have 
“substantial responsibility,” Ussury’s “implied[d] sanction[ing] of screening devices” (in the words 
of the Kala Court, citing the case approvingly) is difficult to reconcile with the no-screening rule set 
forth in 1.10(c). 
 
1.10:400  Disqualification of Firm after Disqualified Lawyer Departs 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.10(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.10(b) 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:2007 
ALI-LGL §  124 
Wolfram §  7.6.3 
If a lawyer leaves a firm, is the lawyer’s former firm imputedly disqualified from representing a 
person with interests materially adverse to those of a client of the formerly associated lawyer? The 
answer, as set forth in Ohio Rule 1.10(b), is that there is imputation, if “the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know” that “the formerly associated lawyer represented the client in the same or a 
substantially related matter” (1.10(b)(1)) or that “any lawyer remaining at the firm has information 
protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter.” 1.10(b)(2). See Ohio Rule 1.10 cmt. 
[5]. As the comment further provides, whether or not matters are “substantially related” for purposes 
of this Rule is defined in Ohio Rule 1.0(n); examples are provided in Ohio Rule 1.9 cmt. [3] 
(discussed in section 1.9:210). 
Compared to prior drafts of proposed Ohio Rule 1.10(b) (as well as to MR 1.10(b)), in which the 
former firm was “not prohibited” from the representation “unless both” (b)(1) and (b)(2) were present, 
the adopted language states that the firm is prohibited “if either” (b)(1) or (b)(2) is known to apply. 
This is a sea-change (unfortunately, for the worse) and was made without the benefit of opportunity 
for comment by the bar.  The result is that Ohio now provides that, even if no material confidential 
information exists at the lawyer’s former firm, the lawyer’s personal disqualification is imputed to 
that firm - thereby preventing the former firm from representing a person with interests adverse to 
those of a client formerly represented by the departed lawyer – based solely on the fact that the 
departed lawyer’s representation was in the same or a substantially related matter.  
One of the consequences of this formulation is that the former firm is now treated less charitably, for 
purposes of imputation, than is the new firm: at the new firm, screening can provide the necessary 
protection against imputation when Rule 1.10(d) is applicable, but there is no such escape for the 
former firm in such circumstances. This change also puts Ohio out on the Rule 1.10(b) limb all by 
itself – no other Model Rule state has opted to trigger imputation in situations involving the same or a 
substantially related matter, where there is no confidential information at the former firm material to 
the matter. See also 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  124(1) & cmt. c(i) 
(2000); Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) §  51:2001-02, 2022-23 (2007). 
A further incongruity is the disconnect between Rules 1.9(b) and 1.10(b). Under 1.9(b), a lawyer 
whose former firm had represented the client cannot (absent consent) represent a new client in the 
same or a substantially related matter if (1) the interests are materially adverse and (2) the lawyer has 
acquired material information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c).  In contrast, under 1.10(b), the 
former firm cannot represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a client of the 
formerly associated lawyer if either (1) the matter is the same or is substantially related or (2) any 
lawyer remaining at the former firm has protected information material to the matter.  As a result, the 
migrating lawyer is precluded from the representation if (1) the interests involved are materially 
adverse, (2) the matters are the same or are substantially related, and (3) the former lawyer has 
protected information (1.9(b)), but the former firm is precluded if (1) the interests are materially 
adverse and either (2) the matters are the same or substantially related or (3) any lawyer at the former 
firm has protected information. 1.10(b).  As stated in ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
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Conduct 173-74, 185-86 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary), the touchstone under both MR 1.9(b) and 
MR 1.10(b) is the existence of protected information, if in the hands of the former lawyer under MR 
1.9(b), and if possessed by the former firm under MR 1.10(b).  Accord 2 Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 124(b) (2000).  
In making these changes in Rule 1.10(b), Ohio has also transformed division (b) into a subjective test, 
premised on the actual or constructive knowledge of “the lawyer”; MR 1.10(b) is objective in nature. 
A further difficulty with this language is the ambiguity of the reference to “the lawyer.” Is this to be 
read as stating that if “the lawyer” does not have the necessary knowledge, then there is no imputation 
after all, even if another lawyer in the firm does have the necessary knowledge? The answer is not 
readily apparent from the words used, although the overall scheme of the division would seem to 
point to the result that there is imputation if “any lawyer” in the firm has the requisite knowledge. 
Otherwise, one would be left with the odd and presumably unintended consequence that remaining 
lawyer A, not having the requisite knowledge, could proceed with the representation, even though 
remaining lawyer B did have such knowledge. All such conundrums are avoided under the language 
of MR 1.10(b).  
As is the case with the similar problem in Rule 1.10(a) (see section 1.10:200 at “Imputed 
disqualification - Parsing the language of Ohio Rule 1.10(a)”) we believe the correct reading of Ohio 
Rule 1.10(b) is that knowledge is a requisite when applying the Rule for disciplinary purposes, but 
should not enter the equation when the issue is disqualification. In the latter circumstance, so long as 
any lawyer in the firm possesses confidential information material to the matter, or, under the Ohio 
formulation, the former lawyer’s representation was in the same or a substantially related matter, the 
taint is imputed to the entire firm. Admittedly, this reading will result in disqualification of the firm 
even if no lawyer in the firm had confidential information relating to the matter, but, as is discussed 
above, this follows from Ohio’s having changed the division (b)(1) and (2) requisites to the 
disjunctive, rather than the conjunctive as in all other Model Rule states. Because disqualification is 
such a severe step, it is possible that the courts will avoid this unsatisfactory result in disqualification 
cases by requiring that the confidential information element be present in any event, even though the 
disjunctive reading would still have to be adhered to when applying Rule 1.10(b) in disciplinary 
matters. 
Probably the leading case applying the generally recognized rule of no imputation at the former firm 
when the issue is disqualification is Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter Tavenol Labs., 
Inc., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (in absence of sharing of confidential information, 
departed lawyer’s former firm, now representing plaintiff against defendant that was and is client of 
departed lawyer, not disqualified). (Novo was cited with approval by the Ohio Supreme Court in 
Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 8, 688 N.E.2d 258, 265 (1998), but 
not on this point.) See also English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1507 (D. 
Colo. 1993) (applying Colorado’s Rule 1.10(b)); no imputation where no material confidential 
information held by departed lawyer’s former firm; motion to disqualify firm denied). 
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1.10:500  Client Consent [see also 1.7:240 and 1.9:200] 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.10(e) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.10(c) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  51:2008 
ALI-LGL §§  122-123 
Wolfram §§  7.2-7.3 
 
Ohio Rule 1.10(e) provides that “[a] disqualification required by this rule [the imputed 
disqualification rule] may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.” 
As stated in Comment [6], “Rule 1.10(e) removes imputation with the informed consent of the 
affected client or former client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7,” which conditions require the 
lawyer’s determination that he or she can represent the affected clients competently, diligently, and 
loyally, that the representation is not prohibited by 1.7(c), and that each affected client/former client 
has given informed consent, confirmed in writing. Ohio Rule 1.10 cmt. [6]. Accord 2 Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  123 cmt. h (2000). Further as to client consent, see 
section 1.7:240 and Rule 1.0(f) & cmts. [6] & [7]. It should be recognized, however, that in some 
imputed-disqualification situations, particularly those involving side switching, the likelihood of 
obtaining consent is, at best, remote. 
The Board of Commissioners opined on Ohio Rule 1.10(e) in Op. 2008-2, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discp. 
LEXIS 2 (June 6, 2008).  The questions before the Board were (1) whether a lawyer director (not 
corporate counsel) was precluded by Rule 1.7 from representing a client suing the director’s 
corporation and (2) if so, whether the disqualification was imputed to his firm under Rule 1.10.  
Having found that the circumstance presented a nonwaivable conflict barring the lawyer director 
from the representation under Rule 1.7, the Board turned to Rule 1.10.  First, it looked at Rule 1.10(a) 
and concluded that the director’s fiduciary duties and personal interest constituted material limitation 
conflicts that “pose[d] a significant risk of materially limiting the lawyer’s loyalty and independence 
in representing a client against the corporation,” and therefore was imputed to the lawyer’s firm under 
Rule 1.10(a).  Although the Board recognized that Rule 1.10(e) provides for waiver of the 
disqualification by consent of the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7, those 
conditions cannot be met here, according to the Board, 
because the corporation and the client are directly adverse to each other 
in the same proceeding.  The corporation is not a client of the law firm 
but a lawyer director’s fiduciary duties to the corporation cannot be 
isolated from the lawyer’s professional duties. 
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Id. at *16.  (The syllabus repeats this same language but adds the word “technically” before “a client,” 
id. at *2.)  Although the step-by-step detail is not expressly stated in the opinion, the reasoning of the 
Board presumably is that (1) under 1.10(e) the conditions of Rule 1.7 control whether imputed 
disqualification can be waived; and (2) if there is a conflict under Rule 1.7(a), Rule 1.7(c)(2) 
precludes the representation, irrespective of client consent, if the clients are directly adverse in the 
same proceeding.  The seeming flaw in the Board’s analysis is that the corporation is not a client of 
the lawyer director and the Rules invoked by the Board all involve current clients.  Query whether the 
language about the lawyer director not being able to “isolate the fiduciary duties owed to the 
corporation from his professional duties as a lawyer” solves this problem.  See further discussion of 
this opinion in section 1.7:240 at “Nonconsentable conflicts - In general.” 
 
1.10:600  Imputed Disqualification of Former or Current Government Lawyers 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.10(f) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.10(d) 
Imputed disqualification - Former or current government lawyers: Ohio Rule 1.10(f) provides that 
disqualification issues regarding lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government 
lawyers are controlled by Ohio Rule 1.11. Comment [7] notes that the imputation rules for former 
government lawyers now in private practice are stated in Ohio Rule 1.11(b) and (c), not Rule 1.10, 
and that under Ohio Rule 1.11(d), when a personally disqualified government lawyer was formerly 
in private practice, nongovernmental employment, or at another government agency, former-client 
conflicts are not imputed to the government lawyers associated with the personally disqualified 
lawyer. Ohio Rule 1.10 cmt. [7]. 
Imputed disqualification of private attorneys associated with part-time government attorney: As 
stated in Ohio Rule 1.10(f), the disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current 
government lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11. If the association is with former government lawyers, 
it is clear that the provisions of Rule 1.11(b) and (c), not Rule 1.10, govern. Rule 1.10 cmt. [7]. 
Pursuant to Rule 1.11(b) and (c), disqualification of other lawyers associated with a former 
governmental lawyer in a private firm can be avoided by proper screening and notice. Equally clear is 
that Rule 1.11(d) applies to a current government lawyer with respect to his or her association with 
other government lawyers and that there is no imputation to the government lawyers with whom the 
disqualified lawyer is associated. Rule 1.11 cmt. [2]. But what about the part-time government 
lawyer who also has a private practice and is associated with other lawyers in a firm? This situation is 
not directly addressed by Rule 1.11, and the answers with respect to imputed disqualification are far 
from clear. Our best effort to sort out this situation is as follows: 
First, Rule 1.10(f) states that Rule 1.11 governs disqualification of “lawyers associated in a firm with 
former or current government lawyers.” Since “firm” does not include a government agency, see 
Rule 1.0 cmt. [4A], the reference in Rule 1.10(f) to current government lawyers has meaning only if 
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it contemplates a part-time government lawyer associated in a private firm with other lawyers.  Why 
then, if Rule 1.11 governs, is Rule 1.11 silent on the point?  We do not know. 
Second, Comment [9] to Rule 1.11 states that divisions (a) and (d) of the Rule “do not prohibit a 
lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government agency when doing so is permitted 
by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law.” While “joint representation” typically means 
joint representation of two or more parties in a single proceeding, it can be argued that in this context 
the term also refers to simultaneous representation of both government and private parties in separate 
proceedings, as could be the case of a part-time government lawyer with a private practice. Even if the 
more traditional reading of “joint representation” is intended, the result for these purposes is no 
different, inasmuch as representation of the private party would necessarily involve nongovernment 
representation - i.e., in the lawyer’s part-time private capacity, just as the agency representation 
would necessarily involve the lawyer wearing his part-time government attorney hat. (Under either 
reading, the joint representation would be subject to Rule 1.7, as well as ethics laws or regulations 
dealing with government-employee conflicts.) 
Third, if this interpretation of Comment [9] is tenable, then Rule 1.11(d) (current government lawyer) 
would seem to be applicable with respect to legal work on the government side; as to such work, there 
is no imputation to other government associates, “[b]ecause of the special problems raised by 
imputation within a government agency.” Rule 1.11 cmt. [2].  Note that Rule 1.10 cmt. [7] 
contemplates Rule 1.11(d) as applicable when “a lawyer represents the government after having 
served clients in private practice.”  And 1.11(d)(2)(i) itself speaks in terms of matters in which the 
current government lawyer had “participated” in private practice.  Does this mean that government 
representation “during,” not “after,” private representation, is controlled by a different regimen?  
Apparently, but once again, the answer is not clear. 
Fourth, the waters get even murkier regarding the part-time government lawyer’s private practice. 
Rule 1.11 simply does not address the imputation issue concerning firm lawyers with whom a 
part-time government lawyer is associated in private practice.  With the exception of Comment [9], 
Rule 1.11 speaks only to conflicts in private practice of a former government lawyer, and Comment 
[9] itself does not address the imputation issue.  (As noted above, Comment [2] does address the 
imputation issue, but only with respect to other government lawyers with whom the disqualified 
lawyer is associated in the agency.)  Taking into account the overall scheme of these Rules and in 
order to provide some direction in the circumstances, one is left with the less-than-satisfactory 
conclusion that, with respect to conflicts arising on the private side of the practice of the part-time 
government, part-time private, practitioner, Rule 1.10(a) probably ought to control, despite the 
seemingly contrary direction in Rule 1.10(f). As is apparent, these questions are not adequately dealt 
with by either Rule 1.10 or 1.11, and additional guidance is needed, either in the form of 
interpretation by the Supreme Court or further, more explicit, elaboration in the Rules. 
Note also that Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-5, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 5 (Aug. 15, 2008), addresses the part-time government attorney conflict-imputation issue and, 
we think, leaves something to be desired in its application of Rule 1.11 to this issue. This opinion is 
discussed in detail in section 1.11:410. 
If the imputation rule set forth in Ohio Rule 1.10(a) is or should be applicable on the private side, that 
would be consistent with most pre-Rule authority. Thus, to the extent that a part-time county 
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prosecutor would be barred from undertaking a private criminal-defense representation because of a 
conflict of interest, all other lawyers in his firm would also be barred from doing so under the doctrine 
of imputed disqualification. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-008, 1988 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 28 (June 17, 1988) (from which the Board “departs” in Opinion 2008-5). Cf. 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 97-4, 1997 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (June 
13, 1997) (full-time law clerk/part-time lawyer cannot appear before common pleas judge for whom 
he clerks or before any other judge in same division of that court; restriction imputed to members and 
associates of the firm with whom he practices). 
A limited exception to this general rule was suggested by Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 75-12 
(July 14, 1975) (relying in part on ABA Formal Op. 55 (Dec. 14, 1931)). In Opinion 75-12, the 
OSBA concluded that a partner or an associate of a part-time prosecutor could accept a court 
appointment to represent an indigent criminal defendant in a county with only a few practicing 
attorneys. The exigencies of the situation were considered to outweigh the concerns of the imputed 
disqualification rule. While the opinion indicated that the OHCPR posed no independent restriction 
on such representation, the legislature subsequently enacted legislation (effective January 13, 1976) 
to prohibit the appointment of such affiliated lawyers as defense counsel in criminal actions. ORC 
120.39(A) (lawyer who is partner or employee of any prosecuting attorney, city law director, village 
solicitor, or similar chief legal officer acting as a prosecutor cannot be appointed as defense counsel 
or co-counsel in a criminal action). See generally Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
88-008, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 28 (June 17, 1988); Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 
81-4 (Apr. 8, 1981). The statute prohibits the “appointment” of affiliated lawyers to criminal defense 
matters. It would not, however, prohibit an affiliated attorney from being retained by an indigent 
defendant on a pro bono basis.  See In re Appeal of a Juvenile, 61 Ohio App.2d 235, 401 N.E.2d 
937 (Lake 1978) (ORC 120.39 restrictions do not apply to retained counsel). Such a retention would 
be both legal, id,. and ethical, where circumstances warrant an exception to the usual 
imputed-disqualification requirements. 
While imputed disqualification concerns arise with respect to other lawyers in the same law firm with 
the part-time government attorney in private practice, as a general rule they do not extend to lawyers 
with whom the part-time government attorney merely shares or leases office space. Such a 
relationship, in the absence of “specific facts” pointing to the contrary result (see Ohio Rule 1.0 cmt. 
[2]), does not make them a “law firm,” and therefore the government attorney’s disqualification 
ordinarily would not be imputed to the private lawyer. See, under the former OHCPR, Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-13, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 19, 
1992) (no imputation where part-time assistant county prosecutor shared office space with criminal 
defense attorney; screening nevertheless recommended); Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 83-1 
(Aug. 22, 1983) (former OH DR 5-105(D) spoke of partners or associates of lawyer or lawyer’s firm, 
and office sharers are not partners or associates). See section 1.10:103. 
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1.11:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.11 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.11 
 
1.11:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Except as noted below, Ohio Rule 1.11 is substantively identical to the Model Rule. 
In Ohio Rule 1.11(a)(1), the words "all applicable laws and Rule 1.9(c) regarding conflicts of 
interest" have been substituted for the "is subject to Rule 1.9(c)" language contained in the Model 
Rule. Division (a) of the Ohio Rule also deletes the introductory language "Except as law may 
otherwise expressly permit,". 
In Ohio Rule 1.11(b)(2), the words "as soon as practicable" are substituted for "promptly." 
See section 1.11:400 for a discussion of the Ohio Rule 1.11(d) technical changes that inject 
ambiguity in lieu of the clarity provided by the Model Rule version. 
 
1.11:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.11: DR 9-101(B). 
 
1.11:110  Federal Conflict-of-Interest Statutes and Regulations 
As noted in ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 199 (5th ed. 2003) 
(commentary): 
 Statutes, regulations, and ordinances at every level of federal, 
state, and local government are the primary means of enforcement 
when it comes to conflicts and confidentiality issues arising out of 
successive government/private-sector employment. 
See 18 USC §  207(a) (2000), governing post-employment conflicts of interest for former federal 
executive branch and certain agency officers and employees with respect to party-specific matters in 
which the federal government is a party or has a direct and substantial interest and in which the officer 
or employee had participated personally and substantially ((a)(1) -- permanent ban), or concerning 
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matters the officer or employee know or should have known were pending under his or her 
responsibility within one year of termination of government service ((a)(2) -- two-year cooling-off 
period). 5 CFR §  2637.201(a) (2006) reiterates that the "basic" statutory prohibition (18 USC 
§ 207(a)(1)) applies to former government lawyers who in subsequent practice attempt to represent a 
client before or involving the federal government in any matter in which the lawyer had participated 
personally and substantially while in the federal government's employ. 
18 USC § 455 (2000) provides that a federal judge must disqualify herself from any proceeding in 
which she previously served as a lawyer "in the matter in controversy." 
 
1.11:120  Ohio Conflict-of-Interest Statutes and Regulations 
The general Ohio conflict-of-interest statute on successive employment applicable to government 
officials and employees is set forth in ORC 102.03(A)(1), which provides as follows: 
 No present or former official or employee shall, during public 
employment or for twelve months thereafter, represent a client or act in 
a representative capacity for any person on any matter in which the 
public official or employee personally participated as a public official 
or employee through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, 
the rendering of advice, investigation, or other substantial exercise of 
administrative discretion. 
"Represent" "includes any formal or informal appearance before, or any written or oral 
communication with, any public agency on behalf of any person." ORC 102.03(A)(5). 
Subsections (2)-(4) (ORC 102.03(A)(2)-(4)) contain discrete prohibitions for certain government 
officials or employees -- to wit, members of the public utility commission, ORC 102.03(A)(2); those 
involved with solid-waste management plans, ORC 102.03(A)(3); and members or employees of the 
general assembly, ORC 102.03(A)(4). See also ORC 2921.42 (unlawful interest by public officials 
in public contract). 
With respect to currently sitting judges, OH CJC Rule 2.11(A)(7)(a) provides that they must 
disqualify themselves from any proceeding in which they served as a lawyer "in the matter in 
controversy." 
 
1.11:130  Definition of "Matter" 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  9.16 (1996). 
For purposes of Ohio Rule 1.11, setting forth special conflict rules for former and current 
government officers and employees, "matter" includes: 
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 (1) any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a 
ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, 
investigation, change, accusation, arrest or other particular matter 
involving a specific party or parties; [and] 
 (2) any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of 
the appropriate government agency. 
Ohio Rule 1.11(e). 
As stated in ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 198-99 (7th ed. 2011) 
(commentary): 
This definition –  important because it excludes legislation, rule 
making, and other policy determinations – codifies an ABA ethics 
opinion [Formal Op. 342 (1975)], which construed the former Model 
Code provision: 
". . . in drafting, enforcing or interpreting governmental or 
agency procedures, regulations, or laws, or in briefing abstract 
principles of law . . . . the same 'matter' is not involved because 
there is lacking the discrete, identifiable transactions or 
conduct involving a particular situation and specific parties." 
(emphasis, ellipses and bracketed material added). This definition is no stranger to Ohio law on the 
subject; in opinions generated prior to the adoption of the Ohio Rules, the Ohio State Bar Association 
quoted with approval the beginning of the paragraph defining "matter" set forth in ABA Formal Op. 
342 (Nov. 24, 1975) (the latter portion of which is quoted above): 
"[T]he term seems to contemplate a discrete and isolatable transaction 
or set of transactions between identifiable parties. . . . The same lawsuit 
or litigation is the same matter. The same issue of fact involving the 
same parties and the same situation or conduct is the same matter." 
Ohio State Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 32, at 4 (n.d.) (ellipsis added) (part-time county prosecutor's 
representation of private party in wrongful death action against the same individual against whom the 
prosecutor obtained a criminal conviction for killing the decedent would involve the same matter.) 
Accord Ohio State Bar Ass'n Informal Op. 79-1, at 3 (Feb. 27, 1979) (where public employee 
investigated two securities offerings to determine their compliance with Ohio Securities Act, he was 
later prohibited from representing investors suing entities involved in the offerings for alleged 
violations of federal securities laws, because suits involved same matter as his prior public-employee 
investigation); Ohio State Bar Ass'n Informal Op. 81-1, at 2 (Feb. 23, 1981) (citing same 
definition in context of former judge's involvement in subsequent case). 
In Formal Opinion 32, the OSBA expanded the definition of the term "matter" to include 
"'[s]ubstantial facts forming the basis of claim or defense; facts material to issue; transaction, event, 
occurrence; subject matter of controversy.'" Ohio State Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 32, at 4-5 (n.d.) 
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(quoting Black's Law Dictionary). Query whether this expansion survives the adoption of Ohio 
Rule 1.11(e); Hazard and Hodes say that the identical language in MR 1.11(e) "codifies" the ABA 
Opinion 342 definition. 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  
15.5, at 15-17 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-1). 
Note, however, that Ohio Rule 1.11 cmt. [1] contains language not found in MR 1.11 cmt. [1], to the 
following effect: "For purposes of Rule 1.9(c), which applies to former government lawyers, the 
definition of 'matter' in division (e) applies." While probably a distinction without a difference (at 
least with respect to Rule 1.11), we think the intent would have been more precisely stated as "in 
applying Rule 1.9(c) to former government lawyers, the definition of 'matter' in division (e) applies." 
(Rule 1.9(c) deals with use or revelation of protected information of former clients in general, not 
such use or revelation as it applies specifically to former government lawyers.)  
The Ohio Ethics Law also contains a definition of "matter" for purposes of certain of its provisions. 
See ORC 102.03(A)(5): 
 As used in divisions (A)(1), (2), and (3) of this section, "matter" 
includes any case, proceeding, application, determination, issue, or 
question, but does not include the proposal, consideration, or 
enactment of statutes, rules, ordinances, resolutions, or charter or 
constitutional amendments. As used in division (A)(4) of this section 
"matter" includes the proposal, consideration, or enactment of statutes, 
resolutions, or constitutional amendments. 
Assuming the same matter is involved in the subsequent representation, it has been opined that the 
prohibition is not lessened by the passage of time. See Ohio State Bar Ass'n Informal Op. 81-1 
(Feb. 23, 1981) (finding that former OHCPR made no provision for passage of time to lessen 
restriction on judicial officer's involvement in subsequent representation involving matter on which 
judge acted on merits in judicial capacity). 
 
1.11:200  Representation of Another Client by Former Government Lawyer 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.11(a) & (b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.11(a) & (b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  9.14-9.18 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  91.4001 
ALI-LGL §  133 
Wolfram §  8.10  
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The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  9.14-9.18 (1996). 
Policy considerations underlying Ohio Rule 1.11: Both the public and the private sector benefit when 
lawyers can move relatively freely between government and private employment. This ease of 
movement makes government service more attractive and often brings an influx of ideas and 
appreciation of the private sector to government. Those moving from government bring with them an 
understanding of the regulatory regime in which they worked, allowing them to more easily broker 
cooperation between the government and those it regulates. Yet unfettered movement poses its own 
dangers. Special issues of side switching and misuse of confidential information are particularly acute. 
Ohio Rule 1.11 seeks to balance these competing concerns. See generally Ohio Rule 1.11 cmt. 4. 
The scope of Ohio Rule 1.11: Whereas the former OHCPR dealt with this issue only in terms of 
conflicts that may occur for former governmental lawyers now in private practice (OH DR 9-101(B)), 
the Ohio Rule, like the Model Rule, treats the other side of the coin as well (i.e., lawyers migrating 
from the nongovernmental or private sector to governmental service). The latter aspect is covered in 
Ohio Rules 1.11(d)(1) & (2)(i), discussed in section 1.11:400 infra. The rule pertaining to migration 
from government to the nongovernment/private sector is set forth in Ohio Rule 1.11(a) and is treated 
here. (The Rule 1.11(b) imputation provisions are discussed in section 1.11:210.) 
Employment restrictions stemming from prior governmental position - In general: Pursuant to Ohio 
Rule 1.11(a)(1), a lawyer who is a former public officer or employee must comply "with all 
applicable laws and Rule 1.9(c) regarding conflicts of interest." Ohio Rule 1.11 cmt. [1] and the 
ABA Model Rules Comparison make clear that the reference to "all applicable laws" in the Ohio 
Rule includes the Ohio ethics statutes found in ORC Chapters 102 and 2921 and the regulations of 
the Ohio Ethics Commission. With respect to compliance with Rule 1.9(c), the language of the Ohio 
Rule is essentially congruent with the ABA 2002 amendments to MR 1.11, which resolved a 
previously existing disagreement by making MR 1.11(a) applicable to former-government-lawyer 
conflicts to the exclusion of 1.9(a) and (b). See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 191 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) (noting that 2002 amendments codified position taken in 
ABA Formal Op. 97-409 (Aug. 2, 1997) that personal and substantial participation in the same  
matter [is] the touchstone of disqualification from any subsequent representation, adverse or not," 
ABA, Annotated Rules 185 (emphasis in original) so as not "to inhibit transfer of employment to and 
from the government." Id. 
Pursuant to Ohio Rule 1.11(a)(2), the former government lawyer is prohibited from representing a 
client "in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a 
public officer or employee," unless the government agency in question gives its informed consent, 
confirmed in writing, to the representation. Division (a)(2) (as well as (d)(2)) applies irrespective of 
whether the lawyer is adverse to a former client. Even if the former client would not be directly 
harmed, protections are necessary in order to prevent a lawyer from exploiting his public office for 
the advantage of another client. Ohio Rule 1.11 cmt. [3]. 
Differences between Ohio Rule 1.11 and former OH DR 9-101(B): It may be helpful to flag the 
differences between the new Rule and former OH DR 9-101(B). As noted above, Ohio Rule 1.11 (in 
subdivisions (d)(1) & (2)(i)) covers migrations to the government, as well as from the government. 
OH DR 9-101(B) was limited to the latter. (A 2006 opinion of the Board Commissioners read the 
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language of former 9-101(B) expansively; even though the disciplinary rule "explicitly restrict[s] the 
acceptance of private employment," the Board opined that it "implicitly and logically also restrict[s] 
the acceptance of some public employment in matters in which an attorney . . . had substantial 
responsibility." Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2006-6, 2006 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 4, at *7 (June 9, 2006) (former Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) hearing officer 
could not represent state in matter in which the lawyer had made determinations or issued orders).) 
With respect to migrations from the government, the Rule applies to matters on which the former 
government lawyer "participated personally and substantially," rather than the "substantial 
responsibility" measure of OH DR 9-101(B). In this regard, the Rule thereby makes explicit the gloss 
that had been put on the "substantial responsibility" language of the former disciplinary rule, as 
contemplating "personal involvement." See Ohio State Bar Ass'n Informal Op. 79-1, at 4 (Feb. 27, 
1979), quoting from ABA Formal Op. 342 (Nov. 24, 1975). For a more recent explication of 
"substantial responsibility," see Op. 2006-6 supra, where the Board opined that "[w]hen an attorney 
serving as a CSEA administrative hearing officer participates in a matter, renders a determination, or 
issues an administrative order, he or she is considered to have exercised substantial 
responsibility . . . ." Id. at *7. Also, division (a)(2) of the Rule deals only with "former" government 
officers or employees; the disciplinary rule was not so limited. See Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 90-10, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 17 (June 15, 1990) (OH DR 9-101(B) 
would prohibit part-time CSEA attorney from representing in private practice anyone involved in one 
of the lawyer's CSEA cases). See also Board Opinion 2006-6, discussed above. 
Under the OHCPR, restrictions on private employment, if applicable, were not subject to waiver by 
consent of those affected. Bd. of Comm'ns on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-10, 1993 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 2 (Dec. 3. 1993). Ohio Rule 1.11(a)(2) changes that by providing that the 
representation can go forward provided the appropriate government agency gives its informed, 
consent, confirmed in writing. 
The only two judicial opinions found under the Code that applied OH DR 9-101(B) to a former 
government lawyer who had moved to private practice are City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric 
Illuminating Co., 440 F.Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (1977) (table), and Randal S. 
O. v. Tammy M. R., 2004 Ohio 6469, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 5904 (Huron). In City of 
Cleveland, the court rejected out of hand the argument that there was an OH DR 9-101(B) problem 
presented by the fact that a former chief counsel for the city was now a member of the firm 
representing one of the defendants in an antitrust suit brought by the city: 
[T]he record is conspicuously silent as to any specific claims or matters 
involving [the lawyer's] participation in [relevant] affairs, either 
substantially or remotely related to the antitrust action presently before 
this Court. 
440 F.Supp at 212 (bracketed material substituted). But where the lawyer had substantial 
responsibility in the same matter when he was a public employee, the disqualification of the lawyer 
was affirmed. Randal S. O. v. Tammy M. R. supra (lawyer disqualified from representing mother in 
action for modification of child-support when, as a former government attorney for the CSEA, he had 
met with father concerning adjustments to same child support and had submitted to court judgment 
entry adopting the agency's findings of recalculation of the amount). 
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Employment restrictions stemming from prior governmental position - Test to apply: In exploring the 
circumstances in which private employment is barred under Ohio Rule 1.11(a), it is worthwhile 
addressing several subsidiary questions: (1) In what public capacity must the lawyer have served to 
trigger a restriction on private employment under the Rule? (2) How does one determine if the private 
employment involves the same matter with which the lawyer had been involved in a governmental 
capacity? (3) What degree of involvement in the matter in a governmental capacity is necessary to 
make the restrictions applicable? (4) What type of employment outside one's governmental capacity 
is barred? These questions are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
(1) Employment restrictions stemming from prior governmental position - The scope of prior 
governmental involvement: Ohio Rule 1.11(a) applies to a lawyer who was a former government 
officer or employee. As such, it probably is safe to conclude that, as under the former OHCPR (where 
the reference was to "public employee"), this broad language was chosen to make clear that the 
prohibition attaches regardless of whether the lawyer was acting as a lawyer when involved in a 
matter in a governmental capacity. Thus, the same result would likely be reached under Ohio Rule 
1.11(a) as was reached under OH DR 9-101(B) in Ohio State Bar Ass'n Informal Op. 79-1 (Feb. 
27, 1979), where it was opined that a lawyer was precluded by the OHCPR from subsequently 
representing investors in a federal securities lawsuit involving the same securities offerings that the 
lawyer had, in an agruably nonlegal position for the State of Ohio, investigated to determine their 
compliance with the Ohio Securities Act. As the opinion notes, "the intent clearly was for DR 
9-101(B) to be applicable to the lawyer whose former public or governmental employment was in any 
capacity and without regard to whether it involved work normally handled by lawyers." Id. at 4. 
(2) Employment restrictions stemming from prior governmental position - Definition of the term 
"matter": See section 1.11:130. 
(3) Employment restrictions stemming from prior governmental position - Degree of involvement 
required: As noted above, in addition to compliance with all other conflicts-of-interest laws and Rule 
1.9(c) (restriction on use or relevation of information relating to former representation), under Ohio 
Rule 1.11(a)(2) the former government lawyer's participation in the matter must have been both 
"substantial" and "personal." In this regard, the new Rule is less restrictive than Ohio State Bar 
Ass'n Informal Op. 90-3 (July 13, 1990), where the OSBA opined that a lawyer, formerly employed 
as an assistant attorney general representing the reparations fund in the victims-of-crimes division of 
the court of claims, should not represent a private claimant under such provisions, if the claim arose 
during the lawyer's employment at the attorney general's office and if the lawyer "had any knowledge 
of the merits of that claim" or if the lawyer "had any direct contact with the matter." Id. at 2. A Board 
opinion decided under the Code that would likewise seem not to meet the "personal" aspect of the 
Rule 1.11(a)(2) test is Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-5, 2001 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 6 (Oct. 5, 2001). In Opinion 2001-5, the Board applied former OH DR 9-101(B) in 
finding that a court-employed lawyer/mediator could not conduct a private mediation for a fee of any 
case pending on the docket of the employing court, even if the lawyer/mediator played no role in the 
court-based process for that case, because the lawyer still had "substantial responsibility" in that 
matter. 
Certainly the personal-and-substantial-participation provisions of Rule 1.11(a)(2) would have been 
easily satisfied and representation barred (absent informed written consent by the agency) on the facts 
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presented in Randal S.O. v. Tammy M.R., 2004 Ohio 6469, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 5904 
(Huron). In Randal the disqualification of a former government attorney was affirmed where the 
lawyer represented a client seeking to modify a reduction in child support -- the very reduction that 
the lawyer had previously effected as an attorney for the Huron County Child Support Enforcement 
Agency, after having met with the father (the present defendant) to discuss his child support 
obligation. As the court of appeals set forth in its opinion, quoting with approval from the trial court, 
the lawyer, when at the CSEA had "'substantial responsibility in the matter'" and "'personal contact 
with and knowledge about'" it. Id. at para. 14. 
(4) Employment restrictions stemming from prior governmental position - Prohibited employment: 
As Ohio Rule 1.11(a)(2) states, the employment prohibited is representation of a client by a former 
government officer or employee in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and 
substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency gives its 
informed, written consent. 
The Rule and its comments envision that "a client" may, in some circumstances at least, be another 
governmental agency or entity, as well as a private client. Thus, Comment [4] refers to instances in 
which "the successive clients are a government agency and another client, public or private ...." Ohio 
Rule 1.11 cmt. [4]. And Comment [5] states that "[w]hen a lawyer has been employed by one 
government agency and then moves to a second government agency, it may be appropriate to treat 
that second agency as another client for purposes of this rule, as when a lawyer is employed by a city 
and subsequently is employed by a federal agency." Ohio Rule 1.11 cmt. [5]. (The comment goes on 
to say that this conflict is governed by division (d). This has to be a reference to (d)(1) (applicability 
of Rules 1.7 & 1.9); division (d)(2)(i) is limited to participation by a current government officer or 
employee regarding a matter in which the lawyer participated "while in private practice or 
nongovernmental employment.") 
Finally, the comments make clear that there is no prohibition in Ohio Rule 1.11 against joint 
representation of a private party and a governmental agency, so long as it is permitted under Ohio 
Rule 1.7 and not otherwise prohibited by law. Ohio Rule 1.11 cmt. [9]. See discussion at section 
1.10:600. 
 
1.11:210  No Imputation to Firm if Former Government Lawyer is Screened 
Ohio Rule 1.11(b) expressly permits lawyers in the firm with which a lawyer (disqualified under 
division (a)) has become associated to undertake representation in such a matter, if the disqualified 
lawyer is "timely screened" from any participation in the matter (and is apportioned no part of the fees 
therefrom), 1.11(b)(1), and if written notice is given "as soon as practicable to the appropriate 
government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule." 1.11(b)(2). 
"[T]he consent of the government is not required for the firm to proceed." 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard & 
W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §15.6, at 15-23 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-1). The Ohio 
version of Comment [7] adds language permitting a "reasonable delay" in the required notice to the 
appropriate government agency when "disclosure [of the prior representation and the employment of 
screening procedures] is likely to significantly injure the current client." Ohio Rule 1.11 cmt. [7]. 
The requirements and procedures for screening in this context are addressed in Ohio Rule 1.0(l) & 
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cmts. [9] & [10]. See Ohio Rule 1.11 cmt. [6] [erroneously citing Rule 1.0(l) as 1.0(k)]. See also 
section 1.10:300. 
 
1.11:300  Use of Confidential Government Information 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.11(c) 
ORC 102.03(B) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.11(c) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  91:4009 
ALI-LGL §  133 
Wolfram §  8.10 
While in government service, individuals are often exposed to the confidential information of 
regulatees. Allowing one to move from the agency and use that information to the disadvantage of the 
regulatee seems a breach of public trust and would, if common, discourage information-sharing with 
the government. Ohio Rule 1.11(c) addresses this issue. 
Pursuant to Ohio Rule 1.11(c), a former government lawyer having information the lawyer knows is 
confidential government information about a "person," acquired when the lawyer was a public officer 
or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter 
in which the information could be used to that person's "material disadvantage." 
Several aspects of the Rule deserve greater discussion. First, one should note that the Rule applies 
where the former government employee learned certain information about a "person." While one 
might argue that the use of the word "person" puts otherwise protected information about an entity 
outside the ambit of the Rule, surely this is not what was intended. One of the accepted definitions of 
"person" (in addition to human being) is an entity recognized by law as having the rights and duties of 
a human being. Black's Law Dictionary 1178 (8th ed. 2004). See also 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & 
W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §§  15.7-15.8 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-1) (using "third 
party" or "private party" as the operative term and citing cases involving corporations). See id. at 
Illus. 15-5 & 15-6. 
Second, the Rule is limited to the potential misuse of "confidential government information." The 
meaning of this phrase is discussed in section 1.11:310. 
Third, the restriction applies only when the lawyer in undertaking private representation "knows" 
confidential government information and the rest of the test is satisfied. While Comment [8] makes 
clear that this prohibition is triggered by "actual knowledge" of confidential government information, 
Ohio Rule 1.11 cmt. [8], actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See Ohio Rule 
1.0(g). 
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Fourth, the restriction applies only when the information is obtained while in government 
employment and the information "could" be used to the material disadvantage of the submitter. No 
actual showing of misuse of the information is required. As long as the former government employee 
"could" use the information to the material disadvantage of the submitter, the provision is triggered. 
Fifth, for the restriction to apply, the lawyer's private client must have interests adverse to the 
submitter in a matter. Two aspects of this qualification are important. First, the parties' interests need 
only be "adverse," not "materially adverse" as some rules require. Compare Ohio Rule 1.9(a). 
Second, the concern arises only when this adversity arises in connection with a "matter" as defined in 
Ohio Rule 1.11(e). The law surrounding this definition is addressed in section 1.11:130. 
Finally, the restriction applies only if the lawyer could use the information on behalf of a private 
client to the "material disadvantage" of the submitter. As written, it seems reasonably clear that the 
qualifier "material" is meant to denote the degree of harm such use might cause the submitter, not to 
require some relationship between the disadvantage and the matter at hand. 
When the Rule is triggered, the lawyer's firm may undertake or continue representation in the matter 
only if the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from participation in the matter and is apportioned 
no part of the fee therefrom. Ohio Rule 1.11(c). According to ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 196 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary), a "conflict resulting from possession of 
'confidential governmental information' cannot be waived." 
1.11:310  Definition of "Confidential Government Information" 
Ohio Rule 1.11(c) contains the definition of "confidential government information" (similar to that 
contained in ORC 102.03(B), quoted below) for purposes of 1.11: 
information that has been obtained under governmental authority and 
that, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law 
from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose and 
that is not otherwise available to the public. 
ORC 102.03(B) also bears on the use of confidential government information by a former 
government official or employee: 
 No present or former public official or employee shall disclose 
or use, without appropriate authorization, any information acquired by 
the public official or employee in the course of the public official's or 
employee's official duties that is confidential because of statutory 
provisions, or that has been clearly designated to the public official or 
employee as confidential when that confidential designation is 
warranted because of the status of the proceedings or the circumstances 
under which the information was received and preserving its 
confidentiality is necessary to the proper conduct of government 
business. 
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With regard to these provisions, one should keep in mind the Ohio Public Records Act, ORC 149.43, 
pursuant to which "public records" are to be made available to any person upon request. Documents 
subject to public records disclosure would, by definition, not be "confidential government 
information." But the Public Records Act exempts from disclosure some 25 different categories (see 
ORC 149.43(A) (a)-(y), including records the release of which is prohibited by law (ORC 
149.43(A)(1)(v)), which category includes documents protected by the attorney-client privilege. See, 
e.g., State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 700 N.E.2d 12 (1998) (per curiam). For 
general commentary on the interaction of the Rule 1.11(c) definition and public records acts, see 1 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 15.8 (3d ed. Supp. 
2005-1). See also 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 74, reporter's note to 
cmt. b, at 577-78 (2000) (attorney-client privilege; work product). 
 
 
1.11:400  Government Lawyer Participation in Matters Related to Prior 
Representation 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.11(d)(1) & (2)(i) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.11(d)(1) & (2)(i) 
Commentary 
ALI-LGL §§  132, 133 
Wolfram §  8.9.4 
Under Ohio Rule 1.11(d), "[e]xcept as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently 
serving as a government officer or employee" (1) must comply with Ohio Rules 1.7 (current-client 
conflicts) and 1.9 (former-client conflicts), and (2) shall not "participate in a matter in which the 
lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental 
employment, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in 
writing." Ohio Rule 1.11(d)(1) & (2)(i). 
The former client's interests are protected by the applicability of Ohio Rule 1.9, which requires the 
former client's consent. The 1.11(d) bar is personal to the individual lawyer; there is no imputation to 
other government officers or employees with whom the lawyer works. Ohio Rule 1.11 cmts. [2] & 
[5]. Screening, however, is ordinarily “prudent.” Id. Accord as to both points, 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, 
Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  15.2, at 15-8 & §  15.9, at 15-32 (3d ed. Supp. 
2005-1); id. §  15.9, at 15-32 & -33; ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 197 
(7th ed. 2011) (commentary). (As a technical aside, the language used to introduce subdivisions 
(d)(1) and (d)(2) varies from the Model Rule and is both cumbersome and unclear. Thus, 
governmental lawyers in Ohio are directed to "comply with both of the following: (1) Rules 1.7 and 
1.9; (2) shall not do either of the following (i) participate in a matter [etc.]; (ii) negotiate for private 
employment, [as to which see section 1.11:500]." Does "both of the following" refer to Rules 1.7 and 
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1.9, or to subdivisions (1) and (2) of division (d)? In all likelihood the latter, but the unnecessary 
ambiguity injected into the Ohio version by this "comply-with-both and don't-do-either" drafting 
could easily be eliminated by returning to the Model Rule formulation, which clearly provides that the 
lawyer "is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and shall not" (i) participate or (ii) negotiate.) 
Pre-Rule Ohio decisions, primarily disqualification cases, are basically compatible with the standards 
set forth in Ohio Rule 1.11(d)(1) & (2)(i). Those cases involved participation by a government 
lawyer (usually a prosecutor) in matters related to a prior representation as a defense lawyer. Most 
were applications of the "side-switching" rules announced in Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & 
Refining Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998), as to which see extensive discussion in 
section 1.9:200. As a general rule, those cases teach that the migrating lawyer cannot further 
participate in the matter on the government's side if he or she was involved, while in private practice 
or a public defender's office, in the same or a substantially related case, but that the conflict typically 
is not imputed to the governmental office or agency with which the lawyer is associated. The question 
of disqualification of an entire prosecutor's office was, in the majority of Ohio's appellate districts, 
decided on a case-by-case basis.  State v. Vidu, Nos. 71703, 71704, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 3390 
(Cuyahoga July 23, 1998). Disqualification of an entire office typically required a showing of actual 
prejudice, not just an appearance of impropriety. E.g., State v. Waggaman, No. 96 CA0078, 1997 
Ohio App. LEXIS 3732 (Medina Aug. 20, 1997) (disapproving contrary holding in State v. Cooper, 
62 Ohio Misc. 1, 409 N.E.2d 1070 (C.P. Hancock 1980)). A number of these cases noted that 
former OH DR 5-101(D) could not be construed to mandate the disqualification of an entire 
government office or department; otherwise, "the government's ability to function would be 
unreasonably impaired." E.g., Vidu, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 3390, at *9; Waggaman, 1997 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 3732. 
One aspect of Ohio Rule 1.11 as it applies to cases such as these and those following should be noted. 
Some involved a government lawyer who was formerly in a public defender's office, which is a 
governmental position. Since subdivision (d)(2)(i) is limited to government lawyers formerly in 
private practice or nongovernmental positions, it is Ohio Rule 1.11(d)(1) (requiring compliance with 
Rule 1.9), not (d)(2)(i), that would be applicable. 
Further on the issue of disqualification of a government lawyer (and imputation to the government 
lawyer's office), based on the lawyer's prior representation while in the private sector or in a public 
defender's office, see the following pre-Rule cases: 
 State v. Britton, 2000 Ohio 1881; 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2521 (Marion June 14, 2000) 
(trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for post-conviction relief based on 
prosecutor's prior involvement, while in private practice 18 years earlier, in handling 
defendant's direct appeal; Kala hearing revealed that presumption of shared confidences was 
rebutted by erection of adequate safeguards, including turning complete control of case over 
to assistant prosecutor; court further found that prosecutor had no confidential information to 
divulge). 
 
Such a case, involving a prosecutor formerly in private practice, would now be controlled 
by Ohio Rule 1.11(d)(2)(i); no imputation to entire office, Rule 1.11 cmt. [2]. 
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 State v. Edighoffer, Nos. 96 CA 161, 96 CA 162, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6191 (Mahoning 
Dec. 16, 1998) (affirming in child-abuse case trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
disqualify prosecutor who had represented defendant in a DUI case four years before; the past 
representation and present prosecution "not even marginally related," id. at *14). 
 
The result would be the same under Ohio Rule 1.11(d); not the same "matter." 
 
 State v. Wiles, 126 Ohio App.3d 71, 709 N.E.2d 898 (Portage 1998) (defendant's public 
defender lawyer went to work for prosecutor's office while case on direct appeal to Supreme 
Court; presumption under Kala that lawyer shared information with new colleagues that 
could be used against defendant in matter at issue (postconviction relief proceeding); trial 
court erred in denying motion for disqualification of prosecutor's office and appointment of 
special prosecutor without holding hearing at which state would have opportunity to rebut 
presumption of shared confidences). 
 
Prosecutor's disqualification would be controlled by provisions of Ohio Rule 1.9(c) 
incorporated by reference in Rule 1.11(d)(1); no imputation to entire office, Rule 1.11 cmt. 
[2]. 
 
 State v. Perotti, No. 89 CA1845, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2393 (Scioto May 15, 1991) 
(rejecting defendant's argument that entire prosecutor's office should be disqualified where 
assistant prosecuting attorney, whom the trial court ordered not to participate in the 
prosecution, had previously represented the defendant in a totally unrelated criminal matter 
five years before; rejecting per se disqualification rule in favor of "facts and circumstances" 
test). 
 
Same result under new Rule; not the same "matter." 
 
 State v. Murphy, No. 9-87-35, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4673 (Marion Nov. 17, 1988) 
(overruling motion to disqualify entire prosecutor's office from further participation in 
connection with defendant's appeal; motion based on fact that lawyer in prosecutor's office 
had been employed by public defender's office appointed to represent defendant on appeal; 
lawyer in question did not work on, had no knowledge of, and did not discuss case while 
employed as public defender and submitted affidavit that he would not participate in the 
appeal; case decided pre-Kala). 
 
Result consistent with Ohio Rule 1.11(d)(1), incorporating standards of Rule 1.9; no 
imputation to entire office, Rule 1.11 cmt. [2]. 
 
 An ethics opinion dealing with a former public defender who became county prosecutor is Bd. 
of Comm'rs on Grievance & Discipline Op. 88-15, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 36 
(June 17, 1988). The Board there approved of the prosecutor's proposal to appoint an assistant 
628
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.11 
 
as special prosecutor to handle those cases that were pending in the public defender's office 
when the prosecutor served there. Referring with approval to ABA Formal Op. 342 (Nov. 24, 
1975), the Board further opined that it would be prudent for the prosecutor to "screen yourself 
from any participation in the particular cases." 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 36, at *2-3. 
 
Again, result consistent with Rule 1.11(d)(1). 
 
With respect to the efforts in some of these cases to disqualify the entire prosecutor's office, as noted 
above Ohio Rule 1.11 cmt. [2] makes clear that "division (d) does not impute the conflicts of a 
lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of the government to other associated government 
officers or employees . . . ." Screening of such lawyer, while not required, is, however, ordinarily 
advisable. Id. 
Note as well that in those cases involving the same matter, the former client would hold the trump 
card as to the individual lawyer's adverse representation; under Rule 1.9, incorporated by reference in 
1.11(d)(1), his or her "informed consent, confirmed in writing," would be required. 
Remember too that Ohio Rule 1.11(d) covers concurrent as well as former-client conflicts. Thus a 
lawyer "currently serving as a public officer or employee shall comply with . . . Rule[] 1.7." Rule 
1.11(d)(1). While the case law dealing with this subject is sparse in comparison with that involving 
former-client conflicts flowing from lawyers migrating to or from the government, there is at least 
one pre-Rule Ohio case dealing with the issue. In State v. Condon, 152 Ohio App.3d 629, 2003 
Ohio 2335, 789 N.E.2d 696 (Hamilton), a criminal defendant argued for dismissal of the indictment 
and disqualification of the prosecutor's office because that office was obligated to defend him, a 
county employee, in a civil lawsuit arising out of the same conduct. The court held that the mere 
appearance of impropriety in a government attorneys' office was not sufficient to warrant vicarious 
disqualification of the entire office, and, inasmuch as defendant presented no evidence of actual 
conflict at the trial court hearing on the motion, denial of the motion was affirmed. We don't know 
enough facts to be able to tell how Ohio Rule 1.7 (applicable by reference in Rule 1.11(d)(1)), would 
play out in Condon. If, as is likely, different lawyers in the office handled the two cases, there should 
be no personal disqualification problem under 1.7. If the same prosecutor attempted to represent both 
the state in the criminal matter and the defendant in the civil action, 1.7(a) would in all likelihood be 
violated, there being no chance of consent under 1.7(b). Once again, even if personal disqualification 
were called for in one or another of the cases, there would be no imputation to others in the office. 
Ohio Rule 1.11 cmt. [2]. See also section 1.10:600 at "Imputed disqualification of private attorneys 
associated with part-time government attorney." 
The Board of Commissioners dealt with the Rule 1.11(d)(1) obligation of current government 
lawyers – in this instance a city law director – in Bd. of Comm’rs of Grievances & Discipline Op. 
2007-4, Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (June 8, 2007). The question put was whether it is proper, 
when there is a conflict between or among the city, city officials, or city entities, for the law director 
to provide counsel by means of use of different assistant law directors for each client. 
The Board’s answer was that if there is in fact a conflict under Rule 1.7(a) and the conditions set forth 
in 1.7(b) are satisfied (competent and diligent representation can be provided to each client, informed 
consent of each client is obtained, and Rule 1.7(c) does not apply), then the representation can go 
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forward, preferably by use of a different lawyer in the law department for each client.  However, if 
under 1.7(c) such representation is prohibited by law or the city entities are directly adverse in the 
same proceeding, the Board opined that the law department could not represent both city clients, even 
by using different city lawyers to represent each. (Under this analysis, one of the city clients 
presumably would have to be represented by special counsel from outside the law department.) 
Overall, this seems a reasonable reading of Rules 1.11 and 1.7, although there is at least one quibble; 
one of the specific fact situations raised by the requester was that of a city law director representing 
the city in a disciplinary proceeding against a city employee before the city civil service commission, 
and at the same time providing legal advice to the commission itself regarding the disciplinary matter.  
The Board found this “inappropriate” under Rule 1.7(c), but without specifying which aspect of 1.7(c) 
would be implicated. The example is not one of representing two clients directly adverse to one 
another in the same proceeding, condemned by 1.7(c)(2), but rather representing one of the 
participants and the decision-maker in the same proceeding. We agree that such dual representation 
would be “inappropriate”; a lawyer surely could not represent both the tribunal and one of the 
adversaries before that tribunal. We suspect this is “prohibited by law,” but it would have been helpful 
if the Board had cited chapter and verse to that effect. Instead, the Board gives us a variation on the 
now discredited appearance-of-impropriety theme (“strong appearance that . . . [it] is inappropriate 
under Rule 1.7(c),” id. at *14-15) and leaves it at that. 
Finally, some migrations to government, such as to judicial office from another public office or from 
private practice, are controlled by other provisions tailored specifically to the governmental position 
in question. See OH CJC Rule 2.11(A)(7). 
 
1.11:410  No Imputed Disqualification of Those Associated in a Firm with 
       Current Government Lawyers 
Rule 1.10(f) provides that “disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current 
government lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11.”  Imputed disqualification of those associated in a firm 
with a former government lawyer who is disqualified can be cured by screening and notice. See Rule 
1.11(b) and section 1.11:210 supra.  With respect to imputed disqualification of other government 
lawyers associated with a disqualified current government lawyer, Rule 1.11 cmt. [2] provides that, 
“[b]ecause of the special problems raised by imputation within a government agency, division (d) 
does not impute the conflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of the 
government to other associated government officers or employees, although ordinarily it will be 
prudent to screen such lawyers.”  Thus, in addition to stating the imputation rule regarding lawyers 
associating in a “firm” with a former government lawyer, consistent with Rule 1.10(f), Rule 1.11 
actually goes further than 1.10(f) and also provides the rule in the non-“firm” context of those 
associated with the disqualified government lawyer in a government agency.  (See Rule 1.0 cmt. 
[4(A)]; “firm” does not include government agencies.) 
But what about the current government lawyer who also has a part-time private practice in a firm with 
other lawyers?  If the part-time government lawyer is disqualified from a matter, are her partners and 
associates also disqualified?  If so, can it be cured by screening and notice? 
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Despite the seeming promise of 1.10(f) that Rule 1.11 will address the imputation issues arising with 
respect to lawyers associated in a firm with either a former or a current government lawyer 
disqualified from a matter, Rule 1.11 has nothing at all to say on these issues when they involve a 
current government lawyer.  It is against this rather contradictory regulatory backdrop that the Board 
of Commissioners decided Op. 2008-5, 2005 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (Aug. 15, 2008). 
The Rule 1.11 aspect of Op. 2008-5 comes up in the context of whether a conflict of interest of a 
part-time city law director is imputed to other lawyers in the law firm of which the city law director is 
a member.  First, the Board looked to Rule 1.10(f), which refers the reader to 1.11 for the governing 
rule.  The Board then stated that “application of Rule 1.11 requires a close examination of the rule.”  
Id. at *10.  Unfortunately, the Board cited to the wrong subdivision of the Rule; the multiple 
references to Rule 1.11(c) should have been to Rule 1.11(d).  An errata notation to this effect was 
placed at the beginning of the opinion sometime in December 2008.  See id. at *1.  Using the correct 
subdivision references, the analysis of the Board was that Rule 1.11(d) 
applies to current government lawyers.  No mention is made anywhere 
in Rule 1.11(d) of imputing the disqualification of a current 
government lawyer to the lawyers associated in a law firm with the 
current government attorney. 
Id. at *10-11 (emphasis in original).  In the absence of such a directive, the Board concludes that 
there is no imputation “to law firm partners or associates who wish to privately represent criminal 
defendants outside the jurisdiction of the city law director.”  Id. at *11. 
Thus we have under Rule 1.11 a regime pursuant to which lawyers in a firm associated with a former 
government attorney who is disqualified are likewise disqualified unless the former government 
lawyer is screened and notice is given as provided in 1.11(b)(1) & (2).  But on the same facts, if the 
disqualified lawyer is a current part-time government attorney, other lawyers at the firm are not 
subject to disqualification and need not engage in screening or notice. 
While the Board’s result is not unreasonable in terms of what Rule 1.11 says (or does not say), does it 
make sense from a policy point of view to subject those associated in a law firm with a disqualified 
former government attorney to more stringent imputed disqualification rules than those applicable to 
law firm associates of a current government lawyer?  At the very least the matter ought to be 
addressed one way or the other, instead of remaining in limbo.  If Rule 1.11 is meant to state the 
imputed disqualification rules for lawyers associated in a firm with a current government lawyer, as 
Rule 1.10(f) provides, then it would seem not too much to ask that Rule 1.11 do just that.  The 
absence of any direction on the subject in the rule seems to us worthy of a further look by the Supreme 
Court. 
In the meantime, Opinion 2008-5, however unsatisfactory it appears to be from a policy standpoint, 
remains the latest word on the issue.  The sooner the matter is addressed by the Supreme Court the 
better. 
This less than desirable state of affairs is exacerbated by the Board’s partial modification of Opinion 
2008-5 in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-6, 2006 Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 
(Dec. 5, 2008).  Not only is the Rule 1.11 portion of 2008-5 not a part of the modification, but 
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Opinion 2008-6 resuscitates Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-008, 1988 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 28 (June 17, 1988), insofar as it opined that there were certain narrow 
circumstances where a part-time municipal prosecutor could represent criminal defendants.  (See 
further discussion of Opinions 2008-5, -6 and 1988-008 in section 1.7:320, at “Government attorneys 
representing criminal defendants.”)  Opinion 2008-5 had rejected this aspect of Opinion 1988-008, 
as well as rejecting that opinion’s determination that any preclusion of the prosecutor from such 
representation would be imputed to the other members of the prosecutor’s law firm.  This rejection in 
Opinion 2008-5 of the imputation advice given in Opinion 1988-008 is not dealt with in Opinion 
2008-6 and thus apparently remains unmodified.  (Sound confusing?  You betcha!)  Whether or not 
the Supreme Court examines the imputation issue, the difficulty in parsing the two opinions in 
combination is such that the Board might well consider withdrawing both opinions and crafting a 
single opinion that eliminates the confusion and uncertainty inherent in existing Opinions 2008-5 and 
-6. 
Further discussion of the disconnect between Rules 1.10(f) and 1.11 and of these imputed 
disqualification issues appears in section 1.10:600 at “Imputed disqualification of private attorneys 
associated with part-time government attorney.” 
 
1.11:500  Government Lawyer Negotiating for Private Employment 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 11.1(d)(2)(ii) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.11(d)(2)(ii) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  91.4010 
ALI-LGL §  125 
Wolfram §  8.10.3 
Ohio Rule 1.11(d)(2)(ii) provides that: 
 (d) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer 
currently serving as a public officer or employee . . . : 
* * * * 
 (2) shall not . . . 
* * * * 
 (ii) negotiate for private employment with any person 
who is involved as a party or as a lawyer for a party in a matter 
in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, 
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except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other 
adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private 
employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the 
conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b). 
See section 1.12:300. Hazard and Hodes note that the (d)(2)(ii) "is participating" language prohibits 
the government lawyer from seeking "employment from private parties (or listen[ing] to overtures 
from them) while she is actively opposing them. After the opposing relationship has ended, however, 
negotiations are no longer unseemly and accordingly are permitted." 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & 
W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 15.10, at 15-34 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-1) (bracketed 
material added). 
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1.12:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.12 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.12 
 
1.12:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.12 is substantively identical to the Model Rule. 
 
1.12:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.12: DR 9-101(A) & (B), EC 5-21. 
 
1.12:200  Former Judge, Arbitrator, Mediator, or Other Third-Party Neutral 
Representing Client in Same Matter 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.12(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.12(a) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  91:4501 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  9.14-9.18 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Laywer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  9.14-9.18 (1996). 
Central to our notion of justice is that of the neutral decision maker. As a general matter, one who is or 
has been involved in resolving a dispute should not also be a partisan for one of the disputants. This 
concern extends not only to concurrent-role conflicts (serving simultaneously as representative of a 
party and as the decision maker) but also to successive-role conflicts (representing a party in 
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connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated to a significant degree as a decision maker). 
Ohio Rule 1.12(a) addresses the second concern. It provides as follows: 
 Except as stated in division (d) [as to which see section 
1.12:500], a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a 
matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as 
a judge or other adjudicative officer or law clerk to such person or as an 
arbitrator, mediator, or other third-party neutral, unless all parties to the 
proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
As noted in Comment [1], this provision parallels that for government officers and employees in Ohio 
Rule 1.11(a). Also, as noted in ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 204 (7th ed. 
2011) (commentary), court rules may be applicable and can be more restrictive in terms of 
limitations imposed upon former law clerks. For example, they typically apply to law clerks 
irrespective of whether the clerk was "personally and substantially" involved in a particular matter. 
See 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 16.3 (3d ed. Supp. 
2005-1). 
In applying the Rule one must identify (1) the nature of the role the lawyer played as a decision maker, 
(2) the degree of the lawyer's involvement in the matter when serving in the decision-making role, (3) 
whether the current representation and the former activity involve the same matter, (4) the nature of 
the lawyer's current position, and (5) whether appropriate consent has been obtained when required. 
The nature of the role the lawyer played as a decision maker: Ohio Rule 1.12(a) applies to a wide 
variety of decision makers -- judges, other adjudicative officers, law clerks and third-party neutrals, 
including arbitrators and mediators. 
Comment [1] to the Rule points out that the phrase "adjudicative officers" includes "such officials as 
judges pro tempore, magistrates, special masters, hearing officers, . . . other parajudicial officers . . . 
[and] part-time judges. Ohio Rule 1.12 cmt. [1]. 
The extension of the Rule to third-party neutrals codifies the aspirational goal contained in former 
OH EC 5-21. See Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.12. 
The application of Rule 1.12, as it applies to neutrals serving as mediators in divorce meditation, was 
considered in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2009-4, 2009 Ohio Griev. & 
Discip. LEXIS 4 (June 12, 2009). In its opinion the Board concluded that while such mediators are 
precluded by Rule 1.7(c) from representing both parties in proceedings subsequent to the mediation, a 
mediator could represent one of the parties in such proceedings if informed consent, confirmed in 
writing, is obtained from both parties to the mediation.  
The Board also noted two additional constraints on this practice, the first applicable to all those 
mediating divorce matters, and the latter only to those who do so as judicial employees. Rule 1.12(b) 
prohibits the mediator from negotiating with the parties for this post-mediation representation until 
the mediation is concluded. Because of statutory constraints, if the mediator is a judicial employee 
any such post-mediation representation cannot take place until a year after the mediator leaves public 
employment. 
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With respect to law clerks, the Rule phrasing is somewhat ambiguous. It clearly covers law clerks for 
a judge or other adjudicative officer. Were a third-party neutral to employ a law clerk, the spirit of the 
Rule should cover that clerk as well, but the text does not do so explicitly. 
Finally, the premise of the Rule is to help maintain neutrality of the nonpartisan decision-maker. But 
in some situations arbitrators are not meant to be neutral; they are selected to be partisan. Ohio Rule 
1.12(d) expressly provides that such arbitrators fall outside the 1.12(a) prohibition. See section 
1.12:500. 
The degree of the lawyer's involvement in the matter when serving in the decision-making role: As is 
the case with Ohio Rule 1.11(a)(2), the operative words are participation "personally and 
substantially" as a judge or other adjudicative officer, law clerk, or third-party neutral. Ohio Rule 
1.12(a). This is a test similar to that imposed by the analogous former disciplinary rule. Under the 
OHCPR, the private employment restrictions applied to matters "upon the merits of which" the 
lawyer "acted in a judicial capacity." OH DR 9-101(A). As noted in ABA, Annotated Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct 205, 206 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary), "[p]articipation on the merits or in 
settlement discussions is considered personal and substantial. . . . Nominal or ministerial 
responsibility [, however,] is not considered personal and substantial." (See, e.g., under former OH 
DR 9-101(A), Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Christ, 74 Ohio St.3d 308, 658 N.E.2d 746 (1996); 
Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2006-6, 2006 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4, at 
*7 (June 9, 2006) ("When an attorney serving as a CSEA administrative hearing officer participates 
in a matter, renders a determination, or issues an administrative order, he or she is considered to 
have . . . acted on the merits.").) The nominal or ministerial responsibility distinction is clearly 
contemplated under the Ohio Rules. Particularly pertinent are the examples in Ohio Rule 1.12 cmt. 
[1]. 
As the comment makes clear, a former judge on a multimember court now in private practice may 
represent a client in a matter pending before that court if the former judge did not participate in that 
matter. Moreover, a former judge is not precluded from acting in a matter on behalf of a client where 
the judge's involvement was merely incidental or remote administrative responsibility not affecting 
the merits. Pursuant to divisions (B)(2) and (C)(2) of the Compliance provisions of the Ohio Code of 
Judicial Conduct (OH CJC), part-time judges and judges pro tempore may not act as a lawyer in any 
proceeding in which he or she had acted as judge or in any "related" proceeding. According to 
Comment [1], these OH CJC provisions, although phrased differently, "correspond in meaning" to 
Rule 1.12(a). Ohio Rule 1.12 cmt. [1]. (The references in Comment [1] to divisions (B) and (C) of 
the Compliance provisions of the old CJC correspond to Application, Parts III and V, of the revised 
CJC, effective March 1, 2009. Presumably the cross-references will be updated in the future.) 
Whether the current representation and the former activity involve the same matter: Ohio Rule 1.12 
does not contain a definition of "matter"; Ohio Rule 1.11(e) (identical to MR 1.11(e)) defines the 
term "[a]s used in this rule." Despite this limitation, Comment [1] is consistent with our suspicion that 
the intent was to have the 1.11(e) definition -- at least insofar as it includes "any judicial or other 
[adjudicative and third-party neutral] proceeding" -- apply in 1.12 as well: "This rule generally 
parallels Rule 1.11." Ohio Rule 1.12 cmt. [1]. Hazard and Hodes' take on this issue is puzzling to say 
the least. According to them, "there is no need for a special definition of what constitutes a 'matter,' as 
there is in Rule 1.11(e)," "because judges customarily are involved in deciding a series of discrete 
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'matters' that appear on their dockets, . . . rather than the potpourri of more broadly based policy issues 
typically facing other public officials." So far so good. But they then conclude that "[i]n any event, if 
that definition were made applicable to Rule 1.12, it would lead to the somewhat redundant result that 
virtually every matter a judge handled [subject, of course, to the "personally and substantially" 
requirement] would be within the scope of the ban." 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William 
Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  16.3, at 16-6 & 16-7 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-1) (bracketed material 
added). Isn't this "somewhat redundant result" precisely what Rule 1.12(a) calls for? 
The "same matter" test of Rule 1.12 is the mirror image of both OH CJC Rule 2.11(A)(7)(a) and 28 
USC §  455 (2000), pursuant to which Ohio and federal judges must disqualify themselves from a 
proceeding if they served as a lawyer "in the matter in controversy." 
The nature of the lawyer's current position: Pursuant to Ohio Rule 1.12(a), the employment 
prohibited is representation of "anyone" in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and 
substantially as an adjudicative officer, law clerk, or third-party neutral, in the absence of informed, 
written consent by all parties to the proceeding. (So far as we have been able to determine, the use of 
"anyone," rather than "client" (as in 1.11(a)), has not been explained or discussed. Hazard and Hodes 
italicize the word but make no comment on it. 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The 
Law of Lawyering §  16.3, at 16-6 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-1)). While Rule 1.12 is entitled "former" 
judges, etc., the prohibition by its terms does not seem to distinguish between preventing such 
representation by a sitting adjudicative officer or third-party neutral, and preventing representation by 
such persons after they have left the bench or a third-party neutral position. Precedent under the 
former OHCPR is in accord. See Ohio State Bar Ass'n. v. Gibson, 55 Ohio St.2d 99, 377 N.E.2d 
751 (1978); Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-5, 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 6 (Oct. 5, 2001) (reading former OH DR 9-101(B) as applied to court-employed mediator as 
if it read "has" substantial responsibility while he "is" public employee). 
A case raising questions related to, but not covered by Rule 1.12 (or the then-applicable OHCPR), is 
Goodman, Weiss, Miller, LLP v. Wright, 104 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2004 Ohio 6675, 819 N.E.2d 298. 
In Goodman Weiss, the relator sought a writ of prohibition to preclude respondent, a retired Supreme 
Court justice who on a number of occasions sits as a visiting intermediate appellate judge pursuant to 
assignment by the Chief Justice, from acting as an expert witness for plaintiffs in a malpractice case 
against Goodman Weiss. Although none of the cases in which Judge Wright had sat or was sitting 
were related in any way to the malpractice case at bar, Goodman Weiss argued that such a practice 
violated various Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, including Canon 2, prohibiting a judge from 
engaging in business or financial dealings perceived to exploit his or her judicial position. While this 
allegation raised some interesting questions (cf. Bd. of Comm'rs Op. 98-12, 1998 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 15 (Dec. 4, 1998)), the Supreme Court granted the motions to dismiss the writ 
without opinion. 
Whether appropriate consent has been obtained when required: If the prohibition in Ohio Rule 1.12(a) 
is triggered, representation is still permissible if "all parties to the proceeding give informed consent, 
confirmed in writing." For the requirements to secure informed consent and confirmation in writing, 
see Ohio Rule 1.0(f) & (b). Note also that Rule 1.12 does not state a time period within which the 
informed consent and written confirmation must be provided. 
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From the Rule's language, it is not entirely clear who must consent. Hazard and Hodes provide an 
answer that makes sense - since the issue arises with respect to representation in the same "matter" as 
that in which the lawyer had participated as a judge, other adjudicative officer, or third-party neutral, 
the "parties" from whom consent is required will most likely be the same as well: 
 The parties who were involved in the earlier matter were on the 
scene and know how the judge conducted their dispute; thus, they stand 
as good representatives of the public in assessing whether those 
suspicions [of possible impropriety] can be allayed in any particular 
case. Accordingly, their ability to lift the bar carries the analogy to Rule 
1.11 a step further: it is as if the parties to the dispute constitute the 
former "government agency" that "employed the judge to adjudicate 
their specific dispute. 
1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  16.3, at 16-6 (3d ed. 
Supp. 2005-1) (bracketed material added). See also id. at 16-13, citing in footnote a Pennsylvania 
Ethics Opinion in which a prosecutor, formerly a law clerk for a judge on the same murder case, had 
to obtain consent from all parties to the defendant's appeals of his convictions, before the prosecutor 
could sign the brief in opposition to the appeals. In those instances in which there might be different 
or additional parties in the subsequent proceeding, their consent should be obtained as well. 
See also Ohio State Bar Ass'n Informal Ops. 82-2 (Aug. 3, 1982) and 75-16 (Oct. 29, 1975), 
opining that a divorce mediator could represent a party post-mediation to finalize the divorce or 
dissolution on certain conditions, one of which was the consent of both parties to the representation 
after each had the opportunity to consult independent counsel. This condition would bring the result 
within the ambit of Ohio Rule 1.12(a), so long as the informed consent was confirmed in writing. 
Confidentiality and service as a judge, adjudicative officer, third-party neutral or law clerk: The Rule 
itself is silent on duties of confidentiality arising out of playing a judicial, adjudicatory, clerk or 
third-party neutral role. Because the lawyer is not representing a client in those roles, Ohio Rule 1.6 
does not apply. Other sources of law, however, such as those pertaining to third-party neutrals, do 
impose confidentiality requirements. See Ohio Rule 1.12 cmt. [3]; ORC 2317.02(H). (According to 
the technical amendments made to the Rules on January 31, 2007, the Ohio Code Comparison to 
Rule 1.12 was revised to delete the reference to ORC 2317.02(H) because it had been repealed prior 
to the effective date of the Rules.  Try as we might, we can find no indication that 2317.02(H) has 
been repealed. Nor, apparently, can Baldwin's or Page's; both include ORC 2317.02(H) in their 2007 
Supplements, as do LEXIS and Westlaw on their Ohio Revised Code websites.) 
 
1.12:300  Negotiating for Future Employment 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.12(b) 
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Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.12(b) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  91:4010 
ALI-LGL §  125 
Wolfram §  8.10.3 
The Ohio Rule on this matter states as follows: 
 A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person 
who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which 
the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or 
other adjudicative officer or as an arbitrator, mediator or other 
third-party neutral. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge or other 
adjudicative officer may negotiate for employment with a party or 
lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating 
personally or substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the 
judge or other adjudicative officer. 
Ohio Rule 1.12(b). The ban of Rule 1.12(b) on adjudicative officers or third-party neutrals (like the 
ban on government officers and employees in Rule 1.11(d)(2(ii)) applies to matters in which the 
officer or neutral "is" participating; it does not apply with respect to completed matters. The point is 
confirmed by Comment [6], which states that the Rule 1.12(b) prohibition concerns a matter in which 
the lawyer "is presently acting as an adjudicative officer or neutral, during the time that the lawyer has 
that role"; the prohibition does not apply "where the lawyer's role has completely ended. Thus, a 
lawyer who, while acting as an independent mediator, attempted to settle a matter that remains 
pending is not prohibited from negotiating for employment with one of the parties or one of the 
lawyers in the matter after the mediation has concluded but while the case is still pending." Ohio Rule 
1.12 cmt. [6]. And, as Hazard and Hodes note, the rule is further relaxed for law clerks, because 
everyone understands that clerks, typically hired for a limited period of a year or two, are "always 'on 
the market.'" 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 16.5, at 
16-12 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-1). 
 
1.12:400  Screening to Prevent Imputed Disqualification 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.12(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.12(c) 
640
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.12 
 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  91:4503 
Wolfram §  7.6.4 
Ohio Rule 1.12(c)(1) expressly provides for "timely" screening of a lawyer disqualified under 1.12(a) 
so that members of his or her firm are not precluded from representation in a matter in which the 
disqualified lawyer participated personally and substantially. For a definition of screening, see Ohio 
Rule 1.0(l). Details on proper screening are discussed in Rule 1.0 cmts. [9] & [10] and in section 
1.10:300. Pursuant to this subdivision, the disqualified lawyer must also be apportioned no part of the 
fee from the matter. Rule 1.12(c)(2) further requires that written notice must "promptly" be given to 
the parties and any appropriate tribunal to enable them to ascertain compliance with the Rule. Consent 
is not required. To be prompt, notice generally should be given "as soon as practicable after the need 
for notice becomes apparent." However, if giving such notice would likely substantially injure a 
current client, reasonable delay in providing notice is permissible. Ohio Rule 1.12 cmt. [5]. 
 
1.12:500  Partisan Arbitrators Selected by Parties to Dispute 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.12(d) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.12(d) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.114-5.116 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.114-5.116 (1996). 
The general rule stated in Ohio Rule 1.12(a), barring subsequent representation in a matter in which 
the lawyer participated personally and substantially as an arbitrator, mediator, or other third-party 
neutral, has a limited exception in Ohio Rule 1.12(d). That subdivision provides that an "arbitrator 
selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from 
subsequently representing that party." (Emphasis added.) Nonpartisans on the panel, typically 
selected by the partisans chosen by each side, do not come within the division (d) exemption and Rule 
1.12 applies "with full force" to them. 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. Williams Hodes, The Law 
of Lawyering §  16.6, at 16-12 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-1). As noted in section 1.12:200, however, that 
“full force” contains an exception when all parties to the proceeding give their informed consent 
confirmed in writing. 
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1.13:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.13 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.13 
 
1.13:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.13 differs from the Model Rule in the following respects: 
In division (a), Ohio has deleted “duly authorized” prior to “constituents” in the first sentence. Two 
new sentences have been added: the first stating that a lawyer for an organization owes allegiance to 
the organization, not to its constituents or others connected with the organization. The second states 
that constituents “include its owners and its duly authorized officers, directors, trustees, and 
employees.” 
In division (b), first sentence, the following changes have been made: “or reasonably should know” 
has been added after “knows”. The words “an officer, employee or other person associated with the 
organization is engaged in” have been deleted following “reasonably should know that” and in their 
place the words “its constituent’s” have been substituted; “intended action” has been substituted for 
“intends to act”; “refusal” has been substituted for “refuses”; “in a matter related to the representation 
that is a violation of” has been deleted and in its stead “(1) violates” has been substituted; “(2) is” has 
been added prior to “a violation of law”; and the word “reasonably” has been deleted prior to 
“necessary”. The second sentence of MR 1.13(b) has been deleted in its entirety and in its place a new 
sentence has been inserted; it states: “When it is necessary to enable the organization to address the 
matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority, 
including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the 
organization under applicable law.” 
Paragraphs (d) and (e) of the Model Rule have been deleted in their entirety. 
Division (c) states that the “discretion or duty of a lawyer for an organization to reveal information 
relating to the representation outside the organization is governed by Rule 1.6(b) and (c).” In contrast, 
MR 1.13(c) provides that in certain specified circumstances a lawyer “may reveal information 
relating to the representation, whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.” 
Division (d) is identical to Model Rule paragraph (f). 
Division (e) is identical to Model Rule paragraph (g), except that the word “written” has been added 
before “consent” in the second sentence. 
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1.13:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.13: EC 5-19. 
 
1.13:200  Entity as Client 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.13(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.13(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.96, 5.113 
Guttenberg & Snyder, The Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  4.2(A) 
Becker, Guttenberg & Snyder, The Law of Professional Conduct in Ohio § 1.07[2] 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  91:2001 
ALI-LGL §§  96-97 
Wolfram §  8.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.96 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.13(a) states the generally recognized rule that a “lawyer employed or retained by an 
organization represents the organization acting through its constituents,” and owes allegiance to the 
organization, not its constituents, who “include its owners and its duly authorized officers, directors, 
trustees, and employees.” (The Supreme Court acknowledged these principles and cited to 1.13(a) in 
deciding the malpractice case of New Destiny Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Wheeler, 129 Ohio St.3d 39, 
2011 Ohio 2266, 950 N.E.2d 157, discussed in section 1.1:300.) The reference to lawyers 
“employed” makes 1.13 applicable to in-house lawyers, as well as to retained outside lawyers. See 
ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 213 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) 
(“employed or retained”). 
The comments make clear that the duties imposed by Rule 1.13 apply to unincorporated associations 
as well as corporations and that “[o]ther constituents” refers to those in organizations other than 
corporations holding positions equivalent to corporate officers, directors, employees and 
shareholders. Rule 1.13 cmt.[1]. Comment [2] states that, with respect to communications to the 
organization’s lawyer by a constituent in that person’s organizational capacity, “the lawyer must keep 
the communication confidential as to persons other than the organizational client as required by Rule. 
1.6.” This does not mean that the constituent is a client of the lawyer. Rule 1.13 cmt. [2]. 
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One by-product of the entity-as-client rule is that corporate counsel cannot assert blanket 
representation of a corporation and all of its current and former employees. See ABA, Annotated 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 219 (5th ed. 2003) (commentary). An attempt to do so 
under the OHCPR was labeled “inappropriate” “bluster” in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2005-3, 2005 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3, at *4 (Feb. 4, 2005). See sections 
4.2:210 and 4.3:200 for further discussion of the applicability of the anti-contact rule in the 
organizational setting. 
Similar to Rule 1.13(a), former OH EC 5-19 stated that a lawyer who was counsel to a corporation or 
similar entity owed allegiance to the entity and not to any of its individual constituents, such as 
directors, officers, or shareholders. The court in Hile v. Firman, Sprague & Huffman Co., L.P.A., 
71 Ohio App.3d 838, 595 N.E.2d 1023 (Hancock 1991), quoted OH EC 5-19 in the course of 
holding that the lawyers for the corporation during bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings were not 
liable to the corporate directors for alleged negligent failure to advise the directors of their potential 
personal responsibility under Ohio law (ORC 5739.33) for sales taxes owed by the corporation in the 
event of nonpayment by a dissolved corporation. For such liability to attach, there must be an 
attorney-client relationship between the directors and corporate counsel or the directors must be in 
privity with the corporation. Neither circumstance was present in Hile. See also discussion at sections 
1.1:410 and 1.7:340. 
And former OH EC 5-25 also reminded that a lawyer, when serving as counsel for a business 
corporation in which nonlawyer directors and officers make the business decisions, must decline to 
accept direction from such laypersons with respect to the exercise of his or her professional judgment. 
It went on to recommend a written agreement that defines the relationship between the lawyer and the 
organization and that provides for the lawyer’s independence. The ethical consideration elaborated on 
the concept of independence in the context of a lawyer for a legal-aid office -- a lawyer should not 
accept such employment unless the legal-aid board set broad policies only and did not interfere with 
the lawyer and the individual client served. This separation of business and legal decision-making 
noted in EC 5-25 is echoed, in the context of application of Rule 1.13(b), by Comment [3], which 
emphasizes that in the normal course business decisions made by constituents of the entity “must be 
accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and 
operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer’s province.” Ohio Rule 
1.13 cmt. [3]. 
Although the entity is the client to which the lawyer owes the duty of loyalty, the entity “cannot act 
except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders, and other constituents.” Ohio Rule 
1.13 cmt. [1]. See Jack A. Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of Professional 
Responsibility in Ohio §  4.2(A) (1992): 
A corporation has many voices, all potentially claiming to articulate the 
true corporate desire. These people or groups claiming to speak for the 
corporation are the ones who interact with the corporate attorney. 
There is no clear consensus among commentators about which party 
speaks for the corporation. Commentators and corporate practitioners 
have asserted that a lawyer owes his loyalty to the shareholders, the 
board of directors, or management. 
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Id. at 96 (footnotes omitted). Most corporate attorneys view management as their client, id. at 96 
n.16 (citing Eric Paul Sloter & Anita Mae Sorenson, Corporate Legal Ethics -- An Empirical 
Study: The Model Rules, The Code of Professional Responsibility and Counsel’s Continuing 
Struggle Between Theory and Practice, 8 J. Corp. L. 601, 686 n.509 (1983)). Guttenberg and 
Snyder find the formulation in what is now 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§  96(1)(a) & (b) (2000), a bit more helpful: 
an attorney employed or retained by a corporation represents the 
interests of the corporation as “defined by its responsible agents acting 
pursuant to the organization’s decision-making procedures; and . . . the 
lawyer must follow instructions in the representation . . . , given by 
persons authorized so to act on behalf of the organization.” 
Guttenberg & Snyder (1998 Supp. at 21) (ellipses included, as quoted). This is generally consistent 
with Rule 1.13(a) (constituents include its “duly authorized” officers, directors, trustees, and 
employees). The fact remains that, whoever it is that speaks for the organizational client, a lawyer 
representing the entity does not, without more, represent any of the entity’s constituencies, and the 
attorney representing only the organization does not owe a duty of care, diligence, or confidentiality 
to any of its constituents, including the board or management. Rule 1.13(a). See Guttenberg & 
Snyder (1998 Supp. 21-22) (citing what is now 2 Restatement (Third) The Law Governing 
Lawyers §  95 cmt. b (2000) and the Hile case, discussed above). Client identity problems may be 
particularly acute in the close corporation context. Guttenberg & Snyder §  4.2(A)(1), at 98; see 
ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 214-15 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). See, 
e.g., Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 96-2 (n.d.), where, in a dispute regarding share reallocation between the 
two original 50% shareholders, it was opined that the corporation’s lawyer, asserting that he 
represented the prospective majority shareholders in the transaction, cannot do so: “Since the client 
here is the corporate entity, the attorney should not represent either of the parties in a transaction 
between them.” Id. at 1. Further as to close corporations, see 1.13:400. 
Two cases under the former OHCPR explore confidentiality and/or privilege issues arising from the 
who-is-the-client question. In Shaffer v. OhioHealth Corp., 2004 Ohio 63, 2004 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 15 (Franklin), Shaffer, a former COO, sued his former company for wrongful termination. 
Prior to termination, and in his capacity as a corporate officer, Shaffer had sought the opinion of 
counsel for the company regarding the legality of proposed corporate contracts. Shaffer retained 
copies of these opinions and communications by counsel, and in the lawsuit the corporation sought a 
protective order with respect to these documents. Noting that ORC 2317.021 “acknowledges that 
corporations or companies, as legal entities, can only communicate with counsel through their 
employees or agents,” id. at para. 10, the court of appeals concluded that 
it can safely be said that, in cases where a corporation, partnership, or 
other collective entity is the client, the attorney-client privilege belongs 
to the company and not to its employees outside of their employment 
capacity. . . . Current corporate executives and managers, if endowed 
with appropriate authority by their employer, may on behalf of the 
corporation either assert or waive the attorney-client privilege. That 
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authority, however, ends with the termination of employment or other 
revocation of authority. . . . 
 We accordingly find that the trial court erred when it held that, 
as a matter of law, the attorney-client privilege did not extend to 
documents and communications in the possession of appellee and 
obtained during his employment with Ohio Health Group, where these 
materials were provided by company legal counsel, the company was 
the legal client, and appellee received such communications or 
documents in his capacity as an employee of the company. 
Id. at paras. 10-11 (citations omitted). 
The second case is Stuffleben v. Cowden, 2003 Ohio 6334, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 5676 
(Cuyahoga). Stuffleben was a legal malpractice action brought by a former majority shareholder in a 
company known as TSI. The defendant lawyers admitted to representing TSI, but denied ever having 
represented Stuffleben. Stuffleben sought the lawyers’ files relating to the corporate representation; 
the law firm objected, claiming privilege, work product, and confidentiality. Since the trial court 
ordered production of the files based on what the putative client believed, without examining the 
reasonableness of that position, the court of appeals reversed. Moreover, 
Stuffleben’s argument that he is entitled to the documents requested 
because his interests are indistinguishable with [sic] the corporations 
[sic] contradicts basic corporate law. . . . 
 Ohio law has consistently held that “an attorney’s 
representation does not make that attorney counsel to the corporate 
officers as individuals.” . . . [citing, inter alia, former OH EC 5-19]. 
id. at paras. 25, 26. The court further rejected Stuffleben’s argument that the privilege “automatically 
arises between corporate counsel and the officers of the corporations in the context of closely-held 
corporations.” Id. at para. 29. In distinguishing the close-corporation cases cited by appellee, the 
court noted that those cases were all disqualification cases, not privilege cases: 
In the context of asserting a right to privileged information, especially 
when its assertion may be adverse to another who undoubtedly holds 
the privilege, i.e., the corporation, we refuse to extend the general 
holdings applicable to disqualification of counsel to the instant case. 
Rather we hold the trial court must narrowly construe the test for 
attorney-client privilege and apply it throughout the course of the 
alleged representation to determine whether Stuffleben is entitled to the 
requested discovery. 
Id. at para. 30. 
647
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.13 
  
For further discussion of confidentiality concerns arising from the who-is-the-client issue, see Susan 
J. Becker, Jack A. Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of Professional Conduct in Ohio 
§ 7.03 (2009-10 ed.); see also section 1.6:510 regarding corporate waiver of attorney-client privilege. 
 
1.13:210  Lawyer with Fiduciary Obligation to Third Person 
See discussion of fiduciary obligations of lawyers serving as corporate directors or as other trustees in 
section 1.13:220. The general rule is set forth in 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers §  135 (2000). 
For discussion of the tangled state of affairs in Ohio regarding a lawyer representing a limited 
partnership’s general partner (who has fiduciary duties to the limited partners), see section 1.13:520 
below. 
 
1.13:220  Lawyer Serving as Officer or Director of an Organization 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.113 (1996). 
There is no per se ethics prohibition against a lawyer serving as both a lawyer for an organization and 
as an officer or director of the organization. E.g., 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers §  135 cmt. d (2000). This is true whether the entity is publicly or closely held. See ABA 
Formal Op. 98-410, at 3 n. 4 (Feb. 27, 1998) (noting other risks that may be posed by dual 
relationship, “especially in the case of public companies”). Analogous to the lawyer/director, a 
lawyer at times both serves as a trustee or an organization and also provides the organization legal 
representation. As is the case with the lawyer/director, while conflicts may arise from performing 
these dual roles, it is not necessarily improper to do so.  Kohn v. Mayflower Condominium Ass’n, 
No. 39213, 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 9379 (Cuyahoga May 17, 1979). 
While there is no per se prohibition, playing such a dual role is fraught with conflict-of-interest 
concerns. They are addressed in Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. [19]; see section 1.7:340. Regarding the lawyer 
for the corporation also serving as officer or director, see 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William 
Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  17.5 n.3, at 17-63 (3d ed. Supp. 2004-2); Restatement §  135 
cmt. d; Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  8.3.3 (1986). Although, the dual role 
generally is not forbidden, if the lawyer is unable to exercise independent professional judgment or if 
the obligations or interests of the lawyer as director are adverse to those as corporate counsel, the 
lawyer may not serve as counsel without the corporation’s informed consent. See Ohio Rule 1.7 cmt. 
[19]; Restatement §  135 cmt. d. Serving in both capacities also may in certain circumstances 
compromise the lawyer’s ability to assure his corporate client that its communications with counsel 
are privileged. Rule 1.7 cmt. [19]; Restatement §  135, reporter’s note to comment d. See also 
Craig C. Albert, The Lawyer-Director: An Oxymoron?, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 413 (1996) 
(recognizing the problems, but concluding that an ethical ban on a lawyer serving as director would 
be inadvisable); Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Advisee, The Public Interest, 
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and Professional Ethics, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 423, 491 (1978) (noting that management often views 
lawyer who serves on board as “inside” director, with mere appearance of independence). 
The Board of Commissioners in Opinion 2008-2 weighed in on this subject with the following 
cautionary words: 
 A lawyer’s service on a board of directors of a corporation is 
fraught with potential conflicts of interest, but such service is not 
barred by the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.  Some lawyers serve 
in the dual role as corporate director and corporate counsel, while some 
lawyers serve as corporate director but not as corporate counsel. 
 Serving in a dual role as a corporate director and corporate 
counsel is cautioned because of the ethical challenges:  conflicts of 
interest calling into question the lawyer’s professional independence; 
confusion among other directors and management as to whether a 
lawyer’s views are legal advice or business suggestions; and concerns 
regarding protection of the confidentiality of client information, 
especially the attorney-client privilege.  See ABA Formal Opinion 
98-410 (1998).  A common example of a conflict of interest calling into 
question a lawyer’s independent judgment would be if a lawyer 
director is called upon to advise the corporation in matters involving 
the actions of the directors. 
 But, serving as a corporate director and not as corporate counsel 
also raises ethical concerns.  For instance, conflicts of interest may 
arise between the lawyer’s duties as corporate directors and the 
lawyer’s duties in representation of clients.  Directors and management 
may rely on the views of the lawyer as legal advice rather than business 
advice, even though the lawyer is not serving as corporate counsel.  
Concerns may arise regarding protection of confidential and privileged 
information particularly if other directors and managers look to the 
lawyer director for legal advice or if the lawyer director voluntarily or 
inadvertently offers legal advice as well as business advice or if the line 
between the lawyer director’s business advice and legal advice is so 
fine that it cannot be parsed as one or the other. 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-2, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 
(June 6, 2008), at *2-4. 
In Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1963), aff’d per 
curiam sub nom. Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Union Stock Yard Co., 337 
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1964), the district court permitted, in a shareholder derivative action, the law firm 
that had traditionally represented the defendant corporation to represent both the corporation and the 
individual defendant-directors, even though one of those defendant-directors was a name partner in 
the firm. Neither the court nor the opposition raised any question about the lawyer’s dual role as a 
director having fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders; the argument was whether in the 
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derivative action the firm could represent both the corporation and the directors as defendants. See 
section 1.13:510. In affirming, the court of appeals likewise had nothing to say concerning the 
lawyer/director issue. See also section 1.13:520 for discussion of this case. 
Although the corporation in Selama-Dindings was apparently publicly held, (see 337 F.2d at 949, 
referring to “[s]ubstantial numbers of the local shareholders”), the district court found that directors 
(which would include the lawyer/director) stand in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and to 
the minority shareholders. See discussion at 1.6:650. This conclusion is in accord with numerous 
Ohio court decisions referring to the status of a corporate officer, director, or controlling shareholder 
as that of a fiduciary or trustee, irrespective of whether the entity is closely held or not. E.g., Crosby 
v. Beam, 47 Ohio St.3d 105, 108, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (1989) (suit against 
officers/directors/controlling shareholders; fiduciary duty is “heightened” in close corporation 
context); Tinter v. Lucik, 172 Ohio App.3d 692, 2007 Ohio 4437, 876 N.E.2d 1026 (Cuyahoga) 
(close corporation case; fiduciary duty between shareholders, “particularly between majority and 
minority shareholders,” id. at para. 23, citing Crosby); see Tablack v. Wellman, 2006 Ohio 4688, 
2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4609 (Mahoning) (close corporation; recognizing Crosby heightened 
fiduciary duty rule, but finding it inapplicable on facts presented). This fiduciary status of the 
officer/director to others in the organization is an important consideration in assessing conflict issues 
arising from an entity’s counsel serving on the board or as an officer. 
The Crosby “heightened-duty” rule was also cited with approval in the course of denying judgment 
on the pleadings to the individual officers or board of managers of a firm-wide partnership, who, in 
response to the defendants’ counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty, had argued that their duties ran 
only to the partnership, not to the defendant/former lawyer/shareholder/employees of one of the 
firm’s offices. Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P. v. Bonasera, 157 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 
2010 Ohio 1677, 926 N.E.2d 375 (C.P. Franklin). 
Another problematic situation is posed when a lawyer, whether or not counsel to the entity, seeks to 
represent a client with interests adverse to those of the entity for which the lawyer serves as a trustee. 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n Formal Op. 31 (Nov. 26, 1979) addressed the role conflict that arises when a 
lawyer, who serves on the board of trustees of a university, is asked to represent someone in litigation 
involving the organization the board oversees. The opinion concluded that a lawyer/member of a 
university board of trustees could not represent an individual in a criminal proceeding involving 
university personnel or property (for example, a student accused of theft of university property or 
assault upon a university security guard), because it would violate former OH DR 5-101(A) and OH 
DR 5-105(A) & (D). Without explicitly saying so, the bar association apparently considered the 
lawyer to be acting in a legal rather than a purely personal capacity when acting as a trustee and, 
therefore, the proposed representation would create a conflict among current clients. If the opinion 
considered the lawyer as serving solely in a personal capacity, a conflict still might have been present, 
but it would have been a conflict with the lawyer’s personal interests, not the interests of a competing 
client. 
The latest word on this situation – and producing an answer different from that in Formal Opinion 31 – 
is Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-2, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 
(June 6, 2008).  The Board opined on whether a corporate board member who was not counsel for the 
entity could represent a client suing the corporation.  Not surprisingly, the answer was that he could 
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not, because he has a material limitation conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a)(2).  But the Board goes 
further and concludes that the conflict is not waivable “because the client and the corporation are 
directly adverse in the same proceeding” pursuant to 1.7(c)(2).  Id. at *12.  Even though “[t]he 
corporation is not technically a client of a lawyer director who is not corporate counsel, . . . a lawyer 
director cannot isolate the fiduciary duties owed to the corporation from his professional duties as a 
lawyer.”  Id.  Said another way, despite the fact that the entity is not a client of the director, the Board 
nevertheless treats it as one for purposes of application of Rule 1.7(c)(2).  See further discussion of 
Opinion 2008-2 in section 1.7:240 at “Nonconsentable conflicts - In general” and section 1.10:500. 
A similar problem may arise when a lawyer serves on the board of trustees of a legal-services 
organization. In this context, the lawyer’s duty to his private clients may conflict with the interests of 
the clients of the legal-services organization. On the one hand, any potential conflict of interest is 
somewhat remote because trustees play no role in the day-to-day client decisions, but only set broad 
policy for the organization. On the other hand, such a position may allow the trustees to place subtle 
pressures on staff attorneys handling cases. In a 1978 opinion, the Ohio State Bar Association 
concluded that this was sufficient to trigger a DR 5-105 conflict, although under appropriate 
circumstances it could be cured by effective disclosure to and consent by the private and legal 
services clients. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 78-8 (Oct. 30, 1978). See generally 2 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  135 cmt. e (2000). Ohio has not adopted 
MR 6.3, which deals with this topic, or its equivalent. The issue is to be treated, instead, under the 
basic conflicts rules, including Ohio Rule 1.7(a). See Ohio Rule 6.3, Note. 
 
1.13:230  Divers Kinds of Entities as Organizations 
Former OH EC 5-19 spoke to representation of “a corporation or similar entity.” The Ohio Supreme 
Court expressly determined that this provision did not extend to partnerships in Arpadi v. First MSP 
Corp., 68 Ohio St.3d 453, 628 N.E.2d 1335 (1994) (limited partnership is not entity “similar” to 
corporation because partnership is aggregate of individuals, not separate legal entity). In that context, 
“the duty owed by an attorney to a partnership extends to the individual partners thereof,”  id. at 458, 
628 N.E.2d at 1339, and abuse of that duty can give rise to malpractice liability to the partners. 
It is unlikely that the Arpadi no-entity rule survives under the Rules. The operative word now is 
“organization,” not “corporation or similar entity,” and it is clear from the comments that 
“unincorporated associations,” such as a partnership, are organizations for Rule 1.13 purposes. See 
Ohio Rule 1.13 cmt. [1] (“[t]he duties defined in this rule apply equally to unincorporated 
associations”). Accord ABA Formal Op. 91-361 (July 12, 1991) (partnership is “organization” 
within meaning of MR 1.13; “a partnership is by definition an unincorporated association,” id. at 2). 
Rule 1.13 cmt. [1], together with an amendment to ORC 1782.08(B) (now 1782.08(C)) (enacted in 
repudiation of this aspect of Arpadi holding and expressly stating that limited partnership is an 
“entity”) and the 2006 enactment of ORC 1775.01(G)(2)(d) (limited or general partnership is an 
“entity”), should be more than sufficient to overcome Arpadi on the partnership/no-entity issue. See 
section 1.1:410 for further discussion of Arpadi, subsequent statutory changes that repudiate various 
aspects of the Arpadi decision (including the no-entity rule), and post-amendment cases dealing with 
the Arpadi entity issue. 
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The court in Sayyah v. Cutrell, 143 Ohio App.3d 102, 757 N.E.2d 779 (Brown 2001), looked to 
former OH EC 5-19 for support for its conclusion that the attorney for an incorporated homeowner’s 
association did not have an attorney-client relationship with the members of the association for 
purposes of a malpractice suit by certain association members against the association’s attorney. 
Since unincorporated associations are “organizations” under 1.13, the Sayyah result with respect to 
incorporated associations is a fortiori good law under the Rule. (On the related inquiry as to whether 
the association members were in privity with the association so as to permit suit by a nonclient (see 
generally section 1.1:410), the court held that the attorney had failed in his OH Civ R 56 obligation to 
present evidence, rather than conclusory assertions, of lack of privity and therefore reversed the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue.) 
 
1.13:300  Preventing Injury to an Entity Client 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.13(b)-(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.13(b)-(c) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  91:2001 
ALI-LGL §  96 
Wolfram §  13.7 
One of the duties a lawyer owes an organizational client is to protect that client when the lawyer 
knows or should know of substantial misconduct by constituents of the organization. In approaching 
this issue one must identify when the duty is triggered and what the duty entails. These matters are 
treated in Ohio Rule 1.13(b). 
In terms of when the duty arises, three factors must be considered. First, the constituent conduct must 
involve either a violation of a legal obligation owed to the organization or a violation that might be 
imputed to the organization. Second, the misconduct must be sufficiently serious -- defined in the 
Rule as conduct “likely to result in substantial injury to the organization.” Third, the lawyer must have 
the requisite knowledge -- here “knows or reasonably should know” -- that the qualifying misconduct 
is intended or has occurred. 
Assuming the duty attaches, the Rule specifies a tiered response. As an overarching standard, the 
lawyer should “proceed as is necessary in the best interest of the organization.” In those 
circumstances in which it is “necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely 
and appropriate manner,” the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority. This duty flows as well 
from the duty of communication. Ohio Rule 1.13 cmt. [3]. How far one is to take the issue up the 
ladder turns on the circumstances. If warranted, the lawyer should take the matter to the “highest 
authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law.” Even if the duty to report up 
the ladder does not attach, the lawyer retains the discretion to do so when matters of “sufficient 
importance” arise and doing so is in the “best interests of the organization.” Ohio Rule 1.13 cmt. [4]. 
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In assessing whether the circumstances warrant reporting up, Ohio Rule 1.13 cmt. [4] suggests that 
the lawyer consider such factors as the seriousness and consequences of the misconduct, the 
motivations and responsibility in the organization of the actor, and the organization’s policies in 
handling such matters. 
It is important to recognize that these provisions are very different from those stated in MR 1.13. 
As stated in the Model Rules Comparison, Ohio has opted for a version of Rule 1.13 that “more 
closely resembles the substance of Model Rule 1.13 as it existed prior to its last revision by the ABA 
in August 2003.” Thus, the Rule requires that the organization’s lawyer communicate to the 
organization matters of material risk of which the lawyer is aware, but “does not include a provision 
of Model Rule 1.13 that imposes a ‘whistle-blowing’ requirement upon lawyers for organizations.” 
Id. (Emphasis added.) As stressed in Ohio Rule 1.13 cmt. [6], “[d]ivision (c) makes clear that a 
lawyer for an organization has the same discretion and obligation to reveal information relating to the 
representation to persons outside the client as any other lawyer, as provided in Rule 1.6(b) and (c) 
(which incorporates Rules 3.3 and 4.1 by reference).” Comment [6] goes on to state that consultation 
with the client in the hope of obviating the need for disclosure, where practicable, is recommended, as 
is giving notice of intent to disclose where consultation is not practicable. The Rule itself simply 
provides that 
 [t]he discretion or duty of a lawyer for an organization to reveal 
information relating to the representation outside the organization is 
governed by Rule 1.6(b) and (c). 
Ohio Rule 1.13(c). Although Comment [6] in its final version deleted language expressly stating that 
“there is no requirement that the lawyer report ‘up-the-ladder’ within the organization before 
revealing information as permitted by Rule 1.6(b) or required by Rule 1.6(c),” it appears that under 
the Ohio Rule up-the-ladder reporting and whistle-blowing still can operate independently of one 
another, unlike MR 1.13 where the whistle-blowing option is available only after failure to get results 
from reporting to higher, and highest, authority within the organization. See MR 1.13(c). Also 
relevant to this issue is language added to Ohio Rule 1.6 cmt. [14] as part of the final 2006 revisions: 
before making a 1.6(b)(1), (2), or (3) discretionary disclosure, “a lawyer for an organization should 
ordinarily bring the issue of taking suitable action” up the ladder. Under this formulation too, 
reporting up is recommended but not a prerequisite to the disclosure permitted by Ohio Rule 1.6(b). 
It should be noted that the subdivisions of Rule 1.6(b) mentioned in Comment [14] that are most 
directly related to Rule 1.13(b) duties are 1.6(b)(2) and (3) – pursuant to which, respectively, the 
lawyer may disclose confidential information if the lawyer reasonably believes it necessary to prevent 
a crime by his entity client (or another person) ((b)(2)), or to mitigate substantial financial injury to 
another (e.g., constituents of the entity or members of the public) resulting from the entity’s 
commission of an illegal or fraudulent act in which the client has used the lawyer’s services ((b)(3)). 
In addition, one must consider Rule 1.6(b)(6), under which the lawyer may disclose information 
relating to the representation in order to comply “with other law or a court order.”  Also, a lawyer has 
the mandatory duty under Rule 3.3(b) to disclose (including, if necessary to remedy the situation, to 
the tribunal) confidential information under Rule 1.6(c) if her entity client, in an adjudicative setting, 
is known by the lawyer to intend to engage, is engaging, or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent 
conduct related to the proceeding. The mandatory duty is likewise applicable with respect to the 
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obligation to disclose a material fact in order to avoid assisting the entity client in an illegal or 
fraudulent act. Rule 4.1(b). 
One other comment is in order concerning the subject of whistle-blowing. Contrary to the Task 
Force’s Model Rule Comparison reference, quoted above, to the Model Rule whistle-blowing 
“requirement,” there is no Model Rule “requirement” -- the disclosure provisions of MR 1.13(c) say 
that the lawyer “may” reveal the information when all internal efforts to cure have been 
unsuccessfully exhausted. In sum, under the Model Rules, whistle-blowing is an option tied to and 
permissible only after failed up-the-ladder reporting; under the Ohio Rule, the two are not necessarily 
tied together and whistle-blowing is optional or mandatory, depending on whether Rule 1.6(b) or (c), 
respectively, applies. 
The duty to take constituent misconduct to higher authority also is worded differently in Ohio than it 
is in the Model Rules. In division (b), not only an Ohio lawyer who knows but also one who 
“reasonably should know” of such conduct is obligated to refer the matter up the ladder “[w]hen it is 
necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner.” Ohio 
Rule 1.13(b). Under the Model Rule, the lawyer must refer the matter up the ladder “[u]nless the 
lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so.” 
MR 1.13(b). See Ohio Rule 1.13 cmts. [3] (noting that “knowledge can be inferred from the 
circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious”), [4] (need to report to higher authority 
depends on “relevant considerations” there set forth and discussed above), & [5] (lawyer “must” refer 
matter to highest authority “if warranted by the circumstances”). 
For a thoughtful analysis of the interplay between the lawyer’s obligations under Rules 1.3 and 1.6 
(and under Sarbanes-Oxley as well), see Robert W. Rapp & Fritz E. Berkenmueller, Business 
Lawyers and New Rules of Conduct, Ohio Law., July/Aug. 2007, at 13. Further as to 
Sarbanes-Oxley, see section 1.13:310. 
For general discussion of these issues, see 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The 
Law of Lawyering §  17.11 (3d ed. Supp. 2004-2); 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers §  96(2)-(3) & cmts. e-f (2000). 
 
1.13:310  Resignation Versus Disclosure Outside the Organization 
This subject is covered by the Model Rules in a provision not adopted in Ohio. Under MR 1.13, as 
amended in 2003, paragraph (c) provides that if the highest authority in the organization “insists upon 
or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner” an act or omission that is “clearly” a violation 
of law, despite the lawyer’s efforts under paragraph (b) (see section 1.13:300), and the lawyer 
believes the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, 
then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial 
injury to the corporation. 
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MR 1.13(c) (emphasis added). As discussed above in section 1.13:300, Ohio’s different 1.13(c) 
disclosure provision apparently is not linked to a failed attempt to rectify by going up the ladder, as is 
the Model Rule’s. See MR 1.13 cmt. [6]. 
MR 1.13(c) constitutes a major change from the prior version, pursuant to which the lawyer’s only 
option under the circumstances presented in paragraph (c), if all else failed, was to resign. Withdrawal 
or resignation (including, presumably, “noisy” withdrawal) remains an option, however. See MR 
1.13(e) & cmt. [8]. MR 1.13(e) further provides that if a lawyer’s withdrawal (or discharge) flows 
from the lawyer’s actions taken pursuant to MR 1.13(b) or (c), the lawyer “shall” proceed as 
necessary to assure that the entity’s highest authority is informed of the discharge or withdrawal. Ohio 
has not adopted this requirement. The permissive disclosure authority contained in MR 1.13(c) bears 
more than a passing likeness to the SEC rules applicable to publicly traded companies under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See this section infra. 
The authority to act under MR 1.13, unlike the comparable authority under MR 1.6(b)(2) and (3), is 
not dependent upon the lawyer’s services having been used in furtherance of the violation, although 
the matter must be related to the lawyer’s representation of the organization. MR 1.13 cmt. [6]. That 
comment also notes that -- unlike Ohio, where disclosure under 1.13(c) is limited to that permitted or 
required by 1.6(b) and (c) -- MR 1.13(c) provides an “additional basis” for disclosure beyond that 
allowed in MR 1.6(b). 
Note further that the permissive disclosure authorized by MR 1.13(c) may be made even if the 
information would otherwise be protected from disclosure by MR 1.6. In contrast, disclosure under 
Ohio Rule 1.13(c) is expressly limited to that permitted or required by Ohio Rule 1.6(b) or (c). 
For example, under Ohio Rule 1.13(c), if an ongoing scheme of criminal fraud by a constituent could 
be imputed to the corporation and the corporation’s lawyer is unsuccessful in getting the scheme shut 
down, with or without reporting up, Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(2) authorizes (but does not compel) the lawyer 
to disclose the necessary information, including information otherwise protected by the 
attorney-client privilege, to the appropriate authorities. See generally section 1.6:350. And, if a 
lawyer representing an organizational client in an adjudicative proceeding learns that the client 
intends to engage, is engaging, or has engaged in fraudulent conduct relating to the proceeding, the 
lawyer would be obligated to take reasonable steps to remedy the situation, including, if necessary, 
disclosure to the tribunal under Ohio Rule 3.3(b) of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. See 
Ohio Rule 1.6(c). While we found no court decisions applying the former OHCPR analog (OH DR 
7-102(B)) where the client was an entity, there are at least two bar association opinions advising that 
the lawyer was obligated to disclose the entity’s fraud. See Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 
87-10 (Sept. 17, 1987); Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 75-8 (June 30, 1975). And cf. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Heffernan, 58 Ohio St.3d 260, 569 N.E.2d 1027 (1991) (lawyer 
disciplined under OH 7-102(B)(1) for failure to disclose past fraud on court by individual client). See 
discussion at section 3.3:610. 
In the wake of Enron and similar fiascos, the legal landscape with respect to these issues was 
significantly altered by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the summer of 2002 (see 15 USC § 
§  7201 et seq. (2002)) and by SEC implementing regulations, which are still in the process of being 
finalized. 
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While this federal regulatory scheme is outside the scope of the subject matter of this treatise, § 307 of 
the Act (15 USC § 7245 (2002)) and implementing regulations thereunder at Part 205 of 17 CFR 
(2007) deal with the professional responsibilities of attorneys appearing before the Commission on 
behalf of an issuer.  A thoughtful overview of a litigator’s duties under Sarbanes-Oxley is found in 
Dan K. Webb & Scott P. Glauberman, Up the Ladder: Litigator Responsibilities under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Litigation, Summer 2004, at 21. 
 
1.13:400  Fairness to Nonclient Constituents Within an Entity Client 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.13(d) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.13(f) 
Ohio Commentary 
Guttenberg & Snyder, The Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  4.2(A)(1) 
Becker, Guttenberg & Snyder, The Law of Professional Conduct in Ohio § 1.07[2] 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  91:2001 
ALI-LGL §  103 
Wolfram §  13.7.5 
Ohio Rule 1.13(d) directs a lawyer for an organization, in dealing with its constituents, to “explain 
the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization’s 
interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.” See Rule 1.13 cmt. 
[10] (in dealing with such a constituent, lawyer should advise constituent of conflict or potential 
conflict, that lawyer cannot represent constituent, that constituent may wish to obtain independent 
representation, and that discussions between lawyer and constituent may not be privileged). 
Guttenberg and Snyder speak to this issue in terms of avoiding inadvertent multiple representation of 
both the entity and one or more of its constituents. See Jack A. Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The 
Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  4.2(A)(1) (1992 & Supp. 1998). Thus, if the lawyer 
does not intend to represent the constituent in addition to the entity in the matter, this must be made 
clear to the constituent. Particularly where the relationship between the lawyer and the constituent is a 
close one, the member may think the entity lawyer is representing him or her as well. If it is not made 
clear that this is not so, an implied attorney-client relationship may be created. Id. at 99 & Supp. at 
22; see Susan J. Becker, Jack A. Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of Professional 
Conduct in Ohio § 1.07[2] (2009-10 ed.); 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The 
Law of Lawyering §  17.13, at 17-52 to 17-53 (3d ed. Supp. 2004-2). 
While there is no state case law on point, a few Ohio federal cases deal with the issue. The guiding 
principle is the reasonable belief of the constituent as to whether he or she is being represented. See 
Berger McGill, Inc. v. Capozzoli (In re Berger McGill, Inc.), 242 B.R. 413 (Bank. S.D. Ohio 
656
Ohio Legal Ethics 1.13 
  
1999) (in adversary bankruptcy proceeding by debtor against creditor/controlling shareholder of 
debtor, pre-petition attorney-client relationship found to have existed between attorneys for 
corporation and corporation’s controlling shareholder, given shareholder’s reasonable belief that 
attorneys were representing him as well as corporation in series of transactions between corporation 
and shareholder substantially related to present action, where shareholder had not been told that 
lawyer was representing corporation only or that shareholder should obtain separate counsel; as a 
result, debtor’s application to employ law firm was denied; in making such determination, state’s 
ethics rules applicable). On the other hand, the shareholder’s belief that an attorney-client relationship 
also existed with respect to a post-petition transaction was found to be not reasonable, since the 
lawyer did advise the shareholder both to obtain separate counsel and that the lawyer was 
representing only the corporation. Id. Compare Nilavar v. Mercy Health Syst.-W. Ohio, 143 F. 
Supp.2d 909 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (motion of plaintiff-shareholder to disqualify law firm representing 
defendants denied; evidence failed to show that plaintiff reasonably believed that law firm 
represented him individually in addition to the corporation in which he was a shareholder). See also 
Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co. (In re Roger J. Au & Son, Inc.), 64 B.R. 600 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 1986) (disqualification of counsel for corporate debtor-in-possession; counsel 
simultaneously represented corporation’s sole shareholder and principal officer, who was potential 
debtor of debtor-in-possession, thus giving rise to potentially adverse interests between the two. 
Result also supported by former OHCPR in that Code conditioned simultaneous representation on 
the absence of conflicting interests; this condition, coupled with admonition to avoid appearance of 
impropriety, suggested that court need not find actual evidence of ethical violation or actual conflict 
before disqualifying counsel). 
See generally 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  103 cmt. e (2000). 
The problem of who is the client is exacerbated when a close corporation is involved. Jack A. 
Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  4.2, at 98 
(1992). In such a situation, according to one court, where there are two shareholders with equal 
interests, “it is indeed reasonable for each shareholder to believe that the corporate counsel is in effect 
his own individual attorney.” Id. at n.27 (quoting Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441, 1445 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987)). See 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  
17.14, at 17-58 (3d ed. Supp. 2004-2); 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  
131 cmt. e, at 370 (2000) (conflict-of-interest problems in representing an organization “may be 
particularly acute in the case of close corporations”); Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  
8.3.2, at 422 (1986). 
These “acute” conflict-of-interest problems arising in the close-corporation context were discussed in 
some detail in the dissenting opinion in Sturm v. Sturm, 61 Ohio St.3d 298, 574 N.E.2d 522 (1991), 
a disqualification case that was decided by the majority on the ground that the conflict had been 
waived. Justice Brown (joined by Justice Resnick) disagreed and therefore addressed the question of 
the duty owed by an attorney representing a close corporation to two equal shareholders involved in a 
divorce dispute over corporate assets: 
 Cook [one of the equal shareholders] claims that the dual 
representation of the corporation and Sturm [the other equal 
shareholder; Cook’s husband] constitutes a conflict of interest. . . . 
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* * * * * 
 The conflict-of-interest issue is complicated because the 
corporation here was a “close corporation.” In such corporations, the 
distinction between corporate and individual representation may 
become blurred. [citing, inter alia, Rosman] . . . The apparent identity 
of interest between the shareholder and the close corporation may lead 
the shareholder to believe that corporate counsel is his own individual 
counsel. 
* * * * * 
 . . . . Wilsman had a fiduciary duty to protect the interests of 
both shareholders. When Wilsman continued to represent the 
corporation, he therefore continued to represent Cook. The once 
identical interests of the corporation, Sturm, and Cook have now 
diverged. Particularly where the corporate assets are the focus of the 
divorce action, Wilsman cannot fulfill his duty to Cook and Sturm as 
corporate counsel, while representing either one of them individually. 
This conflict is sufficient to disqualify Wilsman from representing 
Sturm in the divorce proceeding. 
Id. at 303, 304, 574 N.E.2d at 525, 526. See generally discussion in ABA, Annotated Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct 204 (6th ed. 2007) (commentary) (entity-as-client rule applies to closely 
held corporations just as it does to publicly-held corporations). 
With respect to issues of confidentiality and attorney-client privilege arising from communications 
between an entity’s employees and its counsel, see section 1.6:470. 
 
1.13:500  Joint Representation of Entity and Individual Constituents 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.13(e) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.13(g) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.118, 7.63 
Guttenberg & Snyder, The Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §§  4.2(A)(1), 4.5 
Becker, Guttenberg & Snyder, The  Law of Professional Conduct in Ohio § 1.07[2] 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  91:2601 
ALI-LGL §  131 
Wolfram §  13.7 
Pursuant to Ohio Rule 1.13(e), the lawyer for an organization may represent any of its constituents, 
“subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7.” If written consent is required by Rule 1.7, it “shall be given by 
an appropriate official of the organization, other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the 
shareholders.” Id. See discussion at section 1.7:340. The Model Rule (MR 1.13(g)) and the 
commentary are consistent with this view. 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§  131 cmt. e (2000) (dual representation permitted where no material adversity of interest exists; if 
adversity exists, consent of all affected clients required); 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William 
Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  17.14 (3d ed. Supp. 2004-2) (reiterating the Model Rule and 
Restatement positions). 
If the entity lawyer decides to represent both the organization and one or more of its constituents in a 
matter, the better course is to make the arrangement explicit, after discussion with all involved clients 
concerning conflict-of-interest and confidentiality concerns. See Jack A. Guttenberg & Lloyd B. 
Snyder, The Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  4.2(A)(1), at 98-99 (1992). As noted in 
section 1.13:400, if the lawyer does not intend to represent the constituent, this too should be made 
clear; otherwise, the lawyer may end up with a client by implication, together with the accompanying 
baggage of conflict-of-interest, confidentiality, and disqualification problems. Id. at 99. See, e.g., 
Berger McGill, Inc. v. Capozzoli (In re Berger McGill), 242 B.R. 413 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999), 
discussed in section 1.13:400. See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 
1311 (7th Cir. 1978) (one office of law firm was representing Westinghouse in antitrust suit against, 
inter alia, oil companies, and another office found to be simultaneously representing in related matter 
nationwide trade association (American Petroleum Institute), members of which included 
oil-company defendants in antitrust action; lawyers representing API requested confidential 
information from oil companies with implication that information would be kept confidential, giving 
rise to reasonable belief by oil companies that law firm was representing both API and companies; 
reversing denial of motion to disqualify law firm in antitrust case, Seventh Circuit gave Westinghouse 
option of dismissing oil-company defendants or discharging law firm as its counsel). The 
Westinghouse case is also discussed at section 1.7:270. 
 
1.13:510  Corporate Counsel’s Role in Shareholder Derivative Actions 
A shareholder derivative action is a suit by shareholders on behalf of the corporation for harm to the 
corporation where the officers and directors of the organization have refused to act on the 
corporation’s behalf. While the corporation is nominally a plaintiff, the corporation’s interests often 
are in reality aligned with the officers and directors. Can counsel for the corporation represent both 
the corporation and the targeted corporate directors/officers in defense of a shareholder derivative 
action? The answer is that 
[m]ost derivative actions are a normal incident of the organization’s 
affairs, to be defended by the organization’s lawyer like any other suit. 
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However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those 
in control of the organization [as it typically does], a conflict may arise 
between the lawyer’s duty to the organization and the lawyer’s 
relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs 
who should represent the directors and the organization. 
Ohio Rule 1.13 cmt. [14] (bracketed material added). 
See 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  131 cmt. g, at 371 (2000) (absent 
conclusion of disinterested directors that suit is baseless (in which case, with consent of all clients, 
lawyer may represent corporation and individual defendants), “[e]ven with informed consent of all 
affected clients, the lawyer for the organization . . . may not represent an individual defendant as 
well . . . .”). The Restatement notes that if the corporation’s lawyer’s advice was an important factor in 
the action of the officers and/or directors giving rise to the suit, it is appropriate for the corporation’s 
lawyer to represent, “if any one,” the defendant officers and/or directors, but only with the consent of 
the corporation, and the corporation should obtain new counsel. Id. 
In Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Durham 216 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1963), aff’d per 
curiam sub nom. Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Union Stock Yard Co., 337 
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1964), a derivative action, plaintiff sought to disqualify the corporation’s 
traditional outside counsel from defending the corporation and the defendant directors in the action. 
One of the defendant directors was a name partner in the corporation’s law firm. After noting that this 
director had abstained from voting in directors’ meetings concerning retention of the firm and its 
counsel fees, the district court held that 
it is not improper or illegal for a law firm to represent, in a 
shareholders’ derivative suit, the corporate defendant and the 
individual directors when there is no conflict of interest and no breach 
of confidence or trust. 
216 F. Supp. at 115 (even though the director/partner was the lead lawyer on the appeal). In 
affirming, the Sixth Circuit, finding that the issues involved primarily questions of fact, concluded 
that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and that “no relevant rule of law was 
misapplied.” 337 F.2d at 950. 
Given Ohio Rule 1.13 cmt. [14], it seems reasonably clear that Selama-Dindings, which did involve 
“serious charges of wrongdoing [ultimately rejected by the court] by those in control of the 
corporation,” is not good law today on the dual representation point. (Indeed, one of the charges 
involved erroneous information about the plaintiffs issued by the director/name partner of the law 
firm representing the corporation and the defendant directors in the case.) See Laws. Man. on Prof. 
Conduct (ABA/BNA) §  91:2608 (2000), noting that “[o]lder decisions” (citing Selama-Dindings, 
among others) tended to permit the dual representation, but that “[c]ourts have become more 
sensitive . . . to actual and potential conflicts of interests . . . . Increasingly, therefore, courts have 
granted motions for the disqualification of corporate counsel in derivative actions,” in representing 
the corporation. Numerous federal and state cases so holding are cited, although these cases often 
permit corporate counsel to represent the individual defendant directors and/or officers. Id. 
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Selama-Dindings is further discussed at sections 1.13:220 and 1.13:520. 
Theoretically at least, in a shareholder derivative suit, the plaintiff shareholders are suing on behalf of 
the corporation. Can a lawyer who has formerly represented the corporation represent the shareholder 
class? Can a lawyer who has previously sued the corporation on behalf of an employee do so? For 
differing views on these issues, compare Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 84 (Apr. 27, 1973) (plaintiff’s 
counsel had represented corporation in past, but, since any recovery would go to corporation, any use 
of information from former representation would not be used “to the disadvantage of his [former] 
client” contrary to former OH EC 4-5), with  In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 
624 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (prior representation of employee in suit against corporation not adverse to 
representation of plaintiffs in present derivative action because, as practical matter, derivative 
shareholder claim typically “antagonistic” to corporation and its management; disqualification 
motion denied in absence of showing of actual conflict of interest), discussed in section 1.9:220. 
These two opinions are also discussed at section 1.6:220. As Rule 1.13 cmt. [13] states, “[s]uch an 
action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over 
management of the organization.” 
See also Luce v. Alcox, 165 Ohio App.3d 742, 2006 Ohio 1209, 848 N.E.2d 552 (although 
disqualification of law firm representing majority shareholder/defendant was reversed for failure to 
meet other aspects of Dana [Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut., 900 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 
1990)] test, minority shareholder, suing both on own behalf and derivatively, satisfied first prong of 
Dana, inasmuch as law firm had represented NGT Corporation since its inception; “[c]onsequently, 
Luce [the minority shareholder], on behalf of NGT, has demonstrated a prior attorney-client 
relationship.” Id. at para. 13.). 
 
1.13:520  Representing Client with Fiduciary Duties 
In Ohio, the law with respect to representation of a client having fiduciary duties to others is 
confusing at best. As set forth below, this is the result of (1) the Supreme Court’s decisions in Arpadi 
and Elam; (2) the legislature’s statutory response to those decisions; and (3) subsequent case law, 
which to date has ignored the statutory provisions and continues to cite Arpadi and Elam as good 
law. 
Unlike the majority of jurisdictions (see 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §  
51 reporter’s note to cmt. h, at 373 (2000)), the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the duty of care 
of the lawyer for a limited partnership and its general partner, who or which has a fiduciary obligation 
to the limited partners, runs to the limited partners as well.  Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 68 Ohio 
St.3d 453, 628 N.E.2d 1335 (1994), discussed in section 1.1:410. Arpadi also holds, in terms not 
restricted to the limited-partnership setting, that those persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owing are 
in privity with the fiduciary such that an attorney-client relationship established with the fiduciary 
extends to those in privity with the fiduciary regarding matters to which the fiduciary duty relates.  Id. 
at 454, 628 N.E.2d at 1336 (syllabus three). Elam v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 44 Ohio St.3d 175, 541 
N.E.2d 616 (1989), is in accord in the estates and trusts context. (In addition, the Supreme Court in 
Arpadi concluded that, unlike a corporation, a partnership is not a separate legal entity, but simply an 
aggregate of individuals.  This aspect is discussed in section 1.13:230 supra.)  
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The Ohio legislature seemingly repudiated Arpadi syllabus three (at least in part) and Elam by 
subsequently enacting ORC 1339.18, which provides that an attorney for a fiduciary owes no duty of 
care to those to whom the fiduciary owes fiduciary obligations. (The definition of “fiduciary” in the 
statute is limited to a trustee of an express trust and an executor or administrator of a decedent’s estate; 
it does not include a general partner of a limited partnership.) There is no such limitation, however, in 
the more recent enactment of ORC 1782.65, pursuant to which a lawyer performing services for a 
limited partnership or its general partner owes no duty to, incurs no liability or obligation to, and is 
not in privity with, the limited partners. 
Despite ORC 1339.18 to the contrary, the rule set forth in syllabus three and in Elam continues to be 
cited and followed; see Brinkman v. Doughty, 140 Ohio App.3d 494, 499, 748 N.E.2d 116, 119-20 
(Clark 2000) (citing and quoting Arpadi and Elam for proposition that attorney-client relation with 
fiduciary (executrix) extends to those to whom fiduciary duty owed (beneficiaries)). Accord 
Wanamaker v. Davis, 2007 Ohio 4340, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3878 (Greene) (relying on Elam). 
Another recent and perhaps the most interesting case delving into these issues is LeRoy v. Allen, 
Yurasek & Merklin, 114 Ohio St.3d 323, 2007 Ohio 3608, 872 N.E.2d 254.  One of the questions 
before the Court was whether, as the court of appeals held, a claim had been stated under the privity 
exception to the Scholler rule.  The court of appeals relied on Arpadi, in combination with Crosby v. 
Beam, 47 Ohio St.3d 105, 548 N.E.2d 217, in finding that the majority shareholder of a close 
corporation owed a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders and that this duty was similar to the 
duty owed in Arpadi; therefore, in the Supreme Court’s summary of the lower court’s analysis, “the 
privity exception to Simon [and Scholler] was met as in Arpadi.”  Id. at para. 26.  The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding as follows: 
 The major flaw in the court of appeals’ reasoning is that Arpadi 
found privity in a partnership situation specifically only as to ‘matters 
to which the fiduciary duty relates.’ [citation omitted].  The claims of 
LeRoy and Miller, however, are not such claims.  A private transfer of 
stock does not, in and of itself, implicate any fiduciary duty on the part 
of a majority shareholder toward minority shareholders. 
 The transfer of stock that LeRoy and Miller challenge in this 
case is fundamentally different from the legal work at issue in Arpadi, 
in which the alleged legal malpractice that occurred was for legal 
representation specifically done regarding partnership matters.  The 
transfer of stock was a purely private matter, personal to [the majority 
shareholder], and was not done on behalf of [the corporation].  For that 
reason, the legal work done by defendants regarding that transfer does 
not implicate the fiduciary duties discussed in either Arpadi or Crosby, 
the privity exception of Simon is clearly inapplicable, and LeRoy and 
Miller failed to state a valid claim under that exception.  
Id. at paras. 27-28. 
Thus the LeRoy Court found the Arpadi privity rule inapplicable on the “private transaction” facts 
presented, which the Court held did not implicate any fiduciary duty running from the majority 
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shareholder to the nonclient minority.  Translating LeRoy to the Arpadi limited partnership context, 
there likewise would be no privity if the lawyering at issue involved a matter unrelated to the general 
partner’s fiduciary duty to nonclient limited partners.  Conversely, if the lawyer acts for the general 
partner on a matter that does involve the general partner’s fiduciary duty to other partners, privity and 
the resultant duty of care to nonclients would still lie under Arpadi. 
Two other items of interest arise from the Court’s opinion in LeRoy.  First, there is an intimation that 
all might not be well for the hallowed general rule, as set forth in Scholler and Simon, that, absent 
malice or privity, lawyers are not liable in malpractice to nonclients.  After discussing these two 
precedents and their holdings of no lawyer liability, the Court had this to say: 
 Because LeRoy and Miller do not challenge the general rule of 
attorney immunity set forth in Simon and Scholler as this case now 
stands, this appeal does not test the continuing validity of those 
precedents.  This case also does not present issues regarding whether 
additional exceptions to the general rule beyond those already 
recognized should exist. 
Id. at para. 17.  Do these seemingly gratuitous references to “test[ing] the continuing validity of 
those precedents” and unspecified “additional exceptions” portend that the Court may be receptive to 
examining these issues anew?  Only time will tell. 
The second and equally fascinating point is that there is no hint in the opinion that the privity rule as 
set forth in Arpadi  and Elam has been superseded by statute in any event.  To be sure, the earlier 
legislation (ORC 1339.18) purporting to repudiate Elam and a general reading of Arpadi syllabus 
three was limited to a fiduciary who is a trustee of an express trust or an administrator or executor of 
an estate, and the later 2006 enactments (ORC 1782.65, limited partnerships, and 1701.921(A), 
corporations), which are not so limited, were not in existence when the operative facts occurred in 
LeRoy.  Nevertheless, one would have thought these statutes might at least have generated an “oh, 
by-the-way” footnote.  But there is none, and a reader of LeRoy gains no greater knowledge of the 
legislative efforts to cut down Arpadi and Elam than does a reader of any of the earlier court appeals 
opinions relying on it, such as Brinkman v. Doughty, cited above. 
This logjam was finally broken in Fornshell v. Roetzel & Andress, 2009 Ohio 2728, 2009 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 2265 (Cuyahoga), which recognized that the statutory changes (in this instance ORC 
1705.61, limited liability companies) trumped the Arpadi privity rule, and thus the lawyers for a 
limited liability company owed no duty to the company’s minority owner or the minority owner’s 
manager. This situation is explored in further detail in section 1.1:410. 
Finally, although by today’s standards the case probably gives the wrong answer to the dual 
representation issues presented (see section 1.13:510), Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. 
Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1963), aff’d per curiam sub nom. Selama-Dindings 
Plantations, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Union Stock Yard Co., 337 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1964), is one of the 
relatively few Ohio decisions involving corporate-representation issues in which it is recognized that 
the client/directors had fiduciary duties to others -- here in the shareholder derivative action context. 
In Selama the district court found that the law firm’s representation of both the defendant corporation 
and defendant directors was not inappropriate in a derivative action brought by a corporation that 
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owned the largest single segment of the defendant corporation’s stock. The court held that, despite the 
rule under Ohio law that the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders, the law firm 
could nevertheless defend both the defendant directors (including one of the firm’s name partners, 
who was the lead lawyer on the appeal to the Sixth Circuit) and the corporation in the suit, “where 
there is no conflict of interest and no breach of confidence or trust.” 216 F. Supp. at 115. 
The fiduciary-duty rule is also discussed in section 1.13:220. 
1.13:530  Representing Government Client 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.118, 7.63 (1996). 
Duties of government lawyers in general: Government attorneys, as members of the bar, usually are 
bound by the same basic ethical responsibilities as private attorneys, and Rule 1.13 cmt. [9] makes 
explicit that the “up-the-ladder” reporting duties under the Rule are applicable to governmental 
organizations. (An attempt by the Department of Justice in the late 1980s to exempt federal litigators 
from state ethics rules was opposed by the organized bar; the dispute ended in federal legislation 
confirming the applicability of such rules. 28 USC §  530B (2000). See discussion at section 4.2:220). 
Thus, Ohio attorneys who work for federal agencies have been disciplined under the Ohio 
disciplinary rules for misconduct committed in the course of government employment. Jack A. 
Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  4.5, at 112 
n.87 (1992). See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gorman, 43 Ohio St.3d 166, 539 N.E.2d 1120 
(1989) (former Assistant U.S. Attorney permanently disbarred; misuse for personal gain of position 
as prosecutor in investigation of check-kiting scheme). 
Nevertheless, the unique position of government lawyers as representatives of the public impose on 
them a special duty “to seek justice,” which requires a different orientation to the representation than 
that imposed upon a private practitioner. See State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 613 N.E.2d 203 
(1993) (stressing that prosecutor’s job is not to win cases but to see that justice is done). In civil or 
administrative actions, the government attorney, as with all attorneys, must not assert claims or 
defenses having no basis in law or fact, and must also avoid using his position or the power of the 
government to harass other parties or to produce unjust results. See Ohio Rules 3.1 and 4.4(a). The 
special duties of a government prosecutor are set forth in Ohio Rule 3.8. See sections 3.8:200-:900. 
Overall, the government attorney must be especially scrupulous in following the ethics rules and 
other duties imposed upon him, for failure to do so corrupts the legal system and public confidence in 
the government as a whole.  State v. Hunt, 97 Ohio App.3d 372, 377, 646 N.E.2d 889, 892 
(Franklin 1994) (referring to former OH DR 7-103 and OH EC 7-13 in admonishing an assistant 
prosecutor that “[z]ealous prosecution of criminal cases is expected and admired; however, 
continually crossing the line [as this prosecutor had in a number of cases] corrupts our system of 
justice and will not be tolerated.”). See generally Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC, 962 
F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (describing the higher ethical standards to which government lawyers 
should be held). 
On the issue of who is the client of an Ohio governmental lawyer, compare Arthur F. Greenbaum, 
Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.118 (1996) (no clear 
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guidance provided by Ohio law as to whether it is the government as a whole, a particular branch, an 
agency, or an individual official or office), with Jack A. Guttenberg & Lloyd B. Snyder, The Law 
of Professional Responsibility in Ohio §  4.5, at 112 (1992) (indicating that it is usually the state). 
Ohio Rule 1.13 cmt. [9] states that defining precisely who is the client in the governmental context is 
beyond the scope of the Rules. 
For a discussion of multiclient conflicts and the government lawyer, see sections 1.7:310 and 1.7:320. 
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1.14:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.14 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.14 
 
1.14:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.14 is substantively identical to the Model Rule. 
 
1.14:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.14: EC 7-11, EC 7-12. 
  
1.14:200  Problems in Representing a Client with Partially or Severely 
       Diminished Capacity  
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.14 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.14 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.24 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:601 
ALI-LGL §  24 
Wolfram §  4.4 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.24 (1996). 
Special problems arise in allocating decision-making authority where the client has a mental or 
physical condition that diminishes her ability to make a considered judgment on matters related to the 
representation. Ohio Rule 1.14 provides the framework for dealing with these problems, although it 
does so in a manner less explicit than was provided in former EC 7-12. (For example, EC 7-12 stated 
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directly that the client’s disability and the lack of a legal representative may compel the lawyer to 
make decisions for the client; in contrast, the authority to take such a step if necessary is implicit in 
Rule 1.14.) As the Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.14 states, “the rule does not address the matter 
of decision-making, as [was] the case in EC 7-12, but merely states that the lawyer should maintain a 
normal client-lawyer relationship as far as reasonably possible.” In the words of Hazard and Hodes, 
this normal-as-reasonably-possible concept “commit[s] the fine judgments that must be made to the 
professional discretion of the lawyer on the scene. . . . The chief mission of Model Rule 1.14(a) 
[identical to Ohio Rule 1.14(a)], therefore, is simply to ensure that lawyers adequately think through 
the difficult problems associated with representation of clients with some form of diminished 
capacity.” 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of 
Lawyering §  18.4, at 18-8 to 18-9 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-2). If the lawyer does so, he or she should not 
be at disciplinary risk. Id. See generally Ohio Rule 1.14 cmt. [1] (lawyer’s responsibilities may vary 
according to intelligence, experience, mental condition, or age of client); Adam M. Fried, The 
Specter of Exploitation: Special Concerns in Representing the Diminished Client, Cleveland 
Metro. B.J., June 2009, at 19 (examining lawyer’s role in guarding against financial exploitation of 
client by others. Note that the reference in footnote 7 to comment 3 of “Model Rule 1.14” presumably 
should read “Ohio Rule 1.14”; Ohio’s comment 3 is substantively identical to that of the Model Rule.) 
To the extent the client is acting through a legal guardian, the lawyer should turn to the guardian to 
make those decisions otherwise reserved for the client. Ohio Rule 1.14 cmt. [4]. If there is no 
responsible third party, every effort should be made to involve the client in the decision-making 
process insofar as the client’s condition allows it. Ohio Rule 1.14(a) & cmt. [2]. If that is impossible 
and if the lawyer reasonably believes that the client is at risk of “substantial physical, financial, or 
other harm” unless action is taken, then the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, 
including, where appropriate, seeking the appointment of a guardian for the client. See Rule 1.14(b) 
and cmts. [3] & [9]; section 1.14:400. In assessing the client’s capacity the lawyer should 
consider and balance such factors as: the client’s ability to articulate 
reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability 
to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a 
decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term 
commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, 
the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician. 
Ohio Rule 1.14 cmt. [6]. Appointment of a guardian, particularly when doing so is against the 
client’s wishes, is permitted “if there is no less drastic alternative,” but the courts have recognized that 
in some situations such a step may be necessary to protect the client’s interests. See ABA, Annotated 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 234-35 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). Finally, 
representation of a client with diminished capacity raises special issues with respect to confidential 
information and disclosure of such information where necessary in the best interests of the client. 
Ohio Rule 1.14(c). See section 1.14:500. 
Another “problem” that arises in representation of a disabled client is one created by lawyers 
themselves: Given the client’s limitations, there are always a few rogue lawyers who cannot resist the 
temptation to take advantage of those limitations. Cases decided under the former OHCPR reflecting 
this weakness include Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 106 Ohio St.3d 418, 2005 Ohio 5411, 835 
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N.E.2d 707 (“The injuries suffered due to respondent’s transgressions were immense. Respondent 
misappropriated nearly $ 300,000 from an incompetent ward and a trust she had promised to protect.” 
Id. at para. 36); Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Carlson, 100 Ohio St.3d 134, 2003 Ohio 5073, 797 
N.E.2d 55 (2003) (“egregious” misconduct in arranging to buy mentally-ill client’s property for a 
small fraction of what it was worth; Court upped board’s proposed six-month suspension to two 
years); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Harris, 96 Ohio St.3d 138, 2002 Ohio 2988, 772 N.E.2d 621 
(conversion of funds entrusted to lawyer by institutionalized client); Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Liviola, 94 Ohio St.3d 408, 763 N.E.2d 588 (2002) (duping schizophrenic New York friend into 
entrusting respondent with funds to be forwarded to nonexistent New York lawyer, who supposedly 
would deal with friend’s legal problems); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Clifton, 79 Ohio St.3d 
496, 684 N.E.2d 33 (1997) (misappropriation of assets of incompetent ward for whom respondent 
was acting as guardian and as attorney for the guardianship; this case is discussed in further detail in 
section 1.14:400 and near the end of section 1.3:200); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Slavens, 63 
Ohio St. 3d 162, 586 N.E.2d 92 (1992) (after client was diagnosed with senility and organic brain 
syndrome, respondent had client execute new will which, inter alia. gave respondent 35% of client’s 
$ 1.5 million estate (such misconduct is now dealt with directly by Ohio Rule 1.8(c); see section 
1.8:400); he also obtained power of attorney for the client, pursuant to which he gave himself “gifts” 
in excess of $ 160,000). In all of these decisions save one (Carlson -- two-year suspension), the Court 
imposed either permanent disbarment (Hunter, Liviola, Clifton) or an indefinite suspension (Harris, 
Slavens). The Harris case is particularly interesting on the sanctions aspect. The Board 
recommended indefinite suspension, and the Court agreed, noting that respondent was “an honorably 
discharged veteran,” and had always been active in his church.  96 Ohio St.3d 138, 2002 Ohio 2988, 
772 N.E.2d 621, at para. 6. Justice Cook saw the case differently. In dissent (joined by Justice 
Pfeifer), she restates the issue: “The court’s analysis should not begin with whether an indefinite 
suspension is warranted. . . . [P]recedent dictates that the threshold question must be whether there is 
any reason why we should not disbar Harris. Id. at para. 9 (emphasis in original). Quoting the panel, 
Justice Cook stressed that 
“One who cannot be counted on the protect the interests of a special 
needs client, or one who misappropriates the funds of any client, is 
unfit to practice law in the State of Ohio.” 
Id. at para. 12. 
Another example in which a lawyer disregarded his disabled client’s interests, thereby exposing “the 
client to avoidable financial ruin,” was Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. Newman, 102 Ohio St.3d 186, 2004 
Ohio 2068, 808 N.E.2d 375, at para. 18. In Newman, respondent represented both a shopping center 
and a mentally-disabled client who leased a laundromat in the center; the disabled client was 
ultimately forced into bankruptcy when the laundromat failed. Even though the Court found a 
violation of former OH 7-101(A)(3), because respondent’s “conduct manifests his intent to cause the 
client damage or prejudice,” id. at para. 18 (as well as former OH 5-105(A) & (C)), in the course of 
suspending respondent for one year with six months stayed, it inconsistently concluded that 
“[r]espondent did not commit his misconduct to take advantage of his disabled client . . . .” Id. at para. 
23. 
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Also, it was opined under the Code that while the lawyer has somewhat more leeway when the client 
is under a disability, the lawyer still may not accept a settlement offer that the lawyer believes is in the 
client’s best interest, if the client nevertheless rejects it. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 89-3 (Sept. 29, 
1989). 
 
1.14:300  Maintaining Client-Lawyer Relationship with Client with Diminished  
        Capacity 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.14(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.14(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Becker, Guttenberg & Snyder, The Law of Professional Conduct in Ohio § 8.21[3] 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:601 
ALI-LGL §  24 
Wolfram §  4.4 
While there appear to be no Ohio cases dealing directly with the subject of maintenance of the 
client-lawyer relationship with a client with diminished capacity, the guiding principle under Ohio 
Rule 1.14(a) is that 
 [w]hen a client’s capacity to make adequately considered 
decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether 
because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the 
lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal 
client-lawyer relationship with the client. 
(Emphasis added.) Comment [1] underscores that 
a client with diminished capacity often has the ability to understand, 
deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the 
client’s own well-being. 
Ohio Rule 1.14 cmt. [1]. Similarly, the former OHCPR advised that when a client is “capable of 
understanding the matter in question or of contributing to the advancement of his interests, regardless 
of whether he is legally disqualified from performing certain acts, the lawyer should obtain from him 
all possible aid.” OH EC 7-12. See Rule 1.14 cmt. [3], noting that while family members may 
participate in discussions with the lawyer if the client so desires, the lawyer “must keep the client’s 
interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under division (b), must look to the 
client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client’s behalf.” 
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This theme of maintenance of a normal client-lawyer relationship, insofar as possible, is reiterated 
throughout the literature dealing with this issue. See, e.g., 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers §  24(1) (2000) (“the lawyer must, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a 
normal client-lawyer relationship with the client . . . .”); Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 
§  31:601 (1991) (client should be treated, as much as possible, like any other client; “[t]hat is, the 
lawyer should advise the client of the law, offer advice about the proper course of action, and then 
follow, within reason and the law, the client’s wishes”); accord 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. 
William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering §  18.4 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-2). See generally James D. 
Caruso, Diminished Capacity Representation: Protecting Yourself and Your Client, Ohio Law., 
Mar./Apr. 2008, at 14 (providing overview of Ohio Rule 1.14); Thomas Spahn, Dealing with 
Clients of Diminished Capacity, Experience, Winter 2007, at 41 (overview of MR 1.14 issues). 
See also  In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274 (N.J. 1994) (lawyer for client with Down’s syndrome instructed 
to follow client’s wishes and argue for her positions unless they posed unreasonable risk of harm to 
her welfare or unless her positions were “absurd”). 
 
1.14:400  Appointment of Guardian or Other Protective Action 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.14(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.14(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.117, 7.24 
Becker, Guttenberg & Snyder, The Law of Professional Conduct in Ohio §  8.21[3] 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:601 
ALI-LGL §  24(4) 
Wolfram §  4.4 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  5.117, 7.24 (1996). 
Seeking appointment of a guardian or other protective action: Among the protective actions a lawyer 
may take when the lawyer “reasonably believes” the client has diminished capacity or is at physical, 
financial, or other risk and cannot adequately act in his or her best interest is, in appropriate cases and 
when reasonably necessary, to seek the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator, or guardian. 
Ohio Rule 1.14(b). Comment [7] cites instances in which such appointment may be necessary, such 
as when the client has substantial property that should be sold and appointment of a legal 
representative is required to complete the transaction. Ohio Rule 1.14 cmt. [7]. Also, the rules of 
procedure sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacities involved in litigation 
must be represented in the case by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. Id. 
In other circumstances, weighing the pros and cons of taking such a step is left to the professional 
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judgment of the lawyer. “In considering such alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of 
any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of a client.” Id. 
Ohio Rule 1.14(b) also provides that, in addition to guardianship and guardianship ad litem, other 
“protective action” may be taken as necessary when the lawyer believes the client is at risk of harm. 
Such action could include consultation with family members, use of durable powers of attorney, and 
involvement of professional services or agencies designed to assist and protect the client. Ohio Rule 
1.14(b) cmt. [5]. In taking protective action, 
the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of 
the client to the extent known, the client’s best interests and the goals of 
intruding into the client’s decisionmaking autonomy to the least extent 
feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client’s 
family and social connections. 
Id. See also Lee A. Koosed, What Are the Ethical Obligations for an Attorney Who Believes a 
Client Is Mentally Impaired?, Clev. B. J., May 1997, at 13. Deciding whether to seek guardianship 
for a client with diminished capacity is a difficult determination. Rule 1.14 cmt. [7] advises that 
where no legal representative has been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether doing so is 
necessary to protect the client’s interests. The comment goes on to note, however, that “appointment 
of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact 
require.” Obviously, where the client opposes such a step, appointment of a guardian should be 
undertaken only if no other feasible option is available. 
Should guardianship or guardianship ad litem be deemed necessary for the client, the identical 
language of MR 1.14(b) has been read as requiring that “if the lawyer decides to file a guardianship 
petition, it must be on his own authority under Rule 1.14 and not on behalf of a third party, however 
well intentioned.” A. Frank Johns, What’s an Elder Law Attorney to Do?, Experience, Summer 
2005, at 14, 20 (actually quoting verbatim from ABA Formal Op. 96-404 (Aug. 2, 1996) at 8). 
Accord ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 235 (7th ed. 2011) 
(commentary). 
Difficulties that can arise with respect to representation of a client with diminished capacity and the 
related guardianship issues were explored in some detail in the first disciplinary case addressing the 
provisions of Rule 1.14, Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Parisi, 131 Ohio St.3d 345, 2012 Ohio 879, 965 
N.E.2d 268. In Parisi, the respondent represented a 93-year-old client who became confused and 
disoriented. As a result, respondent applied for guardianship, alleging incompetency. But a few 
weeks later respondent had the client sign a durable power of attorney naming respondent as her 
attorney in fact. Next, Parisi withdrew her own guardianship application and submitted an application 
on behalf of her client’s niece, whom respondent also represented. The probate court later removed 
respondent as counsel for both the ward and her niece. The Board found the dual representation 
violated Rule 1.7(a)(2). In the Supreme Court, Parisi challenged the finding of misconduct, first 
arguing that simultaneous representation of the proposed ward and a guardianship applicant had been 
approved by Court precedent. The Court rejected this reading of its cases and went on to emphasize 
that, as here, 
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the far-reaching and life-altering consequences of an incompetency 
determination . . . create an inherent conflict between the proposed 
ward and the applicant for guardianship, even if guardianship is 
ultimately in the proposed ward’s best interest. 
Id. at para. 9. 
Undeterred, Parisi argued that Rule 1.14(b) (and 1.7(b)) do permit simultaneous representation, and 
any reading of those rules to the contrary would be unconstitutional, given her lack of notice that such 
conduct was unethical. The Court proceeded to review the language of 1.14(a) and (b), together with 
Comment [9], and concluded that 
the emergency provisions of Prof.Cond.R. 1.14 do not entirely 
abrogate a lawyer’s duties to the client under the Rules . . . . Therefore, 
when taking actions authorized by Prof.Cond.R 1.14, the lawyer must 
still determine whether the representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to the other and whether there is substantial risk that the 
lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate 
course of action for one client will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client. Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a). 
Id. at para. 11. The Court found support in ABA Formal Op. 96-404 (1996), which opined that a 
lawyer with a disabled client should not attempt to represent a third party petitioning for guardianship 
over that client: “‘In short, if the lawyer decides to file a guardianship petition, it must be on his own 
authority under Rule 1.14 and not on behalf of a third-party, however well intentioned.’” Id. at para. 
12. The Supreme Court agreed: 
 We concur with this analysis and conclude that the 
guardianship proceeding that Parisi initiated on behalf of Demming’s 
niece, no matter how well-intentioned, was necessarily adverse to 
Demming. Therefore, Parisi’s actions in representing both women in 
the guardianship proceeding violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.7, regardless of 
Demming’s assent or objection to the process. And in light of 
Demming’s diminished capacity, as evidenced by Parisi’s own petition 
for guardianship, we cannot countenance Parisi’s arguments that 
Demming was either competent to execute the durable power of 
attorney or capable of giving informed consent to the dual 
representation. 
Id. at para. 13. As for the constitutional lack-of-notice/vagueness attack, the Court notes that while 
Rule 1.14 expressly permits an attorney to do certain things, including “to seek the appointment of a 
guardian in some circumstances”; “[i]t does not, however, authorize her attorney to represent third 
parties in guardianship proceedings against a client or otherwise permit any departure from Rule 
1.7 . . . .” Id. at para. 14 (emphasis by the Court). Respondent was given a stayed six-month 
suspension for this and other misconduct; three justices issued separate dissents and would have 
imposed more stringent sanctions or conditions. 
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Under the OHCPR regime, it was opined that in dealing with a client under a disability, the lawyer 
should evaluate the possibility that medical treatment might improve the client’s condition and, if it 
would, suggest that option to the client. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 89-3 (Sept. 29, 1989). The extent 
to which a lawyer could proceed to have a guardian appointed for the client, without engendering a 
conflict of interest, was unclear. The Cleveland Bar Association summed up the situation in the 
following terms: 
The attorney should avoid placing himself in an adversarial position to 
the client by simultaneously representing the client and petitioning the 
probate court to appoint a guardian. He may, however, move for the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent his client during the 
subject proceedings, provided that he institutes maximum safeguards 
to protect against prejudice to the client and to avoid unnecessary 
revealing of secrets and confidences of the client. Any settlement or 
compromise entered by the guardian ad litem should be approved by 
the court through its journals. 
Id. at 1. See ABA Formal Op. 96-404 (Aug. 2, 1996) (“The appointment of a guardian is a serious 
deprivation of the client’s rights and ought not be undertaken if other, less drastic solutions are 
available.” Id. at 1.). For a case in which the lawyer successfully helped his client avoid a 
guardianship appointment two different times, even though this may not have been in the client’s best 
interest (her mental health caseworkers were seeking to have a guardian appointed), see Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Sims, 96 Ohio St.3d 465, 2002 Ohio 4798, 776 N.E.2d 18. Respondent 
subsequently obtained a power of attorney granting him sole authority over her affairs, including 
health care, but he then failed to provide for her care even though he had access to client funds with 
which to do so. The Sims case is further discussed in section 1.1:200 at “Skill requirements - 
Disciplinary standards.” 
With Sims, compare Kutnick v. Fischer, 2004 Ohio 5378, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4907 
(Cuyahoga), where the incompetent’s lawyers were sued for malpractice by the administrator of the 
incompetent’s estate for, among other things, instituting a guardianship proceeding against the client 
in an action independent of the case in which the lawyers were successfully defending the 
incompetent against an involuntary commitment proceeding. In the controlling opinion for a 
fragmented court (the second judge concurred in judgment only and wrote a separate opinion; the 
third judge dissented in part), Judge Rocco affirmed the granting of summary judgment for the 
defendant lawyers. On the guardianship point, he concluded that appellant’s “claim for malpractice 
must fail to the extent it is based on the [lawyers’] alleged breach of a duty of loyalty by taking a 
position adverse to Kutnick in the guardianship proceeding,” because 
 [a]n attorney representing an incompetent has special 
responsibilities, as the ethical considerations under Canon 7 
demonstrate. See EC 7-12. We do not believe that any tort duty of 
loyalty precludes an attorney from pursuing the client’s best interests 
by seeking a court determination of the client’s competency and the 
appointment of a guardian in a proceeding separate from that in which 
the attorney is representing the client. 
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Id. at para. 23. Judge Kilbane dissented on this issue; Judge Karpinski agreed with Judge Rocco on 
the application-for-guardianship issue, but reached her conclusion “by a somewhat different route.” 
Id. at para. 91. While agreeing that the Code did not preclude an attorney from filing an application 
for guardianship concerning a client, she went on to find support in the Model Rules, which, as she 
noted, were at that time under consideration for adoption (and have now been adopted) in Ohio. See 
id., at paras. 94-95. The provision cited by Judge Karpinski was proposed Ohio Rule 1.14(b), 
“which tracks” MR 1.14(b), id. at para. 94, and which is identical to Ohio Rule 1.14(b) as adopted. 
Serving as both the lawyer for and guardian of the client: Attorneys are sometimes called on to serve 
as both the attorney and guardian ad litem for a party in a proceeding. At times, this is expressly 
provided by rule or statute. See OH Juv R 4(C) (approving dual role in juvenile court proceedings 
provided no conflict in role exists); ORC 2151.281(H) (approving dual role in acting on behalf of 
abused, neglected, or dependent children absent finding by guardian/attorney or court that conflict 
may exist, in which case court must appoint new guardian ad litem). In other instances, the conflict 
inherent in simultaneously carrying out dual roles is so high that it is expressly prohibited. See ORC 
2151.281(B)(1) (in child abuse or neglect proceeding, lawyer cannot serve as both guardian ad litem 
to child and as attorney responsible for presenting evidence alleging child abuse or neglect). While in 
each role the lawyer is the advocate of the client in some sense, the roles diverge substantially. As an 
attorney, the lawyer’s role is to advance the client’s objectives, even if the lawyer believes those 
objectives are not in the client’s best interest. This is not to suggest that the lawyer must accede to the 
client’s declared position without first counseling the client about the merits of that position, but 
ultimately the lawyer must seek to achieve the client’s lawful objectives. See former OH EC 7-8. As 
a guardian ad litem, in contrast, the lawyer’s duty is to protect the best interest of the client, even if 
that interest is contrary to the client’s desire. 
The leading decision in Ohio on this distinction under the Code was In re Baby Girl Baxter, 17 Ohio 
St.3d 229, 479 N.E.2d 257 (1985). In Baxter, a custody proceeding involving a child of a mildly 
retarded mother who wanted to retain custody, the Court recognized that the applicable juvenile court 
rule expressly provided that counsel for the mother could also act as her guardian ad litem. But, as 
Justice Douglas explained for the Court: 
 The duty of a lawyer to his client and the duty of a guardian ad 
litem to his ward are not always identical and, in fact, may conflict. The 
role of guardian ad litem is to investigate the ward’s situation and then 
to ask the court to do what the guardian feels is in the ward’s best 
interest. The role of the attorney is to zealously represent his client 
within the bounds of the law. DR 7-101; DR 7-102. 
 We . . . find that Heflin [the mother’s attorney] was put in the 
position of being required to ask the court, as guardian ad litem, to do 
what he felt was in his ward’s best interests and simultaneously being 
required to champion his client’s cause as her attorney. Since Heflin 
felt his ward-client’s wishes were not beneficial to her, he was in an 
impossible situation. 
Id. at 232, 479 N.E.2d at 260 (ellipsis and bracketed material added). As a result, the Court held that 
the mother’s lawyer failed to provide her with proper representation in the juvenile court proceedings. 
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It therefore reversed the grant of permanent custody to the county welfare department and remanded 
for further proceedings. 
It is important to recognize that Baxter does not prohibit a lawyer from jointly serving as guardian 
and attorney for the client in all cases. In instances where the roles do not conflict, it is permissible, 
e.g., Jilek v. Jilek, Nos. L-92-304, L-92-305, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3264 (Lucas, June 18, 1993) 
(permitting lawyer to serve as both counsel to and guardian ad litem for child in custody matter where, 
because the lawyer as guardian had no opinion as to the issue presented, conflict with child’s interest 
did not arise). See Penn v. Penn, No. 54673, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4530 (Cuyahoga Nov. 17, 
1988) (no error in permitting one lawyer to occupy both positions for children in divorce proceeding 
where no prejudice is shown as a result of dual representation). See also  In re Howard, 119 Ohio 
App.3d 201, 695 N.E.2d 1 (Hamilton 1997) (no error in failure to appoint guardian ad litem in 
delinquency proceeding in which juvenile was represented by counsel and there was nothing in record 
to suggest parent was acting other than in child’s best interest in testifying that child be committed to 
custody of Department of Youth Services). Where they do conflict, the dual role is not permissible. 
Assuming a conflict exists, the next question is how to resolve it. The Supreme Court in Baxter stated 
that where a role conflict arises, the lawyer should seek permission from the court to withdraw as 
guardian ad litem while remaining as counsel, a request that should be freely granted: 
[W]e hold that when an attorney is appointed to represent a person and 
is also appointed guardian ad litem for that person, his first and highest 
duty is to zealously represent his client within the bounds of the law 
and to champion his client’s cause. If the attorney feels there is a 
conflict between his role as attorney and his role as guardian, he should 
petition the court for an order allowing him to withdraw as guardian. 
The court should not hesitate to grant such request. 
17 Ohio St.3d at 232, 479 N.E.2d at 260. This approach was codified for a guardian ad litem for an 
alleged or adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent child in ORC 2151.281(H), which provides in 
part: 
[I]f a person is serving as guardian ad litem and counsel for a child and 
either that person or the court finds that a conflict may exist between 
the person’s roles as guardian ad litem and as counsel, the court shall 
relieve the person of duties as guardian ad litem and appoint someone 
else as guardian ad litem for the child. 
See In re Spaulding, No. L-92-180, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2071 (Lucas Apr. 16, 1993) (inferring 
that ORC 2151.281(H) was intended to codify In re Baby Girl Baxter). (The dual role of guardian 
ad litem and attorney for a minor is examined in some detail in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2006-5, 2006 Ohio Griev. Discp. LEXIS 3, at *2-5 (June 9, 2006).) 
A number of Ohio courts have followed the In re Baxter lead and do not permit the attorney for the 
disabled client to act also as guardian ad litem when conflicting duties arise in fulfilling the two roles.  
In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 601 N.E.2d 45 (Ottawa 1991) (dual role of attorney for children 
and as their guardian ad litem denied children proper representation during custody dispute over who 
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should be named residential parent; motion of lawyer to withdraw as guardian ad litem granted); 
Bawidamann v. Bawidamann, 63 Ohio App.3d 691, 580 N.E.2d 15 (Montgomery 1989) (dual 
role of attorney and guardian ad litem improper; trial court directed to appoint new guardian ad litem 
to represent best interests of children; if appointment of attorney for children deemed necessary or 
appropriate, counsel should be someone other than guardian ad litem); Dell v. Dell, No. L-86-133, 
1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 9510 (Lucas Dec. 31, 1986) (reversing failure to appoint separate attorney 
for minor where same attorney was both guardian ad litem and lawyer for child and his opinion as 
guardian ad litem was at odds with wishes of child). See also  In re Clark, 141 Ohio App.3d 55, 749 
N.E.2d 833 (Cuyahoga 2001) (failure to appoint counsel for children in child custody proceeding, 
even though they had guardian ad litem, was reversible error);  In re Stacey S., 136 Ohio App.3d 503, 
737 N.E.2d 92 (Lucas 1999) (appointment of guardian ad litem and attorney for guardian ad litem 
insufficient to satisfy children’s right to counsel in custody proceeding). 
A few Ohio courts, however, have not treated the language from Baxter as binding, absent statutory 
direction to do so, and take the position that, as long as either role is dropped, the conflict is cured. For 
these courts, the question of which role should be terminated should be left to the sound discretion of 
the trial court. As the Second District Court of Appeals stated: 
 The factual setting before us differs significantly from that in 
Baxter. In that case the mother’s right to legal representation deriving 
from R.C. 2151.352 and Juv. R. 4(A) was compromised when her 
appointed attorney acted contrary to her interests. One person could not 
perform both roles wholeheartedly and zealously. Recognizing that the 
statutory mandate was the superior motivating authority, the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion seeks to serve the statutory purpose first. There is, 
however, no reason why the conflict of interest cannot be resolved as 
the court did here; allowing the attorney to withdraw as legal counsel 
and appointing another attorney as counsel who is not subject to the 
conflict. 
Gallimore v. Gallimore, No. 88- CA-12, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 1231, at *7-8 (Miami Mar. 30, 
1989). 
The conflict of interest problems in acting as both attorney and guardian ad litem for a client are 
exacerbated when the guardian is likely to be called as witness in a proceeding. The Sixth District 
Court of Appeals summarized this concern in Dell v. Dell, No. L-86-133, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 
9510 (Lucas Dec. 31, 1986): 
DR 5-102, as a general rule, requires an attorney to withdraw where he 
shall testify as a witness in his client’s case. Since custody disputes 
between the parents oftentimes require the testimony of the guardian ad 
litem, the guardian would be unable to represent the minor child 
because the disciplinary rules would necessitate his withdrawal. This 
result is of particular significance where the guardian ad litem’s 
position is in direct contradiction to the child’s alleged wishes. 
Id. at *5. See generally Rule 3.7 of the treatise. 
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Serving as both attorney and guardian ad litem at times may involve other professional responsibility 
concerns in addition to conflicts of interest. Client confidences and secrets may be breached where the 
lawyer learns of information as an attorney that he feels bound to use or disclose, without client 
consent, as a guardian ad litem. Bawidamann v. Bawidamannn, 63 Ohio App.3d 691, 580 N.E.2d 
15 (Montgomery 1989) (criticizing lawyer’s use of confidential communications with child clients to 
impeach their testimony when acting as their guardian ad litem). 
Significant difficulties may also arise when the lawyer attempts to fill the roles of both guardian for a 
disabled person and attorney for the guardianship. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Clifton, 79 
Ohio St.3d 496, 684 N.E.2d 33 (1997): 
 The respondent undertook the dual roles of guardian and 
attorney for the guardianship of both the person and the estate of an 
incompetent woman who it appears had no close relatives. As the 
record indicates, respondent failed miserably in the performance of his 
duties in both roles. . . . 
 . . . The record here indicates that respondent, filling the dual 
role of guardian and attorney to the guardian, not only allowed the 
assets of [the ward’s] estate to dissipate but also appropriated funds of 
the estate to his own use. 
* * * * 
 As to respondent’s responsibility as attorney for the 
guardianship, we said in [Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucey, 14 
Ohio St.3d 18, 21, 470 N.E.2d 888, 890 (1984)], “There are few 
ethical breaches which impact more negatively on the integrity of the 
legal profession than the misuse of a client’s funds.” . . . 
* * * * 
 In this case, . . . we find no mitigating circumstances 
whatsoever. Respondent is permanently disbarred from the practice of 
law in Ohio. 
Id. at 499, 500, 684 N.E. 2d 35, 36. The Clifton case is further discussed at section 1.3:200. Accord 
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Doyle, 68 Ohio St.3d 24, 623 N.E.2d 37 (1993) (indefinite suspension). 
  
1.14:500  Confidentiality Issues 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.14(c) 
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Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.14(c) 
Ohio Rule 1.14(c) tracks the language added as new MR 1.14(c) in 2002: 
 Information relating to the representation of a client with 
diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective 
action pursuant to division (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized 
under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the 
extent reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests. 
Comment [8] elaborates that this implied authorization is applicable 
even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, 
given the risks of disclosure, division (c) limits what the lawyer may 
disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the 
appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer 
should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted 
with will act adversely to the client’s interest before discussing matters 
related to the client. 
Ohio Rule 1.14 cmt. [8]. 
The commentary to ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 235-38 (7th ed. 2011), 
provides an informative overview of issues relating to use of confidential information in the context 
of representation of a person with diminished capacity. Thus, in emphasizing that such use should be 
made only when reasonably necessary, the commentary contrasts a lawyer’s providing confidential 
information to the client’s physician in order to ascertain the client’s condition with dissemination of 
the client’s medical information to news media in order to generate support of the lawyer’s position 
seeking emergency guardianship over the client, in a chronic vegetative state, where the parents had 
authorized withdrawal of sustenance. Id. at 221. Specific instances in which the issue comes up are in 
criminal proceedings (competence to stand trial), id. at 222; and the prevention of contemplated 
suicide by the client. Id. at 222-23. There are also laws in some states that require the reporting of 
privileged information in certain circumstances (e.g., elder abuse statutes; in Ohio see ORC 5101.61). 
Id. at 223.  
The only Ohio case found that deals with the confidentiality issue in this context is Bawidamann v. 
Bawidamann, 63 Ohio App.3d 691, 580 N.E.2d 15 (Montgomery 1989), where the appellate court, 
in holding that minor wards in a child-custody case were denied proper representation in protection of 
their wishes by the trial court’s allowing the guardian ad litem to act as the children’s attorney, was 
critical of the lawyer’s use of confidential information: 
 An attorney’s use of confidential communications from his 
client to argue against his client’s expressed preference is anything but 
the zealous representation of his client’s cause; it is the antithesis of 
legal representation. 
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Id. at 703, 580 N.E.2d at 23. See also Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 89-3 (Sept. 29, 1989) (cited in 
Greenbaum at §  7.24), which stated, inter alia, that where the issue of guardianship arises with 
respect to a disabled client, the client’s lawyer should institute “maximum safeguards . . . to avoid 
unnecessary revealing of secrets and confidences of the client.” Op. 89-3, at 1. 
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1.15:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.15 differs significantly from MR 1.15. 
Rule 1.15(a) contains a number of additions designed to incorporate the various Ohio-specific 
aspects of IOLTA accounts. With respect to such accounts, it provides a detailed checklist of the 
records that must be maintained for client and third-party funds (see subdivisions (a)(1)-(5)) and other 
property. These records are to be retained for seven years after termination of the representation or the 
proper disbursement of the funds and/or property, whichever event comes first. 
Rule 1.15(b) tracks paragraph (b) of the Model Rule, except that the words “or obtaining a waiver of” 
have been inserted after the word “paying.” 
Rule 1.15(c) is identical to paragraph (c) of the Model Rule. 
Rule 1.15(d) differs from paragraph (d) of the Model Rule in the following respects: (1) a new second 
sentence has been added by amendment effective January 1, 2010; pursuant thereto, a third person’s 
interest must be one of which the lawyer has actual knowledge and is limited to statutory liens, final 
judgments disposing of funds or property, or written agreements guaranteeing payment from specific 
funds or property, (2) the words “or a third person, confirmed in writing,” have been added after “by 
agreement with the client” in what is now the third sentence, (3) the latter portion of the Model Rule 
second sentence has been split into a separate sentence beginning with the word “Upon”, and (4) in 
that sentence the words “funds or other” have been added prior to the final word “property.” 
Ohio Rule 1.15(e) contains the following changes: In the first sentence the same “funds or other” has 
been added before the first “property”; “lawyer shall hold the funds or other” has been added before 
the second “property”; after the second “property”, the words “shall be kept separate by the lawyer” 
have been deleted and “pursuant to division (a) of this rule” substituted in their place. In the second 
sentence, “funds or other” has again been added before “property”. 
Ohio Rules 1.15(f), (g), and (h) have no counterparts in the Model Rule. Division (f) deals with 
duties concerning client funds and the records required by division (a) upon dissolution of a law firm; 
division (g) deals with the transfer of client funds upon sale of a law practice; and division (h) deals 
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with further duties of lawyers or a firm having an interest in a business providing law-related services, 
with respect to noninterest-bearing funds of clients or third persons, notification of the existence of an 
interest-bearing trust account, and the Gov Bar R VI 1(F) reporting requirement. 
 
1.15:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.15(a): DR 9-102. 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.15(b): DR 9-102(A)(1). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.15(c): DR 9-102(A). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.15(d), (e), (f) & (g): None. [The 
Correlation Table is in error with respect to division (g); it corresponds to former DR 9-102(C). In 
addition, division (d) generally corresponds with the duties concerning client funds and other 
property set forth in former DR 9-102(B)(1), (3) & (4).] 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.15(h): DR 9-102(D) & (E). 
  
1.15:110  Ohio IOLTA Plan and Rule 1.15 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  9.40 (1996). 
History: Former OH DR 9-102, originally adopted in 1970, was amended effective June 19, 1985 by 
adding subsection (C) to take into account the passage of legislation authorizing lawyers to establish 
Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts (IOLTA). ORC 4705.09. OH DR 9-102(C) (which 
subsequently became 9-102(D)) provided that nothing in the Code of Professional Responsibility 
shall limit lawyers from using IOLTA accounts as permitted by ORC 4705.09-.10. Two further 
amendments were made to OH DR 9-102, the first effective November 1, 2002 and the second 
effective February 1, 2003. The November 2002 amendment added ORC 3953.231 to statutory 
provisions listed in subsection (C), and added a new subsection (D), which spells out the obligation of 
a lawyer, law firm, or ancillary business related to the practice of law to (1) maintain funds of clients 
or third persons in an IOLTA account established in an eligible depository institution as required by 
the statutory provisions or by any rules adopted by the Ohio Legal Assistance Foundation (“OLAF”) 
pursuant to ORC 120.52, (2) notify the OLAF of the existence of an IOLTA account, and (3) comply 
with the reporting requirements contained in Gov Bar R VI 1(F). The February 1, 2003 amendment 
added a new subsection (C), dealing with the obligation to transfer funds held under OH DR 9-102(A) 
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when a law practice is sold. Former subsection (C) became subsection (D), and former subsection (D) 
subsection (E). 
Present status: These OH DR 9-102 provisions are now found, with further elaboration, in Ohio Rule 
1.15. 
Thus, Ohio Rule 1.15(a) provides the overall obligation concerning client property, third-party 
property, IOLTA accounts, and record keeping with respect to such client and third-party funds and 
other property. For property, the lawyer must maintain a record containing the required information; 
for funds, subdivisions (1) through (5) detail the record-keeping obligations of the lawyer. 
Like ORC 4705.09, but unlike former DR 9-102(A), Rule 1.15(a) specifies that the account is to be 
interest-bearing (as did 9-102(E)(1)). Also unlike either 4705.09 or 9-102(A), the obligations 
pursuant to the Rule apply to funds and other property of third parties as well as clients. 
Rule 1.15(b) restates former 9-102(A)(1) and permits a lawyer to deposit his or her own funds in a 
client trust account only for the purpose of paying, or obtaining a waiver of, bank service charges on 
the account. 
Rule 1.15(c) provides that legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance shall be deposited 
in such an account and can be withdrawn only as earned or incurred. As stated by the Task Force in its 
Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.15, former 9-102(A) precluded the placement of advances for 
costs and expenses in the trust account. In Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Helbling, 124 Ohio St.3d 510, 
2010 Ohio 955, 924 N.E.2d 364, respondent violated 1.15(c) “by failing to maintain $1,790.92, 
advanced by client one for litigation expenses, in his IOLTA account.” Id. at para. 7. 
Rule 1.15(d) requires prompt notice to a client or third party on receipt by the lawyer of funds and 
other property in which such person has a lawful interest. Third person interests under the rule are 
limited to those of which the lawyer has actual knowledge, and to statutory liens, final judgments 
disposing of such funds or property, or written agreements by the client guaranteeing payment from 
specific funds or property. Unless the law otherwise permits or the parties otherwise contract in 
writing, the lawyer must promptly deliver such property to the person entitled thereto, and, upon 
request by such person, must promptly render a full accounting. Some of these obligations concerning 
client funds and other property were generally set forth in former 9-102(B)(1), (3) & (4). 
Rule 1.15(e) requires that funds or other property held by the lawyer in which two or more persons 
(one of whom can be the lawyer) claim an interest is to be held separately until the dispute is resolved. 
There was no comparable OHCPR provision. 
Rule 1.15(f) deals with accounting and record-keeping obligations upon dissolution of a law firm. 
There was no comparable provision in the OHCPR. 
Rule 1.15(g), as did former 9-102(C) under the Code, spells out the duties with respect to funds held 
pursuant to this Rule upon the sale of a law practice. 
Rule 1.15(h), in slightly different and somewhat confusing language, carries forward the safekeeping, 
record-keeping, notice, and reporting obligations formerly contained in 9-102(E). See section 
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In Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-3, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 
(Aug. 15, 2008), the Board opined that a lawyer holding client funds in her trust account, but not 
knowing the client’s identity or whereabouts, should follow the procedures set forth in ORC Chapter 
169 for disposition and reporting of unclaimed funds; doing so does not violate the lawyer’s duty of 
safekeeping set forth in Rule 1.15. 
The propriety of garnishment of funds held in an IOLTA trust account was at issue in Hadassah, The 
Women’s Zionist Org. of America, Inc. v. Schwartz, 197 Ohio App.3d 94, 2011 Ohio 5247, 966 
N.E.2d 298 (Hamilton); the court invoked Rule 1.15 in holding that the rule mandates that property 
belonging to a client be kept in a trust account, separate from the lawyer’s property: “BG&L [the law 
firm] kept Schwartz’s [the client] $150,000 retainer in an IOLTA account, which indicates that, at that 
specific point in time, Schwartz, and not BG&L, retained the ownership rights over the $150,000 
retainer. Therefore, the retainer was property subject to garnishment,” id. at para. 9, by Schwartz’s 
judgment creditor, Hadassah. 
Statutory provisions: Pursuant to ORC 4705.09(A)(2), lawyers are required to establish IOLTA 
accounts for deposit of client funds that “are nominal in amount or are to be held by the attorney . . . 
for a short period of time.” The determination of whether funds meet this standard “rests in the sound 
judgment of the particular attorney” and “[n]o imputation of professional misconduct shall arise from 
the attorney’s exercise of judgment in these matters.” ORC 4705.09(A)(3). 
In 1990, the General Counsel of the Ohio State Bar Association gave the following guidance to 
attorneys trying to determine whether it is appropriate to place particular client funds in an IOLTA 
account: 
The generally accepted test as to what funds should go into the IOLTA 
account is whether the amount of interest that can be earned on the 
funds by opening a separate account, would be less than the attorney 
would need to charge for the time spent in opening a separate account 
and maintaining it. 
Albert L. Bell, Client Funds and Property: Handle with Care, Ohio Law., Jul.-Aug. 1990, at 28. 
For a more recent checklist, see Jeffrey D. Fortkamp, A Guide to Creating and Using an IOLTA 
Account, Ohio Law., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 42. These rules of thumb are now detailed in Rule 1.15 
cmt. [3A], pursuant to which client funds must go into an IOLTA account, unless the lawyer can 
otherwise earn income for the client in excess of the costs incurred to secure such income. 
All interest earned on these accounts is to be transferred, at least quarterly, to the Treasurer of the 
State of Ohio for deposit in the state’s legal aid fund. ORC 4705.09(B); ORC 4705.10(A)(3)(a). No 
part of the interest can be paid to the lawyer, the client, or any third person. ORC 4705.09(B). The 
purpose of the legal aid fund is to provide financial assistance to legal aid societies in the state. ORC 
120.52. A less-than-rosy status report on this system is provided in Eugene P. Whetzel, Addressing 
the decline in IOLTA/IOTA revenue, Ohio Law, May/June 2012, at 25. 
In terms of the formal requirements for the account itself, it is to be in the name of “the attorney, firm, 
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or association that established and is maintaining it” and must be identified as “an IOLTA or an 
interest on lawyer’s trust account.” ORC 4705.09(A)(1). No funds of the attorney can be deposited in 
the account “except that funds sufficient to pay or enable a waiver of depository institution service 
charges on the account shall be deposited in the account,” and other funds of the lawyer, firm, or legal 
professional association may be deposited where allowed under the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. ORC 4705.09(A)(3). [This reference to the Code will presumably be changed in the 
future to the Rules of Professional Conduct.] 
The account may be established at any appropriately insured bank, savings bank, or savings and loan 
authorized to do business in Ohio, or at an appropriately insured credit union. ORC 4705.09(A)(1). 
The funds must be subject to withdrawal on demand, or as soon as permitted by federal law, and the 
account must pay a rate of interest not less than that offered to regular nonattorney depositors. ORC 
4705.10(A)(1)-(2). 
Rules governing IOLTA accounts became effective on April 1, 2002. The rules are summarized in 75 
Ohio St. B. Ass’n Rep. No. 13, at 264-65 (April 1, 2002); the full text is available online at 
www.olaf.org/ioltaiota/rules.shtml; they coincide with the November 1, 2002 amendments to what 
was formerly OH DR 9-102(E). 
In other jurisdictions, IOLTA programs have come under constitutional attack. In upholding a state 
IOLTA program in Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216 (2003), the United States Supreme Court 
found that it did not constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 
  
1.15:120  Ohio Client Security Fund 
Gov Bar R VIII establishes the Clients’ Security Fund of Ohio. The fund was established to 
compensate clients who suffer financial harm as a result of certain dishonest conduct by their 
attorneys where insurance or bond is unavailable to cover the claim. Gov Bar R VIII 3(D). General 
information on how to contact the fund is provided below: 
NAME:  Clients’ Security Fund of Ohio 
ADMINISTRATOR:  Janet Green-Marbley 
ADDRESS:  65 South Front Street, 5th Floor 
          Columbus, Ohio 43215-3431 
PHONE NUMBERS:  (614) 387-9390 or (800) 231-1680  
INTERNET WEB SITE: 
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Boards/clientSecurity/default.asp 
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Gov Bar R VIII 3 sets forth the eligibility requirements for claimants. The fund is available to cover 
client losses occasioned by dishonest conduct, such as defalcation, embezzlement, wrongful taking or 
conversion, by an attorney licensed to practice law in Ohio at the time of the misconduct, that caused 
the client a financial loss. Gov Bar R VIII 3-4. An award can be made only if the loss arose out of an 
attorney/client relationship and the lawyer has either resigned, been disciplined by the Ohio Supreme 
Court, convicted of embezzlement or misappropriation, or cannot be proceeded against in 
disciplinary or criminal proceedings because he or she cannot be located or is deceased. Gov Bar R 
VIII 3(C). The claim must be filed within one year of either the occurrence or the discovery of the 
loss, subject to certain tolling provisions. Id. Clients with family or business ties with the attorney are 
for the most part ineligible to seek compensation, absent a showing of extreme hardship or special 
circumstances. Gov Bar R VIII 3(F). 
Gov Bar R VIII 7(F) sets forth guidelines to be employed in determining the amount of the award; 
they include consideration of: 
(1) The amounts available and likely to become available to the fund 
for the payment of claims and the size and number of claims that are 
likely to be presented; 
(2) The amount of the claimant’s loss as compared with the amount of 
losses sustained by other eligible claimants; 
(3) The degree of hardship suffered by the claimant as a result of the 
loss; 
(4) The degree of negligence, if any, of the claimant that may have 
contributed to the loss; 
(5) Any special or unusual circumstances. 
The maximum amount that can be awarded is $ 75,000. Gov Bar R VIII 5. If an award is made, the 
Fund acquires the client’s direct claim against the attorney. Gov Bar R VIII 6(A).  Attorney fees 
cannot be paid from the proceeds of an award unless the Board so directs.  Gov Bar R VIII 6(B).  For 
a disciplinary case involving violation of this Rule, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 113 Ohio 
St.3d 344, 2007 Ohio 2074, 865 N.E.2d 873. 
Determinations of eligibility and award are made by the Board of Commissioners of the Clients’ 
Security Fund of Ohio. Gov Bar R VIII 7(F). All such determinations of the Board are final. Id. 
Claims filed and records obtained in considering claims are confidential. If an award is made, 
however, the parties’ names and the nature of the claim may be disclosed. Gov Bar R VIII 7(E). 
  
1.15:200  Safeguarding and Safekeeping Property 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.15(a), (d) 
687





ABA Model Rule 1.15(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  9.30-9.35, 
9.37-9.38 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  45:109 
ALI-LGL §§  44-46 
Wolfram §  4.8 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  9.30-9.33, 9.37-9.38 (1996). 
Restrictions on handling client or third-person funds and other property - General rationale: In the 
course of representing a client, a lawyer often is entrusted with substantial funds and other valuables. 
Lawyer mishandling of those funds or valuables has been a repeated cause of lawyer discipline. Rule 
1.15, much like OH DR 9-102 before it, sets forth a structure that, if followed, substantially limits the 
prospect for using, or being tempted to use, client funds for the lawyer’s own purposes and/or to the 
client’s or a third person’s detriment. A significant difference between new Rule 1.15 and former OH 
DR 9-102 is that the latter dealt only with client property; the Rule expressly covers property of third 
persons as well. The lawyer’s duties under Rule 1.15 with respect to funds or other property held by 
the lawyer that are claimed by or owed to a third person are extensively discussed in Bd. of Comm’rs 
on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2007-7, 2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (Dec. 7, 2007). (This 
Board opinion was one of the bases for the amendment to Rule 1.15(d) and Comment[4], effective 
January 1, 2010. See 82 OBAR No35, at xxxi (Aug. 31, 2009).) 
The former rule (as presumably Ohio Rule 1.15 will do) did more than sanction intentional 
mishandling of client funds or valuables in a way that harms the client; lawyers were sanctioned even 
when their conduct resulted in no harm to their clients. For example: 
 Using entrusted client fund from IOLTA account to advance money to another client for 
living expenses violated, inter alia, DR 9-102(B)(3), even though IOLTA funds repaid, 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Laatsch, 122 Ohio St.3d 140, 2009 Ohio 4204, 914 N.E.2d 1032. 
 Failure to deposit unearned fees and other client funds in his law firm’s IOLTA account, 
Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Matejkovic, 121 Ohio St.3d 266, 2009 Ohio 776, 903 N.E.2d 
633; Disciplinary Counsel v. Zigan, 118 Ohio St.3d 180, 2008 Ohio 1976, 887 N.E.2d 334. 
For some reason, the Court in Zigan characterizes the 9-102(A) violation as “prohibiting a 
lawyer from depositing personal funds in law firm accounts,” id. at para. 4, but this does not 
accurately describe what occurred in Zigan. (A case in which a lawyer did violate 9-102(A) 
by placing his personal funds in his client-trust account, in an attempt to hide them from 
creditors, is Disciplinary Counsel v. Vogtsberger, 119 Ohio St.3d 458, 2008 Ohio 4571, 
895 N.E.2d 158.) 
 Misusing IOLTA account by treating it as regular office account violated former OH DR 
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9-102(A), despite lack of any evidence suggesting that anyone was harmed by respondent’s 
mismanagement.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 381, 2006 Ohio 1194, 843 
N.E.2d 1198. 
 Commingling of unearned fee with lawyer’s office account containing business and personal 
monies violated OH DR 9-102(A), even though clients suffered no harm. Toledo Bar Ass’n 
v. Johnson, 121 Ohio St.3d 226, 2009 Ohio 777, 903 N.E.2d 306; Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Witt, 103 Ohio St.3d 434, 2004 Ohio 5463, 816 N.E.2d 1036. 
 Placement of client’s insurance settlement proceeds in business checking account (lawyer had 
no client trust account) violated former OH DR 9-102(A), even though lawyer immediately 
wrote check to client for her share of proceeds.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zarensky, 
94 Ohio St.3d 17, 759 N.E.2d 777 (2001). 
 Using unearned client funds to pay office expenses is sanctionable conduct, even where the 
client suffers no harm.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Thompson, 69 Ohio St.2d 667, 433 N.E.2d 
602 (1982). 
That a violation occurred in an attempt to aid a client was no excuse, particularly where the failure to 
maintain client funds in a fiduciary account was part of a scheme to conceal the client’s assets.  Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel v. Sopkovich, 75 Ohio St.3d 192, 661 N.E.2d 1066 (1996) (concealment 
to help client qualify for public assistance). 
Further, lawyers were disciplined for ignorant or mistaken violations of the former rule’s provisions: 
 Through ignorance, an attorney never set up appropriate trust accounts.  Richland County 
Bar Ass’n v. Davis, 57 Ohio St.3d 196, 566 N.E.2d 678 (1991). 
 The fact that a lawyer did not intend to violate former OH DR 9-102(B) or to harm clients did 
not excuse the misconduct.  Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Rubinstein, 22 Ohio St.3d 
212, 490 N.E.2d 584 (1986). But cf. Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Thompson, 69 Ohio St.2d 667, 
670, 433 N.E.2d 602, 604 (1982) (imposing sanctions, but treating “misapprehension with 
regard to the impropriety of [the conduct]” as a mitigating factor in setting the sanction). 
 A lawyer was sanctioned for “forgetting” to pay a client’s medical providers out of settlement 
funds and withdrawing those funds from the trust account “by mistake,” even though he 
corrected the problem when he learned of the grievance.  Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Snow, 72 
Ohio St.3d 409, 650 N.E.2d 858 (1995). 
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As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated: ‘“There are few ethical breaches which impact more 
negatively on the integrity of the legal profession than the misuse of client’s funds.’ This is true 
whether the attorney’s actions are due to dishonesty or, as was the case herein, ignorance and 
ineptitude.” Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucey, 14 Ohio St.3d 18, 21, 470 N.E.2d 888, 890 
(1984) (quoting the oft-repeated language of Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Morton, 5 Ohio 
St.3d 206, 208, 450 N.E.2d 275, 277 (1983)). 
Nor did the fact that the mishandling of funds resulted from the lawyer’s failure to supervise his 
employees relieve the lawyer of responsibility under this provision, although it was, at times, 
considered a mitigating factor in assessing punishment. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lile, 
30 Ohio St.3d 5, 505 N.E.2d 955 (1987). Compare Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Thompson, 69 Ohio 
St.2d 667, 433 N.E.2d 602 (1982) (fact that wrongful withdrawals from trust account were made by 
substitute secretary, who was unfamiliar with the accounts, was treated as mitigating factor), with 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kick, 28 Ohio St.3d 91, 502 N.E.2d 640 (1986) (mishandling of 
client funds through secretary’s theft is not mitigating factor where lawyer’s oversight of client 
accounts was insufficient and lawyer was having personal relationship with secretary). Failure to 
supervise was also treated as a form of neglect. See section 5.3:300. 
Restrictions on handling client or third-person funds and other property - Separation of lawyer funds 
from client or third-person funds: Rule 1.15(a) requires the lawyer to hold “property of clients or 
third persons that is in the lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the 
lawyer’s own property.” Division (a) further provides that funds of clients or third persons are to be 
deposited in “a separate interest-bearing account in a financial institution authorized to do business in 
Ohio and maintained in the state where the lawyer’s office is situated,” id., typically an Interest on 
Lawyer’s Trust Account (IOLTA). See Rule 1.15 cmt. [3A]; see also discussion of IOLTA accounts 
in section 1.15:110.  
The first case to find a violation of Rule 1.15(a) is Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 
58, 2008 Ohio 3340, 891 N.E.2d 749 (drawing check on client trust account to pay rent for firm’s 
office space). The Board of Commissioners addressed the requirements of Rule 1.15(a) (and (c)) in 
the context of credit-card payments in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2007-3, 
2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Apr. 13, 2007). Opinion 2007-3 is discussed this section infra 
at “Exceptions to prohibition on depositing lawyer funds with client or third-person funds.” 
The case law under 1.15(a) and its Code analog, former DR 9-102, usually falls into three broad 
categories – failure to establish a client trust account, failure to deposit client or third party funds into 
such an account, and commingling of client and lawyer funds, typically by placing lawyer funds in the 
trust account or by placing client or third party funds in the lawyer’s business or personal account. 
No client trust account:  Examples of this violation include Disciplinary Counsel v. Maley, 119 
Ohio St.3d 2176, 2008 Ohio 3923, 893 N.E.2d 180; Columbus Bar Ass’n v. DeVillers, 116 Ohio 
St.3d 33, 2007 Ohio 5552, 876 N.E.2d 530; Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Sebree, 111 Ohio St.3d 297, 
2006 Ohio 5788, 856 N.E.2d 210. Cf. Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Weiner, 40 Ohio St.2d 7, 317 N.E.2d 
783 (1974) (attorney sanctioned in part for maintaining trust account outside Ohio, rather than in-state 
as required). 
Failure to deposit in trust account funds to which lawyer not entitled:  As noted previously, Rule 
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1.15(a) differs from DR 9-102 in that the rule calls for deposit in client trust accounts not only of 
client funds, but funds of third parties as well. For a client-fund violation under the Rules, see Akron 
Bar Ass’n v. Maher, 121 Ohio St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 356, 901 N.E.2d 803 (failure to deposit 
unearned client fees in client trust account violated 1.15(a) & (c)). The obligation under the Code was 
limited to client funds, and the failure to place such funds in a client trust account was a common 
violation of DR 9-102. See, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 2008 Ohio 
3340, 891 N.E.2d 749 (pre-February 1, 2007 failure to place unearned client funds in interest-bearing 
client trust account violated 9-102(E)(1)); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Schwieterman, 115 Ohio St.3d 
1, 2007 Ohio 4266, 873 N.E.2d 810 (failure to deposit unearned retainers into firm’s trust account 
violated 9-102(A)).  
Commingling:  This is another common breach of safekeeping obligations, illustrated under the rules 
by cases such as Disciplinary Counsel v. DeGidio, 135 Ohio St.2d 407, 2013 Ohio 1509, 987 
N.E.2d 681 (commingling of personal and client funds in client trust account; deposit of personal 
funds into trust account; use of account to pay personal and business expenses); Cleveland Bar Ass’n 
v. Slavin, 121 Ohio St.3d 618, 2009 Ohio 2015, 906 N.E.2d 1121 (commingling of earned fees with 
client funds in client trust account); and, under the Code, by Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabroff, 123 
Ohio St.3d 182, 2009 Ohio 4205, 915 N.E.2d 307 (commingling of client and personal funds in trust 
account violated DR 9-102(A)); Disciplinary Counsel v. Voltsberger, 119 Ohio St.3d 458, 2008 
Ohio 4571, 895 N.E.2d 158 (placing personal funds in client trust account in attempt to evade 
creditors). 
More often the commingling occurred, not in the client trust account, but in the lawyer’s business or 
personal account. E.g., Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Troy, 121 Ohio St.3d 51, 2009 Ohio 502, 901 
N.E.2d 809 (depositing unearned fees into business operating account violated 9-102(A)); Maley, 
119 Ohio St.3d 217 supra (unearned retainers placed in business checking account); Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n v. McCray, 109 Ohio St.3d 43, 2006 Ohio 1828, 845 N.E.2d 509 (placing funds received 
from client into office operating account violated DR 9-102(A)(2); “unearned fees belong to a client 
and must be kept in a client trust account,” id. at para. 13).  
If the funds were not placed in a trust account as required, or were withdrawn from the account before 
earned, misappropriation of the client’s funds for the lawyer’s own purposes often followed. See 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Brown, 121 Ohio St.3d 445, 2009 Ohio 1249, 905 N.E.2d 184 
(misappropriation of client funds violated Rule 1.15(a) & (c)); Mahoning Bar Ass’n v. Palombaro, 
121 Ohio St.3d 351, 2009 Ohio 1223, 904 N.E.2d 529, at para. 30 (“Respondent regularly wrote 
checks from his client’s trust account to pay his own business expenses”; violation of 1.15(a), (b) & 
(c)); Bubna, 116 Ohio St.3d 294 supra (use of client trust account to pay personal and business 
expenses; 9-102(A) violated); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Greenberger, 113 Ohio St.3d 162, 2007 
Ohio 1255, 863 N.E.2d 167 (instead of depositing client funds in his firm’s trust account, respondent 
used the funds as his own). Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Winkfield, 107 Ohio St.3d 360, 2006 Ohio 6, 
839 N.E.2d 924 (respondent “routinely misappropriated client funds from his trust account for his 
personal use,” id. at para. 33). A lawyer/trustee of a testamentary trust who loaned funds from the 
trust to himself without express authorization in the trust instrument or approval of the probate court 
ran afoul of DR 9-102(A) in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kurtz, 82 Ohio St.3d 55, 693 
N.E.2d 1080 (1998). As Disciplinary Counsel v. Murraine, 130 Ohio St.3d 397, 2011 Ohio 5795, 
958 N.E.2d 942, makes clear, however, Rule 1.15(b) is violated by commingling, even if the lawyer 
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did not use client funds for personal expenses. (In the Murraine case, the respondent for a brief 
period used his client's trust account as a personal bank account, depositing his municipal paychecks 
and paying his bills from it.) 
Former DR 9-102(A) precluded placing “advances for costs and expenses” into client trust accounts. 
In contrast, the Rule requires the lawyer to do so. Ohio Rule 1.15(c). As is noted in the Ohio Code 
Comparison to Rule 1.15, “[t]he vast majority of jurisdictions consider advances for expenses to be 
client funds that must be deposited in the trust account.” Various provisions of the Ohio Revised Code 
(ORC 120.52, 3953.231, 4705.09, 4705.10) also control the establishment and handling of trust 
accounts and should be consulted by the attorney. 
IOLTA money belonging to one client cannot be used to discharge the lawyer’s obligation to pay 
another client amounts to which the latter is entitled. Disciplinary Counsel v. McCauley, 114 Ohio 
St.3d 461, 2007 Ohio 4259, 973 N.E.2d 269 (violation of 9-102(B)(3) & (4)). Nor can funds be 
shifted from one client’s trust account to another in order to cover shortfalls in any client’s trust 
account. See, e.g., again under the former OHCPR, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lawrence, 
72 Ohio St.3d 420, 650 N.E.2d 867 (1995) (9-102(A) violation). As a related matter, the 
unauthorized loan of one client’s funds to another was also found to violate former OH DR 9-102(A).  
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mesi, 72 Ohio St.3d 45, 647 N.E.2d 473 (1995). 
Restrictions on handling client or third-person funds and other property - Exceptions to prohibition on 
depositing lawyer funds with client or third-person funds: As a general rule, lawyers and law firms 
may not place their own funds in client accounts. However, the lawyer may deposit funds for the 
purpose of paying or obtaining a waiver of service charges on the accounts, but only in an amount 
necessary for that purpose. Rule 1.15(b) (carrying forward the exception found in OH DR 
9-102(A)(1)). While hardly a model of clarity, Ohio Rule 1.15 cmt. [2] purports to elaborate. As best 
as we can discern, it provides as follows: First, lawyer funds can be commingled with client funds in 
a client trust account to pay (or obtain a waiver of) bank service charges. Two kinds of service charges 
may be netted against the client’s account - (1) transaction charges (i.e., per check, per deposit charge) 
and (2) monthly maintenance charges. Seven kinds of bank service charges (funded by the lawyer) 
may not be netted against the client’s account: (1) check-printing charges, (2) NSF charges, (3) 
stop-payment charges, (4) teller and ATM charges, (5) electronic fund transfer fees, (6) brokerage 
and credit-card charges, and (7) any other business-related expense not included in the deductible 
transaction and maintenance charges. Ohio Rule 1.15 cmt. [2]. The comment also refers to an 
“IOLTA depository” with respect to the deductible fees, and to a “client trust account depository” 
with respect to those that are not deductible. Are not these depositories one and the same? See Rule 
1.15(a) (“The account shall be designated as a “client trust account” [or] “IOLTA account”). Why 
inject confusion in Comment [2] if they are, as we believe they are, one and the same? (To the extent 
they are not, an explanation should be provided.) 
In any event, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2007-3, 2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 3 (Apr. 13, 2007), citing to Comment [2], advises that a lawyer “may place his or her own 
funds into a client trust account to pay brokerage and credit card service charges.  Credit card service 
charges are the responsibility of the lawyer and may not be deducted from the interest earned on a 
client trust account.”  Id. at *8. 
Second, former OH DR 9-102(A)(2) recognized that, at times, funds may belong in part to the client 
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and in part, either presently or potentially, to the lawyer or firm, such as money provided as a retainer 
or funds paid by an opponent in settlement or in response to an adverse judgment out of which the 
lawyer’s fee is to be paid. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-07, 1989 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 14 (Apr. 14, 1989) (treating retainer in this fashion); accord Ohio State 
Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 90-8 (Oct. 31, 1990) (citing Opinion 89-07 with approval). If a client paid a 
flat fee for services in advance of representation, those funds could be placed in the lawyer’s business 
account, rather than the client’s trust account. Since the funds were given to the lawyer in exchange 
for the lawyer’s promise to carry out the representation in the future, the funds immediately became 
the lawyer’s property rather than the client’s. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
96-4, 1996 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (June 14, 1996) (approving practice in the context of a 
flat-fee arrangement paid in advance of representation in a criminal matter). 
To the extent the funds belong in part to the client and in part to the lawyer, OH DR 9-102(A)(2) 
provided that such funds had to be placed in the client’s trust account. See Cuyahoga County Bar 
Ass’n v. Hardiman, 100 Ohio St.3d 260, 2003 Ohio 5596, 798 N.E.2d 369 (DR 9-102(A)(2) 
violated where lawyer put retainer in office safe rather than IOLTA account, even though question as 
to whether attorney-client relationship existed; “the better practice is to err on the side of caution by 
placing the funds into an IOLTA account,” id. at para. 14). The lawyer may then withdraw the 
portion to which the lawyer or law firm has an undisputed right. Cf. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Lile, 30 Ohio St.3d 5, 6, 505 N.E.2d 955, 955 (1987) (lawyer sanctioned for removing funds from 
trust account to pay office expenses where “the amount of attorneys fees due from [the client] was not 
established” at the time of the withdrawal). 
The result that was called for by DR 9-102(A)(2) – funds belonging in part to the client and in part to 
the lawyer should be placed in a trust account, but the portion belonging to the lawyer can be 
withdrawn as earned – was essentially the procedure recommended by the Board of Commissioners 
in Opinion 2007-3 pursuant to Rule 1.15, even though the 9-102(A)(2) language has not been carried 
forward as such into the Rule. In the context of credit card payments by clients to a lawyer having 
only one merchant account to handle such payments, the Board opined that the proper procedure is 
that all credit card payments should go into the trust account, but any of those amounts constituting 
payments for earned legal fees and reimbursements of expenses should then promptly be transferred 
to the lawyer’s business account. 
This arrangement honors the strict requirement of Rule 1.15(c) that 
legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance go into a client 
trust account, and accommodates Rule 1.15(a) by the prompt transfer 
of the earned fees and expense reimbursement into the business 
account. 
Id. at *5. (Ideally, the lawyer will have two merchant accounts for credit card payments, one crediting 
payments to the trust account and the other crediting payments to a business account. But, as the 
Board notes, this is not always practicable or feasible.) 
To the extent the client disputed the lawyer’s right to the funds, the funds had to remain in the client 
account until the dispute was resolved. OH DR 9-102(A)(2). While not discussed directly in the cases, 
it appears from their facts that where the withdrawal of funds for attorney fees was not authorized by 
the client, the lawyer’s right to the fees was “disputed” within the meaning of the former rule. See, 
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e.g., Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Green, 1 Ohio St.3d 48, 438 N.E.2d 406 (1982) (withdrawal of 
fees from estate checking account “without prior agreement with his client” violated OH DR 
9-102(A)(2)). See generally Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 139 (Feb. 23, 1979) (even where attorney has 
ultimate right to payment, the lawyer could not make a withdrawal from a particular fund to secure 
that payment unless the withdrawal was authorized by the client; until then claim was “disputed” 
within the meaning of OH DR 9-102(A)(2)). 
The 9-102(A)(2) disputed-funds exception is now in substance covered by 1.15(e). Division (e) states 
the rule in terms of a lawyer’s possession of property in which two or more persons claim an interest. 
One of those “two or more persons” can be the lawyer. Id. In such a case, the lawyer must hold the 
funds or other property pursuant to division (a) until the dispute is resolved, with any undisputed 
amounts to be “promptly distribute[d] by the lawyer.” Id. Presumably, the prior case law under 
9-102(A)(2) with respect to retainers and flat fees, etc., discussed above, fits within the 1.15(e) rubric 
as property that is not, in the ordinary course, disputed and belongs to the lawyer. 
Restrictions on handling client or third-person funds and other property - Funds: Rule 1.15(a) 
contains a detailed checklist of the lawyer’s record-keeping obligations with respect to the funds of 
clients and third persons in the lawyer’s possession. See Rule 1.15(a)(1)-(5). These obligations are 
further discussed in section 1.15:230 of the treatise. 
Restrictions on handling client or third-person funds and other property - Other property: Rule 1.15(a) 
also addresses how the lawyer should handle property of the client or a third person in the lawyer’s 
possession other than funds. For such items, the lawyer must maintain a record that identifies the 
property, the date received, the person on whose behalf it is held, and the date of distribution. Id. For 
decisions dealing with such property under the former rule (9-102(B)(2)), see, e.g., Columbus Bar 
Ass’n v. Garrison, 68 Ohio St.3d 461, 628 N.E.2d 1341 (1994) (rule violated by failure to promptly 
identify, label, and store securely client securities and properties); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Kasson, 
53 Ohio St.3d 268, 560 N.E.2d 203 (1990) (loss of an original invoice given the attorney by the 
client violated this rule). As was the case in Kasson under the Code, losing a client’s property is a 
violation under the Rules as well. The Court so held in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Royer, 133 Ohio St.3d 
545, 2012 Ohio 5147, 979 N.E.2d 329, where respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) by having “lost 
evidence that was vital to the [medical] malpractice claim” of his client. Id. at para. 5. The Court 
does not elaborate on what this “vital” evidence was or how the respondent came to lose it. 
In this regard, Rule 1.15 cmt. [1] states that the “lawyer should hold property of others with the care 
required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some 
other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances.” Comment [1] also adds that the 
required records may be maintained electronically. 
Restrictions on handling client or third-person funds and other property - Range of punishment: 
Under the OHCPR, misuse of client funds typically led to a substantial disciplinary sanction. In 1985 
the Court commented that “in recent years this court has articulated a consistent policy of imposing 
either indefinite suspension or permanent disbarment in cases involving the commingling or other 
misuse of client funds.” Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Gross, 17 Ohio St.3d 206, 208, 478 N.E.2d 792, 794 
(1985). Accord Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Herron, 112 Ohio St.3d 564, 2007 Ohio 812, 862 N.E.2d 
107 (violation of DR 9-102(A) and 9-102(B)(3) & (4), together with failure to cooperate in 
investigation resulted in indefinite suspension concurrent with that which respondent was already 
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serving; Green (see infra) followed); Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Green, 97 Ohio St.3d 119, 2002 Ohio 
5314, 776 N.E.2d 1060 (indefinite suspension imposed for violation of OH DR 9-102 (A) & (B), 
failure to keep appropriate records of client’s funds and commingling those funds with respondent’s 
own, and failure to cooperate in the investigation). In 1988 the Court noted that suspensions of at least 
one year were common for such violations. In Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Fox, 101 Ohio St.3d 154, 
2004 Ohio 300, 803 N.E.2d 395, the respondent was suspended for 18 months with 12 months stayed 
for violation of former OH DR 9-102(A), 9-102(B)(3) and 9-102(B)(4), where substantial mitigating 
factors were present. The Court noted that “we have no clear-and-convincing evidence of theft here.” 
Id. at para. 8. 
In a 1996 case, the Court found that a lawyer violated former OH DR 9-102(B)(4) when, after settling 
the client’s case, the lawyer withheld funds in excess of the fee agreement and, although admitting the 
error, failed to repay the client fully for over five years.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Brooks, 75 Ohio 
St.3d 524, 664 N.E.2d 900 (1996). In ordering a one-year suspension from practice, six months of 
which to be stayed upon payment of full restitution plus interest to the client, the Court commented: 
Any lighter sanction would be a message to the bar that a lawyer may 
wrongfully withhold a significant amount of funds owing to a client for 
an indeterminate amount of time and receive little more than an order 
from this court that the funds must be repaid with interest. 
Id. at 526, 664 N.E.2d at 902. The lawyer’s partner, who learned of the failure to return the 
overpayment but failed to rectify the situation, was, by this inaction, also found in violation of OH 
DR 9-102(B)(4) and was given a one-year suspension, all of which would be suspended upon proof of 
full restitution to the client of the overpayment and interest thereon.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Winkfield, 75 Ohio St.3d 527, 664 N.E.2d 902 (1996). Compare Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
McCord, 96 Ohio St.3d 21, 2002 Ohio 2587, 770 N.E.2d 571, where, even though respondent’s 
refusal to return an unearned fee forced the client to take the matter to arbitration and then sue to 
enforce the award, resulting in a default judgment in favor of the client, which judgment respondent 
still refused to pay, the Court saw fit to impose only a six-month suspension with the entire time 
stayed, provided full restitution was made to the client within fourteen days. 
In another 1996 opinion, however, the Court commented: “We have consistently held that 
misappropriation of client funds is an egregious violation of a lawyer’s ethical responsibilities and an 
appropriate sanction for such breach of trust is disbarment. [citations omitted]. We continue to adhere 
to that standard.” Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Connaughton, 75 Ohio St.3d 644, 645, 665 
N.E.2d 675, 676 (1996) (ordering disbarment rather than the indefinite suspension recommended by 
the Board). Accord Greene County Bar Ass’n v. Fodal, 100 Ohio St.3d 310, 2003 Ohio 5852, 798 
N.E.2d 1082 (“Respondent routinely took his clients’ money and provided nothing in return. In the 
absence of any compelling mitigating evidence, the sanction for this misconduct and his disregard of 
the disciplinary process is disbarment,” id. at para. 32; violation of OH DR 9-102(B)(4), among a 
panoply of other violations). But see Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kurtz, 82 Ohio St.3d 55, 
693 N.E.2d 1080 (1998) (Court acknowledged disbarment as the appropriate sanction, but, giving 
weight to the recommendation of the Board based on mitigating factors, concluded that the Board’s 
sanction of indefinite suspension was appropriate). Accord Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 122 Ohio 
St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 2371, 907 N.E.2d 1172; Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Rus, 106 Ohio St.3d 467, 
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2005 Ohio 5520, 835 N.E.2d 1252. 
In a 2011 case, Disciplinary Counsel v. Stubbs, 128 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011 Ohio 553, 944 N.E.2d 
1225, the respondent violated Rule 1.15(d) (and 8.4(c)) by misusing a client’s settlement proceeds to 
pay her own bills. Even though there were multiple aggravating factors and no mitigating factors, a 
unanimous Court imposed only an indefinite suspension, rather than disbarment, citing a similar 
result for “comparable conduct” in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Torian, 106 Ohio St.3d 14, 829 N.E.2d 
1210 (2005). Where the aggravating and mitigating factors were roughly balanced, violation of 
1.15(d) and 8.4(c) resulted in a two-year suspension with the last 18 months stayed in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Burchinal, 133 Ohio St.3d 38, 2012 Ohio 3882, 975 N.E.2d 960 (reciting the 
disbarment presumption for client-fund misappropriation, but recognizing that mitigating factors may 
support a lesser sanction, but one that required an actual suspension for “multiple acts of dishonesty.” 
Id. at paras. 17, 19). 
In determining the appropriate sanction, the Court does take into account the severity of the infraction, 
but it is important to realize that, in this area, even comparatively minor violations have resulted in 
substantial discipline. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Maguire, 131 Ohio St.3d 412, 2012 Ohio 
1298, 965 N.E.2d 996 (one-year suspension of respondent, who deposited her nursing paychecks in 
her client trust account and used it to pay personal bills; during the investigation, she informed relator 
that she had no plans to return to practice of law and had changed her status to inactive; her failure to 
cooperate in the investigation was a basis for the severity of the sanction); Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Morton, 5 Ohio St.3d 206, 450 N.E.2d 275 (1983) (isolated mismanagement of trust 
account involving disputed use of $500-$1000 of client money led to a one-year suspension). In 
Erie-Huron Counties Joint Certified Grievance Comm. v. Miles, 76 Ohio St.3d 574, 577, 669 
N.E.2d 831, 833 (1996), in imposing a one-year suspension without stay, the Court commented: 
[E]ven if there were no damage caused by respondent’s actions, we 
would be disinclined to relax our standards to the extent of imposing 
the one-year stayed suspension proposed by the board. We hold it of 
the utmost importance that attorneys maintain their personal and office 
accounts separate from their clients’ accounts and that the violation of 
that rule warrants a substantial sanction whether or not the client has 
been harmed. To find otherwise would be to encourage speculation 
with clients’ accounts. 
But if the infractions are minor and mitigating factors are present, the Court on occasion has settled 
for a public reprimand. For example, commingling funds which caused no harm to the client has led 
to a public reprimand, rather than more severe sanction, where mitigating factors were present.  
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Larson, 60 Ohio St.3d 133, 573 N.E.2d 1055 (1991). Delay in the ultimate 
payment of client funds to the client also has been punished in this fashion where the lawyer acted 
improperly, but in apparent good faith.  Richland County Bar Ass’n v. Davis, 57 Ohio St.3d 196, 
566 N.E.2d 678 (1991). A public reprimand was deemed appropriate for an attorney’s violations of 
OH DR 9-102(B)(1) and (B)(3) where his misconduct was an isolated incident arising in part from a 
misunderstanding, and where satisfactory restitution had been made.  Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Reed, 53 
Ohio St.3d 8, 557 N.E.2d 1205 (1990). And see Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Hardiman, 100 
Ohio St.3d 260, 2003 Ohio 5596, 798 N.E.2d 369 (sanction lowered by Court to public reprimand 
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where no aggravating factors, numerous mitigating factors, and issue present as to whether 
attorney-client relationship existed). In contrast, where the lawyer’s mishandling of client funds also 
involves an OH DR 1-102(A)(4) violation for dishonesty, deceit, misrepresentation, or fraud, the 
punishment is likely to be substantial.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lawrence, 72 Ohio St.3d 
420, 650 N.E.2d 867 (1995) (rejecting Board’s recommendation for probation and imposing full 
one-year suspension for mishandling client funds because lawyer knew conduct constituted stealing 
from client). (For other 9-102 cases in combination with 1-102(A)(4), see next paragraph.) 
Restrictions on handling client or third-party funds and other property - Coupled with other violations: 
Conduct resulting in violations of former OH DR 9-102 often infringed other disciplinary rules as 
well. For example, to the extent the lawyer purposely misappropriated client funds, the conduct could 
violate OH DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) 
(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) 1-102(A)(5) 
(engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and/or 1-102(A)(6) 
(engaging in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). See, 
e.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Douglas, 113 Ohio St.3d 221, 2007 Ohio 1536, 863 N.E.2d 1044 
(violation, in addition to DR 9-102(B)(4), of 1-102(A)(4), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2) & (3); indefinite 
suspension instead of disbarment imposed, since respondent living in homeless shelter); Cleveland 
Bar Ass’n v. Rus, 106 Ohio St.3d 467, 2005 Ohio 5520, 835 N.E.2d 1252 (in addition to 
appropriation of client’s settlement proceeds to own use, respondent forged client’s name on 
settlement documents, thereby violating former OH DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), (5) & (6) in addition to DR 
9-102(A), (B)(1) & (B)(4); because of significant mitigating factors, including ultimately making 
complete restitution and intention to resign from the bar, respondent was indefinitely suspended, 
rather than disbarred); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. McCully, 97 Ohio St.3d 486, 2002 Ohio 
6724, 780 N.E.2d 574 (respondent’s commingling of client’s funds with her own while serving as 
guardian and attorney for the guardianship, and failure to account for and deliver to client proceeds 
from sale of residence violated OH DR 1-102(A)(4), in addition to OH DR 9-102(B)(3) & (4), 
among other violations; two-year suspension with one year stayed); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Selnick, 
94 Ohio St.3d 1, 759 N.E.2d 764 (2001) (pattern of multiple violations of OH DR 9-102(B)(3) & (4), 
coupled with numerous other violations, including OH DR 1-102(A)(4), (5) & (6), resulted in 
permanent disbarment; respondent consistently failed to provide accountings, to return case files, to 
return unused portion of retainers, and to maintain funds in client trust account sufficient to reflect 
monies collected from or on behalf of clients (such as retainers and settlement proceeds) that should 
have been in the account). The facts of these cases would still result in multiple violations, now of 
Ohio Rules 1.15 and 8.4. 
In a number of cases in which the lawyer “borrowed” money from the client, an indefinite suspension 
has been imposed, whether a DR 1-102(A)(4) violation was present, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Nagorny, 105 Ohio St.3d 97, 2004 Ohio 6899, 822 N.E.2d 1233, or even if it was not, Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Robertson, 113 Ohio St.3d 360, 2007 Ohio 2075, 865 N.E.2d 886 (“A lawyer’s misuse 
of entrusted funds for any reason . . . . is serious and warrants a commensurate sanction regardless of 
whether the lawyer also intended to deceive or cheat the client in the process.”  Id. at para. 17.). 
To the extent the lawyer took a client’s funds, failed to complete the representation, and then failed to 
return the funds or account for them, the conduct often violated OH DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of a 
legal matter), OH DR 7-101(A)(1) (failure to seek the lawful objectives of the client), and/or OH DR 
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7-101(A)(2) (failure to carry out the contract of employment). See, e.g., Lake County Bar Ass’n v. 
Ryan, 109 Ohio St.3d 301, 2006 Ohio 2422, 847 N.E.2d 430 (with respect to one client, never did 
work retained to do and failed to return unearned retainer despite numerous requests therefor; as to 
second clients, respondent failed to satisfy judgment obtained by elderly couple forced to sue 
respondent for return of unearned fees; despite the obnoxiousness of this (and other) conduct, 
respondent received only a two-year suspension, with one year stayed on condition of full restitution 
and probation). Where the client was damaged by these actions taken during the course of the 
relationship, OH DR 7-101(A)(3) was sometimes cited as well. E.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Douglas, 113 Ohio St.3d 221, 2007 Ohio 1536, 863 N.E.2d 1044 (in addition to DR 9-102(B)(4), 
violation of 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2) & (3); indefinite suspension imposed instead of disbarment, 
since respondent living in homeless shelter). 
Another case in which an OH DR 9-102(A) violation was just one of many, in a pattern of 
misconduct occurring in the course of a badly-botched representation in connection with an adoption, 
is Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Hare, 99 Ohio St.3d 310, 2003 Ohio 3651, 791 N.E.2d 966. In 
addition to “depositing into his personal accounts all the money paid to him by the adoptive parents, 
which included unearned and unapproved attorney fees as well as funds intended to be used for the 
birth mother’s medical expenses,” id. at para. 30, the respondent charged a clearly excessive fee in 
violation of OH DR 2-106(A), accepted conflicting employment in violation of OH DR 5-101(A)(1), 
and knowingly falsified adoption documents filed with the probate court in an attempt to conceal his 
actions, in violation of OH DR 7-102(A)(3)-(7). 
A 9-102(B)(4) violation, coupled with failure to cooperate in the investigation as required by Gov 
Bar R V 4(G), resulted in an indefinite suspension in Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Wagner, 113 
Ohio St.3d 158, 2007 Ohio 1253, 863 N.E.2d 164 (misappropriation of client funds, ignoring 
requests for refunds, and ignoring bar association requests for information; “[t]hese are actions 
warranting an indefinite suspension,” id. at para. 14). Among the aggravating factors were a pattern 
of misconduct and multiple offenses, arising out of representation of two clients, each in a single 
matter. 
 
1.15:210  Status of Fee Advances [see section 1.5:420] 
  
1.15:220  Surrendering Possession of Property 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  9.35 (1996). 
As stated in Ohio Rule 1.15(d), when a lawyer receives specific funds or other property in which a 
client or a third person has a lawful interest, the lawyer must “promptly” notify the interested person 
of that fact and,  “[e]xcept as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the 
client or a third person, confirmed in writing,” must “promptly deliver to the client or third person any 
funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive.” A full accounting with 
respect to the funds or other property must also be made on the request of the client or third person. Id. 
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For a case involving violation of the client-notification obligation under Rule 1.15(d), see Allen 
County Bar Ass’n v. Brown, 124 Ohio St.3d 530, 2010 Ohio 580, 925 N.E.2d 112. These 
provisions are comparable to former OH DR 9-102(B)(1) (notification), (3) (account), and (4) 
(delivery), but go further.  By its terms the duties under the disciplinary rule ran only to clients, 
whereas Rule 1.15 extends these obligations to interested third persons as well. See Bd. of Comm’rs 
on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2007-7, 2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (Dec. 7, 2007) 
(discussing obligations to third persons regarding undisputed lawful claims under Rule and providing 
examples of “lawful” third person claims, id. at *7-10).  (Note, however, that other Code provisions 
could be invoked to deal with duties to third persons, as in Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Butts, 114 
Ohio St.3d 472, 2007 Ohio 4265, 873 N.E.2d 279 (15-month delay in payment of client’s creditors, 
to detriment of client’s credit standing, violated DR 1-102(A)(5)-(6) & 6-101(A)(3)). 
Effective January 1, 2010, a second sentence was added to Rule 1.15(d); it provides that for purposes 
of the rule the third person’s interest “shall be one of which the lawyer has actual knowledge and shall 
be limited to a statutory lien, a final judgment addressing disposition of the funds or property, or a 
written agreement by the client or the lawyer on behalf of the client guaranteeing payment from the 
specific funds or property.” 
The Board of Commissioners had occasion to visit this language in its Opinion 2011-1, which 
considered the propriety of a plaintiff’s lawyer agreeing, out of settlement funds, to indemnify any 
third-person claims against the settlement funds. In opining that this was improper, the Board 
concluded that Rule 1.15(d) as amended does not authorize any such agreement. In the words of the 
Board: 
 The language in Prof. Cond. R. 1.15(d) that defines a lawful 
interest as including “a written agreement by the client or the lawyer on 
behalf of the client guaranteeing payment from the specific funds or 
property” [“in the lawyer’s custody”] is not to be construed as a green 
light for a lawyer to agree to personally indemnify [the] opposing party 
for any and all third person claims to settlement proceeds. A personal 
agreement by a lawyer to indemnify the opposing party from any and 
all claims is distinct from an agreement by a client, or the lawyer on 
behalf of the client, guaranteeing payment of lawful claims from the 
funds in the lawyer’s possession. 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances  Discipline Op. 2011-1, 2011 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1, at *7 
(bracketed material added). The Board went on to note that such an agreement is in essence an 
agreement to provide financial assistance to a client, which is unethical under Rules 1.8(e) and 
1.7(a)(2).  
The notification requirement:  Examples of sanctionable conduct under former OH DR 9-102(B)(1) 
included failure to notify a client of the receipt of: 
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 cash in respondent’s possession that client’s former landlord had found after client moved to 
nursing home, Disciplinary Counsel v. Robertson, 113 Ohio St.3d 360, 2007 Ohio 2075, 
865 N.E.2d 886; 
 funds received in settlement of a claim, Disciplinary Counsel v. Wolanin, 121 Ohio St.3d 
390, 2009 Ohio 1393, 904 N.E.2d 879; 
 insurance proceeds, Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Jaeger, 22 Ohio St.3d 39, 488 
N.E.2d 216 (1986); and 
 funds received in payment of a judgment, Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Cantagallo, 6 Ohio St.3d 
10, 451 N.E.2d 224 (1983). 
The accounting requirement:  See section 1.15:230 infra. 
The prompt delivery requirement: Illustrative of violation of the Rule 1.15(d) prompt delivery 
provision are Disciplinary Counsel v. Schiller, 123 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009 Ohio 4909, 915 N.E.2d 
324 (failure to remit client tax refunds to bankruptcy trustee, even though refunds constituted part of 
client’s bankruptcy estate and trustee ordered him to do so), and Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. 
Spector, 121 Ohio St.3d 271, 2009 Ohio 1155, 903 N.E.2d 637 (failure to return unearned retainer 
and case file. Cf. Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 337, 2009 Ohio 764, 904 N.E.2d 
517 (at para. 12 Court references the prompt notification requirement of 1.15(d), but facts and 
characterization of violation at para. 3 indicate that it was a failure promptly to “deliver papers and 
funds belonging to a client.”). See Akron Bar Ass’n v. Maher, 121 Ohio St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 356, 
901 N.E.2d 803 (failure to return property to which client entitled said at para. 35 to violate “Prof. 
Cond. R. 1.15”; presumably 1.15(d) intended). 
Under the former rule, the duty to promptly deliver client funds or other property was limited to 
situations in which the client made a request therefor, e.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Glatki, 88 Ohio 
St.3d 381, 726 N.E.2d 993 (2000) (no violation if no request from client), or the lawyer was ordered 
by a court to do so. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Wagner, 117 Ohio St.3d 456, 2008 Ohio 1200, 
884 N.E.2d 1053 (respondent failed to comply with bankruptcy court’s orders to return clients’ fees; 
DR 9-102(B)(4) violated); see Disciplinary Counsel v. McShane, 121 Ohio St.3d 169, 2009 Ohio 
746, 902 N.E.2d 980 (failure to return to client as directed by arbitration committee money found to 
be wrongfully withheld). The request prerequisite was not carried forward in Rule 1.15(d).  Examples 
of OHCPR cases in which the lawyer failed to return client funds and/or other property upon request 
include Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Portman, 121 Ohio St.3d 518, 2009 Ohio 1705, 905 N.E.2d 
1203; Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Gueli, 119 Ohio St.3d 434, 2008 Ohio 4786, 894 N.E.2d 1231 (case 
file; in another instance a file was returned, but certain “documents and material evidence were 
missing,” id. at para. 44); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Mason, 118 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 2704, 889 
N.E.2d 539 (settlement proceeds); Disciplinary Counsel v. McCauley, 114 Ohio St.3d 461, 2007 
Ohio 4259, 873 N.E.2d 269 (amounts collected for and owing to creditor-clients pursuant to 
respondent’s debt collection agreement); Disciplinary Counsel v. Mathewson, 113 Ohio St.3d 365, 
2007 Ohio 2076, 865 N.E.2d 891 (unearned fees; request made by client’s new attorney). (There are 
instances in which the Court appears to gloss over the request prerequisite. See, e.g., Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Wolanin, 121 Ohio St.3d 390, 2009 Ohio 1393, 904 N.E.2d 879 (finding 9-102(B)(4) 
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violation for failure to remit settlement funds to client; no express finding that client made request, 
but client tried for three months to contact respondent without success). In administering a revocable 
trust, a lawyer cannot avoid the duty to turn over trust assets on the mere belief that the client is 
incompetent.  Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Marzocco, 71 Ohio St.3d 306, 643 N.E.2d 1079 (1994) 
(rejecting this excuse in context of broader array of misconduct). 
Ohio Rule 1.15 also provides guidance in carrying out these provisions in special circumstances, 
such as dissolution of a law firm (division (f); see section 1.15:500) or sale of a practice (division (g); 
see section 1.15:600).  Neither of these provisions is contained in the Model Rules, nor did 1.15(f) 
have a counterpart in the former OHCPR. (The Code analog to Rule 1.15(g) was DR 9-102(C).) 
Other Ohio law gives guidance on handling client property upon the retirement or death of an 
attorney: 
Where a lawyer who retains the originals of a client’s will is going to retire, the lawyer should attempt 
to locate the maker or, if the maker is deceased, the maker’s personal representative and return the 
will to the appropriate party, even though no formal request has been made. If an appropriate recipient 
cannot be found, the lawyer should retain the documents until his death, at which point they will be 
disposed of pursuant to Gov Bar R V 8(F). Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 98-2 (Dec. 14, 
1998). 
In 2000, the same bar association dealt with the question of disposition of client files raised by a law 
firm representing the estate of a deceased lawyer. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 00-02 (Apr. 
25, 2000). Opinion 00-02 advised the firm to make a reasonable effort to locate the client, who, if 
located, could either take possession or authorize disposal. Since the question put to it concerned 
closed files only (as well as the closed files of the lawyer’s lawyer father, who had ceased practice in 
1936!), the bar association recognized that it was unlikely that many clients would be found still 
living. In that case, files “closed for at least five years may be disposed of (subject to the caveat that 
original or important client papers be retained and that efforts to ascertain the clients’ desires have 
been unavailing).” Id. at 4. To protect confidentiality, disposition should be by shredding or 
incineration. Because the Commissioner of the Estate for the deceased lawyer now lived in South 
Carolina, the bar association opined that instead of having her keep the undestroyed files out of state, 
they should, subject to whatever probate-court approval may be required, be made available to the 
local bar association or to Disciplinary Counsel. In Opinion 00-02, there was a party, the executor, 
willing to assume responsibility for the files. Where that is not the case, the procedures set forth in 
Gov Bar R V 8(F) should be used. 
In addressing the duty to deliver client property, special note should be made of the treatment of client 
files maintained by an attorney. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-8, 1992 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (Apr. 10, 1992), provides general guidance on the rights of clients to 
information held in their case files by attorneys. In the syllabus, the Board stated: 
Materials acquired or prepared for the purposes of representing the 
client and other materials that might prove beneficial to the client 
should be returned. These materials include but are not limited to all 
significant correspondence, investigatory documents and reports the 
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client has paid for, filed or unfiled but prepared pleadings and briefs, 
and all materials supplied by the client. 
Id. at *1. In sum, “the client is entitled to receive what he or she has paid for and to the return of what 
he or she has delivered to the lawyer.” Id. at *4. In returning the client’s files, the lawyer may retain a 
copy, but the lawyer should not charge the client for the costs of copying since retention of a copy is 
for the benefit of the lawyer, not the client. Further, the general duty to return client files does not 
attach to the extent the lawyer obtains a retaining lien on the material as security in a fee dispute. See 
Rule 1.8(i)(1) (authorizing retaining liens to secure lawyer’s fee or expenses). See section 1.8:1130. 
Such a practice is discouraged, however, and should not be undertaken where to do so “caus[es] 
foreseeable prejudice to the rights of a client.” Op. 92-8, at syllabus. Failure to return client files 
upon discharge constitutes a violation not only of Rule 1.15(d) but Rule 1.16(b) as well. See section 
1.16:500, at “Return of papers and property to which the client is entitled.” 
 
1.15:230  Documents Relating to Representation 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  9.34 (1996). 
Under Rule 1.15(a), the lawyer has an obligation to keep and preserve “[r]ecords of such account 
funds and other property” for seven years after termination of the representation or disbursement of 
the funds or property, whichever comes first. If the materials held are property other than funds, the 
lawyer must maintain a record that identifies the property, the date received, the person on whose 
behalf it is held, and the date of distribution. 
For funds, the record-keeping requirements are more detailed. Pursuant to subdivisions (a)(1)-(5), the 
lawyer must maintain 
(1) a copy of any fee agreement with each client; 
(2) a record for each client on whose behalf funds are held that shows 
(i) client name 
(ii) date, amount, and source of fund received 
(iii) date, amount, payee, and purpose of each disbursement 
(iv) current balance; 
(3) for each bank account, a record that sets forth 
(i) name of account 
(ii) date, amount, and client affected by each credit and debit 
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(iii) balance; and 
(4) if provided by the bank, all bank statements, deposit slips, and 
cancelled checks for each account. 
(5) The lawyer shall also perform and retain a monthly reconciliation of 
all of the items in subdivisions (a)(2), (3), and (4). 
Respondent failed to follow the record-keeping and reconciliation provisions of Rule 1.15(a)(2)-(5) 
in Disciplinary Counsel v. Bursey, 124 Ohio St.3d 85, 2009 Ohio 6180, 919 N.E.2d 198. A case 
invoking (a)(2) and (3) is Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 119 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008 Ohio 3836, 
894 N.E.2d 31, which rules the Court described as “requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records 
of client funds in the lawyer’s possession and to render appropriate accounts to clients regarding 
them.” Id. at para. 4. Another (a)(2) case is Disciplinary Counsel v. Folwell, 129 Ohio St.3d 297, 
2011 Ohio 3181, 951 N.E.2d 775, at para. 10, where the respondent failed to “maintain [] client 
ledgers as described by Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2)(i) through (iv).” Accord Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
King, 132 Ohio St.3d 501, 2012 Ohio 873, 974 N.E.2d 1180, at para. 5 (“admitted failure to keep 
an individual ledger for each client made it extremely difficult to determine the clients to which 
various withdrawals and deposits pertained.”) For failure to reconcile client accounts, the respondents 
in Folwell supra and Akron Bar Ass’n v. McNerney, 122 Ohio St.3d 40, 2009 Ohio 2374, 907 
N.E.2d 1167, were found to have violated 1.15(a)(5). 
Note that the obligations set forth in subdivisions (a)(1)-(5) are couched in terms of duties to “clients”; 
there is no reference to comparable obligations with respect to funds of third persons held by the 
lawyer. Given the structure of the Rule as a whole, however, this would appear to be an oversight; in 
any event, this discrepancy should be clarified one way or the other. 
The prior rule merely referred generally to the duty to keep “complete records.” OH DR 9-102(B)(3). 
Despite this lack of specificity, the Supreme Court predictably found 9-102(B)(3) violations where 
the record keeping was less than adequate. Thus, the lawyer was sanctioned 
 for failing to keep complete and accurate records of estate assets and failing to keep records of 
his time and services as attorney and fiduciary for the estates, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008 Ohio 3194, 891 N.E.2d 324; 
 for attempting unsuccessfully to reconstruct costs and fees after the fact, resulting in 
respondent being unable to account for the fees and expenses charged to client, Cleveland 
bar Ass’n v. Mishler, 118 Ohio St.3d 109, 2008 Ohio 1810, 886 N.E.2d 818; 
 for having no records to account for client’s funds in his trust account or for checks payable to 
cash written against that account, all as part of scheme to use account to launder money from 
client’s retirement funds and thereby defraud nursing homes, which had provided care for his 
in-law clients, Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 2008 Ohio 91, 880 
N.E.2d 467; 
 for failing to keep any records of transactions in trust account, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Bubna, 116 Ohio St.3d 294, 2007 Ohio 6436, 878 N.E.2d 632. 
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 for being unable to account for client cash (presumably because of inadequate records, 
although the opinion does not expressly so state) and for being unable to document all but 
$350 of $9,000+ fee, Disciplinary Counsel v. Robertson, 113 Ohio St.3d 360, 2007 Ohio 
2075, 865 N.E.2d 886. 
 for failure to keep ledger or other written record of funds received from clients; Court noted 
respondent’s “inattentive and sloppy management of his law practice,” Dayton Bar Ass’n v. 
Sebree, 111 Ohio St.3d 297, 2006 Ohio 5788, 856 N.E.2d 210, id. at para. 16. 
 for nonexistent “client ledgers, records, or receipts showing the source of some of the funds 
deposited into the IOLTA account.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 381, 
2006 Ohio 1194, 843 N.E.2d 1198, at para. 4. 
 because of inadequate record keeping, respondent was unable to verify either that all funds 
deposited into his IOLTA account were client funds or that all withdrawals were for fees he 
had earned.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Croushore, 108 Ohio St.3d 156, 2006 Ohio 412, 841 
N.E.2d 781. 
 “because he had not properly identified the funds in his trust account and often made cash 
withdrawals from that account without appropriate record keeping.” Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Witt, 103 Ohio St.3d 434, 2004 Ohio 5463, 816 N.E.2d 1036, at para. 14. 
 for failure to document transactions involving a loan of client funds to the lawyer and the use 
of client funds for the benefit of third parties.  Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Hall, 38 Ohio 
St.3d 342, 528 N.E.2d 192 (1988). 
 where, in commingling his own funds with funds of the client, the lawyer failed to keep 
virtually any records of client funds.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucey, 14 Ohio 
St.3d 18, 470 N.E.2d 888 (1984). 
In other instances, the problem surfaced when a dispute arose over the lawyer’s conduct with respect 
to the property and the lawyer’s records were inadequate to substantiate the lawyer’s version of what 
had occurred. Thus in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Gueli, 119 Ohio St.3d 434, 2008 Ohio 4786, 894 
N.E.2d 1231, the respondent was found to have violated DR 9-102(B)(3) because he “had no records 
that justified charging the Barnhill estate $37,500 in attorney fees.” Id. at para. 22. In another 
example, a lawyer was disciplined when he claimed to have remitted funds to his client but had no 
record of doing so. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kick, 28 Ohio St.3d 91, 502 N.E.2d 640 
(1986). Similarly, in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Trainor, 99 Ohio St.3d 318, 2003 Ohio 3634, 791 
N.E.2d 972, the respondent was sanctioned under OH DR 9-102(B)(3) for his handling of a $50,000 
settlement obtained for his client. The first $25,000 was properly accounted for, “but as he received 
the remaining amounts and paid additional litigation and medical expenses, he did not similarly 
account for the rest of the funds before his client disputed various payments.” Id. at para. 3. The 
upshot was, in attempting to reconcile his records, respondent found that he had actually overpaid the 
client by more than $12,000. Another 9-102(B)(3) violation occurred in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Rothermil, 104 Ohio St.3d 413, 2004 Ohio 6559, 819 N.E.2d 1099, where respondent, who claimed 
to have “borrowed” funds from the client trust account, which funds were used for purposes unrelated 
to the decedent’s estate, “failed to maintain complete records of funds in his client trust account and 
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was unable to render appropriate accounts” to his client, the administrator, as required. Id. at para. 6. 
(Violation of former OH DR 9-102(A) was also found in both Trainor and Rothermil, even though 
the opinions expressly state that the amounts were placed in “a client trust account.”) 
Of most real-world significance are those instances in which the lawyer’s failure to carry out his or 
her professional responsibilities to the client were attributable to poor record keeping: 
 Record-keeping failure that led to oversight in failing to pay subrogated medical bills, as the 
client had directed, violated OH DR 9-102(B)(3).  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Shabazz, 69 
Ohio St.3d 535, 634 N.E.2d 994 (1994). 
 Drawing a check on the lawyer’s trust account to settle a dispute on the client’s behalf where 
respondent knew or should have known that the account had insufficient funds to cover the 
check, due in part to commingling concerns, violated the rule’s record-keeping requirement.  
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Pugh, 68 Ohio St.3d 172, 624 N.E.2d 1041 (1994). 
 A lawyer was sanctioned for the loss of a client file and the inaccessibility of records during an 
audit where the loss interfered with the lawyer’s ability to make restitution on the client’s 
behalf for certain bad checks the client had written to third parties.  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Ent, 9 Ohio St.3d 44, 457 N.E.2d 1176 (1984). 
The importance of proper record keeping is highlighted by the case of Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Zauderer, 80 Ohio St.3d 435, 687 N.E.2d 410 (1997). In Zauderer, an attorney who represented 
over 300 women in mass tort litigation, incurred over $300,000 in general expenses (nurses, expert 
witnesses, depositions, court costs, transcripts, subscriptions to periodicals, seminars, and postage), in 
addition to expenses advanced by him in the course of their specific cases. Respondent not only failed 
to keep accurate records of the case-specific expenses, but also failed to inform his clients of the 
extraordinary general expenses being incurred. Nor did respondent itemize these general expenses as 
they were incurred. Instead, upon settlement, he informed the clients, in a unilateral alteration of the 
contingent-fee contracts entered into with his clients, that these general expenses would be allocated 
among the clients pursuant to a formula based upon the amount each client received in settlement. 
The Court found that respondent’s failure to keep appropriate records of expenses violated OH DR 
9-102(B)(3) and suspended him for one year, stayed on condition, inter alia, that he refund the 
general expense amounts overcharged to the clients. 
While not directly stated in the rule, OH DR 9-102(B) was interpreted as imposing on the lawyer an 
independent duty to regularly review records of the client’s property as part of maintaining those 
records. As the Ohio Supreme Court stated in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kick, 28 Ohio 
St.3d 91, 93, 502 N.E.2d 640, 642 (1986): 
Kick’s maintenance of his trust account, however, can best be 
characterized as dismal. Although it does not appear that Kick ever 
used any trust account funds for his own purposes, he did not review 
the monthly trust account statements to ascertain that his balance was 
considerably less than what it should have been. 
OH DR 9-102(B)(3) also provided that the lawyer must “render appropriate accounts to his client” 
705




about the property. Rule 1.15(d) restates this obligation as requiring the prompt rendering of “a full 
accounting” with respect to client or third-person funds or other property upon request by the client or 
third person. See, under 1.15(d), Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Sanz, 128 Ohio St.3d 373, 2011 Ohio 766, 
944 N.E.2d 674; Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Kizer, 123 Ohio St.3d 188, 2009 Ohio 4763, 915 N.E.2d 
314, and, under the former disciplinary rule, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Emerson, 122 Ohio St.3d 
176, 2009 Ohio 2883, 909 N.E.2d 635 (failure to comply with clients’ requests for itemized billing); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnston, 121 Ohio St.3d 403, 2009 Ohio 1432, 904 N.E.2d 892 
(record-keeping system inadequate to allow respondent to account to clients for funds in his 
possession); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Jackson, 120 Ohio St.3d 173, 2008 Ohio 5378, 897 
N.E.2d 151 (disregarding client request for full accounting); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. 
Mazanec, 114 Ohio St.3d 427, 2007 Ohio 4268, 872 N.E.2d 1209 (failure to fulfill obligation to 
make annual accounting as trustee of client’s family trust violated 9-102(B)(3)); Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n v. Fox, 101 Ohio St.3d 154, 2004 Ohio 300, 803 N.E.2d 395 (failure to account for trust funds 
that client apparently left in respondent’s custody five years prior to client’s death). While the failure 
to account often flows from inadequate record keeping, this is a separate concern. Even if a lawyer 
maintains adequate records pertaining to a client’s property, he still must make the full accounting 
required on request of the client or third person whose property it is. 
Note that under Rule 1.15(d), the obligation to account is triggered by a request therefor by the client 
or third person, whereas there is no such prerequisite to the duty to deliver funds or property to which 
a client or third person is entitled. Under former DR 9-102(B)(3) & (4), it was just the opposite: there 
was no request requirement for an accounting but there was for delivery of funds or other property. 
In the typical OHCPR disciplinary case in this area, a lawyer undertook to represent a client, failed to 
act on the client’s behalf, and then, in violation of OH DR 9-102(B)(3), failed to account for the funds 
received, or misused the client’s funds and failed to report that misuse to the client. See, e.g., 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Selnick, 94 Ohio St.3d 1, 759 N.E.2d 764 (2001); Cuyahoga County Bar 
Ass’n v. Stidham, 69 Ohio St.3d 80, 630 N.E.2d 662 (1994). Even if the lawyer did make an 
accounting, it, of course, had to be truthful to avoid discipline.  Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Cantagallo, 
6 Ohio St.3d 10, 451 N.E.2d 224 (1983) (lawyer sanctioned for lying to client about dates funds were 
received in payment of judgment). Further, lawyers who made an accounting have been sanctioned 
for failing to do so in a timely fashion. A lawyer’s twenty-month delay in accounting for client funds 
stemming from a misunderstanding about how the legal fee was to be calculated warranted discipline.  
Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Sacher, 8 Ohio St.3d 49, 457 N.E.2d 815 (1983). An eight-year delay in 
making an accounting, allegedly resulting from the lawyer’s belief the client was incompetent, was 
sanctioned in Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Marzocco, 71 Ohio St.3d 306, 643 N.E.2d 1079 (1994). 
Under the OHCPR, sanctions were imposed regardless of the intent of the lawyer or lack of prejudice 
to the client. Thus, failure to maintain complete records, render appropriate accounts, and promptly 
pay funds to a client was actionable even though it resulted from carelessness, lack of organization, 
and a lack of communication, rather than bad intent, and caused the client no prejudice.  Cincinnati 
Bar Ass’n v. Altekruse, 63 Ohio St.3d 139, 586 N.E.2d 75 (1992). Presumably, that will continue to 
be the case under the mandatory provisions of Rule 1.15. 
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1.15:300  Holding Money as a Fiduciary for the Benefit of Clients or Third 
Parties 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.15(d) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.15(d) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  9.35 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  45:501 
ALI-LGL §  44 
Wolfram §  4.8 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  9.35 (1996). 
A lawyer has a fiduciary duty with respect to funds held belonging to others. See Rule 1.15 cmt. [1]: 
“A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary.” 
Compliance with the record-keeping requirements of subdivisions (a)(1)-(5) of the Rule is also 
necessary in order to “fulfill the role of professional fiduciary.” 1.15 cmt. [1]. “A lawyer’s fiduciary 
duties are independent of the lawyer’s employment at a particular firm or the rendering of legal 
services.” Rule 1.15 cmt. [7]. 
As noted in section 1.15:220, the duty the lawyer owes the client or third person under Rule 1.15(d), 
in addition to the duty to account upon request,  is to “promptly notify the client or third person” of the 
receipt of funds or other property in which either has a lawful  interest and to “promptly deliver” any 
funds or other property that either is entitled to receive. This is comparable to the duties set forth in 
former OH DR 9-102(B)(1) (notification) and (4) (delivery). In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Sanborn, 81 Ohio St.3d 282, 690 N.E.2d 1272 (1998), the Court held that respondent violated 
9-102(B)(1) in failing to promptly notify survivors of his receipt of funds of an estate of which he was 
fiduciary (which funds he misappropriated to his own account over a period of ten years). And, in 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. McCord, 96 Ohio St.3d 21, 2002 Ohio 2587, 770 N.E.2d 571, 
the lawyer’s 9-102(B)(4) duty to remit funds to which the client was entitled (unearned fees) was 
violated where respondent refused to return the funds, even though the matter had gone to arbitration, 
the arbitrator had ruled in favor of the client, and “respondent admitted he was bound by the 
arbitration process.” Id. at para. 6. 
What if the lawyer holds client funds but is unable to locate the client? In Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2005-10, 2005 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Dec. 2, 2005), the 
Board sensibly opined that such funds are held by the lawyer/fiduciary/”holder” as unclaimed funds. 
The lawyer may report such funds to the state director of commerce as “unclaimed funds” after the 
statutory dormancy period in accordance with ORC Chapter 169, and in doing so, does not violate 
the lawyer’s ethical duty to preserve such funds under former OH DR 9-102(A) or the duty to deliver 
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them under 9-102(B)(4), so long as the attorney makes a diligent effort to locate the client without 
success. 
See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Stidham, 87 Ohio St.3d 455, 721 N.E.2d 977 (2000), where 
respondent agreed to escrow, on behalf of the seller of a tavern, one-half of the purchase price paid by 
his client, the buyer. Instead of opening the escrow account, respondent put the money in his IOLTA 
account, and then proceeded to draw on the money for other purposes. Respondent was found to have 
violated OH DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6), but, because the money was restored to the seller and for other 
mitigating reasons, the Court reduced the sanction from the Board’s recommended indefinite 
suspension to two years, with the second year stayed, subject to monitoring and other conditions 
imposed. Respondent had also been charged, inter alia, with a violation of OH DR 9-102(B)(4) 
(failure promptly to pay funds that a client is entitled to receive), but this charge was not proven. This 
would appear to be the proper result, inasmuch as OH DR 9-102(B)(4) dealt with funds that the client 
is entitled to receive, whereas the funds in question were those to which the third-party seller was 
entitled. Under 1.15(d), of course, the duty to remit now extends to certain kinds of property (as 
specified in the Rule) to which a third person is entitled. 
 
1.15:400  Dispute Over Lawyer’s Entitlement to Funds Held in Trust 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.15(e) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.15(e) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  7.21, 9.36 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  45:101 
ALI-LGL §§  44-45 
Wolfram §  4.8 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  7.21, 9.36 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.15(e) provides that if funds or other property in the possession of the lawyer is claimed 
by two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer), “the lawyer shall hold the funds or other 
property pursuant to division (a) of this rule until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly 
distribute all portions of the funds or other property as to which the interests are not in dispute.” 
Comment [3] further discusses client/lawyer disputes concerning fees: “The lawyer is not required to 
remit to the client funds that the lawyer reasonably believes represent fees owed. However, a lawyer 
may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer’s contention.” Rule 1.15 cmt. [3]. 
Ohio Rule 1.15(e) also deals with property claimed by both the client and a third party. Again, the 
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lawyer is obligated to keep such property separate until the dispute is resolved. See Comment [4], 
which provides in part: 
A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect third-person 
interests of which the lawyer has actual knowledge against wrongful 
interference by the client. When there is no dispute regarding the funds 
or property in the lawyer’s possession, the lawyer’s ethical duty is to 
promptly notify and deliver the funds or property to which the client or 
third person is entitled.  When the lawyer has actual knowledge of a 
dispute between the client and a third person who has a lawful interest 
in the funds or property in the lawyer’s possession, the lawyer’s ethical 
duty is to notify both the client and the third person, hold the disputed 
funds in accordance with division (a) of this rule until the dispute is 
resolved, and consider whether it is necessary to file an action to have a 
court resolve the dispute. The lawyer should not unilaterally assume to 
resolve the dispute between the client and the third person. When the 
lawyer knows a third person’s claimed interest is not a lawful one, a 
lawyer’s ethical duty is to notify the client of the interest claimed and 
promptly deliver the funds or property to the client. 
Ohio Rule 1.15 cmt. [4]. The duties with respect to disputed claims under Rule 1.15(e) are explored 
in some detail in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2007-7, 2007 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. 7 (Dec. 7, 2007).  Examples of lawful third-person claims under applicable law include:  valid 
statutory subrogation rights to funds in the lawyer’s possession; valid judgment liens or other court 
orders pertaining to such property; written agreements by clients authorizing payment to medical 
providers; and secured claims by creditors specific to funds in the lawyer’s possession.  See id. at 
*8-10. Since Opinion 2007-7 was one of the primary sources for the amendment to Rule 1.15(d) (and 
Comment 4), it seems fair to assume that the Board’s listing of “lawful claims” of third persons is 
congruent with the limitation on a third person’s “lawful interest” as set forth in division (d). 
The approach set forth in Comment [4] and Opinion 2007-7 is consistent with Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 95-12, 1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Oct. 6, 1995), where, 
under former OH DR 9-102(B)(2), it was opined that the lawyer should hold the disputed funds until 
it can be determined, by mediation, arbitration, or interpleader, who has the right to the funds. See 
also Hsu v. Parker, 116 Ohio App.3d 629, 688 N.E.2d 1099 (Cuyahoga 1996) (where client gave 
security interest in potential proceeds of action to treating physician but on settlement of action 
instructed lawyer not to pay, lawyer should have filed complaint in interpleader). 
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As the decision in Hsu indicates, the client’s instructions must be valid to be binding on the lawyer. 
For example, following the clients’ direction to disburse funds to them will not serve as an excuse for 
violating the terms of an escrow agreement under which the lawyer is holding the proceeds of the sale 
of property when a problem with the sale arises. See City of Ravenna v. Fouts, No. 92- P-0098, 
1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 379 (Portage Feb. 4, 1994) (lawyer cannot “hide behind” former OH EC 
7-7 and OH EC 5-21 with “lame excuse” that “clients made him do it,” id. at *6). Citing and quoting 
Fouts, the court in Shiepis Clinic of Chiropractic, Inc. v. Stevenson, No. 1995 CA 00343, 1996 
Ohio App. LEXIS 3707 (Stark July 8, 1996), likewise held that the attorney could not use his 
client’s instructions to excuse his failure to pay medical fees to a provider from settlement proceeds. 
Upon resolution of the dispute, or if there is no dispute (as where the client requests that funds be 
disbursed to third parties having valid claim thereto), subdivision (e) mandates that the lawyer 
“promptly distribute” such property. Cases in which lawyers were sanctioned under the OHCPR for 
failure to disburse client funds at the client’s request included Columbus Bar Ass’n v. McCoy, 28 
Ohio St.3d 96, 502 N.E.2d 642 (1986); Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Cook, 18 Ohio St.3d 
149, 480 N.E.2d 436 (1985). This problem was perhaps better addressed as neglect; the cases 
typically invoked that provision as well. And, if several clients arguably had a right to the same 
property and disagreed as to its disbursement, the attorney could not favor one client over the other, 
but had to seek arbitration or judicial resolution of the matter. Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland Op. 
85-2 (Dec. 13, 1985) (husband and wife clients of lawyer disagreed over which of them was entitled 
to possession of an executed, witnessed, notarized, but unrecorded, deed conveying to wife one-half 
of the husband’s interest in certain property). This result seems consistent with that now called for 
under Rule 1.15(e). 
The only disciplinary case to our knowledge invoking Rule 1.15(e) to date is Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Bhatt, 133 Ohio St.3d 131, 2012 Ohio 4230, 976 N.E.2d 870, where the respondent failed to place 
disputed funds in his client trust account, as the rule requires. Interestingly, it would appear that the 
disputed amounts－proceeds of a business sale by his corporate client－were sent to respondent, who 
received them on behalf of the corporation from the buyer. “However, Bhatt did not deposit those 
checks into his client trust account or otherwise negotiate them because they were made payable to 
[the corporation only].” Id. at para. 7. The monthly checks continued to be made out only to the 
corporation, and, even after respondent “asked the buyer to replace the monthly checks with a single 
check made payable to his client trust account, the buyer sent another check for the prior payments 
payable only to the corporation.” Id. at para. 8. The parties stipulated to the 1.15(e) violation, but it 
would have been helpful if the Court had shed further light on just what respondent could have done 
in that situation and on whether it was the Court’s intention to read 1.15(e) as violated irrespective of 
whether compliance was possible or not. 
  
1.15:500  Fiduciary Duties Upon Dissolution of Law Firm 
Ohio Rule 1.15(f) provides that former partners, managing partners, or supervisory lawyers of a 
dissolved firm “shall promptly account for all client funds and shall make appropriate arrangements 
for one of them to maintain all records generated under division (a) of this rule.” There is no 
analogous Model Rule provision; nor was there under the former OHCPR. 
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Comment [7] states as follows: 
 A lawyer’s fiduciary duties are independent of the lawyer’s 
employment at a particular firm or the rendering of legal services. Law 
firms frequently merge or dissolve. Division (f) provides that whenever 
a law firm dissolves, the former partners, managing partners, or 
supervisory lawyers must appropriately account for all client funds. 
This responsibility may be satisfied by an appropriate designee. 
Ohio Rule 1.15 cmt. [7]. 
  
1.15:600  Obligations on Sale of Law Practice 
Division (g) obligates the seller of a firm (whether a lawyer, law firm, or estate of a deceased lawyer) 
to “account for and transfer all funds held pursuant to this rule to the lawyer or law firm purchasing 
the law practice at the time client files are transferred.” Ohio Rule 1.15(g). Division (g) supplements 
the provisions on sale of a law practice contained in Ohio Rule 1.17. Again, there is no comparable 
Model Rule provision. 
Comment [8] adds the following: 
 All lawyers involved in the sale or purchase of a law practice as 
provided by Rule 1.17 should make reasonable efforts to safeguard and 
account for client property. Division (g) requires the lawyer, law firm 
or estate of a deceased lawyer who sells a practice to account for and 
transfer all client property at the time the client files are transferred. 
 
Ohio Rule 1.15 cmt. [8]. There is no explanation as to why the first sentence of the comment is 
couched in “should make reasonable efforts” language, when the second sentence of the comment 
and division (g) itself state the applicable duties in mandatory terms. 
  
1.15:700  Further Safekeeping Obligations 
Pursuant to Ohio Rule 1.15(h), a lawyer, “a lawyer in the lawyer’s firm,” or a firm that owns an 
interest in a business providing law-related services must: 
(1) with respect to funds of clients and third persons “that cannot earn 
any net income,” maintain such funds in an interest-bearing trust 
account as required by ORC 3953.231, 4705.09 and 4705.10, and any 
rules adopted under ORC 120.52 by the Ohio Legal Assistance 
Foundation (OLAF); 
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(2) notify OLAF of the existence of the account; and 
(3) comply with the Gov Bar R VI 1(F) reporting requirement. 
According to the Task Force’s Ohio Code Comparison, the division (h) obligation “is the same as 
the requirements in DR 9-102(D) and (E).” 
There are unexplained differences, however. The OHCPR referred to “a lawyer, a law firm, or an 
ancillary business related to the practice of law in which the lawyer is a principal.” In contrast, Rule 
1.15(h) is directed at “[a] lawyer, a lawyer in the lawyer’s firm, or a firm that owns an interest in a 
business that provides a law-related service.” Surely it was not intended to exclude law firms not 
having an interest in a law-related service business, but that would appear to be the result produced by 
a literal reading of the language. The other unexplained difference is the language in division (h) 
limiting the provisions of subdivision (h)(1) to funds “that cannot earn any net income for the clients 
or third persons”; this language did not appear in the OHCPR and it is not present in any of the 
statutory provisions referenced in division (h). 
For disciplinary cases under the Code finding a violation of former OH DR 9-102(E)(1) (obligating a 
lawyer to maintain client funds in an interest-bearing trust account), see Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Peden, 118 Ohio St.3d 244, 2008 Ohio 2237, 887 N.E.2d 1183; Disciplinary Counsel v. Millonig, 
108 Ohio St.3d 154, 2006 Ohio 420, 841 N.E.2d 779. 
See also section 1.15:110 supra. 
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1.16:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.16 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.16 
  
1.16:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.16 differs from the Model Rule in the following respects: 
Ohio Rule 1.16(a) substitutes “Subject to divisions (c), (d), and (e) of this rule,” for “Except as stated 
in paragraph (c),” at the outset of division (a). At the end of the introductory sentence, after “client if,” 
Ohio adds “any of the following applies:”. 
In subdivision (a)(1), Ohio substitutes “Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct” after “in violation of” 
instead of “rules of professional conduct”. 
In subdivision (a)(2), Ohio deletes the last word “or”. 
Ohio Rule 1.16(b), as in division (a), substitutes the “Subject to divisions (c), (d), and (e) of this rule” 
language for “Except as stated in paragraph (c),”. Division (b) further substitutes “may withdraw 
from the representation of a client if any of the following applies:” instead of “may withdraw from 
representing a client if:”. 
In subdivision (b)(2), Ohio substitutes “illegal” for “criminal”. 
In subdivision (b)(5), Ohio adds “, financial or otherwise,” after “obligation”. 
In subdivision (b)(6), Ohio deletes the last word “or”. 
Subdivisions (b)(7) and (b)(8) of the Ohio Rule have no counterparts in the Model Rule. 
Subdivision (b)(9) of the Ohio Rule is identical to MR 1.16(b)(7). 
Ohio Rule 1.16(c) rewrites MR 1.16(c), although it is similar in substance. Ohio states: 
If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the rules 
of a tribunal, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in a 
proceeding before that tribunal without its permission. 
This is in lieu of the Model Rule language that 
[a] lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or 
permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When 
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ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation 
notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation. 
Ohio Rule 1.16(d) differs from the Model Rule as follows: At the outset, Ohio adds “As part of the” 
instead of “Upon”. After “to protect a client’s interest,” Ohio deletes the comma, inserts a period, and 
starts the next sentence with “The steps include giving due notice to the client, allowing reasonable 
time for the employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the 
client is entitled, and complying with applicable laws and rules. Client papers and property shall 
promptly be delivered to the client. ‘Client papers and property’ may include correspondence, 
pleadings, deposition transcripts, exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, and other items 
reasonably necessary to the client’s representation.” 
This replaces the Model Rule language after “to protect a client’s interests,” which language states 
“such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, 
surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of 
fee or expenses that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the 
client to the extent permitted by other law.” 
There is no separate Model Rule counterpart to Ohio Rule 1.16(e). As noted above, however, MR 
1.16(d) deals with the substance of Ohio 1.16(e), but in different language. Ohio states in division (e) 
that “A lawyer who withdraws from employment shall refund promptly any part of a fee paid in 
advance that has not been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant to Rule 1.17.” The comparable 
Model Rule language is “refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned 
or incurred.” MR 1.16(d). 
  
1.16:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.16(a): DR 2-110(B). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.16(b): DR 2-110(A)(2), (C)(1), (C)(2), 
(C)(5), (C)(6) & (C)(7). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.16(c): DR 2-110(A)(1). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.16(d): DR 2-110(A)(2). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.16(e): DR 2-110(A)(3). 
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1.16:200  Mandatory Declination or Withdrawal 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.16(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.16(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § §  2.180, 2.194-2.198 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:1001 
ALI-LGL §  32 
Wolfram §  9.5.4 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.194 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.16(a) sets forth three instances in which an attorney must decline or withdraw from the 
representation: (1) to avoid violation of an Ohio Rule of Professional Conduct or other law; (2) 
incapacity of the lawyer; and (3) discharge by the client. Even when withdrawal is mandatory, the 
lawyer still must obtain permission from the tribunal to withdraw when required by its rules to do so 
and must take reasonably practicable steps to protect a client’s interest, including the return of any 
unearned fees. Rules 1.16(c), (d) & (e). See sections 1.16:400-:500. Further, several other rules on 
the subject of conflicts of interest independently mandate withdrawal when the conditions they 
describe exist. See Ohio Rule 3.7(a) (withdrawal as counsel when lawyer becomes witness) and 
section 3.7:200; Ohio Rule 1.7(b)) (withdrawal in face of multiple-client conflicts not cured by 
consent) and section 1.7:200. 
  
1.16:210  Discharge by Client 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.198 (1996). 
The operative provision here is Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(3), pursuant to which the lawyer must withdraw if 
discharged by the client. 
Because the attorney-client employment relationship is an at-will relationship, a client has the right to 
discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability in quantum meruit for 
payment for the lawyer’s services. See Ohio Rule 1.16 cmt. [4]. Supreme Court cases so stating, 
decided under the former OHCPR, include Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachik & Webster v. 
Lansberry, 68 Ohio St.3d 570, 629 N.E.2d 431 (1994); Fox & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Purdon, 44 
Ohio St.3d 69, 541 N.E.2d 448 (1989). See section 1.5:230. If the lawyer refuses to withdraw upon 
discharge by the client, the lawyer is subject to discipline. See, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ginther, 
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98 Ohio St.3d 345, 2003 Ohio 1010, 785 N.E.2d 432 (respondent sanctioned under former OH DR 
2-110(B)(4) for failing to withdraw until six months after client discharged him). (Ginther had 
subsequent difficulties under 2-110 when, among numerous other violations, he indicated to a 
magistrate that he intended to withdraw as counsel, but did not file a motion to do so until nine months 
later and apparently never informed his client of the withdrawal; DR 2-110(A)(2) violated, indefinite 
suspension imposed.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ginther, 108 Ohio St.3d 48, 2005 Ohio 79, 840 
N.E.2d 628.) In Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Gabriel, 57 Ohio St.3d 18, 565 N.E.2d 570 (1991), the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that Gabriel violated OH DR 2-110(B)(4) by refusing to withdraw from the 
representation of a client despite a letter from the client discharging him and notification from the 
client’s new counsel. Gabriel continued to file documents on behalf of the client and told the client’s 
insurance company to deal only with him. The other side of the coin was presented in Norwest Bank 
Minnesota v. Alex-Saunders, No. E-00-022, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3355 (Erie July 28, 2000), 
where the lawyer sought leave to withdraw, pursuant to former OH DR 2-110(B)(4), after his client 
had both discharged him and consented to his withdrawal. The trial court nevertheless denied counsel 
leave to withdraw. The court of appeals reversed, noting that counsel had apparently complied with 
the notice provisions of OH DR 2-110(A)(2) and, in accordance with the mandatory withdrawal 
provisions of OH DR 2-110(B)(4), was obligated to withdraw upon discharge by the client. In such 
circumstances, the appellate court held that the lower court’s denial of the motion was an abuse of 
discretion. 
One caveat to this general freedom of the client to discharge the lawyer arises with respect to 
court-appointed counsel. As Comment [5] to Ohio Rule 1.16 provides, “[w]hether a client can 
discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law.” Even if allowed, after full explanation 
of the consequences to the client, the court may decide that appointment of substitute counsel is 
unjustified, requiring the client to engage in self-representation after discharge of the client’s current 
counsel. Ohio Rule 1.16 cmt. [5]. (This provision seems to be largely ignored in the literature, 
although Hazard & Hodes allude to the rule in 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, 
The Law of Lawyering §  20.6, at 20-10 (3d ed. Supp. 2005-2) (noting client’s choice is to proceed 
with existing lawyer or pro se; “[w]ithout this caveat, a client - most often a criminal defendant - 
could forestall adjudication by refusing to continue with existing counsel and further refusing or 
being unable to find substitute counsel.”).) 
A second limitation arises when a client with a disability lacks the legal capacity to discharge the 
lawyer. Ohio Rule 1.16 cmt. [6] (stating this limitation and providing guidance on how to proceed in 
such a situation). 
A lawyer faces difficult issues when a client moves without contacting the lawyer and cannot be 
located. It has been opined that such action on the client’s part does not constitute constructive 
discharge of the lawyer by the client, so the lawyer’s obligations to the client continue. Cincinnati 
Bar Ass’n Op. 96-97-02 (Oct. 21, 1997). 
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1.16:220  Incapacity of Lawyer 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.197 (1996). 
An attorney must decline the representation or must withdraw from representing a client if the 
lawyer’s “mental or physical condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client.” 
Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(2). The two cases of which we are aware decided under 1.16(a)(2) are 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Wickerham, 132 Ohio St.3d 205, 2012 Ohio 2580, 970 N.E.2d 932, and 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 603, 2011 Ohio 4381, 955 N.E.2d 354. In both, 
substance abuse was a causative factor in the respondents’ misconduct, including their failure to 
withdraw from the representation in the face of materially impairing physical or mental problems. 
(Wickerham was also grappling with custody proceedings regarding her children, in addition to her 
prescription drug addiction.) 
Technically, the former Code analog (OH DR 2-110(B)(3)) could be violated even if no client 
suffered actual harm; the focus was on whether the lawyer faced unreasonable difficulty in carrying 
out the representation effectively. In cases brought for violation of this provision, however, the 
lawyer usually had committed numerous acts of misconduct attributable in large measure to the 
lawyer’s mental or physical condition. Sanction was warranted both for the failure to withdraw when 
the condition arose and for the subsequent misconduct that resulted. E.g., Dayton Bar Ass’n v. 
Andrews, 79 Ohio St.3d 109, 679 N.E.2d 1093 (1997) (in addition to 2-110(B)(3), attorney also 
sanctioned for violation of numerous other provisions, including former OH DR 6-103(A)(3) and 
9-102(B)(4)); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Potts, 65 Ohio St.3d 297, 603 N.E.2d 986 (1992) (attorney 
also sanctioned for neglecting clients as result of substance abuse). While the provision was broadly 
written to cover a wide spectrum of conditions, drug or alcohol dependency was often the culprit. See, 
e.g., Potts supra (drug dependency); Dayton Bar Ass’n v. LaVeris, 12 Ohio St.3d 98, 465 N.E.2d 
457 (1984) (drug and alcohol abuse). 
To the extent Rule 1.16(a)(2) requires that an attorney evaluate his own mental and physical 
condition to determine whether he is competent to handle the representation of clients, a realistic 
assessment may be difficult for a lawyer suffering from certain types of mental or physical problems. 
See also Ohio Rule 8.3(a), which requires all attorneys who possess unprivileged knowledge that any 
lawyer has committed a violation of the Ohio Rules reflecting on fitness to practice to report such 
knowledge to the appropriate disciplinary authority; the 8.3(a) duty includes self-reporting.  See 
section 8.3:200. If an attorney has unprivileged knowledge that another lawyer is suffering from a 
mental or physical condition that requires mandatory withdrawal, but withdrawal has not occurred, 
the duty to report attaches. See section 8.3:200. If the attorney’s knowledge is obtained while serving 
as a member of a lawyer-assistance program, it is subject to an exception to the reporting requirement 
to encourage participation in lawyer-assistance programs. Ohio Rule 8.3(d). See section 8.3:400. 
These 1.16 and 8.3 obligations, in the context of Alzheimer’s-impaired lawyers, are explored in 
Richard Acello, Rising Tide, ABAJ, May 2010, at p. 22. 
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1.16:230  Avoiding Unlawful Conduct 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.196 (1996). 
An attorney must decline or withdraw if “the representation will result in violation of the Ohio Rules 
of Professional Conduct or other law.” Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(1). The related permissive-withdrawal 
provision is division (b)(2), which is triggered when a client persists in conduct involving the 
lawyer’s services, which conduct the lawyer “reasonably believes” is illegal or fraudulent. Courts in 
other jurisdictions occasionally have stated that “when a client insists that an attorney pursue a course 
of conduct that, if the lawyer complied, would violate the lawyer code or other applicable law, the 
lawyer must withdraw even if the lawyer had no intention of following the intentions of the client.” 
See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  9.5, at 552 (1986). Comment [2] to the Rule can 
be read to endorse this view. It provides that “[a] lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from 
representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the 
Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.” Ohio Rule 1.16 cmt. [2] (Emphasis added.) The 
comment goes on to point out that the mere suggestion by the client that the lawyer engage in what is, 
in fact, impermissible conduct does not require declination or withdrawal. 
An example of invocation of Rule 1.16(a)(1), requiring withdrawal when the representation will 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, is Disciplinary Counsel v. Meyer, 134 Ohio St.3d 180, 
2012 Ohio 5487, 980 N.E.2d 1029, where respondent continued to practice while under suspension 
for failure to meet her CLE obligations, thereby violating Rule 5.5(a). 
Disciplinary cases and opinions under the Code analog to Rule 1.16(a)(1), former OH DR 
2-110(B)(2), include Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Williamson, 117 Ohio St.3d 399, 2008 Ohio 
1196, 884 N.E.2d 55 (sexual involvement with client violative of DR 1-102(A)(5) & (6) triggered 
mandatory withdrawal under DR 2-110(B)(2)). Continuing to represent a client, after announcing an 
intent to withdraw in the face of an acknowledged conflict of interest, likewise violated this provision.  
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mazer, 76 Ohio St.3d 481, 668 N.E.2d 478 (1996). Accord 
Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 105 Ohio St.3d 443, 2005 Ohio 2695, 828 N.E.2d 621 (failure to 
withdraw as required in face of stipulated conflict of interest in simultaneous representation of 
multiple clients with competing interests). The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline, addressing former OH DR 2-110(B)(2), found withdrawal to be mandatory when a client 
offered fabricated evidence and refused to reveal the fraud after the lawyer attempted to persuade him 
to do so. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-07, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 14 (Apr. 20, 1990). These pre-Rule decisional interpretations would seem to be applicable 
under the similar language of Ohio Rule 1.16(d)(1). 
In State v. Trapp, 52 Ohio App.2d 189, 368 N.E.2d 1278 (Hamilton 1977), the First District Court 
of Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to allow an attorney, George Clark, to withdraw 
when he knew that his representation would violate the former OHCPR. In Trapp, Clark was aware 
that his client’s alibi defense would require using perjured or false evidence, a practice clearly 
prohibited under OH DR 7-102(A)(4)-(7). The court of appeals found that Clark had “a duty to 
withdraw” under the circumstances and that the trial court erred in not allowing him to do so.  52 
Ohio App.2d at 194, 368 N.E.2d at 1282. 
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Finally, consistent with the first sentence of Rule 1.16 cmt. [1], declining employment is required if 
the representation cannot be performed competently and promptly (and thus violative of Rules 1.1 & 
1.3; see sections 1.1:200 and 1.3:300) or without improper conflict of interest, (e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 & 
3.7; see sections 1.7:300 (concurrent representation), 1.9:210 (former-client conflict), and 3.7:200 
(lawyer as witness)). 
See further discussion of Rule 1.16(a)(1) in section 1.16:240 below. 
 
1.16:240  Legal Action Brought for the Purpose of Harassing or Maliciously 
Injuring Any Person, or Presenting Unwarranted Claim or Defense 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  2.180, 2.195 (1996). 
Under the former OHCPR, an attorney was required to withdraw from representation if the lawyer 
knew or it was obvious that the client was “bringing the legal action, conducting the defense, or 
asserting a position in the litigation, or is otherwise having steps taken for him, merely for the purpose 
of harassing or maliciously injuring any person.’’ OH DR 2-110(B)(1). This aspect of mandatory 
withdrawal is now covered by Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(1), discussed above in section 1.16:230. The rule 
violated would be Rule 4.4(a), which prohibits a lawyer from using means having no substantial 
purpose other than to “embarrass, harass, delay, or burden a third person.” See section 4.4:200. 
Under the Code, a lawyer had to decline representation if he knew or it was obvious that the client 
wished to use the representation to abuse the system. Former OH DR 2-109 identified two categories 
of abuse: accepting representation where the client wanted steps taken in litigation “merely for the 
purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person,” OH DR 2-109(A)(1), and where the client 
wished to present a claim or defense in litigation that was not warranted under either existing law or a 
good faith argument to change the existing law. OH DR 2-109(A)(2). Declination is similarly 
obligatory under Rule 1.16(a)(1), for accepting the representation under such circumstances would 
violate, respectively, Rule 4.4(a) (using means to embarrass, harass, or burden another) and Rule 3.1 
(advancing frivolous claims or defenses). See sections 3.1:200 and 4.4:200. 
In the first disciplinary case decided by the Supreme Court under Rule 1.16(a)(1), Toledo Bar Ass’n 
v. Rust, 124 Ohio St.3d 305, 2010 Ohio 170, 921 N.E.2d 1056, the Court used the tie-in with Rule 
3.1 in finding no violation of (a)(1), inasmuch as the respondent’s pursuit of a wrongful-death claim 
on behalf of his client, while it may have been flawed procedurally, “had some arguably viable legal 
support,” 2009 Ohio 170, at para. 46, and thus did not run afoul of the prohibition against filing 
frivolous claims in Rule 3.1. The finding by the panel and Board that respondent violated 1.16(a)(1) 
was therefore overturned, and the complaint was dismissed.  
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1.16:300  Permissive Withdrawal 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.16(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.16(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  2.199, 2.202-2.205, 
2.209, 2.211, 5.87 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:1101 
ALI-LGL §  32 
Wolfram §  9.5.3 
  
1.16:310  Withdrawal to Undertake Adverse Representation 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  5.87 (1996). 
Because greater restrictions apply to conflicts of interest arising from the representation of current 
clients than to conflicts arising from the representation of a current client and a former client, a lawyer 
faced with a current-client conflict may be tempted to drop one of the clients against the client’s will, 
transforming that client into a former client, while retaining the other. Courts have not been 
sympathetic to such “hot potato” maneuvering, since it poses too severe a threat to the 
conflict-of-interest rules governing current clients.  Sarbey v. Nat’l City Bank, 66 Ohio App.3d 18, 
583 N.E.2d 392 (Summit 1990). Accord Henry Filters, Inc. v. Peabody Barnes, Inc., 82 Ohio 
App.3d 255, 261, 611 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Wood 1992) (“An attorney who is simultaneously 
representing two clients with differing interests cannot conform to the rules of ethics by merely 
discontinuing representation of one client after improperly initiating a lawsuit against that client.”). 
See also Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (applying Ohio 
law to reject this practice even where conflict arose out of merger of two law firms); 
Pioneer-Standard Elecs., Inc. v. Cap Gemini America, Inc., No. 1:101 CV2185, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7120 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2002) (applying former OHCPR). The “hot potato” issue is 
further discussed in section 1.9:200 at “When does a client become a ‘former client’?” 
  
1.16:320  Circumstances Justifying Discretionary Withdrawal 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  2.199, 2.202-2.205, 2.209, 2.211 
(1996). 
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Ohio Rule 1.16(b) identifies nine grounds on which a lawyer may withdraw from representation. If 
any one of these circumstances arises, withdrawal is permitted but is not required. The comments 
admonish, however, that “[a] decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on the basis of 
compelling circumstances . . . .” Rule 1.16 cmt. [8A]. All of these permissive withdrawal provisions 
are “[s]ubject to divisions (c), (d), and (e) of this rule.” 
Discretionary withdrawal - Where interests of client are not adversely affected: Pursuant to Ohio 
Rule 1.16(b)(1), a lawyer may withdraw at any time if “withdrawal can be accomplished without 
material adverse effect on the interests of the client.” As the ABA states, this language was moved out 
of the introductory language of the Rule “to clarify that the remaining subsections in Rule 1.16(b) 
permit the lawyer to withdraw even if there will be a material, adverse effect on the client.” ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 256 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). The Rule 
provides no guidance on what constitutes a “material adverse effect” that would bar withdrawal on 
this ground. The general policy favoring completion of representation once undertaken, however, 
argues for a comparatively light trigger, particularly given the extensive laundry list of for-cause 
grounds available for permissive withdrawal. 
There was no direct OHCPR analog to Rule 1.16(b)(1), although former OH DR 2-110(A)(2) 
generally addressed protection of the client’s interests, now treated in Ohio Rule 1.16(d). See 
discussion at section 1.16:500. 
Discretionary withdrawal - Client insists on pursuing course of conduct attorney believes is illegal or 
fraudulent: An attorney may withdraw from employment if a client “persists in a course of action 
involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is illegal or fraudulent.” Ohio 
Rule 1.16(b)(2). If the lawyer’s continued employment in the representation would involve the 
lawyer in assisting the client in conduct known by the lawyer to be illegal or fraudulent, such 
continued representation would violate Ohio Rule 1.2(d) and necessitate withdrawal under Rule 
1.16(a)(1). See generally sections 1.2:610 and 1.16:230. In either event, a lawyer should not have to 
place his professional reputation in jeopardy by being associated with a client known or reasonably 
thought to be engaged in an ongoing course of illegal or fraudulent conduct. 
Rule 1.16(b)(2) is another of those instances in the Ohio Rules where the Model Rule language 
“criminal or fraudulent” has been replaced with “illegal or fraudulent.” See section 1.2:600 for a 
discussion of the issue generally. With respect to Rule 1.16 specifically, it should be noted (1) that the 
use of “illegal” carries forward the same standard for permissive withdrawal that was present in the 
former OHCPR analog (OH DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) & (c)); and (2) that such usage is found in Model 
Rule states other than Ohio only in Illinois and Virginia (see Illinois Rule 1.16(b)(1)(B) & (C) 
(“illegal” course of conduct); Virginia Rule 1.16(b)(1) (“illegal or unjust” course of action)). As 
stated in the Task Force’s ABA Model Rules Comparison to Rule 1.16, “[t]his allows the lawyer to 
withdraw when the client persists in a course of conduct . . . . includ[ing] violations of statutes or 
administrative regulations for which there are no criminal penalties.” 
Discretionary withdrawal - Client’s use of lawyer’s services to perpetrate crime or fraud: Unlike Ohio 
Rule 1.16(b)(2), which looks to the client’s current conduct, Rule 1.16(b)(3) permits voluntary 
withdrawal when “the client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate a crime or fraud.” This 
“misuse” of the lawyer’s services in the past justifies withdrawal “even if that would materially 
prejudice the client.” Ohio Rule 1.16 cmt. [7]. There was no comparable OHCPR analog (even 
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though in its Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.16 the Task Force erroneously states that Rule 1.16 
(b)(3) corresponds to former OH DR 2-110(C)(1)(c)). Subdivision (b)(3) is further distinguished 
from (b)(2) in its focus on “crime or fraud” rather than the latter’s focus on conduct reasonably 
believed to be “illegal or fraudulent.” 
Discretionary withdrawal - Client does not follow attorney’s advice: Because the lawyer is acting as 
the agent for the client, and it is the client’s interests that are the object of the representation, the client 
has primary decision-making authority in the relationship. See section 1.2:300. Occasional 
disagreement over minor matters should not be cause for withdrawal. Nevertheless, when the client’s 
disregard for the lawyer’s judgment and advice is more substantial, it suggests a breakdown in the 
relationship such that both the client and lawyer might be better served were the relationship 
terminated. In addition, the Rule recognizes that an attorney need not sacrifice his personal beliefs or 
reputation when representing a client. If the client insists that the lawyer pursue ends or utilize means 
that, although permitted, are repugnant or against the advice and judgment of counsel, the attorney 
should be free to withdraw if necessary to protect the attorney’s beliefs or reputation. 
These principles are reflected in Ohio Rule 1.16(b)(4), which provides that if a client “insists upon 
taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental 
disagreement,” the lawyer may withdraw from the employment. 
If this issue arises in the context of a pending matter before a tribunal, however, Ohio Rule 1.16(b)(4) 
is trumped (as are all of the subdivisions of division (b)) by the “subject to division[] (c)” language at 
the outset of division (b). Pursuant thereto, court permission, in a matter pending before a tribunal, is 
required if the rules of the court so state. Cf., under the former OHCPR, McGraw v. Convenient 
Food Mart, No. 97- L-271, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2818 (Lake June 18, 1999) (where local rules 
do not provide guidance, withdrawal is at court’s discretion; no abuse of discretion in denying motion 
to withdraw on morning trial was to commence based on client’s disagreement with lawyer’s advice, 
where client consented to having lawyer represent him at trial). 
Discretionary withdrawal - Client disregards obligation to lawyer, including payment of fee: An 
attorney may withdraw if a client “fails substantially to fulfill an obligation, financial or otherwise, to 
the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will 
withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled.” Ohio Rule 1.16(b)(5). The lawyer’s rights and 
obligations in this situation are discussed in Thomas M. Horwitz, The Client Who Does Not Pay: 
Terminating Representation and Collection of Fees, Cleveland Metro. B.J. (Sept. 2009), at 30. 
See, e.g., under the former OHCPR, Joondeph & Shaffer v. Thermal Designs, Inc., 102 Ohio 
App.3d 59, 656 N.E.2d 990 (Summit 1995) (withdrawal justified where client deliberately 
disregarded its fee obligation). The wording of subdivision (b)(5) indicates that permissive 
withdrawal is appropriate only when the client is in substantial breach of an obligation owed the 
attorney. It does not permit the lawyer to withdraw simply because the lawyer is dissatisfied with the 
financial terms of the lawyer-client relationship. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  
9.5, at 550 (1986). Further, there is authority under the former OHCPR suggesting that an attorney 
may not exercise permissive withdrawal because of the client’s failure to pay a fee, if the attorney 
should have realized at the outset that the client lacked the means to pay for legal services, at least 
where the attorney also failed to make a timely motion to withdraw in a case where court approval 
was required. State v. Hayes, No. 88- A-1402, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 4125 (Ohio App. 
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Ashtabula Nov. 3, 1989). When an attorney intends to withdraw because of a client’s failure to pay a 
fee, the attorney must give reasonable warning to the client that the lawyer will withdraw unless the 
fee payment is made, at a time sufficient to allow the client to fulfill the obligation and avoid the 
lawyer’s withdrawal. Rule 1.16(b)(5). 
Discretionary withdrawal - Client conduct makes it unreasonably difficult for attorney: An attorney 
may withdraw from representation if “the representation will result in an unreasonable financial 
burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client.” Ohio Rule 
1.16(b)(6). If a client refuses to provide necessary information to counsel or fails to attend scheduled 
meetings, for example, the attorney may choose to withdraw because the representation would be 
considered unreasonably difficult -- the attorney could not appropriately manage the case. See also 
Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 91-10 (n.d.) (permissive withdrawal available under former OH DR 
2-110(C)(1)(d), where lawyer could not locate client despite diligent good-faith effort to do so). But 
cf. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 96-97-02 (Oct. 21, 1997) (where client could not be found after 
diligent efforts, lawyer had to continue representation when to abandon it would do client harm). 
Given that the Rule provides that the client’s conduct must render the representation “unreasonably 
difficult,” something more than occasional lack of cooperation by the client should be required to 
justify the lawyer’s withdrawal. 
A case to be considered in connection with the Toledo and Cincinnati Bar Associations’ opinions 
discussed above is Wilson v. Wilson, 154 Ohio App.3d 454, 2003 Ohio 4474, 797 N.E.2d 990 
(Union). In Wilson, the legal-aid attorney, appointed to represent indigent appellant Cassie Wilson in 
a child custody-divorce case, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel based on inadequate assistance by 
the client in the representation and counsel’s lack of knowledge as to where Cassie was living. This 
motion was filed one week before the case was scheduled for trial. Two days before the trial date the 
magistrate granted the motion to withdraw without any notice to Cassie. The magistrate subsequently 
continued the trial date for two weeks. Still without counsel on the rescheduled date, Cassie argued 
that she never received notice of the motion for withdrawal and would have objected to the grounds of 
the motion if she had. Cassie’s request for a second continuance was denied, and the trial court 
affirmed. On appeal, the court of appeals agreed that OH DR 2-110(B) ([sic] OH DR 2-110(A)(2)) 
had not been met (no documents returned to client; notice of withdrawal received only four days 
before trial was not reasonable notice), but nevertheless, because Cassie was granted the extra two 
weeks to find counsel, affirmed the trial court’s refusal to grant a second continuance. 
With respect to withdrawal based on unreasonable financial burden, see ABA, Annotated Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 260 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). 
Discretionary withdrawal - Withdrawal with client’s assent: An attorney is free to withdraw from the 
representation if “the client gives informed consent to termination of the representation.” Ohio Rule 
1.16(b)(7). The attorney-client relationship is an at-will relationship, and the client is free to terminate 
this relationship at any time. This provision simply makes it possible for the attorney to ask the client 
to do so.  Under the Ohio Code analog to 1.16(b)(7) (DR 2-110(C)(5)), withdrawal was permitted if 
the client “knowingly and freely assent[ed]” to the termination.  In Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Norton, 
116 Ohio St.3d 226, 2007 Ohio 6038, 877 N.E.2d 964, the Court found that in unilaterally dropping 
his client’s case without the client’s consent, respondent violated this provision. 
Discretionary withdrawal - Sale of law practice: Ohio Rule 1.16(b)(8) permits withdrawal where 
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“the lawyer sells the law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.” As we note in the portion of the 
treatise dealing with Rule 1.17, “permissive” withdrawal after completion of the sale of a practice 
does not make a whole lot of sense. Clients of the seller will either become clients of the buyer or of 
some other lawyer; this can properly be viewed as a constructive discharge, calling for mandatory 
withdrawal under Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(3). Even without the constructive discharge twist, it is not a 
matter of “may withdraw”; the selling lawyer, by the very nature of the transaction, “has withdrawn,” 
and his or her clients must look elsewhere for representation. 
Discretionary withdrawal - Other good cause for withdrawal exists: Obviously, Ohio Rule 1.16(b)(9) 
is a catch-all provision, designed to provide an escape in appropriate circumstances where no other 
permissive withdrawal ground is applicable. The ABA notes that most of the cases under this division 
concern “antagonism between lawyer and client.” ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 269 (5th ed. 2003). 
Impermissible withdrawal: Once a lawyer agrees to undertake representation, it is expected that the 
lawyer will see the representation to conclusion unless grounds for mandatory or permissive 
withdrawal lie. The policy underlying these provisions is that an attorney should not accept 
employment unless it can be performed to completion, because withdrawal under 1.16(a) and 
1.16(b)(2)-(9) has the potential to cause at least some hardship to the client. See Bennett v. Bennett, 
86 Ohio App.3d 343, 620 N.E.2d 1023 (Cuyahoga 1993) (purpose of former OH DR 2-110 to 
assure client will not be prejudiced as result of withdrawal of counsel). A trusting attorney-client 
relationship requires that the attorney honor the parties’ contractual agreement and not simply 
withdraw from representation without justification. 
Under the former OHCPR, violation of OH DR 2-110(C) could lead to the lawyer’s forfeiting any 
rights to attorney fees for the work already performed, W. Wagner & G. Wagner Co., L.P.A. v. 
Block, 107 Ohio App.3d 603, 669 N.E.2d 272 (Erie 1995) (applied in hourly-rate contract situation); 
Sandler v. Gossick, 87 Ohio App.3d 372, 622 N.E.2d 389 (Cuyahoga 1993) (applied in 
contingent-fee contract situation), and give rise to a malpractice claim. See, e.g., Rumley v. 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, 129 Ohio App.3d 638, 718 N.E.2d 964 (Franklin 1998). 
The mere fact that a court allowed the withdrawal and the clients did not oppose the motion was not, 
standing alone, conclusive evidence that just cause existed for the withdrawal. See W. Wagner & G. 
Wagner Co., L.P.A. v. Block, 107 Ohio App.3d 603, 669 N.E.2d 272 (Erie 1995). 
 
1.16:400  Obtaining Permission to Withdraw Under Local Rule of Tribunal 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.16(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.16(c) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.189 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:1106 
ALI-LGL §  32 
Wolfram §  9.5.1 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.189 (1996). 
If an action is pending before a tribunal, Ohio Rule 1.16(c) obligates an attorney to obtain from the 
tribunal permission to withdraw if the rules of the tribunal so require. See, e.g., Cuyahoga Juv R 7. 
(The second sentence of MR 1.6(c), requiring a lawyer to continue representation when ordered to do 
so by a tribunal, notwithstanding good cause to withdraw, has been deleted from the Ohio Rule. We 
could find no reference to this deletion in the “legislative history.”) Thus, before withdrawing, an 
attorney must check the rules of the particular tribunal to determine if permission to withdraw is 
necessary.  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 373, 745 N.E.2d 418 (2001) (failure to 
follow local court rules requiring that withdrawing lawyer obtain court’s permission violated former 
OH DR 2-110(A)(1)). Division (c) applies irrespective of whether the withdrawal is mandatory under 
division (a) or permissive under division (b). See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 261 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). In criminal cases, constitutional concerns also limit: 1) 
the attorney’s right to seek withdrawal on the basis that there are no nonfrivolous grounds to pursue 
on appeal; and 2) the court’s authority to grant permission to withdraw for this reason.  Penson v. 
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
A further limitation may arise when the lawyer serves as appointed counsel. As stated in Ohio Rule 
1.16 cmt. [3], withdrawal by an appointed lawyer “ordinarily requires approval of the appointed 
authority.” In language that would appear to be applicable to any lawyer in pending litigation (and not 
just to appointed counsel), the comment goes on to note that a lawyer seeking withdrawal may be 
doing so in response to a client’s demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. Spelling 
this out for the court, however, might compromise client confidentiality. Comment [3] to the Rule 
recognizes this dilemma and, in advice really addressed to courts considering a lawyer’s request to 
withdrawal, suggests that “[t]he lawyer’s statement that professional considerations require 
termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient [explanation].” Ohio 
Rule 1.16 cmt. [3]. 
In the first decision applying Rule 1.16(c), Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Johnson, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 97, 2010 Ohio 4832, 936 N.E.2d 938, respondent sought to withdraw (as required by the rules 
of the tribunal) but the court denied her motion. Thereafter, although the Court does not say that she 
formally withdrew despite the denial of her motion, she in effect did so by doing nothing further in the 
matter, with the result that a six-figure default judgment was entered against her clients. It follows that 
such misconduct can also involve violation of Rule 3.4(c) for knowingly disobeying an obligation 
under the rules of the tribunal, as was the case in Johnson. See also Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Davis, 
133 Ohio St.3d 525, 2012 Ohio 4998, 979 N.E.2d 312 (providing in fee contracts for “automatic 
withdrawal” in derogation of local rules which require filing of motion to withdraw); Akron Bar 
Ass’n v. Gibson, 128 Ohio St.3d 347, 2011 Ohio 628, 944 N.E.2d 228 (failure to file motion to 
withdraw violated 1.16(c)). 
In an important opinion bearing on the timing of withdrawal, as it applies to the statute of limitations 
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for malpractice, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Conley, 109 Ohio St.3d 141, 2006 Ohio 2035, 846 
N.E.2d 509, held that the one-year limitation for bringing a legal malpractice claim, is not triggered 
by the filing of a motion to withdraw as required by local court rule, but rather by the lawyer’s earlier 
letters to his client stating that he was terminating the attorney-client relationship. As a result, the 
malpractice action, filed more than one year after the letters, was time barred. Justice Lundberg 
Stratton filed a strong dissent, arguing that withdrawal pursuant to local court rule “establishes a 
bright line that clearly advises all parties when an attorney-client relationship has been terminated and 
eliminates the need for further factual inquiries into the actions of the parties.” Id. at para. 14. The 
Smith case is further discussed in section 1.1:300. 
 
1.16:500  Mitigating Harm to Client Upon Withdrawal 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.16(d) & (e) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.16(d) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  2.190-2.193 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:1201 
ALI-LGL §  32 
Wolfram §  9.5.1 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§  2.190-2.193 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 1.16(d) provides that before an attorney withdraws from the representation of a client, the 
lawyer must 
take steps to the extent reasonably practicable, to protect a client’s 
interest. The steps include giving due notice to the client, allowing 
reasonable time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the 
client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and 
complying with applicable laws and rules. 
This division of the Rule goes on to state that the delivery of client papers and property shall be made 
“promptly.” Id.  The first disciplinary case invoking Rule 1.16(d), “because [respondent] withdrew 
from [his client’s] case without contemporaneously locating or returning her file,” is Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 2008 Ohio 3340, 891 N.E.2d 749, at para. 52. Accord Akron 
Bar Ass’n v. Gibson, 128 Ohio St.3d 347, 2011 Ohio 628, 944 N.E.2d 228 (ceased attending 
hearings on clients’ behalf, failed to forward documents, failed to respond to request for return of 
files); Disciplinary Counsel v. Bursey, 124 Ohio St.3d 85, 2009 Ohio 6180, 919 N.E.2d 198 
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(failure to conscientiously represent client and then deserting her, including failure to return client’s 
file as requested, violated Rules 1.3 and 1.16(d)); Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Kubyn, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 321, 2009 Ohio 1154, 903 N.E.2d 1215 (failure to return client case file upon discharge). 
These 1.16(d) duties apply even where the client has unfairly discharged the lawyer. Ohio Rule 1.16 
cmt. [9]. See also Rule 1.16 cmt. [8A]. 
In Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2010-2 (April 9, 2010), the Board opined on 
the question whether lawyer interview notes of a client or former client are papers to which the client 
is entitled as reasonably necessary to the client’s representation under Rule 1.16(d). According to the 
Board, it is often a professional judgment call for the lawyer, but a few general guidelines are 
provided: 
A lawyer’s notes to himself or herself regarding passing thoughts, ideas, 
impression, or questions will probably not be items reasonably 
necessary to a client’s representation. Internal office management 
memoranda such as personnel assignments or conflicts of interest 
checks will probably not be items reasonably necessary to a client’s 
representation. But a lawyer’s notes regarding facts about the case will 
most likely be an item reasonably necessary to a client’s representation. 
Id. at syllabus (surveying ethics opinions nationwide on the issue). 
If withdrawal is conditioned on court approval, it is the court’s duty to make sure that the lawyer is in 
compliance with these requirements.  Williams v. Williams, Nos. L-99-1324, L-98-1411, 2000 
Ohio App. LEXIS 2232 (Lucas May 26, 2000) (violation of local rule and OH DR 2-110(A)(2) 
requirements); Tschudy v. Tschudy, No. CA-7294, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 673 (Stark Feb. 16, 
1988). Accord Bennett v. Bennett, 86 Ohio App.3d 343, 620 N.E.2d 1023 (Cuyahoga 1993) 
(following Tschudy). 
Simply abandoning the client by failing to carry out the object of the representation violates this 
provision. It was so held under the OHCPR. E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Yeager, 123 Ohio St.3d 
156, 2009 Ohio 4761, 914 N.E.2d 1046 (respondent violated 2-110(A)(2) by “abruptly” leaving 
courtroom in middle of hearing, thereby “completely deserting her client,” id. at para. 15, without 
taking any steps to protect his interests); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Norton, 116 Ohio St.3d 226, 2007 
Ohio 6038, 877 N.E.2d 964 (lawyer dropped case after statute had run on contemplated retaliation 
claim; while lawyer advised client of colorable wrongful discharge claim on which statute had not run, 
Court found violation of DR 2-110(A)(2), requiring lawyer to take reasonable steps to avoid 
foreseeable prejudice to client before withdrawing). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Lord, 114 
Ohio St.3d 466, 2007 Ohio 4260, 873 N.E.2d 273 (abandoning clients violated 2-110(A)(2)). In 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. McCorkle, 105 Ohio St.3d 430, 2005 Ohio 2588, 828 N.E.2d 99, 
respondent abandoned his practice altogether, thereby violating, inter alia, former OH DR 
2-110(A)(2) (withdrawal without taking steps to avoid prejudice to clients), as well as 2-110(A)(1) 
(prohibiting withdrawal without obtaining court’s required permission). Such conduct could also be 
viewed as governed by provisions dealing with neglect and the related rules set forth in former OH 
DR 7-101(A)(1)-(3) – all now covered by Ohio Rule 1.3. See generally Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 
96-97-02 (Oct. 21, 1997) (citing former OHCPR provisions to support its determination that even 
where client cannot be found after diligent efforts, lawyer must continue representation if abandoning 
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it would do client harm). 
In Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Olivito, 110 Ohio St.3d 64, 2006 Ohio 3564, 850 N.E.2d 702, 
respondent argued that he had not violated former DR 2-110(A)(2) because the clients had filed a 
grievance against him, thereby effectively discharging him.  In rejecting this argument, the Court 
found that Mrs. Accola had specifically stated in the grievance that she had not discharged respondent.  
The Court then went on to find that 
respondent attempted to withdraw as counsel for the Accolas before he 
had taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights 
of his clients, before he had provided notice of withdrawal, and before 
giving his clients an opportunity to employ other counsel. 
Id. at para. 18. This argument by respondent would appear to have been a red herring in any event, 
since both under the former Code (DR 2-110(B)(4)) and under the Rule (1.16(a)(3)), a lawyer must 
withdraw if discharged by the client.  Thus, it is not surprising that in other cases the Court has applied 
DR 2-110(A)(2) & (3) (obligations upon withdrawal), not only when the lawyer did in fact withdraw 
without discharge by the client, but also when the client fired the lawyer.  Because of  2-110(B)(4), 
the end result is the same. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Friedman, 114 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007 
Ohio 2477, 866 N.E.2d 1076 (applying DR 2-110(A)(3) (obligation to return unearned fees upon 
withdrawal) in five different instances in which the client discharged respondent). The same result 
will follow under the Rules, not only because of the discharge-equals-mandatory-withdrawal 
provision of 1.16(a)(3), but also because of Rule 1.16 cmt. [9], which requires prompt return of client 
property (i.e., unearned fees) “[e]ven if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged.” See generally 1 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 33(1) & cmt. a (2000) (obligations upon 
termination apply “regardless of whether the client or the lawyer initiates the termination”). 
Adequate notice to client: Regardless of whether the withdrawal is mandatory or permissive, Rule 
1.16(d) requires the withdrawing attorney to give the client notice of the lawyer’s intention to 
withdraw at a time sufficient to allow the client to hire substitute counsel if the client so chooses. See 
generally Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  9.5, at 543-44 (1986) (“Courts have 
emphasized particularly the requirement of giving notice to the client in time to permit the client to 
obtain substitute counsel.”). Failure to do so led to disciplinary action under the OHCPR. Dayton 
Bar Ass’n v. Gross, 17 Ohio St.3d 206, 478 N.E.2d 792 (1985) (lawyer sanctioned under OH DR 
2-110(A)(2) for failure to notify client of withdrawal). In Akron Bar Ass’n v. Johnstone, 54 Ohio 
St.2d 485, 377 N.E.2d 790 (1978), the court publicly reprimanded Johnstone for withdrawing from a 
case without notifying his client, even though Johnstone believed that his part in the case had been 
accomplished and that the remainder of the case was being handled by co-counsel. See also 
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Leneghan, 117 Ohio St.3d 103, 2008 Ohio 506, 881 N.E.2d 1241 
(DR 2-110 violation not charged; public reprimand for neglect that included failure to provide notice 
to either client or court of appeals that respondent was withdrawing from appeal); Wilson v. Wilson, 
154 Ohio App.3d 454, 2003 Ohio 4474, 797 N.E.2d 990 (Union) (in nondisciplinary context, court 
noted that former OH DR 2-110(A)(2) not complied with, but found no prejudice inasmuch as 
magistrate granted 19-day continuance to permit party to obtain new counsel; no error found in lower 
court’s denial of second continuance). 
Without permission from the tribunal, a lawyer was not free under the Code to withdraw without 
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notice to the client.  Columbus Credit Co. v. Evans, 82 Ohio App.3d 798, 613 N.E.2d 671 
(Franklin 1992). Nevertheless, in situations where withdrawal had to be approved by the court, it 
was held that a trial court could allow counsel to withdraw without prior notice to the client. If it 
allowed such withdrawal, the trial court was under a duty to give the client notice of the counsel’s 
withdrawal, along with an opportunity to obtain substitute counsel. Cotton v. Cotton, No. 
88AP-1041, 1989 WL 50571 (Ohio App. Franklin May 9, 1989). A later decision of the Ohio 
Supreme Court indicated, however, that the withdrawing lawyer should give notice to the client in 
any event.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Butler, 85 Ohio St.3d 1, 706 N.E.2d 757 (1999) 
(lawyer sanctioned for failure to give client sufficient notice of court-approved withdrawal; 
possibility of court-provided notice not mentioned). Given the seemingly absolute obligation to give 
due notice to the client, as set forth in Rule 1.16(d), following the Butler rule and giving notice to the 
client in any event is definitely the recommended course. 
Notification of withdrawal need not be elaborate, but it must indicate in some definite way that the 
attorney’s work is at an end. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §  9.5, at 
542 (1986). A cover letter to a final billing often will do. When a lawyer seeks to withdraw from a 
case after undertaking an initial investigation and determining that the case lacks merit, the lawyer 
must give the client due notice of withdrawal, but the notice need not be in writing. As the Ohio 
Supreme Court commented in Trumbull County Bar Ass’n v. Donlin, 76 Ohio St.3d 152, 155, 666 
N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (1996): “While it probably would have been more prudent of respondent to have 
notified his client in writing that he would not handle the case further, the fact that it was not reduced 
to writing does not rise to the level of a violation under OH DR 2-110(A)(2).” 
A disciplinary case more recent than Donlin, however, suggests that a lawyer who relies solely on 
written notice of withdrawal, without more, does so at his peril. In Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ashton, 
108 Ohio St.3d 37, 2006 Ohio 78, 840 N.E.2d 618, the respondent did send a copy of his notice of 
withdrawal from litigation to the client, but the client “apparently” never received it. The Supreme 
Court found that respondent had violated former OH DR 2-110(A)(2) because he “failed to properly 
withdraw from [his client’s] case.” Id. at para. 22. The teaching of Ashton apparently is that, at least 
under the Code, a withdrawing lawyer must take the steps necessary to make sure that the client has in 
fact been notified of the withdrawal. The new Rule, like its Code analog, requires that “due” notice be 
given and that the lawyer “endeavor[] to minimize the possible adverse effect on the rights of the 
client and the possibility of prejudice to the client as a result of the withdrawal.” Rule 1.16 cmt. [8A]. 
Whether this includes the rather onerous standard of the Ashton case is not entirely clear, but so long 
as the issue is in doubt a lawyer would be well-advised to confirm the client’s knowledge of the 
withdrawal by a follow-up phone call or by sending the notice by registered or certified mail, return 
receipt requested. 
The Donlin-Ashton waters were further muddied by the Court’s later decision in Cuyahoga County 
Bar Ass’n v. Ballou, 109 Ohio St.3d 152, 2006 Ohio 2037, 846 N.E.2d 519, where a lawyer was 
disciplined under former OH DR 6-101(A)(3) for missing a hearing at which his [former?] client was 
evicted, even though the respondent orally advised his then client, prior to the hearing, that he would 
not continue the representation and would not appear on the client’s behalf unless he was paid (which 
he was not). The Court makes a point of referring to the fact that the “board also noted that respondent 
did not confirm his decision to withdraw in writing.” Id. at para. 5. Once again, as in Smith v. 
Conley, discussed in section 1.16:400 supra, Justice Lundberg Stratton was the lone dissenter, and 
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once again she raised persuasive points. In addition to asserting that the majority’s decision in Ballou 
was at odds with that in Smith, she also pointed out that the Ballou result is hard to reconcile with 
Donlin, where “we expressly held that the Disciplinary Rules do not require that notice to a client of 
withdrawal from employment be reduced to writing.” Id. at para. 15. 
When a lawyer departs from a law firm, did former OH DR 2-110(A)(2) place a duty on the departing 
lawyer to inform those whom he or she was representing of that fact? Several local bar associations 
opined that it did. See Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 89-5 (Feb. 23, 1990); Ethics Opinion, Cincinnati 
Bar Report, July 8, 1986, at 7. Such a requirement would help preserve the client’s right to counsel 
of choice -- the client may continue with the original firm as counsel or transfer the business instead to 
the departing lawyer. Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected this position in Fred Siegel Co., 
L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St.3d 171, 707 N.E.2d 853 (1999). The Court reasoned that 
even though the departing lawyer had handled matters on behalf of various clients, the clients were 
clients of the firm, not the departing lawyer. The Court noted that, at its core, the purpose of the 
Disciplinary Rule was to protect clients from abandonment. Such a concern does not arise when a 
lawyer departs from a firm; upon the departure of one lawyer in a firm, another lawyer in the firm 
would simply take over the representation. 
Return of papers and property to which client is entitled: When an attorney withdraws from 
representation, the attorney must “deliver[] to the client all papers and property to which the client is 
entitled” and must do so “promptly.” Ohio Rule 1.16(d). See the Lawson, Bursey, and Kubyn cases, 
discussed at the outset of section 1.16:500. See generally, under the former OHCPR, Reid, Johnson, 
Downes, Andrachik & Webster v. Lansberry, 68 Ohio St.3d 570, 629 N.E.2d 431 (1994) 
(discharged attorney must yield case file). (See also the responsibility of the lawyer set forth in Ohio 
Rule 1.15(d), without regard to withdrawal, to “promptly deliver to the client . . . any funds or other 
property that the client is entitled . . . to receive.” See section 1.15:220). Failure to comply with the 
delivery obligation can lead to disciplinary action. E.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Bancsi, 72 Ohio 
St.3d 525, 651 N.E.2d 949 (1995) (lawyer’s failure to return case file after discharge by client 
violated DR 2-110(A)(2)). 
Three principal questions arose with respect to interpretation of this provision under the former 
OHCPR, the first two of which are resolved by the new Rules. First, the former rule imposed a 
mandatory duty to deliver covered property to the client upon withdrawal. Some sources, however, 
spoke of a duty that applied upon client request. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
92-8, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13, at *9 (Apr. 10, 1992) (“An attorney has an ethical duty 
to promptly deliver a former client’s case files to the former client upon request”). And, while former 
OH DR 9-102(B)(4) contained a duty to deliver property to which an existing client is entitled “as 
requested by a client,” new Rule 1.15(d) contains no such limitation. See sections 1.15:220, :300. 
Thus it is now clear that the duty to provide – both to former clients and to current clients – the papers 
and property they are entitled to receive exists independent of any request therefor. (Old habits die 
hard. In Opinion 2010-2, discussed at the beginning of this section, the question whether a lawyer's 
notes must be delivered to the client pursuant to Rule 1.16(d) was phrased in terms of whether they 
are papers "to which the current or former client is entitled upon request.") 
Second, although former OH DR 2-110(A)(2) provided no guidance as to which papers and property 
were ones to which “the client is entitled,” Ohio Rule 1.16(d) does so; they “may include 
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correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts, exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, and 
other items reasonably necessary to the client’s representation.” Ohio Rule 1.16(b). See also Board 
of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-8, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (Apr. 10, 
1992): 
Materials acquired or prepared for the purposes of representing the 
client and other materials that might prove beneficial to the client 
should be returned. These materials include, but are not limited to all 
significant correspondence, investigatory documents and reports the 
client has paid for, filed or unfiled but prepared pleadings and briefs, 
and all materials supplied by the client. 
Id. at *9. 
This return requirement does not preclude an attorney from retaining a copy of the materials, since the 
lawyer may need the information should a dispute arise between the attorney and the client. The 
attorney should not charge the client for the costs of copying, however, because the client has no 
interest in the attorney’s retention of copies. Op. 92-8, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13. See 
Ohio Rule 1.16 cmt. [8A]. As stated most recently in Op. 2010-2 (discussed this section infra), "Any 
expense, such as copying costs, incurred by the lawyers in turning over a client's file on request must 
be borne by the lawyer." 
The third question is the effect of a retaining lien on the requirement to return client property and 
papers. The common law of Ohio gives lawyers a right to place a lien on client papers when a dispute 
over fees owed arises. See section 1.8:1130. Where such a lien is exercised, it can be argued that the 
papers cease to be items to which “the client is entitled” and hence failure to turn them over does not 
violate Ohio Rule 1.16(d). See, under the former rule, Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 104, at 2 (Nov. 12, 
1973) (“If the fees have been earned, and there was no ethical breach by the attorney in withdrawing 
according to Disciplinary Rule 2-110, then under local law [of retaining liens] in Ohio the client is 
clearly not entitled to the papers as long as fees remain unpaid.” (bracketed material added)). The 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, however, stated that the assertion of a 
retaining lien in order to solve fee disputes may violate former OH DR 2-110(A)(2) where it causes 
foreseeable prejudice to the rights of clients and therefore use of such liens is to be discouraged. Bd. 
of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-8, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (Apr. 10, 
1992). Board Op. 2010-02 similarly discourages the use of lawyer liens: 
Lawyers sometimes attempt to rely on the language of Prof. Cond. Rule 
1.8(i)(1) as justification for asserting a lien over a client's file. 
*  *  * 
[quoting 1.8(i)(1)] 
But in Ohio such reliance may be misguided. Rule 1.8(i)[(1)] applies 
only to acquiring "a lien authorized by law." 
In Ohio there is no common law lien on a client's files in a contingent 
fee case. See Reid, 68 Ohio St.3d at 574-75. And, in Ohio, there is no 
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statutory lien on client files. The legality of a lien is a question of law 
outside this Board's advisory authority. 
Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2010-02, 2010 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 
(Apr. 9, 2010), at *8-9 (bracketed material added). Not exactly a ringing endorsement. Again, see 
section 1.8:1130. Requiring a client to sign a release of any claims the client may have against the 
attorney as a condition for return of the client’s file upon discharge also is improper.  Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Schultz, 71 Ohio St.3d 383, 643 N.E.2d 1139 (1994) (treating this as an attempt to limit 
malpractice liability in contravention of former OH DR 6-102(A)). See section 1.8:900. 
Return of unearned fees: “A lawyer who withdraws from employment shall refund promptly any part 
of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned, except where withdrawal is pursuant to Rule 1.17.” 
Ohio Rule 1.16(e). See also Ohio Rule 1.15(d). Failure to do so warrants sanction. See, e.g., under 
the Rules, Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 130 Ohio St.3d 368, 2011 Ohio 5578, 958 N.E.2d 914; 
and Disciplinary Counsel v. Schiller, 123 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009 Ohio 4909, 915 N.E.2d 324 
(violations, inter alia, of DR 2-110(A)(3) and Rule 1.16(e), and 9-102(B)(4) and 1.15(d)). As noted 
in this section supra and in section 1.16:600, the Friedman case, 114 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007 Ohio 2477, 
866 N.E.2d 1076, applied the 2-110(A)(3) withdrawal obligation to return unearned fees to multiple 
instances in which the lawyer was fired by the client.  That same result can be expected under the 
Rules.  See Ohio Rule 1.16 (a)(3), (d), (e) & cmt. [9] and Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Kubyn, 121 
Ohio St.3d 321, 2009 Ohio 1154, 903 N.E.2d 1215, discussed above in this section and in section 
1.16:600. Accord ABA, Annotated Rules of Professional Conduct 265 (7th ed. 2011) 
(commentary) (citations include discharge cases). The Restatement also expressly so states as a 
matter of general ethics law.  See 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 33(1) & 
cmt. a (2000). 
In determining what part of the fee has been earned, upon proper withdrawal the lawyer’s right to 
recovery under the contract ceases and is measured instead, under the doctrine of quantum meruit, by 
the reasonable value of the lawyer’s services rendered.  Frey v. Stegall, No. CA 1586, 1994 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 1985 (Athens May 2, 1994) (quantum meruit proper measure of recovery upon 
attorney’s withdrawal). See also Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachik & Webster v. Lansberry, 68 
Ohio St.3d 570, 629 N.E.2d 431 (1994); Fox & Associates Co., L.P.A. v. Purdon, 44 Ohio St.3d 
69, 541 N.E.2d 448 (1989), discussed in section 1.16:600 below. In contrast, where the lawyer 
voluntarily withdraws without just cause, no fees are recoverable.  W. Wagner & G. Wagner Co., 
L.P.A. v. Block, 107 Ohio App.3d 603, 669 N.E.2d 272 (Erie 1995) (applied in hourly rate-contract 
situation); Sandler v. Gossick, 87 Ohio App.3d 372, 622 N.E.2d 389 (Cuyahoga 1993) (applied in 
contingent-fee contract situation). See section 1.5:260. Nonrefundable retainers are impermissible in 
Ohio, unless the client is advised in writing that if the representation is not completed, the client may 
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1.16:600  Fees on Termination 
Primary Ohio References 
see Ohio Rule 1.16(d), (e) 
Background References 
see ABA Model Rule 1.16(d) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.129 
Commentary 
ALI-LGL §  40 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  2.129 (1996). 
In addition to the obligation under Rule 1.16(e) to return unearned fees upon withdrawal and the 
measure of compensation, if any, upon withdrawal, both discussed in section 1.16:500 above, fee 
issues also can arise when a lawyer is discharged. These issues are discussed in this section. As noted 
in section 1.16:500, the Code analog to Rule 1.16(e) (DR 2-110(A)(3)) was applied in discharge 
cases; this follows from the fact that discharge required mandatory withdrawal. DR 2-110(B)(4). See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Friedman, 114 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007 Ohio 2477, 866 N.E.2d 1076. Rule 
1.16(e) will be similarly applied, given the identical mandate in Rule 1.16(a)(3), that is seen in the 
first case invoking Rule 1.16(e), Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Kubyn, 121 Ohio St.3d 321, 2009 
Ohio 1154, 903 N.E.2d 1215 (failure to return unearned fees on discharge). 
If a lawyer is discharged, with or without just cause, before the completion of the representation, the 
doctrine of quantum meruit, rather than the contract, determines appropriate compensation. This 
approach to the appropriate measure of fees on discharge was first adopted by the Ohio Supreme 
Court in Fox & Associates Co., L.P.A. v. Purdon, 44 Ohio St.3d 69, 541 N.E.2d 448 (1989). There, 
the Court stated: 
 We hold that where an attorney is discharged by a client with or 
without just cause, and whether the contract between the attorney and 
client is express or implied, the attorney is entitled to recover the 
reasonable value of services rendered prior to the discharge on the basis 
of quantum meruit. 
 The new rule strikes the proper balance by providing clients 
greater freedom in substituting counsel, and in promoting confidence 
in the legal profession while protecting the attorney’s right to be 
compensated for services rendered. 
Id. at 72, 541 N.E.2d at 450 (citations omitted). 
See Endicott v. Johrendt, No. 97 APE 08-1122, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1888 (Franklin Apr. 30, 
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1998) (constructive discharge; lawyers entitled to quantum meruit fees plus expenses); cf. Levey v. 
Carpenter, No. 62784, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3071 (Cuyahoga June 17, 1993) (while contract no 
longer controls, terms may still be considered as evidence of just and reasonable value of services). 
(For a somewhat draconian application of the Fox rule, see City of Moraine v. Lewis, 151 Ohio 
App.3d 526, 2003 Ohio 460, 784 N.E.2d 774 (Montgomery), where a contract provided that if the 
city discharged its law director without just cause, the city would be obligated to compensate the 
director for the remainder of the three-year term. The law director, Lewis, had expressed concern 
about taking the job because of the city’s “history of hiring and then promptly firing its law directors.” 
Id. at para. 2. Hence the three-year contract and the obligation to compensate the director for the 
remainder of the term if he were discharged without cause. Of course, a newly-elected city council 
fired Lewis after one month on the job, without cause. The court nevertheless found the compensation 
provision unenforceable as a matter of public policy, citing, inter alia, former OH DR 2-110(A)(3), 
which, like current Ohio Rule 1.16(c), obligated a withdrawing lawyer to refund promptly any 
unearned fees.) 
The burden of proving entitlement rests with the lawyer.  Thus, where a lawyer who withdrew or was 
discharged chose not to appear at the trial at which the client was seeking the $2,500 amount obtained 
in settlement of a lemon-law case, there was no evidence in support of the lawyer’s entitlement to any 
part of the settlement proceeds and the judgment for the client was affirmed. Watterson v. King, 166 
Ohio App.3d 704, 2006 Ohio 2305, 852 N.E.2d 1278. 
As set forth in section 1.5:220, to recover on a quantum meruit claim, the lawyer must show that the 
services were rendered with the client’s knowledge and approval, not gratuitously. Under the doctrine 
of quantum meruit, the lawyer is to be paid the reasonable value of the services rendered, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, in accordance with the guidelines now set forth in Rule 1.5(a)(1)-(8). 
The Court subsequently reaffirmed the Fox approach, over a strong dissent, in Reid, Johnson, 
Downes, Andrachik & Webster v. Lansberry, 68 Ohio St.3d 570, 629 N.E.2d 431 (1994). Accord 
Goldauskas v. Elyria Foundry Co., 145 Ohio App.3d 490, 763 N.E.2d 645 (Lorain 2001). In 
syllabus two, the Reid Court further fleshed out the details of the doctrine as applied to a discharged 
lawyer who had been working under a contingency-fee arrangement. According to the Court, in these 
circumstances the right to recover in quantum meruit arises only upon the successful occurrence of 
the contingency. Accord Gruenspan Co., LPA v. Thompson, 2003 Ohio 3641, 2003 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3287 (Cuyahoga). In Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Schultz, 71 Ohio St.3d 383, 643 N.E.2d 
1139 (1994), the Court enforced this policy, sanctioning a lawyer under former OH DR 2-106(A) for 
entering into contingent-fee agreements with clients whereby the clients agreed to pay an hourly 
charge for the work performed if they discharged the attorney before completion of the representation. 
Accord Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Klos, 81 Ohio St.3d 486, 692 N.E.2d 565 (1998). See Roberts v. 
Hutton, 152 Ohio App.3d 412, 2003 Ohio 1650, 787 N.E.2d 1267 (Franklin) (where settlement 
achieved after lawyer discharged or withdrew, maximum extent of right to fees is reasonable value of 
services rendered prior to date of termination; clause in contingency-fee agreement, stating that 
one-third of last best settlement offer constitutes fair market value of services rendered, was invalid); 
Putnam v. Hogan, 122 Ohio App.3d 351, 701 N.E.2d 774 (Franklin 1997) (lawyer discharged 
prior to recovery sought in underlying action, therefor not entitled to contingent fee under agreement 
with client. On settlement of underlying action, however, lawyer became entitled to recovery in 
quantum meruit). 
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Should the client ultimately recover, not on the claim involved in the representation itself, but on a 
malpractice claim against successor counsel for their mishandling of the representation, the 
application of Reid is unclear. In Belovich v. Saghafi, 104 Ohio App.3d 438, 662 N.E.2d 391 
(Cuyahoga 1995) (per curiam), the Eighth District Court of Appeals split on this issue with the 
majority finding, over a strong dissent, that the quantum meruit recovery could be satisfied out of the 
malpractice judgment. 
In determining the extent of the permissible quantum meruit recovery in the contingency-fee context, 
the amount that would have been owed had the contingency-fee contract been carried to completion 
sets the maximum amount that the lawyer can recover; it may well be less. The Ohio Supreme Court 
adopted this approach in Reid because it believed it necessary to assure that a client can discharge her 
lawyer without fear of economic penalty. 
In contingency-fee situations, lawyers often do not keep complete time records since the 
contemplated fee is usually a percentage of the ultimate recovery without regard to the time expended. 
But to the extent the lawyer is discharged and the fee becomes measured by quantum meruit 
principles, rather than the mere occurrence of a contingency, the lawyer will need to have accurate 
records to help prove the worth of the services provided.  Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachik & 
Webster v. Lansberry, 68 Ohio St.3d 570, 629 N.E.2d 431 (1994). 
If a lawyer withdraws, his or her right to compensation is dependent upon whether the withdrawal 
was with just cause -- if it was, quantum meruit applies; if not, the lawyer forfeits the fee. See section 
1.16:500, final paragraph. 
In an interesting fee-agreement/termination case, arising out of a highly publicized lawsuit involving 
appellee (Medical Mutual, a/k/a Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ohio) and state regulatory agencies, 
appellee entered into a contract terminating its relationship with its then counsel, Kenneth Seminatore. 
The agreement prohibited Seminatore from providing any further representation as to “new or future 
matters” for Blue Cross. Seminatore was not owed any money for legal work performed prior to the 
date of the contract. Nevertheless, Seminatore sued Blue Cross, alleging breach of a provision of the 
contract providing for a $75,000 per month retainer, which “assured of continuity in your 
[Seminatore’s] completion of existing matters.” The court of appeals affirmed the granting of 
summary judgment for Blue Cross; it held that the contract related to existing matters, of which there 
were none, and that it did not call for Blue Cross to pay fees where, as here, no unpaid services had 
been rendered.  Seminatore v. Medical Mutual, 136 Ohio App.3d 758, 760, 737 N.E.2d 1016, 
1017 (Cuyahoga 2000). 
 
1.16:610  Termination of Lawyer’s Authority [see 1.2:270] 
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1.17:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.17 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.17 
 
1.17:101  Model Rule Comparison 
While MR 1.17 and Ohio Rule 1.17 both provide for the sale of a law practice, they differ in sig-
nificant ways. Among the more important differences, Ohio allows only the sale of an entire practice, 
whereas the Model Rule would also allow the sale of an area of practice. Compare Ohio Rule 1.17(a) 
with MR 1.17(a) & (b). Ohio also requires greater disclosure to the seller's clients about the sale and 
provides more detail on how the notice should be given than does the Model Rule counterpart. 
Compare Ohio Rule 1.17(e) with MR 1.17(c). Ohio's Rule deals explicitly with issues of confiden-
tiality and limiting liability that arise in the sale of a law practice, while the Model Rule does so at best 
in comments. Compare Ohio Rule 1.17(c) & (i) with MR 1.17 cmts. [7] & [11]. 
  
1.17:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 1.17: DR 2-111. 
  
1.17:200  Traditional Rule Against the Sale of a Law Practice 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.17 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.17 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  91:801 
Wolfram §  16.2.1 
For many years, the former OHCPR had no express provision on the sale of a law practice. Never-
theless, such sales were thought to be improper as they would violate several general provisions of the 
Code. Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-19, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 
(Oct. 16, 1992) (sale of law practice implicated former OH DR 2-103(B), 4-101(B)(1) & (3)). In 
2003, Ohio adopted former OH DR 2-111, which authorized the sale of a law practice when effected 
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in accordance with its provisions. See generally Eugene P. Whetzel, Buying or Selling a Law 
Practice, Ohio Law., May/June 2003, at 24. Because of the recentness of the adoption of OH DR 
2-111, Ohio Rule 1.17 has, in substance, retained the language of the former disciplinary rule.  For a 
review of the Rule 1.17 provisions, see Harry D. Cornett, Jr. & Nicole Braden Lewis, The Dis-
position of a Law Practice, Cleveland Metro. B.J., Oct. 2008, at 10 (the article also touches on 
obligations under Rule 1.15 in cases of law firm dissolution and under Rule 1.16 in instances of 
disability or retirement). 
  
1.17:300  Problems in Sale of Practice 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.17 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.17 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  91:801 
Wolfram §  16.2.1 
What may be sold: Ohio Rule 1.17(a) allows the sale of a law practice, including the good will of the 
practice. It does not apply to transfer of cases where the sale of a practice is not involved, or to ad-
mission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association. Ohio Rule 1.17 cmts. [14] 
& [15]. For a brief discussion of how to value good will, see Denise G. Callahan, Solos, Small 
Firms Can Sell Their 'Practices,' Ohio Law. Wkly., Apr. 14, 2003, at 1. The practice must be sold 
in its entirety, except where conflict of interest prohibits the transfer of certain clients. See Rule 
1.17(a) and cmts. [2] & [6]. Comment [6] further makes clear that the entire-practice requirement is 
satisfied despite the "fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the 
purchasers, but take their matters elsewhere," so long as "the seller in good faith makes the entire 
practice available for sale to the purchasers." Id. 
Sale participants: Sales are to take place between a "selling lawyer" and a "purchasing lawyer." The 
Rule defines "selling lawyer" as "an individual lawyer, or a law firm, the estate of a deceased lawyer, 
or the representatives of a disabled or disappeared lawyer." Ohio Rule 1.17(b)(2). It defines "pur-
chasing lawyer" as "either an individual lawyer or a law firm." Ohio Rule 1.17(b)(1). The Rule also 
focuses on the motives of the purchaser and prohibits sales when the purchaser's "sole or primary 
purpose" for the purchase is to resell the practice to another. Ohio Rule 1.17(a) & cmt. [1]. The seller 
must "exercise competence" in selecting a qualified buyer, who in turn is obligated to undertake the 
representation competently. Ohio Rule 1.17 cmt. [11]. Failure to do so may result in an Ohio Rule 
1.1 violation. 
Client protections - Confidentiality: One potential problem in the sale of a law practice is that the 
seller will need to share confidential client information with the buyer if the buyer is to make an in-
formed decision about the purchase. Without further restrictions, the prospective purchaser would 
have no duty to preserve that information. To remedy this, Ohio Rule 1.17(c) provides that the 
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prospective purchaser must enter into a confidentiality agreement before protected information is 
shared with the prospective purchaser. Under this agreement the purchaser is to treat the seller's 
clients as his own and "preserve information relating to the representation of the clients of the selling 
lawyer, consistent with Rule 1.6." This agreement remains in effect even if the sale is not completed. 
See Rule 1.17 cmt. [7]. Comment [7] further adds that a conflict check should be completed to assure 
that the purchasing lawyer does not review client-specific information regarding a client as to whom 
the lawyer is conflicted out. 
While the Rule speaks to confidentiality, it does not directly address the question from an evidentiary 
perspective. Would sharing documents or conversations containing privileged information waive the 
privilege? One would assume not, since only the client can waive the privilege. Ohio Rule 1.17(c) is 
designed to ensure against unauthorized disclosure by the purchasing lawyer of protected information 
of the selling lawyer's clients. 
Client protections - Fees: The purchasing lawyer must honor all fee agreements made between the 
seller and the seller's clients pertaining to "legal representation that is ongoing at the time of the sale." 
Ohio Rule 1.17(d)(2). The lawyer is free to negotiate fee agreements for representation commenced 
after the date of the sale. See Rule 1.17(d)(2) & cmt. [10]. Complications could arise in determining 
whether certain tasks undertaken were subparts of the original representation or are a new represen-
tation. A careful lawyer will resolve such ambiguities in the client's favor. 
Client protections - Limiting liability: A lawyer may "not make an agreement prospectively limiting 
the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice absent the client's independent representation in 
making the agreement." Ohio Rule 1.8(h)(1); see section 1.8:910. The same basic approach is used 
with respect to the sale of a law practice, although the language used is more restrictive. Ohio Rule 
1.17(i) provides that neither the seller nor the purchaser "shall attempt to exonerate the lawyer or law 
firm from or limit liability to the former or prospective client for any malpractice or other professional 
negligence." (Emphasis added.) See Rule 1.17 cmt. [11]. There is no provision for independent 
representation in making such an agreement, as there is in Rule 1.8(h)(1). (But see further discussion 
of this issue infra at "Required terms of the agreement," third bullet.) 
The prohibition on limiting liability to the client does not limit the seller and purchaser from agreeing 
to indemnification or other forms of contribution should a claim of professional negligence or mal-
practice be brought. Rule 1.17(i). 
Client protections - Notice to seller's clients: Because each client has the right to choose his or her 
own attorney, clients cannot be "sold" by one lawyer to another. Ohio Rule 1.17 cmt. [1]. Rather, the 
client must choose a new attorney when an existing representation is ended. Nevertheless, as a prac-
tical matter, clients often will be happy to have the purchasing attorney take on the representation. 
The notice provisions in Ohio Rule 1.17(e) reflect this. 
Notice is to be given to all current clients of the seller and to those who were clients in closed files that 
the seller and purchaser agree to transfer. Id. The notice must contain the following information: 
 the anticipated effective date of the proposed sale, Ohio Rule 1.17(e)(1); 
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 a statement that the purchaser will honor all existing fee agreements for representation on-
going at the time of the sale, but that fee agreements for representation commencing after that 
date will be negotiated by the purchasing lawyer and the client, Ohio Rule 1.17(e)(2); 
 the right of the client to obtain her files and seek another attorney, Ohio Rule 1.17(e)(3); 
 the fact that if the client does not object within ninety days of receiving notice, the client's 
consent to representation by the purchasing lawyer will be presumed, Ohio Rule 1.17(e)(4); 
and 
 biographical information about the purchaser, including information on any disciplinary ac-
tion taken against the purchaser and any pending disciplinary complaints against the pur-
chaser that have been certified by a probable-cause panel, Ohio Rule 1.17(e)(5). 
 Comment [7A] purports to add an additional requirement. "At a minimum the notice must 
include information about the proposed sale and the purchasing lawyer that will allow each 
client to make an informed decision regarding consent to the sale." Ohio Rule 1.17 cmt. [7A]. 
The technical aspects of who is obligated to do what in providing the necessary notice to clients are 
somewhat confusing. Rule 1.17(e), the general notice provision, states that both "the selling lawyer 
and purchasing lawyer shall provide written notice of the sale to the clients of the selling lawyer." 
When the seller is the estate of a deceased lawyer or the representative of a disabled or disappeared 
lawyer, Rule 1.17(f) provides that the written notice required by division (e) shall be given by the 
"purchasing lawyer." These two divisions are confirmed by Rule 1.17 cmt. [7A], which states that 
"notice must be provided jointly by the selling and purchasing lawyers," except where division (f) 
applies, "in which case the notice is provided by the purchaser." So far, so good. But Rule 1.17(h) 
states that the "written notice required by division[s] (e) and (f) of this rule shall be provided by cer-
tified mail, return receipt requested. In lieu of providing notice by certified mail, either the selling 
lawyer or purchasing lawyer, or both, may personally deliver the notice to a client." What this seems 
to say (for reasons that are not apparent) is that written notice shall be by both under division (e) and 
by the purchaser under division (f), but that under division (h) there is the option of giving personal 
notice, which, if selected, can be made by seller, purchaser, or both. These technicalities seem unduly 
cumbersome to us. 
If a client cannot be given the notice required under division (e), a client's matter can be transferred to 
the purchasing lawyer only after both the selling and purchasing lawyer have caused notice of the sale 
to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the relevant county. "Upon completion of the 
publication, the client's consent to the sale is presumed." Ohio Rule 1.17(g). 
To the extent the seller is the estate of a deceased lawyer or the representative of a disabled or dis-
appeared lawyer, the process is altered somewhat. First, as noted above, the duty to provide notice -- 
and to obtain written consent (not required under division (e)) -- falls solely on the purchasing at-
torney. Ohio Rule 1.17(f). Second, treating a client's failure to respond as presumed consent if no 
response is received within ninety days applies only if (a) notice was sent to the client's last known 
address shown in the seller's records or (b) the client's rights would be harmed if the purchasing 
lawyer failed to act within the ninety-day period. Id. 
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Required terms of the agreement: Ohio Rule 1.17 requires that certain terms must be included in any 
agreement for the sale of a law practice. These include: 
 a statement by both the selling and purchasing lawyer that the purchaser is doing so "in good 
faith" and with the intention of providing legal services to the seller's clients and future clients, 
Ohio Rule 1.17(d)(1); 
 a provision that the purchaser will abide by any existing fee agreements relating to ongoing 
representations taken on before the sale, Ohio Rule 1.17(d)(2); and 
 incorporation of Ohio Rule 1.8(h) (pertaining to limiting liability to a client), Ohio Rule 
1.17(i), second sentence. (Perhaps this eliminates the distinction between the first sentence of 
Rule 1.17(i) and Rule 1.8(h)(1) with respect to independent representation, noted above at 
"Client protections - Limiting liability.") 
Seller's withdrawal duties: Upon completion of the sale, the selling lawyer may withdraw from the 
representation. Ohio Rule 1.16(b)(8) (recognizing this as a reason for permissive withdrawal). 
[Query whether this characterization makes much sense. Would not a client's agreement to transfer 
matters to the purchasing lawyer constitute a constructive discharge of the selling lawyer, thereby 
implicating mandatory withdrawal under Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(3)?] In certain instances in matters 
pending before a tribunal, court permission may be necessary before the seller's withdrawal and 
buyer's substitution will be allowed. Ohio Rule 1.17 cmt. [12]. 
When withdrawal stems from sale of a law practice, the usual duty to refund advanced fees that have 
not been earned does not apply. Ohio Rule 1.16(e). To the extent the client decides to stay with the 
purchasing attorney, this makes sense. Those funds will just be used by the purchasing attorney in 
carrying out the representation. But as written, relief from the refund obligation applies even if the 
client selects a different attorney. As this was probably a drafting error, the unearned fees should be 
returned in those circumstances, regardless of the language of the Rule. 
As to client funds held by the seller, those should be transferred to the purchasing attorney at the time 
the client files are transferred. Ohio Rule 1.15(g). 
Distribution of sale proceeds: Ohio Rule 5.4(a) generally prohibits sharing legal fees with a 
nonlawyer. See section 5.4:200. Apparently, the proceeds of the sale of a practice are "legal fees"; 
otherwise there would have been no need to provide for a limited sale-of-practice exception (see Rule 
5.4(a)(2)) to the general prohibition. The former disciplinary rule (OH DR 3-102(A)(2)) did not 
address whether the entire sale proceeds were to be treated as legal fees, or whether only a portion of 
the proceeds (such as actual or anticipated accounts receivable from clients) were to be so treated, 
with the balance attributed to goodwill or other assets of the seller. (3-102(A)(2) referred generally to 
"the payment of money" resulting from the sale.) The new rule, however, expressly states that the 
exception applies to the "agreed-upon purchase price." Ohio Rule 5.4(a)(2). 
Restrictions on seller's after-sale practice: As a general matter, restrictions on the right to practice 
following termination of employment are not permitted. Ohio Rule 5.6. See section 5.6:200. In 
contrast, when a professional association is terminated by the sale of a law practice, the parties may 
"reasonably limit the ability of the selling lawyer to reenter the practice of law." Ohio Rule 
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1.17(d)(3). This could include time restrictions, geographical restrictions, and/or any other reasonable 
limitation. Id. 
This limited approval of restrictions on practice does not apply if the selling lawyer is selling the 
practice in order to enter academic, government, or public service, or to serve as in-house counsel to a 
business. In those instances such restrictions are prohibited. Id. See Rule 1.17 cmt. [3]. 
Restriction on use of name of seller's firm: As stated in Ohio Rule 1.17 cmt. [16], the purchaser 
cannot use the seller's name "unless the seller is deceased, disabled, or retired pursuant to Rule VI of 
the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio." 
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1.18:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.18 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.18 
 
1.18:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 1.18 is substantively identical to the Model Rule. 
 
1.18:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following are listed in the Correlation Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 
1.18: EC 4-1, Cuyahoga Cty Bar Ass’n v. Hardiman (2003), 100 Ohio St.3d 260. 
 
1.18:200  Duties to Prospective Client 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 1.18(a)-(d) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 1.18(a)-(d) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  31:151 
ALI-LGL §  15 
Ohio Rule 1.18(a) defines a prospective client as “a person who discusses with a lawyer the 
possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.” As noted in Comment [2], 
however, a “person who communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable 
expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, 
is not a ‘prospective client’ within the meaning of division (a).” Ohio Rule 1.18 cmt. [2]. 
During this preliminary discussion it may be necessary for the client to share confidential information 
with the lawyer in order for the lawyer to evaluate if conflicts exist and if not, whether to take the 
representation. Ohio Rule 1.18 cmt. [3]. Ohio Rule 1.18 seeks to balance the prospective client’s 
interest in the confidential treatment of that information with the lawyer’s interest in the freedom to 
represent others should the lawyer decline to represent the prospective client. 
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Ohio Rule 1.18(b) prohibits the lawyer from using or disclosing information learned in the 
consultation with a prospective client when no professional relationship ensues, except as Rule 1.9 
would permit concerning information of a former client. See Ohio Rule 1.9(c)(1) & (c)(2). See 
section 1.9:400. The prohibition of 1.18(b) is applicable to “information learned in the consultation” 
whether or not the information may be deemed a “confidence or secret,” according to a Task Force 
statement made in the course of the rule-adoption process. This is consistent with the generally 
expansive view of confidentiality taken in the Ohio Rules. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
protection provided is less than that given current clients under Ohio Rule 1.6 and former clients 
under Ohio Rule 1.9. In both, protection is provided for information “relating to the representation” 
which can come from any source, at any time. With respect to prospective clients, however, 
protection extends only to “information learned in the consultation.” 
Ohio Rule 1.18(c) disqualifies the lawyer from representing a client “in the same or a substantially 
related matter” if the client’s interests are “materially adverse to those of a prospective client” and if 
the information received from the prospective client “could be significantly harmful” to the 
prospective client in the matter, except as stated in division (d). Division (c) also prevents the lawyer 
in a firm with which the disqualified lawyer is associated from knowingly undertaking or continuing 
representation in the matter, except as provided in division (d). “Substantially related matter” is a 
defined term; it “involves the same transaction or legal dispute or one in which there is a substantial 
risk that confidential information that would normally have been obtained in the prior representation 
of a client would materially advance the position of another client in a subsequent matter.” Ohio Rule 
1.0(n). As noted in Rule 1.0 cmt. [11], the definition derives from Rule 1.9 cmt. [3] and applies for 
purposes of Rules 1.9, 1.10, and 1.18. As for when interests are “materially adverse,” see discussion 
in section 1.9:220. Unique to the prospective-client rule is the focus on whether the information 
obtained “could be significantly harmful,” rather than simply “material to the matter,” the operative 
phase used in Rules 1.9(b)(2) and 1.10(b)(2). For a discussion of how this phrase should be 
interpreted, see Ronald D. Rotunda & John S. Dzienkowski, The Lawyer's Deskbook on 
Professional Responsibility §  1.18-1(c), at 668-69 (2009-10) (suggesting that phrase should be read 
“very narrowly”). 
Ohio Rule 1.18(d) states that if the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in 
division (c), representation is still permissible if either (1) “both the affected client and the 
prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing” or (2) if the lawyer took 
reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably 
necessary to decide whether to represent the prospective client and (i) the lawyer is timely screened 
from any participation in the matter and apportioned no part of the fee therefrom and (ii) written 
notice is promptly provided to the prospective client. “Informed consent” and “screened” are defined 
in Ohio Rule 1.0(f) and (l), respectively. The terms are further discussed in Rule 1.0 cmts. [6] & [7] 
(informed consent) and cmts. [8]-[10] (screened). See also section 1.10:300. With respect to notice, it 
should be given “as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.” Ohio Rule 
1.18 cmt. [8]. As stated in ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 281 (7th ed. 
2011) (commentary), a way to deal with potential problems of disqualification arising out of 
prospective client disclosure is to condition "consultation upon the prospective client’s informed 
consent that nothing ‘disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a 
different client in the matter.’” MR 1.18 cmt. [5] so provides, as well as noting that in such an 
agreement the prospective client can also expressly consent to the lawyer’s use of information 
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disclosed in the consultation. Hazard and Hodes recommend that this technique be used in the “beauty 
contest” situation. See 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. Williams Hodes, Peter R. Jarvis, The Law 
of Lawyering §  21A.4, at 21A-9 (3d ed. Supp. 2013). 
In Ohio, however, Model Rule comment [5] was deleted during the drafting process, “based on the 
Task Force’s belief that a lawyer should not be able to condition conversations with prospective 
clients in such a way that would allow the attorney to represent another client in the same matter. 
Moreover, the Task Force is not convinced that such a condition would, in each instance, adequately 
protect the prospective client’s right to confidentiality regarding the legal matter that would be 
discussed.” Summary of Task Force Revisions December 2004.  We think this deletion unfortunate; 
sophisticated potential clients -- the primary users of “beauty contests” -- ought to be free to enter into 
such informed waivers with Ohio lawyers. 
Comment [4] instructs that “a lawyer considering whether or not to undertake a new matter should 
limit the initial interview to only such information as reasonably appears necessary,” in order to avoid 
acquiring disqualifying information from the prospective client. Ohio Rule 1.18 cmt. [4]. By so 
doing, the lawyer will help create a situation supporting screening should the individual lawyer be 
disqualified, since screening is available only if “the lawyer who received the information took 
reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably 
necessary . . . .” Ohio Rule 1.18(d)(2). 
The first disciplinary decision to consider Rule 1.18 (specifically, 1.18(a) and (b)) is Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Cicero, 134 Ohio St.3d 311, 2012 Ohio 5457, 982 N.E.2d 650, which involved the much 
publicized Ohio State football players’ tattoos-for-memorabilia incident that ultimately brought down 
the football coach, Jim Tressel. On April 1, 2010, the house of Edward Rife, the owner of the tattoo 
business, was raided by federal agents; they seized thousands of dollars of OSU football memorabilia 
as part of a drug-trafficking investigation. Rife at first retained another lawyer to represent him in any 
criminal proceeding, but shortly thereafter dismissed him and scheduled a meeting with respondent. 
At that meeting, held on April 15, respondent Cicero gave Rife legal advice and obtained information 
from Rife. 
Rife testified that although he never specifically asked for the information he gave at 
the April 15 meeting to be kept confidential, he assumed that it would be. He never 
gave Cicero permission to reveal to Tressel any information discussed. The panel 
found that Cicero should have treated the information from Rife as confidential, but 
instead he planned to forward the information he learned to Tressel, and he did not 
disclose to Rife this intent. 
Id. at para. 6. Cicero passed the information learned from Rife to Tressel by email on April 16. This 
disclosure of confidential information of a prospective client was found to violate 1.18(b) (and 8.4(h)) 
and Cicero was given a one-year suspension. Justices Lundberg Stratton and O’Donnell dissented on 
the sanction; they would have imposed a six-month stayed suspension. 
With respect to the 1.18(a) issue, the Court first found that there was clear and convincing evidence 
that Rife was a prospective client: 
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The two discussed the possibility of a client-lawyer relationship; Cicero admitted this 
in his emails to Tressel, and Rife testified as to the discussion. 
Id. at para. 9. The second step was to consider “whether Cicero improperly related information 
learned during his conversation with Rife,” in violation of 1.18(b). Id. at para. 11. Cicero argued that, 
given all the publicity given to the incident, the information fell under the “generally known” safe 
harbor of Rule 1.9(c)(1), which is an exception to the Rule 1.18(b) confidentiality obligation. The 
Court, however, found that the April 16 emails contained both information generally known and 
information consisting of “a number of specific details of Rife’s case that Cicero could only have 
learned during his consultation with Rife,” and therefore did not fall under the “generally known” 
exception. 
The Court also acknowledged that it was considering Rule 1.18 for the first time: 
 We note that this is the first case in which we have had the occasion to 
determine whether an attorney violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.18 by revealing the 
confidences of a prospective client. We also recognize that the official comments to 
the rule indicate that the protection afforded by the rule is limited in scope: 
 [1]  Prospective clients, like clients, may disclose information to a 
lawyer, place documents or other property in the lawyer’s custody, or rely on 
the lawyer’s advice. A lawyer’s discussions with a prospective client usually 
are limited in time and depth and leave both the prospective client and the 
lawyer free (and sometimes required) to proceed no further. Hence, 
prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection afforded 
clients. 
 [2]  Not all persons who communicate information to a lawyer are 
entitled to protection under this rule. A person who communicates information 
unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is 
willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, is not 
a “prospective client” within the meaning of division (a).  
While we recognize that some limitations on the rule’s protection to prospective 
clients may be justified, those limitations do not come into play here. Indeed, this case 
goes to the very heart of confidentiality between a prospective client and an attorney. 
Before obtaining representation, clients must meet with attorneys, and attorneys often 
must obtain sensitive information before they can decide whether to represent a client. 
Prospective clients trust that their confidences will be protected when they engage in 
an initial consultation with an attorney. Cicero’s almost immediate dissemination of 
the detailed information that Rife provided on April 15 directly violated that trust. This 
conduct violates Prof.Cond.R. 1.18, as well as Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), which prohibits a 
lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law. 
Id. at para. 13. 
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The only other case, to our knowledge, to consider Ohio Rule 1.18 is Cargould v. Manning, 2009 
Ohio 5853, 2009 Ohio App LEXIS 4913 (Franklin), a divorce case where the defendant-appellant 
argued that his motion to disqualify plaintiff-appellee’s counsel should have been granted because he 
was either a former client of plaintiff’s lawyer under Rule 1.9 or, “at least” had been a prospective 
client under Rule 1.18. Manning’s disqualification motion was premised on his having met 
previously with plaintiff’s counsel to discuss the divorce and custody issues. Applying the three-part 
test of Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut., 900 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1990), the trial court 
held that (1) it was unable to determine whether an attorney-client relationship existed between 
Manning and the lawyer, Wolinetz; (2) if such a relationship existed, the subject matter was related to 
the divorce proceedings; and (3) it was unclear what, if any, confidential information Mr. Wolinetz 
had acquired. On appeal, Manning argued that the lower court should have considered the Rules of 
Professional Conduct in deciding his motion. While agreeing that the Rules provide “helpful 
guidance,” the appellate court cited to the Preamble in noting that violation of a rule “‘does not 
necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of the lawyer in 
pending litigation.’” 2009 Ohio 2853, at para. 10. The testimony was conflicting as to whether any 
meeting between the two had taken place; assuming Manning’s testimony was the accurate version, 
he would have been a prospective client under Rule 1.18. But that Rule prohibits a subsequent 
representation in a related matter only if “the lawyer has received from the prospective client 
information that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter.” Id. at para. 16 (quoting from 
Rule 1.18 cmt. [6]). Although Manning testified that he discussed with the lawyer details of the 
divorce and facts unknown to plaintiff, he “did not disclose those details to the court.” Id. As a result, 
the trial court could reasonably conclude that the lawyer did not receive information that could, under 
Dana, be prejudicial to Manning or, under the 1.18 formulation, that could be significantly harmful to 
him. The appellate court therefore concluded that neither Dana nor the Rule 1.18 test precluded 
Wolinetz from representing the wife in the divorce proceeding. The approach of the courts in the 
Manning litigation seems consistent with the narrow interpretation of “significantly harmful” 
recommended by Rotunda/Dzienkowski supra. 
Under the former OHCPR, there was no separate disciplinary rule treating a lawyer’s duty to 
prospective clients. Pre-Rule precedent clearly indicated, however, that at least some of the duties 
arising from the attorney-client relationship were imposed, even if the representation is not 
undertaken. See section 1.2:210 of the treatise. Most of the law developed on this point dealt with 
confidentiality of client information and the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Concerning client 
confidences and secrets, former OH EC 4-1 stated that the protection against disclosure extended to 
“one who has employed or sought to employ” an attorney. (Emphasis added.) See section 1.6:220 at 
“Duty to protect client information - Time period during which duty applies.” For purposes of the 
privilege statute (ORC 2317.02(A)), ORC 2317.021 defines “client” as one who “consults an 
attorney for the purpose of retaining an attorney.” Case law decided under this section holds that the 
statutory privilege applies to communications between a lawyer and a prospective client seeking 
representation. See section 1.6:410, at “Communications seeking representation.” It would appear 
that the ORC 2317.02(A) precedent (as well as former OH EC 4-1) is generally consistent with the 
obligations set forth in Ohio Rule 1.18, although, as noted above, the preclusion contained in Rule 
1.18(b) against use or revelation of information acquired in the consultation is not limited to 
information that was a confidence or secret under the Code. Finally, remember that other duties may 
attach with respect to prospective clients even if a full attorney-client relationship is never established. 
To the extent any advice is given, the duty of competence attaches, and to the extent any property is 
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taken, the duty to safeguard it applies. Ohio Rule 1.18 cmts. [1] & [9]. 
Prospective client issues raised by unsolicited emails to lawyers from those seeking legal services and 
the guidance provided by MR 1.18 on those issues are explored in Kathryn A. Thompson, The Too 
Much Information Age, ABAJ, July 2007, at 28, and again in Eileen Libby, www.warning.law, 
ABAJ, January 2011, at p. 22. 
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2.1:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 2.1 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 2.1 
  
2.1:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 2.1 is identical to the Model Rule. 
  
2.1:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 2.1: EC 7-8. 
  
2.1:200  Exercise of Independent Judgment 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 2.1 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 2.1 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 31:701 
As stated in the first sentence of Ohio Rule 2.1, a lawyer in representing a client “shall exercise 
independent professional judgment and render candid advice.” Comment [1] emphasizes the candor 
requirement: 
 A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the 
lawyer’s honest assessment. 
Ohio Rule 2.1 cmt. [1]. The comment goes on to concede that this may involve unpleasant facts and 
that the lawyer should put the best possible face on it consistent with honesty. “However, a lawyer 
should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to 
the client.” Id. 
The duty to provide candid advice also implicates the duty of competence, Ohio Rule 1.1, and the 
duty of communication in Ohio Rule 1.4. See sections 1.1:200 and 1.4:200-:300. These rule 
provisions are discussed in the context of alternative litigation financing (ALF) in Bd. of Comm’rs 
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on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2012-3, 2012 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Dec. 7, 2012); this 
advisory opinion is summarized at the end of section 1.8:600 supra. 
Three Ohio ethical considerations (former OH EC 7-3, 7-5, and 7-8) dealt with the lawyer’s role as 
advisor and the obligation as such to provide professional and objective counsel to his or her client. 
OH EC 7-3 contrasted the roles of advocate and advisor, and, as to the latter, noted that “a lawyer 
serving as advisor primarily assists his client in determining the course of future conduct and 
relationships.” In doing so, the advisor “in appropriate circumstances should give his professional 
opinion as to what the ultimate decisions of the courts would likely be as to the applicable law.” Id. 
Former OH EC 7-5 reiterated the importance of providing this professional opinion as well as 
“informing his client of the practical effect of such decision.” Id. Accord former OH EC 7-8. 
During the regime of the OHCPR, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of the exercise of 
independent judgment and decision making in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Hardesty, 80 Ohio 
St.3d 444, 687 N.E.2d 417 (1997). In that case, respondent was found to have violated a number of 
disciplinary rules (including former OH DR 1-102(A)(5) & (6)) as a result of his “ready deference to 
his client’s bidding.”  Id. at 446, 687 N.E.2d at 419. The Court emphasized that respondent “yielded 
to these clients’ wishes [to take or not take certain action] when he should have counseled them with 
respect to their duties under the law.”  Id. at 446-47, 687 N.E.2d 419. This prompted the Court to 
give a “hired-gun” lecture in the following terms: 
 All too often we have observed members of the profession, not 
only solo practitioners, but also salaried corporate counsel, members of 
small and large firms, and government attorneys, operating as “hired 
guns,” acting solely at the direction of their employers or clients and 
neglecting their duty to counsel their clients. Neither the position of an 
attorney as an employee, nor the pressure to retain a client in a 
competitive legal environment, can justify an attorney’s abdication of 
the duty of counseling. 
Id. at 447, 687 N.E.2d at 419. The Court then quoted extensively from former OH EC 7-8 and 
concluded that “respondent acted as a ‘hired gun’; he failed in his duty to counsel.” Id. See Akron 
Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 80 Ohio St.3d 6, 684 N.E.2d 288 (1997) (“‘the lawyer’s job is not merely to 
supply whatever means are needed to achieve the client’s goals but also to deliberate with the client 
and on his behalf about those goals.’“ (citing Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 128-29 
(1993)). Cf. Hahn v. Jennings, 2004 Ohio 4789, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4320 (Franklin) (noting 
that defendant in malpractice case was “not simply a ‘hired gun’ required to advance whatever 
argument [his clients] brought to his attention,” id. at para. 28, citing Hardesty). For a 
commentator’s discussion of the “hired gun” lawyer model, see Charles W. Wolfram, Modern 
Legal Ethics § 4.3, at 154 (1986). 
The focus of the Hardesty case on the lawyer’s need to provide objective counsel, in contrast to 
deferring to the client’s bidding, is an important part of the lawyer’s obligation to exercise 
independent judgment. Other, equally important, aspects of a lawyer’s independence are treated 
elsewhere. See, e.g., those sections of the treatise discussing Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 5.4 (conflicts of 
interest, arising from a variety of circumstances, such as obligations to others (see section 1.7:400), 
the lawyer’s own interests (see section 1.7:500), and sexual involvement with clients (see section 
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1.8:210). These aspects of independence are also discussed in ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 284-87 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). 
See also Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 92-93-08 (Mar. 16, 1993) (where a settlement offer is 
conditioned on waiver of attorney’s fees, “a lawyer should evaluate a settlement offer on the basis of 
the client’s interest, not the lawyer’s interest in obtaining a statutory attorney’s fee award, id. at 3). 
  
2.1:300  NonLegal Factors in Giving Advice 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 2.1 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 2.1 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 31:701 
ALI-LGL § 94 
Wolfram § 4.3 
As stated in Ohio Rule 2.1, “[i]n rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the 
client’s situation.” Despite the permissive language of the Rule, such broader counseling may in fact 
be necessary to provide competent advice. As Comment [2] acknowledges, “[a]dvice couched in 
narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client,” especially because “moral and ethical 
considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be 
applied.” Ohio Rule 2.1 cmt. [2]. Accord 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 
94(3) (2000) (“In counseling a client, a lawyer may address nonlegal aspects of a proposed course of 
conduct, including moral, reputational, economic, social, political, and business aspects.”). 
In the main, it is ultimately for the client to make the decision with respect to objectives of the 
representation, as opposed to the strategic or tactical means of achieving those objectives. See 
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 4.3, at 157 (1986). The treatise discusses the 
allocation of decision-making authority between client and lawyer in sections 1.2:310-:330. In 
addition, questions of what advice to seek, whether purely legal or encompassing other considerations 
as well, are for the client to decide. Nevertheless, the comments to the Rule stress the role of the 
lawyer in assuring that the client makes an informed decision as to the advice requested. Ohio Rule 
2.1 cmt. [3]. The lawyer may also need to take the lead in providing advice not otherwise directly 
requested where necessary to protect the client’s interests. Ohio Rule 2.1 cmt. [5]. 
The Ohio Rule is generally consistent with former OH EC 7-8, which spoke to the issue of nonlegal 
factors in giving advice in the following terms: 
Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal 
considerations. . . . A lawyer should bring to bear upon this 
decision-making process the fullness of his experience as well as his 
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objective viewpoint. In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it 
is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead 
to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible. 
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2.3:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 2.3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 2.3 
  
2.3:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 2.3 is identical to the Model Rule, with the exception of the addition of “agree to” prior to 
“provide” in division (a). 
  
2.3:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 2.3: None. 
  
2.3:200  Undertaking an Evaluation for a Client 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 2.3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 2.3 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 71:701 
ALI-LGL § 95 
Wolfram § 13.4.1 
Ohio Rule 2.3(a) provides as follows: 
 A lawyer may agree to provide an evaluation of a matter 
affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if the 
lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible 
with other aspects of the lawyer’s relationship with the client. 
See Ohio Rule 2.3 cmts. [1] (evaluation under Rule “may be performed at the client’s direction or 
when impliedly authorized to carry out the representation; providing examples) and [2] (evaluation 
under Rule distinguished from investigation of one with whom lawyer does not have lawyer-client 
relationship; “[t]he question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being 
examined”). 
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As Hazard and Hodes emphasize, it “applies when a lawyer evaluates or conducts a ‘legal audit’ of his 
own client and makes the results available to a third party.” 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. 
William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 25.2, at 25-3 (3d ed. Supp. 2004) (emphasis in original). 
Examples include title searches ordered by the client-vendor for delivery to the prospective buyer, 
Ohio Rule 2.3 cmt. [1]; registration statements prepared by lawyers for issuers of stock, which 
statements are required to be filed with the government and are used by potential investors, id.; 
auditors’ requests for legal information concerning the client, referred by the client to its lawyer, 
Ohio Rule 2.3 cmt. [6]; and opinions with respect to whether a corporation is authorized to enter into 
a proposed transaction, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 71:701 (2003). With respect 
to auditors’ requests, Comment [2] references the procedure set forth in ABA Statement of Policy 
Regarding Lawyers’ Responses to Auditors’ Requests for Information, reprinted in Committee 
on Audit Inquiry Responses, Auditor’s Letter Handbook (1976 & Supp. 1998), and 31 Bus. Law. 
1709 (1976). 
In situations like these, it is important to ascertain whether conducting such an evaluation is consistent 
with the lawyer’s duties to the client. Ohio Rule 2.3 cmt. [3]. Even if it is, before undertaking the 
evaluation the lawyer still needs to counsel the client regarding the impact that undertaking this role 
may have on the client, particularly the necessity to disclose client information and to follow any 
duties the law may impose on the lawyer in favor of the third party. Id. 
At times there may be a conflict between the need to provide an evaluation and the impact that that 
evaluation may have on the client’s interests. If proceeding with the evaluation may affect the client’s 
interests “materially and adversely,” the lawyer should not undertake such an evaluation without the 
client’s informed consent. Ohio Rule 2.3(b) & cmt. [5]. The Board of Commissioners invoked this 
Rule 2.3(b) limitation in the context of case evaluations sought by providers of alternative litigation 
financing, because “there is significant risk that disclosure of information to an ALF provider about a 
client representation will constitute a waiver of attorney-client privilege”; as a result, the evaluation 
may materially and adversely affect the client’s interests, which triggers informed client consent as a 
prerequisite to providing the evaluation. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2012-3, 
2012 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Dec. 7, 2012), at 25-26. 
Where making a third-part evaluation is permissible, the lawyer who proceeds to do so must be 
careful to avoid any confusion over the lawyer’s role in this setting, and thus should make clear to all 
concerned who has retained him. Ohio Rule 2.3 cmt. [2]. 
As to the evaluation itself, material limitations on the scope of the evaluation should be set forth in the 
report. Ohio Rule 2.3 cmt. [4]. See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 280 
(6th ed. 2007) (commentary). If the lawyer has relied on the conclusions of others, that fact should 
be stated in the opinion; further, the lawyer/evaluator should not simply accept the client’s version of 
the facts material to the opinion if he or she has reason to doubt the accuracy of those facts. Id. Stated 
another way, if the lawyer is relying, without independent investigation, on facts provided by the 
client, that should be stated in the opinion, but such a disclaimer would not protect the lawyer if those 
facts provided by the client are known by the lawyer to be false. “In no circumstances is the lawyer 
permitted to knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law in providing an evaluation 
under this Rule.” Ohio Rule 2.3 cmt. [4]. See 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers § 51(2) cmt. e, at 360-61 (2000); id. at § 95(3). 
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Be aware that if you are a lawyer advising publicly held companies or their auditors about the 
materiality of pending litigation, which advice is going to end up in documents going to the SEC, you 
ought to think about whether your advice is subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (see 15 USC § 7245) 
and the SEC rules promulgated thereunder (17 CFR Part 205). See also Dan K. Webb & Scott P. 
Glauberman, Up the Ladder: Litigator Responsibilities Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Litig., 
Summer 2004, at 21. Nonlitigators helping a client prepare documents to be filed with the SEC also 
must pay attention to Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC rules. See further discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley at 
section 1.13:310. 
  
2.3:300  Duty to Third Persons Who Rely on Lawyer’s Opinion 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 2.3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 2.3 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 71:706 
ALI-LGL § 95 
Wolfram § 13.4.4 
Neither the Rule nor its comments provides much insight on the lawyer’s duty to third persons -- the 
only reference is in Comment [3], which states that “[b]ecause an evaluation for someone other than 
the client involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the 
situation is required. . . . Even when making an evaluation is consistent with the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to the client, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, 
particularly the necessity to disclose information relating to the representation and the duties to the 
third person that these rules and the law impose upon the lawyer with respect to the evaluation. The 
legal duties, if any, that the lawyer may have to the third person are beyond the scope of these rules.” 
Ohio Rule 2.3 cmt. [3]. 
2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 95(3) (2000) sheds a bit more light on the 
issue; pursuant to the Restatement a lawyer providing an evaluation to a nonclient “must exercise care 
with respect to the nonclient to the extent stated in § 51(2) [1 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 51(2) (2000)] and not make false statements prohibited under § 98 [2 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 98 (2000)].” The comments state that the § 
51(2) duty in this context “is to provide a fair and objective opinion.” 2 Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers § 95 cmt. c, at 20 (2000). 
The Restatement further elaborates on the duty of care as follows: Under § 51, a lawyer owes a duty 
to use care within the meaning of § 52(1) (i.e., “the competence and diligence normally exercised by 
lawyers in similar circumstances”) to a nonclient who reasonably relies on the lawyer’s opinion, 
“unless the jurisdiction’s general tort law excludes liability on the ground of remoteness.” 
Restatement (Third) of the law Governing Lawyers §  51(2) cmt. e, at 359 (2000). For a 
discussion of Ohio law on this issue, see this section infra. See also Charles W. Wolfram, Modern 
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Legal Ethics § 13.4.4, at 710 (1986) (evaluator should act candidly with due regard to interests of 
those who can be expected to rely on the opinion).  
Nationally, there is a “growing body of law” holding lawyers liable to nonclient third parties who 
foreseeably and reasonably rely on the lawyer’s opinion. Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 
§ 71:701 (2003). There is at least one Ohio case, decided when the OHCPR was in effect, that can 
arguably be put in this category, even though the lawyer’s “opinion” was rendered under 
circumstances considerably more informal than those envisioned under MR 2.3. See Orshoski v. 
Krieger, No. OT-01-009, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5018 (Ohio App. Ottawa Nov. 9, 2001) 
(prospective subdivision lot purchaser made inquiry of real-estate agent (son of subdivision developer) 
and then relied on oral opinion of lawyer for subdivision developer, who relayed to prospective 
purchaser lawyer’s erroneous opinion that placing prefabricated home on lot would not violate 
restrictive covenant; motion to dismiss in lawyer’s favor reversed; court of appeals held that 
nonclient’s complaint stated negligent representation claim upon which relief could be granted). 
Orshorski is at odds with the traditional Ohio rule that a lawyer is not liable to a nonclient third party 
unless that party is in privity with the client (expressly found not to be the case in Orshorski) or the 
lawyer acts maliciously (not alleged in Orshoski). See Scholler v. Scholler, 10 Ohio St.3d 98, 462 
N.E.2d 158 (1984). For further discussion of Orshoski and the Scholler rule, see section 1.1:410. 
  
2.3:400  Confidentiality of an Evaluation 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 2.3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 2.3 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 71:704 
ALI-LGL § 95 
Wolfram § 13.4.3 
Pursuant to the provisions of Ohio Rule 2.3(b), prior to the lawyer’s undertaking of an evaluation for 
a third party of a matter affecting a client, the client must give “informed consent,” “[w]hen the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is likely to affect the client’s interests 
materially and adversely . . . .” The informed-consent requirement enables the client to make an 
intelligent decision in those instances in which the evaluation may involve disclosure of confidential 
client information. See Ohio Rule 2.3(c) (except where disclosure authorized, information protected 
by Ohio Rule 1.6); see also the commentary to MR 2.3(c), ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 296-97 (7th ed. 2011) (disclosure in evaluation results in loss of 
confidentiality). This, in turn, may waive attorney-client and work-product protections. Id. at 282; 2 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 95 cmt. d (2000). E.g., In re John Doe 
Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982) (conversations between corporate general counsel and 
corporation’s auditor in course of annual audit not protected by attorney-client privilege or 
work-product immunity). 
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According to Wolfram: 
 Confidentiality in evaluation is a matter of careful planning and 
execution of the evaluation and, most importantly, of the development 
of the terms of the undertaking in consultation with the client before it 
begins. A well-advised client would likely require that the lawyer 
submit a draft evaluation report to the client for review prior to its 
release to third parties. 
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 13.4.3, at 708 (1986). 
While not evaluation cases as such (with one possible exception discussed below), there are a number 
of analogous Ohio decisions holding material not privileged where it was intended that the material 
be disseminated to third parties. See, e.g., Walsh v. Barcelona Assocs., Inc., 16 Ohio App.3d 470, 
476 N.E.2d 1090 (Franklin 1984), and other cases cited at section 1.6:430. The same operative 
principle -- lack of intent of confidentiality -- would appear to apply in any instance of authorized 
disclosure of otherwise confidential evaluation materials to nonclients undertaken pursuant to Ohio 
law. 
Consistent with the foregoing analysis, one of the cases cited in section 1.6:430, Johndahl v. 
Columbus Trotting Ass’n, Inc., 104 Ohio App. 118, 147 N.E.2d 101 (Franklin 1956), arguably 
could be considered an evaluation case akin to Ohio Rule 2.3. In Johndahl, the attorney for a 
partnership prepared incorporation papers containing confidential information, to be submitted to the 
appropriate state authorities, as intended by the partnership. At the trial, the lawyer testified and 
submitted evidence as to these matters. On appeal, plaintiff argued that admission of the lawyer’s 
evidence was error, because the information was privileged. The court of appeals disagreed: 
The facts which were carried into the application for incorporation of 
the partnership and the appraisal of its assets became public property or 
were provided to [the lawyer] with the intention that they be so used 
and therefore may not be said to be confidential in nature. 
104 Ohio App. at 128, 147 N.E.2d at 109. Again, the overriding principle in Johndahl, as well as 
the other cases cited in 1.6:430, is the absence of intention that the information be held confidential, a 
circumstance that also applies in the context of evaluations for use by nonclients containing 
disclosure of confidential information pursuant to Ohio Rule 2.3. 
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[ARBITRATORS OR MEDIATORS ARE EXAMPLES OF THIRD-PARTY NEUTRALS. A 
MORE ACCURATE TITLE WOULD BE "LAWYER SERVING AS THIRD-PARTY NEUTRAL" 
(THE MODEL RULE TITLE) OR "LAWYER SERVING AS ARBITRATOR, MEDIATOR, OR 
OTHER THIRD-PARTY NEUTRAL." SEE THE USE OF "OTHER" IN SIMILAR 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE TITLE TO OHIO RULE 1.12.] 
  
2.4:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 2.4 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 2.4 
  
2.4:101  Model Rule Comparison 
The text of Ohio Rule 2.4 is identical to the Model Rule. 
  
2.4:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct is listed in the Correlation Table 
(Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 2.4: EC 5-21. 
  
2.4:200  Obligations of Third-Party Neutral 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 2.4 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 2.4 
The text of Ohio Rule 2.4 is identical to MR 2.4, which was added to the Model Rules in 2002. In 
contrast to former OH EC 5-21 (as to which see below), the Ohio rule involves acting as a third-party 
neutral to assist two or more persons who are not clients in resolving a dispute that has arisen between 
them. Ohio Rule 2.4(a). If one or more of the parties to the dispute are unrepresented, Ohio Rule 
2.4(b) obligates the lawyer neutral, at a minimum, to inform the unrepresented party or parties that he 
is not representing them. And, if the third-party neutral knows or reasonably should know that any 
party is confused about the third-party neutral's role, the neutral must explain to them how that role 
differs from that of a lawyer representing a client. Id. The extent of disclosure required will turn on 
the subject matter of the proceedings, the sophistication of the parties, and the type of dispute 
resolution device employed. Ohio Rule 2.4 cmt. [3]. 
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Because the third-party neutral role does not involve representing clients, many of the Ohio Rules are 
inapplicable to the lawyer working in that capacity (although those rules not based on client 
representation continue to apply). Rather, third-party neutral practice is largely governed by other 
statues and rules. Ohio Rule 2.4 cmt. [2]. See discussion below at "Additional Restrictions." 
In contrast, lawyers who represent clients in an alternative dispute resolution process are subject to 
the full measure of the Ohio Rules. Ohio Rule 2.4 cmt. [5]. If the third-party neutral is subsequently 
asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter, the conflicts-of-interest issues that 
arise for the lawyer and the lawyer's firm are controlled by Ohio Rule 1.12. Ohio Rule 2.4 cmt. [4]. 
See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2009-4, 2009 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 
(June 12, 2009) (mediators), discussed in section 1.12:200. 
The only provision in the former OHCPR touching on the subject of third-party neutrals was OH EC 
5-21, which provided: 
 A lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial arbitrator or 
mediator in matters which involve present or former clients. He may 
serve in either capacity if he first discloses such present or former 
relationships. After a lawyer has undertaken to act as an impartial 
arbitrator or mediator, he should not thereafter represent in the dispute 
any of the parties involved. 
See related discussion concerning partisan arbitrators at section 1.12:500. 
Additional restrictions: In addition to Rules 1.12 and 2.4, other provisions, grounded in the 
substantive law governing arbitrators and mediators, bear on a lawyer's service in these capacities. 
With respect to arbitration, see ORC CH 2711. The Ohio statutory law governing mediation is 
collected in 3 Sarah R. Cole, Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Mediation: Law, Policy, 
Practice at App. C-36 (2d ed. 2007). Subsection (H) of the testimonial-privilege statute prohibits a 
domestic-relations mediator from testifying in certain domestic relations proceedings concerning 
information discussed or presented in the mediation process. ORC 2317.02(H). (In its Ohio Code 
Comparison to Rule 1.12, the Task Force states that 2317.02(H) has been repealed; we find no 
evidence of repeal.  See section 1.12:200 at "Confidentiality and service as a judge, adjudicative 
officer, third-party neutral or law clerk.") See also Rule 2.4 cmt. [2], noting that various laws and 
codes of ethics may apply to lawyer/third-party neutrals, including but not limited to the Ohio Ethics 
Law and the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes. 
Lawyer as arbitrator: In cases involving arbitration, courts have considered the impact that potential 
conflicts of interests of the lawyer/arbitrator may have on the validity of the arbitration process itself. 
Significant conflicts must be disclosed to the parties involved in the arbitration. Failure to do so 
constitutes "evident partiality" on the arbitrator's part, which justifies vacation of an arbitration award. 
ORC 2711.10(B). 
Of most concern are situations in which there is a direct and substantial relationship between the 
arbitrator and a party. Under such circumstances, there is a duty to discover and disclose the 
relationship. The primary case on this point is Close v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 21 Ohio App.3d 
228, 486 N.E.2d 1275 (Franklin 1985). In Close, an arbitration decision was vacated under ORC 
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2711.10(B) where the attorney-arbitrator was a member of a law firm that did substantial work for 
one of the parties in the litigation. The fact that the arbitrator was not personally aware of the fact was 
found to be irrelevant. He had a duty to discover and to disclose the conflict so that the parties could 
address and resolve the conflict before arbitration. 
Also troubling for the courts are cases in which the lawyer-arbitrator has a continuing relationship 
with an attorney representing one of the parties in the litigation. In King v. Sentry Claims Serv., 71 
Ohio App.3d 701, 595 N.E.2d 380 (Cuyahoga 1991), for example, the arbitrator chosen by the 
plaintiffs had an ongoing legal and business relationship with the plaintiffs' attorney. The arbitrator 
had even signed a complaint by the plaintiffs in a previous, possibly related, proceeding as a 
professional courtesy to the plaintiff's lawyer. Similarly, in Furtado v. Hearthstone Condominium 
Ass'n, No. 86 AP-1003, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 7217 (Ohio App. Franklin May 19, 1987), the 
arbitrator chosen by defendant's counsel had received referrals from defendant's counsel, which 
referrals accounted for between one to five percent of the arbitrator's legal practice, and he rented 
office space, shared office services, and was a social friend of the defendant's lawyer. He also was 
godparent to one of the defendant's lawyer's children. In both King and Furtado, over strong dissents, 
the arbitration award was held not violative of ORC 2711.10(B), despite the failure of the arbitrator 
to disclose the underlying relationship. 
As the relationship between the arbitrator and the party becomes more remote, failure to disclose the 
relationship becomes less of a concern. For example, in Beck Suppliers, Inc. v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 53 Ohio App.3d 98, 558 N.E.2d 1187 (Sandusky 1988), the fact that the arbitrator's 
law firm represented the parent and affiliate corporations of a party was considered to be too indirect 
a relationship to warrant vacation of the arbitration award because of a failure to disclose that fact. In 
Staff v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 87 Ohio App.3d 440, 622 N.E.2d 434 (Cuyahoga 1993), the 
failure to disclose that the lawyer for a party in the arbitration had signed an endorsement letter for the 
arbitrator when the arbitrator was running for judge was held to be of no legal consequence. A 2009 
case finding that the “evident partiality” test of ORC 2711.10(B) had not been met is Greenwald v. 
Shayne, 152 Ohio Misc.2d 12, 2009 Ohio 3384, 910 N.E.2d 536 (C.P. Franklin). In Greenwald, 
the alleged malfeasance of the arbitrator, Leach, was his switching firms in his local 
managing-partner role some months after rendering his decision in an arbitration involving the 
dissolution of a law partnership, where one of the partners had left to set up his own firm in Arizona. 
In rejecting this argument for vacation of the award, the Greenwald court quoted with approval the 
language of Shook, Inc. v. Corp. Interior Sys., Inc., 2003 Ohio 2089, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 
1971 (Montgomery), to the effect that “when alleged bias is rooted in an arbitrator’s relationship 
with a nonparty (like Leach’s potential new law firm) ‘the relationship must be such that one could 
reasonably infer bias, not those which are peripheral, superficial, or insignificant. * * * The basis for 
the alleged bias must not be indirect, remote, or tenuous.’” Greenwald at para. 33 (alternate holding; 
the court also held that Shayne’s attempt to vacate the award was untimely under the three-month 
limitation rule of ORC 2711.13).  
Lawyer as mediator: The conflict-of-interest problems arising for a lawyer engaged in mediation are 
illustrated clearly in the divorce-mediation context. A lawyer who attempts to represent both spouses 
in a divorce faces at least a potential conflict of interest, as each is likely to have differing interests on 
such questions as how the marital estate should be divided and what the child custody arrangements 
should be. See generally section 1.7:310 at "Conflict among current clients - Divorce, dissolution, 
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and related matters." If, however, the lawyer acts as an impartial intermediary instead of as an 
advocate for each client, and the right limitations are in place, the conduct can be carried out free of 
conflict. The real question in such circumstances is how far the lawyer can go in mediation before the 
lawyer's status shifts from a neutral intermediary to a party's representative. 
Substantial disagreement exists nationally concerning the proper scope of activities that can be 
carried out by a lawyer/mediator. See 1 Sarah R. Cole, Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, 
Mediation: Law, Policy, Practice § 10.02 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2008-09). Prior to the adoption of 
the Rules, the primary guidance in Ohio came from one Board of Commissioners' opinion and two 
opinions of the Ohio State Bar Association. 
In Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-5, 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 
(Oct. 5, 2001), the Board opined that a court-employed lawyer/mediator could not conduct a 
private-fee mediation of any case pending on the docket of the employing court. Such conduct 
violated the Ohio Ethics Law applicable to judicial employees (accepting outside compensation to 
perform his/her official duties) and former OH DR 9-101(B), which prohibited an attorney from 
accepting private employment in a matter in which the attorney had "substantial responsibility" as a 
public employee. This would not be the case if the lawyer/mediator engaged in private-fee mediation 
of matters not pending on the docket of the employing court or of civil cases pending in jurisdictions 
other than that of the employing court. The underlying (if unstated) premise of the opinion is that 
attorneys can properly act as court-employed mediators. 
The two state bar opinions are Ohio State Bar Ass'n Informal Op. 82-2 (Aug. 3, 1982); Ohio State 
Bar Ass'n Informal Op. 75-16 (Oct. 29, 1975). Considered together, these opinions endorsed the 
role of lawyer as mediator in the divorce context, at least where the mediation was limited to 
economic issues. (The principal bar association opinion approving divorce mediation, Op. 75-16, 
involved a mediation practice in which the mediators expressly limited their mediation to the 
economic aspects of terminating a marriage and specifically declined to opine on whether the 
termination was advisable, or how custody, visitation, and related issues should be handled. In 
practice, however, such noneconomic issues often are handled by lawyer-mediators in the mediation 
process.) Preparing a memorandum of understanding to memorialize the results of the mediation also 
is allowed. The bar association viewed this as merely the act of a scrivener, raising no 
conflict-of-interest questions not already raised by the act of mediating itself. Op. 82-2, at 3. 
Instructing the parties to have the document reviewed by independent counsel before signing it 
further assured that the lawyer/mediator's role was properly confined. Id. 
The opinions also allowed, in limited circumstances, post-mediation representation of any of the 
parties in court proceedings to finalize the divorce or dissolution. The bar association acknowledged 
that to represent one of the parties in the divorce or dissolution proceeding would appear to raise a 
conflict, but found the conduct to be proper, provided three conditions were met. First, the lawyer 
must fully inform the client that, because he or she acted as a mediator, the lawyer cannot advise the 
client on the merits of the memorandum of understanding or the termination of the marriage. Second, 
both parties must consent to the representation, after each side has had the opportunity to consult 
independent counsel about the matter. Third, representation is permitted only in instances where the 
underlying agreement and desire to terminate the marriage remain unchanged. Id. at 4; Op. 75-16, at 
2. The latest word on the limitations under Ohio Rule 1.12 on post-mediation representation by a 
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third-party neutral of parties to the mediation proceedings are spelled out in Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2009-4, 2009 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (June 12. 2009), 
discussed in section 1.12:200. 
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3.1:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.1 
OH Civ R 11 
OH App R 23 
SCt Prac R 14.5(A) 
ORC 2323.51, 2705 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.1 
  
3.1:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 3.1 is substantively identical to the Model Rule. 
  
3.1:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct are listed in the Correlation Table 
(Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.1: DR 7-102(A)(2), EC 7-25. 
  
3.1:200  Non-Meritorious Assertions in Litigation 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.1 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.1 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.45-7.46, 7.56 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:151 
ALI-LGL § 110 
Wolfram § 11.2 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.45-7.46, 7.56 (1996). 
Advancing an unwarranted claim or defense: Ohio Rule 3.1 prohibits a lawyer from “bring[ing] or 
defend[ing] a proceeding, or assert[ing] or controvert[ing] an issue in a proceeding, unless there is a 
basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” 
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As stated in Comment [2], the filing of an action or defense taken on behalf of a client is not frivolous 
merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or 
because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by 
discovery. 
Ohio Rule 3.1 cmt. [2]. Lawyers must, however, inform themselves about the facts of their clients’ 
cases and applicable law and thereby determine that good faith arguments can be made in support of 
their clients’ position.  
Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the 
client’s position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, 
however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument 
on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a 
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law. 
Id.  Comment [2] played an important role in the Court’s decision in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Rust, 124 
Ohio St.3d 305, 2010 Ohio 170, 921 N.E.2d 1056, where the finding of violation of Rule 1.16(a)(1) 
was overturned and the case dismissed.  The premise of the (a)(1) violation – requiring termination if 
the representations transgressed any of the Rules of Professional Conduct – was that respondent had 
pursued a frivolous wrongful-death claim in violation of Rule 3.1. In finding that Rust committed no 
ethical impropriety, the Supreme Court relied in part on the language of Comment [2] making clear 
that where lawyers can “‘determine that they can make good faith arguments in support of their 
clients’ positions[,] [s]uch action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client’s 
position ultimately will not prevail.’” Id. at para. 45. The Rust case is also discussed at the end of 
section 1.16:240. In contrast, a Rule 3.1 violation was established in Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 
127 Ohio St.3d 436, 2010 Ohio 6241, 940 N.E.2d 952, where respondent filed multiple specious 
affidavits of disqualification and unfounded requests for recusal. Accord Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. 
Trivers, 134 Ohio St.3d 139, 2012 Ohio 5389, 980 N.E.2d 992 (filing Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
petition on behalf of person who had died three years previously; respondent incorrectly thought 
petition could be pursued on behalf of petitioner’s estate). 
While there can be no question that acts knowingly or recklessly frivolous, or intentionally misusing 
legal procedure, as in Pullins, violate Rule 3.1, the Trivers transgression of the rule was premised on 
a mistake as to the applicable law. Although we all make them from time to time, the rule seems not to 
grant any exemptions for mistakes; instead, it imposes an obligation that lawyers “inform themselves 
about . . . the applicable law” and then make good faith arguments based on that law, or its extension 
or reversal. 
The case of Akron Bar Ass’n v. Groner, 131 Ohio St.3d 194, 2012 Ohio 222, 963 N.E.2d 149, 
seems to lie somewhere between Rust and Pullins/Trivers. Respondent’s violation of 3.1 was filing 
a pleading that “had no basis in fact or law for the false assertions and misleading arguments” made in 
the pleading. Id. at para. 12. The false statements resulted from Groner’s having obtained a report 
from an internet site indicating that a person with the identical full name as the person she was 
interested in, her client’s sister, had filed for bankruptcy and had a felony record. In fact the sister had 
no felony record or bankruptcy filing. Within a few days, after conversations with opposing counsel 
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and her own client, Groner “began to suspect that the information she had submitted about Fowler 
[the sister] was not correct. Groner subsequently filed a motion for mediation in which she amended 
the [pleading] to remove most of the allegations made about Fowler.” Id. at para. 11. Groner also 
testified that at the time she believed the information she received from the internet to be correct but 
did not verify the information; she also testified that she made the statements in good faith. Id. at 
para. 13. One might argue that this course of conduct is more akin to “action taken for a client [that] 
is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully developed,” (Cmt. [2]) than an 
“abuse [of] legal procedure” (Cmt. [1]), but Rule 3.1 was found to have been violated nevertheless. 
Groner was given a six-month suspension, all stayed. (The Groner case is also discussed in sections 
0.2:240 (at “Hearing – Board determination and recommendation”), 3.3:200, and 4.1:200.) 
In another Rule 3.1 case, Disciplinary Counsel v. Lehmkuhl, 137 Ohio St.3d 71, 2013 Ohio 4539, 
997 N.E.2d 532, the respondent received only a public reprimand for conduct that, arguably, was 
worse than that in Groner. Lehmkuhl had filed a defamation action, on his own behalf and on behalf 
of others, based on statements allegedly made during a TV interview by a married couple identified in 
the complaint as Joseph and Amanda Erb. But Amanda was not Joseph’s wife; she was his daughter 
and had nothing to do with the incident. Her lack of involvement was set forth in defendants’ answer 
and counterclaim. Despite having knowledge of his error in January 2010, Lehmkuhl did not dismiss 
the claims against the daughter until more than four months later and thus did not timely amend his 
complaint, whereas Groner’s mistake, committed under a same-day filing deadline, was rectified 
“[o]nce Groner learned of the erroneous information.” 131 Ohio St.3d 194, at para. 22. 
Can a lawyer ethically file an action he knows to be time-barred in the hope that his adversary will fail 
to assert the affirmative defense? This issue is considered in Thomas Spahn, Filing a Time-Barred 
Claim: Ethics Rules vs. Courts’ Attitude, 20 Experience No. 1 (2010), at 46. 
The Rule also contains an exception to the “not frivolous” test -- in a criminal or other case in which 
incarceration may result, a lawyer, in providing the assistance of counsel to which a criminal 
defendant is constitutionally entitled, may put the prosecution to its proof even if there is no 
nonfrivolous basis for defense. See Ohio Rule 3.1 & cmt. [3]. 
If, when the lawyer is approached to undertake representation, the prospective client wants the lawyer 
to present a frivolous claim or defense, the lawyer must refuse the employment. Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(1). 
See section 1.16:700. 
If the lawyer discovers this to be the client’s intent after accepting the representation, the lawyer 
likewise must (not may, as was the case under former OH DR 2-110(C)(1)(a)) withdraw. Ohio Rule 
1.16(a)(1). See section 1.16:230. If the lawyer nevertheless accepts or remains in the representation 
and advances a frivolous claim or defense, the lawyer violates Ohio Rule 3.1. 
The core concern of Ohio Rule 3.1 was treated under the former OHCPR in DR 7-102(A)(2). That 
provision prohibited the filing of claims or defenses unwarranted under existing law or by a 
good-faith argument to modify existing law. It did not expressly address advancing claims or 
defenses lacking a basis in fact, nor did it explain the special standards for criminal-defense counsel. 
Nevertheless, the case law discussing former OH DR 7-102(A)(2) should still provide significant 
guidance in understanding the new Rule. 
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Under the former OHCPR, violations often arose when a lawyer, acting on his own behalf, raised 
unwarranted claims or defenses. For example, a lawyer violated this provision by filing a 
counterclaim seeking disbarment of opposing counsel for adding him as a defendant in a civil action 
and by knowingly making false statements to the court to the effect that the Cincinnati Bar 
Association had advised him that his charges of misconduct against opposing counsel were valid.  
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Gebhart, 69 Ohio St.2d 287, 431 N.E.2d 1031 (1982). And a lawyer, who 
filed a claim against a client for money owed and later withdrew it, and who admitted that he knew 
from the outset that his client actually owed him nothing, was found to have violated former OH DR 
7-102(A)(2).  Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Gargiulo, 62 Ohio St.2d 239, 404 N.E.2d 1343 (1980). 
Bringing suit for fees against the widow and son of the sole shareholder of a company for whom 
respondent had done legal work, when the lawyer had never performed legal work for either the 
widow or the son, also violated 7-102(A)(2).  Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Wishnosky, 88 Ohio St.3d 
385, 726 N.E.2d 996 (2000). Another case in which the lawyer was disciplined under, inter alia, OH 
DR 7-102(A)(2) for advancing an unwarranted claim on his own behalf was Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Elsass, 86 Ohio St.3d 195, 713 N.E.2d 421 (1999) (lawyer brought defamation action against party 
who had filed ethics complaint against him, even though lawyer was aware of controlling Ohio 
authority to effect that ethics complaints are afforded absolute privilege from civil liability for 
statements made in course of disciplinary proceeding, so long as allegedly defamatory statements 
bear some reasonable relation to disciplinary proceeding, as was the case here).  
The most recent OHCPR cases in this category are Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 
219, 2009 Ohio 2870, 909 N.E.2d 1271, and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Baumgartner, 100 
Ohio St.3d 41, 2003 Ohio 4756, 796 N.E.2d 495. In Frost, the respondent received an indefinite 
suspension for, inter alia, filing a baseless defamation claim against two lawyers who opposed her in 
a sexual-harassment suit and who allegedly had made slanderous remarks about respondent. The 
Court characterized the suit as “completely frivolous.” Id. at para. 31. In Baumgartner, respondent 
was disbarred for violating former OH DR 7-102(A)(2), among many other provisions, based on her 
numerous baseless claims against a panoply of public officials in furtherance of her vigilante 
campaign directed at perceived public corruption. In an attempt to further this goal, respondent filed a 
“barrage” of actions and affidavits, all of which were found to be unwarranted. Included was her 
“own ‘citizen’s’ complaint,” filed in municipal court along with her own affidavits, accusing eleven 
public officials of various felonies and misdemeanors. Id. at paras. 6-7. She also filed a federal 
action against the chairman of the disciplinary panel hearing her case, the Disciplinary Counsel, and 
various others claimed to be involved in what she considered to be public corruption. Id. at para. 4. 
As a result of this “vendetta,” respondent was convicted in a separate criminal proceeding of making 
false accusations of impropriety. Id. at para. 9. Even when clients were involved, as in some of the 
counts, the Court found that respondent used their cases “to press her own agenda.” Id. at para. 32. 
In addition to lawyers pressing their own unwarranted claims, the case law under former OH DR 
7-102(A)(2) also extended to conduct while asserting claims on behalf of clients and others. The most 
recent example is Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mitchell, 118 Ohio St.3d 98, 2008 Ohio 1822, 886 
N.E.2d 222, where the respondent, as part of her efforts to obtain for her client Medicaid 
reimbursements for unsubstantiated health care expenses, filed a whole series of unfounded and 
“illegitimate” legal actions to compel the agency to pay the unsubstantiated expenses. In Cleveland 
Bar Ass’n v. Sweeney, 71 Ohio St.3d 197, 643 N.E.2d 89 (1994), a lawyer filed a joint action on 
behalf of his client and a second party against an insurance company for bad-faith refusal to settle an 
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action. The lawyer, however, had neither discussed the matter with the second party, nor received her 
authorization to represent her; in fact, the party had no knowledge of the suit being brought on her 
behalf. The Court treated bringing suit on behalf of a nonclient as a violation of former OH DR 
7-102(A)(2) -- knowingly advancing a claim unwarranted under existing law. The Court was not 
swayed by the attorney’s argument that he joined the second party in the action as a plaintiff only 
because he believed she was an involuntary plaintiff and necessary party under OH Civ R 19. 
Because the lawyer’s conduct arises in a court setting, one can look to the judicial response to the 
conduct as an indicia of whether the claim or defense was warranted. One must be careful, however, 
to avoid overreading the court’s reaction. Thus, in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Hardesty, 80 
Ohio St.3d 444, 447-48, 687 N.E.2d 417, 419-20 (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer’s 
filing of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on behalf of his clients, which petition was later dismissed 
for “substantial abuse” because the bankruptcy court concluded on conflicting evidence that the 
debtors had the ability to pay some of their creditors in a Chapter 13 plan, did not constitute a 
violation of 7-102(A)(2). 
There was one important exception contained in former OH DR 7-102(A)(2), which exception is 
continued in Ohio Rule 3.1. It provides lawyers the freedom to raise claims or defenses not presently 
recognized in the law, as long as the lawyer reasonably believes there is a good faith argument for the 
position. This freedom is necessary for the advancement of the law and to assure the proper 
representation of one’s client. See Ohio Rule 3.1 cmt. [1]. Instructive in this regard is Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Pollock, 100 Ohio St.3d 280, 2003 Ohio 5752, 798 N.E.2d 594. Although 
respondent was found to have violated a number of provisions of the former OHCPR for his vendetta 
against multiple defendants in multiple lawsuits, the Court dismissed the 7-102(A)(2) charge. In so 
holding, it reasoned as follows: 
[W]e decline to find specifically unethical what respondent insists is 
creative precedent and argument to advance his clients’ causes. It is 
true that various courts, including this one, have found his claims 
meritless and, at times, frustratingly repetitious. However, those 
findings do not necessarily mean that the arguments are so far-fetched 
that professional discipline is in order. Attorneys must be given rein to 
experiment in groundbreaking legal pursuits, and here, respondent 
researched and supplied precedent (however tenuous) for his 
controversial claims. We will not foreclose the assertion of novel legal 
theories through the disciplinary process unless they are absolutely 
specious. 
Id. at para. 45. (Similar sentiments were expressed in a case arising under ORC 2323.51, Riston v. 
Butler, 149 Ohio App.3d 390, 2002 Ohio 2308, 777 N.E.2d 857, at para. 39 (Hamilton).) 
Finally, it should be noted that the advancement of unwarranted claims or defenses is policed by 
means other than the disciplinary rules. OH Civ R 11 and ORC 2323.51, as well as OH App R 23 
and SCt Prac R 14.5(A), (all dealing with frivolous claims), provide means for controlling such 
conduct. These provisions are discussed in section 3.1:300. 
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Taking action that serves only to harass or maliciously injure another: Former OH DR 7-102(A)(1) 
prohibited a lawyer, in representing a client, from filing a suit, asserting a position, conducting a 
defense, delaying a trial, or taking other action on behalf of a client when the lawyer knows or it is 
obvious that the action is intended only to harass or maliciously injure another. While specific 
reference to harassment and malicious injury has not been carried over into Ohio Rule 3.1, it has been 
stated that MR 3.1 (substantively identical to the Ohio Rule) is “to the same general effect” as DR 
7-102(A)(1) by virtue of the obligation to sue or defend on a basis that is “not frivolous.” See ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 299 (4th ed. 1999) (Model Code Comparison). 
As is further stated there, the “knowledge” or “obvious” factor has been deleted; the “not frivolous” 
test is an objective one. Id. However, because the Rules treat the Ohio version of Rule 4.4(a), rather 
than Rule 3.1, as the successor to OH DR 7-102(A)(1), discussion of the obligation not to harass or 
maliciously injure another has been placed in section 4.4:200 of the treatise. \ 
3.1:300  Judicial Sanctions for Abusive Litigation Practice (Especially Rule 11) 
Primary Ohio References 
OH Civ R 11 
OH App R 23 
SCt Prac R 14.5(A) 
ORC 2323.51 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.1 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:106 
ALI/LGL § 110 
Wolfram § 11.2 
Ohio rule and statutory sanctions - In general: In Ohio, there are sanction provisions for frivolous or 
otherwise improper conduct at every level of the litigation process. There is, of course, OH Civ R 11, 
which is still modeled in substantial part on the original (1938) version of the federal rule and is 
applicable to civil actions in most state trial-court proceedings. (There is no comparable Ohio 
criminal rule.) OH Civ R 11, “to the extent that [it] would by [its] nature be clearly inapplicable,” 
does not apply to appeals or certain other excepted proceedings, as set forth in OH Civ R 1(C). See, 
e.g., McGowan v. Stoyer, 2002 Ohio 5410, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 5409 (Franklin) (“Civ. R. 11 
does not apply to conduct in the court of appeals,” id. at para. 26). But see In re Terrance P., 124 
Ohio App.3d 487, 706 N.E.2d 801 (Lucas 1997), where the court held that OH Civ R 11 applied in 
an appeal of a juvenile proceeding with respect to the adequacy of a notice of appeal. [Since a notice 
of appeal is filed in the trial court, one wonders why the issue was not simply treated as a normal 
appellate issue, with the court reviewing the correctness of the trial court’s dismissal of the notice for 
want of a proper signature.] Other civil rules also contain sanction provisions dealing with specific 
subjects. See, e.g., OH Civ R 37 (discovery); OH Civ R 45(E) (subpoenas). OH App R 23 is 
applicable in intermediate appellate proceedings, civil and criminal, and SCt Prac R 14.5(A) is 
applicable to all matters lodged in the Supreme Court. 
ORC 2323.51, the frivolous action statute, applies to the filing of a civil action and the taking of any 
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other action in connection with a civil action, including the filing of pleadings, motions, or other 
papers therein. ORC 2323.51(A)(1)(a). Other than appeals by an inmate against a government entity 
or employee (see ORC 2323.51(A)(1)(b)), the statute does not apply to appeals. State ex rel. Ohio 
Dep’t of Health v. Sowald, 65 Ohio St.3d 338, 603 N.E.2d 1017 (1992) (“the statute refers to trial 
court judgments in civil actions. Accordingly, R.C. 2323.51 does not contemplate awarding attorney 
fees for defending appeals in civil actions.”  Id. at 343, 603 N.E.2d at 1021). The current version of 
the statute is consistent with the Sowald result -- the provision mentioned above directed at appeals 
by inmates (not present in the version of the statute before the Sowald Court), merely reinforces the 
conclusion that “conduct” taken “in connection with a civil action,” ORC 2323.51(A)(1)(a), is 
limited to actions taken in the court in which civil proceedings are instituted. 
One decision ( Jackson v. Bellomy, 2002 Ohio 6495, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6279 (Franklin)) 
attempted to distinguish Sowald on the ground that Sowald “was referring to the appeal of an 
appellate court’s judgment [in mandamus], not to an appeal of a trial court’s original judgment.” Id. 
at para. 58. This dubious distinction was coupled with the somewhat more plausible argument that 
the statutory language “taking any other action in connection with a civil action” includes “taking the 
further related action of appealing its decision over a three year period of time,” which “needlessly 
prolonged this controversy.” Id. We know of no other decision so interpreting this language, and the 
current wording of the statute, limiting the types of appeals (i.e., those by inmates) constituting 
“conduct” to which the statute applies, would seem to render the second Jackson rationale obsolete. 
Who may be sanctioned for misconduct - Civil Rule 11: OH Civ R 11 (in contrast to the current 
version of the federal rule, pursuant to which sanctions may be imposed on the lawyers, law firms, or 
parties responsible for the violation) is directed solely at the signing attorney (or pro se litigant). 
Village of Ottawa Hills v. Afjeh, 2006 Ohio 2618, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 2461 (Lucas) (Rule 11 
sanctions imposed on pro se litigants); David v. Kaiser, 2004 Ohio 3149, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 
2820 (Lucas) (OH Civ R 11 sanctions cannot be imposed on represented party); Riley v. Langer, 95 
Ohio App.3d 151, 642 N.E.2d 1 (Hamilton 1994) (law firm on whose behalf attorney signed 
pleading cannot be held liable for sanctions under OH Civ R 11). But see Oster v. Crais, 2003 Ohio 
5320, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 4789 (Licking), where the trial court had erroneously imposed Rule 
11 sanctions “against appellants and their attorneys, jointly and severally.” Id. at para. 7. Because of 
deficiencies in the record supplied by appellants, the court of appeals could not “pass on the propriety 
of that ruling in the absence of a transcript, and must presume regularity and affirm.” Id. at para. 20.  
Note that sanctions may be imposed under OH Civ R 11 on local counsel who signs a court document 
drafted by another firm; the lawyer “had a nondelegable responsibility to ensure that the requirements 
of Civ. R. 11 were fulfilled.” Lewis v. Celina Fin. Corp., 101 Ohio App.3d 464, 472, 655 N.E.2d 
1333, 1338 (Mercer 1995). 
Who may be sanctioned for misconduct - Revised Code 2323.51: The language of ORC 
2323.51(B)(4) permits the imposition of sanctions on “a party, the party’s counsel of record, or both.” 
In determining upon whom sanctions should be levied under this provision, a considerable body of 
case law expressly articulates the view that sanctions under the statute should be imposed on the 
person who was actually responsible for the offending conduct.  Ron Schiederer & Assocs. v. City 
of London, 81 Ohio St.3d 94, 97, 689 N.E.2d 552, 554 (1998) (sanctions for frivolous conduct 
affirmed; sanctions against attorney limited to actions taken during the time when he was representing 
client; separate sanctions imposed against client for conduct occurring when he was acting pro se. 
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“The General Assembly [in ORC 2323.51] gave courts the discretion to hold those engaging in 
frivolous conduct responsible for their actions.”). Accord Kinnison v. Advance Stores Co., 2006 
Ohio 222, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 192 (Richland) (sanctionable conduct by appellant’s counsel; 
sanctions imposed on attorney); Stohlman v. Hall, 158 Ohio App.3d 499, 2004 Ohio 5219, 817 
N.E.2d 118 (Cuyahoga) (no evidence that plaintiffs themselves intended to harass or maliciously 
injure defendant; sanctions therefore imposed on plaintiffs’ counsel, not plaintiffs, for filing frivolous 
claims); Sain v. Roo, 2001 Ohio 4115, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4740, at *23-24 (Franklin Oct. 23, 
2001) (“The objective of the statute is to impose sanctions on the person actually responsible for the 
frivolous conduct. . . . [S]anctions may be imposed both jointly and severally on both plaintiff and 
counsel, if the conduct so warrants,” as here); Master v. Chalko, No. 75973, 2000 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 2014 (Cuyahoga May 11, 2000) (ORC 2323.51 “provides the trial court with a mechanism 
to place blame directly where fault lies,” id. at *5; sanctions imposed on lawyer, his law firm, and his 
client). Presumably this was the method used in Peterman v. Stewart, 2006 Ohio 4671, 2006 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 4611 (Delaware), where the appellate court affirmed an award of sanctions against 
plaintiff and her attorney at a ratio of 1 to 17 ($1,780; $30,215.90); the basis of the allocation is not 
discussed). See generally 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 110 cmt. g, at 
174 (2000): “Courts generally attempt to impose sanctions for unwarranted litigation on the lawyer or 
client . . . in proportion to their relative responsibility.” See also Rindfleisch v. AFT, Inc., 2005 Ohio 
191, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 211 (Cuyahoga) (overruling assignment of error that sanctions should 
have been imposed on defendant’s counsel as well as defendant; where it is “unclear who was 
advancing the frivolous conduct . . . we are unable to find that the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding attorney fees solely against [defendant].” Id. at para. 19.). 
There is some authority to the effect that a party can be sanctioned, even though the offender was the 
party’s attorney.  Dictaphone Corp. v. City of E. Cleveland, No. 60616, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 
2842 (Cuyahoga June 4, 1992); see Mathis v. St. Alexis Hosp., 99 Ohio App.3d 159, 650 N.E.2d 
141 (Cuyahoga 1994) (parties entered into covenant not to sue, pursuant to which hospital agreed not 
to pursue sanctions against plaintiffs; plaintiffs then refiled wrongful death claims, arguing that 
covenant failed for want of consideration since any sanctions award should have been directed at 
plaintiff’s attorney, not plaintiffs; court of appeals held covenant enforceable “in light of R.C. 
2323.51, which authorizes sanctions against a party as well as his attorney for frivolous conduct, and 
in light of [Dictaphone], where sanctions were upheld against the party and its attorney, even though 
it was only the attorney who engaged in frivolous conduct.”  Id. at 164, 650 N.E.2d at 144.). A more 
recent case seemingly in accord is Burchett v. Larkin, 192 Ohio App.3d 418, 2011 Ohio 684, 949 
N.E.2d 516 (Scioto) (sanctions imposed on appellants, including the party-plaintiffs, even though the 
conduct found frivolous was that of their attorney). 
A lawyer is subject to sanction under the frivolous action statute even though not the lawyer making 
the factual misstatements to the court, if that lawyer “knowingly acquiesces in the active 
misrepresentation of facts by his or her co-counsel to a court, without clarifying that 
misrepresentation to the court.” Shields v. Englewood, 172 Ohio App. 3d 620, 2007 Ohio 3165, 876 
N.E.2d 972 (Montgomery), at para. 67. 
One court has read ORC 2323.51 as permitting the imposition of sanctions against the offending 
attorney’s law firm, because it, as well as the individual attorney, was “counsel of record.” Lewis v. 
Celina Fin. Corp., 101 Ohio App.3d 464, 472, 655 N.E.2d 1333, 1339 (Mercer 1995) (lawyer’s 
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filing of unfounded complaint without adequate investigation can constitute frivolous conduct under 
2323.51; no specific finding of independent wrongdoing by his firm as such). Another has done 
likewise, again without any separate discussion of wrongdoing by the firm. Master v. Chalko, No. 
75973, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2014 (Cuyahoga May 11, 2000) (sanctions imposed on lawyer’s 
firm, as well as lawyer and client). Compare Bowling v. Stafford & Stafford, L.P.A., 2010 Ohio 
2769, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 2312 (Hamilton), and Riley v. Langer, 95 Ohio App.3d 151, 642 
N.E.2d 1 (Hamilton 1994), where the courts affirmed the imposition of sanctions on the law firms  
involved for their “frivolous conduct” in delaying and obstructing proceedings in Bowling and in 
asserting unwarranted legal positions in Riley. 
A government-agency litigant is a “party” subject to sanctions under ORC 2323.51.  Hollon v. 
Hollon, 117 Ohio App.3d 344, 690 N.E.2d 893 (Athens 1996) (county agency). See Ohio Civil 
Rights Comm’n v. Harlett, 132 Ohio App.3d 341, 347 n.2, 724 N.E.2d 1242, 1247 n.2 (Wood 
1999) (dictum; trial court’s imposition of sanctions against state agency under ORC 2323.51 reversed 
on de novo review by court of appeals; “we cannot say that appellants’ pursuit of this case was 
absolutely unwarranted under existing law.”  Id. at 348, 724 N.E.2d at 1247.). Cf. State ex rel. 
Fisher v. Cleveland Trinidad Paving Co., No. 65889, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3757 (Cuyahoga 
Aug. 25, 1994) (state is subject to, not immune from, court’s enforcement of discovery rules). (While 
not expressly addressing the issue, the Supreme Court imposed sanctions under what is now SCt R 
XIV(5)(A) on a county board of revision in Edbow, Inc. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision, 86 
Ohio St.3d 1207, 712 N.E.2d 757 (1999). The government agency-as-party issue does not appear to 
have arisen under the other sanction provision applicable to parties, OH App R 23.) 
A Rule 11/ORC 2323.51 case, in which everyone involved seems to have missed the distinction 
between the two provisions with respect to who may be sanctioned, is  In re Blake, 151 Ohio App.3d 
777, 2003 Ohio 899, 786 N.E.2d 78 (Clark). In Blake, the plaintiff’s grandparents were sanctioned 
for filing a frivolous suit seeking custody of their grandson. The parents initially moved for sanctions 
under OH Civ R 11 but at the hearing sought attorney fees under ORC 2323.51 as well. The court 
awarded attorney fees under the statute. On appeal the grandparents argued that it was unfair to award 
sanctions under the statute because they had no notice of the ORC 2323.51 basis until the date of the 
hearing and had no opportunity to respond. The appellate court rejected this argument, first, because 
the record reflected no objection to the new basis for sanctions and, second, because the grounds for 
sanctions under both the rule and the statutes are similar: 
These standards are not so dissimilar that we will presume that the 
[grandparents] were prejudiced by the consideration of R.C. 2323.51. 
Moreover, they have presented no specific argument as to how they 
were prejudiced. 
Id. at para. 18. Since sanctions under OH Civ R 11 can be awarded only against the offending 
attorney, however, it would appear that the last-minute use of ORC 2323.51, without an opportunity 
to respond, was prejudicial on its face. 
Who may be sanctioned for misconduct - Appellate Rule 23: OH App R 23 is by its terms applicable 
only to the “appellant,” see, e.g., Chiropractic Clinic v. Kutsko, 92 Ohio App.3d 608, 636 N.E.2d 
422 (Cuyahoga 1994). Thus, counsel to the represented party is not subject to sanction under this rule. 
OH App R 23 sanctions may be imposed on an appellant who is proceeding pro se. Siemienkowski v. 
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State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4072 (Cuyahoga) (nonlawyer appellants). 
Who may be sanctioned for misconduct - Supreme Court Practice Rule 14.5(A): Pursuant to the 
language of SCt Prac R 14.5(A), appropriate sanctions may be imposed on “the person who signed 
the appeal or action, a represented party, or both.” In nine of the ten cases applying the Rule to date, 
the sanction has been imposed on the offending attorney or attorneys, or on the party, as the Court 
deemed appropriate. State ex rel. Howard v. Doneghy, 102 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004 Ohio 3207, 810 
N.E.2d 958 (sanctioned appellant was attorney appearing pro se); State ex rel. Howard v. Indus. 
Comm’n, 101 Ohio St.3d 1465, 2004 Ohio 819, 804 N.E.2d 39 (sanctions imposed on 
party-attorney, presumably appearing pro se); State ex rel. Howard v. Zimmerman, 99 Ohio St.3d 
1535, 2003 Ohio 4753, 795 N.E.2d 676 (sanctioned mandamus relator was attorney, presumably 
appearing pro se); State ex rel. Kreps v. Christiansen, 88 Ohio St.3d 313, 725 N.E.2d 663 (2000) 
(sanctioned appellant was attorney appearing pro se); State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson, 86 Ohio 
St.3d 629, 716 N.E.2d 704 (1999) (attorneys); State ex rel. Forsyth v. Brigner, 86 Ohio St.3d 585, 
715 N.E.2d 1164 (1999) (in forma pauperis party); Edbow, Inc. v. Franklin County Bd. of 
Revision, 86 Ohio St.3d 1207, 712 N.E.2d 757 (1999) (party); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Pagac, 80 Ohio St.3d 1451, 686 N.E.2d 524 (1997) (sanctioned movant was disbarred attorney, 
presumably appearing pro se); Smith v. Serva-Portion, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 1504, 679 N.E.2d 5 
(1997) (in forma pauperis party). (In the tenth case, Torrance v. Bealer, 124 Ohio St.3d 1490, 2010 
Ohio 670, 922 N.E.2d 226, the person against whom the sanction was imposed is not specified in the 
entry.) 
Sanctions pursuant to the inherent authority of the courts: There is one other wrinkle in the Ohio 
sanctions scheme that should be mentioned. Above and beyond the statutes and rules dealing with 
frivolous conduct, Ohio subscribes to the view that its courts have inherent power to deal with such 
abuses. A key case is Slabinski v. Servisteel Holding Co., 33 Ohio App.3d 345, 515 N.E.2d 1021 
(Lorain 1986). There, the court of appeals held that the trial court had inherent power to sanction the 
plaintiffs’ attorney for taking an ex parte dismissal of the case without advising the court that there 
was a pending counterclaim by defendants; nor did he advise defendants that the case had been 
dismissed. The trial court found the actions of plaintiffs’ attorney to be an “abuse of process.” The 
trial court granted defendants reasonable attorney fees and expenses, and the court of appeals 
affirmed: 
 Infrequently, but consistently, Ohio courts have relied upon the 
inherent powers of courts to do those things necessary for the 
preservation of judicial powers and processes. These inherent powers 
include the power to prevent abuse committed by counsel upon the 
court’s processes. 
Id. at 346, 515 N.E.2d at 1023. Accord Whitt v. Whitt, 2004 Ohio 5285, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 
4851 (Greene) (affirming imposition of sanctions under inherent power theory based on vexatious, 
bad faith conduct); Haas v. Haas, 2002 Ohio 6375, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6246, at para. 19 
(Miami) (inherent power to award attorney fees against a party who acts “in bad faith, vexatiously, 
wantonly, obdurately, or for oppressive reasons”; inherent power sanctions against party who 
deliberately misrepresented her income at divorce hearing affirmed); Curtis v. Curtis, 140 Ohio 
App.3d 812, 749 N.E.2d 772 (Hamilton 2000) (finding sanctions justified under inherent authority, 
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as well as 2323.51 and statute applicable to this domestic relations matter; remanded for recalculation 
of award based on higher amount supported by evidence of record); State ex rel. Richard v. 
Cuyahoga County Comm’rs, 100 Ohio App.3d 592, 654 N.E.2d 443 (Cuyahoga 1995) (pursuant 
to its inherent powers, court denied prisoner future in forma pauperis status after he had made 63 
previous in forma pauperis filings); see Cincinnati Bd. of Educ. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 
No. C-910803, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 5465 (Hamilton Oct. 18, 1992) (where OH Civ R 37 
sanctions unavailable in absence of motion to compel, trial court nevertheless had inherent authority 
to impose sanctions for discovery abuse consisting of bad-faith misrepresentation in interrogatory 
answers; argument that “the trial court lacked the authority to award sanctions for discovery abuse 
except as specifically provided in the civil rules” expressly rejected, id. at *10). Other sanctions cases 
acknowledge the inherent power of the court to act in such circumstances, but then go on to ground 
the decision on a specific statute or rule. E.g., Lewis v. Celina Fin. Corp., 101 Ohio App.3d 464, 
655 N.E.2d 1333 (Mercer 1995) (OH Civ R 11; ORC 2323.51). But see Drennen v. Heinonen, 146 
Ohio App.3d 214, 765 N.E.2d 915 (Ashtabula 2001), where the appellate court reversed the trial 
court’s award of attorney fees to opposing counsel for counsel’s failure to attend a scheduling 
conference. Emphasizing the absence of any provision in the local rules for imposition of sanctions 
for missing a scheduling conference, the reviewing court held that the trial court had exceeded its 
authority. No mention was made of the court’s inherent authority, other than noting that the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals, in Turner v. Boyrdkdar, No. 75235, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2799 
(Cuyahoga June 17, 1999), had “sympathized with the trial court’s inherent right to control its 
courtroom” but nevertheless reversed fines not provided for in its local rules. 146 Ohio App.3d at 
216, 765 N.E.2d at 916-17. A brief but informative summary of the inherent power doctrine in state 
and federal courts is presented in Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct 
of Civil Litigation, 73 Tex L. Rev. 1805 (1995). The contempt aspect of the courts’ inherent power 
is discussed in sections 3.1:500 and 3.5:400. 
Federal court sanctions: In addition to the applicable state provisions, the Ohio practitioner should 
also be aware of the federal counterparts, Fed R Civ P 11, FRAP 38, 28 USC §§ 1912, 1927, which 
deal with frivolous filings in federal district courts and frivolous appeals in federal appellate courts. 
(See also Fed R Crim P 42.) There are no provisions dealing specifically with frivolous conduct in 
the Sixth Circuit local rules or those of the Ohio federal district courts. For a Sixth Circuit case 
affirming the district court’s invocation of its inherent power to sanction a party for bad-faith 
litigation misconduct, see First Bank v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 
2002); in Red Carpet Studios v. Sater, 465 F.3d 642 (6th Cir. 2006), the court held that appellant’s 
vexatious and harassing conduct was sanctionable under § 1927, the trial court’s inherent authority, 
or both. An informative Sixth Circuit decision granting appellee’s motion for attorneys fees and costs 
under the FRAP 38 frivolous appeal rule is B&H Med., L.L.C. v. ABP Admin., Inc., 526 F.3d 257, 
271 (6th Cir. 2008) (“We generally impose sanctions only in the rare case when an appeal involves 
‘an improper purpose, such as harassment, or delay,’ [citation omitted], or, when, as here, an appeal 
consists of baseless or improperly raised arguments, [citation omitted].”) For the court’s follow-up 
opinion fixing an amount constituting a reasonable sanction, see 534 F.3d 801. In BDT Prods., Inc. v. 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010), the court concluded that §1927 may not be 
invoked to impose sanctions on law firms, as opposed to individual lawyers. 
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Sanctions - The standard employed - Unfounded assertions of fact: One aspect that should be noted 
preliminarily with respect to the applicable standards is the extent to which the various provisions 
permit the imposition of sanctions for frivolous assertions of  fact, as opposed to, or in addition to, law. 
The Supreme Court rule, SCt R XIV(5)(A), expressly includes the well-grounded-in-fact 
requirement: pursuant thereto, an appeal or other action “shall be considered frivolous if it is not 
reasonably well-grounded in fact [or law].” Id. Neither OH Civ R 11 nor OH App 23 makes any 
distinction between law or fact frivolousness; the former refers generally to the need for “good 
ground” to support a document filed, the latter generally to frivolous appeals. See Cominsky v. 
Malner, 2004 Ohio 2202, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 1954 (Lake) (imposing Rule 23 sanctions for 
appeal “not reasonably well grounded in fact, and, therefore, . . . frivolous.” Id. at para. 26.). 
ORC 2323.51 has had a checkered history on this issue. Traditionally limited in this regard to 
unwarranted assertions of law, the provision was amended by the ill-fated Tort Reform Act of 1996 to 
add unfounded factual assertions to the definition of frivolous conduct. That Act was declared 
unconstitutional en toto by the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Sheward v. Ohio Academy of Trial 
Lawyers, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999). In response, the legislature reinstated the 
section as it had existed prior to the 1996 Act. See 2001 S 108, § 1, effective July 6, 2001. A second 
Tort Reform Act was enacted effective April 7, 2005; it added to the “frivolous conduct” definition, in 
language substantively identical to the 1996 Act, unwarranted or unsupported factual contentions. 
See ORC 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(iii) & (iv). Cases applying the 2005 version of 2323.51 include 
Donaldson v. Todd, 174 Ohio App.3d 117, 2007 Ohio 6504, 881 N.E.2d 280 (Franklin) (finding 
appellant’s motion for sanctions under statute demonstrated “arguable merit,” id. at para. 10, 
inasmuch as it called into question whether factual allegations in plaintiff’s petition had any 
“evidentiary support” under subdivision (A)(2)(a)(iii); denial of motion reversed and case remanded 
for hearing). 
Even though not expressly included in the pre-2005 version of the statute, frivolous assertions of fact 
were read in by a number of cases. See, e.g., Springfield Township v. Adams, 2005 Ohio 591, 2005 
Ohio App. LEXIS 613 (Summit) (reversing failure to hold hearing on motion for sanctions having 
arguable merit, based in part on filings having “no basis in law or fact,” id. at para. 19); All Climate 
Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Zee Props., Inc., No. 01 AP-784, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1951 
(Franklin Apr. 25, 2002). See also Jones v. Billingham, 105 Ohio App.3d 8, 12, 663 N.E.2d 657, 
659 (Montgomery 1995) (dictum; under ORC 2323.51 (and OH Civ R 11), a “frivolous claim is a 
claim that is not supported by facts in which the complainant has a good-faith belief, and which is not 
grounded in any legitimate theory of law or argument for future modification of the law”). 
Disagreeing with this reading, the court in Riston v. Butler, 149 Ohio App.3d 390, 2002 Ohio 2308, 
777 N.E.2d 857 (Hamilton), sided with those courts that “have determined that the language of R.C. 
2323.51 ‘does not define frivolous conduct so as to include the assertion of a claim or defense which 
is not well grounded in fact,’ and have refused to read such language into the statute.” Id. at para. 27. 
Accord Tablack v. Wellman, 2006 Ohio 4688, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4609 (Mahoning). Under 
the current version of the Reform Act, this split on the proper reading of the prior language of ORC 
2323.51 will be of academic interest only.  
Sanctions - The standard employed - Civil Rule 11: Ohio Civ R 11 regulates three types of conduct: 
signing pleadings, motions, or other documents that (1) lack good grounds to support them, (2) are 
filed for delay, or (3) contain “scandalous or indecent” material. For a case in which the scandalous or 
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indecent provision was applied, see Jackson v. Bellomy, 2002 Ohio 6495, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 
6279 (Franklin) (post-hearing statement including “inflammatory,” “outrageous,” and totally 
irrelevant discussion about encounter between opposing counsel and police); see also In re Estate of 
Call, 2005 Ohio 1466, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 1420 (Lorain) (affirming trial court’s imposition of 
Rule 11 sanctions on attorney based on presence of “scandalous” matter, as well as on willfully filing 
allegations when he lacked good grounds for doing so). 
Most Rule 11 motions deal with the other two grounds. Thus, the attorney (or pro se litigant) can be 
sanctioned, on an opposing party’s motion or on the court’s own motion, for a “willful” violation of 
the rule; i.e., signing a pleading, motion, or other document for which there is no good ground of 
support, or one filed for purposes of delay. The attorney’s signature constitutes a certificate that the 
lawyer has read the document, that “to the best of the attorney’s . . . knowledge, information, and 
belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.” An oft-cited case 
analyzing the OH Civ R 11 standard is Ceol v. Zion Indus., Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 286, 610 N.E.2d 
1076 (Lorain 1992): 
 An attempt to invoke Civ. R. 11 . . . should be followed by a 
three-step determination. First, the court must consider whether the 
attorney signing the document (1) has read the pleading, (2) harbors 
good grounds to support it to the best of his or her knowledge, and (3) 
did not file it for purposes of delay. If any one of these requirements is 
not satisfied, the next question is whether the violation was “willful” as 
opposed to merely negligent. . . . If so, the court may impose an 
“appropriate action.” Broad discretion is afforded to the determination 
of what, if any, sanction is to be administered. 
Id. at 290, 610 N.E.2d at 1078 (emphasis by the court; ellipses added). Accord Teter v. Rossi, No. 
2002 Ohio 4818, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4883, at para. 19 (Trumbull). Consistent with Ceol, the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals in Alpha Benefits Agency, Inc. v. King Ins. Agency, Inc., 134 
Ohio App.3d 763, 731 N.E.2d 1209 (Cuyahoga 1999), reversed the trial court’s imposition of 
sanctions under OH Civ R 11 where there was nothing to indicate that the lower court had considered 
the Ceol factors before sanctioning appellant’s counsel. 
The application of the first factor, whether the lawyer has read the document he signed, is self-evident. 
(At least one disciplinary decision, Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Flanagan, 77 Ohio St.3d 381, 674 
N.E.2d 681 (1997), pointed out respondent’s failure to comply with the Rule 11 protocol making a 
lawyer’s signature a certification that he has read the document.) Although not stated expressly in the 
Rule, there is also a duty to inform oneself before signing by undertaking an investigation reasonable 
under the circumstances. See, e.g., Lewis v. Celina Fin. Corp., 101 Ohio App.3d 464, 655 N.E.2d 
1333 (Mercer 1995). 
The second concern, whether the lawyer signed a document lacking good grounds to support it, arises 
often. It is important to note that the question is not whether the position asserted is ultimately 
successful, but rather whether based on the lawyer’s “knowledge, information or belief” the lawyer 
believes there are “good grounds to support it.” Ohio Civ R 11. Related is the limitation, discussed 
below, that only willful violations are subject to sanction. Taken together the Rule punishes the 
willful filing of groundless positions while leaving room for lawyers to develop the facts, present 
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novel theories and otherwise advance their clients’ interests. Two cases help illustrate this balance. 
In CWP Ltd. P’ship v. Vitrano, 96 Ohio Misc.2d 37, 708 N.E.2d 1091 (C.P. Cuyahoga 1998), the 
court held that “[a]ttorneys should not be placed in peril simply because they are unsuccessful in 
attempting to fashion a legal remedy or because an appeal which they prosecute falls by the wayside.” 
 The type of conduct contemplated under Civ. R. 11 and R.C. 
2323.51 for which sanctions would be appropriate would include 










 None of these adjectives is appropriate to describe the failed 
efforts of CWP or its attorneys to obtain a judgment against the 
Vitranos in Cuyahoga County. 
Id. at 43, 708 N.E.2d at 1095. 
In an unusual invocation of OH Civ R 11, plaintiffs in Marsalis v. Wilson, 149 Ohio App.3d 637, 
2002 Ohio 5534, 778 N.E.2d 612 (Champaign), argued that they could not file their action for 
breach of fiduciary duty against corporate directors and officers without risking OH Civ R 11 
sanctions, unless they were allowed to obtain discovery of the information they sought in order to 
rebut the presumption of the business-judgment rule. Unpersuaded, the appellate court in an 
instructive opinion noted that “[p]laintiffs’ argument confuses pleading and proof,” id. at para. 15, 
and that they are not obligated to plead operative facts that would rebut the presumption in their 
complaint. The court went on to hold that, although plaintiffs’ Rule 11 concerns were not thereby 
completely resolved, the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs possessed sufficient information to file 
their complaint “would collaterally estop a Civ. R. 11 claim to the contrary on the same issue in a 
subsequent proceeding between these same parties.” Id. at para. 18. 
One caveat should be noted. Although Ohio Civ R 11 is addressed to the signing of documents, the 
signing lawyer’s responsibility for such documents is a continuing one. If an assertion, properly made 
at the time of signing, becomes improper because the lawyer later learns the assertion is, in fact, 
groundless, the lawyer will be found in violation of Rule 11 if the lawyer continues to pursue the 
groundless point.  Taylor v. Franklin Blvd. Nursing Home, Inc., 112 Ohio App.3d 27, 677 N.E.2d 
1212 (Cuyahoga 1996) (willful violation shown where lawyer continued “to pursue the action 
despite plaintiff’s own acknowledgment [at her deposition] that she had no claim.”  Id. at 32, 677 
N.E.2d at 1215). See Stafford v. Columbus Bonding Ctr., 177 Ohio App.3d 799, 2008 Ohio 3948, 
896 N.E.2d 191 (Franklin) (rejecting appellant’s argument that a plaintiff “may assert claims past 
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their statutes of limitations in hopes that the defendant will fail to raise the affirmative defense,” 
because “appellant’s further pursuance of those claims after the point of [defendant’s] filing of its 
answer [raising the limitations defense] was, as found by the trial court, a violation of Civ. R. 11 and 
R.C. 2323.51.” Id. at para. 13.). Similar misconduct was a basis for sanctioning a lawyer in the case 
of Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. King, 95 Ohio St.3d 93, 766 N.E.2d 131 (2002), where one of 
the numerous violations of probation by a previously disciplined attorney consisted of his being 
sanctioned under OH Civ R 11 “for frivolous behavior in continuing to pursue an action despite his 
client’s own acknowledgment that she had no claim.”  Id. at 93, 766 N.E.2d at 132. 
The third factor is whether the signed document was filed for purposes of delay. Although delay is 
rarely invoked as an independent ground in the cases, one such example is McDonald v. Berry, 84 
Ohio App.3d 6, 8, 616 N.E.2d 248, 249 (Cuyahoga 1992) (sanctioning party under Rule 11 for 
“‘tactics . . . delaying and otherwise prolonging this litigation.’”). While unstated in the Rule, it 
should be limited to instances where the filing is made principally or perhaps even solely for delay. If 
a lawyer files a document for which there is support, it should be allowed even is securing delay is one 
of the factors behind its filing. 
Even if a lawyer violates one of these requirements, sanctions will not be imposed unless the lawyer’s 
violation was “willful.” E.g., Kreger v. Spetka, 2005 Ohio 3868, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 3557 
(Lucas) (imposition of Rule 11 sanctions requires finding that filing was willful; evidence 
established that conduct of pro se plaintiff was merely negligent, not willful). The rule “employs a 
subjective bad-faith standard,” State ex rel. Dreamer v. Mason, 115 Ohio St.3d 190, 2007 Ohio 
4789, 874 N.E.2d 510, at para. 19; it is the lawyer’s actual intent or belief that is relevant to the 
determination of willfulness. Stafford v. Columbus Bonding Ctr., 177 Ohio App.3d 799, 2008 
Ohio 3948, 896 N.E.2d 191 (Franklin); see Brady v. Hickman & Lowder Co., LPA, 2004 Ohio 
4745, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4307 (Cuyahoga) (filing suit under guise of being attorney-in-fact 
under power of attorney, when plaintiff knew power of attorney had been revoked, was willful 
violation of Rule 11); see also Good v. Krohn, 151 Ohio App.3d 832, 2002 Ohio 4001, 786 N.E.2d 
480 (Allen) (in finding that appellee insurance company’s arguments, with respect to whether the 
policy contained an uninsured motorist’s form, incorrectly stated the “true contents of the policy,” id. 
at para. 13, the court reversed and recommended that, on remand, “the trial court may wish to 
consider whether Civ. R. 11 sanctions are appropriate.”: 
The propriety of Lumbermen’s representations is questionable and 
raises grave concerns as to whether its conduct before this court and the 
trial court constitutes a deliberate, malicious, bad-faith attempt to 
mislead the judiciary and opposing party or merely a fortuitous 
incident of inadvertent neglect. 
Id. at para. 14. 
Sanctions - The standard employed - Civil Rule 11 - Violation found: Violations of Ohio Civ R 11 
are not uncommon. Numerous cases involve signing a document in the face of known facts that 
clearly demonstrate the assertion is groundless. For example, in Beechler v. Peterman, 2001 Ohio 
4064, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4922 (Franklin Nov. 6, 2001), attorney Elsass asserted on behalf of 
his client Beechler a legal-malpractice claim against attorney Peterman after having entered into an 
agreement with Peterman to settle the claim. Affirming the imposition of OH Civ R 11 sanctions, the 
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court of appeals reiterated the magistrate’s findings 
that there was clear and convincing evidence that Elsass “had no 
justiciable basis to file the claim for legal malpractice against Ms. 
Peterman since he and his client had accepted a settlement and received 
payment as to such settlement.” The magistrate further found that 
“there is no legal or equitable basis to place an endorsement upon a 
check of ‘deposit on damages * * *,’ which was intended to represent 
full settlement of a claim, and then to further maintain an action of 
malpractice on the claim.” 
Id. at *9-10. In Jones v. Records Deposition Service, 2002 Ohio 2269, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 
2295 (Lucas), attorney Rogers was sanctioned under OH Civ R 11 for filing an action challenging on 
behalf of his client subpoenas the reporting firm had served in the underlying action to obtain the 
client’s medical records. Rogers claimed the subpoenas were invalid and that the disclosure invaded 
his client’s privacy. The problem with this position was that his client had previously signed a release 
permitting her employer’s attorney access to her medical records. The court of appeals rejected 
Rogers’ argument that he had sufficient grounds for filing the suit: 
[W]e find that Rogers did not have sufficient facts to justify filing this 
action. Rogers knew that there had been a waiver of Jones’ 
confidentiality rights and that he failed to challenge the subpoenas in 
the underlying civil action to prevent improper disclosure of her 
records. 
Id. at para. 15. Another example is Rust v. Harris-Gordon, 2004 Ohio 1636, 2004 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 1470 (Lucas), where the plaintiff attorney , having previously litigated and lost his “charging 
lien” theory against a third party, nevertheless filed suit on the same theory against yet another third 
party. Since the previous litigation had “already established that no such lien existed, meaning that no 
third party could be held responsible for any agreement between Rust and [his former client],” id. at 
para. 41, and “[d]espite being informed that his claim against Mickel was not viable, he continued to 
pursue it. In our view, whether through ignorance or petulance, Rust’s actions constitute a willful 
filing of a claim without legal authority to support it,” id. at para. 43; the trial court’s imposition of 
sanctions under Rule 11 was therefore affirmed. (With respect, the pairing of “ignorance” with 
“willful” conduct seems a bit of a nonsequitur; perhaps the court intended “obstinence.”). Appellant 
continued to throw good money after bad: his unsuccessful appeal of the trial court’s Rule 11 
sanctions resulted in Ohio App R 23 sanctions, because the appeal as to appellee Mikel raised no 
reasonable question for review and was frivolous. 
As stated above, only willful violations are subject to sanction. Determining whether the lawyer’s 
actions were, in fact, willful often turns on an analysis of the surrounding circumstances. Sometimes, 
as where a lawyer acts in the face of clear evidence that his assertions are groundless, a court may, as 
in Rust above, infer willfulness from that act alone, but often other factors are relied upon as well. For 
example, in the Jones case, cited above, the court further found that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding the violation willful, given the existence of evidence of Rogers’ “personal 
animus” against the reporting service based on a prior incident. See also Haney v. Trout, Nos. 
00AP-1448, 00 AP-1457, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 501 (Franklin Feb. 12, 2002) (post-judgment 
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motions containing reckless allegations of “criminal activity, civil fraud and professional 
misconduct,’” as well as other “bizarre legal arguments,” were filed without good grounds and 
constituted “willful” violation of OH Civ R 11; neither law nor facts supported the filings, as a 
reasonable investigation would have disclosed. Id. at *15-16). 
Sanctions - The standard employed - Civil Rule 11 - Violation not found: In Nationsrent v. Michael 
Constr. Co., 2002 Ohio 1380; 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1388 (Summit Mar. 27, 2002), the court of 
appeals reversed the imposition of sanctions under OH Civ R 11 (and ORC 2323.51) on plaintiff and 
its attorney for suing the defendant to obtain payment for rental of a bulldozer. The court held that the 
lawyer had plausible grounds for doing so, given that defendant had an account with plaintiff (which 
defendant had falsely denied), the bulldozer was used during the rental period at the defendant’s 
construction site, and the individual renting the bulldozer represented that he was authorized to do so 
(although in fact he was apparently not so authorized). As the court noted, “[a] simple denial by 
Appellee [defendant] was insufficient to convert Appellant’s original belief that Appellee was 
responsible for the rental into a groundless complaint, especially when one considers Appellee 
previously lied about its [account] relationship with Appellant.” Id. at *7. 
A more recent case in which Rule 11 monetary sanctions were reversed is Bowersmith v. United 
Parcel Service, Inc., 166 Ohio App.3d 22, 2006 Ohio 1417, 848 N.E.2d 919 (Union). Plaintiffs 
argued that Shank, the lawyer for UPS, had violated Rule 11 by filing a 12(B)(6) motion for dismissal 
that was not grounded on applicable law and that ignored a 1996 amendment to the Carmack 
Amendment, 49 USC § 14706. Shank had asserted that the Carmack Amendment preempts state law 
claims, such as the negligence and breach of contract claims advanced by plaintiffs. The 1996 
amendments did not affect Shank’s preemption arguments, which remained good law. E.g., Coughlin 
v. United Van Lines, Inc., 362 F. Supp.2d 1166 (C.D. Cal 2005) (breach of contract and negligence 
claims preempted, citing the same U.S. Supreme Court precedents relied on by Shank). Apparently, 
neither the plaintiffs nor the trial court ever got this straight; as the appellate court noted, “[n]ot only 
was Shank’s argument made in good faith, it was correct,” and appellees’ argument was “the closest 
thing to frivolity in this case.” Id. at paras. 14, 9. 
Sanctions under OH Civ R 11 have also been reversed where: 
 the conduct was not willful, Riston v. Butler, 149 Ohio App.3d 390, 2002 Ohio 2308, 777 
N.E.2d 857 (Hamilton) (despite unresolved questions at time complaint filed, lawyer’s 
subjective reasons for doing so were more than adequate); 
 the facts at the time of filing were unclear and the lawyer erred in favor of the client, Burns v. 
Henne, 115 Ohio App.3d 297, 685 N.E.2d 294 (Miami 1996) (lawyer asserting fraud 
against realty company sanctioned by trial court for including, in trial court’s words, 
“allegations . . . which he knew to be false”; according to appellate court, at time of filing of 
complaint, unclear which of two realty companies (or both acting in concert) may have 
presented “bogus” furnace-inspection report and thereby “duped” closing agent; “[t]hus, to 
guarantee protection of his clients’ interests, Pelaez properly named both real estate 
companies in the complaint.”  Id. at 304, 685 N.E.2d at 299); 
 the lawyer reasonably relied on his client’s factual representations – such “does not constitute 
bad faith” moreover, his “failure to research his claim, his unawareness of the law, and his 
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collection of only inapplicable, out-of-state case law appears to rest in negligence rather than 
willfulness.” Kozar v. Bio-Medical Applications of Ohio, Inc., 2004 Ohio 4963, 2004 
Ohio App. LEXIS 4516, at para. 12 (Summit) (affirming trial court’s denial of Rule 11 
sanctions); 
 legitimate legal arguments existed for the position advanced, Harmon v. Adams, 2002 Ohio 
2103, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 2048 (Union) (claim barred by res judicata, but “we cannot 
say that there were no legitimate arguments of law supporting Appellant’s action on their 
contention that res judicata did not bar their claims,” id. at para. 2); particularly is this so 
when the issue concerns a newly enacted statute, Carr v. Riddle, 136 Ohio App.3d 700, 737 
N.E.2d 976 (Cuyahoga 2000) (assertions made under new statute, uninterpreted by any 
appellate rulings, were not violative of OH Civ R 11, even if court rejects position asserted); 
and 
 assertion of a claim that arguably would be lost if not advanced as a compulsory counterclaim, 
Lable & Co. v. Flowers, 104 Ohio App.3d 227, 661 N.E.2d 782 (Lorain 1995) (asserting 
racial discrimination counterclaim in forcible entry and detainer action violated neither OH 
Civ R 11 nor ORC 2323.51, inasmuch as defendant’s attorney had good grounds for doing so 
and legitimate argument could be made that counterclaim was compulsory). 
Sanctions - The standard employed - Revised Code 2323.51: Under ORC 2323.51, “frivolous 
conduct” in a civil action is sanctionable; conduct is frivolous if (italicized language added by 2005 
amendments): 
 (i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure 
another party to the civil action or appeal or is for another improper 
purpose, including, but not limited to, causing unnecessary delay or a 
needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
 (ii) It is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported 
by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, or cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the 
establishment of new law. 
 (iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual 
contentions that have no evidentiary support, or, if specifically so 
identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery. 
 (iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that 
are not warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are 
not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 
ORC 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i)-(iv).   
Harassment or malicious injury - 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i): The inquiry in Ohio cases decided under the 
first prong of ORC 2323.51(A)(2)(a) -- actions intended to harass or maliciously injure -- is a factual 
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one, and appellate courts regularly treat the trial court’s findings on this issue with deference. E.g., 
Burrell v. Kassicieh, 128 Ohio App.3d 226, 714 N.E.2d 442 (Seneca 1998). (As opposed to the 
second prong -- whether the action is warranted by law or a good faith extension of existing law -- 
which in more recent decisions is treated as a question of law that the appellate court reviews de novo. 
E.g., Riston v. Butler, 149 Ohio App.3d 390, 2002 Ohio 2308, 777 N.E.2d 857 (Hamilton), 
discussed below.) At least on its face, the (a)(i) standard is a high one. To prove a violation it must be 
shown that the action taken “obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party.” 
(Emphasis added.) Thus it appears that the conduct must clearly be for a singular purpose - “merely” 
to harass or to maliciously injure. 
The harassment/malicious injury cases under ORC 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i) include: Wheeler v. Best 
Employee Fed. Credit Union, 2009 Ohio 2139, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1831 (Cuyahoga) 
(reversing sanctions award premised, inter alia, on plaintiff’s taking a voluntary dismissal under Rule 
41(A) with jury in courtroom but not yet empanelled and out-of-state witnesses for defendant present; 
exercising “absolute” right to one dismissal under 41(A)(1) “cannot be properly considered ‘frivolous 
conduct’ pursuant to R.C. 2323.51.” Id.  at para. 43.); Neubauer v. Ohio Remcon, Inc., 2006 Ohio 
1481, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 1335 (Franklin) (affirming award of sanctions where “appellant 
refused to dismiss a groundless complaint in order to harass or maliciously injure appellee.” Id. at 
para. 45); Nationsrent v. Michael Constr. Co., 2002 Ohio 1380; 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1388 
(Summit Mar. 27, 2002) (reversing award of sanctions under ORC 2323.51 where there is “a 
complete absence of any evidence that Appellant’s actions served merely to harass or maliciously 
injure Appellee.” Id. at *3); Master v. Chalko, No. 75973, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2014 (Ohio 
App. Cuyahoga May 11, 2000) (sanction award affirmed; record “replete with evidence of malice” 
and reveals “overwhelming evidence that the appellants pursued litigation against the appellee in an 
abusive and vexatious manner. This is precisely the type of lawsuit for which the award of attorney 
fees under R.C. 2323.51 is designed.” Id. at *9.); Evans v. Bossin, 107 Ohio App.3d 544, 669 
N.E.2d 87 (Hamilton 1995) (sanction award affirmed; plaintiff’s defamation action based on 
subjective belief, without any personal knowledge by plaintiff of the facts alleged; 
abuse-of-discretion standard of review employed; “we cannot say that the trial court abused its 
discretion in determining that there were no good grounds to assert any claim against Bossin for 
defamation, and that appellant’s claim against Bossin was intended to harass and maliciously injure 
her.”  Id. at 546, 669 N.E.2d at 88); Masturzo v. Revere Rd. Synagogue, 98 Ohio App.3d 347, 648 
N.E.2d 582 (Summit 1994) (naming of appellee as defendant in third-party complaint based on 
questionable information and then refusing to dismiss when presented with clear evidence that 
appellee was not proper party constituted “sufficient credible evidence on which the trial court could 
find that appellant and its attorney engaged in frivolous conduct pursuant to R.C. 2523.51(A)(2)(a) 
[sic 2323.51(A)(2)(a), now ORC 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i)].”  Id. at 353, 648 N.E.2d at 586).  
This subdivision also applies to conduct undertaken for any other “improper purpose,” including 
causing unnecessary delay or needlessly increasing the cost of litigation. It is unclear whether the 
“obviously” and “merely” limitations apply to the “another improper purpose” portion of the 
subsection as well. 
Legally groundless conduct - 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(ii): One of the more thoughtful cases decided under 
ORC 2323.51 is the decision of the First District Court of Appeals (Painter, J.) in Riston v. Butler, 
149 Ohio App.3d 390, 2002 Ohio 2308, 777 N.E.2d 857 (Hamilton). In Riston, the defendants 
787
Ohio Legal Ethics 3.1 
  
sought ORC 2323.51 sanctions against plaintiffs’ lawyer and his law firm for filing a complaint that 
defendants claimed was frivolous. In a careful opinion, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s 
imposition of sanctions against the lawyer and the firm. 
At issue in Riston was whether the conduct was legally groundless under ORC 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(ii). 
Finding that this issue presents a question of law reviewable de novo (accord, e.g., State Farm Ins. 
Co. v. Peda, 2005 Ohio 3405, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 3152 (Lake) and overruling its prior 
opinions to the contrary, the court concluded that there was no violation of the rule. Using an 
objective standard (accord, e.g., Stafford v. Columbus Bonding Ctr., 177 Ohio App.3d 799, 2008 
Ohio 3948, 896 N.E.2d 191 (Franklin)), the Riston court found that the filing of the complaint was 
not legally groundless: 
B. A Legally Groundless Claim Does Not Mean A Claim Not Well 
Grounded In Fact 
* * * * 
“The test, we find, is whether no reasonable lawyer would have 
brought the action in light of the existing law. In other words, a claim is 
frivolous if it is absolutely clear under the existing law that no 
reasonable lawyer could argue the claim.” [quoting from Hickman v. 
Murray, No. CA 15030, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1028 
(Montgomery Mar. 22, 1996), at *14.] 
C. Frivolous Conduct Under the Legally Groundless Prong Means No 
Reasonable Lawyer Would Assert The Claim 
 Thus, we are not determining whether the complaint in this case 
was well grounded in fact. We are determining whether it was 
absolutely clear that no reasonable attorney would have alleged that 
Menke [the landlord] was negligent for injuries to the Riston children 
or had breached the warranty of habitability based on the client’s 
representation of residency and the evidence the firm possessed. It is 
not frivolous conduct for an attorney to reasonably rely on the 
representations of his or her client. . . . Reliance on a client’s 
representations after the client is warned about the need for accuracy 
and the client reviews the complaint to verify its accuracy, even where 
there is contradictory documentary evidence available, is not 
necessarily unreasonable. 
* * * * 
 . . . We cannot say that it was absolutely clear that under 
existing law no reasonable attorney could have pursued the claim. 
Riston, 149 Ohio App.3d 390, 2002 Ohio 2308, 777 N.E.2d 857, at paras. 30, 31, 33 (footnotes 
omitted). A similar test is set forth in 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 110 
cmt. d, at 172 (2000): “A frivolous position is one that a lawyer of ordinary competence would 
recognize as so lacking in merit that there is no substantial possibility that the tribunal would accept 
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it.” 
In Elsass v. Frank, 2002 Ohio 2947, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 2803 (Delaware), the court, affirming 
sanctions of attorney fees and costs, noted that the trial court had properly held a hearing pursuant to 
ORC 2323.51(B)(2) at which the trial court found that 
“the Plaintiff’s [Elsass’s] conduct was frivolous in pursuing this 
lawsuit after signing a release and settling disputes with the Defendant. 
Certainly, the Defendant was adversely affected by the time and 
emotions expended in defending the suit after understanding that the 
matter was closed and having to engage counsel and incur substantial 
fees.” 
 The trial court went on to state “[i]f any case cries out for 
sanctions for frivolous conduct, this case does.” 
Id. at paras. 47-48. See also Rosser v. Terminix Int’l Co., 143 Ohio App.3d 157, 757 N.E.2d 820 
(Hamilton 2001) (attempt to relitigate mandatory arbitration issue violated ORC 2323.51; “because 
the Rossers have frivolously attempted to circumvent the arbitration process without a good faith 
argument that would alter established law and the persuasive authority of their own [prior] appealed 
case, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of sanctions.”  Id. at 160, 757 N.E.2d at 823). And in Ceol 
v. Zion Indus., Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 286, 610 N.E.2d 1076 (Lorain 1992), the court of appeals 
reversed the lower court’s holding that misinterpretation of the state of existing law does not 
constitute frivolous conduct and sent the case back for reconsideration of an award of attorney fees 
under ORC 2323.51. “The trial court erred, as a matter of law, by treating ignorance as an exception 
to R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(b) [now ORC 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(ii)].”  Id. at 293, 610 N.E.2d at 1080. (While 
the court found that the attorney for Ceol had engaged in frivolous conduct throughout the 
proceedings below, one of the examples given was that “[t]he complaint he signed contains numerous 
mistakes including references to Zion Industries as ‘Pewter Mug’ and Scott Ceol as ‘her.’”  Id. at 292, 
610 N.E.2d at 1079. Surely mistakes of this sort should not be sanctionable as frivolous conduct 
under ORC 2323.51 or any other rule.) Accord, on the ignorance of the law point, Kozar v. 
Bio-Medical Applications, 2004 Ohio 4963, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4516 (Summit) (“As a matter 
of law, an attorney’s ignorance of the law or failure to investigate the law is not deemed objectively 
reasonable,” citing Ceol). 
Bringing suit under a nonexistent statute has been held to violate ORC 2323.51. See Seminatore v. 
Climaco, Climaco, Seminatore, Lefkowitz & Garofoli, 148 Ohio App.3d 613, 2002 Ohio 3892, 
774 N.E.2d 1233 (Cuyahoga), where appellant’s assignment of error directed to the trial court’s 
imposition of sanctions against him was summarily overruled by the court of appeals, because 
appellant failed to provide either a transcript of proceedings or an OH App R 9 statement with 
respect to the sanctions hearing. The opinion of Judge Karpinski, dissenting in part (but not on the 
sanctions issue), provides more detail concerning what occurred in the trial court: 
In his complaint [filed on November 15, 1999], appellant . . . made a 
fraud claim under R.C. 1777.99, which was repealed on July 1, 1996. 
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 Despite the fact that the . . . statute embodied in R.C. 1777.99 
had been repealed, appellant filed a motion for summary judgment on 
that claim. Appellees opposed the motion and simultaneously filed a 
motion for sanctions, in which they argued that appellant should be 
sanctioned, pursuant to R.C. 2323.51, for filing a claim that no longer 
existed under Ohio law. The trial court denied appellant’s motion for 
summary judgment and granted appellees’ motion for sanctions. 
Following a sanctions hearing, the court granted sanctions against 
appellant in the amount of $ 1,732.50 . . . . 
Id. at paras. 42-43. 
In contrast, an award of sanctions under ORC 2323.51 was reversed where the court found that 
legal grounds did exist for Appellant’s complaint, and it therefore 
follows that the claim was warranted under existing law. Accordingly, 
there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that 
Appellant’s claim constituted frivolous conduct under the second 
prong of R.C. 2323.51 [unwarranted by law]. 
Nationsrent v. Michael Constr. Co., 2002 Ohio 1380, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1388, at *10 
(Summit Mar. 27, 2002). Accord Harmon v. Adams, 2002 Ohio 2103, Ohio App. LEXIS 2048 
(Union) (claim that suit not barred by res judicata supported by arguable extension of cited 
authority). 
Unsupported or unwarranted factual contentions or denials - 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(iii) & (iv): In 
addressing unwarranted factual assertions, the statute seems to apply different standards for 
“allegations or other factual contentions” (presumably all contentions involved in advancing a claim) 
and “denials or factual contentions” (presumably all contentions involved in defending a claim). In 
the former situation, sanctions apply if a party makes allegations or other factual contentions that (1) 
“have no evidentiary support” (emphasis added) or (2) specifically identify the matter as one where 
the necessary factual support is “likely” to come after a reasonable opportunity for discovery, but in 
fact it is not “likely.” In the latter situation, sanctions apply if a party makes denials or other factual 
contentions that are (1) not warranted by the evidence (emphasis added) or (2) specifically identify 
the matter as one where the response is made on “information and belief,” but that assertion is 
unreasonable. 
Whether these seemingly fine distinctions make a difference is unclear, for there is only one case 
touching on the issue, under either these 2005 provisions or the virtually identical provisions in the 
short-lived 1996 Tort Reform Act. That case seized on the “factual contentions that are not warranted 
by the evidence” language of subpart (iv); there was no discussion of the test set forth in subpart (iii). 
See Shields v. Englewood, 172 Ohio App.3d 620, 2007 Ohio 3165, 876 N.E.2d 972 
(Montgomery). A further hint as to how they may be read can perhaps be gleaned from those few 
cases, primarily from the Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County), that read “frivolous 
conduct” as including unsupported factual assertions, even though the statute at that time did not 
expressly include such within the statutory definition. See All Climate Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. 
Zee Props., Inc., No. 01 AP-784, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1951 (Franklin Apr. 25, 2002); Crooks 
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v. Consol. Stores Corp., No. 98 AP-83, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 350 (Franklin Feb. 4, 1999); 
Jones v. Billingham, 105 Ohio App.3d 8, 663 N.E.2d 657 (Montgomery 1995); Rossman & Co. v. 
Donaldson, No. 94 APE03-388, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5535 (Franklin Dec. 6, 1994). These 
cases talk in terms of claims unsubstantiated by evidence and failure to make a reasonable 
investigation of the facts, as well as the law, as constituting frivolous conduct violative of ORC 
2323.51. 
Sanctions - The standard employed - Appellate Rule 23: Under OH App R 23, the inquiry is whether 
the appeal is “frivolous”; if the court of appeals determines that it is, “the appellant” (not appellant’s 
counsel) may be sanctioned. See Contel Credit Corp. v. Rosenblatt, 43 Ohio App.3d 113, 539 
N.E.2d 708 (Cuyahoga 1988) (appeal summarily rejected for noncompliance with OH App R 12(A); 
court sua sponte imposed sanctions on appellant under OH App R 23). The case law has determined 
that an appeal is “frivolous” in the OH App R 23 sense if the appeal presents no reasonable question 
for review. See, e.g., Siemienkowski v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 Ohio 4122, 2006 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 4072 (Cuyahoga), imposing Rule 23 sanctions sua sponte, noting the inherent power of court 
to do so. After being sanctioned $30,000 under ORC 2323.51 in prior litigation for frivolous conduct 
appellants “proceeded to instigate additional meritless litigation in the instant case,” id. at para. 8, 
consisting of the claim that the defendant should reimburse these costs under their homeowners 
insurance policy(!) Undaunted, after the trial court “summarily” granted summary judgment to State 
Farm, the plaintiffs appealed. In the words of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, “[a]ppellants need 
to take a step back and stop making a mockery of the American civil justice system.” Id. at para. 9. 
Likewise, in Mitchell v. Backer, 135 Ohio App.3d 775, 735 N.E.2d 919 (Hamilton 1999), the court 
sua sponte found that, after two prior appeals raising the same issue, appellant’s third effort was 
frivolous: 
[W]e can only conclude that Backer is refusing to understand or to 
accept the determination that the contract was valid, and that he is 
merely rehashing arguments that we have rejected in earlier cases. This 
is now the third appearance of this case in this court -- all on the same 
issue. While Backer may not like our rulings, he may not continue 
appeals that present no reasonable question to review. 
Id. at 777, 735 N.E.2d at 921. Accord Rust v. Harris-Gordon, 2004 Ohio 1636, 2004 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 1470 (Lucas) (granting motion for Rule 23 sanctions; ‘[w]e have already granted sanctions 
against appellant for similar actions once before in a related case. . . . Rust files materials based solely 
on what he wishes the law were, rather than on what the law is.” Id. at para. 55.). 
As the Sixth District Court of Appeals put it in denying sanctions in Franklin Park 
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 73 Ohio App.3d 452, 597 N.E.2d 1120 
(Lucas 1991), sanctions under OH App R 23 are allowed only when the right thereto is unquestioned 
and there is no semblance of a defense. See Kassmakis v. Dasani, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 5898 
(Lucas) (sanctions motion denied where appellant, though unsuccessful, raised argument supported 
by case law). 
Another appellate court sanction case worthy of note is Starks v. Choice Hotels Int’l, 175 Ohio 
App.3d 510, 2007 Ohio 1019, 887 N.E.2d 1244 (Hamilton). In Starks, the plaintiff motel guest, 
who overslept and missed the check-out deadline, sued the motel franchisors (but not the franchisee) 
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to recover his $46 daily rate together with $750,000 in damages, and, in the words of the court, “free 
lodging for life (at the Econo Lodge!) . . . .” Id. at para. 5. On various grounds (lack of personal 
jurisdiction, improper venue, wrong defendants), the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
dismissal of the suit. Finding the suit frivolous (“we know one when we see one,” id. at para. 1), the 
First District Court of Appeals, through Judge Painter, took a somewhat unusual approach in 
imposing sanctions. Instead of invoking Rule 23, it granted each appellee a judgment in the amount 
of $1,250 under ORC 2505.35 which permits the imposition of such amount unless there is 
reasonable cause for the appeal.  The court’s reason for doing so was that 
 [t]hough the fees [incurred defending the baseless lawsuit and 
appeal] are undoubtedly more, we use the statute rather than App.R. 23 
so that no more time will be spent by counsel in preparing fee affidavits. 
But if counsel would like to submit those affidavits, we will certainly 
consider granting any reasonable fees. 
Id. at para. 17. Accord Hamrick v. Wellman Prods. Group, 2004 Ohio 5477, 2004 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 4694 (Medina) (citing Rule 23 authority to impose sanctions for frivolous appeal, but 
imposing same “[i]n accordance with R.C. 2503.35” id. at para. 46). 
Sanctions - The standard employed - Supreme Court Practice Rule 14.5(A): SCt Prac R 14.5(A) can 
be invoked, by a party on motion or by the Court sua sponte, if “an appeal or other action is frivolous 
or is prosecuted for delay, harassment, or any other improper purpose . . . .” An appeal or other action 
“shall be considered frivolous if it is not reasonably well-grounded in fact or warranted by existing 
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Id. 
Sanctions have been entered under what is now SCt R 14.5(A) in ten cases; two are particularly 
worthy of note. The first, State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson, 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 716 N.E.2d 704 
(1999), was a mandamus action in which one of the relators (a state representative) challenged the 
validity of an appropriations bill (it failed to provide funding for an airport in the relator’s district) on 
the ground, inter alia, that the General Assembly had not followed its own rules in passing the bill. 
Citing well-established authority that the legislature’s rules and its adherence or nonadherence to 
same are the exclusive province of the legislature (“it is well settled that, in considering the validity of 
a statute, courts will not inquire into whether the legislature complied with its own rules in enacting 
the statute, as long as no constitutional provision is violated,”  id. at 633, 716 N.E.2d at 708), the 
Supreme Court found the action frivolous and imposed sanctions on relators’ two attorneys (one of 
whom was relator’s husband; both attorneys were also relators). The Court also found that harassment 
was the only apparent rationale for another allegation -- that the actions of the chairman of the joint 
committee on the bill were criminal and constituted the offenses of retaliation, intimidation, and 
coercion. The Court further noted that these same attorneys had only recently filed another meritless 
extraordinary writ case. (The decision awarding fees and expenses is reported at 88 Ohio St.3d 1413, 
723 N.E.2d 119 (2000).) 
Undeterred, the lawyers then filed a federal action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction to 
the effect that what is now SCt Prac R 14.5(A) was unconstitutional on its face; while the Sixth 
Circuit rejected the claim on Article III standing grounds, the federal court left no doubt that it had 
little sympathy for the claimant’s arguments, either on the merits before the Ohio Supreme Court or 
before the Sixth Circuit on their claim of unconstitutionality. See Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court, 
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252 F.3d 828, 831, 838 (6th Cir. 2001). 
In the second noteworthy 14.5(A) sanction case, State ex rel. Kreps v. Christiansen, 88 Ohio St.3d 
313, 725 N.E.2d 663 (2000), the Court found that the appeal of a denial of claims for extraordinary 
relief against four Ohio judges (which claims raised issues that should have been pursued by appeal 
rather than by extraordinary writ) was frivolous, in that it lacked any reasonably well-grounded basis 
in fact or existing law, or in any good-faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law. The Supreme Court imposed sanctions against the appellant, appearing pro se, for this 
conduct, even though the appellee judges had not requested them. 
The other Rule 14.5(A) sanction decisions are Torrance v. Bealer, 124 Ohio St.3d 1490, 2010 Ohio 
670, 922 N.E.2d 226 (frivolous mandamus action); State ex rel. Howard v. Doneghy, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 355, 2004 Ohio 3207, 810 N.E.2d 958 (appeal found frivolous); State ex rel. Howard v. 
Indus. Comm’n, 101 Ohio St.3d 1465, 2004 Ohio 819, 804 N.E.2d 39 (appeal; sanctions imposed; 
misconduct not specified); State ex rel. Howard v. Zimmerman, 99 Ohio St.3d 1535, 2003 Ohio 
4753, 795 N.E.2d 676 (mandamus action found frivolous); State ex rel. Forsyth v. Brigner, 86 
Ohio St.3d 585, 715 N.E.2d 1164 (1999) (appeal found frivolous); Edbow, Inc. v. Franklin County 
Bd. of Revision, 86 Ohio St.3d 1207, 712 N.E.2d 757 (1999) (appeal found frivolous); Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Pagac, 80 Ohio St.3d 1451, 686 N.E.2d 524 (1997) (motion found 
frivolous); Smith v. Serva-Portion, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 1504, 679 N.E.2d 5 (1997) (appeals found 
frivolous). See also, Rust v. Harris-Gordon, 103 Ohio St.3d 1431, 2004 Ohio 4620, 814 N.E.2d 
493 (granting motion for sanctions for frivolous action; Rule XIV(5)(A) (the identical predecessor to 
Rule 14.5(A)) not cited). 
Sanctions - The remedies available: The standard remedy is attorney fees, but each of the provisions 
also authorizes a broader range of sanctions. 
Sanctions - The remedies available - Civil Rule 11: Under OH Civ R 11, the court may take 
“appropriate action, including an award to the opposing party of expenses and reasonable attorney 
fees incurred in bringing any motion under this rule.” For a typical OH Civ R 11 attorney-fee case, 
see Beechler v. Peterman, 2001 Ohio 4064; 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4922 (Franklin Nov. 6, 2001) 
(sanction of $3,000 in attorney fees imposed; fifteen hours at $200 an hour found reasonable and 
related to attorney’s work on behalf of defendant opposing frivolous legal-malpractice claim). Ohio 
courts have held also that the award of attorney fees as sanctions under OH Civ R 11 (and ORC 
2323.51) can properly include the time spent by a law clerk on the matter. E.g., All Climate Heating 
& Cooling, Inc. v. Zee Props., Inc., No. 01 AP-74, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1951 (Franklin Apr. 
25, 2002). (Note, however, in the context of cases dealing with the question of excessive fees under 
former OH DR 2-106(A), that 
[c]osts of litigation generally do not include secretarial charges or fees 
of paraprofessionals. Those costs are considered to be normal overhead 
subsumed in the percentage fee. 
 . . . If an attorney charges separately for a legal assistant, the 
legal assistant’s hourly charges should be stated and agreed to in 
writing. 
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Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Brooks, 87 Ohio St.3d 344, 345-46, 721 N.E.2d 23, 25 (1999)). See also 
section 1.5:410 at “Expenses and the reasonableness requirement.”) For an OH Civ R 11 case in 
which the “appropriate action” included sanctions in addition to attorney fees and costs, see Haney v. 
Trout, Nos. 00AP-1448, 00 AP-1457, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 501 (Franklin Feb. 12, 2002) 
(affirming, in addition to attorney fees, imposition of sanctions requiring that offending attorney 
attend certain CLE seminars, that he read the Rules of Civil Procedure, and that he file a report with 
the trial court regarding his understanding of those rules). 
While OH Civ R 11 does not speak directly to the question whether a hearing is required on a 
sanctions motion, most cases hold that a trial court should not impose sanctions without first holding 
a hearing. E.g., Rondini v. Seman, 2002 Ohio 6590, Ohio App. LEXIS 6303 (Lake); Millikin v. 
Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., No. 13770, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3692 (Montgomery 
July 22, 1993) (lawyer given no opportunity to show that he did not act willfully; sanctions reversed). 
But see Schwartz v. Gen. Accident Ins., 91 Ohio App.3d 603, 632 N.E.2d 1379 (Hamilton 1993) 
(OH Civ R 11 “does not contain a provision mandating that a hearing be held prior to granting a 
motion for sanctions.”  Id. at 606, 632 N.E.2d at 1381.). Some courts have held more broadly that a 
hearing should be held in any event to allow the presentation of evidence on the violation issue.  
Schnorf v. Klingman, No. L-94-247, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 417 (Lucas Feb. 9, 1996) (hearing 
not held; order denying sanctions reversed and remanded to give movant opportunity to conduct 
discovery prior to hearing); Woodworth v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, No. 95 APE02-219, 1995 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 5424 (Franklin Dec. 7, 1995) (denial of request for hearing by movant reversed; 
“[w]here there exists an arguable basis for an award of sanctions, a trial court must hold a hearing on 
the issue,” id. at 15). Accord Donaldson v. Todd, 174 Ohio App.3d 117, 2007 Ohio 6504, 881 
N.E.2d 280 (Franklin) (hearing required if motion has “arguable merit,” citing, inter alia, 
Woodworth); Mitchell v. W. Reserve Area Agency, 2004 Ohio 4353, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 
3952 (Cuyahoga) (demonstration that sanctions motion had “actual merit” requires hearing). 
No hearing need be held, however, in denying sanctions “where the court has sufficient knowledge of 
the circumstances for the denial of the requested relief and the hearing would be perfunctory, 
meaningless or redundant.” Goff v. Ameritrust Co., Nos. 65196, 66016, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 
1916, at *30 (Cuyahoga May 5, 1994). Accord Seifert v. Polaris Joint Voc. Sch., No. 65840, 1994 
Ohio App. LEXIS 5240, at *9 (Cuyahoga Nov. 23, 1994) (“A trial court may dismiss the motion 
[without a hearing] if it has sufficient knowledge that sanctions under Civ. R. 11 are not appropriate”). 
See Adlaka v. Giannini, 2006 Ohio 4611, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4574 (Mahoning) (no abuse of 
discretion in denying sanctions against attorney-defendant without hearing; although reasonable 
jurist “could” have reprimanded [him] or awarded some minimal expenses to plaintiff, “we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this matter.” Id. at para. 46.). 
An interesting decision holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions 
under OH Civ R 11 without holding a hearing is Jackson v. Bellomy, 2002 Ohio 6495, 2002 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 6279 (Franklin). While recognizing that the normal rule (reflected, inter alia, in its 
own prior decisions) is that a hearing should be held in such circumstances, the court reasoned that 
this case differs substantially from those cases in which we ordered a 
hearing prior to an award of sanctions. The cases we reviewed in the 
past involved a determination of whether a pleading or motion 
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contained a suspect argument of law which may or may not have been 
supported by good grounds based on the signor’s knowledge or 
information and belief. Therefore, investigating the attorney’s 
underlying motive for including a suspect legal argument was 
necessary for a finding of “willfulness” under the rule. 
Id. at para. 75. In this case, however, the language at issue was the final sentence of the rule, 
permitting sanctions “if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.” As the court read this sentence of 
the rule, “no separate finding of willfulness is necessary, if the insertion of such material into a 
pleading or other document has no proper motivation.” Id. at para. 76. [Given the court’s basis of 
distinction, its choice of the final word in the quoted language is unfortunate.] The Jackson court 
found further support for its reading in Riston v. Butler, 149 Ohio App.3d 390, 2002 Ohio 2308, 
777 N.E.2d 857, at para. 9 (Hamilton), stating that a lawyer can be subjected to sanction under the 
rule if “the rule is willfully violated, or if a scandalous or indecent matter as been inserted,” Jackson 
at para. 76 (emphasis added by Jackson court). 
The cases are virtually unanimous in concluding that OH Civ R 11 (and ORC 2323.51) motions, 
which raise issues collateral to and independent of the underlying action, can be entertained by the 
trial court, even if it has lost jurisdiction of the underlying action by way of 
 Appeal of final judgment, Thom’s, Inc. v. Rezzano, Nos. 54541, 54671, 54691, 1988 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 4538 (Cuyahoga Nov. 10, 1988) (court had authority to consider OH Civ R 11 
sanctions motion after final judgment in appealed action); 
 Voluntary dismissal, e.g., Wheeler v. Best Employee Fed. Credit Union, 2009 Ohio 2139, 
2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1831 (Cuyahoga) (ORC 2323.51); Williams v. Thamann, 173 
Ohio App. 426, 2007 Ohio 4320, 878 N.E.2d 1070 (Hamilton) (court retains limited 
jurisdiction to consider sanctions under OH Civ R 11 and ORC 2323.51 after underlying 
action voluntarily dismissed); cf. State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002 
Ohio 3605, 771 N.E.2d 853, at para. 23 (citing with approval decisions so holding, in case 
involving imposition of sanctions under OH Civ R 45(E) after voluntary dismissal); 
or even if it never had jurisdiction of the underlying action in the first place.  Flatinger v. Flatinger, 
2002 Ohio 3781, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3829 (Franklin) (“A contrary conclusion would prevent a 
trial court from sanctioning a litigant who intentionally files actions over which the trial court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction solely for the purpose of harassing the opposing party.” Id. at para. 7.). 
Accord Goff v. Ameritrust Co., Nos. 65196, 66016, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1916, at *25 
(Cuyahoga May 5, 1994) (“Even in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, as in the present case, 
a trial court retains inherent authority to impose Civ. R. 11 sanctions.”). 
Sanctions - The remedies available - Revised Code 2323.51: Under ORC 2323.51, sanctions may 
include the payment “to any party to the civil action who was adversely affected by frivolous 
conduct” of “court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other reasonable expenses incurred in 
connection with the civil action . . . .” ORC 2323.51(B)(1). While under an earlier version of 
2323.51(B)(3), requiring that the fees were “necessitated by the frivolous conduct,” courts held that a 
movant for 2323.51 fees “‘must affirmatively demonstrate that he or she incurred additional 
attorney’s fees as a direct, identifiable result of defending the frivolous conduct in particular.’” 
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Stohlman v. Hall, 158 Ohio App.3d 499, 2004 Ohio 5219, 817 N.E.2d 118, at para. 8 (Cuyahoga) 
(quoting Wiltberger v. Davis, 110 Ohio App.3d 46, 54, 673 N.E.2d 628, 633 (Franklin 1996), the 
proof required to recover attorney fees under the current statutory language (ORC 2323.51(B)(1)) is 
no longer so rigorous: it calls only for proof that the fees were “‘incurred in connection with the civil 
action’ in which the frivolous action had occurred.” Bowling v. Stafford & Stafford, L.P.A., 2010 
Ohio 2769, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 2312 (Hamilton), at para. 14 (drawing this distinction between 
the two versions of the statute and applying the latter). ORC 2323.51 does not, however, authorize an 
award based on stress or lost time, or for “miscellaneous.” Orbit Elecs., Inc. v. Helm Instrument 
Co., 167 Ohio App.3d 301, 2006 Ohio 2317, 855 N.E.2d 91 (Cuyahoga).  
The Supreme Court has expressly held that the “reasonable expenses incurred” may properly include 
the fees incurred in prosecuting a motion for ORC 2323.51 sanctions.  Ron Scheiderer & Assocs. v. 
City of London, 81 Ohio St.3d 94, 689 N.E.2d 552 (1998) (syllabus). But while a court has the 
discretion to include expenses incurred in prosecuting a 2323.51 motion, there is no requirement that 
a court do so. Stohlman supra. Moreover, if the “party adversely affected by frivolous conduct” is a 
pro se litigant, he or she is not entitled to attorney fees -- ORC 2323.51 “provides for attorney fees, 
not compensation for pro se litigants.” State ex rel. Freeman v. Wilkinson, 64 Ohio St.3d 516, 
517-18, 597 N.E.2d 126, 127 (1992) (nonlawyer litigant; query whether the same rule applies when 
the pro se litigant is an attorney). 
Ohio intermediate appellate and lower court decisions answering our query when the pro se litigant is 
a lawyer have been mixed.  There is one appellate decision, Mikhael v. Gallup, 2006 Ohio 3917, 
2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3884 (Summit); it holds that attorney fees could be awarded because (1) 
unlike Freeman, the recipient was an attorney and (2) the lawyer was representing, in addition to 
himself, his law firm and clients whom he had represented in the underlying case and who were 
codefendants. The trial court decisions are split. The earlier one, Hillyer v. Roth, 74 Ohio Misc.2d 
127, 660 N.E.2d 534 (C.P. Lucas), concluded that Freeman required that attorney fees could not be 
awarded, even if the pro se litigant is an attorney. The most recent case is McClure v. Fischer 
Attached Homes, 146 Ohio Misc.2d 70, 2008 Ohio 2677, 889 N.E.2d 612 (C.P. Clermont), and it 
sides with those decisions permitting recovery of attorney fees. Note that in all of these cases 
awarding fees, the lawyer was representing not only himself but also his firm; there does not appear to 
be an Ohio case where a lawyer, proceeding pro se, sought recovery of 2323.51 fees only on his own 
behalf. 
Pursuant to ORC 2323.51(B)(3), the amount of attorney fees awarded shall not exceed (a) in a 
contingent-fee case, an amount corresponding to reasonable fees had the party been represented on an 
hourly-fee or other noncontingent-fee basis; (b) in cases other than those where the fee is contingent, 
the attorney fees that were reasonably incurred by the party. In an unusual 2323.51(B)(3) case, the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed a sanction order against a malpractice plaintiff, but also 
found that the defendant/lawyer should have mitigated his damages “by seeking early termination of 
the case by dispositive motion rather than waiting until trial and perpetuating the proceedings.” 
Nguyen v. Kramer, 2008 Ohio 4573, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3847 (Cuyahoga), at para. 19. 
While this seems a reasonable enough conclusion, the basis upon which it was reached is the statutory 
language limiting the sanction to reasonable fees “‘that would have been charged for legal services 
necessitated by the frivolous conduct.’ The language ‘necessitated by’ implies that the movant is not 
entitled to fees which were a result of the movant’s own improper conduct.” Id. at para. 19. But, as 
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noted above, this “necessitated by” language no longer exists; it was eliminated by House Bill 455, 
effective no later than October 17, 1996 – more than four years prior to any of the operative dates in 
the Nguyen case. Nevertheless, it would seem that the same result can be justified by the “reasonable 
fees” and “reasonably incurred” language in the statute as in effect during the course of the Nguyen 
litigation and presently. See ORC 2323.51(B)(3). 
A party seeking sanctions pursuant to ORC 2323.51 may, pursuant to division (B)(1), file a motion 
for sanctions not more than 30 days after entry of final judgment. See Soler v. Evans, St. Clair & 
Kelsey, 94 Ohio St.3d 432, 763 N.E.2d 1169 (2002) (syllabus one) (“judgment” in statute means a 
final appealable order); Kudukis v. Mascinskas, 2005 Ohio 2465, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 2347 
(Cuyahoga) (applying Soler; rejecting argument that statutory period for filing motion runs from last 
appellate decision). Under the prior version of the statute, courts held that, in the absence of a motion 
pursuant to ORC 2323.51(B)(2), sanctions under the statute could not be imposed. Huffman v. 
Medina County Child Support Enforcement Agency, 2004 Ohio 729, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 
680 (Medina). The 2005 version of (B)(2) expressly authorizes sanctions pursuant to motion under 
(B)(1) “or on the court’s own initiative.” 
The court may not award sanctions under ORC 2323.51 without first holding a hearing on the issue. 
ORC 2323.51(B)(2). E.g., Wheeler v. Best Employee Fed. Credit Union, 2009 Ohio 2139, 2009 
Ohio App. LEXIS 1831 (Cuyahoga) (reversing trial court’s order finding 2323.51 violation without 
hearing). Shields v. Englewood, 172 Ohio App.3d 620, 2007 Ohio 3165, 876 N.E.2d 972, at para. 
50 (Montgomery) (“if attorneys fees are to be ultimately awarded, then a hearing indeed must be held 
in accordance with subsections (a), (b), and (c) of R.C. 2323.51(B)(2)”). 
As to whether the court may deny an ORC 2323.51 motion for sanctions without holding a hearing, 
compare, e.g., Sidenstricker v. Miller Pavement Maint., Inc., 2001 Ohio 4111; 2001 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 4793 (Franklin Oct. 25, 2001) (it may: citing case law), State Farm Ins. Cos. v. Peda, 2005 
Ohio 3405, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 3152 (Lake) (no hearing required where issue to be decided “is 
a legal issue which could be determined solely by recourse to the pleadings, briefs, and applicable 
law,” id. at para. 31); Wilson v. Lynch & Lynch Co., L.P.A., 99 Ohio App.3d 760, 651 N.E.2d 
1328 (Geauga 1994); (same; argument that claims not warranted by existing law is “clearly one 
which the trial court could fully review without benefit of a hearing” id. at 771, 651 N.E.2d at 1335); 
and Seifert v. Polaris Joint Voc. Sch., No. 65840, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5240, at *8 (Cuyahoga 
Nov. 23, 1994) (it may “if it determines that a hearing is perfunctory, meaningless, and redundant”), 
with Borowski v. State Chem. Mfg. Co., 97 Ohio App.3d 635, 647 N.E.2d 230 (Cuyahoga 1994) 
(it may not; citing prior Eighth District cases). One court, in dictum, apparently thought that ORC 
2323.51 “expressly require[s] a hearing when declining to impose sanctions,” but there is no such 
language in the statute. See Goff v. Ameritrust Co., Nos. 65196, 66016, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 
1916, at *30 (Cuyahoga May 5, 1994). [This may well be a typographical error; perhaps what the 
court said (or intended to say) was: “unlike the frivolous conduct statute, R.C. 2323.51, Civ. R. 11 
does not expressly require a hearing when deciding to impose sanctions,” id. (emphasis added), which 
would be a correct statement of the law.] Virtually all of the authority supporting the view that a 
hearing is required, even when the motion is denied, came from the Eighth District Court of Appeals. 
That line of authority was jettisoned by the Eighth District in Pisani v. Pisani, 101 Ohio App.3d 83, 
654 N.E.2d 1355 (Cuyahoga 1995), where the court cited an extensive list of its prior decisions 
holding that a hearing was required, and found them out of step with every other appellate district that 
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had considered the issue: 
In order to reconcile our own decisions and those of our sister appellate 
courts, we now hold that a hearing is mandatory under R.C. 2323.51 
only when sanctions are imposed and is not necessary when the court 
determines, upon consideration of the motion and in its discretion, that 
it lacks merit. 
Id. at 88, 654 N.E.2d at 1358. Of the many subsequent Eighth District opinions following Pisani, see, 
e.g. Beal v. Allen, 2002 Ohio 4054, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4246 (Cuyahoga). But if the party 
seeking sanctions demonstrates “actual merit” the court has a duty to conduct a hearing on the motion. 
Mitchell v. Reserve Area Agency, 2004 Ohio 4353, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 3952, at para. 14 
(Cuyahoga) (so construing Pisani). 
What if the movant has demonstrated “arguable merit” for her sanctions motion?  The answer in such 
cases, at least in Franklin and Summit counties, is that a hearing must be held; “‘the trial court may 
deny an oral hearing only to those motions which “on their face reveal the lack of a triable issue”‘“), 
Donaldson v. Todd, 174 Ohio App.3d 117, 2007 Ohio 6504, 881 N.E.2d 280 (Franklin), at para. 
9 (quoting from Cortext Ltd. v. Pride Media, Ltd., 2003 WL 22434592 ( Ohio App. Franklin); 
arguable merit present; hearing required); DeCarlo v. Estate of Maxwell, 167 Ohio App.3d 131, 
2006 Ohio 3116, 854 N.E.2d 230 (Summit) (same; “[t]he only way a court is excused from [holding 
a hearing] is if it finds no basis whatsoever for the imposition of sanctions.” Id. at para. 6.). 
Sanctions - The remedies available - Appellate Rule 23: OH App R 23 states that the court of appeals 
may direct “appellant to pay reasonable expenses of the appellee including attorney fees and costs.” 
See, e.g., Tessler v. Ayer, 108 Ohio App.3d 47, 669 N.E.2d 891 (Hamilton 1995) (attorney fees 
and costs awarded). In Riley v. Supervalue Holdings, Inc., 2005 Ohio 6996, 2005 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 6318 (Hamilton), the court awarded attorney fees in an amount of $2,500; Judge Painter 
dissenting in part because “[i]f fees are awarded at all, they should at least approximate the amount 
actually expended – which, according to counsel’s affidavit, was $31,035.46.” Id. at para. 31. 
Appellate courts have the power to impose sanctions under this provision sua sponte. E.g., 
Siemienkowski v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 Ohio 4122, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4072 
(Cuyahoga). (Compare Thom’s Inc. v. Rezzano, Nos. 54641, 54671, 54691, 1988 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 4538 (Cuyahoga Nov. 10, 1988) (sua sponte imposition of OH Civ R 11 sanctions without 
hearing reversed; hearing required).) But, in the court’s discretion, a post-sanction evidentiary 
submission typically is allowed concerning the reasonableness of the amount of the Rule 23 sanction 
to be imposed. Siemienkowski. If the appellate court does not act sua sponte, numerous decisions 
reflect the view that Rule 23 sanctions will not be considered in the absence of a motion to impose 
same. E.g., Barbato v. Mercy Med. Center, 2005 Ohio 5219, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 4725 
(Stark); Richards v. Beechmont Volvo, 127 Ohio App.3d 188, 711 N.E.2d 1088 (1998) 
(Hamilton) (“A paragraph in a responsive brief is insufficient to raise the issue before this court, and 
we therefore decline to consider it.” Id. at 192, 711 N.E.2d at 1091.). Even when the sanctions issue 
is presented by motion, the appellate courts consider the matter to be within their own sound 
discretion and apparently do not hold a hearing or take evidentiary submissions, e.g., Cominsky v. 
Malner, 2004 Ohio 2202, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 1954 (Lake), other than on the reasonableness of 
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the sanction to be imposed, e.g., Stuller v. Price, 2003 Ohio 6826, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6127 
(Franklin). 
Sanctions - The remedies available - Supreme Court Practice Rule 14.5(A): SCt Prac R 14.5(A) 
provides that an appropriate sanction may include “an award to the opposing party of reasonable 
expenses, reasonable attorney fees, costs or double costs, and any other sanction the Supreme Court 
considers just.” At least two of the ten cases invoking the rule since its promulgation in 1997 have 
imposed sanctions against the offending attorneys. See State ex rel. Kreps v. Christiansen, 88 Ohio 
St.3d 313, 725 N.E.2d 663 (2000) (sanctions imposed sua sponte against attorney-appellant acting 
pro se; appellees ordered to submit detailed documentation of their counsel’s expenses and attorney 
fees that have been or will be paid by appellee-judges, the city of Toledo, and/or Lucas County in 
connection with the appeal); State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson, 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 716 N.E.2d 
704 (1999) (motion to impose sanctions on relators’ attorneys granted; respondents ordered to submit 
detailed bill and documentation of “expenses and approximate amount of compensation and fringe 
benefits, if any, of their counsel that have been or will be paid by the state in connection with the legal 
services rendered in defending against the frivolous claims raised by relators.”  Id. at 636, 716 
N.E.2d at 711). Three other cases imposed sanctions on the same pro se litigant, but it is unclear 
whether he was an attorney. See State ex rel. Howard v. Doneghy, 102 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004 Ohio 
3207, 810 N.E.2d 958 (attorney fees and expenses); State ex rel. Howard v. Indus. Comm’n, 101 
Ohio St.3d 1465, 2004 Ohio 819, 804 N.E.2d 39 (attorney fees); State ex rel. Howard v. 
Zimmerman, 99 Ohio St.3d 1535, 2003 Ohio 4753, 795 N.E.2d 676 (mandamus action found 
frivolous; all pending motions filed by relator stricken; relator prohibited from filing additional 
documents in previously decided related cases; clerk ordered not to accept further appeals or original 
actions by relator unless accompanied by required docket fee and security for costs).  In other SCt 
Prac R 14.5 cases, sanctions were imposed on parties: State ex rel. Forsyth v. Brigner, 86 Ohio 
St.3d 585, 715 N.E.2d 1164 (1999) (in forma pauperis status abused; clerk ordered not to accept 
further appeals or original actions unless accompanied by required docket fee and security deposit); 
Edbow, Inc. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision, 86 Ohio St.3d 1207, 712 N.E.2d 757 (1999) 
(reasonable attorney fees awarded to appellee); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Pagac, 80 Ohio 
St.3d 1451, 686 N.E.2d 524 (1997) (contempt motion of respondent found frivolous; motion stricken 
and respondent, a previously disbarred attorney presumably acting pro se, sanctioned in amount of 
$500, to be paid into Attorney Registration Fund); Smith v. Serva-Portion, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 
1504, 679 N.E.2d 5 (1997) (in forma pauperis status abused; appeals dismissed and clerk ordered not 
to accept additional appeals by appellant unless accompanied by required docket fee). Finally, in 
Torrance v. Bealer, 124 Ohio St.3d 1490, 2010 Ohio 670, 922 N.E.2d 226, the Court awarded 
respondents $10,000 in attorney fees; the entry does not state who had to pay them. 
Sanctions - A cautionary note: Use of the sanction weapon must be undertaken with care; otherwise, it 
can turn around and inflict injury on the would-be beneficiary of the initial sanctions motion or action. 
A case in point is Powell v. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, 182 F.3d 918, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 
16854 (6th Cir. 1999) (table). Powell had its genesis in an underlying action in Ohio state court in 
which Huntington Bank sued Powell for defamation. In response, Powell’s lawyer, Mazer, filing on 
Powell’s behalf an action in federal court against Huntington, its lawyer (Alexander), and 
Alexander’s law firm, alleged that the defamation suit was an abuse of process, constituted malicious 
prosecution, and violated ORC 2323.51. The district court granted Alexander’s motion for judgment 
on the pleadings; it held that no colorable claim for abuse of process or malicious prosecution had 
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been alleged and that an ORC 2323.51 frivolous-conduct claim could not be pursued in federal court. 
Alexander’s lawyer then filed a motion for sanctions against Mazer pursuant to Fed R Civ P 11, 
which the district court granted; the court found that the assertion of the malicious prosecution and 
abuse of process claims was not reasonable and was done for the purpose of harassment and 
intimidation in an effort to interfere with Alexander’s representation of Huntington. (See 990 F.Supp. 
541 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (setting hearing as to nature and extent of sanctions).) While the court of 
appeals vacated that portion of the sanction characterized as imposing a “perpetual penalty” (by 
making the suspension of payment of a $10,000 monetary sanction payable to the Clients Security 
Fund of Ohio contingent on Mazer’s obtaining a written opinion from a member of the Columbus Bar 
Association before filing any future malicious-prosecution or abuse-of-process action against a 
lawyer based on the lawyer’s representation of a client), a $1,000 sanction imposed against Mazer, 
payable to Alexander, was sustained. The Sixth Circuit found that the claims asserted in retaliation 
against Alexander “utterly lacked any basis in [Ohio] law.” 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16854, at *10. 
  
3.1:400  Civil Liability for Abusive Litigation Practice [see also 1.1:520] 
Primary Ohio References 
none 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.1 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:117 
ALI-LGL § 57 
Wolfram § 11.2 
The primary civil avenues used against lawyers by opposing litigants who feel themselves victimized 
by abusive conduct are suits for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Nationally there are 
special rules limiting lawyer liability for malicious prosecution (see 1 Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers § 57(2) (2000)) and abuse of process (id. at cmt. d); these rules, and how 
they compare with Ohio law, are discussed at section 1.1:520. In this connection, it should be 
remembered that Ohio has a general rule immunizing lawyers from liability to nonclient third parties 
not in privity with the client, unless the lawyer acts maliciously. See Scholler v. Scholler, 10 Ohio 
St.3d 98, 462 N.E.2d 158 (1984) (syllabus one), and the cases applying the Scholler rule, discussed 
at section 1.1:410. The Scholler rule is consistent with the malice element of the malicious 
prosecution tort; its application to abuse of process is more problematic. See discussion at sections 
1.1:410 and 1.1:520. 
The risk that misuse of such actions can itself give rise to sanctions should again be noted.  Haupricht 
v. Davis Farm Services, Inc., No. F-95-013, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4819 (Fulton Nov. 3, 1995), 
involving frivolous claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, is such a case. Therein 
appellant had sued Davis and its lawyer, based on the defendants’ earlier attempts to collect on a debt 
from appellant; appellant had obtained credit to purchase farm supplies from Davis by signing a 
security agreement falsely pledging as collateral farm machinery that he did not own. Not 
surprisingly, the trial court granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the abuse of 
800
Ohio Legal Ethics 3.1 
  
process and malicious prosecution claims and then granted monetary sanctions against appellant’s 
lawyer in response to defendants’ motions under ORC 2323.51 and OH Civ R 11. The court of 
appeals affirmed. And see the discussion of Powell v. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, 182 F.3d 918, 
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16854 (6th Cir. 1999) (table), at the end of section 3.1:300. 
Abuse of process: The elements of the tort of abuse of process in Ohio are: 
(1) a legal proceeding has been set in motion in proper form and with 
probable cause; 
(2) the proceeding has been perverted to attempt to accomplish an 
ulterior purpose for which it was not designed; and 
(3) direct damage resulted from the wrongful use of process. 
Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A., 68 Ohio St.3d 294, 626 N.E.2d 115 (1994) 
(syllabus one). As will be seen below, almost all of the subsequent case law has taken the Yaklevich 
syllabus at its word and refused to allow abuse-of-process suits unless they are predicated on the 
existence of probable cause to bring the underlying action. The decision itself, however, is difficult to 
square with the syllabus -- the Court in Yaklevich actually held the complaint sufficient to withstand 
a OH Civ R 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, even though it alleged that the prior proceeding had been 
commenced without probable cause. See further discussion of this aspect of Yaklevich in section 
1.1:520 at “Abuse of process – Probable cause requirement.” 
While many, if not most, of the abuse-of-process suits against lawyers arguably involve abusive 
litigation tactics, in only a handful has the claim survived. And even these few are suspect in one way 
or another. In Bayer v. Neff, 95- L-044, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5897 (Lake Dec. 29, 1995), the 
court, reversing the trial court, found the following allegations sufficient to overcome a motion to 
dismiss: 
 “During approximately the last three (3) years [appellee] 
[defendant lawyer] has engaged in a pattern of behavior including, but 
not limited to, conspiring with * * * the Neffs [his clients] to file a civil 
lawsuit against [appellant] and then dismissing same [sic]; by 
personally bringing criminal charges against [appellant]; and by 
making false accusations about [appellant] to the Lake County 
Sheriff’s Department and the Zoning Inspector.” 
Id. at *6 (other than “[appellee],” “[appellant],” and “[sic],” bracketed material added). The court 
also held that appellant’s response to the lawyer’s motion for summary judgment should have 
precluded the granting of that motion, in that his affidavit stated that the lawyer “‘acted in bad faith, 
frequently on his own behalf, and maliciously * * *,’” id. at *13 (emphasis in original), along with 
further lengthy quotations from the affidavit, at the end of which the court merely concludes that 
“[t]hese submissions are sufficient to overcome a summary judgment obstacle on the abuse of process 
claim.” Id. at *16-17. In neither the dismissal nor the summary-judgment context did the appellate 
court provide one word of analysis on the three Yaklevich elements or how they were met here.  (The 
only judge that addressed the Yaklevich requisites was Judge Christley in dissent; she persuasively 
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argued that appellant’s submissions “are most emphatic about what can only be interpreted as a lack 
of probable cause.”  Id.  at *21.) 
Another post-Yaklevich abuse-of-process case allowed to proceed against an attorney is Thompson 
v. R&R Service Systems, Inc., Nos. 96APE10-1277, 96 APE10-1278, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 
2677 (Franklin June 19, 1997). Abusive litigation practice was certainly alleged in Thompson, 
where the defendant attorney was claimed to have invoked criminal process as a means of obtaining a 
civil remedy (return of a van) more promptly. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants, 
including the attorney, at the close of plaintiffs’ case. Reversing, the court of appeals found that the 
use of criminal proceedings to achieve a civil remedy was a subversion of the process, citing and 
quoting former OH EC 7-21. Thus, “[a]ppellants have presented sufficient evidence to at least raise a 
jury question regarding the perversion of the criminal process for an improper, collateral purpose,” id. 
at *37; the issue of whether probable cause existed to pursue the criminal action was also held to be a 
jury question. So far, so good. Inexplicably, the court also found that an “attorney may be liable for 
abuse of process only if the attorney acts maliciously, with an ulterior motive separate and apart from 
the client’s interest.” Id. This extra hurdle for attorney cases was tacked on even though the otherwise 
applicable Yaklevich test, which the court quoted, was itself a case in which the abuse-of-process 
defendant was a law firm. Compounding the problem, after adding the extra test, the court proceeded 
to ignore the second part of it. While it certainly can be persuasively argued that the defendant 
attorney acted maliciously, it seems most unlikely that her efforts to get the van returned to her clients 
constituted “an ulterior motive separate and apart from the client’s interest.” The Thompson case is 
further discussed this section infra at “Malicious criminal prosecution.” 
The third such case, Dever v. Lucas, 174 Ohio App.3d 725, 2008 Ohio 332, 884 N.E.2d 641 
(Delaware), rests on firmer ground than either Bayer or Thompson. The lawyer-defendant in Dever 
argued that the trial court had been correct in dismissing the abuse-of-process claim because the 
plaintiffs, in asserting claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, had pleaded 
inconsistent statements.  Looking to Rule 8(E)(2) on alternative pleading and the Supreme Court’s 
language in Yaklevich about the wisdom of asserting both malicious prosecution and abuse of 
process when the issue of probable cause is unclear, the Dever court concluded that the assertion of 
abuse of process as an alternative theory of recovery was “appropriate” and reversed the dismissal of 
the claim. 
See also Luciani v. Schiavone, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5842 (6th Cir. 2000) (table), 
where the court of appeals reversed a summary judgment for the defendant lawyer and his firm on the 
abuse-of-process claim because a jury could infer that the defendants were using the underlying Ohio 
separation action as a “bargaining chip” to obtain custody arrangements, support provisions, and 
property settlement, none of which the Ohio court had power to order. “Alternatively, a jury could 
infer that Mr. Schiavone [the lawyer] was attempting to obtain actual judgments from the Ohio court 
that it had no power to grant.” Id. at *17. On remand, the district court denied the lawyers’ renewed 
motion for summary judgment.  Luciani v. Schiavone, No. C-1-97-272, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
25918 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 2, 2001). The lower court held, first, that a jury could reasonably find that all 
three Yaklevich factors, including the first, were satisfied, because the Ohio court had jurisdiction 
over the separation action and thus the fact finder could conclude that the Ohio action was initiated 
with probable cause. The defendants argued further on remand, however, that as lawyers they were 
immune from liability to a third party under Scholler. Without stopping to consider whether Scholler 
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applies to a case arguably controlled by the Yaklevich rule, the district court determined that since 
plaintiffs were not in privity with defendants’ client, they must show that defendants acted 
maliciously. The court concluded that plaintiffs may well be able to do so: 
[T]he Court agrees that an attorney who attempts to obtain relief from a 
court that he knows to be powerless to grant it acts in bad faith. The 
Court concludes, therefore, that Plaintiffs may establish that 
Defendants acted in bad faith, and, therefore, maliciously, when they 
perverted the Ohio proceeding by seeking relief that the Ohio court 
could not grant. The Court concludes, therefore, that Defendants are 
not entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim for 
abuse of process. 
Id. at *19. 
All of the other Ohio abuse-of-process cases against lawyers that we found have failed, because of an 
inability to meet one or another of the Yaklevich requisites, even though in most of these cases one 
might fairly describe the alleged conduct of the lawyer(s) as abusive litigation practice. For example, 
in Gugliotta v. Morano, 161 Ohio App.3d 152, 2005 Ohio 2570, 829 N.E.2d 757 (Summit), an 
attorney sued a former client for defamation, and the former client counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, 
abuse of process. The trial court denied the lawyer’s motion for directed verdict on the 
abuse-of-process counterclaim, but the court of appeals held that the defendant’s counterclaim failed 
as a matter of law, because 
“[a]buse of process does not lie for the wrongful bringing of an action, 
but for the improper use, or ‘abuse’ of process” once a proper claim has 
been commenced. [citation omitted]. 
Id. at para. 50. According to the court, defendant’s argument that the lawyer threatened litigation to 
coerce defendant to retract her complaints to the BBB and the Akron Bar Association Board of 
Grievances (the foundation of the lawyer’s defamation action) was the undoing of the 
abuse-of-process claim: Defendant’s “own argument that [the lawyer] used the threat of litigation as a 
tool of coercion serves to defeat her claim of abuse of process,” id. In other words, in the Gugliotta 
court’s view, the former client was arguing that the action was improperly brought and thus failed the 
first prong of the Yaklevich syllabus. It seems equally plausible, however, that the former client was 
attempting to argue that the “process” was abused by the filing of the defamation complaint for an 
ulterior purpose that perverted the proceeding, in satisfaction of the second prong of the Yaklevich 
test. In any event, there is no direct discussion by the court of a critical issue under the first prong -- 
whether the defamation action had been brought with probable cause. 
Another case finding no liability for abuse of process by an attorney is Willis & Linnen Co., L.P.A. 
v. Linnen, 163 Ohio App.3d 400, 2005 Ohio 4934, 837 N.E.2d 1263 (Summit), where the court 
found that the underlying contempt proceeding was brought with probable cause, but that there was 
no perversion of the process: the lawyer “did not seek to achieve through the use of the courts 
anything that those courts were powerless to order.” Id. at para. 23. (See further discussion of Willis 
Linnen below.) Accord Ahlers v. Pettinelli, 2006 Ohio 1199, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 1090 
(Cuyahoga) (judgment on pleadings for defendant lawyers affirmed; “Ahlers cannot demonstrate 
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that Pettinelli initiated the execution to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was [not] 
designed.” Id. at para. 13 (bracketed material added).). 
In Wolfe v. Little, No. 18718, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1902 (Montgomery Apr. 27, 2001), 
defendants were alleged to have perverted the proceedings by improperly subpoenaing plaintiffs for 
deposition, submitting a false affidavit, and communicating with the court ex parte. The court found 
these assertions wanting, because, according to the Wolfe court, the 
perversion-for-an-ulterior-purpose element must be one attempting to gain an advantage outside the 
proceeding, whereas plaintiffs’ ulterior purpose allegation (deprivation of due process rights) 
concerned perversion of the proceeding to gain an advantage in the proceeding itself. Diametrically 
opposed to this conclusion is Willis & Linnen Co., L.P.A. v Linnen, 163 Ohio App.3d 400, 2005 
Ohio 4934, 837 N.E.2d 1263 (Summit), where the court found no perversion of the process because 
“there is no evidence, or even allegation, that [the lawyer/counterclaim-defendant] sought any 
collateral advantage during the contempt proceedings.” Id. at para. 24 (emphasis by the court). 
These cases are further discussed in section 1.1:520. 
A further twist on the ulterior purpose/perversion factor is found in Pritchard v. Algis Sirvaitis & 
Assocs., 2006 Ohio 3153, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3038 (Cuyahoga), where the court affirmed a 
Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal for the defendant lawyers on plaintiff’s abuse-of-process claim because, 
“although appellant claimed appellee’s purpose was improper, he alleged their ‘improper’ purpose 
was not directed at him.  Instead, he alleged appellees refiled the Morgan lawsuit in order to mislead 
their client, and that, as an indirect result of their improper purpose, he suffered injury.” Id. at paras. 
32-33 (emphasis by the court)). (The “Morgan lawsuit” was a medical malpractice action against, 
among others, Dr. Pritchard, who asserted the abuse-of-process claim against the law firm 
representing the medical malpractice plaintiff, Morgan. Pritchard’s economic damage was his 
insurer’s cancellation of his medical malpractice insurance and the need to obtain new, more 
expensive, coverage.) 
Cases in which the plaintiff alleged that the filing of the underlying action was frivolous, and thus 
abusive, obviously fail to meet the first Yaklevich element of an action filed with probable cause. E.g., 
Nationwide Ins. Enters. v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., No. 00 AP-1474, 2001 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3314 (Franklin July 26, 2001) (dismissal affirmed where complaint alleged that underlying 
action in Kentucky was initiated improperly and without probable cause by defendant lawyer who 
had prior knowledge that the Kentucky court was without jurisdiction). See Kavlich v. Hildebrand, 
2009 Ohio 1090, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 854 (Cuyahoga), where the court found the first factor 
lacking based on plaintiff’s assertion that the defendant lawyer had “unilaterally” filed a medical 
malpractice counterclaim on behalf of the patient in the doctor’s collection action “without obtaining 
[the patient’s] consent and approval.” According to the court of appeals, “[t]hese assertions gravely 
undermine plaintiff’s abuse of process as they defeat the requisite first element of this claim for relief: 
a legal proceeding was properly initiated and supported by probable cause.” Id. at para. 20. (The 
court also found that there was no perversion for an ulterior purpose, in contrast to plaintiff’s view 
that the counterclaim was designed to derail the collection action: “The objective of the counterclaim 
was simply to raise a claim for damages for alleged substandard treatment.” Id. at para. 23.) 
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In Tilberry v. McIntyre, 135 Ohio App.3d 229, 733 N.E.2d 636 (Cuyahoga 1999), the probable 
cause element was present in defendant’s seeking of sanctions in the underlying action (even though 
the sanctions order was reversed on appeal), but failed on the second element: “we conclude that the 
Tilberrys failed to present evidence that ‘defendants have done anything more than carry out the 
process in the federal court to its authorized conclusion.’”  Id. at 241, 733 N.E.2d at 644 (quoting 
language from Yaklevich). Summary judgment for defendants was affirmed. Accord Havens-Tobias 
v. Eagle, 2003 Ohio 1561, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 1512 (Montgomery) (12(B)(6) dismissal 
affirmed; plaintiffs failed to allege second element, perversion for ulterior purpose); Moffitt v. 
Litteral, 2002 Ohio 4973, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 5000 (Montgomery) (probable cause present 
but no perversion for ulterior purpose: even though not ultimately successful, legal proceeding to set 
aside transfer of title to vehicle was set in motion for legitimate purpose rather than one for which 
system not designed: “The court had power to void the transfer if it concluded it was a fraudulent 
conveyance.” Id. at para. 69.) 
See also Tablack v. Wellman, 2006 Ohio 4688, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4609 (Delaware), where 
all of the parties were lawyers, but the case involved an intra-firm squabble regarding compensation 
and retirement. Some of the defendant-lawyers counterclaimed for abuse of process against the 
plaintiff; summary judgment for plaintiff on these claims was affirmed for failure of the 
counterclaimants to satisfy the first two Yaklevich factors. 
There are two abuse-of-process cases involving lawyers decided prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Yaklevich; in both, summary judgment for the defendant lawyer was reversed under the 
Scholler malice exception to lawyer immunity from liability to nonclients. The first is Pheils v. 
Garber-Lawrence Publishing Group, Inc., No. L-92-418, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5914 (Lucas 
Dec. 10, 1993) (numerous allegedly harassing lawsuits filed by defendant lawyer against plaintiff, in 
at least one of which notice by publication was sought using an address known by the lawyer to be 
erroneous; the lawyer sought thereby to prevent the defendant from learning of the suit and defending 
it; this was use of process for an improper purpose; court found issue of fact existed on Scholler 
malice issue). And in Petrey v. Simon, 19 Ohio App.3d 285, 484 N.E.2d 257 (Hamilton 1984), the 
evidence showed that the lawyer was on actual notice that appellant was not the correct party named 
as the defendant in the underlying action and that he persisted with the case even after learning that 
appellant’s name and social-security number were different from that of the party sought. The court 
made no effort to differentiate the separate claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process; 
instead, the court held that summary judgment in the lawyer’s favor was improper under the malice 
exception to the Scholler immunity rule. 
Malicious civil prosecution: Generally, 
 [i]n order to state a cause of action for malicious civil 
prosecution in Ohio, four essential elements must be alleged by the 
plaintiff: (1) malicious institution of prior proceedings against the 
plaintiff by defendant, (2) lack of probable cause for the filing of the 
prior lawsuit, (3) termination of the prior proceedings in plaintiff’s 
favor, and (4) seizure of plaintiff’s person or property during the course 
of the prior proceedings. 
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Robb v. Chagrin Lagoons Yacht Club, Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d 264, 265, 662 N.E.2d 9, 10 (1996) 
(syllabus) (nonlawyer defendant). The rule is the same when such a suit is brought against lawyers. 
See Kelly v. Whiting, 17 Ohio St.3d 91, 94-95, 477 N.E.2d 1123, 1127 (1985) (claim against, inter 
alia, plaintiff’s ex-wife’s lawyer and his law firm, based on allegedly malicious issuance of writ 
requiring malicious-prosecution plaintiff to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for 
failure to comply with child nonsupport order; motion to dismiss nongovernmental defendants 
affirmed for failure to meet the third and fourth factors set forth above). While one prior Supreme 
Court lawyer case, Border City Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Moan, 15 Ohio St.3d 65, 472 N.E.2d 350 
(1984) (per curiam), seemed to limit the tort to the first three elements, Border City has been ignored 
in subsequent malicious-civil-prosecution cases against lawyers; the four-part test set forth above in 
Robb and Kelly or a special variation applied in cases involving lawyer defendants (see below) has 
been regularly applied. See, e.g., Ahlbeck v. Joelson, No. L-96-413, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3519 
(Lucas Aug. 8, 1997) (claim based on allegedly frivolous adversary complaint filed by defendant 
lawyer in bankruptcy proceeding, but summary judgment in defendant’s favor affirmed for failure to 
meet fourth element, seizure of person or property). In an earlier case applying the now-accepted test, 
Petrey v. Simon, 19 Ohio App.3d 285, 484 N.E.2d 251 (Hamilton 1984), summary judgment for 
the defendant attorney was reversed where the seizure-of-property prong was satisfied as a result of 
wrongful attachment of plaintiff’s wages. The underlying action, instituted by defendant lawyer 
Simon, sought an order holding his client’s ex-husband in contempt for failure to comply with a child 
support order in favor of the client. Plaintiff was not the ex-husband and was not a party to the prior 
action; nor did he have any notice or opportunity to defend. Relying on Scholler v. Scholler, 10 Ohio 
St.3d 98, 462 N.E.2d 158 (1984), the appellate court found that a genuine issue of fact existed as to 
the factors of malice and good faith, given evidence that Simon was on actual notice that he was 
pursuing the wrong party and had even gone so far as to obtain the wage assignment by substituting 
plaintiff’s social-security number for that belonging to her ex-husband, given Simon by his client. 
A number of cases in which a lawyer is the malicious-prosecution defendant have stated two of the 
four elements (malice and lack of probable cause) in a fashion tailored to attorneys: 
In view of the attorney’s ethical responsibility of zealous 
representation it must be shown that the attorneys either acted 
maliciously or that they knew, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
their client was motivated solely by actual malice. It must also be 
shown that they did not have a good-faith basis for believing that the 
civil or criminal proceeding was warranted under existing law, or under 
a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law. This is, essentially, the “probable cause” element as it 
applies to attorneys. 
 As in all other actions of malicious prosecution, the appellant 
bore the burden of providing that his person or property was seized in 
the course of the proceedings, and that the proceedings were terminated 
in his favor. 
Woyczynski v. Wolf, 11 Ohio App.3d 226, 229, 464 N.E.2d 612, 617 (Cuyahoga 1983) (defendant 
attorneys had good cause to file both criminal and civil complaints on behalf of their client; summary 
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judgment for defendant attorneys affirmed). Abusive litigation practice cases generally in accord with 
Woyczynski include: Thompson v. R&R Serv. Sys., Inc., Nos. 96APE10-1277, 96 APE10-1278, 
1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2677, at *19 (Franklin June 19, 1997) (malicious criminal prosecution 
case using Woyczynski test; see discussion at “Malicious criminal prosecution,” this section infra); 
Cipriani v. Stephanoff, No. 56250, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 114 (Cuyahoga Jan. 11, 1990) (using 
Woyczynski test; summary judgment for defendant lawyer reversed; genuine issue of material fact 
existed as to whether she acted with malice in having plaintiff’s driver’s license wrongfully 
suspended in attempt to execute on prior judgment against plaintiff); Shore, Shirley & Co. v. Kelley, 
40 Ohio App.3d 10, 531 N.E.2d 333 (Cuyahoga 1988) (using Woyczynski test; upholding jury 
verdict against defendant attorney; $15,000,000 counterclaim, filed by attorney with malice and 
without probable cause in prior municipal-court action for professional fees in the amount of 
$2,432.82 and dismissed therein, proximately caused cancellation of claimant accounting firm’s 
malpractice insurance and other damages). 
For an attorney case in which both the general four-part test and the Woyczynski adaptation of it for 
lawyer misconduct were utilized in the course of reversing summary judgment for the defendant 
attorney, see Butts v. Bjelovuk, 129 Ohio App.3d 134, 717 N.E.2d 381 (Cuyahoga 1998) (court 
found that conflicting evidence created genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant acted 
maliciously and without probable cause in bringing action for eviction and rent against nonlessee, 
who as malicious-prosecution plaintiff had satisfied other two elements of tort -- termination of prior 
action in her favor and seizure of property through garnishment of her bank account). The court in 
Vitrano v. CWP Ltd. P’ship, No. 19516, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6179 (Summit Dec. 22, 1999), 
likewise referred to both versions of the test in a case allegedly brought without probable cause, but 
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for want of an allegation that the prior action 
terminated in plaintiff’s favor. 
Malicious criminal prosecution: The elements of civil liability in Ohio for malicious criminal 
prosecution are the same as those for malicious civil prosecution, except that it is now established that 
the former does not require seizure of person or property.  Trussell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 53 Ohio 
St.3d 142, 559 N.E.2d 732 (1990) (disapproving Woyczynski on the necessity-of-seizure point; 
nonlawyer defendant). Accord Froelich v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Health, 114 Ohio St.3d 286, 2007 
Ohio 4161, 871 N.E.2d 1159 (“The tort of malicious prosecution in a criminal setting requires proof 
of three essential elements: (1) malice in instituting or continuing the prosecution, (2) lack of probable 
cause, and (3) termination of the prosecution in favor of the accused,’” id. at para. 10, quoting the 
Trussell syllabus; nonlawyer defendant). See Willis & Linnen Co., L.P.A., v. Linnen, 163 Ohio 
App.3d 400, 2005 Ohio 4934, 837 N.E.2d 1263 (Summit) (summary judgment for 
lawyer/counterclaim-defendant on malicious-criminal-prosecution claim, because lawyer had 
probable cause for contempt proceedings in underlying action against counterclaimant). See also 1 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 57 cmt. e, at 433 (2000). Ohio 
malicious-criminal-prosecution cases involving lawyers as defendants have used the lawyer-tailored 
tests in determining whether the lawyer defendant acted with malice and without probable cause in an 
abusive-litigation-tactics context. See Thompson v. R&R Serv. Sys., Inc. Nos. 96APE10-1277, 96 
APE-1278, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2677 (Franklin June 19, 1997) (reversing directed verdict for 
defendant lawyer on malicious-criminal-prosecution claim, where lawyer and his clients had pursued 
criminal prosecution against plaintiff in order to obtain purely civil relief (regaining possession of 
clients’ van) in contract dispute that should have gone to arbitration in any event; evidence presented 
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from which jury could find that attorney acted maliciously and knew her clients were motivated by 
malice). See also Pollack v. Kanter, 68 Ohio App.3d 673, 589 N.E.2d 443 (Cuyahoga 1990), a 
case decided one month before Trussell came down, involving seizure of the person of the plaintiff. 
In Pollack, plaintiff alleged that defendant lawyers forwarded to the prosecutor a letter written by 
plaintiff; as a result, plaintiff was arrested and indicted for extortion, which indictment was later 
nolled. The appellate court held that the complaint was sufficient to state a claim; the trial court’s 
dismissal under OH Civ R 12(B)(6) was reversed. For a case in which the general Trussell rule was 
applied in affirming dismissal and summary judgment in favor of the defendant lawyer, see Bayer v. 
Neff, No. 95- L-044, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5897 (Lake Dec. 29, 1995) (failure to satisfy 
termination-of-prosecution-in-favor-of-accused element, even though, after trial court’s dismissal of 
plaintiff’s malicious-prosecution suit, his conviction for aggravated menacing was reversed and on 
retrial he was acquitted; “appellant’s premature filing of the complaint and/or subsequent failure to 
request that the trial court stay the proceeding until the [criminal] appeal was resolved, was fatal to the 
instant appeal regarding this issue. The trial court, at the time that it disposed of appellant’s case, only 
had before it appellant’s conviction.” Id. at *11.). 
Rule 11 violation: It is settled in Ohio that civil liability cannot be grounded on abusive litigation 
practice in violation of OH Civ R 11. In Border City Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Moan, 15 Ohio St.3d 
65, 472 N.E.2d 350 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the language of OH Civ R 11 “does not 
provide the basis for a civil action against the attorney who violates this rule.”  Id. at 67 n.1, 472 
N.E.2d at 352 n.1. Accord Bales v. Hack, 31 Ohio App.3d 111, 114, 509 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Clark 
1986) (rule does not “bestow upon the wounded party a civil action for damages.” citing and 
following Border City). While there appears to be no case law on point, presumably civil liability 
likewise cannot be independently grounded on violation of ORC 2323.51, OH App R 23, or SCt 
Prac R 14.5. 
A comment is in order with regard to the Border City discussion of the meaning of OH Civ R 11’s 
“appropriate action” language (a lawyer violating the Rule “may be subjected to appropriate action”). 
The Supreme Court said “appropriate action” was “simply a reference to a disciplinary proceeding 
brought under the Rules for the Government of the Bar.” 15 Ohio St.3d at 67 n.1, 472 N.E.2d at 352 
n.1. But surely this is incorrect. As the Court further noted in the same footnote, the Staff Notes 
contemplated “appropriate court disciplinary action” (emphasis added). We believe this is a reference, 
not to violation of the OHCPR, but rather to “willful violation of Rule 11,” as the Staff Notes state. 
As the court in Mitchell v. Whitaker put it, OH Civ R 11 “authorizes a court to impose sanctions in 
the course of an action under its supervision.” 33 Ohio App.3d at 172, 514 N.E.2d at 939. See 
Kemp, Schaefer & Rowe Co., L.P.A. v. Frecker, 70 Ohio App.3d 493, 497, 591 N.E.2d 402, 404 
(Franklin 1990) (“appropriate action” may include imposition of sanction of attorney fees for willful 
violation). It must be conceded, however, that some courts continued to quote the Border City 
language that “appropriate action” referred to Gov Bar R disciplinary proceedings. See Millikin v. 
Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., No. 13770, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3692 (Ohio App. 
Montgomery July 22, 1993). This issue was effectively put to rest by the 1994 amendment to OH 
Civ R 11, which expressly provides that an attorney may be subjected to appropriate action, 
“including an award to the opposing party of expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
bringing any motion under this rule.” The Supreme Court Rules Advisory Committee commentary on 
the 1994 amendment notes the Border City statement (“arguably . . . dicta”) but concludes that the 
amendment “merely codifies existing practice . . . .” Page’s Ohio Rev Code Ann, Civil Rules, 76 
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(1994). 
See further discussion of civil liability for violation of OH Civ R 11 at the end of section 1.1:410. 
 
3.1:500  Complying with Law and Tribunal Rulings 
Primary Ohio References 
ORC 2705 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.1 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:1201 
ALI-LGL § 105 
Wolfram §§ 12.1.3, 13.3.7 
Ohio Rule 3.4(c) deals with a lawyer’s knowing disregard of “an obligation under the rules of a 
tribunal.” This provision, and the disciplinary cases dealing with its Code analog, former OH DR 
7-106(A), are discussed in section 3.4:400. 
Out-of-court contempt - In general: In addition to section 3.4:400, the subject here -- “complying with 
law and tribunal rulings” -- also partially overlaps other sections of rule 3.1, such as section 3.1:300, 
dealing with judicial sanctions for abusive litigation practice. In contrast to section 3.1:300, which is 
concerned primarily with sanctions expressly authorized by court rule or statute, this section 
examines the vehicle potentially available to a court whenever a lawyer violates a court ruling -- 
utilization of the contempt power. This power is sometimes expressly incorporated into procedural 
rules (see, e.g., OH Civ R 37(B)(1), (2)(d), 45(E), 53(C), 56(G)), but it need not be so. The contempt 
power is inherent in the courts, and is “as ancient as the laws themselves.” Schick v. United States, 
195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904) (quoting Blackstone’s Commentaries). It is also the subject of statutory 
provisions in many states, including Ohio. See ORC Ch. 2705 (enacted in its original form in 1834). 
Although there is uncertainty nationally whether the existence of statutory provisions dealing with 
contempt should preempt the court’s inherent contempt powers, see Daniel J. Meador, Inherent 
Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1805, 1818 (1995), it is 
clear that the statutory provisions do not supersede the inherent power in Ohio. See, e.g., the 
following contempt cases involving nonlawyers: State ex rel. Bitter v. Missig, 72 Ohio St.3d 249, 
252, 648 N.E.2d 1355, 1357 (1995) (“The court of appeals possesses both inherent and statutory 
authority to compel compliance with its lawfully issued orders.”); Burt v. Dodge, 65 Ohio St.3d 34, 
35, 599 N.E.2d 693, 694 (1992) (“A common pleas court has both inherent and statutory power to 
punish contempts.”). 
(Special note should be taken of the opinion of the court in the nonlawyer case of  In re Contemnor 
Caron, 110 Ohio Misc.2d 58, 744 N.E.2d 787 (C.P. Franklin 2000), which is an encyclopedic 
treatise on the law of contempt in Ohio (as well as Anglo-American contempt law generally). If you 
have an issue relating to contempt in Ohio, Caron should be consulted.) 
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Disobedience of court orders can, of course, occur either in, near, or away from, the courtroom. As 
noted in Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 61:1201 (1998): 
 Courts frequently exercise their contempt power to control and 
punish the misbehavior of lawyers in court. Less frequently, courts use 
their contempt power to punish conduct that takes place outside the 
courtroom, such as disobedience of court orders. 
Direct contempt involving lawyer misconduct in or near the courtroom, which includes but is not 
limited to violation of court orders or rulings, is discussed in section 3.5:400. The present section 
examines indirect contempt, where the lawyer, outside the presence of the court, fails to obey one or 
more of its rulings or orders with respect to discovery or the like. See  In re LoDico, 2005 Ohio 172, 
2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 165 (Stark) (discussing the direct/indirect distinction at para. 35). Most of 
these kinds of cases involve criminal contempt -- that is, a sanction that is punitive and intended to 
vindicate the court’s authority, typically as punishment for prior disobedience -- rather than civil 
contempt, where the sanction is designed to coerce compliance with the court’s order. Perhaps the 
leading case setting forth the civil/criminal distinction is Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 
221 U.S. 418, 441-43 (1911). The Gompers dichotomy is generally followed in Ohio lawyer 
contempt decisions. E.g., In re LoDico, 1999 CA00159, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2851 (Stark June 
26, 2000); Catholic Soc. Servs. v. Howard, 106 Ohio App.3d 615, 666 N.E.2d 658 (Cuyahoga 
1995); In re Davis, 77 Ohio App.3d 257, 602 N.E.2d 270 (Montgomery 1991). See  In re 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Attorney Potts, 100 Ohio St.3d 97, 2003 Ohio 5234, 796 
N.E.2d 915 (characterizing as criminal contempt lawyer’s refusal to obey order to submit documents 
for in-camera review, where trial court “fined him $250, and ordered him to serve ten days in the 
county jail.” Id. at para. 6). See also State ex rel. Benbow v. Runyan, 99 Ohio St.3d 410, 2003 
Ohio 4127, 792 N.E.2d 1124 (rejecting lawyer’s argument that he was entitled to writ of prohibition 
from court of appeals to prevent trial court from proceeding with criminal-contempt proceedings 
against him because complaint of his client had been dismissed with prejudice after adverse jury 
verdict against it; “even when a trial court has unconditionally dismissed a case, the court retains 
jurisdiction to consider the collateral issue of criminal contempt.” Id. at para. 7.). Accord State ex 
rel. Amhed v. Costine, 100 Ohio St.3d 36, 2003 Ohio 4776, 795 N.E.2d 672 (“Trial courts may 
consider collateral issues like criminal contempt and Civ.R. 11 sanctions despite a dismissal.” Id. at 
para. 5.); State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 740 N.E.2d 265 (2001) (while civil 
contempt proceeding is rendered moot upon settlement or dismissal of underlying action (citing 
Gompers), criminal contempt, being separate and independent proceeding, can be pursued by court 
after dismissal of underlying case; nonlawyer contemnor). 
A succinct (perhaps a bit too succinct) formulation of direct/indirect civil/criminal contempt 
distinctions is found in In re Contempt of Heffernan, 117 Ohio App.3d 499, 2008 Ohio 3685, 895 
N.E.2d 215 (Cuyahoga): “A criminal contempt order serves the purpose of punishing the offender 
and vindicating the court’s authority, while a civil contempt order attempts to coerce compliance with 
the court’s directives. Indirect contempt occurs outside the court’s presence. Direct contempt is 
misbehavior that occurs in the court’s presence and that obstructs the due and orderly administration 
of justice.” Id. at para. 20 (citations omitted). 
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For an example of indirect civil contempt in a criminal case, see  In re Original Grand Jury 
Investigation, 89 Ohio St.3d 544, 733 N.E.2d 1135 (2000) (lawyer ordered by court to comply with 
subpoena and turn over to grand jury letter containing threats against others written by client to his 
brother; lawyer refused and was held in civil contempt under ORC 2705.02, with an ongoing daily 
fine of $25 until he complied with order. Court of appeals held that lawyer had obligation to turn over 
letter but that contempt citation would be vacated upon lawyer’s compliance with order; the Supreme 
Court affirmed). 
A somewhat unique civil-contempt case in a criminal setting was presented in State v. Doe, 101 Ohio 
St.3d 170, 2004 Ohio 705, 803 N.E.2d 777. In Doe, the contemptuous conduct was the refusal by 
lawyer Lewis to answer grand jury interrogatories after the trial court had ordered her to do so. (The 
lawyer’s refusal was based on privilege, which the Court held had been waived by the deceased 
client’s spouse in accordance with ORC 2317.02(A); see discussion at section 1.6:500.) Arguably 
this behavior was, like In re Original Grand Jury, an indirect contempt, occurring out of the 
presence of the court. But a statute makes clear that such a case is to be treated as one for direct 
contempt, as if in the presence of the court. See ORC 2939.15 (“Court may proceed against witness 
for contempt”): 
 If the Court of Common Pleas determines that a witness before 
the grand jury is required to answer an interrogatory and such witness 
persists in his refusal, he shall be brought before the court, which shall 
proceed in a like manner as if such witness had been interrogated and 
refused to answer in open court. 
(Emphasis added.) Perhaps this statutory language invests the trial court with authority to proceed 
with summary contempt proceedings (as to which see section 3.5:400), but in this case the court held 
a hearing, with Lewis and her lawyer in attendance, and Lewis was given the opportunity to justify 
her refusal. Lewis offered no evidence, and the court found her in contempt and ordered her confined 
to jail unless she purged herself of the contempt by answering the questions by noon of the next day. 
Lewis appealed, and the contempt order was stayed pending disposition of the appeal. In its 
unanimous affirmance, the Supreme Court stated that the “trial court did not err in finding Lewis in 
contempt. The judgment of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed.” Id. at para. 23. Although all of 
the justices concurred in Chief Justice Moyer’s opinion for the Court, in a separate concurring opinion 
joined by five of the seven justices, Justice Lundberg Stratton argued that while 
our judgment technically affirms that Lewis was in contempt . . ., the 
assertion of attorney-client privilege under these unique circumstances 
was an issue of first impression in this state. Consequently, unless 
Lewis continues to refuse to testify despite our ruling, I believe that no 
sanctions should be imposed on her. 
Id. at para. 24. With respect, it would appear from the procedural posture of the case that this is 
exactly what should happen in any event. The contempt order was stayed pending disposition on 
appeal. It thus seems unlikely in the extreme that the trial court would order Lewis to jail without 
giving her the opportunity to comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling. In that event, sanctions would 
in all probability be imposed only if “Lewis continues to refuse to testify despite our ruling.” Id. 
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As will be demonstrated by many of the cases discussed in the subdivisions that follow, the general 
rule is that the sanction of indirect contempt for out-of-court conduct cannot be imposed unless the 
procedural safeguards of notice and hearing are provided. See ORC 2705.03. The circumstances in 
which a court may invoke the summary contempt power -- i.e., without hearing or other due process 
norms -- for direct contempt of court are explored in detail in section 3.5:400. The nuances involved 
in the direct/indirect and direct/summary contempt distinctions are also reflected in  In re Davis, 77 
Ohio App.3d 257, 602 N.E.2d 270 (Montgomery 1991), discussed in this section at “Out-of-court 
contempt - Nonappearance or late appearance for court date” infra. 
Out-of-court contempt - Probate matters: There are a number of nondisciplinary cases in which a 
lawyer has been found in contempt for disobeying a probate court order away from the courtroom. 
The most recent Supreme Court case in point is  In re Guardianship of Jadwisiak, 64 Ohio St.3d 
176, 593 N.E.2d 1379 (1992). Jadwisiak involved court approval of settlement proceeds from 
personal-injury and product-liability actions obtained on behalf of a ward of the court. Martin, Florida 
co-counsel for the ward, had previously received attorney fees from the settlement proceeds in the 
product-liability action, and the Ohio probate court, on March 2, 1988, ordered Martin to remit these 
funds to the Ohio court. Martin refused to comply and was found in contempt. Pursuant to the 
contempt ruling, Martin could purge himself by paying into court the wrongfully withheld funds, plus 
10% interest. Martin did not comply with this order either, and was again found in contempt, with the 
penalty this time a $250 fine and ten days in prison. The court of appeals affirmed the contempt 
judgment. In the Supreme Court, Martin argued that the probate court lacked personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction, that the March 2 order was therefore void, and that contempt cannot be used to 
enforce an invalid order. The Court, affirming this aspect of the case, held that the probate court had 
subject matter jurisdiction over the entire amount of the settlement funds, including attorney fees. 
Pursuant thereto, the probate court had the inherent power to order Martin to remit the ward’s 
settlement proceeds under his control so that that court could carry out its statutory obligation to 
maintain control over the entire settlement proceeds, which were part of the ward’s estate. It followed 
that its order to compel Martin to return the funds was authorized by law and that the court could 
properly enforce its order in a contempt proceeding. The probate court’s contempt authority, 
conferred by ORC 2101.23, gives the court the power to punish contempt as it might be punished in 
the court of common pleas -- as a result, ORC 2705.02(A), disobeyance of a lawful court order, was 
applicable. Accord  In re Kinross, 84 Ohio App.3d 335, 616 N.E.2d 1128 (Hamilton 1992) (same; 
Jadwisiak followed; appellant lawyer properly found guilty of a first indirect contempt, but the fine 
imposed -- $500 per day until compliance with order to return funds -- was in excess of that permitted 
by ORC 2705.05(A)(1); cause therefore remanded regarding amount of fine). But see inherent power 
cases holding that the court is not bound by the statutory limits, this section infra at “Out-of-court 
contempt - Sanctions.” 
A more recent indirect criminal contempt decision in the probate context is In re Hards, 175 Ohio 
App.3d 168, 2008 Ohio 630, 885 N.E.2d 980 (Lake). The court of appeals in Hards affirmed the 
trial court’s finding of numerous acts of contempt in violation of ORC 2705.02 by a guardian who 
refused to obey multiple probate court orders relating to the guardianship and guardianship assets. 
The guardian’s lawyer was likewise found in contempt; his “culpability resides in the fact that he 
advised his client, Adams, to disobey court orders to take these actions.” Id. at para. 54. “An attorney 
who advises or counsels a client to act in defiance of a court’s valid order is liable to contempt.” Id.  at 
para. 56. 
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A case in which the conduct was found to be a direct contempt, because the conduct was a fraud on 
the court, is nevertheless treated here rather than in section 3.5:400, inasmuch as it did not involve the 
subject matter of that section -- disruption of proceedings in the presence of the court; instead, it 
concerned actions taken out of the presence of the court -- typically categorized as indirect contempt. 
The case,  In re Estate of Wright, 165 Ohio St. 15, 133 N.E.2d 350 (1956), dealt with an 
administrator of an estate who, without disclosure to the probate court, contracted to represent the heir 
in connection with the estate. The Supreme Court held that direct contempt is “not confined to a 
disorderly or obstreperous act in the presence of the court itself” (conduct covered in section 3.5:400), 
but also includes 
conduct obstructing justice in the court itself in failing to make a frank 
and full disclosure, in failing to give the court full information as to his 
contract with the sole heir at the time such agreement was entered into, 
and in failing to obtain the consent of such agreement from all parties 
concerned in the administration of the estate. 
 An act need not be in the immediate presence of the court in 
order to constitute direct contempt, if it tends to obstruct justice or 
interfere with actions of the court in the courtroom itself. 
Id. at 25-26, 133 N.E.2d at 357-58. Since the act was “such as to influence or persuade the court to 
make orders in its own courtroom, concerning which it probably would have done otherwise had the 
act not occurred,” id., it “interfere[d] with actions of the court in the courtroom itself.” Reversing the 
court of appeals, which had ruled that the contempt was not direct and that the provisions of ORC 
2705.02-03 for indirect contempt were therefore applicable, the Supreme Court held that the probate 
court could penalize the administrator summarily under ORC 2705.01. In fact, however, a 
“protracted trial” was had on both the motion for vacation of the final account and the matter of 
contempt, and “all parties were apprised that the matter of contempt of court was being tried along 
with the matter of the vacation of the final account.”  Id. at 17, 25, 133 N.E.2d at 352, 357. Thus, as 
a practical matter, it would appear that the contemnor did receive notice and hearing comparable to 
that provided for in ORC 2705.03. Moreover, since the hearing was held well after the events giving 
rise to the charge, there was no “need for speed” -- a factor that some courts have held must be present, 
in addition to the contempt being direct and an obstruction of justice, before the summary procedures 
of ORC 2705.01 can be invoked. See, e.g., In re Davis, 77 Ohio App.3d 257, 263-64, 602 N.E.2d 
270, 274-75 (Montgomery 1991), discussed this section infra at “Out-of-court contempt - 
Nonappearance or late appearance for court date.” This view on the requisites for summary contempt 
is also fully explored in  In re Contemnor Caron, 110 Ohio Misc.2d 58, 89-97, 744 N.E.2d 787, 
809-15 (C.P. Franklin 2000). Further discussion of summary contempt is found in section 3.5:400. 
Not surprisingly, cases involving lawyers decided subsequent to Wright cite it in support of the 
proposition that a direct contempt obstructing justice in the abstract, rather than having an immediate 
negative impact on in-court proceedings, is sufficient to bring the summary procedures of ORC 
2705.01 into play (even though in some of them, as in Wright, a hearing was nevertheless held).  Fed. 
Land Bank Ass’n v. Walton, 99 Ohio App.3d 729, 651 N.E.2d 1048 (Wyandot 1995) (lawyer’s 
filing of memorandum accusing judge of fraud constituted direct contempt; summary punishment 
affirmed); see State v. Local Union 5760, 172 Ohio St. 75, 173 N.E.2d 331 (1961) (hearing held, 
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but trial court had power to try nonlawyer defendants summarily for interfering with sheriff’s attempt 
to execute court order of replevin). 
While the Supreme Court in Wright does not mention a specific rule or order of the probate court 
violated by the attorney, there can be little doubt that the Court viewed the lawyer as violating settled 
law relating to administration of estates and representation of conflicting interests: 
 It is a fundamental principle of law that, where parties having 
different interests are involved, no lawyer can represent or receive 
compensation from such parties without a full disclosure, to all parties 
involved, of his dual representation and the arrangements as to the 
compensation to be received therefrom. 
 Every lawyer worthy of the name learns this principle ab 
initio. . . . It follows that, where one is acting as an administrator of an 
estate, his sole duty is to its proper administration, and he cannot 
properly have an arrangement to represent a claimant against the estate 
without a full disclosure of such arrangement to the court and to all 
persons concerned with the estate, not only as to terms of the 
arrangement, but as to the compensation he is to receive therefrom. 
165 Ohio St. at 23, 133 N.E.2d at 356. 
Out-of-court contempt - County courts: County courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction created by 
statute, have no inherent authority to hold parties in contempt, but only such powers as are expressly 
conferred on them by statute. State ex rel. Johnson v. County Court, 25 Ohio St.3d 53, 495 N.E.2d 
16 (1986). Cf. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Adjustment Serv. Corp., 89 Ohio St.3d 385, 388-89, 732 
N.E.2d 362, 366 (2000) (“The board [of Commissioners on the Unauthorized Practice of Law], 
having been created by rule, has no inherent power to hold in contempt, just as a tribunal created by 
statute is confined to its statutory powers and has no inherent powers.”). The Johnson Court also held 
that, pursuant to then-existing ORC 1907.371, the provisions of ORC 2705 “apply to county courts 
except where ‘a special provision is made in Chapter[] 1907 . . . .’ Since contempt powers are 
conferred on county court judges by R.C. 1907.171, they have no authority to discharge contempts 
under R.C. 2705.02.” 25 Ohio St.3d at 56, 495 N.E.2d at 20 (emphasis by the Court). 
New legislation regarding the contempt powers of county courts became effective on March 17, 1987. 
Former ORC 1907.171 and 1907.371 were repealed, and pursuant to ORC 1907.18(B), county 
courts now have contempt power that, in the absence of any such specific provision in ORC 1907 
(ORC 1907.171 having been repealed), may be exercised “in a manner authorized by the Revised 
Code or common law for the judges of the courts of common pleas.” Thus, the provisions of ORC 
2705 are now available to county courts, and, arguably, by the statute’s reference to “common law,” 
so is the inherent-contempt power. 
Out-of-court contempt - Nonappearance or late appearance for court date: Failure to appear at a 
scheduled hearing by a lawyer having knowledge of the hearing is typically treated as an indirect 
criminal contempt. E.g., In re Olivito, 2005 Ohio 2701, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 2548 (Mahoning); 
In re Purola, 73 Ohio App.3d 306, 596 N.E.2d 1140 (Auglaize 1991). 
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If the attorney shows up late, things get more complicated: In Weiland v. Indus. Comm’n, 166 Ohio 
St. 62, 139 N.E.2d 36 (1956), appellant was late for a jury trial because his car broke down. The trial 
court found him guilty of contempt in violation of the trial-scheduling order, and the court of appeals 
affirmed. Reversing, the Supreme Court noted that part of the offense occurred on the drive to the 
court and thus was an indirect contempt. Appellant was therefore entitled to offer evidence to show 
extenuating circumstances, which the trial court did not afford. The case was remanded for rehearing. 
(The Court viewed the act of “entering the court late and after the trial had started,” as a direct 
contempt.  Id. at 66, 139 N.E.2d at 39.) Concurring, Judge Stewart would have entered final 
judgment for appellant: 
[W]here a lawyer starts for court at a time when he reasonably expects 
to be on time, and through an accident, happening without fault on his 
part, he arrives late, and particularly where he has taken pains to inform 
the court of his predicament and that he will be late, in my opinion he is 
no more guilty of contempt of court than would a judge, who was 
prevented from opening court in time as a result of like circumstances, 
be guilty of a dereliction of duty. 
Id. at 67, 139 N.E.2d at 39. Accord, as to the majority opinion, State v. Butler, No. 34574, 1976 
Ohio App Lexis 7467 (Cuyahoga Feb. 26, 1976) (tardiness of lawyer has elements of both direct 
and indirect contempt). But see State v. Belcastro, 139 Ohio App.3d 498, 744 N.E.2d 271 
(Cuyahoga 2000) (without notice or hearing, lawyer found in both direct and indirect contempt for 
noncompliance with order to be in court within ten minutes after verdict in criminal case; order of 
direct contempt reversed: “Contemnor’s inaccessibility necessarily occurred outside the courtroom. 
We therefore find that the court erred by classifying contemnor’s conduct as a direct contempt”; 
indirect contempt order remanded for hearing under ORC 2705.03: “This court has consistently held 
that arriving late to a hearing or not appearing at all constitutes an indirect contempt of the court.”  Id. 
at 501, 744 N.E.2d at 273 (citations omitted).). Accord In re Contempt of Heffernan, 177 Ohio 
App.3d 499, 2008 Ohio 3685, 895 N.E.2d 215 (Cuyahoga) (following the Belcastro language 
quoted above; reversing trial court; arriving late is not direct contempt and could not be summarily 
punished; trial court summary finding of direct contempt reversed). Note that under the Weiland rule 
the direct contempt aspect -- “entering the court late and after the trial had started” -- has the effect of 
giving the lawyer who never shows up the protections afforded indirect contemnors, whereas the 
tardy lawyer who does show is faced with a direct contempt charge as well. 
The court’s decision in  In re Davis, 77 Ohio App.3d 257, 602 N.E.2d 270 (Montgomery 1991), is 
interesting in a number of respects. Davis was summarily found guilty of direct criminal contempt 
after failing to appear for the trial of his client on the date scheduled; as a result, the court ordered a 
mistrial. On appeal of his contempt conviction, Davis argued that his conduct did not constitute direct 
contempt. While the court of appeals recognized that “Ohio has generally treated an attorney’s 
absence from court as an indirect contempt,”  id. at 266, 602 N.E.2d at 276, the court nevertheless 
refused to overturn the trial court’s finding that this was a direct contempt. This, however, was not the 
end of the inquiry: The court held that the use of the summary contempt power set forth in ORC 
2705.01 requires, not only a direct contempt, “but a palpable need to act immediately.”  Id. at 267, 
602 N.E.2d at 277. Inasmuch as the proceeding had terminated in a mistrial two days before the 
contempt sanction was imposed summarily, 
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the court was not faced or presented . . . with a form of court-disrupting 
misbehavior which constituted an open threat to the orderly procedure 
of the court and required immediate suppression and punishment to 
preserve the order of the court’s proceedings. . . . The need, if any, for 
immediate action terminated with the mistrial. There was no longer any 
“need for speed,” which is a concomitant requirement for a summary 
proceeding. By following a summary procedure the court exceeded its 
inherent authority, as discussed in Cooke and Oliver [Cooke v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257(1948)], 
supra. 
77 Ohio App.3d at 266-67, 602 N.E.2d at 276-77 (emphasis by the court). Pursuant to the Davis 
analysis, the trial court should have proceeded under ORC 2705.03 instead of ORC 2705.01 and 
conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether or not appellant was in contempt. See further 
discussion of this issue in section 3.5:400. 
In contrast to Davis, the court of appeals in  In re Purola, 73 Ohio App.3d 306, 596 N.E.2d 1140 
(Auglaize 1991), did follow the general Ohio rule and found that an attorney’s failure to appear for a 
final pretrial as ordered was an indirect criminal contempt. Although the trial court characterized the 
contempt as direct in its journal entry, the lower court in fact dealt with the contempt as if it were 
indirect and provided notice of the charge and a full hearing. The appellate court therefore concluded 
that the trial court’s classification of the contempt as direct in its journal entry was harmless error and 
affirmed. 
Out-of-court contempt - Other: As the previous subsections reflect, a wide variety of out-of-court 
conduct can trigger contempt. A few additional examples involving lawyers include: 
 Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Ishler, 44 Ohio St.2d 204, 339 N.E.2d 828 (1975). Ishler, having 
previously been indefinitely suspended and ordered not to practice law in Ohio by the 
Supreme Court, concocted a scheme whereby he appeared in 61 cases in the Toledo 
Municipal Court, pursuant to supposed “assignments” of claims purchased by promissory 
notes, so that he could institute legal proceedings on the claims in his name as assignee, acting 
as “attorney pro se.” As the Supreme Court found, this “was an attempt to do by indirection 
that which he acknowledged he could not do directly by reason of his indefinite suspension 
from the practice of law.”  Id. at 207, 359 N.E.2d at 830. As a result, this “course of conduct 
contrived to circumvent the July 3, 1974, order of this court indefinitely suspending him from 
the practice of law in Ohio . . . and as such constitute acts of contempt of this court in violation 
of R.C. 2705.02(A).” Id. 
 In re Green, 172 Ohio St. 269, 175 N.E.2d 59 (1961), rev’d, 369 U.S. 689 (1962). In Green, 
a union lawyer knowingly advised his clients to disobey a temporary restraining order against 
picketing entered by the common pleas court. A written charge of contempt was lodged 
against him under ORC 2705.02, and an ORC 2705.03 hearing was held. As a result, he was 
found in contempt; the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed: 
 
[A]n attorney at law who deliberately advises his clients against whom 
the order is directed to disobey and disregard it, which they do upon 
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such advice, is guilty of contempt of court and may be punished 
therefor. 
Id. at 269-70, 175 N.E.2d at 60 (syllabus three). (Accord In re Hards, 175 Ohio App.3d 
168, 2008 Ohio 630, 885 N.E.2d 980 (Lake) (applying the Green rule to lawyer who advised 
guardian client to disobey probate court orders).) While the Ohio Supreme Court in Green 
found “unfortunate” the acrimonious situation that developed between Green and the judge at 
the hearing, it rejected Green’s claim of denial of due process. Reversing, the United States 
Supreme Court held that it was a violation of due process to convict Green of contempt 
pursuant to a hearing in which he was not allowed to testify on his own behalf (the Court 
characterized the hearing as one in which the judge ruled “that the only purpose of the hearing 
was to sentence petitioner,” 369 U.S. at 691) and without an opportunity to establish that the 
state court was acting in a field reserved exclusively for the NLRB.  In re Green, 369 U.S. 
689 (1962). 
 State ex rel. Turner v. Albin, 118 Ohio St. 527, 161 N.E. 792 (1928). Albin involved a 
scheme to evade the standards for admission to the Ohio Bar. The defendants were charged 
with a conspiracy in which, in exchange for money, exam results for unsuccessful applicants 
would be given a passing grade by altering the test results after they had been received in the 
Supreme Court Clerk’s Office. In addition to the candidates for admission, an attorney 
previously admitted and a former employee in the Clerk’s office were involved in the scheme 
and named as defendants. The Supreme Court noted that the legislature made the bar 
examination a prerequisite to admission and empowered the Supreme Court to prescribe rules 
governing same. Thus, in addition to the good moral character requirement, “it is equally 
important that the processes of selection be executed in an honorable manner, and that they 
not be defeated or frustrated by fraudulent means.”  Id. at 534, 161 N.E. at 794. All 
defendants, having engaged in a fraud on the Court, were found guilty of contempt and, if 
previously admitted, were disbarred. 
 In City of Garfield Heights v. Wolpert, 122 Ohio App.3d 287, 701 N.E.2d 734 (Cuyahoga 
1997), the court, affirming a finding of indirect contempt, applied ORC 2705.02(A) and 
concluded: 
[W]e know of no rule of practice within our adversary system which 
authorizes an attorney to make repeated, ex parte telephone calls to the 
tribunal before which he or she is practicing after being commanded 
not to do so by the tribunal. 
Id. at 293, 701 N.E.2d at 738. 
Out-of-court contempt - Sanctions: Typical sanctions for contemptuous failure to comply with a court 
order are a fine, imprisonment, or both. See, e.g., Zakany v. Zakany, 9 Ohio St.3d 192, 459 N.E.2d 
870 (1984) (ten days in jail plus $500 fine; nonlawyer case);  In re Purola, 73 Ohio App.3d 306, 596 
N.E.2d 1140 (Auglaize 1991) ($100 fine; lawyer case). ORC 2705.05(A) provides that in the case of 
indirect criminal contempt, penalties are limited to, for a first offense, a fine of not more than $250, 
imprisonment for a definite term of not more than 30 days, or both; for a second offense, a fine of 
$500, imprisonment for 60 days, or both; and for a third offense, a $1000 fine, imprisonment of not 
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more that 90 days, or both. E.g., In re Kinross, 84 Ohio App.3d 335, 616 N.E.2d 1128 (Hamilton 
1992) (reversing imposition on lawyer of fine that exceeded ORC 2705.05(A)(1) limit for first 
indirect offense). The court in  In re Olivito, 2005 Ohio 2701, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 2548 
(Mahoning), had it both ways; while recognizing that courts have inherent power to punish for 
contempt and thus are not bound by the ORC 2705.05(A) limits, it proceeded to find that the trial 
court’s imposition of a 30-day sentence (within the statutory limit for a first offense) was nevertheless 
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion in the circumstances presented. 
In addition to the lawyer cases of Olivito and State ex rel. Turner v. Albin, 118 Ohio St. 527, 527, 
161 N.E. 792, 792 (1928) (syllabus two) (“courts have inherent power to impose a penalty 
reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the offense”), there is a substantial body of Ohio 
nonlawyer contempt authority holding that the limits of ORC 2705.05(A)(1)-(3) cannot constrain a 
court’s inherent authority to impose the sanction it considers appropriate. E.g., McDaniel v. 
McDaniel, 74 Ohio App.3d 577, 599 N.E.2d 758 (Cuyahoga 1991) (indirect contempt; “[w]hile 
[ORC] 2705.05 sets forth the penalties for contempt of court, a court may, pursuant to its inherent 
powers, punish a contemptuous refusal to comply with its orders, without regard to the statutory 
penalties,”  id. at 579, 599 N.E.2d at 759); In re Guardianship of Sechler, Nos. 98AP-1223, -1128, 
-968, -1107, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2036, at *25 (Franklin May 4, 1999) (collecting cases). See 
Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Project Jericho, 52 Ohio St.3d 56, 556 N.E.2d 
157 (1990) (in indirect-contempt case, Court stated that if valid order has been issued, “a court has the 
statutory and inherent power to entertain contempt proceedings and punish disobedience of that order,  
id. at 61, 556 N.E.2d at 163 (citing ORC 2705.02(A) and Zakany syllabus recognizing both 
statutory authority and inherent power to punish disobedience of orders with contempt proceedings; 
Court further held that trial court properly assessed attorney fees against contemnors, even though 
ORC 2705.02(A)(1)-(3) (not cited) does not include attorney fees in the penalties that may be 
imposed in cases of indirect contempt). See generally  In re Contemnor Caron, 110 Ohio Misc.2d 
58, 102, 104, 744 N.E.2d 787, 819, 820 (C.P. Franklin 2000). But see  In re Lands, 146 Ohio St. 
589, 67 N.E.2d 433 (1946) (even though the contempt power is inherent and not dependent on 
legislative sanction, “where the General Assembly has prescribed the procedure for the exercise of 
the power it is the duty of the court to follow such procedure,”  id. at 595, 67 N.E.2d at 437). 
Three subsequent Supreme Court cases have cited Lands on this point. (All of these cases, with the 
exception of Local 5760, are indirect-contempt cases, like Lands.) The first is State v. County 
Court, 25 Ohio St.3d 53, 54, 495 N.E.2d 16, 18 (1986) (dictum; “[s]tatutory powers to deal with 
contempts are merely cumulative and in addition to the inherent authority of the court . . . . However, 
where a procedure has been prescribed for the exercise of the power to punish contempts by rule or by 
statute, it is the duty of the court to follow such procedure [citing Lands].”). The second case, City of 
Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Dist. Council 51, 35 Ohio St.2d 197, 299 N.E.2d 686 (1973), draws a 
similar power/procedure distinction: On the one hand, compare: “it has been stated that statutory 
procedures must be followed in indirect contempt proceedings,  id. at 202, 299 N.E.2d at 692 (citing 
Lands); that “R.C. 2705.03 sets forth the procedure which must be followed in indirect contempt 
proceedings,”  id. at 203, 299 N.E.2d at 292; and “it is conceded that the General Assembly may 
prescribe procedure in indirect contempt cases” id. with, on the other hand: “The power to punish for 
contempt is said to be inherent in the courts and to exist independently from express constitutional 
provision or legislative enactment,”  id. at 202, 299 N.E.2d at 691 (citing Local Union 5760); “[i]t is, 
however, highly doubtful that the General Assembly may properly limit the power of a court to 
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punish for contempt,”  id. at 207, 299 N.E.2d at 694; and “the power to punish for contempt has 
traditionally been regarded as inherent in the courts and not subject to legislative control,” id. (citing 
Local Union 5760). The Court subsequently stated in State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 203 n.3, 
400 N.E.2d 386, 389 n.3 (1980) (dictum), that “[w]e adhere” to the position in Cincinnati that it is 
“highly doubtful” the legislature can limit the courts’ power to punish for contempt. 
The third Supreme Court case invoking Lands on this point is State v. Local Union 5760, 172 Ohio 
St. 75, 173 N.E.2d 331 (1961), a direct-contempt case, which noted, after quoting the Lands 
reference to the duty to follow statutory procedures, that “[t]he opinion in that case, however, in no 
way implies that courts are bound by such statutory procedure in cases of direct or summary 
contempt.”  Id. at 80, 173 N.E.2d at 336. But the pertinent syllabus in Local 5760 does not refer to 
direct or summary contempt; it confirms generally that “[t]he inherent power of a court to punish for 
contempt of court may not be limited by legislative authority,”  id. at 75, 173 N.E.2d at 333 (syllabus 
one). 
Based on the foregoing, one can say with some confidence that the inherent power of a court to deal 
with direct contempt, including the imposition of sanctions and/or the procedures utilized, cannot be 
limited by the legislature. Given the rather murky state of the case law, the conclusions to be drawn 
with respect to indirect contempt are stated with less confidence but appear to be as follows: the 
power to deal with indirect contempt is inherent in the courts; that power cannot be circumscribed by 
the legislature. In matters of procedure, however, such as the notice, hearing, and bail rights specified 
in ORC 2705.03-05, legislative requisites must be followed, so long as they are consistent with due 
process and other constitutional protections. 
ORC 2705.06 expressly provides for imprisonment to coerce compliance in cases of civil contempt: 
“When the contempt consists of the omission to do an act which the accused can yet perform, he may 
be imprisoned until he performs it.” E.g., In re Guardianship of Brisboy, 94 Ohio App.3d 361, 640 
N.E.2d 908 (Huron 1994) (imprisonment until repayment ordered is made). 
Out-of-court contempt - Abuse: The potential abuse arising from misuse of the court’s contempt 
powers is well illustrated in City of Cleveland v. Geraci, No. 64075, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5997 
(Cuyahoga Dec. 16, 1993). In Geraci, the attorney for a defendant who had been cited for a traffic 
violation complained to a local television station about the slowness of the elevators in the Justice 
Center. Upon learning of this heinous act, a Cleveland Municipal Court judge had Geraci haled into 
court and summarily found him guilty of both direct and indirect contempt. Not surprisingly, the 
Court of Appeals reversed: 
The conduct of the appellant did not obstruct the administration of 
justice. Thus, the trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of 
direct contempt . . . . 
Id. at *7-8. The finding of indirect contempt was also overturned, because the 
failure of the trial court to comply with the mandate of R.C. 2705.03 
requires a remand to the trial court for a new hearing with regard to 
whether the conduct of appellant constituted indirect contempt. 
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Id. at *10. 
Abuse of the contempt power can lead to disciplinary proceedings against the offending judge.  This 
occurred in Disciplinary Counsel v. Cox, 113 Ohio St.3d 48, 2007 Ohio 979, 862 N.E.2d 514, 
where respondent’s conduct was found to have violated various Canons of Judicial Conduct, as well 
as former DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).  It all started when 
James Portis, the alleged contemnor, accompanied his nephew to a hearing in respondent’s courtroom.  
Fines and costs were assessed against the nephew, and they left the courtroom to pay the amount.  
After the court cashier advised Portis that an additional $200 fee was owing, Portis responded that 
“judges can be crooks, too.”  After Portis left the courthouse, the cashier reported the remark to the 
judge, who ordered the police to arrest Portis.  After being locked up for three hours, Portis was 
brought back before respondent, who accused Portis of indirect contempt.  After considerable 
dialogue, during which it was apparent that Portis did not understand what was happening to him, he 
ended up pleading no contest, was fined $500 and assessed costs. 
Both the panel and the Board recommended a one-year suspension, but the Court, emphasizing the 
contempt aspect and respondent’s lying about it during the disciplinary investigation, found “[t]he 
recommended sanction too lenient for respondent’s egregious conduct” and imposed an indefinite 
suspension instead.  Rather than its proper use in service of the administration of justice, “here, it is 
obvious that respondent used this [contempt] power merely to intimidate and demean Portis.”  Id. at 
para. 41. 
[R]espondent concedes without explanation that he wrongly advised 
Portis that Portis had the burden of proving his innocence to the 
contempt charge.  Respondent also had no explanation for why he 
admonished Portis with the threat “That’s what we are going to try and 
prove against you,” implicating his own partiality in the process.  
Finally, respondent acknowledged that he had insulted Portis by 
suggesting that he was “too dense to understand” the contempt charge 
against him. 
Id. at para. 29. 
While this “subversive” conduct “seriously undermined these goals” of the even handed 
administration of justice and public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, id. at para. 42, what 
really set the Court off, we think, were respondent’s falsehoods to the relator – representing that he 
had actually heard the “crook” statement; that it was because of this “direct” contempt that Portis was 
placed in custody; and that Portis had pleaded no contest but had not been fined. 
[A]lthough neither the panel nor the board emphatically denounced 
respondent’s false accounts of the events underlying the Portis 
contempt citation, we find these untruths intolerable. . . . 
 That a lawyer who once served as a member of the judiciary in 
this state would submit dishonest or misleading information during a 
disciplinary investigation to cover up his misuse of judicial authority is 
an affront to our entire legal and disciplinary system. 
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Id. at paras. 43-44. 
Out-of-court contempt - Disciplinary proceedings against contemnors: In the group of cases under 
consideration in section 3.1:500, a few of the examples are disciplinary decisions where sanctions are 
premised, at least in part, on an underlying determination finding the respondent in contempt for 
having ignored or violated, away from the courtroom, a court order or ruling. Disciplinary cases of 
this kind include: 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Ewing, 83 Ohio St.3d 314, 699 
N.E.2d 928 (1998). In Ewing, respondent disbursed funds held in his 
lawyer trust account, including payment of legal fees to himself, even 
though prior orders entered both by the common pleas court and the 
bankruptcy court specifically prohibited him from doing so. The 
common pleas court found respondent in contempt for disbursing the 
funds, and the court of appeals affirmed. For knowingly violating the 
orders of both courts, respondent was disbarred by the Supreme Court. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Leary, 67 Ohio St.3d 425, 619 
N.E.2d 410 (1993). Respondent O’Leary acted as the attorney for 
Bowman, the administrator of an estate. Both respondent and the 
administrator were removed by the probate court and were ordered to 
turn over all estate assets and financial records to the new administrator. 
“However, Bowman and O’Leary defied this order, and on December 
18, 1986, Judge Spicer [of the probate court] held them in contempt of 
court.”  Id. at 426, 619 N.E.2d at 410. For his disregard of the probate 
court’s order (violating former OH DR 7-106(A)) and numerous other 
violations of the OHCPR, O’Leary was permanently disbarred. 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Sullivan, 65 Ohio St. 293, 603 N.E.2d 983 
(1992). Sullivan concerned respondent’s refusal to answer 
interrogatories after the trial court had granted a motion to compel 
answers. The court subsequently found Sullivan and her client in 
contempt for failure to obey the court’s discovery order. Respondent 
and the client were fined $500, plus $100 per day until the 
interrogatories were properly answered. They never were, and the fines 
remained unpaid. For this and other misconduct in the course of the 
litigation, respondent was indefinitely suspended from the practice of 
law. The Supreme Court also noted that respondent had a prior 
disciplinary infraction, with respect to which the Supreme Court had 
ordered her to pay the costs. The Court twice held her in contempt for 
failing to do so. 
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THE NOTE TO RULE 3.2 STATES THAT MR 3.2 IS NOT ADOPTED IN OHIO, BECAUSE 
"THE SUBSTANCE OF MODEL RULE 3.2 IS ADDRESSED BY OTHER PROVISIONS OF 
THE OHIO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, INCLUDING RULES 1.3 
[DILIGENCE], 3.1 [MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS], AND 4.4(a) 
[RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS]." (Bracketed material in original.) 
Ohio had no disciplinary rule comparable to MR 3.2, which deals with dilatory practices in litigation. 
The former OHCPR treated delay in two respects: First, as a form of neglect, for which the lawyer 
was subject to sanction under OH DR 6-101(A)(3). This provision, including the delay aspect, is 
treated in sections 1.3:200-:300 of the treatise. The treatise Rule 1.3 "delay" cases are procrastination 
cases. See section 1.3:300. Second, the lawyer was obligated under OH DR 7-102(A)(1) not to, 
among other things, "delay a trial" "when he knows or it is obvious that such action would serve 
merely to harass or maliciously injure another." This aspect of OH DR 7-102(A)(1) required dilatory 
action (or inaction) with knowing or objective intent to harass or injure. (MR 3.2 has no such 
express-intent caveat; it requires the lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation 
consistent with the interests of the client. Note, however, that pursuant to the comment, a failure to 
expedite is not reasonable if done "for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain 
rightful redress or repose." MR 3.2 cmt. [1].) Insofar as the disciplinary cases under OH DR 
7-102(A)(1) involved such intentional, dilatory litigation tactics, they are treated as a part of section 
3.2:200 below. (The aspects of former OH DR 7-102(A)(1) other than delay are discussed in section 
4.4:200.) 
3.2:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
None 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.2 
3.2:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio did not adopt MR 3.2 and substituted nothing in its place. See introductory paragraph above. 
3.2:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
See section 3.2:101. 
3.2:200  Dilatory Tactics 
Primary Ohio References 
None 
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ABA Model Rule 3.2 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:202 
ALI-LGL § 106 
Wolfram § 11.2.5 
The Ohio case law on intentionally dilatory litigation tactics is somewhat sparse. Nevertheless, there 
were a few Supreme Court disciplinary cases under the Code that dealt with former OH DR 
7-102(A)(1) violations. For example, in Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Finneran, 80 Ohio St.3d 428, 687 
N.E.2d 405 (1997), the Court (citing the delay language in both OH Civ R 11 and OH DR 
7-102(A)(1)) found that respondent's dilatory tactics (a pattern, in personal injury suits, of taking 
dismissals without prejudice under OH Civ R 41 in order to avoid having to respond to discovery 
requests, coupled with repeated refilings, most of which ultimately ended in dismissals with prejudice) 
violated OH DR 7-102(A)(1) and called for an indefinite suspension: 
 DR 7-102(A)(1) provides that a lawyer shall not "conduct a 
defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client * * * 
when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or 
maliciously injure another." Dilatory practices bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute. As the American Bar Association stated in its 
comments to Rule 3.2 of its Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
"Delay should not be indulged merely for the convenience of the 
advocates, or for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt 
to obtain rightful redress or repose." ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on 
Professional Conduct (1990), at 01:147. Engaging, as respondent did, 
in a procedure or tactic that had no purpose other than delay constituted 
representation outside the spirit and intent of our law. We conclude that 
the tactics of delay employed by respondent violated DR 7-102(A)(1). 
Id. at 431-32, 687 N.E.2d at 407-08 (ellipsis in original). In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
O'Leary, 67 Ohio St.3d 425, 619 N.E.2d 410 (1993), one of the numerous charges against the 
respondent concerned his deposition during the disciplinary process, at which he was to produce 
documents pursuant to subpoena. O'Leary appeared, but without the documents. The deposition was 
rescheduled and a more detailed subpoena issued. At the second deposition, O'Leary produced only 
one document called for by the subpoena. "The second deposition was held nearly three months after 
the first, yet O'Leary complained of insufficient time to locate his files."  Id. at 427, 619 N.E.2d 411. 
For this violation of Gov Bar R V(5)(A) and a host of OHCPR violations, including OH DR 
7-102(A)(1), O'Leary was disbarred. See also Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Sullivan, 65 Ohio St.3d 293, 
603 N.E.2d 983 (1992) (multiple efforts to delay proceedings, one of which was expressly noted as 
designed to "drag this out" in accordance with client's wishes, violated numerous provisions of the 
OHCPR and resulted in indefinite suspension, although, curiously, the list of violations did not 
include OH DR 7-102(A)(1)). 
A group of disciplinary cases involving a practice then common in traffic and criminal matters in 
Toledo Municipal Court should also be noted, even though OH DR 7-102(A)(1) was not invoked. In 
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the Toledo cases, a defense lawyer would be entrusted with the affidavit specifying the alleged 
offense and containing the history of the proceedings in the case but then would fail to return it to the 
court file until requested to do so. While the affidavit was out of the file, the case would not proceed. 
While various excuses were given for this delaying tactic, the lawyers involved were found guilty of 
violating provisions of the former OHCPR, usually OH DR 1-102(A)(5) and OH DR 7-102(A)(8). 
E.g., Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Wittenberg, 60 Ohio St.3d 94, 573 N.E.2d 641 (1991). These cases are 
discussed in more detail in section 8.4:500 at "Misconduct directed at a tribunal." 
A number of contempt cases also can be cited in which the attorney's conduct, rather than expediting 
litigation, purposefully hindered, disrupted, or delayed it. See, e.g., State ex rel. Seventh Urban, Inc. 
v. McFaul, 5 Ohio St.3d 120, 449 N.E.2d 445 (1983) (in-court assault on officer of opposing party 
minutes before proceeding in court of appeals was scheduled to begin, resulting in delay of 
proceeding); State v. Wilson, 30 Ohio St.2d 312, 285 N.E.2d 38 (1972) (constant interruptions and 
refusals to obey trial court orders resulted in "actual interruption of the court in the conduct of its 
business,"  id. at 314, 285 N.E.2d at 40). Compare City of Cleveland v. Heben, 74 Ohio App.3d 
568, 599 N.E.2d 766 (Cuyahoga 1991) (summary contempt of lawyer affirmed), with  In re 
Contempt of Rossman, 82 Ohio App.3d 730, 613 N.E.2d 241 (Cuyahoga 1992) (summary 
contempt of lawyer reversed). These two cases were decided by the same panel, and Judge Krupansky 
dissented in both. In Heben, while he agreed that the lawyer's remark ("I have no respect for this 
Court") "may have been ill-mannered, his conduct posed no 'actual or imminent' threat to the 
administration of justice." 74 Ohio App.3d at 575, 599 N.E.2d at 770. In Rossman, Judge 
Krupansky thought the lawyer's refusal to proceed with voir dire, contrary to the court's direct order to 
so do, thereby forcing the halt of the voir dire process and a delay in the trial, was an obstruction of 
justice that the trial court properly punished summarily. See further discussion of these cases at 
section 3.5:400. 
One of the most extensive discussions by the Ohio Supreme Court of dilatory tactics in litigation and 
matters preceding litigation occurs in a nondisciplinary context in the case of State ex rel. Ryant 
Comm. v. Lorain County Bd. of Elections, 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 712 N.E.2d 696 (1999). In Ryant, a 
group of voters had challenged a petition placing a zoning amendment on the ballot for a special 
election. At the same time, the challengers sought subpoenas "but did not inform the board [of 
elections] of any specific individuals or records that they wanted subpoenaed."  Id. at 109, 712 
N.E.2d at 698. In response to arguments that the challenge did not specify which signatures on the 
petition were being challenged, the challengers took the position that they would not provide this 
information until the board ordered them to do so because this information was deemed to be 
attorney-work product. Thereafter, the board ordered that this and other information be produced by a 
certain date. After the date had passed, the challengers notified the board that a handwriting expert 
would testify at a protest hearing. At this initial protest hearing, the challengers withheld their 
handwriting expert because only two of the four board members were present. On the day of the initial 
hearing, the challengers filed yet another protest, challenging additional signatures on the petition. At 
the final protest meeting, with three board members present, the handwriting expert testified that ten 
signatures were not written by the purported signatories (four of these had previously been 
invalidated by the board). Since the petitions had already been determined to contain over 2,000 valid 
signatures (80 more than required), the protest was denied and the rezoning issue certified for the 
special election ballot. A week prior to this final hearing, the challengers (now relators) filed a writ of 
prohibition in the Supreme Court to prevent the board from conducting the special election. 
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The Supreme Court denied the writ on grounds of laches, finding that the relators failed to specify 
their objections as required by statute and failed to act with the diligence and promptness required in 
election matters: 
The twenty-eight days between March 2 [when relators copied the 
petition] and March 30 [when they filed their protest] provided ample 
time for relators to review the part-petitions and board records to 
formulate specific objections to specific signatures. Instead, relators 
chose to include a laundry list of general, alleged defects. In the 
absence of specific objections, the board, the petitioners, and First 
Interstate [an intervenor] were left with one hundred twenty 
part-petitions containing over two thousand four hundred signatures 
and no notice of which specific signatures were being challenged and 
for what reasons. 
Id. at 112-13, 712 N.E.2d at 701. Zeroing in on relators' dilatory tactics, the Court concluded as 
follows: 
 By not promptly submitting a statutorily sufficient protest and 
by engaging in acts of gamesmanship that did not assist the board in its 
objective of expeditiously determining their challenges, relators 
commenced a sequence of dilatory actions that necessitated our order 
to impound the ballots for the special election. If relators had acted 
with the requisite diligence, they would have been able to file an 
expedited election case that could have been submitted to the court 
pursuant to the expedited election schedule of [S Ct Prac R X (9)] well 
before the June 1 special election. Instead, relators' unjustified delaying 
tactics led to our impoundment order and resulted in prejudice to the 
electors of Avon. 
Id. at 113-14, 712 N.E.2d at 701. 
And see ORC 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i), effective April 7, 2005, which includes improperly "causing 
unnecessary delay" as within the definition of "frivolous conduct" in a civil action. 
  
3.2:300  Judicial Sanctions for Dilatory Tactics 
Primary Ohio References 
OH Civ R 11 
ORC 2323.51, 2705 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.2 
826




ABA/BNA § 61:202 
ALI-LGL § 106 
Wolfram § 11.2.5 
Judicial sanctions for dilatory tactics in or related to litigation include: 
 Imposition of sanctions under ORC 2323.51 and court rules governing frivolous filings. See 
Crawford v. Ribbon Tech. Corp., 143 Ohio App.3d 510, 758 N.E.2d 674 (Franklin 2001) 
($1,000 in expenses and $3,230 in attorney fees imposed under ORC 2323.51). Both OH Civ 
R 11 and SCt R XIV(5)(A) expressly include action taken for the purpose of "delay" as a 
basis for the imposition of sanctions, but we found no Rule 11 cases expressly grounding 
sanctions on the delay aspect of the rule. Although the Supreme Court denied a motion for 
sanctions in the dilatory tactics case of State ex rel. Ryant Comm. v. Lorain County Bd. of 
Elections, 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 114 n.3, 712 N.E.2d 696, 702 n.3 (1999), one gets the 
impression from the opinion that the Court's imposition of sanctions pursuant to what is now 
SCt R XIV(5)(A) on the same lawyers in the later case of State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson, 
86 Ohio St.3d 629, 716 N.E.2d 704 (1999), was at least in part a nunc pro tunc correction of 
the failure to sanction in Ryant. See  id. at 636, 716 N.E.2d at 711. See section 3.1:300. 
 Citation for contempt. See State ex rel. Seventh Urban, Inc. v. McFaul, 5 Ohio St.3d 120, 
449 N.E.2d 445 (1983) (direct criminal contempt; contemnor received jail sentence 
(suspended), was fined, and was assessed the costs of the contempt hearing); State v. Wilson, 
30 Ohio St.2d 312, 285 N.E.2d 38 (1972) (affirmance of summary contempt finding; fine of 
$500 and five days in jail imposed by trial court, which jail sentence was suspended by court 
of appeals); City of Cleveland v. Heben, 74 Ohio App.3d 568, 599 N.E.2d 766 (Cuyahoga 
1991) (direct criminal contempt; fine of $250 affirmed, imprisonment for 30 days found 
unreasonably excessive and reversed). See section 3.5:400. 
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3.3:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.3 
3.3:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 3.3 is for the most part substantively identical to MR 3.3. Differences are noted as 
follows: 
In division (b) of the Ohio Rule, the disclosure obligation regarding a 
person who is engaging, will engage, or has engaged in criminal or 
fraudulent conduct makes express reference to the client: thus “, 
including the client,” has been added after “person”. 
In division (c), after “continue” the Ohio Rule substitutes “until the 
issue to which the duty relates is determined by the highest tribunal that 
may consider the issue, or the time has expired for such determination,” 
for “to the conclusion of the proceeding,”. 
3.3:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.3(a): DR 7-102(A)(1), (4), & (5) & 
7-106(B)(1). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.3(b): DR 7-102(B). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.3(c): DR 7-106(B). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.3(d): None. 
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3.3:200  False Statements to a Tribunal 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.3(a)(1) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.49 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:301 
ALI-LGL § 120 
Wolfram § 12.5 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.49 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 3.3(a)(1) contains two prohibitions. First, it prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making a 
false statement of law or fact to a tribunal. Second, to the extent the lawyer inadvertently makes a 
false statement of law or fact to a tribunal and later discovers it, the Rule requires that the lawyer 
correct the matter if the false statement was material. Taken together, the provisions bar a lawyer from 
“knowingly” making false statements to a tribunal regardless of their significance. If inadvertent 
falsity arises and is subsequently realized by the lawyer, the duty to cure extends only to those false 
statements that were “material.” 
Illustrative of the first prong of 3.3(a)(1) is Disciplinary Counsel v. Rohrer, 124 Ohio St.3d 65, 
2009 Ohio 5930, 919 N.E.2d 191, where the respondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) (and 8.4(c)) 
by knowingly telling the juvenile court judge at the October 11, 2007 
hearing that his staff had “misconstrued” his directions, when in fact, 
he had told them to deliver the motion to the newspaper [in defiance of 
a court order to the contrary]. He also made false statements to the 
court when he said that the motion had been delivered to the newspaper 
“without [his] knowledge” and that it “was not [his] intent.” He knew 
that these statements were false. 
Id. at para. 20 (first bracketed material added). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Mitchell, 124 Ohio 
St.3d 266, 2010 Ohio 135, 921 N.E.2d 634, where respondent was indefinitely suspended for lying 
to a magistrate in an attempt to evade detection for practicing with a suspended license, first, by 
giving the magistrate a false middle name in answer to her inquiry and second, after that name still did 
not appear on the licensed attorney rolls, by falsely stating that he was licensed in Kentucky. In 
addition to Rule 3.3(a)(1), this conduct violated 5.5(b)(2), 8.4(c), (d) and (e). Three other 
affirmative-false-statement-to-tribunal cases under the Rules are Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. 
Pryatel, 135 Ohio St.3d 410, 2013 Ohio 1537, 988 N.E.2d 541 (in representation of prisoner 
seeking judicial release, respondent in motion stated that his client “has arranged for employment 
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upon his release,” even though client informed respondent that he was permanently disabled and 
unable to secure employment); Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon-Seymour, 131 Ohio St.3d 161, 
2012 Ohio 114, 962 N.E.2d 309 (hired to probate estate, respondent “falsely represented to the 
probate court that she had made disbursements to pay certain estate obligations, when in fact she had 
not paid those debts,” id. at para. 4); Disciplinary Counsel v. Zapor, 127 Ohio St.3d 372, 2010 
Ohio 5769, 939 N.E.2d 1230 (acting as guardian, respondent falsely represented to probate court that 
he had deposited ward's Social Security checks into her account and had made no withdrawals in 
excess of authorized monthly amount for her care.) 
Misrepresentations to the Supreme Court in the reinstatement process resulted in a violation of Rule 
3.3(a)(1) in Trumbull County Bar Ass’n v. Large, 134 Ohio St.3d 172, 2012 Ohio 5482, 980 
N.E.2d 1021. Large applied for reinstatement and, with his application submitted an affidavit stating 
that he had complied with the Court’s suspension order (seven different notification and delivery 
obligations). In fact he had failed timely to return property, files and an unearned retainer to former 
clients, failed to inform clients of his suspension, and failed to notify the Trumbull County Court of 
Common Pleas of his suspension, all of which he was obligated to do within 30 days of the order 
suspending him. For this and numerous other violations, Large was suspended for two years, with the 
final six months stayed. 
These decisions seem a long way removed from that in Akron Bar Ass’n v. Groner, 131 Oho St.3d 
194, 2012 Ohio 222, 963 N.E.2d 149, where the respondent filed a false pleading, together with an 
exhibit based on the false information, in probate court opposing the appointment of her client’s sister 
as fiduciary of the mother’s estate. The respondent subsequently realized that the statements were 
inaccurate and filed a motion for mediation, amending the pleading and removing “most” of the false 
allegations made therein against the applicant. Id. at para. 11. The panel, the Board and the Court all 
found violations of Rule 3.3(a)(1) and (3). In response to objections that “she made the statements in 
good faith and believed that they were correct,” id. at para. 13, the Court merely states that it agrees 
with the Board’s finding of these violations: “There was clear and convincing evidence that in a 
pleading, Groner made a number of false statements that had no basis in law or fact.” Id. at para. 15. 
But what about making these statements “knowingly”? Although this is a requisite of Rule 3.3, the 
Court does not address this issue. This seems odd, particularly against the backdrop of protestations 
of good faith by the respondent and without any discussion of respondent’s credibility or lack thereof. 
(Groner was also found guilty of violating 3.3(a)(3) (offering evidence known to be false), 
presumably because she attached as Exhibit A to her objection a pre-application bond form that 
apparently also contained the false information about the sister.) See also sections 0.2:240, 3.1:200, 
and 4.1:200. 
Sometimes, false statements of fact to a judge end up as Rule 8.4(c) violations, rather than the 
seemingly more explicitly applicable 3.3(a)(1). See Disciplinary Counsel v. Hilburn, 135 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 2012 Ohio 5528, 984 N.E.2d 940 (respondent falsely told judge she had already contacted 
OLAP and requested help). 
Unlike former OH DR 7-102(A)(5), which deals with false statements knowingly made by a lawyer 
“in his representation of a client,” this Rule is limited to knowingly making false statements to a 
tribunal. For purposes of the Rules, a “tribunal” is “a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration 
proceeding, or a legislative body, administrative body, or other body acting in an adjudicative 
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capacity.” Ohio Rule 1.0(o). The term covers not only appearances before the tribunal itself, but also 
“ancillary proceeding[s] conducted pursuant to the tribunal’s adjudicative authority, such as a 
deposition.” Ohio Rule 3.3 cmt. [1]. Cases involving false statements to clients are discussed in 
section 8.4:400, and those dealing with false statements to nonclients other than a tribunal are dealt 
with in section 4.1:200. 
As stated in Comment [2], 
[t]his rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of 
the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the 
adjudicative process. . . . Consequently, although a lawyer in an 
adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition 
of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer 
must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or 
fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. 
Rule 3.3 cmt. [2]. In keeping with this duty to keep the court from being knowingly misled as to the 
law or facts, the duty extends beyond affirmative misrepresentations to situations “where failure to 
disclose is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation.” Ohio Rule 3.3 cmt. [3]. 
As recognized in Comment [13], a “practical time limit” on the obligation to rectify false statements 
or false evidence is required, and the limits set in Rule 3.3(c) (determination by highest court that can 
consider issue to which the duty relates, or expiration of time for such determination) “is a reasonably 
definite point for termination of the obligation.” Rule 3.3 cmt. [13]. 
False statements to a tribunal: Examples of conduct directed to a court violative of former OH DR 
7-102(A)(5) are numerous. The most common transgressions occurred when a lawyer forged a 
signature, falsified documents, or lied to a court or other tribunal. Some specific situations include a 
lawyer who: 
 prepared unfounded affidavit of disqualification against judge assigned to case in which 
respondent and his wife were named as defendants, Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 127 
Ohio St.3d 436, 2010 Ohio 6241, 940 N.E.2d 952; 
 made multiple misrepresentations to juvenile court about: purported scheduling conflicts, 
failure to receive notice of decision, not receiving responses to discovery requests (no requests 
had ever been made), and having received no notice of proceedings resulting in sanctions 
against her, Disciplinary Counsel v. Yeager, 123 Ohio St.3d 156, 2009 Ohio 4761, 914 
N.E.2d 1046; 
 misrepresented to the probate court that he represented one Juan Rios, who was deceased, 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Taylor, 120 Ohio St.3d 366, 2008 Ohio 6202, 899 N.E.2d 955; 
 falsely stated to a magistrate that she had provided to the appropriate agency information 
sufficient to verify her client’s health-care expenses, Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mitchell, 118 
Ohio St.3d 98, 2008 Ohio 1822, 886 N.E.2d 222; 
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 falsely stated in an affidavit filed in conjunction with a notice of appeal that he represented the 
appellant, when in fact he was suspended from practice at the time, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Frazier, 110 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006 Ohio 4481, 853 N.E.2d 295; 
 falsely represented to bankruptcy court that the reason he had not responded to a motion for 
default judgment against his client was the client’s failure to rehire respondent until mid-July, 
2000 (the motion for default had been filed on July 5 and was granted on July 21), when in fact 
he had been rehired in June 2000.  Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 105 Ohio St.3d 443, 2005 
Ohio 2695, 828 N.E.2d 612; 
 filed omnibus charges and affidavits of corruption and other criminal acts against an array of 
public officials, which charges were found to have no foundation in law or fact; respondent 
also lied to a judge in the course of a hearing on such claims.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Baumgartner, 100 Ohio St.3d 41, 2003 Ohio 4756, 796 N.E.2d 495; 
 filed (through one of his employees) falsified qualified-domestic-relations orders with 
domestic-relations court, after increasing his client’s entitlement to 401(k) and pension 
benefits from the entitlement numbers submitted to him by opposing counsel, representing the 
ex-husband, and, on one of the QDROs, after substituting a new signature page, forging the 
name of opposing counsel and the ex-husband, all without informing opposing counsel of the 
changes or obtaining consent to place the signatures on the document.  Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Herman, 99 Ohio St.3d 362, 2003 Ohio 3932, 792 N.E.2d 1078; 
 filed with the court probate accounts that respondent knew contained false statements of fact.  
Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Hare, 99 Ohio St.3d 310, 2003 Ohio 3651, 791 N.E.2d 966; 
 falsely told the court that he had become involved with the father of a youth charged in a 
high-profile school shooting incident by sending him a condolence note, when in fact he had 
previously signed and faxed a solicitation letter to the father and prior to that the lawyer’s 
employee had made solicitation telephone calls on the lawyer’s behalf to the father.  Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth, 93 Ohio St.3d 173, 754 N.E.2d 219 (2001) (lawyer’s 
misconduct violated panoply of provisions in addition to OH DR 7-102(A)(5); disbarment 
imposed); 
 falsely represented to two courts that his client was a first-time offender, knowing the 
representation to be false, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Nienaber, 80 Ohio St.3d 534, 687 
N.E.2d 678 (1997); 
 knowingly misrepresented the date of a personal injury in a complaint in an effort to render the 
action timely, Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Caywood, 62 Ohio St.3d 185, 580 N.E.2d 
1076 (1991) (conduct also violated OH DR 1-102(A)(4), OH DR 6-101(A)(3), and OH DR 
7-101(A)(2)); 
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As the Comments state, violation of the Rule extends to circumstances in which “failure to make a 
disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation.” The analogous Code provision was 
DR 7-103(A)(3), which precluded a lawyer’s concealment or failure to disclose, in representing a 
client, “that which he is required to reveal.” 7-103(A)(3) cases involving failures to disclose to a 
tribunal include Trumbull County Bar Ass’n v. Kafantaris, 121 Ohio St.3d 387, 2009 Ohio 1389, 
904 N.E.2d 875 (failure to disclose deceased client’s settlement proceeds to probate court; failure to 
file notice of disqualification with probate court in accordance with prior Supreme Court suspension 
order; Kafantaris’s affidavit to Supreme Court falsely swearing that he had complied with terms of 
Court’s suspension order is likewise found to violate 7-102(A)(3), although 7-102(A)(5) seems more 
appropriate in this instance); Disciplinary Counsel v. Carlson, 111 Ohio St.3d 281, 2006 Ohio 
5707, 855 N.E.2d 1218 (respondent filed final estate accounting containing misleading 
nondisclosure); Disciplinary Counsel v. Beeler, 105 Ohio St.3d 188, 2005 Ohio 1143, 824 N.E.2d 
78 (filing with court statement of assets and liabilities that failed to disclose properties as assets of the 
estate). 
Misconduct that violated OH DR 7-102(A)(5) could also violate OH DR 6-101(A)(3) -- “A lawyer 
shall not: . . . [n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to him.” When, as in Caywood supra, a lawyer 
knowingly misrepresents the date of injury in a complaint in an attempt to render a client’s action 
timely, the lawyer has violated both provisions. 
In a 1994 case, a court-appointed lawyer for an indigent criminal defendant was found to have 
violated 7-102(A)(5) by submitting a travel-expense voucher for reimbursement that included 
personal expenses as well as properly claimed business expenses.  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Nienaber, 68 Ohio St.3d 459, 628 N.E.2d 1340 (1994). The Board of Commissioners recommended 
a public reprimand, perhaps because the lawyer admitted the error, claimed it was a mistake, and 
made full restitution. Unswayed, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered a six-month suspension. 
The lawyer’s misconduct did not need to be as severe as that depicted in the foregoing examples to 
violate the disciplinary rule, however. Filing an affidavit of the lawyer to support a 
summary-judgment motion that was based on hearsay, rather than personal knowledge as required, 
was found to violate OH DR 7-102(A)(5). By filing an affidavit based on hearsay, the lawyer was 
making a false statement of fact that the document was based on personal knowledge when it was not. 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 128 (July 29, 1976). 
Lying to the court also was prohibited under former OHCPR provisions other than (or in addition to) 
OH DR 7-102(A)(5) -- most often OH DR 1-102(A)(4), which prohibited engaging in “conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” (now Rule 8.4(c)). The DR 1-102(A)(4) 
cases in this category include: Herman, 99 Ohio St.3d 362, 2003 Ohio 3932, 792 N.E.2d 1078, 
discussed this section supra; Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Banks, 94 Ohio St.3d 428, 763 N.E.2d 1166 
(2002) (four separate occasions during respondent’s felony trial when he gave testimony that he knew 
to be materially false); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Allison, 90 Ohio St.3d 296, 737 N.E.2d 
955 (2000) (misrepresenting to probate court in report of estate distributions that lawyer had received 
only $1,000 in attorney fees when in fact he had persuaded fiduciary of estate to provide him with 
checks totaling additional $6,000; two-year suspension with second year stayed); Columbus Bar 
Ass’n v. Connors, 89 Ohio St.3d 370, 731 N.E.2d 1127 (2000) (falsely representing to trial court 
that his suspension had been lifted and that he had been reinstated by the Supreme Court); see 
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Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Elsass, 86 Ohio St.3d 195, 713 N.E.2d 421 (1999) (while under suspension, 
preparing and filing with court motions and other documents that purported to be pro se papers of 
client; indefinite suspension imposed). 
Sanctions for false statements to a tribunal: In its opinion in Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Speros, 73 
Ohio St.3d 101, 652 N.E.2d 681 (1995), the Ohio Supreme Court spoke at length about the 
appropriate sanction for OH DR 7-102(A)(5) and OH DR 1-102(A)(4) violations, which were often 
jointly charged under the Code. In Speros, an attorney, falsely blaming clerical error rather than his 
own inattention, filed an affidavit in support of a motion to reinstate an appeal in which he lied as to 
the reason for his failure to file a timely brief and forged the notary’s signature on the affidavit. After 
finding that this conduct violated OH DR 1-102(A)(4), as conduct involving dishonesty or 
misrepresentation, and OH DR 7-102(A)(5), as conduct involving the knowing use of a false 
statement of fact in representation of a client, the Court considered the appropriate sanction. While 
the Board recommended a six-month suspension, respondent argued for a public reprimand and cited 
numerous cases in which the Court had issued a public reprimand for attorney falsehoods. In response, 
the Court first noted that its earlier treatment may have been too lenient: 
 Respondent calls to our attention several other cases in which 
we issued only public reprimands for an attorney’s deception of a client, 
and these cases may imply that we view this misconduct as a minor 
transgression. We do not. Dishonesty toward a client, whose interests 
are the attorney’s duty to protect, is reprehensible. And, as we continue 
to see such violations of DR 1-102(A)(4), we recognize that this 
misconduct may hereafter require more severe discipline than we have 
previously imposed. 
Id. at 104, 652 N.E.2d at 683. The Court went on in Speros to distinguish the case before it from 
those instances in which a public reprimand has been deemed sufficient: 
 But, distressed as we are by any attorney’s dishonesty toward a 
client, we find greater evil in an attorney’s deliberate attempt to 
deceive a court while under oath. That attorney perpetrates a fraud 
upon the judiciary and a corresponding, surreptitious fraud upon his or 
her unsuspecting client. Cf.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Heffernan, (1991), 
58 Ohio St.3d 260, 261, 569 N.E.2d 1027, 1028 (Failure to reveal a 
client’s fraud upon a court is “a serious breach of duty for which a 
public reprimand is not an adequate sanction.”) This is the misconduct 
with which we are faced here, and it exits in none of the cases 
respondent cites to establish a comparable violation of DR 
1-102(A)(4). 
Id. As the remainder of the opinion reemphasizes, while any misrepresentation by a lawyer is 
significant, those made under oath and directed to a court while representing a client are considered 
particularly odious. Id. at 104-05, 652 N.E.2d 683. Rejecting respondent’s argument that a public 
reprimand was sufficient sanction, the Court suspended him for six months. Accord Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n v. Herzog, 87 Ohio St.3d 215, 217, 718 N.E.2d 1274, 1275 (1999) (“We will not allow 
attorneys who lie to courts to continue practicing law without interruption.”); Office of Disciplinary 
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Counsel v. Greene, 74 Ohio St.3d 13, 13, 655 N.E.2d 1299, 1300 (1995) (syllabus) (“When a 
lawyer intentionally misrepresents a crucial fact to a court in order to effect a desired result to benefit 
a party, the lawyer will be suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for an appropriate period of 
time.”). 
One rather bizarre attempt at “sanctioning” a lawyer for what the judge apparently thought was a false 
statement to the court occurred in the trial-court proceedings underlying the case of  In re Conway, 
No. 79615, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5531 (Cuyahoga Dec. 7, 2001) (reversing finding of indirect 
criminal contempt based on alleged intemperate remarks by lawyer to judge’s law clerk). In the 
underlying matter, because she had concluded that lawyer Conway’s representation that he was a 
former captain in the Marines was false, the trial judge held a hearing in open court; the hearing 
included “testimony” from former Marines invited to the hearing by the judge, the judge’s discourse 
on Marine Corps history, and her concluding remarks: 
“These are Marines, Mr. Conway. Your false representations only 
serve to denigrate these Marines present who are United States Marines 
and who have fought for rights and freedom and to keep our honor 
clean and who are proud to claim the title of United States Marine. You 
should be ashamed, Mr. Conway, and based on all of this, this 
information will be sent to the Ohio Supreme Court for disciplinary 
action for your lying to this Court, and misrepresenting yourself.” 
Id. at *6-7. Unfortunately, the judge had apparently obtained erroneous information by telephone 
from the Department of Defense concerning Mr. Conway’s military record. Mr. Conway was a retired 
U.S. Marine Corps captain. 
  
3.3:300  Disclosing Adverse Legal Authority 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.3(a)(2) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.100 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 4:303 
ALI-LGL § 111 
Wolfram § 12.8 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.100 (1996). 
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Ohio Rule 3.3(a)(2), which mirrors former OH DR 7-106(B)(1), requires a lawyer to disclose 
adverse legal authority to the tribunal, but only in limited circumstances. Disclosure is required only 
if the legal authority emanates from the controlling jurisdiction and is known by the lawyer to be 
“directly adverse” to the position of counsel’s client and has not been disclosed by opposing counsel. 
Thus, adverse cases from other court systems need not be disclosed, because they are not from the 
controlling jurisdiction. Moreover, cases from the controlling jurisdiction that are merely relevant to 
the case at hand are not subject to the mandatory-disclosure requirement; direct adversity to the 
client’s position is necessary. Even then, the failure to disclose is not a violation if the authority has 
already been disclosed to the tribunal by the opposing counsel. Finally, this duty, like the others set 
forth in the Rule, continues until determination of the issue by the highest tribunal or expiration of 
time for such determination. Rule 3.3(c). The interesting historical development in the ABA of the 
lawyer’s duty to disclose adverse legal authority to the tribunal (the current articulation of this duty in 
MR 3.3(a)(2) is identical to the Ohio rule) is set forth in Thomas Spahn, Lawyers’ Duties to Advise 
the Court of Adverse Facts and Law, 20 Experience No. 3 (2010).) 
At a minimum, the phrase “legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction” means all case law, statutes, 
and other legal authority that the court is required to consider as a matter of law. In Ohio, this includes, 
of course, precedent from the U.S. and Ohio Supreme Courts and also all officially reported court of 
appeals opinions issued prior to May 1, 2002, which opinions, arguably, are still deemed “controlling 
authority for all purposes in the judicial district in which they were rendered” unless subsequently 
reversed or modified. (Unofficially reported and unpublished court of appeals opinions issued prior to 
the May 1 date are (were?) considered “persuasive authority” only.) The uncertainty expressed in the 
preceding two sentences results from the fact that on February 5, 2002, the Ohio Supreme Court 
adopted then-new Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions (SCt Rep R), which became 
effective on May 1, 2002. See 94 Ohio St.3d XCIV-CV (2002). The 2002 rules have now themselves 
been replaced by the new Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions, effective July 1, 2012. 
See 132 Ohio St.3d CLXI-CLXV (2012).  
The impact of the 2002 rules on previously issued court of appeals opinions was less than crystal clear. 
On the one hand, the rules stated that “[a]ll court of appeals opinions issued after May 1, 2002 [the 
intent here was probably “on or after May 1, 2002”] may be cited as legal authority and weighted as 
deemed appropriate by the courts.” SCt Rep R 4(B). But SCt Rep R 4(A) stated that the 
“controlling/persuasive” dichotomy of the old rules (pursuant to which the opinion was “controlling” 
only if officially reported) is “abolished.” The tension between these two 2002 sections has been 
eliminated in the 2012 amendments: old SCtRep R 4(A) has been deleted. Moreover, in 2012 Rule 
3.4, language has been added to the old 4(B) wording that strengthens the view that the 
“controlling/persuasive” distinction is not abolished for pre-May 1, 2002 opinions, in that the weight 
to be given as deemed appropriate by the courts to opinions issued after May 1, 2002, is “without 
regard to whether the opinion was published or in what form it was published.” Rep Op R 3.4. 
A unique aspect of Ohio law that was also affected by the 2002 Reporting Rules is the “syllabus rule.” 
Pursuant to the syllabus rule, the controlling points of law of an Ohio Supreme Court opinion are set 
forth in the syllabus, not the text, of the opinion (other than in a per curiam opinion, where the text 
states the law). Pursuant to the 2002 rules, however, both the syllabus and the text (including 
footnotes) stated the law of a Supreme Court opinion. See former SCt Rep R 1(B)(1). This is 
continued in the 2012 rules. See Rep Op R 2.2. However, the impact on pre-May 1 Supreme Court 
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opinions under both the 2002 and 2012 versions of the Rules remains unclear -- is the law now stated 
in the syllabus and the text of all Supreme Court opinions, or just those issued on or after May 1, 2002? 
(After the 2002 revision, the Ohio Supreme Court Clerk’s office informally advised that the syllabus 
rule would continue to apply to all pre-May 1 Supreme Court opinions (which advice lends some 
additional support to the view that the abolishment of the “controlling/persuasive” distinction, 
discussed above, is not abolished for pre-May 1, 2002 court of appeals opinions).) 
It should also be noted that under the 2002 rules, if there was “disharmony” between the syllabus and 
the text of an opinion, the syllabus controlled. SCt Rep R 1(B)(2). That provision has been removed 
from the 2012 version of the Reporting Rules. 
The principal change in the rules from the 2002 to the 2012 version, in addition to the points noted 
above, is that the Court “hereby designates the Supreme Court website as the Ohio Official Reports 
for opinions of the courts of appeals and the Court of Claims as of July 1, 2012.” Rep Op R 3.2, 132 
Ohio St.3d CLXIII. (Note, however, that the printed word is still the final word in one respect: all 
opinions of the Supreme Court, courts of appeals, and Court of Claims reported in the printed bound 
volumes of the Ohio Official Reports “shall control as to accuracy over the same opinions as reported 
in any other printed source or posted to the Supreme Court website or any other electronic database.” 
Rep Op R 4.2, 132 Ohio St.3d CLXV.) The citation format is to follow the Supreme Court Writing 
Manual, which is set forth at 130 Ohio St.3d CXIX-CCLXXXIII (2011). The references to 
publication and posting of trial court opinions (other than those of the Court of Claims) that were 
included in the 2002 rules (former SCt Rep R 10) have been deleted from the 2012 rules. 
State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman, 92 Ohio St.3d 312, 750 N.E.2d 156 (2001), raises an interesting 
question concerning the effect of a per curiam opinion. In Icsman (decided before the 5/1/2002 
amendments), one Justice (Lundberg Stratton) “concur[red].” Four other justices “concur[red] in 
judgment.” The two other justices, in an opinion concurring and dissenting in part, agreed with the 
per curiam opinion on one of the two issues decided. By our count, that makes a total of three justices 
endorsing the per curiam opinion, at least in part. Query whether such an opinion has precedential 
value.) 
The admonition in former OH EC 7-23, that lawyers in an adversary system “will present and argue 
the existing law in the light most favorable to [their] client,” recognized that lawyers have some 
leeway in construing precedent. If a case is susceptible to more than one good-faith interpretation, one 
of which is directly adverse to the client’s position and another of which is not, a lawyer might choose 
the favorable interpretation and remain silent about the precedent. Whether this is tactically the best 
approach is a separate matter. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 12.8, at 682 (1986) 
(effective advocacy usually requires attacking adverse precedent head on). 
The purpose of Rule 3.3(a)(2) is to ensure an equitable and accurate determination of the legal issues 
presented in the matter. As stated in Comment [4], the “underlying concept is that legal argument is a 
discussion seeking to determine the legal premise properly applicable to the case.” Rule 3.3 cmt. [4]. 
To achieve this, a tribunal must be aware of all precedents in its jurisdiction that are directly pertinent 
and applicable to the case. As officers of the court, attorneys have a duty to make sure that the court is 
properly informed. “Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes 
dishonesty toward the tribunal.” Id. Having avoided such conduct, however, attorneys are expected to 
present the law in a light most favorable to their client’s case, and are free to challenge the soundness 
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of any directly adverse authority. 
Of course, even in citing favorable precedent (whether or not from a “controlling” jurisdiction), a 
lawyer must take care that the decision has not been reversed. A lack of such care occurred in Kuhnle 
Bros., Inc. v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 1997), where counsel for the appellant 
cited a District of Utah case in support of its position. The Sixth Circuit was not pleased. In a footnote, 
the court pointed out that the case relied on had been reversed by the Tenth Circuit more than a year 
prior to the filing of appellant’s brief. In assessing double costs against appellant pursuant to 28 USC 
§ 1912 for this gaffe, the Sixth Circuit found that “[t]his behavior would seem to violate Ohio 
Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(4) & (5) and 7-102(A)(5).” 103 F.3d at 520 n.2. OH DR 7-106(B)(1) 
was not mentioned. 
Finally, while not an Ohio case, Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346 
(Fed. Cir. 2003), serves as a reminder that playing fast and loose with precedent is not limited to 
failure to disclose the existence of adverse authority; it also encompasses misciting that authority, by, 
inter alia, rewriting and deleting material unfavorable to your argument. Thus, in Precision, Mikki 
Walser, a government lawyer, sought reconsideration of the Court of International Trade’s grant of 
summary judgment to Precision, when the government had been ordered to file a response to the 
motion “forthwith” and she had filed its response twelve days later. In the motion for reconsideration, 
Walser argued that twelve days complied with the “forthwith” command because there was no 
uniform definition of the term. In support, she relied on quotations from several opinions, but in the 
process misstated them by making material omissions and otherwise doctoring the quoted text in a 
misleading way. (I.e., failing to show that it was she and not the court that had supplied the emphasis 
to one of her quotes.) See  id., at 1348-49. The lower court found counsel in violation of CIT Rule 11 
and formally reprimanded her.  Id. at 1350. In affirming, the Federal Circuit’s quotation of the 
language of the lower court is instructive: Walser 
“either willfully or through an unacceptable level of negligence, and 
the use of selective quotations and direct misquotation, concealed a 
Supreme Court case of which she was or should have been aware. 
Counsel’s argument that the case was inopposite or dicta is simply 
irrelevant to this analysis; her misconduct lies not in deciding the case 
was irrelevant but in attempting to conceal it from the court and 
opposing counsel. That, simply put, is a violation of any attorney’s 
fundamental duty to be candid and scrupulously accurate.” (emphasis 
in original). 
 The court concluded that Walser violated Rule 11 because she 
“signed a brief before this court which omitted directly relevant 
language from what was represented as precedential authority, which 
effectively changed the meaning of at least one quotation, and which 
intentionally or negligently misled the court.” 
Id. at 1355. 
Perhaps the most unusual thing about the Precision case is why on earth the Department of Justice 
thought it wise to file an amicus brief seeking to defend such behavior. The court of appeals found 
839
Ohio Legal Ethics 3.3 
 
DOJ’s brief “troubling.”  Id. at 1358. 
  
3.3:400  Offering False Evidence 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.3(a)(3) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.48 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:304 
ALI-LGL §§ 115, 117, 120 
Wolfram §§ 12.4.6, 12.5 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.48 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 3.3(a)(3) provides in pertinent part that a lawyer shall not “offer evidence that the lawyer 
knows to be false.” The Rule, like the predecessor disciplinary rule (OH DR 7-102(A)(4)), applies 
regardless of whether the lawyer, the client, or a third party is the source of the perjured testimony or 
false evidence. As stated in Rule 3.3 cmt. [8], “the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood.” 
Absent an “obvious falsehood,” “the lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or 
other evidence in favor of the client.” Id. Should the lawyer not know that the evidence is false but 
only “reasonably believe[]” that it is, the lawyer (except with respect to the testimony of a defendant 
in a criminal matter) is allowed but not required to refuse to offer the evidence. Ohio Rule 3.3(a)(3) 
& cmt.[8]. See section 3.3:600. 
If the lawyer knows a client intends to testify falsely or wants the attorney to introduce false evidence, 
the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to the contrary. But if persuasion fails, the lawyer 
must refuse to introduce that evidence. Ohio Rule 3.3 cmt. [6]. If the false information involves only 
a portion of a witness’s expected testimony, the lawyer may put the witness on the stand for those 
other points, but may not elicit or permit the witness to give testimony the lawyer knows to be false. 
Id. For a discussion of the lawyer’s duty if she discovers that material false evidence was presented, 
see section 3.3:500. 
Under the former OHCPR, cases sanctioning a lawyer for offering false evidence include 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 127 Ohio St.3d 436, 2010 Ohio 6241, 940 N.E.2d 952 (forging 
wife’s name on affidavit and then notarizing it; conduct also violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and 
7-102(A)(6)); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mitchell, 118 Ohio St.3d 98, 2008 Ohio 1822, 886 N.E.2d 
222 (advancing dubious and uncorroborated evidence supposedly supporting her client’s claim to 
Medicaid reimbursement for health-care expenses violated DR 7-102(A)(4)); Stark County Bar 
Ass’n v. Hare, 99 Ohio St.3d 310, 2003 Ohio 3651, 791 N.E.2d 966 (using probate accounts that 
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respondent knew to be false; this and many other violations resulted in disbarment); Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth, 93 Ohio St.3d 173, 754 N.E.2d 219 (2001) (submitting on behalf of 
clients false and forged affidavit and letter; for this violation of 7-102(A)(4) and a myriad of other 
violations, respondent was disbarred); Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Hendricks, 68 Ohio St.3d 566, 
629 N.E.2d 429 (1994) (lawyer sanctioned under OH DR 7-102(A)(4) for having perjured herself in 
court proceeding and deposition); Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 44 Ohio St.3d 134, 541 
N.E.2d 607 (1989) (at beneficiary’s request, lawyer destroyed valid will of deceased and offered for 
probate an earlier, revoked will; violation of OH DR 7-102). See Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Cooke, 
111 Ohio St.3d 290, 2006 Ohio 5709, 855 N.E.2d 1226 (respondent violated DR 7-102(A)(4) in 
remaining silent when client testified falsely in response to trustee’s question at bankruptcy creditor’s 
meeting; 7-102(A)(3) also violated). Compare Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Allen, 94 Ohio 
St.3d 129, 760 N.E.2d 820 (2002) (knowingly dictating for client’s signature false affidavit; lawyer 
subsequently convicted of perjury and sanctioned under OH DR 1-102(A)(3)-(5) and 7-102(A)(7); 
for whatever reason, OH DR 7-102(A)(4) violation not charged); accord Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Camera, 68 Ohio St.3d 478, 628 N.E.2d 1353 (1994) (sanctions imposed under OH DR 
1-102(A)(4), 7-102(A)(5), and 7-102(A)(7), but no charge of OH DR 7-102(A)(4) violation). See 
also State v. Tolliver, No. 90 AP-1130, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1611 (Franklin Apr. 9, 1991), 
where the Tenth District Court of Appeals noted that if a lawyer were to examine a witness that the 
lawyer believed would commit perjury and thereby knowingly elicit false testimony, the lawyer’s 
conduct would violate the disciplinary rules. 
In addition to Groner (see above in section 3.3:200), Rule 3.3(a)(3) was found to have been violated 
in Disciplinary Counsel v. Bogdanski, 135 Ohio St.3d 235, 2013 Ohio 398, 985 N.E.2d 1251 
(forging signature and notarizing it on affidavit filed with court and on verification page of response 
to request for production of documents). (Bogdanski was also charged with violation of numerous 
other rules; despite her seemingly inexhaustible “‘barrage of excuse-making’ for her inadequate 
representation,” id. at para. 6, she was indefinitely suspended.) 
Other of the Rules of Professional Conduct also bear on the obligation not to offer false testimony. If 
the lawyer knows that a witness intends to offer false testimony and, through direct or 
cross-examination, the lawyer permits the witness to do so, this conduct can be seen as -- in addition 
to knowingly offering false testimony -- knowingly making a false statement of fact, Rule 3.3(a)(1) 
(see section 3.3:200), participating in the creation of false evidence, Rule 3.4(b) (see section 3.4:300), 
and, if the witness is the lawyer’s client, assisting the client in illegal or fraudulent conduct. Rule 
1.2(d) (see section 1.2:600). If the lawyer learns of the perjury after the fact, the lawyer still has a duty 
to cure the problem, and the extent of that duty depends upon what reasonable measures are needed to 
remedy the situation, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. Ohio Rule 3.3(a)(3). See 
section 3.3:500. The lawyer’s knowing use of the perjured testimony once on the record, by alluding 
to it in closing argument for example, is impermissible as well. Rule 3.3(a)(1). If it is impossible to 
continue in the representation without making use of the perjured testimony, withdrawal is required. 
Ohio Rule 1.16(a)(1). See section 1.16:230. 
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With regard to withdrawal, note State v. Trapp, 52 Ohio App.2d 189, 368 N.E.2d 1278 (Hamilton 
1977), in which the First District Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to allow 
an attorney, George Clark, to withdraw when he knew that his continued representation would violate 
a disciplinary rule. In Trapp, Clark was aware that his client’s alibi defense would require using 
perjured or false evidence, a practice clearly prohibited under the former OHCPR. The court of 
appeals made clear that Clark had “a duty to withdraw” under the circumstances and that the trial 
court erred in not allowing him to do so.  Id. at 194, 368 N.E.2d at 1282. The Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, also addressing this provision, found withdrawal 
mandatory where a client who offered fabricated evidence refused to reveal the fraud after the lawyer 
had attempted to persuade him to do so. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievance & Discipline Op. 90-07, 
1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 14 (Apr. 20, 1990). 
To the extent the perjury problem arises in the context of criminal-defense representation, the 
lawyer’s conduct may implicate the client’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 
While some open questions arguably remain, the tenor of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most significant 
opinion in this area, Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), strongly suggests that the lawyer can 
follow these ethical precepts without fear of trampling on an accused’s Sixth Amendment rights. See 
ABA Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 317 (6th ed. 2007) (commentary). 
Compare Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics 134 (1990) (Nix decides only 
that Sixth Amendment is not violated where lawyer threatens to withdraw and to expose client perjury 
in attempt to dissuade client from giving perjured testimony), with 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. 
William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 29.15, at 29-30 (3d ed. Supp. 2007) (after Nix “it is now 
settled that the Sixth Amendment is not violated if a lawyer interdicts or discloses a client’s perjury”). 
Ohio case law relying on Nix bears out the Hazard and Hodes conclusion.  State v. Freeman, No. 
64531, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 887 (Cuyahoga Mar. 10, 1994) (lawyer’s disclosure of potential 
client perjury to judge in chambers and refusal to recap false testimony in closing argument or to 
request jury instruction on defense based on false testimony did not violate defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights); State v. Tolliver, No. 90 AP-1130, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1611 (Franklin 
Apr. 9, 1991) (defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated where lawyer indicated to 
court belief that client would give perjured testimony and, at court’s direction, the client testified 
without assistance of counsel); State v. Rembert, No. 55654, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 5100 
(Cuyahoga Oct. 19, 1989) (refusal to call alibi witnesses that counsel believed would perjure 
themselves did not violate Sixth Amendment). 
Rule 3.3(a)(3), with its focus on offering false evidence, seems directed primarily to evidentiary, 
trial-type proceedings. Under the OHCPR, OH DR 7-102(A)(4), although similarly focused, was in 
practice not so limited. Misrepresenting the value of a decedent’s savings account on an Ohio estate 
tax return, for example, was found to violate this provision.  Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Wroblewski, 32 
Ohio St.3d 162, 512 N.E.2d 978 (1987). Similarly, a lawyer who executed a release in his client’s 
name without authorization from his client and endorsed his client’s settlement checks with a forged 
signature also violated OH DR 7-102(A)(4).  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Russo, 21 Ohio 
St.3d 15, 487 N.E.2d 296 (1986). It remains to be seen whether this expansive reading will continue 
under Rule 3.3(a)(3). The additional language in the Rule (not found in the Code), obligating a 
lawyer who learns that false evidence has been offered to take reasonable remedial measures, 
including, if necessary, “disclosure to the tribunal” (together with similar references to the trier of 
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fact and tribunal in the comments), points to a more restrictive reading. 
Knowing use of false testimony also may lead to the overturning of a verdict in both civil (see OH 
Civ R 59(A)(2) and 60(B)(3)) and criminal actions (see OH Crim R 33), and may subject the lawyer 
to criminal sanctions. See ORC 2921.12(A)(2) (making it a crime to “[m]ake, present, or use any 
record, document, or thing, knowing it to be false and with purpose to mislead a public official” in a 
proceeding); ORC 2921.13 (falsification); ORC 2921.32(A)(5) (obstructing justice through the 
communication of false information). 
  
3.3:410  False Evidence in Civil Proceedings 
See section 3.3:400. 
  
3.3:420  False Evidence in Criminal Proceedings 
See section 3.3:400. 
  
3.3:430  Offering a Witness an Improper Inducement 
Rule 3.3 is concerned with “Candor Toward the Tribunal,” while Rule 3.4 is directed to “Fairness to 
Opposing Party and Counsel.” These Rules expressly prohibit the lawyer from offering false evidence 
and from falsifying evidence, but only 3.4 expressly deals with offering a witness a prohibited 
inducement. Nevertheless, if a lawyer in fairness to opposing parties and counsel under Ohio Rule 
3.4 cannot “buy” testimony, true or false, then surely it follows that a lawyer can do no such thing 
consistent with his or her obligation of candor toward the court under Rule 3.3. This point is made 
with respect to the Model Rules in Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 61:714 (1997), 
where, in addition to emphasizing that “[i]n its most dramatic application, Rule 3.4(b)’s prohibition 
against counseling falsehoods bars a lawyer from suborning perjury by intentionally inducing a 
witness to give false testimony,” it is further noted that the MR 3.4(b) duty to opposing party and 
counsel, prohibiting counseling or assisting false testimony, “compliments the lawyer’s 
corresponding duty to the tribunal under Rule 3.3.” Id. Accord 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. 
William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 30.6, at 30-15 (3d ed. Supp. 2011) 
(“Model Rule 3.4(b) repeats a few obvious prohibitions from Rule 3.3 and reinforces Rule 3.4(a). Its 
placement in Rule 3.4 rather than Rule 3.3 merely confirms that the duty to prevent false or tainted 
testimony or evidence from infecting a proceeding runs not only to the tribunal but to opposing parties 
and counsel as well”). 
Given that a lawyer’s improper inducement of a witness to give false testimony is a violation of the 
duty of candor to the tribunal, as well as a breach of the duty of fairness to the opposing party and 
counsel, the material on inducement found at section 3.4:310 of the treatise is equally applicable here. 
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3.3:440  Interviewing and Preparing Witnesses 
The Restatement is instructive with respect to the general ethical responsibilities regarding witness 
interviews and witness preparation. 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 116 
cmt. b (2000) contains a useful primer with respect to “litigation practice uniformly followed in the 
United States” on these matters. Id. at 205. While no Ohio ethics authority directly on point was 
found (other than that referenced concerning improper inducement in sections 3.3:430 and 3.4:310), 
there is no reason to believe that the Restatement check-list is not fully operative as a part of Ohio 
practice. The touchstone here, in terms of witness preparation (as well as witness interviews), is 
“invit[ing] the witness to provide truthful testimony favorable to the lawyer’s client,” as opposed to 
“assist[ing] the witness to testify falsely as to a material fact.” Id. at 206. See also Thomas Spahn, 
What Can A Lawyer Do When Preparing a Fact Witness to Testify?, 19 Experience (ABA), No. 
2 2009, at 46. 
Ohio criminal cases containing allegations of improper “coaching” of witnesses by the prosecution 
are generally consistent with this position. Thus, if the prosecution’s preparation is consistent with 
counseling the witness to testify truthfully, efforts to premise exclusion of evidence, a mistrial, or 
reversal of a conviction on such conduct have been unavailing. See, e.g., State v. Henness, 79 Ohio 
St.3d 53, 679 N.E.2d 686 (1997) (no reversible error where prior to cross-examination prosecutors 
told witness defense counsel would ask about her prior record and gave witness opportunity to review 
record so that she could “‘intelligently answer his questions’,”  id. at 60, 679 N.E.2d at 693); State v. 
McCoy, No. 99 AP-1048, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4035 (Franklin Sept. 7, 2000) (rejecting 
defendant’s claim of error based on prosecutor allegedly telling witness what to say prior to taking 
stand; no allegation that prosecutor asked witness to testify untruthfully, but merely that he reviewed 
her anticipated testimony with her and thus “prepared the witness in a permissible manner,” id. at *5); 
State v. Hill, Nos. 3720, 3745, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 4462 (Trumbull Nov. 27, 1989) (no 
evidence other than that state “coached” witness to tell the truth; no prejudicial error), aff’d, 64 Ohio 
St.3d 313, 595 N.E.2d 884 (1992); State v. Kent, Nos. C-850305-C-850308, 1986 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5716 (Hamilton Feb. 26, 1986) (assignment of error, based on prosecutor’s telephone 
conversation during recess with state’s expert witness while separation-of-witnesses order in effect, 
overruled where defendant’s attorney unable to demonstrate any prejudice to his client and where 
during cross-examination attorney asked no questions as to what information expert had received in 
conversation with prosecutor). This result has been held to follow even where there is a “flagrant 
violation” of a court order prohibiting such contact, so long as it cannot be said as a result that defense 
counsel was denied the opportunity for full cross-examination or that defendant was materially 
prejudiced.  State v. Prater, 13 Ohio App.3d 98, 101, 468 N.E.2d 356, 360 (Wood 1983). This 
portion of the Prater opinion was disavowed by the two concurring judges, who wondered why the 
assignment of error was not well taken if, as the judge writing for the court states, the prosecutor’s 
conduct was in fact a “flagrant violation of the court’s effort to afford defense counsel a fair 
opportunity for effective cross-examination.” Id. The concurring judges rejected the assignment of 
error on the different ground that the trial judge was in the best position to determine whether the 
conduct did interfere with the right of effective cross-examination and he had concluded that it did 
not. 
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The general rule permitting truthful witness preparation is a two-way street: when defense counsel 
consulted with defendant during an overnight recess prior to his testifying, the court held that there 
was a right to do so but further held that the prosecutor had the right to cross-examine defendant on 
the conversation and to comment on it during closing argument. State v. McKinnon, No. 90- 
CA-1744, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3124 (Ross June 10, 1992) (citing and quoting Geders v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 80, 89-90 (1976)).  
For an instance in which the witness-coaching issue was raised in the civil context, without 
determination of the merits of the issue, see Abner v. Elliott, No. CA98-02-038, 1998 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3348 (Butler July 20, 1998), aff’d, 85 Ohio St.3d 11, 706 N.E.2d 765 (1999). In Abner the 
relators sought a writ of prohibition against the trial judge, who had imposed sanctions premised on 
the refusal of plaintiffs’ counsel to abide by discovery orders arising out of allegations of witness 
coaching. Finding that the lower court’s action was not in excess of its jurisdiction -- the only issue 
before it on writ of prohibition -- the appellate court denied the writ and granted the respondent 
judge’s motion to dismiss; with respect to the correctness of the trial court’s underlying rulings, the 
court merely noted that such issues were not before it on prohibition and were matters to be decided 
on appeal, a position with which the Supreme Court agreed (along with a number of other reasons 
why prohibition did not lie) in affirming the court of appeals. 
  
3.3:500  Remedial Measures Necessary to Correct False Evidence 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.3(a)(3) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.53-7.55 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §§ 61.401 et seq. 
 ALI-LGL §§ 66-67 
Wolfram §§ 12.5-12.6, 13.3.6 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.53-7.55 (1996). 
In pertinent part, Ohio Rule 3.3(a)(3) provides that 
[i]f a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer has 
offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, 
the lawyer shall take reasonable measures to remedy the situation, 
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. 
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Comment [10] elaborates: 
In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony 
elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take 
reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate’s 
proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the 
client of the lawyer’s duty of candor to the tribunal, and seek the 
client’s cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the 
false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further 
remedial action including making such disclosure to the tribunal as is 
reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires 
the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by 
Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done. 
Rule 3.3 cmt. [10]. See also Rule 1.6(c) & cmt.[15] and Rule 3.3 cmt. [11]. 
Rule 3.3(a)(3) sets up, as a threshold requirement, that the lawyer must “come to know” of the falsity 
of the evidence. The mere possibility, or even probability, that a client or witness called by the lawyer 
has offered false material evidence is insufficient to require the lawyer to act under this provision. But 
see Rule 1.0(g) (“A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”) 
Even if the lawyer “knows” the evidence is false, the duty to act arises only if the evidence is 
“material.” 
Finally, the Rule imposes a duty on the lawyer only when the client or the lawyer’s witness “has” 
offered material evidence known by the lawyer to be false. Knowledge that the client or witness plans 
to testify falsely does not trigger this provision, although it well may implicate other Rules. See, e.g., 
Rule 3.3(b). 
Maura Hughes, “Candor Toward the Tribunal Under Ohio Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, 
Clev Metro B J, Nov. 2012, at 15, asserts that the obligation arising under Rule 3.3(a)(3) applies to 
“any” lawyer who comes to know of the falsity of evidence previously offered by the client: “The rule 
is not limited to the lawyer who actually presented the inaccurate evidence, nor to lawyers of record in 
a proceeding.” Id. at 16. Query whether Ms. Hughes’ conclusion regarding the reach of 3.3(a)(3) is 
overbroad. The first sentence of Comment [1] (which she does not cite) points to a more restrictive 
reading – limited to the lawyer who is in the trenches at the time: “This rule governs the conduct of a 
lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal.” Even under Ms. Hughes’ reading, 
however, the obligation is not open-ended. As noted above in section 3.3:200, under Rule 3.3(c), the 
duty terminates upon final determination of the pertinent issue by the highest court that can consider 
the issue or expiration of time for such consideration. The Hughes article makes the further point that 
in-house corporate counsel is subject to this duty as well. Thus, if his or her client, the corporation, 
through its executive officers or other authorized representatives, offers false evidence that at any 
time during the proceeding is discovered to be false by in-house counsel, the 3.3(a)(3) duty 
presumably would apply. 
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Given the clear language of the Rule, there seems little doubt that a lawyer has the duty to reveal a 
client’s false evidence to the affected tribunal, if other reasonable means, including attempts to 
persuade the client to rectify the situation, have failed. Accord Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 135 (Oct. 
27, 1978) (opining that principle of confidentiality does not trump duty to disclose under former OH 
7-102(B)(1); where client gives deposition testimony that the lawyer knows to be false, the lawyer 
should recess the deposition and call upon the client to rectify the false evidence immediately; failure 
to do so may be considered assisting fraudulent conduct in violation of former OH DR 7-102(A)(7)). 
Even then, however, disclosure should be made in a manner that protects client confidences as much 
as possible. 
Other cases under the former OHCPR in which the Court sanctioned lawyers for failing to reveal 
known false evidence include Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 312, 677 
N.E.2d 1188 (1997) (client, as in Heffernan, discussed below, misrepresented his identity before 
court), and Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Walker, 17 Ohio St.3d 144, 478 N.E.2d 767 (1985) (client 
testifying falsely about her knowledge as to existence and whereabouts of marital asset in domestic 
relations proceeding). 
The facts of one former OHCPR case raise an interesting question as to how the timing provisions of 
Rule 3.3(c) would apply to the 3.3(a)(3) obligation to material evidence that the lawyer comes to 
know is false.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Heffernan, 58 Ohio St.3d 260, 569 N.E.2d 1027 
(1991). Heffernan disciplined an attorney who failed to disclose a false statement previously made 
by his client in court. The lawyer’s client pretended to be his brother at the time of his traffic court 
hearing to escape the ramifications of his own bad-driving record. Several months after the hearing, 
his lawyer learned of the perjury and confronted his client to rectify it, but, when the client refused to 
do so, the lawyer failed to disclose the matter to the court. The Supreme Court sanctioned the attorney 
for violating former OH DR 7-102(B)(1). 
Is the result different under the new Rule? In all probability it is, and Comment [13] adds weight to 
that conclusion by noting that “[d]ivision (c) modifies the rule set forth in [Heffernan] to the extent 
that Heffernan imposed an obligation to disclose false evidence or statements that is unlimited in 
time.” Rule 3.3 cmt. [13]. We raise one question. Rule 3.3(c) states that the duty to disclose 
continues “until the issue to which the duty relates is determined by the highest tribunal that may 
consider the issue, or the time has expired for such determination.” In Heffernan the respondent 
learned of the false identity “a few months after the court hearing,” 58 Ohio St. at 260, 569 N.E.2d at 
1027, presumably long after the time for appeal had expired. But what about collateral proceedings? 
Do they count under the Rule in determining when the “highest tribunal” has decided the matter or 
whether time for such decision has expired? Interestingly, in Heffernan -- more than two years after 
the initial court hearing -- the falsely charged brother, Joseph Fresenda, moved to withdraw the 
no-contest plea “based on the fact that it was actually his brother Phillip Fresenda who was cited and 
found guilty of the traffic offense and that Phillip had held himself out to be Joseph to the citing 
officer and the municipal court.” Id. (emphasis in original). Although the Heffernan decision does 
not indicate how the motion to withdraw the plea was decided, it is at least arguable that this issue had 
not yet been finally determined under the formulation of division (c), and it is more than arguable that 
“the issue to which the duty relates” was precisely that raised in the motion to withdraw. 
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3.3:600  Discretion to Withhold Evidence Believed To Be False 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.3(a)(3) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:304 
ALI-LGL § 120 
Wolfram § 125 
Ohio Rule 3.3(a)(3) also provides that a lawyer “may refuse to offer evidence, other than the 
testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.” As further 
stated in Comment [8], 
[a] lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude 
its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer’s knowledge that evidence 
is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 
1.0(g). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the 
veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer 
cannot ignore an obvious falsehood. 
Rule 3.3 cmt. [8]. 
The 2002 amendments to the Model Rules added the caveat, included in the Ohio Rule, that the 
discretion to withhold based on reasonable belief of falsity is unavailable with respect to the 
testimony of a criminal defendant; in such cases (as in all cases) the lawyer’s obligation is not to offer 
evidence he or she “knows” to be false. See Rule 3.3(a)(3), first sentence, and section 3.3:400. As is 
stated in MR 3.3 cmt. [9], which was not adopted in Ohio): 
Offering such proof [that which the lawyer reasonably believes to be 
false] may reflect adversely on the lawyer’s ability to discriminate in 
the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer’s effectiveness as an 
advocate.” 
As stated in ABA, Annotated Rules of Professional Conduct 319 (6th ed. 2007) (commentary), 
[t]he obligations of candor toward a tribunal provided in Rule 3.3(a) 
and (b) all supersede the obligation to protect the confidentiality of 
information relating to the representation provided in Rule 1.6. 
Such disclosure of protected information in order to comply with Rule 3.3 is expressly stated in the 
mandatory disclosure language of Ohio Rule 1.6(c), a provision not found in the Model Rules.  See 
section 1.6:395. 
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With respect to the exception for false testimony by criminal defendants, MR cmt. [9] states as 
follows: 
Because of the special protections historically provided criminal 
defendants . . . this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the 
testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but 
does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer 
knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client’s 
decision to testify. 
Further as to criminal-defendant testimony, see ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 333-34 (7th ed. 2011). 
 
3.3:700  Duty to Remedy Criminal or Fraudulent Conduct Related to 
Adjudicative Proceeding 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.3(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.3(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.51, 7.53-7.55 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:301 
ALI-LGL § 120 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.51, 7.53-7.55 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 3.3(b) obligates a lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who 
knows that any person (including the client) intends to engage, is engaging, or has engaged in 
criminal or fraudulent conduct, to “take reasonable measures to remedy the situation, including, if 
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.” See Rule 3.3 cmt. [12]. And, pursuant to Rule 1.6(c), 
disclosure of information relating to the representation, including privileged information, is 
mandatory to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to comply with Rule 3.3 (or 4.1). 
As stated in the comment, this duty is part of the “special obligation” of lawyers “to protect a tribunal 
against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the judicial process . . . . Thus, 
division (b) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure if 
necessary . . . .” Id. 
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Division (b), modeled closely on MR 3.3(b) (the only difference is the insertion of “including the 
client” following “a person”) is significantly different from one OHCPR analog, OH DR 
7-102(A)(7). Former 7-102(A)(7) prohibited counseling or assisting the client in conduct known to be 
illegal or fraudulent. In Rule 3.3(b), there is no reference to refraining from counseling or assisting 
misconduct (a matter now treated in Ohio Rule 1.2(d)); Rule 3.3(b) imposes an affirmative 
obligation on a lawyer who, in representing a client in an adjudicative proceeding, knows of criminal 
or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding -- not just by the client, as before, but by any “person,” 
-- to take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. 
Another code antecedent, OH DR 7-102(B), is more closely related to the Rule. DR 7-102(B) dealt 
with the obligations of a lawyer who learns (via “information clearly establishing”) that in the course 
of the representation, a client “has” perpetuated a fraud on a person or tribunal; if so, the lawyer had to 
call on the client to rectify; if the client refused or was unable to do so, the lawyer “shall” reveal the 
fraud to the person or tribunal affected. DR 7-102(B)(1). Division (B)(2) obligated a lawyer learning 
of a fraud having been perpetrated by a person other than the client on a tribunal to promptly reveal 
that fraud to the tribunal. 
While somewhat similar in overall effect, there are three significant differences between DR 7-102(B) 
and Rule 3.3(b). First, the disciplinary rule was limited to past conduct; the Rule deals with past, 
present, and future misconduct. Second, the misconduct addressed in the disciplinary rule was fraud; 
in the Rule it is criminal or fraudulent conduct. Third, 7-102(B)(1) sought to police fraud by the client 
on a tribunal and on “a person” as well. The Rule is limited to misconduct related to the proceeding 
before a tribunal. As the Task Force states in Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 3.3, 
the rule does not adopt the DR 7-102(B)(1) requirement that the lawyer 
reveal the client’s fraudulent act, during the course of the 
representation, upon any person. Requiring a lawyer to disclose any 
and all frauds a client commits during the representation is unworkable. 
There is no Ohio precedent where a lawyer was disciplined for failing 
to disclose a client’s fraud upon a third person. 
Despite the Task Force’s disclaimer with respect to disclosure of fraud by the client on other than a 
tribunal, remember that Ohio Rule 4.1(b) speaks to disclosure obligations relating to client fraud (or 
illegal conduct) against a third person. Under Rule 4.1(b), in the course of representation a lawyer 
“shall not” knowingly fail to disclose a material fact when necessary to avoid assisting a client’s fraud 
or illegal act. If the material facts encompass information relating to the representation, including 
privileged information, they must nevertheless be disclosed in accordance with the mandatory 
provisions of Rule 1.6(c). In contrast to the Task Force statement in its Ohio Code Commentary to 
Rule 3.3, quoted above, its Ohio Code Commentary to Rule 4.1 states that 4.1(b) “parallels . . . its 
‘fraud on a person’ portion of DR 7-102(B)(1).” See further discussion in section 4.1:300. 
It should also be noted in connection with Rule 3.3(b) that “fraud” and “fraudulent” are now defined 
terms. Each “denotes conduct that has an intent to deceive and is either of the following: (1) an actual 
or implied misrepresentation of a material fact that is made with knowledge of its falsity or with such 
utter disregard and recklessness about its falsity that knowledge may be inferred; (2) a knowing 
concealment of a material fact where there is a duty to disclose the material fact.” Ohio Rule 1.0(d). 
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The following cases decided under the former OHCPR would seem to rest reasonably comfortably 
within the Rule 3.3(b) mold. 
Known fraudulent or criminal conduct by a client related to an adjudicative proceeding: 
 Disciplinary Counsel v. Cirincione, 102 Ohio St.3d 117, 2004 Ohio 1810, 807 N.E.2d 320. 
In Cirincione, respondent was found to have violated DR 7-102(B)(1) for failing to call upon 
the client to rectify her violation of judicial-release conditions and then not reporting the 
matter to the court. 
 Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 312, 677 N.E.2d 1188 (1997). In 
Taylor, respondent found out, during his representation of a client on various motor-vehicle 
infractions, that the client was using the identity of his brother. Unlike Heffernan, discussed 
immediately below, respondent apparently went along with the scheme after being advised of 
it by the client’s sister; there was no indication of any attempt to have the client rectify the 
matter, and respondent did not notify the courts of the fraud. Violation of, inter alia, DR 
7-102(B)(1). 
 Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Heffernan, 58 Ohio St.3d 260, 569 N.E.2d 1027 (1991). 
In Heffernan, the Court disciplined an attorney who failed to disclose a previous false 
statement made to the court by his client. The lawyer’s client had pretended to be his brother 
during a traffic court hearing, in order to escape the ramifications of his own bad-driving 
record. Several months after the hearing, the lawyer learned of the perjury and confronted his 
client to have him rectify the criminal and fraudulent conduct. When the client failed to do so, 
the lawyer did not disclose the conduct to the court. Former OH DR 7-102(B)(1) held violated. 
(Query, however, whether Heffernan is still good law under the time limit imposed on the 
division (b) duty by Rule 3.3(c). This issue is discussed in Rule 3.3 cmt. [13] and in section 
3.3:500 supra). 
 Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Walker, 17 Ohio St.3d 144, 478 N.E.2d 767 (1985). In Walker 
the respondent remained silent when his client lied to the court about the existence and 
whereabouts of assets; DR 7-102(B)(1) violated. 
To the extent a client perpetrates a fraud with respect to a matter in which the lawyer does not 
represent the client, but the fraud has an impact upon a matter in which the lawyer does represent the 
client (and in that respect can be viewed as “related to the proceeding”), it would seem that Rule 3.3(b) 
should be applicable. An ethics opinion to this effect under the former OHCPR is: 
 Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 94-2 (Sept. 8, 1994). According to the facts presented, a lawyer 
represented a minor and the minor’s unmarried parents in a personal-injury action and an 
uninsured-motorist claim. In a separate proceeding, which occurred while the accident 
litigation was pending, the mother, who was not represented by the lawyer in this second 
matter, had the child’s name changed without the father’s consent. In the course of doing so, 
she presented the probate court with a false affidavit that the location of the father was 
unknown and could not be discovered with reasonable diligence. That affidavit, in turn, could 
have affected the tort matter in which the lawyer was providing representation, undercutting 
the father’s claim for loss of the child’s services by contradicting the father’s claim of 
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involvement with his child. Under these circumstances, the bar association opined that the 
lawyer had to assure that the fraud was revealed to the tribunal hearing the tort case, the 
probate court, and the affected person, the father. 
Conduct that is “related to the proceeding” need not be part of the formal proceedings, although such 
conduct in the proceeding itself is certainly included. See Rule 3.3 cmt. [10] (depositions). Other 
conduct that is “related to the proceeding” includes “bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully 
communicating with a witness, juror, court official, or other participant in the proceeding.” Rule 3.3 
cmt. [12]. Likewise coming within the Rule is “unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or 
other evidence, or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so.” Id. 
See also Reporter’s Explanation of Changes to Model Rule 3.3 (2002), referring to “jury 
tampering or document destruction” and “lies or misrepresentations by the opposing party or 
witnesses called by the opposing party” as examples that fall within the Rule. While the precise reach 
of “related to the proceedings” will have to await further development, these examples make clear 
that the fraudulent or criminal conduct will “relate[] to the proceeding” if it “undermines the integrity 
of the adjudicative process” in that proceeding. Rule 3.3 cmt. [12]. 
(The debate with respect to whether the lawyer is obligated to disclose otherwise protected 
information has, of course, been resolved under the Rule, which expressly provides that the lawyer’s 
duty under Rule 3.3(b) applies even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise 
protected by Rule 1.6. Ohio Rule 3.3(c).) 
One ethics opinion that does not survive adoption of Rules 3.3(b) and (c) is Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievance & Discipline Op. 90-07, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 14 (Apr. 20, 1990), in which 
the Board opined that, despite former 7-102(B)(1) and 4-101(C)(2) (allowing a lawyer to disclose 
confidential information when permitted under a disciplinary rule), a lawyer should not disclose 
confidential information about a client fraud upon a tribunal; if the client refuses to reveal the fraud, 
the lawyer should withdraw.  Obviously, Rules 3.3(b) and (c) call for a different result than that 
provided in Opinion 90-07.  
Another ethics ruling that would appear not to have survived is Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 
87-10 (Sept. 17, 1987). In Opinion 87-10, a lawyer learned that a corporate client had committed 
fraud involving misrepresentation to the Internal Revenue Service of facts in seeking subchapter S 
status for tax filing purposes. The OSBA opined that if the IRS was a “person or tribunal” within the 
meaning of former 7-102(B), the lawyer had to call on the client to rectify and if it refused to do so the 
lawyer was obligated to reveal the matter to the IRS. There are three problems with this result under 
Rule 3.3(b): First, the IRS was not acting in this instance as a “tribunal” (i.e., “an administrative 
agency . . . acting in an adjudicative capacity. [An] administrative agency . . . acts in an adjudicative 
capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or 
presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal judgment 
directly affecting a party’s interests in a particular matter.”) Rule 1.0(o). Second, for similar reasons, 
the lawyer was not representing the client “in an adjudicative proceeding,” and the fraud did not relate 
to such a proceeding, as required by Rule 3.3(b). (But it would likely be a violation of Rule 1.2(d).) 
Third, even if the IRS were a “person” (an undefined term under the Rules) disclosure of a client’s 
fraud on a person is no longer covered by Rule 3.3(b). See Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 3.3. As 
discussed above, however, such conduct may now be covered by Rule 4.1(b). 
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Known fraudulent or criminal conduct related to an adjudicative proceeding by a person other than a 
client: To our knowledge, there are only two Ohio disciplinary cases involving violation of former 
OH DR 7-102(B)(2) that implicated a duty to disclose to the tribunal fraud on the tribunal by a person 
other than a client. In Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Wright, 58 Ohio St.3d 126, 568 N.E.2d 1218 (1991), 
former clients of respondent (the Edgintons) declared bankruptcy; they were represented by another 
attorney in the bankruptcy proceedings. While the evidence was disputed as to whether respondent, 
while representing the Edgintons, had counseled them to conceal certain expectancy assets, it was 
undisputed that at a meeting of creditors at which respondent was present, he heard the Edgintons 
make the false statements about their assets but did not disclose this to the bankruptcy court. As a 
result, respondent was found to have violated DR 7-102(B)(2). The other case, Bar Ass’n of Greater 
Cleveland v. Cassaro, 61 Ohio St.2d 62, 399 N.E.2d 545 (1980), is more problematical. There is a 
conclusion that OH DR 7-102(B)(2) was violated by respondent, but no analysis of that violation. As 
best as can be discerned, this violation was based on the fact that respondent was handling on referral 
fraudulent workers’ compensation claims concocted by another lawyer, Berman. Presumably the 
7-102(B)(2) violation was premised on respondent’s failure to advise the Industrial Commission that 
the claims of his clients were the result of fraud by Berman, but there is precious little in the opinion 
that examines this charge, other than the conclusory finding of violation of the disciplinary rule. 
There are two ethics opinions dealing with this point, Ohio State Bar Ass’n Op. 75-8 (June 30, 1975) 
(lawyer obligated to disclose fraud on Industrial Commission by others in addition to client), and 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 89-2 (Nov. 17, 1989) (obligation to disclose to tribunal fraud on court 
perpetrated by supposed eye-witness by testifying falsely at deposition and arbitration concerning 
circumstances of automobile accident). 
Once again, the differences between the former disciplinary rule and Rule 3.3(b) should be 
emphasized. First, Rule 3.3(b) deals with both criminal and fraudulent conduct, not just fraud. 
Second, it does not cover known fraud or criminal conduct by a client toward another person, unless 
that conduct can be fairly said to be related to the adjudicative proceeding in which the lawyer is 
representing the client. Third, it covers past, present, and future criminal or fraudulent activity, not 
just past fraud. 
  
3.3:800  Duty of Disclosure in Ex Parte Proceedings 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.3(d) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.3(d) 
Commentary 
ALI-LGL § 112 
Wolfram § 12.7 
Ohio Rule 3.3(d) provides that in an ex parte proceeding, “a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all 
material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether 
or not the facts are adverse.” 
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Because “in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is 
no balance of presentation by opposing advocates,” Rule 3.3 cmt. [14], this expanded duty of candor 
is applicable. See also ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 335-36 (7th ed. 
2011) (commentary). 
While the OHCPR did not speak to the ex parte proceeding issue, there is now one Supreme Court 
disciplinary case, decided under the Rules of Professional Conduct, that does:  Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Stafford, 131 Ohio St.3d 385, 2012 Ohio 909, 965 N.E.2d 971. In a divorce action, Stafford 
represented the wife and filed her complaint for divorce, which sought spousal support and division of 
marital property, but made no mention of an existing prenuptial agreement. Husband answered and 
counterclaimed for divorce, asserting that the prenuptial limited the wife’s rights and reasserting it in 
a motion for summary judgment. Stafford opposed the summary judgment motion but never 
answered the counterclaim. Two years later, Stafford filed a motion for leave to file an amended 
complaint, premised on the supposed need to include additional necessary parties. The motion made 
no mention of the prenuptial agreement. In the amended complaint (not attached to the motion), 
however, Stafford acknowledged the existence of the prenuptial but claimed it was unenforceable. 
The motion for leave was granted by the trial court ex parte the day it was filed. Respondent followed 
the same pattern in his belated motion seeking leave to answer the counterclaim filed two years before 
– the motion was premised on “issues regarding service of the answer and counterclaim” but the 
answer itself asserted that the prenuptial identified in the husband’s counterclaim was unenforceable. 
These less-than-forthcoming motions for leave granted ex parte were the basis for the Rule 3.3(d) 
violations. As explained by the Court, 
[t]he board determined that Stafford had “intentionally misled the court 
by filing his motion for leave to file an amended complaint on specific 
grounds stated and then surreptitiously including an additional 
allegation regarding the prenuptial agreement omitted in the original 
complaint but critical to his client’s interests.” The board further noted 
that Stafford had misled the domestic-relations court into granting ex 
parte relief “without the court’s full knowledge of the extent and 
purpose of the relief sought and by taking advantage of local rules not 
designed for the purpose to do so.” 
Id. at para. 18. In rejecting Stafford’s objection regarding the 3.3(d) violation, Justice McGee Brown 
wrote as follows: 
Stafford abused the domestic-relations court’s procedure and deceived 
the court by requesting leave to amend a pleading, bringing attention to 
a singular issue while surreptitiously including a completely different 
and unrelated amendment in the pleadings. Belatedly sneaking a 
defense into pleadings without the knowledge or permission of the 
court constitutes a failure to “inform the tribunal of all material facts 
known to the lawyer.” Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(d). 
Id. at para. 30. For this and other violations, Stafford was suspended from practice for twelve 
months. 
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3.4:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
  
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.4 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.4 
  
3.4:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 3.4 differs substantively from the Model Rule in the following respects: 
In division (d), the words “intentionally or habitually” have been added after “in pretrial procedure”, 
and “motion or” has been added before the first “discovery request”. 
In division (e), the words “or by a good-faith belief that such evidence may exist,” have been added 
after “admissible evidence”. 
Division (f) has been deleted. 
A new division (g) has been added; it prohibits a lawyer from advising or causing a person to hide or 
leave the jurisdiction so as to become unavailable as a witness (tracking former OH DR 7-109(B)). 
  
3.4:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.4(a): DR 7-102(A)(8) & DR 7-109(A); 
EC 7-27. 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.4(b): DR 7-102(A)(6) & 7-109(C); EC 
7-26 & 7-28. 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.4(c): DR 7-106(A). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.4(d): DR 7-106(C)(7); EC 7-25. 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.4(e): DR 7-106(C)(1) & (4); EC 7-24. 
[The listing should also include DR 7-106(C)(3).] 
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The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.4(g): OH DR 7-109(B); EC 7-27. 
  
3.4:103  Overview 
As stated in Ohio Rule 3.4 cmt. [1], 
 [t]he procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the 
evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the contending 
parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by 
prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, 
improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery 
procedure, and the like. However, a lawyer representing an 
organization, in accordance with law, may request an employee of the 
client to refrain from giving information to another party. See Rule 4.2, 
Comment [7]. 
These prohibitions are set forth in Ohio Rule 3.4. 
While the terms “zealous” and “zealously” are not found in the Ohio Rules -- indeed, the terms have 
been expressly rejected, see the Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 1.3 -- they were very much present 
in characterizing the lawyer’s commitment to his or her client’s cause in the former OHCPR. (See 
Canon 7 (“A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law”); OH EC 7-1 
(“Zealous representation”); OH DR 7-101 (“Representing a client zealously”)). Nevertheless, there 
were numerous instances in the Code where a line was drawn to demarcate the “bounds of the law” 
beyond which zealousness could not go. OH DR 7-102(A), 7-106(A) and (C), and 7-109 (the 
OHCPR counterparts to Ohio Rule 3.4) were examples of such limitations. See, e.g., Toledo Bar 
Ass’n v. Batt, 78 Ohio St.3d 189, 192, 677 N.E.2d 349, 352 (1997) (“We recognize that an attorney 
must zealously represent his client, but we also recognize that an attorney has a duty to be civil to 
opposing counsel and the court. Respondent’s bullying tactics toward witnesses, opposing counsel, 
and the board . . . have no place in our jurisprudence.”). 
It should be further noted, in the context of “fairness” to opposing parties and counsel, that there are in 
Ohio a number of documents dealing with the subject of professionalism, which, in significant part, 
are designed to encourage a renewal of lawyer civility in dealing with others in a professional 
capacity. See, e.g., the Statement on Professionalism, issued by the Ohio Supreme Court on 
February 3, 1997, Gov Bar R, App. V (referring to “dignity, integrity, and honor”; noting a 
“diminishing of courtesy and civility among lawyers in their dealings with each other”); A Lawyer’s 
Creed, id. (in which the lawyer offers “fairness, integrity, and civility” to opposing parties and their 
counsel); A Lawyer’s Aspirational Ideals, id. (aspiring to cooperation with opposing counsel, 
including courtesy and civility in all communications and the avoidance of “rudeness and other acts 
of disrespect” in depositions and similar meetings). See also former OH EC 1-5, which noted, inter 
alia, that a lawyer “should be temperate and dignified.” 
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Nor should the oath of office taken on induction to the Bar of Ohio be forgotten on this subject. In it, 
each applicant accepted for admission commits to “conduct myself with dignity and civility and show 
respect toward judges, court staff, clients, fellow professionals, and all other persons.” Gov Bar R I 
8. 
See section 0.1:102. 
  
3.4:200  Unlawful Destruction and Concealment of Evidence 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.4(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.4(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.47, 7.140-7.142 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61.702 
ALI-LGL §§ 118, 119 
Wolfram § 12.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.47, 7.140-7.142 (1996). 
Suppression in general: Ohio Rule 3.4(a) attempts to ensure that lawyers do not unfairly inhibit the 
access of other parties to important evidentiary information pertaining to a matter. See Rule 3.4 cmts. 
[1] & [2]. To this end, the Rule prohibits a lawyer from suppressing evidence that the lawyer has a 
legal obligation to reveal or produce. Under the former OHCPR, this concern was addressed in OH 
DR 7-109(A). See also OH DR 7-102(A)(3). 
Suppression of evidence: Rule 3.4(a), substantively identical to MR 3.4(a), states that a lawyer shall 
not “unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence, unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a 
document or other material having potential evidentiary value, or counsel or assist another person to 
do any such act.” This provision applies only when two conditions are met. First, the lawyer’s 
conduct must involve the suppression of evidence, by obstructing another party’s access to same, by 
altering, destroying, or concealing material that may have evidentiary significance, or by assisting 
others to do any of the above. Second, these actions must be taken “unlawfully” -- i.e., the conduct 
prevents other parties from obtaining evidence they have a legal right to have, pursuant to court order, 
subpoena, discovery request, or other legally enforceable obligation. 
With respect to the second prong of the test, it would appear to be settled under Rule 3.4(a) that an 
actual legal obligation to produce must be present. As is stated in ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 340 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary): 
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Rule 3.4(a) prohibits a lawyer from "unlawfully" concealing material 
having potential evidentiary value.  This does not impose a duty to 
volunteer all relevant information that the lawyer has, but prohibits 
concealing potential evidence a lawyer has a legal duty to disclose. 
Consistent with this reading, Ohio Supreme Court authority under the former OHCPR made an 
existing legal obligation a prerequisite. Thus, in  In re Original Grand Jury Investigation, 89 Ohio 
St.3d 544, 733 N.E.2d 1135 (2000), the Court found support in OH DR 7-109(A) for its conclusion 
that the lawyer in question was legally obligated to comply with a grand-jury subpoena ordering the 
relinquishment of a letter written by his client. The case is further discussed on this point in section 
1.6:380. Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Tomlan, 118 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008 Ohio 1471, 885 N.E.2d 
895 (failure to reveal “any and all” estate assets in answer to interrogatories and in testimony under 
oath in probate court; such concealment of evidence that respondent had duty to reveal violated DR 
7-109(A)); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Marsick, 81 Ohio St.3d 551, 553, 692 N.E.2d 991, 992 (1998) 
(with respect to suppression of relevant, nonconfidential information when responding to plaintiff’s 
interrogatory requests specifically inquiring about the existence of post-accident interviews and 
knowledge of anyone on the scene shortly after the accident, lawyer’s failure, in answering 
interrogatory, to disclose statement obtained from tow-truck driver, who arrived on scene after 
collision, violated, inter alia, OH DR 7-109(A); six-month suspension imposed. “A discovery 
request raises an obligation to produce the evidence sought when it is relevant and not privileged. 
Concealing evidence that is clearly requested is tantamount to deceiving both opposing counsel and 
the court.”). See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Kellogg, 126 Ohio St.3d 360, 2010 Ohio 3285, 933 
N.E.2d 1085, finding a violation of DR 7-109(A) where the respondent (general counsel for a 
“nutraceutical” company) “instigat[ed] the removal of a misbranded supplement from the company’s 
warehouse after learning that an FDA inspection of the facility was imminent.” Id. at para. 10. 
The need to meet both prongs of the test before a violation would lie in Ohio under the Code was also 
illustrated in a Cleveland Bar Association opinion addressing counsel conduct directed toward 
altering medical reports to be exchanged in the discovery context. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 147 
(Apr. 24, 1981). If a party undergoes a court-ordered mental or physical examination under OH Civ 
R 35, the examiner submits a written medical report to the party requesting the examination. The 
party examined, in turn, has a right to a copy of that report upon request. The bar association warned 
that any request by the lawyer for the party who sought the examination, asking the examining doctor 
to revise the written report to exclude certain matters, might constitute suppression of evidence that 
the lawyer had a legal duty to produce, thereby violating former OH DR 7-109(A). In contrast, the 
opinion noted, a lawyer may ask the client’s own expert physician to delete certain matters from the 
expert’s report, for tactical reasons, if the information is not material and its omission does not in any 
way make the report misleading, because there is no legal obligation to reveal or produce the report in 
a particular form. To go further, however, and request that the doctor destroy earlier versions of the 
medical reports would violate this rule, since the doctor may have a legal obligation to produce the 
earlier report as part of discovery. In the bar association’s opinion, such action also might violate 
ORC 2921.12, a third-degree felony, as well as OH DR 7-102(A)(7), which prohibited a lawyer from 
counseling or assisting a client in conduct the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent. 
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Because the legal obligation to produce or reveal evidence flows from criminal law, court order, or 
discovery request, failure to comply can have consequences outside the disciplinary process. Such 
conduct may violate the criminal law, ORC 2921.12(A)(1); ORC 2913.42(A)(1); ORC 
2921.32(A)(4), and can result in discovery sanctions, OH Civ R 37, as well as citation for contempt. 
See In re Original Grand Jury Investigation, 89 Ohio St.3d 544, 733 N.E.2d 1135 (2000). And 
allegations that opposing counsel destroyed evidence can also result in opposing counsel’s having to 
withdraw from representation in the matter. See Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St. 3d 578, 
591, 664 N.E.2d 1272, 1282 (1996). 
In addition, improper conduct with respect to evidence may give rise to tort liability for spoliation of 
evidence. In Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 67 Ohio St.3d 28, 29, 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (1993), 
the Court summarized the doctrine in the following terms: 
A cause of action exists in tort for interference with or destruction of 
evidence; . . . the elements of a claim for interference with or 
destruction of evidence are (1) pending or probable litigation involving 
the plaintiff, (2) knowledge on the part of defendant that litigation 
exists or is probable, (3) willful destruction of evidence by defendant 
designed to disrupt the plaintiff’s case, (4) disruption of the plaintiff’s 
case, and (5) damages proximately caused by the defendant’s acts . . . . 
In the language of the Court, a cause of action exists for “interference with or destruction of 
evidence,” one of the elements of which is “willful destruction of evidence.” Id. Given this ambiguity 
(“interference with or destruction”), there has not been unanimity in subsequent decisions as to the 
scope of the tort. Compare, e.g., Tate v. Adena Reg. Med. Ctr., 155 Ohio App.3d 524, 2003 Ohio 
7042, 801 N.E.2d 930 (Ross) (reading Smith as requiring destruction; rejecting plaintiffs’ argument 
that interference with or concealment of evidence was sufficient); Pratt v. Payne, 153 Ohio App.3d 
450, 2003 Ohio 3777, 794 N.E.2d 723 (Montgomery) (reading Smith as requiring destruction); 
McGuire v. Draper, Hollenbaugh & Briscoe Co., L.P.A., 2002 Ohio 6170 (App. Highland) 
(same); White v. Ford Motor Co., 142 Ohio App.3d 384, 386, 755 N.E.2d 954, 956 (Franklin 
2001) (same), with Drawl v. Cornicelli, 124 Ohio App.3d 562, 566-68, 706 N.E.2d 849, 851-52 
(Lake 1997) (reading Smith as covering destruction, alteration, or concealment). Even though the 
decided majority of intermediate appellate decisions read the Smith decision narrowly, note that in 
Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center, 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 650, 635 N.E.2d 331, 342 (1994), the 
Supreme Court quoted the interference or destruction language from Smith; it then proceeded to hold 
that alteration of evidence need not be dealt with in a separate spoliation tort claim like that in Smith, 
but can also be addressed by an award of punitive damages, even if the actual damages in the case do 
not flow from the alteration itself, as would be required in the separate spoliation claim recognized in 
Smith. A more recent Supreme Court case touching on the issue, Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93 
Ohio St.3d 488, 756 N.E.2d 657 (2001), again refers to misconduct broader than the willful 
destruction prerequisite of Smith. Justice Cook’s dissent analyzes the inconsistency present in the 
Smith language,  id. at 493, 494-96 & n.3, 756 N.E.2d at 661, 662-63 & n.3. 
Overall, OH DR 7-109(A) was quite similar to former OH DR 7-102(A)(3) (concealing or 
knowingly failing to disclose that which the law requires to be disclosed). Thus, as the Court held in 
Marsick, conduct that violated OH DR 7-109(A) was likely to violate OH DR 7-102(A)(3) as well. 
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In re Original Grand Jury is consistent with this analysis. See 89 Ohio St.3d at 549, 733 N.E.2d at 
1140 (citing OH DR 7-102(A)(3) and OH DR 7-109(A) in support of its conclusion that the lawyer 
was under a legal obligation to turn over physical evidence (letter written by his client)). 
Can a lawyer violate 3.4(a) if he destroys evidence having potential evidentiary value while acting on 
his own behalf as a party to litigation, rather than as an advocate? The respondent in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Robinson, 126 Ohio St.3d 371, 2010 Ohio 3829, 933 N.E.2d 1095, argued that he could 
not have violated the rule, inasmuch as it “applies only to attorneys who are acting in their 
professional capacity as advocates because Chapter III of the Rules of Professional Conduct is 
entitled ‘Advocate.’“ Id. at para. 23. The Supreme Court was not persuaded; it found that no court 
had so held and that a number had held to the contrary. Moreover, since Ohio statutory law makes 
tampering with evidence by “any person” unlawful, in applying Rule 3.4(a) 
to respondent’s conduct undertaken as a party to litigation, we do not 
hold respondent to a higher standard than a member of the general 
public. Instead, we recognize that respondent’s conduct, be it in a 
personal or professional capacity, demonstrates a lack of respect for the 
law that he has been sworn to uphold, thereby undermining public 
confidence in our justice system. Therefore, we conclude that the 
prohibitions against the obstruction of access to evidence set forth in 
Prof. Cond. R. 3.4(a) apply with equal force to attorneys acting in 
either a personal or professional capacity. 
Id. at para. 30. 
Concealing or knowingly failing to disclose that which the law requires to be disclosed: Former OH 
DR 7-102(A)(3) provided that “[i]n his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not conceal or 
knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.” The phrase “conceal or 
knowingly fail to disclose,” appeared to limit the application of this provision to intentional conduct; 
therefore, an attorney’s negligent failure to disclose something required to be revealed by law did not 
fall within this provision. See Am. Bar Found., Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility 
312 (1979) (interpreting identical language in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility). 
A number of cases employing former 7-102(A)(3) involved the failure to disclose documents or other 
potential evidentiary material, and thus would presumably fall under the Rule 3.4(a) prohibition. See, 
e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Leary, 67 Ohio St.3d 425, 619 N.E.2d 410 (1993) 
(concealment of estate records and later refusal to turn them over to probate court); Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Lowery, 58 Ohio St.3d 72, 567 N.E.2d 1038 (1991) (failure to disclose decedent’s most 
recent will to probate court). Note that the first portion of 3.4(a) is directed at obstruction of “another 
party’s” access to evidence, whereas the prohibition against alteration, destruction, or concealment of 
evidence is not so limited. This reading is consistent with the discussion of MR 3.4(a) (substantively 
identical to the Ohio Rule) in ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 338-40, (7th 
ed. 2011) (commentary). 
Violations of OH DR 7-102(A)(3) were not restricted to the probate context. For example, a lawyer 
who knowingly withheld relevant information from a bar association’s Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Committee and who had previously concealed from the court that his supposed “partner” in defending 
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a criminal charge was not an attorney (indeed, the lawyer affirmatively represented that his “partner” 
was an attorney), was found to have violated OH DR 7-102(A)(3), among other violations.  
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Culbreath, 88 Ohio St.3d 271, 725 N.E.2d 629 (2000). In Dayton Bar 
Ass’n v. Callahan, 36 Ohio St.3d 179, 522 N.E.2d 542 (1988), the respondent was found to have 
violated, among other rules, OH 7-102(A)(3) in knowingly failing to disclose the true purpose of his 
clients’ marriage when he submitted forms on their behalf to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service. (This conduct violated 18 USC §§ 1001, 1002 (2000) as well.) 
An egregious example of violation of former 7-102(A)(3) in the criminal context occurred in Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrenn, 99 Ohio St.3d 222, 2003 Ohio 3288, 790 N.E.2d 1195. In 
Wrenn, at a pretrial hearing in a juvenile sexual-assault case, the respondent, an assistant county 
prosecutor, stood by and agreed that the state was still waiting on semen test results, even though he 
had previously been informed verbally that the Bureau of Criminal Investigation had determined that 
the semen was not that of the defendant, but of the twelve-year-old victim. (Respondent also 
interviewed the victim privately later that day, at which time the boy changed his story and conceded 
that the semen was his, not defendant’s. Respondent advised neither defense counsel nor the court of 
this information.) With respect to this flagrant violation OH DR 7-102(A)(3) (and three other 
disciplinary rules), the Court had this to say: 
 Here, respondent knew that the DNA testing had been 
completed and that it was not Derr’s [defendant’s] semen on the 
victim’s shirt. The fact that the information was not yet provided in the 
form of a written report does not negate respondent’s duty to disclose 
the information. In addition, the respondent knew that the victim had 
changed his story about the source of that semen and neglected to tell 
Derr’s counsel. Whether or not the DNA test results were implicated in 
the plea actually negotiated, the credibility of the victim certainly was 
an issue. Respondent’s failure to disclose the information before the 
first plea was inexcusable and undermined the integrity of the criminal 
justice system. The failure to disclose this information violated four 
Disciplinary Rules and warrants the imposition of sanctions. 
Id. at para. 23. Despite the Court’s strong language, Wrenn received only a stayed six-month 
suspension. Chief Justice Moyer, joined by Justice Pfiefer, would have imposed the sanction with no 
stay. For further discussion of the sanction/mitigation aspect of the Wrenn case, see section 8.4:400, 
at “Misconduct in the judicial process.” 
To the extent criminal statutes involving suppression of evidence apply to attorneys, failure to comply 
with them would violate Rule 3.4(a). See generally ORC 2921.32 (obstructing justice). An 
interesting case in which respondent was convicted of obstruction of justice for false answers to the 
police as to the whereabouts of the friend who was living with him is Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Hastie, 29 Ohio St.3d 28, 505 N.E.2d 261 (1987). Despite the fact that there is no indication that 
these actions were taken “[i]n his representation of a client,” respondent was found to have violated 
OH DR 7-102(A)(3), among other provisions. Other criminal-reporting statutes may come into play 
here as well, see, e.g., ORC 2921.22 (failure to report a crime); ORC 2921.23 (failure to aid 
law-enforcement officers), although their application to the client-lawyer relationship often is unclear. 
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See generally ORC 2921.22(G)(1) (limited exception to crime reporting where revelation would 
violate attorney-client privilege). See also section 1.6:320. 
Conduct that violated OH DR 7-102(A)(3) also frequently violated OH DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and OH DR 1-102(A)(5) 
(prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). See Rule 8.4(c) & (d) and sections 
8.4:400-:500. An example of conduct violative of all three provisions is Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Lowery, 58 Ohio St.3d 72, 567 N.E.2d 1038 (1991) (concealment of decedent’s will and 
misrepresentation of identity of heirs at law). 
  
3.4:210  Physical Evidence of Client Crime 
Comment [2] notes as follows with respect to such physical evidence: 
A lawyer is permitted to take temporary possession of physical 
evidence of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a limited 
examination that will not alter or destroy material characteristics of the 
evidence. In such a case, the lawyer is required to turn the evidence 
over to the police or other prosecuting authority, depending on the 
circumstances. 
Rule 3.4 cmt. [2]. See, to the same effect, 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 
119 (2000). 
The leading case in Ohio on this issue probably is In re Original Grand Jury Investigation, 89 
Ohio St.3d 544, 733 N.E.2d 1135 (2000), discussed at sections 1.6:380 and 3.4:200. See also 
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 12.3.5, at 645-46 (1986). An exhaustive review of 
the issue can be found at Stephen Gillers, Guns, Fruits, Drugs, and Documents: A Criminal 
Defense Lawyer’s Responsibility for Real Evidence, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 813 (2011). 
  
3.4:300  Falsifying Evidence 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.4(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.4(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.50, 7.143. 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:705 
ALI-LGL §§ 117, 118 
Wolfram § 12.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.50 (1996). 
Rule 3.4(b) prohibits a lawyer from falsifying evidence, counseling or assisting a witness to testify 
falsely, or offering to a witness an inducement that is prohibited by law. Such behavior may also 
subject the lawyer to criminal penalties for tampering with evidence. See ORC 2921.12(A)(2) (“No 
person, knowing that an official proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely 
to be instituted, shall . . . [m]ake, present, or use any record, document, or thing, knowing it to be false 
and with purpose to mislead.”). 
 
Violation of the analogous disciplinary rule (OH DR 7-102(A)(6)) under the former OHCPR was 
found where a lawyer: 
 forged and then notarized his wife’s name on affidavit filed in support of TRO, and, in a 
separate count, prepared and filed a false affidavit of disqualification, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Pullins, 127 Ohio St.3d 436, 2010 Ohio 6241, 940 N.E.2d 952; 
 fabricated a new, purportedly timely-filed, document after missing the deadline to refile a 
worker’s compensation claim, Disciplinary Counsel v. Niermeyer, 119 Ohio St.3d 99, 2008 
Ohio 3824, 892 N.E.2d 434; 
 advanced uncorroborated receipts and other suspect evidence in attempt to justify Medicaid 
reimbursement of client for unsubstantiated health-care expenses, Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Mitchell, 118 Ohio St.3d 98, 2008 Ohio 1822, 886 N.E.2d 222; 
 created and filed falsified qualified domestic relations reports in which the entitlements of 
respondent’s client were unilaterally increased and the signatures of opposing counsel and his 
client, the ex-husband, were forged, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Herman, 99 Ohio 
St.3d 362, 2003 Ohio 3932, 792 N.E.2d 1078; 
 created and filed knowingly false probate accounts in connection with an adoption matter, 
which accounts failed to disclose the payment of exorbitant fees to respondent, who 
represented therein that no such disbursements had been made, Stark County Bar Ass’n v. 
Hare, 99 Ohio St.3d 310, 2003 Ohio 3651, 791 N.E.2d 966 (numerous other violations, all 
of which resulted in disbarment); 
 suggested that the complaining witness in a domestic-violence action testify in a manner that 
had no basis in fact, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Deardorff, 84 Ohio St.3d 85, 702 N.E.2d 59 
(1998) (conduct also violated OH DR 1-102(A)(3)-(A)(5)); 
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 created false evidence of receipts for disbursements from an estate, Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Stinson, 25 Ohio St.3d 130, 495 N.E.2d 434 (1986) (conduct violated other 
numerous provisions, including OH DR 1-102(A)(4) & (A)(6)); 
See also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Carpenter, 68 Ohio St.3d 99, 623 N.E.2d 1188 (1993) 
(trustee’s creation of false evidence concerning sale of real estate and balance in testamentary trust 
violated numerous provisions, including OH DR 7-102(A)(4) and (A)(6)). Compare 
Findlay/Hancock County Bar Ass’n v. Filkins, 90 Ohio St.3d 1, 734 N.E.2d 764 (2000), where 
the Court rejected the Board’s finding of violation and concluded, in a case turning entirely on the 
credibility of the witnesses, that the relator failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
respondent had told his client to lie during a court-ordered psychological evaluation. 
In cases that turn in part on a client’s state of mind, the lawyer has substantial leeway in the 
development and preservation of supporting evidence, because it often is difficult to be certain as to 
the client’s state of mind at the time of the events that are the subject of the dispute. As it was put in 
former OH EC 7-6, the lawyer “should resolve reasonable doubts in favor of his client.” Id. 
  
3.4:310  Prohibited Inducements 
The material in this section is excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide 
to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.143 (1996). 
As noted in section 3.4:300, Rule 3.4(b) also regulates payments made to witnesses. Whether a 
particular payment is permissible depends on the reason for the payment, the classification of the 
recipient as a lay witness or an expert witness, and the method used to compute the payment. 
While it is not improper to pay a witness’s reasonable expenses or to compensate an expert witness on 
terms permitted by law, it is improper to pay a lay witness a fee for testifying. Rule 3.4 cmt. [3]. It is 
also improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee. Id. 
As the text of the Rule makes clear, an improper inducement need not be actually paid for a violation 
to be found. The mere “offer” of such an inducement is sufficient. Nor need the compensation be 
monetary. For example, providing free legal services in exchange for testimony was considered 
impermissible under the former disciplinary rule, OH DR 7-109(C). Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 143 
(June 21, 1979). An obvious purpose of this requirement is to encourage truthful witness testimony 
by forbidding financial inducements that might tempt witnesses to alter their testimony in exchange 
for compensation. Even if the witness is crucial to the case and will refuse to testify without 
compensation, the lawyer cannot participate in the provision of compensation beyond that allowed in 
the Rule. Id. In short, “a [lay] witness may not be paid for ‘telling the truth . . . .” ABA, Annotated 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 343 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). 
Paying a complaining witness so that she would not testify in two criminal actions, which conduct 
resulted in both actions being dismissed, also was held to violate former 7-109(C).  Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Melamed, 62 Ohio St.3d 187, 580 N.E.2d 1077 (1991) (conduct also 
violated OH DR 1-102(A)(3)-(A)(5) and 5-101(A)). The situation can be characterized as one in 
which payment is contingent on the content of the witness’s testimony; here the testimony was her 
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silence. If the lawyer’s conduct rises to the level of bribery, it is of course subject to the criminal law 
as well. ORC 2921.02(C). See, e.g., State v. Jurek, 55 Ohio App.3d 70, 562 N.E.2d 941 
(Cuyahoga 1989) (bribery conviction upheld where lawyer offered complaining witness $1,000 to 
request that charges against lawyer’s client be dropped). See also United States v. Blaszak, 349 F.3d 
881 (6th Cir. 2003), affirming a conviction under 18 USC § 201(c)(3) (seeking payment for 
testimony). While not mentioning OH DR 7-109(C), the federal court did state as follows: 
we find it simply incredible that a licensed attorney and member of the 
Ohio bar would claim that he believed it lawful to accept $500,000 in 
exchange for non-expert truthful testimony. 
349 F.3d at 887. Interestingly, in the follow-up disciplinary action, Blaszak apparently was not 
charged with violating OH DR 7-109(C).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Blaszak, 104 Ohio St.3d 330, 
2004 Ohio 6593, 819 N.E.2d 689 (various rules violated, including OH DR 1-102(A)(4), but 
because of “overwhelming evidence of mitigation,” two-year suspension imposed, with credit for 
time (more than two years) during which respondent was under interim suspension for having been 
convicted of a felony). 
While Rule 3.4(b) prohibits paying an occurrence witness anything other than amounts needed to 
defray the cost of serving as a witness, expert witnesses may be paid a reasonable fee for their 
professional services in serving as an expert. Rule 3.4 cmt. [3]. An expert’s fee cannot be made 
contingent on the outcome of the case. Id. The OSBA opined that the former OHCPR did not bar 
entering into a contingency-fee arrangement with a lay agency that assisted in finding expert 
witnesses to testify. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 80-7 (July 17, 1980). 
See section 3.3:430. 
  
3.4:400  Knowing Disobedience to Rules of Tribunal 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.4(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.4(c) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.98, 7.108 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:710 
ALI-LGL § 105 
Wolfram § 12.1 
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The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.98, 7.108 (1996). 
Rule 3.4(c) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, 
“except for an open refusal based on a good faith assertion that no valid obligation exists.” As 
expressly stated, this provision does not prohibit a lawyer from challenging, in good faith, the validity 
of such an obligation. See also sections 3.1:500 and 3.5:400. And, as not quite expressly stated, 
disobedience of the “obligation under the rules of a tribunal” includes court orders as well as the 
tribunal’s “rules.” See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 344-45 (7th ed. 
2011) (commentary). (The Code analog, former OH DR 7-106(A), addressed the matter more 
directly: “standing rule of a tribunal or a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding.”) See 
2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 30.7, 
at 30-17 (3d ed. Supp. 2011) (noting the change in language but concluding “there is no reason to 
think that the old rule was intended to be narrowed”). The first case decided under Rule 3.4(c) applies 
this broader reading. Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 122 Ohio St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 2371, 907 N.E.2d 
1172 (disobeyance of judgment entry requiring respondent to remit settlement funds within seven 
days of order). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Rohrer, 124 Ohio St.3d 65, 2009 Ohio 5930, 919 
N.E.2d 191 (directing member of staff to deliver copy of motion to compel to newspaper, “in 
defiance of the juvenile court’s order prohibiting communications with the media.” Id. at p. 20.). A 
case involving violation of the rules of the tribunal, and therefore ORPC 3.4(c), is Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Shaw, 126 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010 Ohio 4412, 935 N.E.2d 405 (probate court rule 
requiring prior judicial approval of payment of counsel fees.). 
Examples of conduct found to violate former OH DR 7-106(A) included: 
 refusal to obey court orders, Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 127 Ohio St.3d 436, 2010 
Ohio 6241, 940 N.E.2d 952 (issuing subpoenas in stayed case; failure to appear when ordered 
to “‘defend against a suggestion of an apparent abuse of process,’” id. at para. 39); 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Emerson, 122 Ohio St.3d 176, 2009 Ohio 2883, 909 N.E.2d 635 
(ignoring district court order to file notice of withdrawal or continue as counsel; “[r]espondent 
did not withdraw but continued in failing to assist the client.” Id. at para. 5.); Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n v. McCray, 109 Ohio St.3d 43, 2006 Ohio 1828, 845 N.E.2d 509 (disobedience of 
order that proceeds from sale of client’s house shall remain escrowed until further order of 
court; funds removed without respondent’s obtaining such order; no legal or ethical right to do 
so, even though used to pay legal fees admittedly owing; Court expressly noted that this action 
could not “be described as a good-faith test of that order, id. at para. 17); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. LoDico, 106 Ohio St.3d 229, 2005 Ohio 4630, 833 N.E.2d 1235 (consistently 
ignoring court’s rulings on admission of evidence and on scope of permissible examination); 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Armengau, 99 Ohio St.3d 55, 2003 Ohio 2465, 788 
N.E.2d 1068 (violation of pretrial order limiting respondent’s cross-examination of 
confidential police informant); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Stidham, 87 Ohio St.3d 455, 721 
N.E.2d 977 (2000) (respondent obtained check from executor in payment of fees in violation 
of local rule of probate court that attorney fees are not to be paid until final account prepared 
for filing unless payment otherwise approved by court), 
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 failure timely to comply with discovery orders, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Sullivan, 65 Ohio 
St.3d 293, 603 N.E.2d 983 (1992) (habitual failure to comply with discovery orders caused 
entry of default judgment against client), 
 disregard of a restraining order, Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Osborne, 62 Ohio St.3d 77, 578 
N.E.2d 455 (1991) (preparing quitclaim deed assigning client-husband’s interest in the 
couple’s house to mortgagee in defiance of restraining order), and 
 deliberately ignoring the granting of a motion in limine.  Igo v. Coachman Indus., Inc. 938 
F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying OHCPR). 
Despite the different factual settings presented, each of these cases involved the disobedience of a 
court ruling, which warranted sanction. Depending on the exact circumstances involved, such 
conduct could also violate OH DR 1-102(A)(5) and (A)(6) (now Rule 8.4(d) & (h)) as prejudicial to 
the administration of justice and reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law, as well as 
provisions related to neglect of a client’s cause in OH DR 6-101(A)(3) and OH DR 7-101(A) (now 
Rule 1.3). See, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Sullivan, 65 Ohio St.3d 293, 603 N.E.2d 983 (1992) 
(conduct found to violate enumerated provisions as well as former OH DR 7-106(A)). See also 
Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Randall, 118 Ohio St.3d 408, 2008 Ohio 2709, 889 N.E.2d 535, discussed at 
the end of this section. In that case DR 1-102(A)(5)-(6) & 6-101(A)(3) were invoked; for reasons 
unknown the disregard of court rulings and orders was treated as a 7-106(C)(7) violation, rather than 
a violation of 7-106(A). 
Former 7-106(A) also prohibited a lawyer from “advis[ing] his client” to disregard a standing rule of 
a tribunal or its order made in the course of a proceeding. See, e.g., Muskingum County Certified 
Grievance Comm. v. Greenberger, 108 Ohio St.3d 258, 2006 Ohio 790, 842 N.E.2d 1042 
(advising client to keep daughter with him in Ohio, in contravention of order of Ohio court to return 
daughter to ex-wife in Florida). Again, the Rule is not explicit in including within the 3.4(c) 
prohibition advising a client to violate a court rule or order, but the Model Rule commentary states 
without reservation that this (“advising their clients to disobey . . . court orders”) is covered as well. 
See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 344 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). 
Such behavior also is regulated outside the disciplinary system through a court’s exercise of its 
contempt powers. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Jadwisiak, 64 Ohio St.3d 176, 593 N.E.2d 1379 
(1992) (lawyer held in contempt for failure to comply with probate court order to remit settlement 
proceeds). But cf. State v. Schiewe, 110 Ohio App.3d 170, 673 N.E.2d 941 (Wood 1996) 
(prosecutor’s contempt citation for failure to follow court order to refrain from putting on repetitious 
testimony was overturned where compliance with the order would have been inconsistent with 
prosecutor’s ethical duty to his client). 
Finally, former OH DR 7-106(C)(7) required that lawyers not intentionally or habitually violate any 
established rule of procedure or evidence. The purpose of this rule was to maintain the integrity of the 
legal system, which could be tainted by an attorney’s chronic or intentional violation of procedural or 
evidentiary rules. While this language as such has not been incorporated in division (c) of Rule 3.4, it 
would seem fairly to be encompassed by the prohibition against “knowingly disobey[ing] an 
obligation under the rules of a tribunal.” (See the Task Force’s Ohio Code Comparison, where 
former OH DR 7-106(C) is listed among the disciplinary rules that address the scope of Rule 3.4.) 
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For example, under the former OHCPR, see Disciplinary Counsel v. LoDico, 106 Ohio St.3d 229, 
2005 Ohio 4630, 833 N.E.2d 1235 (OH DR 7-106(C)(7) violated where, at bench conference, 
respondent intentionally spoke loudly enough for jury to hear him call witness a liar); Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Donnell, 79 Ohio St.3d 501, 684 N.E.2d 36 (1997) (lawyer violated rule by 
giving orders to court, cross-examining his own witnesses, arguing with witnesses, and attempting to 
call opposing counsel as witness). Intentionally filing cases in courts where there is no colorable basis 
for venue would violate this provision. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 126 (Apr. 30, 1976). So too would 
blatant and repeated violations of the basic rules of evidence.  State v. Cotton, No. C-950288, 1996 
Ohio App. LEXIS 2634, at *21 (Ohio App. Hamilton June 26, 1996) (Painter, J., concurring; 
calling upon prosecutor to review OH DR 7-106(C)(7) before retrial in light of “rampant and 
egregious” prosecutorial misconduct in soliciting of inadmissible testimony of prior unsubstantiated 
accusations against the defendant). 
Curiously, DR 7-106(C)(7), rather than 7-106(A), was invoked in Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Randall, 
118 Ohio St.3d 408, 2008 Ohio 2709, 889 N.E.2d 535, even though the violation clearly involved 
“disregard … of … a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding,” as stated in 7-106(A). 
There is no explanation provided as to why the case proceeded under 7-106(C)(7). (In its citation, the 
Court erroneously refers to (B)(7), rather than (C)(7); there is no DR 7-106(B)(7).) 
  
3.4:500  Fairness in Pretrial Practice 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.4(d) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.4(d) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:709 
ALI-LGL § 106 
Wolfram § 12.4 
Rule 3.4(d) precludes a lawyer, in pretrial procedure, from “intentionally or habitually mak[ing] a 
frivolous motion or discovery request or fail[ing] to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a 
legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.” 
Some of the relevant OHCPR cases have been discussed in the previous section (3.4:400), e.g., 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Sullivan, 65 Ohio St.3d 293, 603 N.E.2d 983 (1992) (disregard of 
discovery orders; OH DR 7-106(A) violation). In addition, see Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Finneran, 
80 Ohio St.3d 428, 687 N.E.2d 405 (1997) (misconduct, including repeated flagrant failures to 
respond to discovery requests in multiple cases, resulted in indefinite suspension from practice of law 
for violation of, inter alia, OH DR 7-106(C)(7)). 
Also, provisions barring concealment or suppression of evidence that the lawyer is legally obligated 
to reveal (see Rule 3.4(a) & cmt. [2]) can come into play at the pretrial stage. E.g., Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Marsick, 81 Ohio St.3d 551, 692 N.E.2d 991 (1998) (both OH DR 7-102(A)(3) and OH 
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DR 7-109(A) violated by concealing relevant nonprivileged evidence clearly requested by 
interrogatories; such concealment “is tantamount to deceiving both opposing counsel and the court,”  
id. at 553, 692 N.E.2d at 992). Concealment of evidence during discovery can also result in lawyer 
disqualification. See Royal Indem. Co. v. J.C. Penney Co., 27 Ohio St.3d 31, 501 N.E.2d 617 
(1986). See also Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 664 N.E.2d 1272 (1996) (charge 
that opposing counsel destroyed piece of documentary evidence during pretrial stage of case; as a 
result, opposing counsel moved to withdraw; motion granted). 
Moreover, Ohio courts have the inherent power to deal with abuses arising in pretrial practice such as 
discovery. See Cincinnati Bd. of Educ. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. C-910803 1992 
Ohio App. LEXIS 5465 (Hamilton Oct. 18, 1992) (where OH Civ R 37 sanctions unavailable in 
absence of motion to compel, trial court nevertheless had inherent authority to impose sanctions for 
discovery abuse consisting of bad-faith misrepresentation in interrogatory answers; argument that 
“the trial court lacked the authority to award sanctions for discovery abuse except as specifically 
provided in the civil rules” expressly rejected, id. at *4). 
  
3.4:600  Improper Trial Tactics 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.4(e) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.4(e) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.102-7.103, 
7.105-7.106 
Commentary 
ALI-LGL § 107 
Wolfram § 12.1 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.102-7.103, 7.105-7.106 (1996). 
Conduct before a tribunal - In general: OH DR 7-106(C) enumerated seven types of behavior that 
lawyers were prohibited from committing when appearing before a tribunal in a professional capacity. 
Three of the 7-106(C) prohibitions are now reflected in Ohio Rule 3.4(e) -- a lawyer shall not: 
 allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence or by a good-faith belief that such evidence may exist 
(former OH DR 7-106(C)(1), together with the good-faith belief test of State v. Gillard, 40 
Ohio St.3d 226, 533 N.E.2d 272 (1988)); 
 assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness (former OH 
DR 7-106(C)(3)); or 
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 state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the 
culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused (former OH DR 
7-106(C)(4)). 
Three other subsections of 7-106(C) are now covered by other Rules -- (C)(2) is treated in Rule 4.4(a) 
(see section 4.4:210); (C)(6) is dealt with in Rule 3.5(a)(6) (see section 3.5:400); (C)(7) is covered in 
Rules 3.4(c) and (d) (see 3.4:400). The other subdivision of former DR 7-106(C) ((C)(5)) (dealing 
with failure to comply with local custom or controversy or practice), which was not brought forward 
into the Model Rules, is not reflected in the Ohio Rules either. As stated in ABA, Annotated Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 332 (4th ed. 1999) (Model Code Comparison), subdivision (C)(5) 
“was too vague to be a rule of conduct enforceable as law.” 
Conduct before a tribunal - Referring to matters that are irrelevant or unsupported by admissible 
evidence: As former OH EC 7-25 made clear, the rules of evidence and procedure governing a 
proceeding are in place to ensure a framework for fair and just decisions under the law. A conscious 
attempt by a lawyer to avoid the restrictions those provisions impose is unjustified. 
To this end, Rule 3.4(e) prohibits a lawyer from alluding to matters she has no reasonable basis to 
believe are relevant, or that will not be supported by admissible evidence. If the lawyer does not know 
that admissible evidence exists on a relevant point, but has a “good-faith belief” that it may, the 
lawyer may proceed without violating this provision. Id. This aspect of Rule 3.4(e) incorporates the 
standard set forth in State v. Gillard, 40 Ohio St.3d 226, 533 N.E.2d 272 (1988) (affirming that 
cross-examiner may ask a question if examiner has good-faith belief that factual predicate for 
question exists). While the Rule does not say so expressly, it seems clear from the context that the 
terms “relevant” and “admissible evidence” as used here are intended to mean those concepts as used 
in the law of evidence. If there is no reasonable basis to believe a matter is both relevant and 
supported by admissible evidence, then there is no justification to present the matter before the trier of 
fact. 
The analog to this portion of Rule 3.4(e) (OH DR 7-106(C)(1)) was not violated by presenting 
information that the trial court ultimately excluded as irrelevant, or for which admissible evidentiary 
support failed to develop. The focus was, and under the Rule is (at least in part), on conscious 
violation of the evidentiary rules, as indicated by the requirement that the lawyer is subject to sanction 
only if he “does not reasonably believe” the matter alluded to is relevant. This subjective standard is 
apparently intended to apply to the admissible-evidence issue as well; thus, division (e) states that the 
lawyer may not allude to any matter that will not be supported by admissible evidence “or by a 
good-faith belief that such evidence may exist,” an addition not contained in MR 3.4(e). 
The restriction applies “in trial.” Thus, comments made at voir dire, during opening and closing 
statements, or during the presentation of evidence can violate the Rule. See Charles W. Wolfram, 
Modern Legal Ethics § 12.1.2, at 623-24 (1986). 
Query whether the Rule also applies during discovery depositions, as did the former disciplinary 
provision, at least where “an attorney engages in subterfuge that intimidates a witness.” Cincinnati 
Bar Ass’n v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003 Ohio 6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, at para. 16 (rejecting 
respondent’s argument that the former “before-a-tribunal” requirement excluded depositions). As 
noted, the “before-a-tribunal” language has been replaced, in division (e), with “in trial.” While one 
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could argue in the abstract that these words are sufficiently broad to cover a trial’s pretrial aspects, 
that argument is considerably more difficult to make in the face of division (d), which, in contrast to 
division (e), deals expressly with “pretrial procedure.” 
Applying former OH DR 7-106(C)(1), courts found that 
 displaying suggestively labeled tapes in front of deponent and referring to them during 
questioning, thereby implying that the respondent had recorded conversations of the deponent, 
when in fact the tapes were blank, Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003 Ohio 6649, 800 N.E.2d 
1117 (“Respondent’s deceitful tactic intimidated her witness by creating the false impression 
that respondent possessed compromising personal information that she could offer as 
evidence,”  id. at para. 17; conduct violated both OH DR 1-102(A)(4) and 7-106(C)(1)), 
 making numerous allegations of corruption and bias against judges and the county prosecutor 
in documents filed in court, for which respondent had no credible proof, Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009 Ohio 2870, 909 N.E.2d 1271, and 
 comments regarding a party’s wealth, Igo v. Coachman Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 
1991) (counsel’s repeated comments about defendant’s wealth, made in attempt to promote 
large verdict, together with other misconduct, justified reversal of verdict and remand for new 
trial in civil action), or 
 socio-economic status, State v. Jacks, 63 Ohio App.3d 200, 578 N.E.2d 512 (Cuyahoga 
1989) (reversing criminal conviction in part because prosecutor engaged in line of questioning 
about defendant’s socio-economic status, whether defendant received welfare, and whether 
defendant was employed), 
were unsupported by admissible evidence (Statzer, Baumgartner) or irrelevant (Igo, Jacks) and 
thus violated OH DR 7-106(C)(1). 
So too would comments about matters excluded from the trial by an order granting a motion in limine.  
Igo v. Coachman Indus., Inc. 938 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1991) (such conduct might violate both OH 
DR 7-106(A) and (C)(1)). 
Disparaging and untrue comments directed 
 at the court, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Leary, 67 Ohio St.3d 425, 619 N.E.2d 410 
(1993) (filing two unsubstantiated affidavits of prejudice against judge as well as an 
unsubstantiated motion to disqualify); accord Frost supra, 
 at counsel, Frost supra (baseless defamation suit against opposing counsel); State v. Smith, 
14 Ohio St.3d 13, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984) (prosecutor in closing argument falsely accused 
opposing counsel of suborning perjury; criminal conviction reversed), or 
 at parties, Igo v. Coachman Indus., Inc. 938 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1991) (wild and 
unsubstantiated allegations of dilatory conduct and unsavory motivations made at trial against 
defendant), 
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also violated OH DR 7-106(C)(1), because such comments were both irrelevant and unsupported by 
admissible evidence. Not surprisingly, promising a judge in open court that a client’s relatives would 
all vote for the judge if he granted the client probation violated this provision as well.  Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Pagac, 72 Ohio St.3d 341, 650 N.E.2d 423 (1995). 
One exception to former OH DR 7-106(C)(1) sometimes arose during the course of a criminal 
proceeding. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline concluded that, given the 
time constraints in some criminal cases, a defense attorney was not required always to conduct a 
complete investigation of a case before filing a motion to suppress. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 88-33, 1988 WL 508824 (Dec. 20, 1988). Consequently, a criminal defense 
attorney did not violate OH DR 7-106(C)(1) by filing a “blanket” motion to suppress on behalf of a 
client, even though technically this might involve alluding to a matter not supported by admissible 
evidence. Although not raised by the Board, if a subjective test applied, it might be argued that under 
these circumstances the lawyer did not meet the “no reasonable basis to believe” requirement, and 
thus the conduct was permissible. 
Violations of this aspect of Rule 3.4(e) are subject to regulation not only through the disciplinary 
system, but also by the trial court through reprimands, evidentiary rulings, and, ultimately, contempt 
powers. See, e.g., In re Gonzalez, 70 Ohio App.3d 752, 591 N.E.2d 1371 (Cuyahoga 1990) (lawyer 
found in contempt for repeatedly asking irrelevant questions in face of court order not to do so). In 
addition, misconduct of this type can lead to a mistrial or reversal in both 
 civil cases, Igo v. Coachman Indus., Inc. 938 F.2d 650, 654 (6th Cir. 1991) (attorney 
misconduct in possible violation of number of provisions of the OHCPR, including OH DR 
7-106(C)(1), “merits investigation by the Ohio State Bar Association” and warranted reversal 
of verdict and remand for new trial), and 
 criminal matters, State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984) (prosecutor’s 
misconduct in violation of OH DR 7-106(C)(1) was of sufficient magnitude to warrant 
reversal of criminal conviction and remand for new trial). 
Courts often address prosecutorial misconduct of this kind without reference to ethics rules. See, e.g., 
State v. Liberatore, 69 Ohio St.2d 583, 433 N.E.2d 561 (1982) (alluding to matters not in evidence 
in closing, and drawing inferences therefrom, was part of prosecutorial misconduct warranting 
reversal of criminal conviction); State v. Willard, 144 Ohio App.3d 767, 761 N.E.2d 688 (Franklin 
2001) (prosecutor’s improper remarks in closing argument warranted reversal for new trial). 
Conduct before a tribunal - Asserting one’s personal knowledge or opinion: As an advocate, the 
lawyer’s role is to participate in the introduction of evidence and to argue the case based on that 
evidence. See Rule 3.4 cmt. [3A]. Statements by the lawyer as to personal knowledge of the facts in 
issue, other than when testifying as a witness (Rule 3.4(e)), or his or her personal opinion concerning 
the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or 
innocence of a criminal defendant, blur the line between the lawyer as an advocate and the lawyer as 
a witness and are prohibited. Id. See generally section 3.7:200. Such comments may be given 
disproportionate weight by the jury, either because of the special rapport the lawyer creates with them 
or because the comments are not subject to cross-examination as they would be if presented through 
sworn testimony. 
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Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Donnell, 75 Ohio St.3d 501, 684 N.E.2d 36 (1997), is one of the 
rare cases applying former OH DR 7-106(C)(3) (personal knowledge of facts). In Donnell, “[o]n 
numerous occasions during the hearings [on motions relating to child custody and visitation rights], 
and despite admonishments by the judge, respondent without testifying asserted his personal 
knowledge of the facts,”  id. at 502, 684 N.E.2d at 37, thereby violating this provision. Another case 
invoking 7-106(C)(3) is Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Armengau, 99 Ohio St.3d 55, 2003 
Ohio 2465, 788 N.E.2d 1068, where respondent, in defending a client against charges of 
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle from a dealership, used his own personal experience with the 
dealership (where he posed as a potential customer) in cross-examining the sales person with whom 
he had dealt). 
The line between permissible argument based on an analysis of the evidence and impermissible 
argument based on personal opinion is often unclear. Compare State v. Stith, No. 95 APA07-934, 
1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2443, at *13 (Franklin June 6, 1996) (finding prosecutor’s closing 
remarks, including the following, on credibility of state’s witnesses, not to violate former OH DR 
7-106(C)(4): 
“The credibility of these witnesses is unquestionable. The effect that 
this experience had upon them was obvious, and their desire to be as 
truthful as they could be was equally as obvious. Their testimony was 
corroborated by all of the physical evidence that was produced in this 
crime, as well.”), 
with State v. Alfieri, 132 Ohio App.3d 69, 724 N.E.2d 477 (Hamilton 1998) (“The prosecutor’s act 
of personally vouching for the credibility of the state’s witness [“David Baker is one of the best 
witnesses I’ve ever seen or had in courtroom. This is a man who was absolutely sincere, who was 
absolutely sure of what took place that day.”] was an invasion of the province of the jury and was in 
direct violation of DR 7-106(C)(4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.”  Id. at 84, 85, 724 
N.E.2d at 487), and State v. McComas, No. 93- CA-32, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 533, at *3 (Ohio 
App. Lawrence Feb. 15, 1996) (finding prosecutor’s comments, quoted below, on credibility of 
testimony of victim and on guilt of defendant violated OH DR 7-106(C)(4): 
“To me there’s no question that this little girl sit [sic] on this witness 
stand and told the truth. I believe her, and I want to tell you why I 
believe her. I think you do believe her. . . . If there is a man guiltier than 
this man sitting right here, I don’t know where he’s at [sic].”). 
(bracketed material in opinion). 
Nationally, most cases have allowed a lawyer to “suggest, urge, advocate, assert, and contend in his 
closing speech” as long as he does “not give his personal beliefs or state as factual matters not in 
evidence.” E.g., United States v. Wilkins, 422 F.Supp. 1371, 1377 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See State v. 
Watson, 61 Ohio St.3d 1, 572 N.E.2d 97 (1991) (drawing these distinctions in prosecutorial 
misconduct context). 
At times, however, lawyer conduct clearly goes over the line. For example, a lawyer who referred to 
defense evidence as “lies,” “garbage,” “garbage lies,” a “smoke screen,” and “a well conceived and 
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well rehearsed lie” violated the former disciplinary rule.  State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 470 
N.E.2d 883 (1984) (reversing criminal conviction for prosecutor’s misconduct in violation of OH 
DR 7-106(C)(4)). See also State v. LaFreniere, 85 Ohio App.3d 840, 621 N.E.2d 812 (Lake 1993) 
(reversing criminal conviction, with citation to OH DR 7-106(C)(4), in part because of prosecutorial 
misconduct in making personal statements as to credibility in closing, including reference to 
accused’s testimony as “a pack of lies”). Compare State v. Broyles, No. 93- A-1818, 1994 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5537, at *13 (Ashtabula Dec. 9, 1994) (contrasting “pack of lies” statement in LaFreniere 
with use of words like “fabrication” and “truthful,” which court found to be “neutral 
characterizations” of witness testimony that “did not cross that line from objective characterization of 
testimony into subjective opinion of the prosecutor’s office”). 
Accusations or reminders about the penalties for perjury made by a prosecutor to a witness 
constituted implicit statements concerning the credibility of the witness, and thus were improper 
under OH DR 7-106(C)(4).  State v. Halley, 93 Ohio App.3d 71, 637 N.E.2d 937 (Franklin 1994). 
Another disciplinary case finding a violation of DR 7-106(C)(4) is Akron Bar Ass’n v. Markovich, 
117 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008 Ohio 862, 883 N.E.2d 1046, where the respondent, representing his client 
in a criminal case, questioned witnesses in an “inappropriate” manner – presumably including his 
personal assertions as to witness credibility, although the opinion does not provide specific examples 
of same. 
Transgressions of former OH DR 7-106(C)(4) can be found on the civil side as well. Thus, a lawyer 
who, in a products liability case, offered his personal opinion that, without doubt, the defendants were 
bitterly disappointed that there was no crash killing the plaintiff, because the product defect would 
have been destroyed in such a crash, also violated this provision.  Igo v. Coachman Indus., Inc., 938 
F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1991) (interpreting OHCPR). 
Courts often regulated misconduct of this kind without reference to the former OHCPR. On the 
criminal side, see, e.g., State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 613 N.E.2d 203 (1993) (criminal 
conviction overturned for massive prosecutorial misconduct, including expressing personal opinions 
about guilt of accused); State v. Willard, 144 Ohio App.3d 767, 761 N.E.2d 688 (Franklin 2001) 
(improper remarks in closing argument, including opinion that dependant “is guilty” and “this is what 
a man who rapes his daughter looks like,” justified reversal of conviction). In civil litigation, see, e.g., 
Pesek v. Univ. Neurologists Ass’n, 87 Ohio St.3d 495, 721 N.E.2d 1011 (2000) (new trial granted, 
based in part on defense counsel’s attack in closing argument on plaintiffs’ counsel and the credibility 
of plaintiffs’ expert witness; “[c]ounsel for [defendants] made various assertions and drew many 
inferences that simply were not warranted by the evidence. To attack counsel for [plaintiffs] and 
[plaintiffs’] expert witness was inexcusable, unprincipled, and clearly outside the scope of final 
argument.”  id. at 501, 721 N.E.2d at 1017, despite failure of plaintiffs’ counsel to object to much of 
the diatribe); see also Verbanic v. Verbanic, 70 Ohio St.3d 41, 635 N.E.2d 1260 (1994) (new trial 
granted, based on litany of counsel misconduct, including allegations that the opposing party was 
“queer” and had AIDS). 
Conduct before a tribunal - Intentional or habitual violation of established rules of procedure or 
evidence: See section 3.4:400. 
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Conduct before a tribunal - Other misconduct: Rule 3.4 is not the only Rule to deal with misconduct 
before the court. Others include: 
 Rule 3.1 -- advancing a frivolous claim or defense, see section 3.1:200; 
 Rule 3.5(a)(5) -- engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal, see section 3.5:400; 
 Rule 3.5(a)(6) -- engaging in undignified or discourteous conduct degrading to a tribunal, see 
section 3.5:400; and 
 Rule 4.4(a) – obtaining evidence from a witness by abusive means, see section 4.4:210. 
  
3.4:700  Advising Witnesses Not To Speak To Opposing Parties 
Primary Ohio References 
see Ohio Rule 3.4(f) cmt. [1]. 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.4(f) 
Commentary 
ALI-LGL § 116(4) 
Wolfram § 12.4.2 
The MR 3.4(f) prohibition that a lawyer shall not request a person other than client (unless that person 
is a relative, employee, or other agent of the client) to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant 
information to another party, has been deleted from the Ohio Rule, as has the related comment, MR 
3.4 cmt. [4]. What remains is language added to Comment [1], permitting a lawyer representing an 
organization to request, if in accordance with law, an employee of the client to refrain from giving 
information to another party. Ohio Rule 3.4 cmt. [1]. 
  
3.4:800  Advising Potential Witness To Leave The Jurisdiction 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.4(g) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.142 
The material in this section is excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide 
to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.142 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 3.4(g), as did former OH DR 7-109(B), prohibits a lawyer from advising or causing a 
potential witness to hide or leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal to avoid being a witness. (There is no 
comparable Model Rule.) See, e.g., under the former OHCPR, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
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Slodov, 74 Ohio St.3d 618, 660 N.E.2d 1164 (1996) (OH DR 7-109(B) violated where counsel 
instructed client to leave the courthouse during a brief recess after giving direct testimony, but before 
cross-examination began, apparently to help force the court to rule on a motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction). For this Rule to apply, the lawyer’s motive is the key, because a violation arises only 
when the lawyer’s conduct is done “for the purpose of [the individual’s] becoming unavailable as a 
witness.” Such behavior not only has disciplinary consequences, but can lead to the vacation of a 
judgment tainted by such behavior. Kobayashi v. Koizumi, No. 80 AP-664, 1981 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 11002 (Franklin Feb. 2, 1981) (defendant’s allegation that attorney advised defendant not to 
attend trial to avoid testifying raises OH Civ R 60(B) claim). If witness unavailability is the product 
of force or the unlawful threat of harm on the lawyer’s part, criminal sanctions will lie. ORC 2921.03; 
ORC 2921.04(B). Similarly, criminal sanctions will lie if the lawyer, with the purpose of hindering a 
criminal prosecution, induces a witness “to withhold testimony or information or to elude legal 
process summoning the person to testify or supply evidence.” ORC 2921.32(A)(4). 
Note as well the related admonition added to Rule 3.4 cmt. [2], stating that “[a]pplicable law also 
prohibits the use of force, intimidation, or deception to delay, hinder, or prevent a person from 
attending or testifying in a proceeding.” 
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3.5:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.5 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.5 
  
3.5:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 3.5 differs significantly from MR 3.5. 
In addition to instances of new or different language, the format has been changed. There are only two 
divisions, (a) and (b), rather than the four subparts of MR 3.5 (a)-(d). Division (a) of the Ohio Rule 
contains six subdivisions, some of which restate, in whole or in part, paragraphs (a)-(d) of the Model 
Rule. Division (b) of the Ohio Rule has no counterpart in the Model Rule; it is taken from former OH 
DR 7-108(G). 
The changes incorporated into Ohio Rule 3.5(a) are as follows: 
MR 3.5(a) is now Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(1). 
Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(2) is new and prohibits a lawyer from lending 
anything of value or giving anything of more than de minimis value to a 
judicial officer, official or employee of a tribunal. It is adapted from 
former OH DR 7-110(A). 
Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(3) replaces MR 3.5 (b) and precludes ex parte 
communication with a judicial officer or other official about the merits 
of the case (3.5(a)(3)(i)) or with a juror or prospective juror during the 
proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order. 
3.5(a)(3)(ii). See former OH DR 7-108(A) & (B) and 7-110(B). 
Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(4)(i)-(iii) is substantively identical to MR 
3.5(c)(1)-(3). 
Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(5) is identical to MR 3.5(d). 
Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(6) has no counterpart in the Model Rule. It 
corresponds to former DR 7-106(C)(6). 
Ohio Rule 3.5(b) requires the lawyer to reveal to the tribunal known 
improper conduct by or toward a juror, prospective juror, or a family 
member of a juror or prospective juror. This division has no Model 
Rule analog and restates the substance of former OH DR 7-108(G). 
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3.5:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.5(a): DR 7-106(C)(6), 7-108(A) & (B), & 
7-110. 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.5(b): OH DR 7-108(G). 
  
3.5:200  Improperly Influencing a Judge, Juror, or Other Court Official 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(1) & (2) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.5(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.151-7.152, 8.21 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:801 
ALI-LGL §§ 113(2), 115 
Wolfram §§ 11.3, 11.4 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.151 (1996). 
Ohio Rules 3.5(a)(1) and (2) address the proper relationship between a lawyer on the one hand, and 
the judges, officials, employees of a tribunal, and sitting and prospective jurors, on the other. The 
thrust of these provisions is to control lawyer conduct that might compromise the integrity and 
impartiality of the tribunal. 
To this end, Rule 3.5(a)(1) bars a lawyer from seeking to influence “a judicial officer, juror, 
prospective juror, or other official by means prohibited by law.” The two categories commonly 
categorized as improper influence are those proscribed by criminal law (primarily bribery) and by the 
Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct (OH CJC), e.g., OH CJC Rule 3.13(A). See Rule 3.5 cmt. [1]. 
Division (a)(2) specifically prohibits a lawyer from lending anything of value or giving anything of 
more than de minimis value to “a judicial officer, official, or employee of a tribunal.” See section 
3.5:210. Division (a)(1) is substantively the same as MR 3.5(a); division (a)(2) is similar to former 
OH DR 7-110(A). 
To our knowledge, the first case finding a violation of Rule 3.5(a)(1) is Disciplinary Counsel v. 
O’Malley, 137 Ohio St.3d 161, 2013 Ohio 4566, 998 N.E.2d 470. O’Malley’s violation (as well as 
that of 3.5(a)(3)(i), as to which see section 3.5:300, infra), consisted of having his previous boss, 
Cuyahoga County Treasurer Frank Russo, approach the judge sitting on a case in which O’Malley 
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represented two of the parties and tell the judge to deny pending summary judgment motions 
(including O’Malley’s), which tactic O’Malley thought would be beneficial for settlement purposes. 
The judge duly followed instructions and O’Malley later settled the case. In the words of the 
Restatement, such “[a]n attempt by a lawyer to obtain special treatment from a judicial officer 
compromises that interest” in “the reality and the perception of impartiality on the part of judicial 
officers.” 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §113 cmt. f, at 193 (2000). 
Although O’Malley was not a bribery case (at least the opinion gave no indication that anything of 
value passed to the judge), the “means prohibited by law” include “contributing to a [judge’s] 
violation” of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The judge’s denial of the summary judgment motions 
apparently was the result of ex parte contact, through Russo, which would violate CJC Rule 2.9, all 
at the urging of O’Malley. See Rule 3.5, cmt, [1]. Accord 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William 
Hodes, Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering §31.4 (3d ed. Supp. 2011) (“Lawyers who attempt 
to influence judicial officers in any of these ways are doing so through means prohibited by that ‘law’ 
[CJC], and thus in violation of Rule 3.5(a).” Id. at 31-5. 
As indicated by Laws. Man. of Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 61:804 (2006), many of the 
disciplinary cases arising under MR 3.5(a) (comparable to Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(1)) have dealt with 
bribery of one form or another, which in Ohio involves conduct “with purpose to corrupt.” (See ORC 
2921.02(A).) In contrast, there is no such intent requirement in Ohio subdivision (a)(2) -- any loan, or 
any gift of more than de minimis value, to the designated persons is a violation, irrespective of the 
motive of the lawyer doing the loaning or giving. Other differences between the two subdivisions are 
that only (a)(2) deals with loans or gifts to court “employees” and only (a)(1) deals with improper 
influence directed at “juror[s] [or] prospective juror[s].” While “or other official” in (a)(1) is not 
expressly limited to an official of a tribunal and thus could be thought to be more broadly construed, 
the reading set forth in Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 61:803 (1992) seemed a 
reasonable one: 
Both the title “Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal,” and the 
placement of Rule 3.5 with other rules regarding advocacy seem to 
indicate that “other official” should be narrowly construed to apply to 
officials employed by or constituting a “tribunal,” though the 
Comment does not so indicate. 
(Unfortunately, this sensible analysis was deleted in the 2006 update; in its stead, the new discussion, 
with one exception, still supports a tribunal-related construction of “other official.” The exception is 
an Illinois disciplinary proceeding involving bribery of legislators (In re Pappas, 442 N.E.2d 142 (Ill. 
1982)), which the Manual cites as supporting its statement that MR 3.5 “is also frequently invoked 
when the charge involves bribery of a government official other than a judge.” § 61:807 (2006). The 
difficulty with the Manual’s citation of Pappas is three-fold: First, the operative phrase “other 
official” nowhere appears in Ill. Rule 3.5. Second, Illinois did not adopt its version of the Model 
Rules until 1990, eight years after the Pappas decision; third, not only does Pappas not cite MR 3.5, 
it makes no mention of any ethics rule.) 
A more persuasive reason for such the narrow reading may be found in the use of the identical phrase 
in the prohibition in subdivision (a)(3)(i) against ex parte communications with “a judicial officer or 
other official.” Comment [2] leaves no doubt that this language deals with communications “with 
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persons serving in an official capacity in the proceeding.” Rule 3.5 cmt. [2] (emphasis added). And 
see Rule 3.5 cmt. [1], clearly indicating that the subject matter here is “improper influence upon a 
tribunal.” See also 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of 
Lawyering § 31.4 (3d ed. Supp. 2011) (title of section is “Improperly Influencing a Judge, Juror, or 
Other Court Official”). (It might be further noted that since all of the other persons listed in division 
(a)(1) are clearly associated with a tribunal, the reading of “other official” should likewise be so 
limited. See 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 
47.17 (7th ed. 2007) (ejusdem generis).) 
In sum, while both subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) are closely related and in some instances may 
overlap (i.e., bribing a judge), each polices distinct conduct in an effort to achieve the general goal of 
the integrity of the tribunal. 
  
 
3.5:210  Improperly Influencing a Judicial Officer, Official, or Employee of a 
Tribunal 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.152, 8.21 (1996). 
Giving or lending anything of value: Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(2), its comments, and the Task Force 
commentary related thereto, raise the question of what was intended in terms of prohibited loans or 
gifts. The Rule itself distinguishes between a lawyer “lend[ing] anything of value” and a lawyer 
“giv[ing] anything of more than de minimis value.” The basis for the distinction is nowhere explained. 
Nor does this language, contrary to the Task Force statement in its Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 
3.5, “restate” the OH DR 7-110(A) prohibitions. 7-110(A) made no “de minimis” distinction between 
loans and gifts; instead, there was a flat ban on both, de minimis or otherwise. The water is further 
muddied by the Task Force’s comment, in its ABA Model Rule Comparison to Rule 3.5, that under 
“the Ohio Rule . . . a lawyer can never give or loan anything of more than de minimis value to a 
judicial officer, juror, prospective juror, or other official,” which of course is not what the Rule says. 
This mistake is repeated later in the ABA Model Rule Comparison, but this time, instead of saying 
that both loans and gifts are subject to the de minimis exception, the ban is stated in absolute terms, 
ignoring the de minimus exception for gifts: “it is never justified for a lawyer to make a gift or loan to 
a judge, hearing officer, magistrate, official, or employee of a tribunal.” To be on safe ground here, 
one must return to the language of the Rule -- no loans; no gifts of more than de minimus value. And, 
as set forth below, with respect to the provisions of the OH CJC, the absolute safest ground is no gifts 
or loans at all. 
Comment [1] notes that as used in division (a)(2) “de minimis” 
means an insignificant item or interest that could not raise a reasonable 
question as to the impartiality of a judicial officer, official, or employee 
of a tribunal. 
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Ohio Rule 3.5 cmt. [1]. The comment provides no guidance on the level of gift that might trigger the 
“reasonable question” threshold. 
Two other sources, the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct (OH CJC) and the Ohio Ethics Law (see ORC 
102.03(D)-(F)), may provide some guidance by analogy. Most pertinent is the OH CJC, referenced 
in Rule 3.5 cmt [1] and “with which an advocate should be familiar,” id.; it looks at gift-giving from 
the judge-recipient perspective. 
OH CJC Rule 3.13(A) would appear to preclude a judge from accepting “any gifts, loans, bequests, 
benefits, or other things of value,” with listed exceptions, including “[o]rdinary social hospitality” 
and special occasion (wedding, etc.) gifts from relatives or friends. Id. at (A)(3) & (9). Also excluded 
is “[a]ny other thing of value” from a person other than a person seeking to do business with the court 
or a party or other person who has or is likely to come before the judge. Id. at (A)(12). If none of the 
various exclusions in (A)(1)-(12) is applicable, the no-gift/no-loan rule of 3.13(A) would seem to be 
absolute, with no de minimis exception. 
Given these conflicting signals, it remains to be seen just how Rule 3.5(a)(2) will be interpreted. 
Under the literal language of the Rule, a lawyer must steer clear of loaning anything to court 
personnel, whereas gifts of de minimis value are arguably acceptable, despite the more restrictive 
provisions of OH CJC Rule 3.13(A)(12) discussed above. On the other hand, aiding judges in 
violation of the CJC by not following its more restrictive standard does not seem to us to be the wisest 
course; the safest route would be to avoid such gifts altogether, de minimis or otherwise. This course 
also would be consistent with the admonition requiring a lawyer “to avoid contributing to a violation 
of [the CJC].” Rule 3.5 cmt. [1]. 
With respect to the language of the Rule itself, two aspects of Rule 3.5(a)(2) deserve special mention. 
First, the Rule speaks to acts directed not only at decision-makers in adjudications, but also any 
official or employee of a tribunal. Giving a thing of more than de minimis value to a clerk, bailiff, or 
secretary may still have an impact on the proceeding and, therefore, is barred. See, under the former 
OHCPR, Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 114 (Dec. 17, 1974). 
Second, as noted, the Rule bars a lawyer from giving anything of more than de minimis value to a 
judge, official, or employee of a tribunal, but prohibits all lending to such persons, de minimis or not. 
Thus, a small birthday gift to a life-long friend who serves in such a capacity is no longer a violation 
under the terms of the Rule, as it was under a literal reading of OH DR 7-110(A), which made no 
distinction based on the value of the loan or gift. See Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 114, at 4 (Dec. 17, 
1974) (finding improper “[a]ny gift, no matter how small, and even if only in the nature of a 
Christmas gratuity”). Nor is the Rule limited to actions directed toward those before whom the lawyer 
has a pending action. But cf. OH CJC Rule 3.13(A)(12), discussed above, providing judges limited 
leeway in accepting gifts and loans, other than from parties and other persons (i.e., lawyers) who have 
or who are likely to come before the judge or who have business before the court. That leeway was 
certainly exceeded in one case, where the judge over a period of years accepted professional football 
tickets from a lawyer who appeared before him, in violation of former OH CJC Canon 2(C)(5)(h).  
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lisotto, 94 Ohio St.3d 213, 761 N.E.2d 1037 (2002) (public 
reprimand for violation of Canon; respondent judge subsequently paid lawyer for tickets after 
realizing error in accepting them). 
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Under the literal wording of Rule 3.5(a)(2), any assistance given to a judge running for election also 
would appear to be barred. However, the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically provides that while a 
judge or candidate for judicial office cannot personally solicit or accept campaign funds, a committee 
can be formed for this purpose, which committee may solicit campaign contributions from lawyers 
who are not employees of the court or doing contractual business with the court. OH CJC Rule 
4.4(A), (C)(1). 
Receiving anything of value when lawyer/public official knows it is given to influence public acts: 
Former OH DR 8-101(A)(3) prohibited a lawyer who is a public official from accepting anything of 
value when he or she knows or it is obvious that the thing is offered for the purpose of influencing 
public acts. This provision of the Code was not carried forward to the new Rules; such conduct would 
now be covered from an ethics standpoint by the provisions of Rule 8.4; it also may constitute a 
violation of state substantive law, such as ORC 102.03(D) & (E) of the Ohio Ethics Law. See also 
ORC 2921.43 (soliciting or receiving improper compensation). See generally sections 8.4:300, :400 
(at “Misconduct in other governmental settings”), :500, :1000. 
Improper influence of a tribunal: Former OH DR 8-101(A)(2) addressed matters before a tribunal 
and provided that the lawyer/public official could not: 
 [u]se his public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a 
tribunal to act in favor of himself or of a client. 
As is the case with former OH DR 8-101(A)(3) (see supra), this provision is not a part of the new 
Ohio Rules and would be policed by the provisions of Rule 8.4, and, perhaps, Rule 1.11(d)(1). Again, 
see generally sections 8.4:300, :400 (at “Misconduct in other governmental settings”), :500, :1000. 
  
3.5:220  Improperly Influencing a Juror 
Obvious examples of conduct that would violate Rule 3.5(a)(1) as it applies to jurors and prospective 
jurors would be efforts at jury tampering, such as bribing a juror (prohibited by ORC 2921.02) or 
juror intimidation (prohibited by ORC 2921.03). But division (a)(1) is not limited to criminal conduct; 
it extends to improper ex parte contact as well. See 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes 
& Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 31.4, at 31-5 (3d ed. Supp. 2011). Such contact is 
expressly prohibited (“unless authorized . . . by law or court order”) by Rule 3.5(a)(3(ii) and will be 
considered in the next section, dealing with impermissible ex parte communication. 
  
3.5:300  Improper Ex Parte Communications 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(3) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.5(b) 
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Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.131-32, 7.153 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:801 
ALI-LGL § 113(1) 
Wolfram § 11.3.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.131-32, 7.153 (1996). 
Communication with judicial officers or other officials in pending cases: Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(3)(i) 
prohibits a lawyer from communicating ex parte with 
 a judicial officer or other official as to the merits of the case 
during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order. 
Comment [2] makes clear that the persons with whom a lawyer may not communicate ex parte during 
a proceeding are those “serving in an official capacity in the proceeding, such as judges, masters, 
magistrates, or jurors [see Rule 3.5(a)(3)(ii), discussed below], unless authorized to do so by law, 
court order, or these rules.” Rule 3.5 cmt. [2]. 
Unlike the prohibition regarding gifts or loans in Rule 3.5(a)(2), subdivision (a)(3)(i) is more limited. 
First, it applies only “during the proceeding.” Second, it implicates only ex parte communications 
between a lawyer and “persons serving in an official capacity in the proceeding.” (Rule 3.5 cmt. [2]). 
Third, only communications “as to the merits of the case” are controlled. Finally, the Rule does not 
ban such communications, but limits the instances in which they may occur to those authorized “by 
law or court order.” 
With respect to the first limitation, the Rule applies only to ex parte communications during the 
proceedings of a case. In addition to classic civil or criminal litigation matters, the phrase also 
encompasses proceedings before administrative tribunals, arbitration panels, and the like. See Rule 
1.0(o). Accord ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 355 (7th ed. 2011) 
(commentary). 
While neither the Rule nor the comment expressly so states, the “proceedings” about which the Rule 
is concerned should be, and in all probability are, limited to adversary proceedings. This is consistent 
with the view stated by the Task Force in its Ohio Code Comparison that 3.5(a)(3) “incorporates the 
prohibitions on improper ex parte communications contained in . . . DR 7-110(B),” which did 
expressly describe the context of the prohibition as “[i]n an adversary proceeding.” E.g., under the 
Code, Disciplinary Counsel v. Tomlan, 118 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008 Ohio 1471, 885 N.E.2d 895 
(speaking to judge “about the merits of a pending adversarial proceeding without notice to opposing 
counsel and without legal justification. . . . violated DR 7-110(B),” id. at para. 31). See also 2 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 113(1) cmt. d, at 192 (2000) (prohibition 
applies to judicial officers authorized to rule on “a disputed matter”). Such an interpretation would 
take matters such as uncontested divorces, or an agreed distribution, out of the scope of the Rule. 
Even in an adversary proceeding, Wolfram argues that undisputed matters, such as a stipulated 
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discovery schedule, should not be within the scope of the Rule. As he notes, 
[t]here is no reason why every trip to a courthouse should be 
simultaneously duplicated by a lawyer from the other side if the matter 
is not or no longer in dispute. 
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 11.3.3, at 606 (1986). Accord 2 Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 113(1) cmt. d, at 192 (2000) (prohibition applies to 
communications “about a disputed matter”). And a lawyer, whose client concedes an amount owing 
but not knowing to whom, who pays money into court pursuant to the interpleader provisions of OH 
Civ R 22, would seem likewise to fall outside the scope of Rule 3.5(a)(3)(i), since the client is taking 
no position as to how the money should be distributed. On the other hand, an ex parte proceeding for 
a TRO, where an adversary exists but is absent, is presumably within the ambit of the Rule, but, 
pursuant to its terms, such communications are nonetheless acceptable because they are 
“authorized . . . by law” (OH Civ R 65(A)). See Millstein v. Millstein, 2002 Ohio 4783, 2002 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 4854, at para. 205 (Cuyahoga) (rejecting ex parte argument; court notes that an 
applicable local rule expressly provides that TROs “‘will be granted on an ex parte basis . . . .’“). 
Accord 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 113(1) cmt. e (2000). See also 
section 3.3:800, concerning the enhanced duty of disclosure in authorized ex parte proceedings. 
Second, the Rule restricts only communications made by a lawyer to “a judicial officer or other 
official.” See generally Cordero v. Vasquez, No. C.A.L.-87-205, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2808 
(Lucas July 15, 1988) (after lawyer for plaintiff-mother initiated ex parte communication with trial 
judge to discuss pending child-custody case, trial judge overruled referee’s report and 
recommendation and ordered custody to mother. Citing former OH DR 7-110 and corresponding ex 
parte provisions of OH CJC, appellate court vacated judgment for this and other errors.). See 
Glassman v. Offenberg, No. 67334, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5388 (Cuyahoga Dec. 7, 1995), 
where the court referred to Local Domestic Relations Division Rule 6(A), “which prohibits ex parte 
communications between an attorney and either the judge or referee who is presiding over the case. 
Id. at *11 (emphasis added).) The Restatement view is that the prohibition against communications 
with a “judicial officer” applies to 
a judge, master, hearing officer, arbitrator, or other officer authorized 
to rule upon evidence or argument about a disputed matter. 
2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 113(1) cmt. d, at 192 (2000). Although 
the Restatement does not take a position on the issue of ex parte “communications with officials with 
decision-making authority in nonadjudicative matters, such as a legislator or the policymaking head 
of a governmental department,” id., it seems reasonably clear from the language of 3.5(a)(3)(i) that 
such contacts would not be within the scope of the Rule, which covers contacts with “a judicial officer 
or other official” serving in “the proceedings, such as judges, masters, magistrates, or jurors.” Rule 
3.5 cmt. [2]. But see Ohio Rule 3.9, requiring conformance with Rule 3.5 by advocates in 
nonadjudicative proceedings. Likewise, communications to court employees are not included; nor are 
communications with judges or other officials before whom the case is not pending or 
communications with the same judge on behalf of a separate client about a different proceeding -- the 
Rule deals with “the case” and “the proceeding,” not some other case or proceeding. See Howard v. 
Simon, 18 Ohio App.3d 14, 480 N.E.2d 99 (Cuyahoga 1984) (former OH DR 7-110(B) did not 
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prohibit ex parte communication with judge in pending matter concerning related but different 
proceeding). The Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, with certain exceptions, prohibits a judge from 
participating in ex parte communications “concerning a pending or impending matter.” OH CJC 
Rule 2.9(A) & Terminology (ex parte communication). See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Karto, 94 Ohio St.3d 109, 760 N.E.2d 412 (2002) (CJC and DR 1-102(A)(5) violated where 
respondent judge contacted prosecutor and asked him to bring felony charges against juveniles 
against whom delinquency complaint had been filed by employee of juvenile probation department as 
result of respondent’s ex parte conversation with employee.) A case in which both the judge and the 
prosecutor were disciplined (public reprimand) for engaging in multiple ex parte communications in 
which the prosecutor complied with the court’s request to prepare the court’s sentencing opinion 
(imposing the death sentence) is Disciplinary Counsel v. Stuard, 121 Ohio St.3d 29, 2009 Ohio 
261, 901 N.E.2d 788 (prosecutor violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and 7-110(B)). 
While by its terms Rule 3.5(a)(3)(i) applies to any lawyer who engages in prohibited ex parte 
communications, it seems implicit from the make-up of the Rule and its exceptions that it is directed 
only at a lawyer involved in “the proceeding.” See Howard v. Simon supra. But even a lawyer not so 
involved may violate other provisions of the OHCPR by communicating or attempting to cause 
another to communicate with a judge concerning a pending case. This may well explain why the 
Supreme Court did not invoke former OH DR 7-110(B) in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Detty, 
96 Ohio St.3d 57, 2002 Ohio 2992, 770 N.E.2d 1015 (respondent, romantically involved with 
plaintiff in divorce case, attempted, both directly and through another judge, to exert political 
pressure on judge in effort to change way things were going before judge’s magistrate in the divorce 
case; respondent’s conduct violated OH DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6): “it is improper for an attorney not 
representing a party in the case to directly or indirectly communicate with a judge to influence the 
outcome of pending litigation.” Id. at para. 5.). 
Third, unlike MR 3.5(b), Rule 3.5(a)(3)(i) is concerned (as was former OH DR 7-110(B)) only with 
communications “as to the merits of the case”; communication on other topics remains permissible. 
This phrase, however, is ambiguous. It clearly addresses communications addressed to substantive 
issues in an action, but does it extend to purely procedural matters as well? (Of course, the distinction 
between substance and procedure is not absolute -- some procedural motions, like summary judgment 
motions, may deal with the merits of the case directly and others do so indirectly, such as those 
addressing evidentiary issues that shape how the merits of the cause will be established.) For example, 
would ex parte discussion of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction fall within the Rule? 
It does involve the merits of the case, in the sense that it speaks to whether the action should proceed 
in the forum, but it does not speak to whether the substantive claim has merit. Wolfram strongly takes 
the view that the 
exception for nonmerits communications should be strictly limited to 
communications that are neither about the factual or legal issues in the 
case nor about matters that a reasonable lawyer would consider 
important for tactical or strategic reasons. The nonmerits exception 
should not be employed to differentiate between various phases of the 
proceeding. 
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 11.3.3, at 605 (1986). 
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In the analogous section of the Code of Judicial Conduct, ex parte communications concerning a 
pending or impending proceeding are banned in general, but an exception is made as follows: “When 
circumstances require it, an ex parte communication for scheduling, administrative, or emergency 
purposes, that does not address substantive matters or issues on the merits, is permitted, provided the 
judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a 
result of the ex parte communication.” OH CJC Rule 2.9(A)(1). See State v. Crawford, No. 
88-C-18, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 3056 (Columbiana July 27, 1989) (ex parte conversation 
concerning discovery request is permissible where conversation was had only to correct clerical error 
in judge’s order). Clearly, the spirit of Rule 3.5(a)(3)(i) is best met by limiting ex parte 
communications to the sort authorized in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Compare In re 
Disqualification of Williams, 74 Ohio St.3d 1248, 657 N.E.2d 1352 (1993) (ex parte 
communication initiated by judge with party’s law director, not for scheduling or ministerial purposes, 
but concerning substantive matter of party’s likelihood of contributing to settlement; disqualification 
ordered “[t]o avoid even the appearance of impropriety,”  id. at 1250, 657 N.E.2d at 1353), with  In 
re Disqualification of Christiansen, 88 Ohio St.3d 1211, 723 N.E.2d 1100 (1999) (affidavit of 
disqualification denied where judge had settlement discussion with representative of defendant after 
parties had previously authorized judge to conduct ex parte settlement discussions with 
representatives of each party, even though “the more appropriate approach would have been to 
include counsel for the defendants in the settlement discussion with the corporate agent,”  id. at 1212, 
723 N.E.2d at 1101). 
While case law on this issue is sparse, a decision by the Tenth District Court of Appeals is instructive 
with respect to former OH CJC Canon 3(B)(7)(a), now Rule 2.9(A)(1). McDermott v. Tweel, 151 
Ohio App.3d 763, 2003 Ohio 885, 786 N.E. 2d 67 (Franklin), was a medical malpractice case in 
which a trial setting before a visiting judge was postponed because the judge was scheduled to sit for 
one week only and it was estimated that the case would take two weeks to try. After plaintiff’s counsel 
left the courthouse, defense counsel appeared before the originally assigned judge to seek direction on 
how to proceed, given the visiting judge’s inability to try the case. The trial court’s entry indicated 
that defense counsel was told by the judge that the trial would be rescheduled, but that the court would 
move the rescheduled date if it was not a good date for plaintiff. After summary judgment was 
granted to the two doctor defendants, plaintiff appealed; her first assignment of error was that the 
court’s ex parte meeting with defense counsel was improper and prejudicial to her. In rejecting this 
assignment of error, the court of appeals relied directly on the language of OH CJC Canon 3(B)(7)(a) 
and held that 
the trial court’s entry of April 10, 2002, plainly states that the only 
matters discussed during the ex parte meeting between it and defense 
counsel related to the scheduling of a new trial date and a cutoff date 
for the filing of motions. Further, the trial court explicitly indicated that 
it was willing to reschedule the trial date to accommodate plaintiff’s 
schedule if necessary. Plaintiff does not suggest that substantive 
matters were discussed during the meeting but asserts that he [sic she] 
was prejudiced by the trial court’s decision to extend the time for filing 
motions without input from plaintiff’s counsel, in that such extension 
allowed defendants to file the motions for summary judgment which 
ultimately led to the dismissal of her claims. The trial court’s extension 
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of the motions deadline applied to plaintiff as well as defendants and, 
in fact, plaintiff availed herself of the extension by filing a motion for 
partial summary judgment. The fact that the trial court’s decision to 
extend the time for filing motions ultimately led to the dismissal of 
plaintiff’s claims on the merits, while perhaps prejudicial to plaintiff in 
the broadest sense of the word, was not unfairly prejudicial. 
Id. at para. 23 (emphasis by the court; bracketed material added). See also Westfield Cos. v. O.K.L. 
Can Line, 2003 Ohio 7151, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 7151 (Hamilton) (Painter, J.), where, in a 
nondisciplinary context, the court found that the trial judge’s ex parte communication to the jury, in 
which he made disparaging remarks about trial counsel, constituted prejudicial error. While both 
parties could have been prejudiced by the comments, the court noted that plaintiff-appellant, as the 
party with the burden of proof, suffered more. See id. at paras. 52-55. A case that seems out of step 
with the substantive or “on the merits” limitation is Codero v. Vazquez, No. C.A.L.-87-205, 1988 
Ohio App. LEXIS 2808 (Lucas July 15, 1988), where the court interpreted the OH CJC to restrict 
ex parte communications regardless of their impact: “What is actually discussed by the trial court 
during an ex parte conference is irrelevant.” Id. at *8. 
The Ninth District Court of Appeals has held that sending a judge a copy of a grievance, filed with the 
local bar association against opposing counsel and apparently stemming from opposing counsel’s 
conduct in the case, was not a communication on the merits of the cause and, hence, fell outside the 
former OH DR 7-110 prohibition.  Carter v. Payer, No. 16765, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5129 
(Summit Nov. 9, 1994). Nor was communicating ex parte with the judge on behalf of another client 
about a different case.  Howard v. Simon, 18 Ohio App.3d 14, 480 N.E.2d 99 (Cuyahoga 1984). 
(“Howard does not allege that the merits of [his] case were discussed.”  Id. at 17, 480 N.E.2d at 
103.). 
In contrast, ex parte communications by the lawyer to the acting judge assigned to the matter at issue, 
made after his client had been convicted and sentenced to 30 days in jail, with the purpose of 
obtaining mitigation of the sentence, would constitute a communication “as to the merits of the case.” 
While not addressing the “merits” issue explicitly, the court in City of Garfield Heights v. Wolpert, 
122 Ohio App.3d 287, 701 N.E.2d 734 (Cuyahoga 1997), affirmed a finding of indirect contempt 
against the lawyer based on his incessant telephone calls to the judge and conversations with the judge 
on two or three occasions on the subject. The appellate court cited former OH DR 7-110 as 
prohibiting “ex parte communications with judges, officials, and employees of a tribunal” (the 
reference to “employees” is in error), and concluded that 
we know of no rule of practice within our adversary system which 
authorizes an attorney to make repeated, ex parte telephone calls to the 
tribunal before which he or she is practicing after being commanded 
not to do so by the tribunal. 
Id. at 293, 701 N.E.2d at 738. See also Wolfe v. Little, No. 18718, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1902 
(Montgomery Apr. 27, 2001) (in context of finding no ulterior purpose as required for abuse of 
process claim, appellate court said of underlying allegation of contact with trial judge by other side, 
resulting in entry increasing judgment for other side from $25,000 to $300,000, that “an ex parte 
communication with the trial court is completely inappropriate and could possibly subject the 
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attorney to disciplinary action, if proven,” id. at *9). 
Fourth, even with respect to communications on the merits directed to presiding officials in the 
proceeding, the Rule does not prohibit all communication, but only certain ex parte communication. 
Of course the Rule does not apply to communication in the presence of the other side during the 
official proceeding, since such communications are by definition not “ex parte” and in any event are 
clearly authorized by law. Both oral and written communications are permitted, as long as notice 
appropriate to the circumstances is provided to opposing counsel, or to the adverse party if 
unrepresented. See Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Arkow, 104 Ohio St.3d 265, 2004 Ohio 6512, 819 
N.E.2d 284 (inadequate notice; placement of proposed order in custody case in opposing lawyer’s 
mailbox at court with letter erroneously indicating respondent would seek judge’s approval on 
January 20, rather than intended January 10 date, which was next day, violated former OH DR 
7-110(B)). If the lawyer communicates in writing to the tribunal, a copy of the writing should be 
delivered promptly to the other side. See Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 73-10 (Aug. 8, 1973) 
(submitting to judge confidential trial brief not available to opposing counsel is improper). But see 
Crawford v. Ribbon Tech. Corp., 143 Ohio App.3d 510, 758 N.E.2d 674 (Franklin 2001) (after 
ex parte conversation with magistrate by defendant’s counsel, magistrate in supplemental decision 
added attorney fees to sanctions against plaintiff’s attorney; attorney’s assignment of error based on 
the ex parte contact rejected because he was “given notice of the conversation, albeit, after the fact. 
Most important, however, Harwood [plaintiff’s lawyer] filed objections to the supplemental decision. 
Therefore, Harwood was afforded notice and the opportunity to respond and thus was not 
prejudiced.”  Id. at 513, 758 N.E.2d at 676.) One would have thought former OH DR 7-110(B) 
relevant to this decision, and yet neither the court nor (insofar as one can tell from the appellate court 
opinion) the appellant raised it. From an OH DR 7-110(B) perspective, the decision is almost 
certainly incorrect -- notice after the fact cannot be “adequate notice” -- but the disciplinary rule 
appears to have been overlooked by all concerned. 
And even ex parte communication with the judge about the merits does not violate the Rule if it is 
authorized “by law or court order.” The obvious example is an application for a temporary restraining 
order under OH Civ R 65(A). 
An interesting and informative article on ex parte communications is Jack M. Weiss, It Depends on 
the Meaning of “Ex Parte,” Litig., Winter 2003, at 27.  A more recent discussion of the subject is 
found in Kathryn A. Thompson, Private Talks, ABAJ, Feb. 2007, at 20 (reviewing MR 3.5(b) and 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(B)(7)). 
Finally, as a postscript to this subsection, consider two disciplinary decisions in which the rule against 
ex parte communications was not invoked. In Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Sauter, 96 Ohio St.3d 136, 
2002 Ohio 3610, 772 N.E.2d 620, former OH DR 7-110(B) was not applied (the lawyer was publicly 
reprimanded for violation of OH DR 1-102(A)(5)), because the case involved a communication 
running from the court to lawyers involved in the pending case (not by the judge, but by his 
lawyer/law clerk). Despite not being within the scope of the rule (or the CJC) for this reason, it 
nevertheless is a classic example of an improper communication that met all of the other indicia of the 
rule. First, it concerned an adversary proceeding (a contested valuation appeal in an eminent-domain 
case); second, it did indeed involve a communication as to the merits of the case -- the clerk gave 
substantive information to lawyers for the City of Cincinnati appealing the case, shortly before oral 
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argument, as to how they might best argue their appeal); and third, it was done ex parte, without 
notice to the lawyers on the other side of the appeal. The Sauter case is further discussed at section 
8.4:500. 
Nor was the present version of the rule, Rule 3.5(a)(3)(i), invoked in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Stafford, 131 Ohio St.3d 385, 2012 Ohio 909, 965 N.E.2d 971, a case in which the Court wrote a 
lengthy opinion, other aspects of which are discussed elsewhere in this treatise. Of interest here is the 
fact that, despite the absence of a 3.5(a)(3)(i) charge, two of the justices (O’Donnell joined by 
Lundberg Stratton) wrote a six-page concurring “advisory” opinion dealing with the issue. The 
trigger for this unusual addendum to the decision was a comment made by counsel for the respondent 
at oral argument, at which the supposed “common practice” of ex parte activity at the Domestic 
Relations Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas was being pursued by Justice 
Stratton: 
 Justice Lundberg Stratton: Don’t you think maybe we have a 
duty to say, “That’s it. I don’t care if the judge does it or not, it’s not 
allowable, it’s not ethical, you’re ‘ex-parte-ing,’ and this is where it’s 
stopping?” Because the judges apparently aren’t stopping it, according 
to you? 
 Counsel for Stafford: I think if that’s a decision this court 
makes, then it’s certainly obviously the power of this court to do that, 
but not retroactively to a litigant who is among thousands who do the 
same thing. 
Id. at para. 81 (emphasis by Justice O’Donnell). Justice O’Donnell found that “[t]hese statements of 
counsel appear to be incredible and very troubling,” id. at para. 82, and proceeded to review 
disciplinary precedent in which both lawyers and judges have been sanctioned for engaging in 
unauthorized ex parte communications. While noting that a 3.5(a)(3)(i) violation was not charged, 
Justice O’Donnell toward the end of the opinion once again voices his concern over the practice 
reflected in the case at bar: “What is disturbing is the cavalier attitude toward ex parte 
communications evidenced by counsel’s colloquy with a member of this court and the incredible 
representation that thousands of lawyers do the same thing.” Id. at 89. Given this admonishment, 
Ohio lawyers and judges will perhaps give more serious consideration to Rule 3.5(a)(3)(i) in the 
future. 
There was a 3.5(a)(3)(i)charge and finding of violation in Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Malley, 137 
Ohio St.3d 161, 2013 Ohio 4566, 998 N.E.2d 470; the facts present a legal question regarding the 
scope of the subsection which is addressed in the Court’s opinion only by result, not by analysis. 
(Perhaps so because the parties stipulated to the 3.5(a)(3) violation.) The facts upon which this 
conclusion was based is that Frank Russo, not O’Malley, but at O’Malley’s request, contacted the 
judge in a pending case in which respondent was representing clients and told him pursuant to 
O’Malley’s instructions to deny the pending summary judgment motions submitted by all parties in 
the litigation (because he thought his effort to settle the case was being hindered by a lack of ruling on 
long-pending summary judgment motions). The judge did so and then told O’Malley what he had 
done. Do these facts violate 3.5(a)(3)(i)? The Rule provides that “[a] lawyer shall not . . . 
communicate ex parte with” the judge “as to the merits of the case during the proceeding . . ..” But the 
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lawyer, O’Malley, did not communicate ex parte with the judge; Russo did. Despite the fact that this 
variation is not directly addressed either in the rule or in the Court’s opinion in O’Malley, this seems 
to us the proper result. A lawyer should not be shielded from a violation by claiming he or she acted 
only indirectly, not directly. The Restatement expressly addresses the issue in 2 Restatement (Third) 
of the Law Governing Lawyers §113 cmt. c, at 192 (2000): “The prohibition applies regardless of 
who initiates the communication and whether it occurs . . . directly or through a third person . . . .” The 
Reporter’s Note on comment c sets forth the change from the ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility, where DR 7-110(B) did include the “causing another to communicate” as an 
infraction, to the Model Rules, where this aspect is covered by the Rule 8.4(a) language prohibiting a 
lawyer from violating the rules by “do[ing] so through the acts of another.” The Ohio version of 8.4(a) 
is identical in pertinent part to the Model Rule and could be brought into play if necessary. Moreover, 
Ohio DR 7-110(B) was identical to the Model Code provision and the comparison to the formal Ohio 
Code provision states that “Rule 3.5(a)(3) incorporates the prohibitions on improper ex parte 
communications contained in . . . 7-110(B).” That “legislative history” would seem sufficient to bring 
O’Malley’s having caused Russo to communicate his instructions to the judge within the orbit of 
Rule 3.5, without the need to invoke 8.4(a). (It is unclear from the opinion whether the judge “told 
O’Malley that he had denied the summary judgment motions” in private or in court; even if the former, 
query whether a judge telling a lawyer in a pending case that he has denied the motions is 
“communication . . . as to the merits of the case . . . ” in the sense intended by the Rule). 
Limitations on communications with jurors and prospective jurors: Particularly before the jury is 
selected, trial counsel has a substantial interest in obtaining information about prospective jurors in 
order to conduct an effective voir dire. Unregulated contact with prospective jurors, however, may 
invade the jurors’ legitimate privacy interests or may provide an avenue for undue influence that 
could undercut a juror’s impartiality if selected to serve on the case. To accommodate these 
competing concerns, the Rule does not restrain investigation of prospective jurors, but prohibits direct 
ex parte communication with them “during the proceeding,” unless authorized by law or court order. 
Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(3)(ii). Although the Rule does not define this time period, it would by definition 
have to include that portion of the proceeding during which jurors are “prospective” – i.e., when they 
have not yet been seated as jurors, but are members of the venire or jury pool from which jurors are 
drawn. See 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 115(1) (2000) (“A lawyer 
may not: (1) except as authorized by law, communicate with or seek to influence a person known by 
the lawyer to be a member of a jury pool from which the jury will be drawn.”). Accord 2 Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 31.3 (3d ed. Supp. 
2011); Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 61:808 (2006). 
During trial, because ex parte communication with jurors outside the course of the official 
proceedings raises the possibility of jury tampering, such communications are barred, again unless 
specifically authorized by law or court order. Rule 3.5(a)(3)(ii). Under former OH DR 7-108(B), the 
prohibition extended not only to lawyers connected with the case ((B)(1)), but also precluded any 
lawyer from communicating with a juror concerning the case. ((B)(2)). The new Rule does not 
directly address this issue; the strictures of division (a)(3)(ii) (like all of Rule 3.5) are imposed on “[a] 
lawyer.” The Task Force Report and related documents give no indication that the drafters intended a 
change on this point and the language of the Rule can be read to restate the former practice, since its 
language “[a] lawyer” could encompass any lawyer, whether directly involved in the proceeding or 
not. See also Rule 3.5 cmt. [2]. 
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We are not aware of any Ohio disciplinary cases or ethics opinions dealing with ex parte jury contact. 
Juror communication - Other implications: Impermissible contact with jurors is regulated outside the 
disciplinary process as well. Such activity may warrant a new trial or relief from judgment, see OH 
Civ R 59(A)(2), 60(B)(3). See generally Howard P. Fink, Arthur F. Greenbaum & Charles E. 
Wilson, Guide to the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure §§ 59-7 & 60-8 (2006 ed.). If the behavior 
constitutes jury tampering, the lawyer will be subject to criminal penalties. See ORC 2921.02 
(prohibiting bribery of juror); ORC 2921.03 (prohibiting juror intimidation in civil action or 
proceeding). 
  
3.5:350  Communication with Juror after Discharge of Jury 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(4) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.5(c) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.132 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.132 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(4) prohibits a lawyer from communicating with a juror or prospective juror after 
the jury is discharged, if 
 (i) the communication is prohibited by law or court order; 
 (ii) the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to 
communicate; [or] 
 (iii) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, 
duress, or harassment. 
Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(4) is an essentially verbatim restatement of MR 3.5(c), which was added to the 
Model Rule by the 2002 amendments. (See also Ohio Rule 3.5 cmt. [3], which sheds little additional 
light on the subject.) As noted in ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 356 (7th 
ed. 2011) (commentary): 
This subsection permits more post-verdict juror contact than the prior 
Model Rule, but also affords jurors greater protection than the Model 
Code’s DR 7-108 prohibition against asking jurors questions or making 
comments that are “calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror 
[or] to influence his actions in future jury service.” 
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(Bracketed material added to conform to language of OH DR 7-108.) 
In reviewing the three prohibited categories in Rule 3.5(a)(4), (i) there is no Ohio “law” of which we 
are aware prohibiting such contact; on the other hand, a court can “order” that such contact not take 
place by rule or in a specific case. See Tasin v. SIFCO Indus., 50 Ohio St.3d 102, 553 N.E.2d 257 
(1990) (upholding local rule prohibiting post-verdict contact by counsel (or parties) with jurors). 
Subdivision (ii) is self-explanatory. Subdivision (iii) is both more and less inclusive than former OH 
DR 7-108(D). More inclusive in prohibiting “misrepresentation, coercion, duress”; less inclusive in 
dropping “embarrass[ment]” and communications “calculated . . . to influence [the juror’s] actions in 
future jury service.” (These subdivision (iii) distinctions may be much ado about very little.) Finally, 
the 3.5(a)(4) prohibitions apply to “[a] lawyer,” which can be read to mean “any lawyer.” The 
7-108(D) prohibitions applied only to lawyers “connected” to the case. 
  
3.5:400  Conduct Disruptive of or Degrading to a Tribunal 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(5), (6) 
ORC 2705 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.5(d) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.29, 7.107 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:902 
ALI-LGL § 105 
Wolfram § 12.1.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.29, 7.107 (1996). 
Two provisions in the Ohio Rules address this issue -- Rules 3.5(a)(5) and (6). The former prohibits a 
lawyer from engaging “in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.” The latter from engaging “in 
undignified or discourteous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal.” Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(5) had no 
counterpart in the former OHCPR, whereas Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(6) is analogous to former OH DR 
7-106(C)(6). 
Initial issues: Three threshold questions emerge in interpreting these provisions. The first is whether 
they are dependent on the lawyer playing a particular role, as was the case under DR 7-106(C) -- all of 
the subdivisions of 7-106(C), including (C)(6), were introduced by language limiting their 
application to conduct of a lawyer “appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal.” Thus, a 
lawyer committing conduct otherwise violative of 7-106(C)(6) would not breach the rule if, for 
example, it occurred while acting as a witness in a case, as opposed to “in his professional capacity.” 
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The second issue is whether the conduct has to occur in court. Once again, under the former rule, this 
was answered by the introductory language of 7-106(C) -- it had to occur in the context of a lawyer’s 
“appearing . . . before a tribunal.” Thus, writing an intemperate letter to the editor criticizing a judge 
was held to be beyond the reach of the former rule.  Crawford County Bar Ass’n v. Nicholson, 66 
Ohio St.3d 585, 613 N.E.2d 1025 (1993) (rejecting Board’s finding of violation, inasmuch as “DR 
7-106(C)(6) governs only conduct by a lawyer ‘appearing in his professional capacity before a 
tribunal.’“  Id. at 588, 613 N.E.2d at 1027. While it is unclear from the Nicholson opinion whether 
the letter concerned cases in which respondent was involved “in a professional capacity,” the answer 
to that question was irrelevant under the court’s reasoning, because it did not occur “in appearing . . . 
before a tribunal.” (If such a letter contained knowingly false accusations against a judge, it would 
have been covered by former OH DR 8-102 (now Rule 8.2(a)). See section 8.2:200.)  However, in a 
2007 case, the “appearing before a tribunal” language was construed broadly.  Thus, in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Scurry, 115 Ohio St.3d 201, 2007 Ohio 4796, 874 N.E.2d 521, the Court, although not 
addressing the “appearing before a tribunal” language directly, found that respondent had violated 
DR 7-106(C)(6) by telephoning court personnel while in an inebriated state, during which 
conversations “he rambled on in expletives and incomplete sentences.” Id. at para. 10.  The 
unanimous opinion in Scurry rather clearly indicated both that the violative conduct need not occur 
in the courtroom per se and that it need not be directed to the judge – telephonic misconduct toward 
court staff, such as court clerks and deputy clerks, was sufficient. 
Since the introductory appearing-in-professional-capacity-before-tribunal language from the former 
disciplinary rule has not been retained, it seems likely that the Scurry reading would be the result 
under 3.5(a)(6) as well. That has now been confirmed by the Hennekes decision, discussed at the end 
of this paragraph. Whether the same can be said of the result in Nicholson, where the conduct 
involved statements in a newspaper rather than being made to the court or its personnel, is unclear.  
Note that the Task Force states in the Comparison to Former Ohio Code that “Rule 3.5(a)(6) 
corresponds to DR 7-106(C)(6).” On the in-court/out-of-court issue as it relates to Rule 3.5(a)(5), 
there is additional, diametrically opposed, commentary. Compare ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 359 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) (stating with respect to the Model Rule 
counterpart to Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(5) that “[c]onduct need not occur inside the courtroom to be 
disruptive to a tribunal”), with 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, 
The Law of Lawyering § 31.6, at 31-12 (3d ed. Supp. 2011) (“virtually impossible” that action 
taken by lawyer outside the courtroom could disrupt tribunal). [We think the ABA has the better of 
that argument.] In sum, it remains to be seen whether conduct condemned by Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(5) 
will be limited to that occurring in a lawyer’s professional capacity or his appearance before a tribunal.  
Probably not. With respect to 3.5(a)(6), the Court held in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Hennekes, 135 
Ohio St.3d 106, 2012 Ohio 5689, 984 N.E.2d 1031, that, as in Scurry under the Code, telephonic 
misconduct toward court staff – here hanging up on the court’s bailiff and then refusing to pick up 
when the bailiff repeatedly tried to call respondent back – violates the rule. 
The third question is whether or not the prohibited conduct must relate to a pending proceeding before 
a tribunal. The issue might come up if a lawyer criticized a judge generally, without reference to a 
specific case, or about a case now concluded. The language of Comment [5], referring to the duties set 
forth in (a)(5) and (a)(6) as being applicable “to any proceeding of a tribunal, including a deposition” 
(it gives no indication that these duties apply other than in that context), suggests that a pending 
proceeding must be implicated. The Task Force’s Comparison to ABA Model Rules, however, 
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detailing the difference in focus between subdivisions (a)(5) and (a)(6), is also relevant here: 
Rule 3.5(a)(5) addresses a wide range of conduct that, although 
disruptive to a pending proceeding, may not be directed to the tribunal 
itself, such as comments directed toward opposing counsel or a litigant 
before the jury. Rule 3.5(a)(6) speaks to conduct that is degrading to a 
tribunal, without regard to whether the conduct is disruptive to a 
pending matter. 
As to subdivision (a)(5), this statement clearly supports the view that the disruptive conduct 
prohibited must relate to a pending proceeding.  But regarding (a)(6), the Comparison can be read as 
indicating that a violation need not concern a pending proceeding, although this is by no means clear, 
given the language of Ohio Rule 3.5 cmt. [5] that the (a)(6) duty “applies to any proceeding of a 
tribunal, including a deposition.” 
In the first case decided under Rule 3.5(a)(6), none of these issues was presented, since the offending 
conduct consisted of the lawyer acting (unprofessionally) in his professional capacity in the 
courtroom in a pending proceeding – he left the courtroom during a hearing even though the judge 
instructed him to stay. Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Sakmar, 127 Ohio St.3d 244, 2010 Ohio 
5720, 938 N.E.2d 355. Similarly, in the second case to invoke Rule 3.5(a)(6), Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Pullins, 127 Ohio St.3d 436, 2010 Ohio 6241, 940 N.E.2d 952, the respondent submitted 
disparaging and false affidavits of disqualification against two judges in two separate matters.  Pullins 
was also found to have violated DR 7-106(C)(6) for comparable assertions in disqualification 
affidavits and other court filings prior to the effective date of the Rules. (These issues likewise were 
not presented in a 2012 decision, Disciplinary Counsel v. Proctor, 131 Ohio St.3d 215, 2012 Ohio 
684, 963 N.E.2d 806 (remarks made in professional capacity about judge in pending case).) 
However, in Akron Bar Ass’n v. DiCato, 130 Ohio St.3d 394, 2011 Ohio 5796, 958 N.E.2d 938, at 
least one of these questions was answered. The respondent in DiCato was found to have violated 
Rule 3.5(a)(6) for calling a sitting judge a “lying, cheating bitch,” id. at para. 4, during a telephone 
conversation with a court bailiff. Obviously, this confirms that the conduct need not have occurred in 
an appearance before a tribunal, consistent with the deletion of such language in Rule 3.5(a)(6). 
(Since the conversation with the bailiff was about fee applications awaiting the judge’s approval, the 
remark was in all likelihood made in his professional capacity concerning pending cases.) 
Elements of violation: Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(5) has two elements. A violation occurs when a lawyer (1) 
acts intentionally to (2) disrupt a tribunal. Actual disruption need not occur. Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(6), in 
contrast, does not turn on the lawyer’s intent, but requires that undignified or discourteous conduct in 
question actually be “degrading to the tribunal.” Under former OH DR 7-106(C)(6) (the Code analog 
to 3.5(a)(6)), sanctions often were imposed for inappropriate behavior directed at the judge or other 
court personnel. Lawyers were sanctioned under this provision for: 
 disrupting criminal proceedings by insisting that respondent, not court-appointed counsel, 
was the attorney for defendant, as a result of which respondent was found to be in criminal 
contempt; at a subsequent hearing held to enable respondent to purge himself of the contempt 
by committing not to further interfere in the criminal proceedings, respondent refused to do so 
and accused the judge of collusion with the prosecutor’s office.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
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Vogel, 117 Ohio St.3d 108, 2008 Ohio 504, 881 N.E.2d 1244. 
 a pervasive pattern of egregious behavior disruptive of criminal proceedings in which 
respondent represented the defendant; conduct “appears to have been an effort to create ‘an 
atmosphere of utter confusion and chaos . . . .’ [Quoting from Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 
400 U.S. 455, 462 (1971).] Rather than advancing the pursuit of justice, respondent advanced 
obstruction, obfuscation, and opprobrium.” Disciplinary Counsel v. LoDico, 106 Ohio St.3d 
229, 2005 Ohio 4630, 833 N.E.2d 1235, at para. 24 (eighteen-month suspension imposed, 
with last six months conditionally stayed); 
 making, in court filings, extended and heated accusations of dishonesty and of ignoring of 
well-established law directed against a panel of the Eighth District Court of Appeals that had 
ruled against his client, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 
2003 Ohio 4048, 793 N.E.2d 425 (“unfounded attacks against the integrity of the judiciary 
require an actual suspension from the practice of law.” Id. at para. 36. Six-month suspension 
imposed); 
 constantly arguing with and interrupting the judge and showing little or no respect for 
witnesses, among other violations, by lawyer appearing pro se, Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Donnell, 79 Ohio St.3d 501, 684 N.E.2d 36 (1997) (“As the board aptly noted, 
‘This is yet another textbook example of why an attorney should not represent himself.’“  Id. 
at 503, 684 N.E.2d at 38.); 
 filing seven affidavits of prejudice against a visiting judge who had no prior connection to the 
litigation or its participants, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Leary, 67 Ohio St.3d 425, 
619 N.E.2d 410 (1993); 
 accusing the judge of “bullshit,” Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mills, 93 Ohio St.3d 407, 
408, 755 N.E.2d 336, 337 (2001); or of playing a “silly game,” Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Grimes, 66 Ohio St.3d 607, 614 N.E.2d 740 (1993); 
 calling the judge an alcoholic, Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Cregan, 69 Ohio St.3d 550, 
634 N.E.2d 1005 (1994); 
 giving the judge an obscene finger gesture, Crawford County Bar Ass’n v. Nicholson, 66 
Ohio St.3d 585, 613 N.E.2d 1025 (1993); and 
 threatening the judge or court personnel.  Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Cregan, 69 Ohio 
St.3d 550, 634 N.E.2d 1005 (1994). 
A lawyer entering court with her briefcase displaying a bumper sticker supporting the judge, in a 
possible attempt to win the judge’s favor, violated this provision.  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Sullivan, 
65 Ohio St.3d 293, 603 N.E.2d 983 (1992). So too did begging on one’s knees for mercy for a client.  
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Pagac, 72 Ohio St.3d 341, 650 N.E.2d 423 (1995) (in one 
instance, attorney Pagac also asked the client’s relatives to stand and promise that they would vote for 
the judge if he granted probation!). 
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All of these examples would similarly violate Rule 3.5(a)(6); some, as in LoDico and Donnell, 
would violate Rule 3.5(a)(5) as well. 
While the language of the disciplinary rule (like Rule 3.5(a)(6)) addressed only conduct degrading 
“to a tribunal,” it was construed to apply as well to conduct directed toward opposing counsel.  Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mills, 93 Ohio St.3d 407, 408, 755 N.E. 336, 337 (2001) (berating 
opposing counsel at hearing before magistrate for having sought continuances “five f_ _ _ _ _ g 
times.”); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Levin, 35 Ohio St.3d 4, 517 N.E.2d 892 (1988) 
(attorney who threatened and addressed opposing counsel with variety of expletives and 
unprofessional terms during deposition violated numerous provisions of the OHCPR, including OH 
DR 7-106(C)(6)). Moreover, 
 threatening another attorney, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Levin, 35 Ohio St.3d 4, 517 
N.E.2d 892 (1988), 
 shoving another attorney, Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Cregan, 69 Ohio St.3d 550, 634 
N.E.2d 1005 (1994), and 
 including inappropriate comments in the margin of interrogatories, Crawford County Bar 
Ass’n v. Nicholson, 66 Ohio St.3d 585, 613 N.E.2d 1025 (1993), 
all warranted sanction under former OH DR 7-106(C)(6). (In a later disciplinary decision involving 
Nicholson, the respondent engaged in further disruptive courtroom tactics and thus violated the 
probation imposed in the 1993 decision. As a result, his six-month suspension was reinstated. See 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Nicholson, 80 Ohio St.3d 275, 685 N.E.3d 1234 (1997) 
(accusing the judge of making an obscene finger gesture during respondent’s presentation and 
referring to the female prosecutor as “a scared, whimpy[sic], little girl lawyer,”  id. at 276, 685 
N.E.2d at 1235 (bracketed material by the Court)). 
It is unclear whether this expansive reading of DR 7-106(C) -- rendering it applicable to conduct 
directed at opposing counsel -- will continue under Rule 3.5(a)(6), although the ABA Model Rule 
Comparison language quoted earlier in this section would indicate that, in contrast to division (a)(5), 
it will not. (Conduct degrading to someone other than a tribunal, however (such as opposing counsel), 
may well be policed by other Rules, such as Rule 4.4(a).) 
Behavior condemned under DR 7-106(C)(6) was often found to violate the more general prohibitions 
of former OH DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6) as prejudicial to the administration of justice or reflecting 
adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law (now, respectively, Rules 8.4(d) and (h)), and, at 
times, would arise in a context that violated other provisions of OH DR 7-106 as well. See LoDico 
supra (conduct also violated OH DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), and OH DR 7-106(A) and (C)(7)); Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel v. Levin, 35 Ohio St.3d 4, 517 N.E.2d 892 (1988) (attorney who 
threatened and addressed opposing counsel with expletives and other unprofessional terms during 
deposition violated, in addition to 7-106(C)(6), 1-102(A)(5) and (6), and 7-106(C)(2), (5), and (7)). 
In other instances, conduct degrading to or disruptive of the tribunal was punished under OH DR 
1-102(A)(5) and (6) alone. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Pridemore, 28 Ohio St.3d 106, 
502 N.E.2d 635 (1986), where the Supreme Court held that a mentally unstable attorney’s bizarre 
courtroom behavior that disrupted a criminal proceeding in which he was not acting as counsel, 
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together with separate erratic and threatening behavior toward various doctors, violated former OH 
DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6). (The lawyer’s courtroom behavior included “telling the court about his 
health, an alleged wiretap of his telephone, and about his meeting with a Pulitzer prize winner, a 
political cartoonist, and a close relative of the chief writer of T.V. Guide magazine.”  Id. at 106, 502 
N.E.2d at 635). Appearing before the court in an intoxicated condition, causing the court to have to 
reschedule the matter, was also held to violate OH DR 1-102(A)(5) and/or (6).  Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Bregger, 63 Ohio St.3d 374, 588 N.E.2d 781 (1992) (OH DR 1-102(A)(5)); Trumbull 
County Bar Ass’n v. Landers, 61 Ohio St.3d 88, 572 N.E.2d 677 (1991) (OH DR 1-102(A)(5) & 
(6)). 
Occasionally, as a defense to making inappropriate comments, lawyers have contended that the judge 
and/or the opposing attorney acted improperly first. This argument has fallen upon deaf ears; 
according to the Supreme Court, the attorney is not thereby authorized to respond with a temper 
tantrum of his own. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mills, 93 Ohio St.3d 407, 755 N.E.2d 
336 (2001) (berating magistrate and opposing counsel with obscenities and engaging in tirade 
violated former OH DR 7-106(C)(6); such response would have been inappropriate even if counsel 
and magistrate had acted improperly first). The Court similarly rejected arguments that the judge’s 
supposed predilection for vulgarity induced the attorney’s comments; disrespect for the court is not 
excused by a judge’s tendency toward profanity.  Greater Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Carlin, 67 Ohio 
St.2d 311, 423 N.E.2d 477 (1981). [An aptly named respondent, although his first name was not 
George.] Nor did the Court condone such conduct merely because the case was bitterly contested and 
the lawyer passionately believed in the client’s innocence.  Greater Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Milano, 
9 Ohio St.3d 86, 459 N.E.2d 496 (1984). As the Ohio Supreme Court stated in State v. Wilson, 30 
Ohio St.2d 312, 314-15, 285 N.E.2d 38, 40 (1972): 
No amount of provocation on the part of the judge can be permitted to 
excuse counsel from the obligation of his oath of office (“I will 
maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers”); to 
excuse him from his duties imposed by the Code of Professional 
Responsibility; or to condone the acts of counsel if in fact they are 
themselves contemptuous. 
The respondent in LoDico argued that, given the “passion and zeal” inherent in criminal defense 
representation, “this grievance implicates the unique question of whether criminal defense counsel 
can be subjected to professional discipline for the conduct described.” 106 Ohio St.3d 229, 2005 
Ohio 4630, 833 N.E.2d 1235, at para. 22. The Court’s answer to this “unique question” was not 
surprising: 
Although criminal cases bring responsibility and necessity of a 
vigorous defense, an attorney is not endowed with a concomitant right 
to denigrate the court in discharging that responsibility. 
 . . . No proper defense or strategy warrants the type of 
misconduct exhibited by respondent. 
Id. at paras. 30, 31. 
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In Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Batt, 78 Ohio St.3d 189, 677 N.E.2d 349 (1997), the Supreme Court 
disbarred respondent, whose many transgressions included an appearance in his capacity as city 
solicitor before the Ohio Hazardous Waste Facility Board, where 
respondent engaged in contemptuous, undignified, and discourteous 
conduct. We recognize that an attorney must zealously represent his 
client, but we also recognize that an attorney has a duty to be civil to 
opposing counsel and the court. Respondent’s bullying tactics toward 
opposing witnesses, opposing counsel, and the board that are revealed 
in the record of this hearing have no place in our jurisprudence. 
Id. at 192, 677 N.E.2d at 352. In the Court’s description of the panel’s findings on this count, more 
detail was provided: 
This conduct included using insulting or intemperate language, as well 
as shouting or screaming at, arguing with, or otherwise harassing the 
hearing panel, opposing counsel, or witnesses. The respondent publicly 
called the presiding judge a “marginal incompetent,” and implied that 
panel members were biased, and were responding to political 
measures. 
Id. at 190, 677 N.E.2d at 351. Interestingly, not only were OH DR 7-106(C)(6) and other 7-106(C) 
subsections invoked, but OH DR 7-101(A)(1) as well, “for failing to avoid offensive tactics and 
failing to treat with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process.” Id. This was 
an expansive reading of former OH DR 7-101(A)(1), which stated in this regard merely that by 
avoiding offensive tactics and treating others with courtesy, the lawyer did not thereby violate her 
obligation under the Code to represent the client zealously. See section 1.3:200. 
Trial conduct of the type discussed here, if engaged in by a prosecutor, can lead to reversal of a 
criminal conviction for prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 613 
N.E.2d 203 (1993) (criminal conviction overturned for prosecutorial misconduct, which included 
denigrating defense counsel); State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984) (criminal 
conviction overturned for prosecutorial misconduct, which included falsely implying that defense 
counsel suborned perjury). 
Contempt: Such disruptive conduct is also regulated by courts through their inherent and statutory 
contempt power, as well as by Rule 3.5(a)(5). See LoDico supra (conduct resulted in both contempt 
citation and disciplinary proceedings). In Verbanic v. Verbanic, 70 Ohio St.3d 41, 635 N.E.2d 
1260 (1994), a case in which “the record is inundated with examples of how a case should not be 
tried,”  id. at 41, 635 N.E.2d at 1261, an attorney was twice held in contempt -- first, for his improper 
questions and making derogatory comments about the appellee (that he was “queer” and suggesting 
that he had AIDS) and second, for shoving another attorney during the trial. For this and other 
extensive misconduct in Verbanic, including violation of former OH DR 7-106(C)(6), and for 
violations in numerous other matters, the lawyer was permanently disbarred.  Mahoning County Bar 
Ass’n v. Cregan, 69 Ohio St.3d 550, 634 N.E.2d 1005 (1994). 
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Direct contempt - The standards: The type of contempt relevant here -- lawyer conduct in direct 
contempt of court -- involves misbehavior in or near the presence of the court that obstructs justice 
and that often (but, in Ohio, not always) is disruptive of the proceedings. (Indirect contempt by 
lawyers who, out of the presence of the court, disobey court orders or rulings is discussed in section 
3.1:500.) For a detailed analysis of the distinctions between direct/indirect and direct/summary 
contempt, see  In re Contemnor Caron, 110 Ohio Misc.2d 58, 89-97, 744 N.E.2d 787, 809-15 (C.P. 
Franklin 2000). 
An interesting decision involving direct civil contempt in a criminal case is State v. Doe, 101 Ohio 
St.3d 170, 2004 Ohio 705, 803 N.E.2d 777. In Doe, the lawyer was found in contempt for refusing to 
answer questions before a grand jury. The issue of direct or indirect contempt was answered in this 
case by statute -- such a refusal before the grand jury is treated as if the witness had refused to answer 
in open court. ORC 2939.15. The contempt aspect of the Doe case is examined in detail in section 
3.1:500. 
At a minimum, a direct contempt summarily punishable must obstruct justice (see ORC 2705.01); a 
number of cases go further and hold that a summary proceeding, which does not provide the basic 
procedural due process protections, can be justified only when the conduct poses an immediate threat 
to or disruption of the administration of justice by the court. Thus, on the one hand, there are Ohio 
cases in which no immediate disruption of the proceedings is apparent but the summary contempt 
provisions of ORC 2705.01 were nevertheless deemed applicable. On the other, some Ohio cases 
have held that ORC 2705.01 can be invoked only when there is an imminent threat to or disruption of 
the administration of justice in the proceedings. In any event, we have come a long way from the 
circumstances presented in Anonymous, 73 Eng. Rep. 416 (1631), where the prisoner 
“threw a brickbat at the said Judge, which nearly missed; and for this an 
indictment was immediately drawn by Noy against the prisoner, and 
his right hand cut off and fixed to the gibbet, upon which he was 
himself immediately hanged in the presence of the Court.” 
(Quoted in  In re Contemnor Caron, 110 Ohio Misc.2d at 107, 744 N.E.2d at 822.) As the Caron 
court remarked: “Some sanctions for direct contempt are more summary than others.” Id. 
Direct contempt - The case law: As noted in section 3.1:500 at “Out-of-court contempt - Probate 
matters,” the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the summary procedures of ORC 2705.01 may be 
used to deal with lawyer contempt that the Court found to be direct and an obstruction of justice, even 
when the conduct did not occur in the presence of the court and did not pose a threat of immediate 
disruption of the proceedings. See  In re Estate of Wright, 165 Ohio St. 15, 133 N.E.2d 350 (1956) 
(nondisclosure of material fact by estate administrator constituted fraud on court causing court to 
enter orders it otherwise probably would not have entered; in such circumstances “there is such an 
obstruction of justice as to constitute direct contempt,”  id. at 25, 133 N.E.2d at 357, summarily 
punishable under ORC 2705.01. Syllabus three). The Court in Wright expressly stated that “a direct 
contempt of court is not confined to a disorderly or obstreperous act in the presence of the court 
itself.” Id. Another lawyer contempt case in which the Supreme Court approved the use of ORC 
2705.01, in circumstances significantly closer to the disruption threshold, is State ex rel. Seventh 
Urban, Inc. v. McFaul, 5 Ohio St.3d 120, 449 N.E.2d 445 (1983). Seventh Urban involved an 
in-courtroom assault by a lawyer on the opposing party’s president in the presence of court reporters, 
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a bailiff, and an assistant prosecutor, shortly before a court of appeals hearing was scheduled to begin. 
As a result, the proceeding was delayed for approximately ten minutes. Although (as in Wright) a full 
contempt hearing was later held (with the court of appeals finding the lawyer in direct criminal 
contempt), on appeal the Supreme Court rejected the lawyer’s argument that his conduct did not 
obstruct justice and left little doubt that the summary procedures of ORC 2705.01 could have been 
used. First, citing Wright, the Court noted: 
In order to constitute direct contempt, an act need not be in the 
immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or 
interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself. 
Id. at 122, 449 N.E.2d at 448. Second, given the place, time, and witnesses, the conduct was “an 
open threat to the orderly procedure of the court,” and “[c]onsequently, Schulman’s assault of Willis 
obstructed the administration of justice.”  Id. at 123, 449 N.E.2d at 448. Finally: 
Striking someone who is in a courtroom on court business, the act 
occurring in the presence of the court’s bailiff, marshal, constable or 
court reporter, is a direct contempt in the constructive presence of the 
court and may be punished as such. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Court gave short shrift to appellant’s second argument -- that the evidence 
did not support a finding that he intended to obstruct justice. Reasoning that since a person is 
presumed to intend the natural and reasonable consequences of his acts, the Court concluded that the 
“natural, reasonable and probable consequences of Schulman’s voluntary act of striking Willis was 
the obstruction of justice.” Id. 
The third Supreme Court case relevant here is State v. Wilson, 30 Ohio St.2d 312, 285 N.E.2d 38 
(1972), which affirmed a finding of summary contempt based on a lawyer’s innumerable 
interruptions and refusals to obey the trial court’s orders to “sit down” during his representation of 
two defendants in a capital murder case. While both the majority and the dissent complained of the 
sparseness of the record, the Court nevertheless concluded: 
 The record here does show, however, that appellant 
unnecessarily repeated objections, requests for examination and 
requests for the maintenance of the record (especially when it was 
obvious that no interruption or silencing of the reporter occurred or was 
ordered) and a constant disregard of the court’s order to sit down, all of 
which amounted to disrespect for the court, to disruption of quiet and 
order, and to actual interruption of the court in the conduct of its 
business. 
Id. at 314, 285 N.E.2d at 40 (emphasis added). 
Many court of appeals cases can be cited for the proposition that a finding of direct contempt for 
obstructing justice ipso facto brings the summary punishment provisions of ORC 2705.01 into play. 
(The three cases cited are ones in which the contemnor was a lawyer.) E.g., In re Contempt of 
Morris, 110 App.3d 475, 674 N.E.2d 761 (Cuyahoga 1996); Fed. Land Bank v. Walton, 99 Ohio 
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App.3d 729, 651 N.E.2d 1048 (Wyandot 1995); see City of Cleveland v. Heben, 74 Ohio App.3d 
568, 599 N.E.2d 766 (Cuyahoga 1991) (reiterating the imminent-threat-to-administration-of-justice 
standard, but ultimately not applying it). 
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in In re Wright, however, there is a substantial body of 
post-Wright Ohio case law taking the position that a direct contempt justifying use of the ORC 
2705.01 summary procedures must be both conduct in the actual or constructive presence of the court 
and constitute an imminent threat to the administration of justice. The most detailed exposition of this 
approach in Ohio is that stated in  In re Contemnor Caron, 110 Ohio Misc.2d 58, 744 N.E.2d 787 
(C.P. Franklin 2000). As the Caron court put it: 
A prevalent misconception exists yet today that direct contempt 
is synonymous with summary (i.e., without due process) contempt; or 
to state it differently, that every direct contempt justifies a summary 
sanction; or to again state it differently, that where the contumacious 
act is committed “within the presence of the court,” it need not 
constitute an “imminent threat to the administration of justice” to 
justify a summary sanction. Assuming a contumacious act qualifies as a 
direct contempt, however, this is simply a precursor to one of the 
essential issues of present-day contempt law in America -- whether the 
circumstances of the direct contempt include both essential elements of 
summary contempt: (a) the “judge’s personal knowledge” and (b) the 
“imminent threat to the administration of justice.” . . . 
The dual essential elements of summary contempt [citing Ex 
parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 
517 (1925); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)] are: 
1. A contumacious act committed in open court in the judge’s
presence and immediate view that results in the judge’s personal 
knowledge and makes further evidence unnecessary for a summary 
finding of contempt . . . and 
2. The contumacious act constitutes an imminent threat to the
administration of justice that may result in demoralization of the 
court’s authority unless the court imposes a summary contempt 
sanction . . . . 
110 Ohio Misc.2d at 89-90, 744 N.E.2d at 809 (emphasis by the court; bracketed material added). 
Another, more recent, case also exhaustively canvassing this issue and reaching the same conclusion 
as that in Caron is In re LoDico, 2005 Ohio 172, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 165 (Stark) (relying 
extensively on the Caron analysis). See also William F. Chinnock & Mark P. Painter, The Law of 
Contempt of Court in Ohio, 34 Tol. L. Rev. 309, 321 (2003) (Judge Painter sits on Ohio’s First 
District Court of Appeals; Judge Chinnock is the author of the Caron decision). 
Ohio lawyer cases following this imminent threat approach (all of which cited here except Heben 
reversed a summary finding of contempt) include LoDico supra (reversing direct summary contempt 
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finding based on lawyer’s response to court’s question whether lawyer was officially withdrawing: 
“I’m saying that I can’t be effective in representing Mr. Cameron. So however the Court wants to 
view that, the Court can view that.” Id. at paras. 20-22.); State v. Schiewe, 110 Ohio App.3d 170, 
673 N.E.2d 941 (Wood 1996); In re Contempt of Rossman, 82 Ohio App.3d 730, 613 N.E.2d 241 
(Cuyahoga 1992); In re Davis, 77 Ohio App.3d 257, 602 N.E.2d 270 (Montgomery 1991); State v. 
Milano, No. 44610, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 13733 (Cuyahoga Aug. 4, 1983). See Catholic Soc. 
Servs. v. Howard, 106 Ohio App.3d 615, 666 N.E.2d 658 (Cuyahoga 1995) (invoking both 
obstruction and imminent threat standards); see also City of Cleveland v. Heben, 74 Ohio App.3d 
568, 575, 599 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Cuyahoga 1991) (Blanche Krupansky, C.J., dissenting) (“while I 
agree defendant’s conduct may have been ill-mannered, his conduct posed no ‘actual or imminent’ 
threat to the administration of justice,”  id. at 575, 599 N.E.2d at 770). The Heben and Rossman 
cases provide an interesting comparison -- the panel in both cases was comprised of the same three 
judges; in Heben, summary contempt was affirmed, while in Rossman it was reversed. Judge 
Krupansky dissented in both cases and in Rossman remarked as follows: 
 I am amazed that the same majority in Heben as in the case sub 
judice could affirm the contempt sanction against Heben for making 
“derogatory statements * * * to the court after it had Heben brought 
back into the courtroom,” with no mention that Heben obstructed the 
administration of justice, Heben, supra, 74 Ohio App.3d at 573, 599 
N.E.2d at 769; yet in the case sub judice the same majority finds 
Rossman’s behavior [attempting to pursue line of questioning in 
defiance of trial court’s order, resulting in delay of voir dire] not to be 
contemptuous, completely ignoring the statutory law and the case law 
based on stare decisis. I am truly astounded. 
82 Ohio App.3d at 739, 613 N.E.2d at 247. There are also nonlawyer cases holding that an 
imminent threat is necessary before summary contempt procedures can be utilized. E.g., State v. 
Newman, Nos. 97 CA2507, 2525, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1431 (Scioto Apr. 3, 1998); State v. 
Conliff, 61 Ohio App.2d 185, 401 N.E.2d 469 (Franklin 1978) (“Displays of ill-mannered conduct 
are not summarily punishable under the law of direct contempt unless they pose an imminent threat to 
the administration of justice.”  Id. at 185, 401 N.E.2d at 470 (syllabus)). 
Summary punishment of lawyers for direct contempt that obstructs justice and is explicitly or 
implicitly immediately disruptive of the proceedings has been upheld in a number of cases. E.g., 
Bank One Trust Co. v. Scherer, 176 Ohio App.3d 694, 2008 Ohio 2952, 893 N.E.2d 542 
(Franklin) (summary conviction of direct criminal contempt affirmed, with exception of penalty, 
which was found excessive; imminent threat standard applied and found satisfied by lawyer’s refusal 
to answer court’s questions about conflict of interest issue and other obstructive tactics during hearing; 
dissent argued that lawyer’s “obstinacy did not pose an imminent threat to the administration of 
justice. Because the purpose of the hearing was not related to the conflict of interest, and the hearing 
on scheduled matters had already concluded, the progress of the hearing was not in jeopardy,” id. at 
para 54; this seems to us an overly rigid view of what constitutes a “hearing”); Scherer v. Scherer, 
72 Ohio App.3d 211, 594 N.E.2d 150 (Logan 1991) (conduct obstructed administration of justice in 
hearing before referee, forcing referee to terminate proceeding); Graham v. Mem’l Hosp., No. 
14-88-6, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 418 (Union Feb. 7, 1990) (disruptive behavior throughout trial, 
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ultimately resulting in mistrial);  In re McGinty, 30 Ohio App.3d 219, 507 N.E.2d 441 (Cuyahoga 
1986) (prosecutor’s disruption of court’s ordered sequence for interviewing witness by intruding on 
defense counsel’s private interrogation, which conduct was witnessed and/or heard by judge, 
obstructed administration of justice). See  In re Gonzalez, 70 Ohio App.3d 752, 591 N.E.2d 1371 
(Cuyahoga 1990), where the court of appeals, in affirming a summary contempt order, noted that the 
lawyer’s “outrageous conduct was obstructing justice in the direct presence of the court.”  Id. at 757, 
591 N.E.2d at 1373. The only example given of the lawyer’s “outrageous conduct” was his 
continuing to ask questions, contrary to the trial court’s order, about the victim’s sexual activity in a 
rape-of-minor case. The appellate court did note, however, that “[t]he case already had one mistrial 
and the judge was attempting to protect this trial.” Id. Compare City of Cleveland v. Heben, 74 Ohio 
App.3d 568, 599 N.E.2d 766 (Cuyahoga 1991) (while espousing “imminent threat to the 
administration of justice” requisite, appellate court affirmed summary finding of contempt based on 
counsel’s derogatory remark (“I have no respect for this Court”) that, in the reviewing court’s words, 
“tended to embarrass the court’s performance of its functions in the administration of justice,”  id. at 
574, 599 N.E.2d at 769; there was a persuasive dissent). 
While the purported invalidity of a court order is generally not a defense to a charge of contempt for 
defying the order (such issues should be raised by motion or on appeal), at least two Ohio court of 
appeals cases have held that in the criminal context, where the defense lawyer was subject to the 
potentially inconsistent obligations of (a) obeying an order in open court to proceed to trial (thereby 
running the risk of violating former OH DR 6-101(A)(2) and (A)(3)) and (b) protecting her client’s 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, the fact that the order was contrary to law or an 
abuse of discretion was held to be a defense to the contempt citation.  In re Sherlock, 37 Ohio 
App.3d 204, 525 N.E.2d 512 (Montgomery 1987) (appellate court concluded that if conduct 
properly held contemptuous, trial court was authorized to impose summary punishment for counsel’s 
refusal to proceed with trial, but contempt finding held improper where refusal based on concern that 
client would receive ineffective assistance of counsel and that lawyer would be in violation of 
OHCPR if she proceeded without being prepared); State v. Gasen, 48 Ohio App.2d 191, 356 
N.E.2d 505 (Hamilton 1976) (same). Compare State v. Christon, 68 Ohio App.3d 471, 589 N.E.2d 
53 (Montgomery 1990) (distinguishing Sherlock because in Christon “appellants were not 
adequately prepared due solely to their own inaction.”  Id. at 477, 589 N.E.2d at 57). The same 
concerns arise on the other side of the aisle, when a prosecutor is confronted with an order that places 
him in the “untenable position” of either disobeying the court’s order or violating his professional 
responsibility to his client, the state. See State v. Schiewe, 110 Ohio App.3d 170, 177, 673 N.E.2d 
941, 945 (Wood 1996) (contempt held improper). Different, but equally compelling, considerations 
may point to the same result where the lawyer is placed in the position of either obeying a court order 
to testify at trial or protecting his criminal-defendant client’s attorney-client privilege. See State v. 
McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 651 N.E.2d 985 (1995) (court of appeals’ reversal of contempt 
order, imposed for refusal to testify in defiance of trial court order, affirmed; attorney properly 
refused to disclose confidential client communications as to which there had been no waiver). 
McDermott is also discussed in section 1.6:520. 
Some courts clearly overreach in invoking the summary procedures of ORC 2705.01. Thus, in 
Catholic Social Services v. Howard, 106 Ohio App.3d 615, 666 N.E.2d 658 (Cuyahoga 1995), the 
trial court summarily held appellant in contempt for appearing in a hallway near the courtroom, after 
the court had ordered that appellant not appear before it or be present near the courtroom. The 
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appellate court reversed, finding that there was no evidence that appellant’s mere presence in the 
vicinity of the courtroom obstructed justice or constituted an imminent threat to the administration of 
justice. (The court of appeals further noted that the trial court’s order in effect precluded appellant 
from practicing in the trial judge’s courtroom, and, as such, conflicts with the Supreme Court’s 
exclusive authority to govern the practice of law.) 
The ultimate in overreaching may well have occurred in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Karto, 94 
Ohio St.3d 109, 760 N.E.2d 412 (2002), where the respondent judge, who stated he originally 
intended only to admonish the alleged condemnor, found her guilty of “civil” contempt for 
supposedly threatening the judge by making a “popping” noise while pointing her finger at him. 
“According to the stipulated facts, this proceeding took place without the filing of a complaint or a 
case number, and without a journal entry memorializing the proceedings. . . . [Respondent] did not 
advise Smith that she had a right to be represented by counsel . . . .”  Id. at 111, 760 N.E.2d at 415. 
Not surprisingly, the judge was sanctioned for misuse of the contempt power in this (and one other) 
instance. 
Finally, there is a substantial body of case law (both lawyer and nonlawyer) holding that in cases of 
direct, summary contempt, the “order must contain a clear and complete recital of the facts upon 
which the finding is based to allow an appellate court to judge its lawfulness.” E.g., State v. Sindell, 
CA No. 2745, 1978 Ohio App. LEXIS 8236, at *3 (Lorain Dec. 13, 1978) (lawyer case; contempt 
citation reversed and remanded for want of such order); State v. Butler, No. 34574, 1976 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 7467 (Cuyahoga Feb. 26, 1976) (same). 
  
3.5:500  Disclosure of Improper Conduct by or Toward a Juror 
Primary Ohio References 




Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.133 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.133 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 3.5(b), which in general mirrors former OH DR 7-108(G), places a duty on the lawyer 
promptly to report misconduct involving jurors to the tribunal hearing the action. Division (b) 
requires the lawyer to reveal “improper conduct by a juror or prospective juror, or by another toward 
a juror, prospective juror, or family member of a juror or prospective juror, of which the lawyer has 
knowledge.” Two aspects of the rule deserve special mention. 
First, the rule does not restrict the reporting duty to misconduct that violates Rule 3.5, but speaks 
more generally to any “improper conduct.” One Ohio appellate court under the former OHCPR held 
that a prosecutor’s failure to disclose a prior relationship with a juror violated the predecessor 
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disciplinary rule, OH DR 7-108(G). State v. Mathias, No. 91 CA31, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1458 
(Gallia Mar. 31, 1994). 
Second, Rule 3.5(b) requires the lawyer to report misconduct by a juror or prospective juror, or 
misconduct toward a juror, prospective juror or the family of same by “another.” It is unclear how 
broadly “another” should be interpreted in this context. If it includes improper conduct by a client, it 
may constitute a mandatory disclosure provision overriding the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6. 
It should be noted, however, that the mandatory disclosure provision in Ohio Rule 1.6(c) speaks only 
in terms of disclosure necessary to comply with Rule 3.3 or 4.1. Under the terms of those Rules, the 
client misconduct would have to be either fraudulent or criminal (Rule 3.3(b), or illegal (Rule 
4.1(b)). 
A case in which the duty to report under former OH DR 7-108(G) was raised is Bell v. Mt. Sinai 
Med. Ctr., 95 Ohio App.3d 590, 643 N.E.2d 151 (Cuyahoga 1994). In Bell, plaintiff-appellant’s 
counsel argued on appeal that the lower court erred in denying his motion for new trial because a 
senior partner at defense counsel’s firm violated this and other provisions of the OHCPR when he 
failed to inform the court and plaintiff’s counsel that a juror had informed a local surgeon in a 
telephone call that the jury was going to find in favor of one of the defendant doctors. The senior 
partner had been informed of the telephone call by the local surgeon, who had been called by the juror 
to seek guidance on issues in the case. The senior partner promptly advised the trial court that the 
telephone call occurred, but kept the jury-verdict information to himself. Without any real analysis of 
the issue, the appellate court merely noted that the trial court has wide discretion on ruling on a 
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3.6:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.6 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.6 
  
3.6:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 3.6 is substantively identical to the Model Rule, except that in division (b) the language 
"of this rule and if permitted by Rule 1.6" has been added after "division (a)" in the first line. 
  
3.6:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.6: DR 7-107. 
  
3.6:200  Improper Extrajudicial Statements 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.6(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.6(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.115-7.119, 7.122 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:1001 
ALI-LGL § 109 
Wolfram § 12.2 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.115-7.119, 7.122 (1996). 
Trial publicity in general: The public has a legitimate interest in and a right to know about the 
workings of our legal system, both in general and in the context of particular cases. Ohio Rule 3.6 
cmt. [1]; see Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). The public dissemination of information 
about ongoing investigations and proceedings furthers that interest. Lawyers involved in a particular 
case are uniquely qualified to provide valuable insights about such matters. Id. Further, even though 
they are officers of the court, lawyers retain a First Amendment right to speak on these issues, the 
extent of which may vary depending on the underlying social and political implications of the speech 
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in question. Toledo Bar Ass'n Op. 85-3 (5-7-85). Cf. Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) 
(while the social and political nature of the speech involved was mentioned in the opinion, it is un-
clear whether it was treated as a factor). 
On the other hand, excessive publicity may undermine both the rights of the parties to have their case 
decided before an impartial tribunal and the integrity of the legal system itself. Comments from 
lawyers actually participating in a case under discussion can be expected to be treated as particularly 
significant by the public and, therefore, are more likely to have a detrimental impact.  Gentile v. State 
Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). Through media comments, the lawyer might be able to place before the 
public evidence and arguments that would not be admissible at trial. Such conduct may taint the 
outcome of the trial itself. Id. Even if it does not affect the outcome of the trial, it may substantially 
restrict the ultimate jury pool of those who remain unaffected by the public dissemination of infor-
mation. Id. 
Ohio Rule 3.6 seeks to accommodate these competing concerns, while staying within constitutional 
limits. The distinction that the Rule draws between prohibited and permitted speech turns on the 
source of the communication, the context in which the communication occurs, and the likely impact 
of the communication. Even if a communication would violate the Rule based on the application of 
these criteria, it still is permissible if the subject matter of the communication falls within the Rule's 
safe-harbor provision (Ohio Rule 3.6(b)) or if the communication is necessary to rebut negative 
publicity generated by others. Ohio Rule 3.6(c). 
Source of the communication: The restrictions on trial publicity in Ohio Rule 3.6 apply only to 
lawyers who have participated or are participating in the investigation or litigation of a matter, Rule 
3.6(a), and to those associated with them. Rule 3.6(d) (division (a) restrictions apply to any "lawyer 
associated in a firm or governmental agency with a lawyer subject to division (a)"). Lawyers who are 
unaffiliated with a case remain free to comment upon it. This provides the public access to expert 
commentary on pending litigation, while protecting the parties and the system from the harms likely 
to arise from improper public comments from lawyers actually participating in the proceeding itself 
or their surrogates. See Rule 3.5 cmt. [3]; see also ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 369 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary).  
Context in which the communication occurs: Ohio Rule 3.6(a) is concerned only with "extrajudicial 
statement[s] that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of 
public communication" and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an "adjudi-
cative proceeding." The three contextual limitations set forth in the Rule carefully limit its reach. 
First, the Rule speaks only to "extrajudicial" statements. Comments made in the official course of a 
proceeding are not covered. This is not to suggest that lawyer speech is immune from regulation if it 
occurs as a formal part of the litigation process, but only that such conduct is outside the scope of 
Ohio Rule 3.6. A court may exercise its contempt powers to control improper speech in the court-
room; parties may move to strike scandalous matter from civil pleadings; and improper speech may 
violate other Rules. (In this connection, it should be remembered that as a matter of defamation law, 
lawyers have an absolute privilege to publish matter in judicial proceedings, even if the publication is 
made with malice, so long as it bears some reasonable relation to the proceeding. "Judicial pro-
ceeding" is read expansively. See discussion at section 1.1:510.) 
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Second, the statements must be made in a situation in which the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that they will be publicly disseminated. Ohio Rule 3.6(a). Thus, communications about a case, 
reasonably thought by the lawyer to be private communications, remain unaffected by the Rule, even 
if they ultimately do become public, since the lawyer would not reasonably expect their public dis-
semination. However, if a lawyer makes improper comments in a context in which public dissemi-
nation is likely, the lawyer has committed a disciplinary offense, even if the statements are not in fact 
disseminated. See 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 32.5, 
illus. 32-1 (3d ed. 2001). Further, the intent of the lawyer when making the statement is irrelevant. 
Even if the lawyer does not intend the comments to be publicly disseminated, if she reasonably should 
have known they likely would be, this aspect of the Rule is satisfied. 
Third, the prohibition in Ohio Rule 3.6 is limited to comments that might have a material prejudicial 
impact in "an adjudicative proceeding." See generally Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Batt, 78 Ohio St.3d 189, 
677 N.E.2d 349 (1997) (applying former OH DR 7-107 to conduct engaged in during an Ohio 
Hazardous Waste Facility Board hearing). Comments directed toward a matter pending in legislative 
hearings or nonadjudicatory administrative proceedings are not covered by the Rule. 
Substantial likelihood of material prejudice: Ohio Rule 3.6 applies only to an extrajudicial statement 
that "the lawyer knows or reasonably should know . . . will have a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter." Ohio Rule 3.6(a). This standard incorporates a 
knowledge requirement, a predictive element, and a severity-of-harm concern. 
First, with respect to the knowledge requirement, statements that have an unexpectedly severe impact 
on a proceeding are not improper. Only where the lawyer knew or reasonably should have known 
about a statement's likely impact is the Rule implicated. 
Second, the Rule is concerned only with statements that have "a substantial likelihood" of having an 
improper impact. Thus, the disclosure of financial and time records relating to criminal and habeas 
proceedings that have been completed are not covered by the Rule. See, under the former OHCPR, 
State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v. Bodiker, 134 Ohio App.3d 415, 731 N.E.2d 245 
(Franklin 1999) (no substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a judicial proceeding: "Relators 
do not articulate, nor do we discern, how the release of the requested information at this time, after all 
judicial proceedings involving [the defendant] have been concluded, will prejudice . . . the adjudica-
tive proceedings in this case. Accordingly DR . . . 7-107(A) do[es] not pertain to this proceeding."  Id. 
at 426, 731 N.E.2d at 253.). Similarly, in Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-25, 
1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (Dec. 16, 1988), the Board opined that while a prosecutor was 
subject to former OH DR 7-107(A) (now Rule 3.6(a)) with respect to pending matters, the rule did 
not apply to completed criminal investigations. Thus, on completion of the investigation, a prosecutor 
was permitted to explain why criminal charges had not been authorized. If a comment meets the 
substantial-likelihood standard, however, the Rule is violated even if the comment ultimately does 
not adversely affect the proceeding. See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
357-58 (4th ed. 1999) (commentary) (so stating with respect to the identical language in MR 3.6(a) 
and noting that the Nevada Supreme Court "explicitly found that there was no actual prejudice" in 
Gentile. See 501 U.S. at 1065). 
Finally, the Rule's prohibition is limited to comments of some magnitude. Only those that have a 
likelihood of "materially prejudicing" an adjudicative proceeding are banned. 
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Ambiguity exists as to the intended scope of the substantial-likelihood-of-material-prejudice standard 
in Ohio Rule 3.6(a). While the identical language in MR 3.6(a) was intended to be analogous to the 
"clear-and-present-danger" test that must be met in certain contexts before speech can be suppressed 
by a state consistent with the First Amendment, see ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 243 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court in Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 103 (1991), held that 
government has greater constitutional leeway in regulating lawyer speech in the ethics context than a 
"clear-and-present-danger-of-prejudice" standard would allow and that the language of the Rule can 
permissibly be construed to permit a lesser threshold for regulation. See ABA, Annotated Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 366 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). The Ohio Supreme Court did not 
speak to this issue under the identical language of former OH DR 7-107(A), so it remains to be seen 
how this language will be interpreted under the new Rules. 
Context plays an important role in determining whether a statement presents a "substantial likelihood 
of material[] prejudic[e]." While there are no absolutes in this area, several factors can influence the 
determination. 
One is whether the proceeding is criminal or civil in nature. While public communications can un-
dercut the integrity of any proceeding, concerns are greatest in criminal cases, both because such 
cases are most likely to capture the public attention and therefore be influenced by public comment, 
and because the underlying need for fairness is greatest where individual life and liberty interests are 
involved. See generally Ohio Rule 3.6 cmt. [6]. 
A second factor is whether the action will be tried to a judge or a jury. As was recognized in Gentile, 
a judge is much less likely to be swayed by extrajudicial comments than are jurors.  Gentile v. State 
Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1077 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part). See Ohio Rule 3.6 cmt. [6] 
(finding likelihood of prejudice to be less in nonjury hearings or arbitration proceedings than in jury 
trials). 
A third factor is the time in the proceeding at which the comment is made. For example, comments 
made early on in the investigation of a matter typically are less likely to cause material prejudice than 
those made close to the time of voir dire or while the trial is ongoing, if the jury is likely to become 
aware of them. See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 369 (7th ed. 2011) 
(commentary) ("timing [of statement] has proved to be an important criterion in assessing its po-
tential for prejudice"). See also Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 61:1013 (2007). 
A fourth factor is whether the information has been disseminated previously or will be disseminated 
in the proceeding itself. Reiteration of previously released information often is less likely, in and of 
itself, to materially prejudice the proceeding; the damage already has been done. (This will not always 
be the case, however, for the timing of the release, its cumulative effect, and the tenor and degree of 
its public dissemination may render it substantially likely to have a material effect on the proceeding.) 
Similarly, release of information that will subsequently be put to the proof at trial may not have a 
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the proceeding where the proof at trial is likely to be 
the decision-maker's focus, rather than the extrajudicial comments themselves. 2 Geoffrey C. Haz-
ard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 32.6 (3d ed. 2001). 
Statements often carrying a substantial likelihood of material prejudice: Comment [5] provides a list 
of particular statements that are likely to violate the substantial-likelihood-of-material prejudice 
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standard. Ohio Rule 3.6 cmt. [5]. As pointed out by the ABA with respect to the identical MR 3.6 
cmt. [5], the list was included "to give fair notice of the kinds of statements that are generally thought 
to be more likely than other kinds of statements to pose unacceptable dangers to the fair administra-
tion of justice." ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 355 (4th ed. 1999) (Model 
Code Comparison). The Comparison goes on to caution that whether or not making a listed 
statement will in fact violate the Rule depends on the particular facts of the case in which the state-
ment is made. Id. Comment [5] of the Ohio Rule states as follows: 
 There are . . . certain subjects that are more likely than not to 
have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when 
they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any 
other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects re-
late to: 
 (1) the character, credibility, reputation, or criminal record 
of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the 
identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or 
witness; 
 (2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in in-
carceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or 
the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or 
statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's re-
fusal or failure to make a statement; 
 (3) the performance or results of any examination or test or 
the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or 
test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to 
be presented; 
 (4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or 
suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in 
incarceration; 
 (5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that 
would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an 
impartial trial; 
 (6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, 
unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the 
charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is pre-
sumed innocent until and unless proven guilty. 
Ohio Rule 3.6 cmt. [5]. 
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Disclosure of the probable result of a court decision: Ohio Rule 3.6 does not carry forward the 
strange (and perhaps unique) prohibition contained in former OH DR 7-111, relating to premature 
disclosure of the result of a pending court decision deemed confidential. According to the Task Force, 
it "believes the subject-matter of that rule is addressed in Rules 8.4(b) and (d) as well as R.C. 
102.03(B)." Task Force Report 27. (One wonders how such conduct, without more, could be con-
sidered "illegal" as required by Rule 8.4(b), unless the lawyer is a present or former public official 
subject to the nondisclosure strictures of ORC 102.3(B).) 
Other controls on lawyer trial speech: Improper or discourteous comments directed toward the trial 
judge or others involved in the proceeding may be subject to discipline under Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(5) 
and/or (6) (conduct intended to disrupt, or that is degrading to, a tribunal). See section 3.5:400. In 
individual cases, a court in appropriate circumstances may impose protective orders limiting lawyer 
speech. OH Civ R 26(C). See generally 1 Howard P. Fink, Arthur F. Greenbaum & Charles E. 
Wilson, Guide to The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure § 26-8 (2006 ed.). Gag orders also may be 
issued but are often constitutionally suspect. See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 354-55 (6th ed. 2007) (commentary). See generally Elizabeth L. Hendershot, Note, 
Constitutional Gag Orders Restricting Trial Participant's Speech: A Guide for Ohio Trial 
Judges, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 1537 (1995). Failure to follow these limitations can lead to sanction directly 
by the court, as well as possible disciplinary violations. See Ohio Rule 3.4(c). See generally section 
3.4:400. 
  
3.6:300  Permissible Statements 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.6(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.6(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.120 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 69:1001 
ALI-LGL § 109 
Wolfram § 12.2 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.120 (1996). 
Trial publicity - Permissible comments: In order to give lawyers some sense of security with respect 
to their extrajudicial publicly disseminated comments, Ohio Rule 3.6(b) provides a safe-harbor 
provision listing comments that a lawyer can make without fear of sanction. These are, 
"[n]otwithstanding division (a) of this rule and if permitted by Rule 1.6": 
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(1) the claim, offense, or defense involved and, except when prohibited 
by law, the identity of the persons involved; 
(2) information contained in a public record; 
(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress; 
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; 
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information 
necessary thereto; 
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, 
when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of sub-
stantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; 
(7) in a criminal case, in addition to divisions (b)(1) to (6) of this rule, 
any of the following: 
(i) the identity, residence, occupation, and family status of the 
accused; 
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information nec-
essary to aid in apprehension of that person; 
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; 
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agen-
cies and the length of the investigation. 
As stated in Comment [4], division (b) "is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of the subjects on 
which a lawyer may make a statement, but statements on other matters may be subject to division (a)." 
Rule 3.6 cmt. [4]. 
Two principal factors are at work in the decision to allow comment on these matters without sanction. 
Disclosure is authorized where the act of disclosure is likely to be beneficial and the risk of harm from 
such disclosure is comparatively slight. 
With respect to much of the information listed, disclosure may be beneficial. In this vein, disclosure is 
allowed for matters likely to be of public interest, which includes disclosure of core information about 
the case and the course of an investigation and subsequent proceedings, Ohio Rule 3.6(b)(1), (3)-(4), 
(7)(i) & (iii); and disclosure necessary to protect the public from harm, Rule 3.6(b)(6). Disclosure 
also is authorized where necessary to aid in the investigation of a matter, Rule 3.6(b)(3), (7)(ii) & (iv), 
or to secure evidence relevant to the proceeding. Rule 3.6(b)(5). Further, as a practical matter, dis-
closure of the listed information typically is unlikely to cause material prejudice in the proceeding 
either because the information itself is not sufficiently prejudicial in nature or because the information 
is part of the public record. See Ohio Rule 3.6(b)(2). See also  In re Grand Jury Investigation, 23 
Ohio App.3d 159, 492 N.E.2d 459 (Cuyahoga 1985), where the court held that reiteration by a 
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prosecutor of remarks made in open court did not violate what was then OH DR 7-107(A)(1). The 
7-107(A)(1) provision (permitting extrajudicial statements that did no more than state without elab-
oration information in public record), was analogous to what is now the exception contained in Rule 
3.6(b)(2) (information contained in public record). 
Note that, unlike MR 3.6(b), under Ohio Rule 3.6(b) the safe-harbor statements may be made only 
"if permitted by Rule 1.6." As restated in Comment [2], "[t]he provisions of this rule do not supersede 
the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6." Ohio Rule 3.6 cmt. [2]. The comment further notes that 
special confidentiality rules may apply in juvenile, domestic relations, disciplinary and mental disa-
bility proceedings, and perhaps others. If so, "Rule 3.4(c) requires compliance with such rules." 
  
3.6:400  Responding to Adverse Publicity 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.6(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.6(c) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.121 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:1001 
ALI-LGL § 109 
Wolfram § 12.2 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.121 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 3.6(c) recognizes that, at times, a lawyer may need to make certain public statements 
regarding an investigation or litigation to protect a client from substantial prejudice arising from 
publicity generated by persons other than the lawyer or the lawyer's client. Comments made in such a 
defensive fashion are exempt from the general prohibitions of Ohio Rule 3.6, but they must be 
"limited to information necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity." Ohio Rule 3.6(c). 
In assessing whether, given the facts of a particular case, defensive disclosure is permissible, the Rule 
applies an objective rather than a subjective standard; it permits disclosure otherwise improper under 
the Rule only when "a reasonable lawyer" would believe it is required. A subjective belief that dis-
closure is necessary is not enough. 
Further, defensive disclosure is appropriate only when three conditions are met: First, the harm of the 
publicity to which the lawyer seeks to respond must be significant. Only if the effect can be charac-
terized as "substantial," "undue," and "prejudicial" is defensive disclosure permitted. Second, the 
adverse publicity at issue must be "recent." The Rule allows a lawyer to respond quickly to suffi-
ciently adverse publicity in order to neutralize the situation, but it does not allow the lawyer, later in a 
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proceeding, to use stale adverse publicity as a pretext to avoid the basic limitations of Rule 3.6. Third, 
the Rule is limited to instances in which the adverse publicity comes from a source other than the 
lawyer or the lawyer's client. This limitation discourages manipulative behavior whereby a lawyer 
might attempt to create adverse publicity in order to trigger an opportunity to respond. 
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3.7:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.7 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.7 
 
3.7:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rules 3.7(a) and (b) are substantively identical to the Model Rule. 
Division (c), dealing with testimony by a government lawyer participating in a case, has no 
counterpart in the Model Rule. 
  
3.7:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.7: DR 5-101(B) & 5-102. 
  
3.7:200  Prohibition of Advocate as Witness 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.7(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.7(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.58-5.67, 5.69-5.74 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:501 
ALI-LGL § 108 
Wolfram § 7.5 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.58-5.67, 5.69-5.74 (1996). 
Advocate-witness rule - Introduction: As a general proposition, Ohio Rule 3.7 prohibits a lawyer 
from serving as both trial counsel and a witness in the same litigation, because of the inherent 
incompatibility of these roles. This prohibition is sometimes referred to as the "advocate-witness 
rule." While the Rule prohibits this conduct in many instances, the bar is not absolute. And, where the 
prohibition applies, it is not imputed to other lawyers in the firm with which the lawyer is associated. 
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See section 3.7:300. (Imputation does apparently apply, however, to associated government lawyers. 
See section 3.7:400.) 
Potential violations of this prohibition frequently are relied upon to support motions to disqualify 
counsel. Less frequently, violations have served as grounds for professional discipline. See Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Collins, 71 Ohio St.3d 310, 643 N.E.2d 1082 (1994) (violation of former 
OH DR 5-101(B) & 5-102(A); public reprimand). If a trial court allows lawyer testimony where 
testifying constitutes a violation of the rule, a new trial may be required. In 155 North High, Ltd. v. 
Cincinnati Insurance Co., No. 93 AP-45, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4815, (Franklin Sept. 28, 1993), 
aff'd on other grounds, 72 Ohio St.3d 423, 650 N.E.2d 869 (1995), the court found a violation of the 
advocate-witness rule caused by lawyer testimony that was sufficiently prejudicial under the 
circumstances to require a new trial. The court acknowledged that some states believe that violations 
of the advocate-witness rule should be policed solely through the disciplinary process, not through the 
additional remedy of a new trial, but rejected that limitation. Rather, the court indicated that a new 
trial may be ordered for violation of the rule if the error could have improperly tainted the proceedings. 
The opinion provided the following guidance for making this assessment: 
 We think the best approach to be taken in this situation is to 
examine the record to determine if the error could have improperly 
tainted the proceedings. [citation omitted] If the case against the 
opposing party was close and it cannot be said that the judgment is free 
from suspicion, then prejudice is more likely to be found. Moreover, 
the clearer the violation of the rule, the more justification there is for 
the court to take action. As astutely recognized by the court in Hubbard 
v. Hubbard (Fla. App. 1970), 233 So.2d 150, 154, to affirm a judgment 
for a party whose lawyer has breached the rule through tactical effort "* 
* * would be to condone the breach and, perhaps, to encourage others 
to disregard the dictates of the canon * * *." 
1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4815, at *20-21 (ellipses in original). 
Advocate-witness rule - Underlying policies: The basic theory underlying the prohibition on acting as 
both an advocate and a witness in the same proceeding is that the roles are inconsistent. See generally 
Ohio Rule 3.7 cmts. [1] & [2]. Like the former OHCPR, the Rules do not prohibit a lawyer from 
serving as counsel for a client in one proceeding and as a witness in a separate proceeding involving 
the same client. See Toledo Bar Ass'n Op. 88-1 (Feb. 18, 1988). It is the convergence of roles in one 
proceeding that creates the conflict. Each role may be undermined should the lawyer attempt to play 
both. Avoiding this type of conflict serves to protect not only the client, but the opposing party and the 
integrity of the legal system as well. 155 North High, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 
423, 650 N.E.2d 869 (1995) (recognizing these multiple interests). 
 
The lawyer who serves as both an advocate and a witness in the same proceeding may be more easily 
impeached for bias as a witness, because of the combined roles. Ohio State Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 
33 (Dec. 12, 1980). On the other hand, because the lawyer/witness often builds a special rapport with 
the trier of fact in the lawyer's role, it may, as a practical matter, interfere with opposing counsel's 
ability effectively to cross-examine or impeach the lawyer/witness. 
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From the lawyer's perspective, serving as both an advocate and a witness might place the lawyer in 
the awkward position of having to impeach his own testimony to serve the interests of his client, or to 
argue his own credibility. A jury may become confused over the boundaries between lawyer 
testimony and lawyer advocacy. 
From a policy perspective more generally, there is a fear that the lawyer who also serves as a witness 
may develop an animosity toward opposing counsel, after being subject to cross-examination or 
impeachment, that will result in a lack of cooperation in the litigation or a loss of objectivity in 
considering settlement.  Gen. Mill Supply Co. v. SCA Servs., Inc., 697 F.2d 704 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(articulating this concern as part of multi-part balancing test to resolve advocate-witness 
disqualification issues). 
Counterbalanced against these concerns is the right of a party to counsel of choice.  Reamsnyder v. 
Jaskolski, No. L-84-447, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 8533, at *8 (Lucas Aug. 23, 1985) ("The rule is 
designed to protect the interest of all the parties and the reputation of the legal community. However, 
the disqualification of an attorney is a drastic step and should not be made quickly; for such a decision 
necessarily infringes upon the inviolable right to counsel of one's choice." (citation omitted)). Accord 
Puritas Metal Prods., Inc. v. Cole, 2008 Ohio 4653, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3900 (Lorain). See 
also Banque Arabe et Internationale D'Investissement v. Ameritrust Corp., 690 F. Supp. 607, 
613 (S.D. Ohio 1988) ("A party's right to select its own counsel is an important public right and a 
vital freedom that should be preserved; the extreme measure of disqualifying a party's counsel of 
choice should be imposed only when absolutely necessary."). Where the issue arises unexpectedly 
after representation has been underway, withdrawal or disqualification can be particularly disruptive. 
Nevertheless, the basic premise of the Rule is that in most cases it is better for the lawyer to serve as a 
witness and withdraw as trial counsel than the reverse. Lawyers are plentiful, but witnesses are few. 
Advocate-witness rule's prohibitions - In general: Subject to the exceptions discussed below, the 
advocate-witness rule states as follows: 
 A lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a trial in which the 
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness . . . . 
Ohio Rule 3.7(a). 
In determining whether the advocate-witness rule applies, several subsidiary issues must be addressed. 
The threshold inquiry is whether the particular proceeding in which the lawyer may be a witness is 
one to which the prohibition applies. Even if serving as both an advocate and a witness in a 
proceeding might otherwise be barred, the prohibition is not absolute. The extent to which the 
prohibition can be avoided by client consent or because the conduct falls into one of the exceptions 
recognized in the Rule also must be addressed. Finally, assuming the advocate-witness rule bars a 
particular lawyer from representing a client in litigation, a question remains concerning the extent to 
which the prohibition should be extended to other lawyers with whom that lawyer practices. 
Advocate-witness rule's prohibitions - Advocate at trial: The advocate-witness prohibition arises only 
when the lawyer is "act[ing] as an advocate at a trial" in which the lawyer is likely to be called as a 
necessary witness. This advocate-at-trial limitation raises several problems of interpretation. 
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First, when does a matter involve "trial"? Is the prohibition limited to court proceedings, or does it 
apply more broadly to adjudications before any tribunal? Should it extend as well to nonadjudicative 
dispute-resolution procedures such as arbitration? While the word "tribunal" is not used in the Rule 
itself, it is used in the comments, and thus the Rule 1.0(n) definition of that term applies. Pursuant 
thereto, it includes "a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding, or a legislative body, 
administrative agency, or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity," which capacity contemplates 
a neutral official rendering a binding legal judgment after the presentation of evidence/legal argument 
by the parties. Id. Thus, it seems reasonably clear that "trial" will trigger the restrictions of Rule 3.7 in 
any adjudicative proceeding. 
Consistent with this result, the State Employment Relations Board concluded that the 
advocate-witness prohibitions of the former OHCPR applied to lawyers representing parties in 
unfair-labor-practice adjudications conducted by the agency. In re City of Cleveland, SERB 94-021 
(Oct. 26, 1994), aff'd, State Employment Relations Bd. v. City of Cleveland, 106 Ohio App.3d 
128, 665 N.E.2d 693 (Cuyahoga 1995); In re Springfield Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., SERB 
94-020 (Oct. 26, 1994), aff'd, State Employment Relations Bd. v. Springfield Local Sch. Dist. Bd. 
of Educ., 104 Ohio App.3d 191, 661 N.E.2d 278 (Summit 1995). SERB's position was upheld on 
appeal, although the court stressed SERB's statutory authority to regulate the practice of those 
appearing before it, rather than the meaning of disciplinary rules involved.  106 Ohio App.3d 128, 
665 N.E.2d 693; 104 Ohio App.3d 191, 661 N.E.2d 278. 
The Rule 3.7 prohibition is directed to a lawyer "act[ing] as an advocate." The Code "employment" 
language could be read as barring any work on the litigation matter; at a minimum it barred any work 
involving presence in the courtroom. See State ex rel. Berry v. Henderson, No. CA 1892, 1983 
Ohio App. LEXIS 13323, at *3 (Clark Oct. 3, 1983) (affirming trial court finding that prosecutor's 
testimony would violate the advocate-witness rule and the order disqualifying him "from either active 
or passive participation in the courtroom at trial, so that he may have no influence upon the jury other 
than as a witness"). This would appear no longer to be the law under the advocate-at-trial formulation 
of Rule 3.7(a). Moreover, because the concerns underlying the prohibition focus on the conflict 
between serving as both advocate and witness, it makes sense that the prohibition be read as applying 
only to counsel taking an active role in the trial and to allow the lawyer/witness to engage in less 
visible support of the trial effort. Note that under the weight of Model Rule precedent, "unlike its 
Model Code predecessor," the identical language in MR 3.7 does not preclude a likely lawyer/witness 
from participating in pretrial work on the case or from participating in post-trial appeals. ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 377 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) (section 
entitled "Disqualification Generally Limited To Acting As Trial Counsel"). 
Advocate-witness rule's prohibitions - Acting as a witness: Assuming that a lawyer is or will be acting 
as an advocate at a trial, a problem arises only where the lawyer "is likely to be a necessary witness." 
Rule 3.7(a). Thus, for the prohibition to apply, it must be contemplated that the lawyer will likely be 
a witness in a matter or provide testimonial evidence. Even under the Code, nontestimonial input by a 
lawyer in a case, such as submitting briefs or presenting oral argument, was perfectly proper and did 
not invoke the advocate-witness prohibition. See Bank One Lima, N.A. v. Altenburger, 84 Ohio 
App.3d 250, 616 N.E.2d 954 (Van Wert 1992) (trial court reversed for treating lawyer's brief, 
identification of expert witnesses to be called, and identification of documents, as testimonial acts 
triggering disqualification for violation of advocate-witness prohibition). 
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As noted above, the concern of the Rule is not limited to the lawyer's being called to the stand to give 
oral testimony at trial. A lawyer's testimonial affidavit, for example, filed in connection with a 
summary judgment motion could trigger the Rule and, therefore, the need for disqualification or 
sanction. See, under the Code, Bank One Lima, N.A. supra (stating as general matter that lawyer 
affidavit is testimony, but not all such testimony justifies characterizing him as witness for 5-101 and 
5-102 purposes; reversing disqualification ruling where lawyer's affidavit only (1) stated that attached 
documents were received from opposing counsel and (2) identified expert witnesses). See generally 
ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 377 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) 
(collecting lawyer affidavit cases, including Bank One Lima). 
Advocate-witness rule's prohibitions - Likelihood of being called as "necessary" witness: The 
formulation under Rule 3.7(a) is both less and more restrictive than the former disciplinary rule. The 
"likely-to-be" called language is broader than the Code's test, under which the lawyer must have 
"known" or it must have been "obvious" that he or she would be called. On the other hand, the 
prohibition under 3.7(a) applies only if the lawyer is likely to be a "necessary" witness, i.e., one 
whose testimony is unobtainable elsewhere and is relevant and material. ABA, Annotated Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 375-76 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) (collecting cases). If the 
lawyer's testimony would be duplicative or obtainable elsewhere, disqualification is not called for. Id. 
at 362. See Brown v. Spectrum Networks, Inc., 180 Ohio App.3d 99, 2008 Ohio 6687, 904 
N.E.2d 576 (Hamilton) (using ABA test). 
To our knowledge the five cases thus far applying the advocate/witness rule as set forth in Rule 3.7 
are Rock v. Sanislo, 2009 Ohio 6913, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 5799 (Medina) (disqualification 
affirmed; testimony was material; attorney-client privilege not applicable; asserted exception (a)(3) 
not supported by record); Damron v. CSX Transp., Inc., 184 Ohio App.3d 183, 2009 Ohio 3638, 
920 N.E.2d 169 (Montgomery), Brown supra, Puritas Metal Prods., Inc. v. Cole, 2008 Ohio 4653, 
2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3900 (Lorain), and Horen v. Bd. of Educ., 174 Ohio App.3d 317, 2007 
Ohio 6883, 882 N.E.2d 14 (Lucas) (disqualification affirmed in context not involving 
self-representation; the self-representation aspect of Horen is discussed this section infra, at 
"Exceptions to the advocate-witness rule - Right to self-representation"). Damron, Brown, and 
Puritas reversed disqualification orders; both Brown and Puritas stressed the absence of the 
requisite evidentiary hearing to determine if the testimony is "necessary" (i.e., relevant and material, 
and unobtainable elsewhere) and if any of the exceptions in Rule 3.7(b)(1)-(3) apply. The court in 
Brown also applied the Mentor Lagoons v. Rubin (discussed this section infra at “Motions to 
disqualify and the advocate-witness rule”)  first step – that the initial inquiry is to determine whether 
the lawyer's testimony would be admissible (if not, that is the end of the inquiry). Brown further held 
that there had been no determination whether the clients would suffer substantial hardship if their 
counsel was disqualified. (Horen also held that the admissibility test was applicable under the Rules.) 
The Damron court found no evidentiary support for the position that the lawyer's testimony would be 
necessary; indeed, the record was unequivocally to the contrary. The court alternatively held that any 
such testimony by the lawyer would be undisputed in any event and therefore within the 3.7(a)(1) 
exception. 
Advocate-witness rule's prohibitions - Client consent to lawyer testimony: The language of the Rule 
focuses on issues and decisions largely independent of the client's desires. The question is whether the 
lawyer is likely to be called as a necessary witness. The Rules do not permit the client to consent to the 
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conflict and counsel to remain. See ABA, Annotated Rules of Professional Conduct 377 (7th ed. 
2011 (commentary) (citing cases imposing disqualification of lawyer whose testimony is deemed 
necessary, even if client willing to forgo such testimony, inasmuch as Rule designed to protect 
opposing parties and integrity of judicial system as a whole). As the Ohio Supreme Court stated with 
respect to the Code rule in 155 North High, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 423, 
427, 650 N.E.2d 869, 872 (1995) (footnote omitted): 
 DR 5-102(A), unlike other rules in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, makes no provision for client waiver of its application. 
This is so because the rule against a lawyer serving in the dual role of 
witness and advocate is designed to protect three distinct interests: 
those of the client, those of the adverse party, and that of ensuring the 
institutional integrity of the legal system as a whole. 
Nevertheless, because employment of the advocate-witness rule works to divest clients of the counsel 
of their choice, some courts, particularly in the disqualification context, have taken into account the 
client's interest in retaining counsel of choice in interpreting the underlying rule. 
For example, in Banque Arabe et Internationale D'Investissement v. Ameritrust Corp., 690 F. 
Supp. 607, 613 (S.D. Ohio 1988), the court, applying the OHCPR, noted that while the decision 
whether the lawyer ought to be called as a witness is an independent one, "the judgment of a 
sophisticated and informed client as to how best to conduct its case and protect its interests in 
determining to call or not to call counsel as a witness should be highly respected and accorded great 
deference." However, at least one Ohio court has questioned whether Banque Arabe remains good 
law. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Martin, No. 96 APE02-215, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3930 
(Franklin Sept. 12, 1996). 
In State v. Today's Bookstore, Inc., 86 Ohio App.3d 810, 621 N.E.2d 1283 (Montgomery 1993), 
the court reviewed a common pleas court ruling disqualifying, on the day of trial, a city prosecutor 
who was to be called as a defense witness. When the city said it could not substitute another attorney 
on the day of trial, the case was dismissed for want of prosecution. While the appellate court found the 
prosecutor should not have been called as a witness at all, the court went on to conclude that even if it 
had been proper to call the prosecutor as a witness for the defense, disqualification was not required. 
The court stated: 
Division (B) of the Rule [OH DR 5-102(B)] is obviously intended to 
protect the client. In this case, if the city of Dayton, a sophisticated 
litigant, was satisfied that the advantages of avoiding substituting trial 
counsel on the day of trial outweighed the disadvantages of having its 
trial counsel called to testify on behalf of the adverse party (on matters 
of dubious relevance to any issue in the case), that was a decision for 
the city to make. It would serve no useful purpose to "protect" the 
interests of the city by dismissing its prosecution with prejudice as a 
consequence of its refusal to substitute counsel when the worst that 
could have happened as a result of its decision to proceed with Popp as 
its counsel is that it might have suffered an adverse jury verdict as a 
consequence. To have insisted on protecting the city's interests by 
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threatening it with dismissal of its prosecution with prejudice was an 
abuse of discretion. 
86 Ohio App. at 825, 621 N.E.2d at 1293. 
Whether this approach survived 155 North High, Ltd., given the latter's clear statement disavowing 
a role for client consent, seems unlikely. See Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Martin, No. 96 
APE02-215, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3930 (Ohio App. Franklin Sept. 12, 1996) (finding that 155 
North High renders client consent irrelevant; issue under former disciplinary rule was whether 
lawyer "ought to testify" on client's behalf).  Accord A.B.B. Santec West, Inc. v. Weinsten, 2007 
Ohio 2116, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1981 (Cuyahoga) ("ought to testify" test "establishes an 
objective standard," id. at para. 23, citing Libby-Owens). 
One respect in which client consent does come into play under the Rule is set forth in Comment [6]. It 
notes that in determining whether it is permissible to act as an advocate in a trial where the lawyer will 
be a necessary witness, 
the lawyer also must consider that the dual role may give rise to a 
conflict of interest that will require compliance with Rule 1.7 or 1.9. . . . 
[Discussing examples of 1.7 and 1.9 conflicts in context of testimony 
otherwise falling within (a)(3) substantial-hardship exception.] 
Determining whether such a conflict exists is primarily the 
responsibility of the lawyer involved. If there is a conflict of interest, 
the lawyer must secure the client's informed consent, confirmed in 
writing. In some cases, the lawyer will be precluded from seeking the 
client's consent. See Rule 1.7[(c)]. 
Rule 3.7 cmt. [6] (emphasis, ellipsis, and bracketed material added). 
Exceptions to the advocate-witness rule - In general: Ohio Rule 3.7(a) recognizes three exceptions to 
the application of the advocate-witness prohibition to testimony by the lawyer. Thus, testimony will 
be permitted if any one or more of the following apply: 
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services 
rendered in the case; 
(3) the disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship 
on the client. 
Rule 3.7(a)(1)-(3). 
Exceptions to the advocate-witness rule - Testimony on uncontested matters: The first exception 
recognizes that sometimes a lawyer's testimony, while necessary, will be so uncontroversial that the 
harm the advocate-witness rule seeks to deter will not arise from the lawyer's assumption of the dual 
roles of advocate and witness. See Rule 3.7 cmt. [3] (ambiguities in dual role "purely theoretical"). 
925
Ohio Legal Ethics 3.7  
  
Under these circumstances, the client's interest in being represented by counsel of choice takes 
precedence. For example, under the Code, where an attorney secured an affidavit from a mortgage 
loan company's appraiser in connection with a suit by a buyer against a seller for a material defect, 
and the buyer later sought to sue the appraiser, the lawyer could properly represent the buyer. The 
ethics committee concluded that even if the lawyer were called to testify about obtaining the affidavit, 
the testimony was likely to relate solely to an uncontested matter or a matter of formality, for which 
there was no reason to believe that substantial evidence would be entered in opposition. Under these 
circumstances, rejection of employment or withdrawal was not required. Toledo Bar Ass'n Op. 83-1 
(Nov. 8, 1983); accord Lucas v. Barrett, No. 94 CA1998, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5203 (Ross Nov. 
16, 1994) (testifying that an affidavit was notarized in accordance with law falls within formality 
exception); Univ. Carnegie Med. Partners Ass'n v. Weiss & Kramer, Inc., No. 65422, 1994 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 2690 (Cuyahoga June 23, 1994) (in action for rent and other charges, trial-court 
decision not to disqualify the lawyer whose testimony went to formalities of lease agreement and to 
points already conceded by opponent, thereby satisfying former OH DR 5-102(A) exceptions, was 
not abuse of discretion). [Note that the fourth exception under the Code, testifying to matters of 
formality, has not been expressly carried forward into Rule 3.7(a). It is largely, if not entirely, 
subsumed by the division (a)(1) exception for uncontested issues.] The Second District Court of 
Appeals utilized the 3.7(a)(1) uncontested issue exception as an alternate basis for reversing the trial 
court's disqualification order in Damron v. CSX Transp., Inc., 184 Ohio App.3d 183, 2009 Ohio 
3638, 920 N.E.2d 169. 
Exceptions to the advocate-witness rule - Testimony concerning the value of legal services rendered: 
The second exception in division (a) is based primarily on notions of efficiency. See Rule 3.7 cmt. [3] 
(exception avoids need for second trial with new counsel to resolve issue). In cases in which attorney 
fees may be awarded, testimony is necessary to establish a right to a particular amount of 
compensation. This phase of the litigation typically arises after the case in chief has been resolved. To 
require new counsel to come into the case at the attorney-fee stage would be too costly. Further, 
because the issues involved are, to a large degree, collateral to the merits of the case in chief, the 
concerns that underlie the advocate-witness rule are less likely to be implicated. 
In so testifying, the lawyer may need to divulge client confidences. Ohio Rule 1.6(b)(4) recognizes 
an exception to client confidentiality duties where "necessary to establish a claim . . . on behalf of the 
lawyer," which includes actions to collect a fee. See section 1.6:630. 
Exceptions to the advocate-witness rule - Substantial hardship to the client: The third and most 
controversial exception in Rule 3.7(a) applies if refusing to allow the lawyer to remain as trial 
counsel "would work a substantial hardship on the client." Rule 3.7(a)(3).  "This exception requires 'a 
balancing . . . between the interests of the client and those of the tribunal and the opposing party.' 
Model Rule 3.7 cmt. [4]." ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 379 (7th ed. 
2011) (commentary) (ellipses in original). 
Comment [4] sheds further light on the inquiry to be made: 
Whether the tribunal is likely to be misled or the opposing party is 
likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the 
importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the 
probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other 
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witnesses. Even if there is a risk of such prejudice, in determining 
whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to 
the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. 
Ohio Rule 3.7 cmt. [4]. 
The ABA Annotated Rules provide additional insight by noting several factors reflected in the case 
law that will be considered on the "substantial hardship" issue, including: the amount of time and 
money the client has invested in the lawyer; the foreseeability of the need for the lawyer's testimony; 
and the likely difficulty in obtaining substitute counsel. ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 379-80 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). 
Exceptions to the advocate-witness rule - Right to self-representation: A potential conflict exists 
between the right to self-representation and the advocate-witness rule where a lawyer seeks to 
represent himself in an action and also testify as a witness in the proceeding. The United States 
Supreme Court has suggested, in dictum, that this situation presents potential ethical difficulties that 
might make the lawyer's testifying inappropriate.  Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). See generally 
Toledo Bar Ass'n Op. 86-7 (Mar. 12, 1986) (recognizing lawyer's right to represent himself in 
probate court proceedings, but advising that it would be imprudent to do so in light of concerns of 
advocate-witness rule). Nevertheless, under the Code, Ohio courts found a right to testify in such 
circumstances and concluded that the practice did not run afoul of the advocate-witness rule. 155 
North High, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 93 AP-45, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4815, at *16 
(Franklin Sept. 28, 1993) ("Of course, if an attorney is representing himself, then he has a right to do 
so and to testify and hence, DR 5-102(A) could not serve to prohibit him from assuming such dual 
roles"), aff'd on other grounds, 72 Ohio St.3d 423, 650 N.E.2d 869 (1995). But cf. Morrison v. 
Gugle, 142 Ohio App.3d 244, 755 N.E.2d 404 (Franklin 2001) (reversing trial-court refusal to 
disqualify testifying lawyer from acting as Gugle's attorney where lawyer was also a defendant). See 
ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 380 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) (stating 
that MR 3.7(a), substantively identical to Ohio Rule 3.7(a), does not bar the pro se lawyer-litigant 
from testifying). 
So far as we are aware, the first Ohio case applying a Rule of Professional Conduct, in this instance 
Rule 3.7, is Horen v. Bd. of Educ., 174 Ohio App.3d 317, 2007 Ohio 6883, 882 N.E.2d 14 (Lucas).  
One of the issues in Horen was whether one of the plaintiffs, a lawyer, could represent herself while 
testifying to substantive facts in the case.  The court of appeals held that she could and reversed the 
trial court's disqualification order in this respect.  (Although the court said that it could not find any 
other Ohio appellate court decision addressing the issue, we believe that the 155 North High opinion 
by the Tenth District Court of Appeals, cited above, does so and is in accord with the result in Horen 
on the self-representation issue.  Also in accord is the opinion by federal Magistrate Judge Kemp in 
Cooke v. AT&T, No. 2:05-cv-374, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32489 (S.D. Ohio, May 23, 2006). 
The other issue in Horen was whether trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying, on 
advocate-witness grounds, the plaintiff lawyer from representing her husband and their child, when 
"it can be anticipated that [Mrs.] Horen will be providing substantial factual testimony that is central 
to the claims in this proceeding."  Id. at para. 25.  The appellate court ruled in this instance that there 
was no abuse of discretion; the only one of the three express exceptions set forth in the Rule that could 
be applicable, said the court, was the substantial hardship provision in Rule 3.7(a)(3), and plaintiffs, 
927
Ohio Legal Ethics 3.7  
  
who bore the burden of proof on this issue, presented no evidence of such hardship or, looking to prior 
case law under the Code, the legal expertise constituting "distinctive value" under former DR 
5-101(B)(4), as read by the Supreme Court's opinion in 155 N. High, 72 Ohio St.3d 423, 429, 650 
N.E.2d 869, 873-74.  Preliminary to reaching this conclusion, the Horen court of appeals also 
reviewed prior decisions holding that a court faced with an advocate/witness disqualification issue 
must apply a two-part analysis: first, to determine whether the lawyer's testimony is admissible and, if 
so, determining whether disqualification is necessary and whether any of the exceptions apply.  The 
burden of proving disqualification is on the movant; the burden of proving that an exception applies is 
on the lawyer claiming the exception.  "All of these principles are applicable to an analysis of the 
application of the new rules."  Horen at para. 22. Accord Brown v. Spectrum Networks, Inc., 180 
Ohio App.3d 99, 2008 Ohio 6687, 904 N.E.2d 576, at para. 13. Contra, as to the need for 
disqualification where a party/attorney is also representing his or her spouse, is Magistrate Kemp's 
opinion in Cooke v. AT&T supra (finding the result of disqualification such as that in Horen results 
from a "wooden" application of DR 5-101(B) and 5-102(A); disqualification motion denied). 
Motions to disqualify and the advocate-witness rule: As discussed above, subject to limited 
exceptions, Rule 3.7(a) prohibits a lawyer from acting as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is 
likely to be a necessary witness. The issue often comes to a head through a disqualification motion 
seeking the removal of counsel on the grounds that the lawyer's continuing involvement in the case 
would violate the advocate-witness rule. In Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 31 Ohio St.3d 256, 510 
N.E.2d 379 (1987), the Ohio Supreme Court sought to provide trial courts with guidance in 
addressing this problem: 
As a first step, a court must determine whether the proposed testimony is admissible, without regard 
to any ethical violation that the attorney's testifying might involve. Mentor Lagoons v. Rubin 
(syllabus two). If the testimony would not be admissible, that ends the inquiry.  
If the testimony is admissible, the lawyer involved may move to withdraw or opposing counsel may 
move to disqualify the testifying lawyer, or the court may do so sua sponte. The court must then 
determine whether any of the exceptions to the advocate-witness prohibition apply "and, thus, 
whether the attorney may testify and continue to provide representation." Mentor Lagoons v. Rubin 
(syllabus two); see Hall v. Tucker, 169 Ohio App.3d 520, 2006 Ohio 5895, 863 N.E.2d 1064 
(Jackson) (reversing disqualification order where trial court, contrary to first step of Rubin analysis, 
failed to determine admissibility of lawyers' testimony); A.B.B. Santec v. Weinsten, 2007 Ohio 
2116, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1981 (Cuyahoga) (likewise reversing disqualification where trial 
court failed to determine admissibility of lawyers' testimony and did not consider applicability of 
exceptions to former OH DR 5-102). Without an applicable exception, disqualification is appropriate, 
for it would be unethical for the trial court judge to participate knowingly in what may be a 
disciplinary violation.  Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Teague, 71 Ohio App.3d 719, 595 N.E.2d 392 
(Lake 1991). In making these determinations, the trial court is not overstepping its bounds by 
deciding whether a disciplinary rule will be violated (an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Ohio Supreme Court), but rather is preventing a potential violation through the exercise of its inherent 
authority to regulate practice before it and to protect the integrity of its proceedings. Rubin (syllabus 
two). Cf. In re City of Cleveland, SERB 94-021, 3-133 (Oct. 26, 1994) ("SERB must disqualify a 
lawyer or a law firm if it is necessary to do so in order to prevent a breach of the [OHCPR] by the 
lawyer or law firm, especially where failure to do so may result in serious questions regarding due 
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process or the integrity of the proceedings."), aff'd, State Employment Relations Bd. v. City of 
Cleveland, 106 Ohio App.3d 128, 665 N.E.2d 693 (Cuyahoga 1995). If the testimony is admissible 
and even if not within any of the exceptions to the advocate-witness rule, the court must allow the 
testimony; refusing to admit the testimony, solely on the ground that it would violate the 
advocate-witness rule, is prejudicial error. Rubin (syllabus one) and 31 Ohio St.3d at 258-59, 510 
N.E.2d at 381-82. There would appear to be no reason why these results would not continue to be the 
law under Rule 3.7 as well. 
In subsequent decisions, lower courts struggled with how to implement the Supreme Court's mandate 
in Mentor Lagoons v. Rubin. The most extensive discussion is contained in the court of appeals' 
decision in Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Teague, 71 Ohio App.3d 719, 595 N.E.2d 392 (Lake 1991). 
In Teague, the appellate court held that a trial court must hold a hearing to determine the questions the 
Court declared in Rubin to be relevant when an advocate-witness issue arises. Accord, e.g., Ross v. 
Ross, 94 Ohio App.3d 123, 130, 640 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Cuyahoga 1994) ("[I]t is a reversible error 
for the trial court to summarily disqualify an attorney solely on a paper allegation without a hearing."). 
Contra Univ. Carnegie Med. Partners Ass'n v. Weiss & Kramer, Inc., No. 65422, 1994 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 2690, at *4 (Cuyahoga June 23, 1994) ("[A] trial court is not required to hold a hearing on a 
motion to disqualify [on advocate-witness grounds].").  After reviewing the Ross and Carnegie 
decisions, the court in Hall v. Tucker, 169 Ohio App.3d 520, 2006 Ohio 5895, 863 N.E.2d 1064 
(Jackson), concluded that on a motion to disqualify the trial court "must conduct some form of 
hearing," either oral or on paper, if sufficient evidence can be submitted by the latter route.  Id. at 
paras. 23-24. As noted above, the cases addressing this issue under Rule 3.7 have held that a hearing 
is mandatory. Brown, 180 Ohio App.3d 99; Puritas Metals, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3900.  
Following the hearing point, the Teague court gets into the byzantine differences arising under 
former OH DR 5-102 as to whether the testimony is on behalf of the client or the opposing party. 
Suffice it to say for present purposes that testimony on behalf of the client "creates a rebuttable 
presumption against employment . . . . [T]his situation is inherently different from that under DR 
5-102(B) [called to testify by the opposing party], in which the presumption is in favor of continuing 
employment." 71 Ohio App.3d 719, 724, 595 N.E.2d 392, 395. (It is our belief that this distinction 
has been abolished by the Rules, since the former disciplinary-rule language on which it was based 
has been eliminated. If a rebuttable presumption survives at all, it is one against acting "as an advocate 
at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness," subject to the Rule 3.7(a)(1)-(3) 
exceptions. Of course, it must be remembered that, presumption or not, there is now no imputation to 
other lawyers in the firm, even if the advocate is likely to be called as a necessary witness. Rule 3.7(b); 
see section 3.7:300.) 
Given the substantial disruption that granting a motion to disqualify may cause a party, opposing 
litigants may be tempted to raise such motions as a mere litigation tactic. A court considering a 
disqualification motion should be sensitive to these concerns, particularly where disqualification is 
based on opposing counsel's attempt to call the lawyer. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court has 
suggested that caution in invoking the advocate-witness rule is appropriate: 
 This case does not deal with the issue of an attorney's testimony 
against his or her client (DR 5-102[B]). Courts will closely scrutinize 
this situation because an adverse party may try to call an opposing 
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lawyer as a witness simply to disqualify that lawyer, thus creating an 
unfair tactical advantage, or to harass opposing counsel. 
155 North High, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 423, 426 n. 2, 650 N.E.2d 869, 871 n.2 
(1995). See Baker v. BP Am., Inc., 768 F.Supp. 208, 213 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (in relying on OHCPR 
to disqualify attorney under advocate-witness rule, court stated: "This Court recognizes that motions 
to disqualify counsel should be considered with extreme caution, in view of the litigant's interest in 
retaining counsel of the litigant's choice, and the danger that the opposing party might use a motion to 
disqualify to achieve tactical advantage"). As the Eighth District Court of Appeals stated in the 
advocate-witness context: 
 We cannot overemphasize the fact that in addition to 
considering the elements of DR 5-102 and the exceptions in DR 
5-101(B)(1) through (4) in a disqualification hearing, trial courts have 
an obligation to the judicial system to stop any attempt by counsel to 
use the motion to disqualify as a trial tactic to delay proceedings, 
deprive the opposing party of counsel of his choice, or as a tool to 
harass, embarrass, and frustrate the opponent. 
Ross v. Ross, 94 Ohio App.3d 123, 132, 640 N.E.2d 265, 271 (Cuyahoga 1994). See generally 
ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 374 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) 
(discussing tactical abuse of disqualification motions). 
If counsel needs to withdraw because he or she will be called as a witness, time usually should be 
given for the client to obtain new counsel. However, where the need to secure new counsel has been 
evident for some time but the client has failed to act, it is not error to proceed with scheduled hearings, 
rather than granting a continuance, particularly if the client's interests parallel those of others in the 
proceeding who are represented by counsel.  De Capite v. Cotton's Garage, Inc., Nos. 45949, 45969, 
1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 14740 (Cuyahoga July 21, 1983). 
The law under the former disciplinary rules: Although Rule 3.7 has adopted the Model Rule approach 
and has jettisoned the arcane distinctions in the Code regarding commencing and continuing 
employment, and whether the testimony would be on behalf of or other than on behalf of the client, 
and, if the latter, whether the testimony is prejudicial to the client (see former DR 5-101(B) and 
5-102), the fact remains that the Code provisions will continue to be applicable to all cases involving 
conduct occurring prior to February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules. See Form of Citation, 
Effective Date, Application (b). Because of this, and because the former rules differ so significantly 
from Rule 3.7, we have retained a summary discussion of the law under the former disciplinary rules, 
at least for the time being. That discussion follows. 
Former advocate-witness rule's prohibitions - Accepting employment in contemplated or pending 
litigation: While the basic concerns underlying the advocate-witness problem remain the same under 
both regimes, the former disciplinary rule drew a distinction between accepting employment and 
continuing employment already begun. 
Under former DR 5-101(B), a lawyer could not accept employment in contemplated or pending 
litigation if the lawyer "knows or it is obvious" that the lawyer or a lawyer in the firm ought to be 
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called as a witness, irrespective of by whom. The rule then articulated four exceptions to that general 
rule; they are discussed later in this section. 
The 5-101(B) prohibition arose at this stage only if the lawyer knew or it was obvious that a lawyer in 
the firm "ought to be called as a witness." The mere possibility that one may be called as a witness 
was not enough. On the other hand, the test did not require that a lawyer in the firm in fact be called as 
a witness, only that one ought to be called. See Gantzos v. Jefferson Ins. Co., No. L-85-078, 1985 
Ohio App. LEXIS 8691 (Lucas Sept. 6, 1985).  As the Supreme Court stated in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. McNamee, 119 Ohio St.3d 269, 2008 Ohio 3883, 893 N.E.2d 490, in sanctioning 
respondent for violation of, inter alia, DR 5-101(B), respondent continued to represent all sides in a 
matter when it went to arbitration "despite the likelihood that he would be called as a witness."  Id. at 
para. 32. 
 
In assessing whether a lawyer "ought to be called as a witness," the court could consider whether the 
lawyer's testimony is merely cumulative and could be presented through another witness.  
Schropshire v. City of Englewood, 92 Ohio App.3d 168, 634 N.E.2d 657 (Montgomery 1993). In 
contrast, where the testimony of the lawyer was central to the controversy, the lawyer "ought" to be 
called. See 155 North High, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 423, 650 N.E.2d 869 (1995); 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Collins, 71 Ohio St.3d 310, 643 N.E.2d 1082 (1994). To the 
extent that the lawyer would testify on behalf of the client, the disciplinary rules applied the same 
"ought" standard, regardless of whether the issue arose pre-retention (5-101(B)) or post-retention 
(5-102(A)).   
Former advocate-witness rule's prohibitions - Continuing employment in contemplated or pending 
litigation - In general: Particularly in complex matters, the need for the lawyer's testimony might not 
be apparent at the inception of the employment such that acceptance of the employment would be 
barred under former DR 5-101(B). Rather, only as the case unfolded did the likelihood of the lawyer's 
testifying become apparent. Former DR 5-102(A) and (B) addressed the circumstances under which 
counsel had to withdraw after accepting employment in contemplated or pending litigation. Unlike 
5-101(B), these provisions differentiated between the lawyer serving as a witness on behalf of the 
client (5-102(A)) and the lawyer called to testify other than on behalf of the client (5-102(B)). 
Former advocate-witness rule's prohibitions - Continuing employment in contemplated or pending 
litigation - Lawyer as witness for the client: Where the lawyer's testimony would be on the client's 
behalf, the restriction on continuing as counsel, for the most part, mirrored the language of the 
pre-employment prohibition. Once the lawyer learned, or it became obvious, that a lawyer in the firm 
"ought to be called as a witness on behalf of the client" the lawyer and the firm had to withdraw from 
representation of the client in the trial, unless one of the four exceptions recognized in DR 5-101(B) 
was met. (Where the lawyer informed the court that he would not testify on behalf of the client, the 
rule was inapplicable.  Vinci v. Ceraolo, 79 Ohio App.3d 640, 607 N.E.2d 1079 (Cuyahoga 1992) 
(applying former OH DR 5-102(A)). Compare Karaman v. Pickerel, Schaefer & Ebeling Co., 
2008 Ohio 4139, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 3498 (Montgomery) (affirming disqualification under 
DR 5-102(A), even though "appellants were steadfast that [their lawyer] would not be called to testify 
on their behalf"; no abuse of discretion under objective "ought-to-be-called" test, id. at para. 22).) 
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The language in DR 5-102(A) varied somewhat from the language regarding the pre-employment 
situation, but the import of the differences is not clear. First, 5-102(A) required withdrawal when the 
lawyer "learns" or it was obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to testify. Pre-employment, DR 
5-101(B) required the lawyer to decline employment where he or she "knows" or it was obvious that a 
lawyer in the firm ought to be called as a witness. Second, 5-102(A) dealt only with the situation 
where the lawyer ought to be called as a witness for the client and left to DR 5-102(B), and a different 
standard, the situation in which the lawyer will be called to testify for another party. The 
pre-employment standard in DR 5-101(B) made no distinction as to on whose behalf the lawyer 
would testify. Third, 5-102(A) provided that if the advocate-witness problem arises, the lawyer 
involved must "withdraw from the conduct of the trial" and "his or her firm, if any, shall not continue 
representation in the trial." The pre-employment standard used the broader term "litigation" to 
describe the area in which the lawyer and lawyers in her firm could not work. At least one Ohio court 
read the term "trial" in former OH DR 5-102(A) to encompass all stages of the litigation. 
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Martin, No. 96 APE02-215, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3930 (Franklin 
Sept. 12, 1996). 
Former advocate-witness rule's prohibitions - Continuing employment in contemplated or pending 
litigation - Lawyer testimony not on behalf of the client: Post-retention, a different standard applied if 
the lawyer was to be called to testify other than on behalf of the lawyer's client. DR 5-102(B). The 
mere fact that a lawyer learned, or it was obvious, that a lawyer in the firm might be called as a 
witness under these circumstances did not necessitate withdrawal. Rather, the lawyer could remain in 
the litigation until it was "apparent" that the testimony "is or may be prejudicial to the client." See, e.g., 
Hall v. Tucker, 169 Ohio App.3d 520, 2006 Ohio 5895, 863 N.E.2d 1064 (Jackson); Crockett v. 
Crockett, No. 02AP-482, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 567 (Franklin).  
 
3.7:300  An Affiliated Lawyer as Advocate (Imputed Disqualification) 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.7(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.7(b) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:510 
ALI-LGI § 108 
Wolfram § 7.5 
Ohio Rule 3.7(b), like MR 3.7(b) and in direct contrast to former DR 5-101(B) and 5-102, does not 
automatically impute the advocate-witness prohibition to other members of the testifying lawyer's 
firm. It provides as follows: 
 A lawyer may act as an advocate in a trial in which another 
lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless 
precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or 1.9. 
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Comment [7] further states that if "the testifying lawyer also would be disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9 
from representing the client in the matter, other lawyers in the firm will be precluded from doing so by 
Rule 1.10, unless the client gives informed consent under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7." Ohio 
Rule 3.7 cmt. [7]. 
 
3.7:400  The Advocate-Witness Rule and Government Lawyers 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.7(c) 
Background References 
None 
Ohio Rule 3.7(c), a provision found in neither the Model Rule nor the OHCPR, states: 
 A government lawyer participating in a case shall not testify or 
offer the testimony of another lawyer in the same government agency, 
except where division (a) applies or where permitted by law. 
Comment [8] adds that "the ethical reasons for restrictions in serving as an advocate and a witness 
apply with equal force to lawyers in government offices and lawyers in private practice." The 
comment goes on, however, to say that "[d]ivision (c) reflects the difference between the 
relationships among salaried lawyers working in government agencies and relationships between law 
firm lawyers where financial ties among the partners and associates in the firm are intertwined." This 
"difference" is not further explained, either in the comment or in the Task Force Model Code 
Comparison to Rule 3.7. Division (c) seems counterintuitive in any event. Wouldn't the "difference" 
in relationships, if anything, point to a more lenient application of the advocate-witness rule for 
governmental lawyers? Division (c) does just the opposite -- the nonimputation rule among law-firm 
lawyers does not apply; instead, the general rule is imputation, unless the division (a) exceptions 
apply or where "permitted . . . by common law" (presumably a reference to the Coleman rule, 
discussed in the next paragraph). Ohio Rule 3.7 cmt. [8]. This approach also appears to be out of step 
with the law generally; see ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 381 (7th ed. 
2011) (commentary), which states that "[w]hen the result would be to bar an entire government 
office from prosecuting cases, courts are even more reluctant to impute the disqualification of a 
lawyer-witness to other lawyers in the office," citing cases. 
One final footnote: In the Model Rule Comparison to Rule 3.7, the Task Force purports to quote 
from State v. Coleman, 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 544 N.E.2d 622 (1989), in support of the accurate 
statement that while generally to be avoided, the testimony of a prosecutor may be permitted in 
extraordinary circumstances. Lest the reader, like some of us, be confused by the quote (which omits 
a rather important word), the actual language of Coleman is that "a prosecuting attorney should avoid 
being a witness in a criminal prosecution, but where it is a complex proceeding [etc.]," he or she may 
do so.  Id. at 302, 544 N.E.2d at 628. 
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Ohio Rule 3.8 imposes three special duties on a prosecutor in a criminal case. They are discussed in 
the sections beginning with section 3.8:200. 
For a review of the special duties of prosecutors nationally, see Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct 
(ABA/BNA) §§ 61:601-:630 (1997). 
With regard to unsuccessful argument by federal prosecutors in the 1980s that they were not subject 
to state ethics rules, see discussion in ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 387 
(7th ed. 2011) (commentary) and in section 4.2:220 infra. 
  
3.8:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.8 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.8 
  
3.8:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 3.8 differs from the Model Rule in the following respects: 
The introductory language has been changed from "The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:" to "The 
prosecutor in a criminal case shall not do any of the following:". 
Division (a) deletes "refrain from prosecuting" at the outset and substitutes "pursue or prosecute". 
Divisions (b) and (c) have been reserved; paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Model Rule are not included. 
In division (d) "fail to" has been added at the outset; "fail to" has been added before "disclose"; "and 
to the tribunal" has been deleted after "defense"; "an" has been substituted for "a protective" before 
"order". 
In division (e), the word "not" has been deleted at the outset; "all of the following apply" has been 
added after "believes". 
Division (f) has been reserved; paragraph (f) of the Model Rule has not been included. 
  
3.8:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.8(a): DR 7-103(A). 
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The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.8(d): DR 7-103(B), EC 7-13. 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.8(e): None. 
[The Table also refers to division (g); there is no division (g).] 
  
3.8:200  The Decision to Charge 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.8(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.8(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.64 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:601 
ALI-LGL § 97 
Wolfram § 13.10.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.64 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 3.8(a) precludes a prosecutor in a criminal case from "pursu[ing] or prosecut[ing] a charge 
that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause." To do so is an abuse of authority and is 
subject to sanction, as it was under former DR 7-103(A). See Stark County Bar Ass'n v. Russell, 25 
Ohio St.3d 124, 495 N.E.2d 430 (1986) (public prosecutor disciplined for threatening criminal 
prosecution to gain advantage in civil matter in violation of OH DR 7-105(A) and for initiating 
criminal proceedings unsupported by probable cause in violation of OH DR 7-103(A)). A public 
prosecutor can proceed in good faith, however, to prosecute a case to conclusion even while 
recognizing that acquittal is likely, as long as the case is supported by probable cause.  State v. 
Comstock, 79 Ohio App.3d 414, 607 N.E.2d 520 (Lucas 1992). Accord State v. Wright, No. 94- 
J-33, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3482 (Jefferson Aug. 15, 1996). But note that under OH Crim R 
12(K), if an appeal by the state from an order suppressing or excluding evidence results in an 
affirmance, the defendant cannot be prosecuted for the same offense unless there is a showing of 
newly discovered evidence that could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered prior to the 
filing of the appeal. 
The language of division (a), directing that the prosecutor shall not "pursue or prosecute" a charge 
known to be unsupported by reasonable cause, clearly includes but reaches beyond the focus of 
former DR 7-103(A) upon "institut[ing] or caus[ing] to be instituted" such a charge. Obviously, the 
pursuit or prosecution of an action does not end with its institution, and thus the prohibition applies 
936
Ohio Legal Ethics Rule 3.8 
  
throughout the case, from beginning to end, including grand jury proceedings. As the Rule recognizes, 
there is simply no justification for proceeding in any phase of the case if the prosecutor "knows" that 
probable cause is lacking. Accord Comment [1], discussing the prosecutor's role as "a minister of 
justice," whose responsibilities "carr[y] with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is 
accorded justice and that guilt is decided on the basis of sufficient evidence." Rule 3.8 cmt. [1]. The 
ABA Model Code Comparison to Rule 3.8 further notes that division (a) "is expanded to prohibit 
either the pursuit or prosecution of unsupported charges and, thus, would include grand jury 
proceedings." See also former OH EC 7-14 (government lawyer should "refrain from ...continuing 
litigation that is obviously unfair"). 
An eloquent summation of the special ethical obligations of a prosecutor was penned by Justice 
Sutherland in Berger v. United States, 259 U.S. 78 (1935) – the prosecutor 
is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a 
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as 
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall 
be done. 
Id. at 88. 
  
3.8:300  Efforts to Assure Accused's Right to Counsel 
Primary Ohio References 
none 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.8(b) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:605 
ALI/LGL § 97 
Wolfram § 13.10 
There is no Ohio Rule 3.8(b). MR 3.8(b) obligates the prosecutor to 
make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of 
the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been 
given reasonable opportunity to retain counsel. 
The explanation given by the Task Force in the ABA Model Rule Comparison to Rule 3.8 states 
that division (b) "is deleted because ensuring that the defendant is advised about the right to counsel is 
a police and judicial function and because Rule 4.3 sets forth the duties of all lawyers in dealing with 
unrepresented persons." We think that this explanation is unpersuasive and that the omission is 
unfortunate. Even though a Miranda notice may be the business of the police, surely it does no harm 
to engage prosecutors in assuring that the constitutional mandate is satisfied. As for Rule 4.3, the 
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obligations there stated hardly satisfy the special responsibilities operative in this particular criminal 
context. Finally, the deletion of division (b) results in a missed opportunity, taken in many Model 
Rule states, to further safeguard an accused's right to counsel. 
  
3.8:400  Seeking Waivers of Rights from Unrepresented Defendants 
Primary Ohio References 
none 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.8(c) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:611 
ALI-LGL § 97 
Wolfram § 13.10 
As is the case with MR 3.8(b), MR 3.8(c) has been deleted; in the words of the Task Force, "because 
of its breadth and potential adverse impact on defendants who seek continuances that would be 
beneficial to their case or who seek to participate in diversion programs." Model Rule Comparison 
to Rule 3.8. With all due respect, this reason for rejecting the Model Rule is wanting. The Model Rule 
does not constrain prosecutors from securing such waivers where the accused seeks the waiver, 
particularly where it is done for a legitimate strategic reason. If necessary, one would have thought 
that these benefits could easily have been preserved as exceptions, while retaining the obligation not 
to seek from an unrepresented defendant "a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a 
preliminary hearing." MR 3.8(c). Ohio is one of only four Model Rule states that have deleted 
paragraph (c). 
While we have found no OHCPR authority directly on point, there is one Board of Commissioner's 
ethics opinion condemning comparable conduct by a prosecutor, even where the defendant was 
represented. Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-6, 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 7 (Dec. 7, 2001). 
In Opinion 2001-6, the Board opined that it is unethical "for a prosecutor to negotiate and a criminal 
defense attorney to advise a defendant to enter a plea agreement that waives the defendant's appellate 
or post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel or prosecutorial misconduct." Id. at 
*1. On the waiver of prosecutorial misconduct aspect, the Board, quoting former OH DR 7-103 and 
OH EC 7-13, had this to say: 
Prosecutorial misconduct may involve violations of disciplinary rules 
that may come to the judge's attention and be reported to disciplinary 
authorities pursuant to Canon 3(D)(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct 
[former OH CJC Canon 3(D)(2), now CJC Rule 2.15(B)] and DR 
1-103(A). A prosecutor should not attempt through a plea agreement to 
excuse himself or herself from following disciplinary rules governing a 
prosecutor's behavior. A prosecutor does not serve justice by 
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attempting to shield his or her past or future misconduct from scrutiny 
by obtaining a criminal defendant's waiver of appellate or 
post-conviction claims based on allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct. This Board's view is that waiver of appellate or 
post-conviction claims of prosecutorial misconduct is an improper 
attempt to insulate the prosecutor from his or her duties under DR 
7-102, 7-103, and DR 1-102(A)(5) of the Ohio Code of Professional 
Responsibility. 
Id. at *6-7. Compare Burke v. Johnson, 167 F.3d 276 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of § 
1983 action against police; enforcing oral release/dismissal agreement entered into by county 
prosecutor and defense counsel on behalf of criminal defendant, whereby defendant agreed to plead 
guilty to reduced charges in exchange for release of any civil claims against police arising from arrest; 
preponderance of evidence demonstrated that agreement was entered into voluntarily, defendant was 
represented by experienced counsel who discussed agreement with defendant, and agreement was 
read into record by prosecutor before judge at plea hearing, was stipulated to on record by defense 
counsel, and was agreed to on record by defendant; standards for enforcement of such agreements set 
forth in Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987), satisfied). As to release/dismissal 
agreements, see also ABA, Annotated Rules of Professional Conduct 389 (7th ed. 2011) 
(commentary). 
  
3.8:500  Disclosing Evidence Favorable to the Accused 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.8(d) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.8(d) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.65 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:606 
ALI-LGL § 97 
Wolfram § 13.10.5 
The material in this section is excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide 
to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.65 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 3.8(d) prohibits prosecutors involved in criminal litigation from failing to make timely 
disclosure to the defense of exculpatory evidence, known to the prosecutors, that tends to negate the 
guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, from failing to 
disclose to the defense all known unprivileged mitigating information, except where the prosecutor is 
relieved of his 3.8(d) obligations by an order of the tribunal. As stated in Comment [3], this exception 
allows a prosecutor to seek such an order if disclosure of information to the defense could result in 
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substantial harm to an individual or the public interest. Rule 3.8 cmt. [3] (See also OH Crim R 
16(B)(1)(f), providing for comparable disclosure in discovery, on motion of defendant. For a case in 
which an argument under OH Crim R 16(B)(1(f) was rejected, see State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d 
646, 693 N.E.2d 246 (1998) (rule's language "material either to guilt or punishment" has same 
meaning as identical language in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and is limited to 
exculpatory, mitigating, or impeachment evidence; defendant's attempt to use Rule 16 to obtain 
evidence of discriminatory prosecution not within stated limits).)  
The interrelationship between Crim. R. 16, Brady, and DR 7-103(B) (the Code precursor to Rule 
3.8(d)) was at the core of the decision in Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 124 Ohio St.3d 
415, 2010 Ohio 282, 923 N.E.2d 125. The Court held that conduct could not be violative of DR 
7-103(B) unless it violated either Brady or Ohio Crim. R. 16. Thus, the charges against the 
prosecutor-respondent in Kellog-Martin were dismissed, inasmuch as she had no legal duty under 
either Brady or Rule 16 to disclose to the defense certain impeachment evidence. Chief Justice 
Moyer entered a lengthy dissent. 
Like the Rule 3.8(d) obligation to make disclosure to "the defense," DR 7-103(B) mentioned only 
disclosure to "counsel for the defendant." However, there is at least one case that can be read as 
extending the 7-103(B) disclosure requirement to judges and tribunals as well. Thus, in Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Jones, 66 Ohio St.3d 369, 613 N.E.2d 178 (1993), a prosecutor who found 
previously lost evidence was suspended for six months for failing to deliver the evidence to the court 
and to tell defense counsel and the judge that the evidence had been found. The uncertainty in the case 
arises from the fact that multiple disciplinary rules were found to have been violated (including 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and the Court does not clearly allocate the 
misconduct to a particular rule. Without referring to the Jones case, the Task Force in its Model Code 
Comparison to Rule 3.8 states that division (d) "is modified [by deleting "and to the tribunal" with 
respect to mitigation evidence] to comport with Ohio law." The situation is further confounded by the 
fact that the missing evidence in Jones could have gone either to negation of guilt or mitigation or 
both. All in all, particularly given the Task Force's statement, the most likely interpretation is that the 
prosecutor's 3.8(d) duty is to defense counsel, period. (The failure to so advise the court may well 
implicate other rules, such as Rule 3.3 ("Candor Toward the Tribunal").) Failure to disclose to 
defense counsel evidence that the alleged victim suffered from a multiple personality disorder also 
violated the former Code provision.  State v. Cotton, 113 Ohio App.3d 125, 680 N.E.2d 657 
(Hamilton 1996) (Painter, J. concurring; calling on the prosecutor to study OH DR 7-103(B) before 
retrial, in light of his failure to follow it). The problem was exacerbated in Cotton by the fact that the 
prosecutor also suggested to the alleged victim's social worker, who knew of the multiple personality 
disorder, that she not speak with defense counsel. 
A disciplinary case involving a flagrant violation of former OH DR 7-103(B) is Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrenn, 99 Ohio St.3d 222, 2003 Ohio 3288, 790 N.E.2d 1195. In Wrenn, 
an assistant county prosecutor failed to inform the court and opposing counsel of his knowledge of 
DNA testing results that were favorable to the defense, and the Court stated as follows: 
 Respondent breached his duties as an officer of the court and 
his public responsibility as an assistant prosecutor. He had ethical and 
legal obligations to disclose discoverable information that was relevant, 
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exculpatory, and not privileged and he failed to do so on more than one 
occasion. We do not accept respondent's assertion that it was an 
innocent misrepresentation. When the court inquired about the DNA 
test results at the pretrial, respondent failed to disclose that he had 
knowledge that the testing was complete and the results were favorable 
to [defendant]. 
Id. at para. 21. Despite the strong words, Wrenn received only a six-month suspension, all stayed. 
Chief Justice Moyer and Justice Pfeifer dissented on the sanctions issue; that aspect of the case is 
further discussed in section 8.4:400, at "Misconduct in the judicial process." Contrast the sanction 
meted out in the more highly publicized 2007 case involving the prosecutor of the Duke lacrosse team 
members, Michael Nifons, who likewise withheld DNA evidence; he was disbarred. See Eileen 
Libby, A Higher Law, ABAJ, Oct. 2009, at 28, and Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutorial 
Disclosure, Cleveland Metro. B.J., July/Aug. 2009, at 34, both referring to the Nifong case in the 
context of disclosure obligations imposed on prosecutors by MR 3.8. 
The obligation that the disclosure be "timely" apparently has been construed by only one state court of 
last resort. In  In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167 (Colo. 2002) (en banc), the court held that to be 
"timely" under MR 3.8(d), the disclosure of exculpatory evidence of which the prosecutor has 
knowledge prior to any critical stage of the proceeding (here, a preliminary hearing) must be made 
before that stage of the proceeding takes place. See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 375-76 (6th ed. 2007) (commentary). 
The responsibility to make timely disclosure of exculpatory evidence arises only when the evidence 
and its exculpatory nature is "known" to the prosecutor. Without such knowledge, failure to disclose 
does not violate Rule 3.8(d), although, if the underlying conduct is egregious, it may still be treated as 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. See, under the former OHCPR, Cuyahoga 
County Bar Ass'n v. Gerstenslager, 45 Ohio St.3d 88, 543 N.E.2d 491 (1989); State v. Holt, 132 
Ohio App.3d 601, 725 N.E.2d 1155 (Hamilton 1997) (Painter, J.) (prosecutor not only had duty 
under OH DR 7-103(B) to disclose any promises made to a witness but also to find out if any 
promises had been made; in case at bar prosecutor claimed no knowledge of any promises and record 
failed to reflect that prosecuting witnesses were offered any promises for their testimony; thus "the 
record simply does not demonstrate any breach of that duty in this case."  Id. at 609, 725 N.E.2d at 
1161.). 
Although the prosecutor may not suppress evidence that would benefit the defendant's case, the Rule 
places no affirmative duty on the prosecutor to gather evidence for the accused. But cf. the Holt case, 
above, where the court, while finding on the record presented no breach of the OH DR 7-103(B) duty 
by the prosecutor, noted that the prosecutor had an affirmative duty to determine if promises had been 
made to state witnesses and "cannot claim 'personal ignorance' on the subject." 132 Ohio App.3d at 
609, 725 N.E.2d at 1160-61. (Former OH EC 7-13, while placing no duty on a prosecutor to gather 
evidence, did admonish that "a prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely 
because he believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the accused.") Cf. State v. Urrego, 41 
Ohio App.2d 124, 322 N.E.2d 688 (Monroe 1974) (finding no due-process requirement to gather 
evidence for defendant). 
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Nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence by a prosecutor is seldom policed by the disciplinary process, 
but instead is dealt with by the trial courts in applying a similar requirement imposed on the 
prosecutor as an aspect of constitutionally-required due process, known as the Brady doctrine 
(Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (due process violated when, after request by defense for 
any statements made by co-defendant, the prosecution failed to disclose co-defendant's confession to 
murder for which defendant was convicted)), which requires the prosecutor to disclose to defendants 
favorable evidence that is material to guilt or punishment.  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). To 
be material, the evidence must be such that "there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable 
probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); accord Kyles, 514 U.S. 419. Where the prosecutor fails to provide 
information in response to a specific request for it, that may be particularly misleading to the defense 
and hence more likely to have had an impact on the case's outcome.  Bagley, 473 U.S. 667. See also 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), where a unanimous Court held that due process was 
violated by the government's failure to disclose that it had promised the sole eye-witness that he 
would not be prosecuted in return for his testifying for the government. Not surprisingly, this 
nondisclosed evidence was found material, given the critical nature of the witness's testimony, which 
in turn made the issue of his credibility all the more important. "[W]hether the nondisclosure was a 
result of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor."  Id. at 154. For a more 
complete discussion of the Brady doctrine both nationally and in Ohio, see 6 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Jerold H. Israel,  Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 24.3(b) (3d ed. 2007); 2 
Lewis R. Katz, Paul C. Giannelli, Judith P. Lipton & Phyllis L. Crocker, Baldwin's Ohio 
Practice, Katz Giannelli Criminal Law ch. 50 (3d ed. 2009). An Ohio case finding violation of 
Brady is State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007 Ohio 4837, 873 N.E.2d 858 (failure to disclose 
police reports implicating as guilty persons other than defendants in death-sentence murder case). See 
also State v. Lewis, 70 Ohio App.3d 624, 591 N.E.2d 854 (Lawrence 1990) (state's failure to 
preserve "potentially useful evidence" did not violate due process). 
  
3.8:600  Monitoring Extrajudicial Statements by Law Enforcement Officials 
Primary Ohio References 
None 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.8(f) 
Commentary 
ALI-LGL § 97 
Ohio has not adopted MR 3.8(f), which, insofar as relevant here, provides that a prosecutor be 
responsible for certain extrajudicial statements of law enforcement personnel and other nonlawyers 
involved in the prosecutorial function. To the extent the nonlawyer personnel are employed, retained, 
or associated with the prosecutor, the prosecutor may still be responsible for their improper 
extrajudicial statements in certain situations under Ohio Rule 5.3(c). See section 5.3:400. 
Further as to MR 3.8(f), see section 3.8:800 below. 
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3.8:700  Issuing a Subpoena to a Lawyer 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.8(e) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.8(e) 
Rule 3.8(e) precludes a prosecutor from directing a subpoena to a lawyer in a grand jury or other 
criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client, unless 
the prosecutor reasonably believes that all of the following apply: 
 (1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any 
applicable privilege; 
 (2) the disclosure sought is essential to the successful completion of an 
ongoing investigations or prosecution; 
 (3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information. 
As is apparent from this language, division (e) "is intended to limit" such subpoenas to those 
situations in which "there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship." Rule 3.8 
cmt. [4]. 
For discussion of the issue generally, see 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. 
Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 34.8 (3d ed. Supp. 2009); ABA Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 390-91 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). See also 2 Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers § 97, reporter's note to cmt. h (2000). 
  
3.8:800  Making Extrajudicial Statements 
Primary Ohio References 
None 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.8(f) 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 61:609 
ALI-LGL § 109 
Wolfram § 12.2.2 
MR 3.8(f), which precludes a prosecutor from making certain extrajudicial statements, has been 
deleted "because a prosecutor, like all lawyers, is subject to Rule 3.6." ABA Model Code 
Comparison to Rule 3.8. But the Model Rule choice of making MR 3.8(f) applicable to prosecutors, 
in addition to the general prohibitions of 3.6, reinforces the notion that extra safeguards are important 
in the prosecution context. We think the deletion of MR 3.8(f) is a mistake. 
In Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-25, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 
(Dec. 16, 1988), the Board opined that while a prosecutor was subject to former OH DR 7-107(A) 
(now Rule 3.6(a))with respect to pending matters, the rule did not apply to completed criminal 
investigations. Thus, on completion of the investigation, a prosecutor was permitted to explain why 
criminal charges had not been authorized. See also  In re Grand Jury Investigation, 23 Ohio 
App.3d 159, 492 N.E.2d 459 (Cuyahoga 1985), where the court held that reiteration by a prosecutor 
of remarks made in open court did not violate what was then OH DR 7-107(A)(1). The 7-107(A)(1) 
provision (permitting extrajudicial statements that did no more than state without elaboration 
information in public record), was analogous to what is now the exception contained in Rule 3.6(b)(2) 
(information contained in public record). See sections 3.6:200-:400. 
  
3.8:900  Peremptory Strikes of Jurors 




While Ohio prohibits certain discriminatory conduct by lawyers, see Rule 8.4(g), we are unaware of 
any Ohio ethics decisions or advisory opinions on the subject of discrimination in the use of 
peremptory challenges of jurors by prosecutors. The general Ohio law on peremptory challenges, 
which is beyond the scope of this ethics narrative, may be found at OH Crim R 24(D) & (E) and 
cases cited thereunder. 
The federal constitutional implications relating to peremptory challenges by the prosecution are set 
forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (Equal Protection Clause violated by exercise of 
peremptory strike solely on basis of race); and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) 
(same result if state strikes are based solely on gender; paternity/child support case). For cases 
applying the J.E.B. gender rule to the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges in criminal cases, 
see, e.g. Simon v. Mississippi, 513 U.S. 956 (1994); Cleveland v. Arkansas, 511 U.S. 1080 (1994). 
Similar restrictions apply in civil suits as well. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 
U.S. 614 (1991). 
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3.8:1000  Duty to Disclose New Exculpatory Evidence Regarding Convicted 
       Defendant 
Primary Ohio References 
None 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.8(g), (h) 
In February 2008, the ABA House of Delegates approved the addition of paragraphs (g) and (h) to 
MR 3.8. Pursuant to these provision, a prosecutor who knows of 
new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood 
that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the 
defendant was convicted 
shall (1) disclose that evidence promptly to the appropriate court or authority and (2), if the conviction 
occurred in the prosecutor's jurisdiction, (A) promptly disclose the evidence to the defendant unless 
there is a court-authorized delay and (B) undertake, or cause to be undertaken, further investigation to 
determine whether the defendant was wrongly convicted.  MR 3.8(g). If the prosecutor has clear and 
convincing evidence that a defendant was wrongly convicted in a court in the prosecutor's jurisdiction, 
"the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction." MR 3.8(h). 
In addition to the new paragraphs, related Comments [7], [8], and [9] were also added to MR 3.8. 
Comment [7] reiterates the prosecutor's obligation under paragraph (g) and further notes that the 
obligation to notify the defendant must be made through the defendant's lawyer; if the defendant is 
unrepresented, the disclosure ordinarily would be accompanied by a request to a court for 
appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking appropriate action. 
With respect to paragraph (h), Comment [8] states that "necessary steps" to remedy the conviction 
may include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that 
the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant, and, 
where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor has 
knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the 
defendant was convicted. 
Comment [9] provides a safe harbor to a prosecutor whose independent judgment that evidence is 
insufficient to trigger paragraphs (g) or (h) is subsequently proved to be erroneous, provided that 
judgment was exercised in good faith. 
So far as we are aware, neither Ohio nor any other state has taken steps to incorporate paragraphs (g) 
or (h) and the accompanying comments into its Rules of Professional Conduct.  The new Model Rule 
provisions are discussed in 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The 
Law of Lawyering § 34.10 (3d ed. Supp. 2009).  
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3.9:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.9 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.9 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 8.22-8.23 
  
3.9:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 3.9 is identical to the Model Rule. 
  
3.9:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 3.9: None. 
  
3.9:200  Duties of Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 3.9 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 3.9 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 8.19 
Commentary 
ALI-LGL § 104 
Wolfram § 13.8 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 8.19 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 3.9 states that 
 [a] lawyer representing a client before a legislative body or 
administrative agency in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose 
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that the appearance is in a representative capacity and shall conform to 
the provisions of Rules 3.3(a) to (c), 3.4(a) to (c), and 3.5. 
See sections 3.3:200-:700, 3.4:200-:400, and 3.5:200-500. [Query how some of the provisions of 
Rule 3.5 (such as division (b), dealing with disclosure of improper conduct by or toward a juror) 
could possibly have any relevance to the nonadjudicative proceedings addressed in Rule 3.9.] 
Comment [1] provides that such decision-making bodies (i.e., "legislatures, municipal councils, and 
executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule-making or policy-making capacity") "like a 
court, should be able to rely on the integrity of the submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing before 
such a body must deal with it honestly and in conformity with applicable rules of procedure." Rule 
3.9 cmt. [1]. 
Comment [3] cautions that the Rule applies only 
when a lawyer represents a client in connection with an official hearing 
or meeting of a governmental agency or a legislative body to which the 
lawyer or the lawyer's client is presenting evidence or argument. It does 
not apply to representation of a client in a negotiation or other bilateral 
transaction with a governmental agency or in connection with an ap-
plication for a license or other privilege or the client's compliance with 
generally applicable reporting requirements, such as the filing of in-
come tax returns. Nor does it apply to the representation of a client in 
connection with an investigation or examination of the client's affairs 
conducted by governmental investigators or examiners. Representation 
in such matters is governed by Rules 4.1 to 4.4. 
Rule 3.9 cmt. [3]. 
See also 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 104 (2000). 
It should be noted also that the OHCPR dealt with limits placed on a lawyer/public official with 
respect to advocacy in legislative matters. Former OH DR 8-101(A)(1) provided that a lawyer who 
held public office could not 
 [u]se his public position to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a special 
advantage in legislative matters for himself or for a client under cir-
cumstances where he knows or it is obvious that such action is not in 
the public interest. 
There is no comparable provision in the Rules. 
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4.1:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 4.1 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 4.1 
  
4.1:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 4.1 is substantively identical to its Model Rule counterpart, with the following two 
exceptions: 
In division (b), “an illegal” has been substituted for “criminal” and the 
final clause, “, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.”, has been 
deleted. 
 
4.1:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 4.1(a): DR-7-102(A)(5). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 4.1(b): DR 7-102(A)(3) & 7-102(B)(1). 
  
4.1:200  Truthfulness in Out-of-Court Statements 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 4.1(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 4.1(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.49 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  71:201 
ALI-LGL §  98 
Wolfram §  13.5 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §  7.49 (1996). 
Under the Ohio Rules, treatment of a lawyer’s false statement of law or fact depends on to whom the 
statement is made and whether the statement is made in the course of representing a client. False 
statements made to a tribunal are addressed in Ohio Rule 3.3(a)(1). See section 3.3:200. False 
statements made to a third person during the course of the representation are treated by Ohio Rule 
4.1(a). Ohio Rule 8.4(c) encompasses false statements to anyone (the court, third-parties, the client), 
in any context, regardless of whether the lawyer is representing a client. See section 8.4:400. A case 
involving violation of both 4.1(a) and 8.4(c) is Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Craig, 131 Ohio St.3d 364, 
2012 Ohio 1083, 965 N.E.2d 287 (respondent forged client’s signature, notarized it, and filed the 
document with Franklin County Recorder’s office). 
Ohio Rule 4.1(a) deals with a lawyer’s false statement of law or fact to others, and the Rule (unlike 
former OH DR 7-102(A)(5)) is expressly so limited -- the lawyer in the course of representing a client 
shall not “knowingly. . . (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person.” Ohio 
Rule 4.1(a) (emphasis added). Note also the distinction between Rule 3.3(a)(1) and 4.1(a) in terms of 
materiality: any false statement of fact made to a court is sanctionable (although the failure to correct 
a previous false statement to a court is limited to a previous misstatement of material fact), whereas 
false statements of fact made to others are sanctionable only if material. Also, while representations 
made to a court will almost always be made while representing a client, Rule 3.3(a)(1) is not 
expressly so limited. Compare Rule 4.1(a) (“[i]n the course of representing a client”). 
Key to understanding Rule 4.1(a) is the meaning of the phrase “false statement of material fact.” Its 
meaning turns on three factors - what constitutes a false statement, what is a statement of fact, and 
when will such statements be considered material. 
As Comment [1] makes clear, the phrase “false statement” is not limited to affirmative falsehoods. 
Rather it extends as well to incorporating or affirming a statement the lawyer knows to be false, and 
making partially true but misleading statements or omissions. Ohio Rule 4.1 cmt. [1]. 
Comment [2] recognizes that what constitutes a fact “depends on the circumstances.” Ohio Rule 4.1 
cmt. [2]. For example, certain generally accepted conventions in negotiation allow negotiators to 
make statements that appear factual, but which are treated instead as mere puffery. Examples that 
usually fall in this category include estimates of price or value, a party’s bargaining range regarding 
settlement, or the existence of an undisclosed principal. Id. See Thomas Spahn, Negotiation Ethics 
- What about “Little White Lies?”, 19 Experience No. 3 (2009), at 44. 
False statements of fact violate the Rule only when they are material. The ordinary meaning of the 
term should apply in this context. 
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The first reported case utilizing Rule 4.1(a) was Disciplinary Counsel v. Bursey, 124 Ohio St.3d 85, 
2009 Ohio 6180, 919 N.E.2d 198. Respondent there made withdrawals from a minor child’s estate 
bank account at a point when he had “no further authority or obligations with regard to the estate,” id. 
at para. 38, of which he had been guardian five years earlier. The Court accepted the Board finding 
that respondent had violated “Prof.Cond.R. 4.1 (prohibiting a lawyer from making a statement to a 
third person during representation that the lawyer knows to be false)”, in addition to 8.4(c) and (h), 
“[b]ecause he misappropriated funds from the minor’s estate.” Id. at para. 39. While Bursey’s 
unauthorized withdrawals – made long after his obligations and authority regarding the estate had 
ended – no doubt constituted material misrepresentations to the bank, were they made “in the course 
of representing a client”? Or, in the language of Rule 4.1 cmt. [1], is this an instance of 
“misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in representing a client,” as to which “see Rule 8.4”? The 
opinion does not speak to this issue. 
The fuzziness of interpretation of Rule 4.1(a) continued in Akron Bar Ass’n v. Gibson, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 347, 2011 Ohio 628, 944 N.E.2d 228. While the thrust of 4.1(a) is to obligate a lawyer “to be 
truthful when dealing with others on  a client’s behalf,” Rule 4.1 cmt. [1], respondent Gibson’s 
actions involved (1) a failure to disclose to the court and opposing counsel, in her petition to release 
money placed in escrow by her client, a material fact regarding that money – that it was to be paid to 
respondent and her husband and (2) a failure to disclose to the court, in her motion for withdrawal of 
her request for payment for nonlegal services, that she had already been paid. This conduct, with the 
exception of her failure to disclose to opposing counsel, seems a far cry from “dealing with others in 
the client’s behalf,” and also seems more appropriately dealt with under Rule 3.3(a)(1). 
The most recent in the string of strange Rule 4.1 cases is Akron Bar Ass’n v. Groner, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 194, 2012 Ohio 222, 963 N.E.2d 149, and it may be the most questionable of all. Groner filed a 
pleading opposing the appointment of one Fowler (her client’s sister) as administratrix of the 
mother’s estate. The pleading contained false accusations about the sister. Subsequently, when she 
realized that the information was not correct, Groner filed “a motion for mediation in which she 
amended the objections to remove most of the allegations made about Fowler.” Id. at para. 11. On 
these facts, the Court upheld the finding that respondent “filed a pleading containing false statements 
of material fact that became a public record and that she did not correct these statements, in violation 
of Prof.Cond.R 4.1.” Id. at para. 12. Rule 4.1(a) prohibits knowingly making a false statement of 
material fact to a third person in the course of representing a client. Apparently, the “third person” to 
whom the false statement was made here is the general public, given the status of the pleading as a 
public record. See para. 12. If this is correct, then any document filed not under seal containing 
statements of fact known to be false violates not only Rule 3.3(a)(1) but 4.1(a) as well. Finally, even 
though paragraph 11 of the opinion, as set forth above, states that respondent subsequently amended 
most of the allegations, the Court in paragraph 12 says “she did not correct these statements . . . .” All 
in all, a perplexing decision. 
A rather more ordinary 4.1(a) violation was found in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Culbreath, 134 Ohio 
St.3d 24, 2012 Ohio 5031, 979 N.E.2d 1223, where the respondent, in the course of distribution of 
settlement funds, made misrepresentations as to the amount of the settlement to a representative of the 
firm providing billing services to the client’s medical provider. 
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Disciplinary cases under DR 7-102(A)(5) involving false statements to third persons include Dayton 
Bar Ass’n v. Gross, 17 Ohio St.3d 206, 478 N.E.2d 792 (1985), in which the respondent, among 
other fabrications, lied to Social Security officials on behalf of his client, wrote a bad check to a 
nursing home on behalf of his client, and lied to disciplinary authorities investigating the charge that, 
in exchange for repayment of money owed, he obtained his client’s signature on a release 
withdrawing an ethics complaint. In each of these instances, respondent was found to have violated 
7-102(A)(5). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Frazier, 110 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006 Ohio 4481, 853 
N.E.2d 295 (knowingly and falsely representing to opposing counsel that he was still counsel for 
client, even though statement made six months after he had been indefinitely suspended); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hutchins, 102 Ohio St.3d 97, 2004 Ohio 1805, 807 N.E.2d 303 
(respondent fabricated court order in connection with client’s divorce proceeding and sent it to 
escrow agent for title company handling sale of jointly owned property); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Deaton, 102 Ohio St.3d 19, 2004 Ohio 1587, 806 N.E.2d 503 (lying to client’s mortgage company 
that client was no longer obligated to pay child support); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 
79 Ohio St.3d 115, 679 N.E.2d 1098 (1997) (assisting client in filing false federal corporate-tax 
return); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Camera, 68 Ohio St.3d 478, 628 N.E.2d 1353 (1994) 
(signing affidavit at sheriff’s sale falsely stating that he was not attempting to purchase certain 
property on behalf of client). 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. McMahon, 114 Ohio St.3d 331, 2007 Ohio 3673, 872 N.E.2d 261, is the 
most recent example of violation of the Code provision involving statements to a third person. In 
McMahon, the respondent represented a passenger injured in a two-car collision.  In order to 
persuade the insurer for the driver of the other car to enter into settlement negotiations, McMahon 
wrote a letter to the insurance company in which he purported to quote nonexistent testimony given 
by the driver at a nonexistent hearing before the Shaker Heights Municipal Court.  The invented 
testimony had the driver conceding that she was at fault and the judge finding her guilty of the traffic 
charge of improperly changing lanes.  This knowingly false statement of fact violated former DR 
7-102(A)(5), for which respondent was suspended for six months, rather than the public reprimand 
recommended by the panel or the six-month stayed suspension recommended by the Board (and the 
two dissenting justices). 
Remember that DR 7-102(A)(5), which prohibited a lawyer during the representation from 
knowingly making a false statement of law or fact to anyone, could be invoked when the statement 
was made to the client, as in Lorain County Bar Ass’n v. Robinson, 121 Ohio St.3d 24, 2009 Ohio 
262, 901 N.E.2d 783 (false statement regarding status of client’s bankruptcy case). Under the Rules, 
this would be a Rule 8.4(c) violation, not a violation of 4.1(a). 
  
4.1:300  Disclosures to Avoid Assisting Client Fraud [see also 1.6:395, 1.6:670] 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 4.1(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 4.1(b) 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA §  71:203 
ALI-LGL §§  67, 94 
Wolfram §§  12.6, 13.3 
Rule 4.1(b) prohibits a lawyer, in representing a client, from knowingly failing to disclose a material 
fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting an illegal or fraudulent client act. While the 
disclosure obligation in Rule 3.3(b) is directed to known criminal or fraudulent conduct by any 
person (including a client) related to a proceeding before a tribunal, the language of 4.1(b) read 
literally seems to command disclosure necessary to avoid assisting any “illegal or fraudulent act by a 
client.” Although the answer is not entirely clear, the context suggests that the prohibition is directed 
to dealings with a third person, with Rule 3.3(b) being the operative provision for comparable 
conduct directed toward a tribunal. Rule 4.1 is entitled “Truthfulness in Statements to Others,” and 
the overall heading for Rules 4.1-4.4 is “Transactions with Persons Other than Clients.” The “dealing 
with others” language in Comment [1] is consistent with this reading. Rule 4.1 cmt [1]. See also the 
Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 4.1 (“Division (b) parallels . . . the ‘fraud on a person’ portion of 
DR 7-102(B)(1). The ‘fraud on a tribunal’ portion of DR 7-102(B)(1) is now found in Rule 3.3.”). 
Note as well that the assisting-an-illegal-or-fraudulent-act-by-a-client language in Rule 4.1 is similar 
to the prohibition contained in Rule 1.2(d). While 1.2(d) does not itself contain disclosure obligations, 
the 4.1(b) disclosure obligations may well come into play when a lawyer is discharging 1.2(d) duties. 
See Ohio Rule 4.1 cmt. [3]. 
Rule 4.1(b) is one of the numerous instances in the Ohio Rules where “illegal” has been substituted 
for the Model Rules word “criminal.” (See Rules 1.2(d), 1.6(b)(2), 1.16(e)(2), 8.4(b).) In using 
“illegal,” the Task Force not only has injected a term that was not present in the OHCPR analogs to 
Rule 4.1(b) (OH DR 7-102(A)(3) and 7-102(B)(1)), but also puts Ohio’s version of Rule 4.1 in a 
class by itself: so far as we are aware, Ohio is the only Model Rule jurisdiction that has replaced 
“criminal” with “illegal” in Rule 4.1(b). See further discussion of the “illegal”/”criminal” issue at 
sections 1.2:600 and 8.4:300. 
As noted above, Ohio Rule 4.1(b) deals with assisting “illegal” or fraudulent conduct by a client, not 
“criminal” or fraudulent conduct. Also unlike the Model Rule, if disclosure is necessary in order to 
comply, the Ohio Rule obligates a lawyer to make such disclosure, even if the material fact would 
otherwise be protected by the attorney-client privilege. Rule 4.1 cmt. [3]. Why Comment [3] refers 
only to the privilege and not information relating to the representation protected by Rule 1.6 is 
unclear; Ohio Rule 1.6(c) clearly states that disclosure of such information necessary to comply with 
Rule 4.1 is mandatory. Comment [3] also states that the Rule calls for disclosure if the client persists 
in the illegal or fraudulent act and “[i]f withdrawal is not sufficient to avoid such assistance.” 
Such disclosure may include disaffirming an opinion, document, 
affirmation or the like or may require further disclosure . . . . Disclosure 
is not required unless the lawyer is unable to withdraw or the client is 
using the lawyer’s work product to assist the client’s illegal or 
fraudulent act. 
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Id. (Comment [3] is internally inconsistent in speaking first of disclosure being required “[i]f 
withdrawal is not sufficient”; subsequently, the comment states that disclosure is not required “unless 
the lawyer is unable to withdraw.” (Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, the thrust of the comment seems 
to suggest that withdrawal is the favored course if it will be enough to avoid assisting the illegal or 
fraudulent act of a client.) 
Comment [4] reminds that the Rule addresses only “ongoing or future” illegal or fraudulent client acts. 
If the lawyer subsequently becomes aware of past illegal or fraudulent client acts, pursuant to Rule 
1.6(b)(3) the lawyer may, but is not required to, reveal information reasonably necessary to mitigate 
injury to financial or property interests of another resulting from the commission of such acts in the 
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services. Rule 4.1 cmt. [4]. 
Under the former OHCPR, there were only a limited number of cases dealing with a lawyer’s failure 
to disclose a material fact in order to avoid assisting client fraud on a person or entity other than a 
tribunal. See Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Callahan, 36 Ohio St.3d 179, 522 N.E.2d 542 (1988), where 
respondent admitted that he should have disclosed the true purpose of the marriage of his clients 
(entered into to affect favorably the husband’s immigration status) to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service when he submitted forms on their behalf to the INS. In so doing, respondent 
was found to have violated former OH DR 7-102(A)(3), among other disciplinary rules, and, in a 
federal criminal proceeding, 18 USC §§ 1001, 1002 (2000) (fraud; false documents). Accord 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Cooke, 111 Ohio St.3d 290, 2006 Ohio 5709, 855 N.E.1226 (client made 
false statement to bankruptcy trustee in presence of respondent, who did nothing to correct statement; 
DR 7-102(A)(3) violated); Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Korte, 111 Ohio St.3d 273, 2006 Ohio 5705, 855 
N.E.2d 1211 (failing to disclose, as required by Ohio Administrative Code, copies of employer’s 
doctor’s medical-examination reports of claimant to Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and to 
claimant’s counsel); Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Kinney, 89 Ohio St.3d 77, 728 N.E.2d 1052 (2000) 
(lawyer’s failure to disclose his knowing misrepresentation of purchase price of tavern in documents 
he filed on behalf of seller with Liquor Control Division of Ohio Department of Commerce; OH DR 
7-102(A)(3) & (7) violated); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Culbreath, 88 Ohio St.3d 271, 725 N.E.2d 
629 (2000) (knowingly withholding material information from relator’s Unauthorized Practice of 
Law Committee); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Fell, 51 Ohio St.2d 33, 364 N.E.2d 872 (1977) (deliberately 
withholding from Industrial Commission fact of his client’s death in order to obtain fee to which he 
was not entitled). 
It is important to emphasize that Rule 4.1(b) requires disclosure of material facts (including those 
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6), if necessary to avoid assisting in client fraud against third persons. 
This is so, even though the Task Force in its Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 3.3 states that that 
Rule 3.3 “does not adopt the DR 7-102(B)(1) requirement that the lawyer reveal the client’s 
fraudulent act, during the course of the representation, upon any person.” Requiring such disclosure is, 
in the Task Force’s words, “unworkable.” Id. In its Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 4.1, however, 
the Task Force acknowledges that “[d]ivision (b) parallels ...the ‘fraud on a person’ portion of DR 
7-102(B)(1).” Despite the absence of Ohio cases on the subject, “[n]evertheless, revealing such an 
ongoing or future fraud is justified under Rule 4.1(b) when the client refuses to prevent it, and the 
lawyer’s withdrawal from the matter is not sufficient to prevent assisting the fraud.” Id. Thus, as 
previously noted, the “fraud-on-a-person” disclosure obligations of former DR 7-102(B)(1) are 
continued under the new Rules in those circumstances covered by Rule 4.1(b). 
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See also the obligations in this regard of a lawyer for a publicly-traded company under §  307 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (15 USC §  7245 (2002)), discussed at sections 1.6:350 and 1.13:310. 
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4.2:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 4.2 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 4.2 
  
4.2:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 4.2 is identical to the Model Rule. 
  
4.2:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 4.2: DR 7-104(A)(1). 
  
4.2:200  Communication with a Represented Person 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 4.2 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 4.2 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 7.72-7.74 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 71:301 
ALI-LGL §§ 99-102 
Wolfram § 11.6.2 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.72 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 4.2 precludes a lawyer from communicating on the subject of the representation with a 
person whom the lawyer knows is represented by another lawyer in that matter, unless the other 
person’s lawyer consents to the communication or the communication is authorized by law or court 
order. E.g., under the former OHCPR analog (DR 7-104(A)(1)), Richland County Bar Ass’n v. 
Bourdeau, 109 Ohio St.3d 158, 2006 Ohio 2039, 846 N.E.2d 525 (respondent, representing 
husband in domestic relations matter, called wife, who was in hiding with couple’s child, at her 
cell-phone number without her lawyer’s consent and left message that frightened wife; DR 
7-104(A)(1) violated); Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 105 Ohio St.3d 443, 2005 Ohio 2695, 828 
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N.E.2d 621 (direct communication with represented party without consent of party’s lawyer violated 
7-104(A)(1)); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 100 Ohio St.3d 291, 2003 Ohio 5753, 
798 N.E.2d 604 (in grandparent visitation dispute, former rule violated when respondent called 
paternal grandmother to ask for her attorney’s home phone number, “even though [respondent] knew 
that the grandmother was represented and that the grandmother’s attorney had not given respondent 
permission to contact his client,” id. at para. 12; moreover, respondent subsequently went to 
grandmother’s home and harassed her in attempt to have visitation arrangements changed); 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Sladoje, 97 Ohio St.3d 116, 2002 Ohio 5350, 776 N.E.2d 1057 (Rule 
violated when respondent, representing client during meeting with her former husband’s two sons 
regarding division of ex-husband’s estate assets, learned at meeting that sons were represented by 
counsel; “however, [respondent] did not consult the sons’ attorney at all before allowing them to 
execute the agreement with their ex-stepmother,” id. at para. 6); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Dewey, 92 
Ohio St.3d 419, 750 N.E.2d 1118 (2001) (direct telephone contact with vendors by vendee’s lawyer 
(who knew vendors’ attorney was out of town), demanding that document necessary to transaction be 
signed without delay, violated former disciplinary rule). 
The first case of which we are aware applying Rule 4.2 is Damron v. CSX Transp., Inc., 184 Ohio 
App.3d 183, 2009 Ohio 3638, 920 N.E.2d 169 (Montgomery), where the court concluded that 
plaintiff’s lawyer (Baran) had not violated the rule when he spoke to Barnes, an employee of the 
corporate defendant in the case, without the permission of the defendant’s lawyers. The underlying 
lawsuit was a wrongful death action against the railroad; while that suit was pending Barnes called 
plaintiff’s lawyer and spoke about possible representation by Baran regarding a disability claim that 
Barnes wanted to bring against the railroad (Baran declined the representation after consulting with 
ethics counsel), but not about the wrongful death action, as to which the employee would likely be a 
witness regarding spoliation of evidence by CSX. Although the presiding judge entered a strong 
dissent, arguing that the two matters were intertwined because the disability claim might be used to 
impeach Barnes’ spoliation testimony, the majority saw it differently and ruled that: 
 The subject of Attorney Baran’s representation when he 
communicated with Barnes on March 23 and 24, 2007, was the 
Damron/Hensley litigation and the claims for wrongful death and 
survivorship against CSX that that action involves. Barnes’s disability 
claim and his dispute with CSX concerning it was a matter manifestly 
outside the subject of Attorney Baran’s representation when the two 
communicated. Their communication concerning Barnes’s disability 
claim was therefore not prohibited by Prof.Cond.R 4.2, and that rule is 
not implicated merely because CSX may offer extrinsic evidence 
concerning Barnes’s disability claim to impeach his credibility if and 
when he testifies on behalf of plaintiffs concerning a 
spoliation-of-evidence claim [i.e., shredding of photos by another CSX 
employee allegedly witnessed by Barnes]. 
Id. at para. 55. (See also the Oliver case, cited in the third paragraph below.) 
The first disciplinary action applying 4.2 is Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Cameron, 130 Ohio St.3d 
299, 2011 Ohio 5200, 958 N.E.2d 138, where the respondent, acting pro se in defending a 
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collection-of-fees lawsuit by an expert he had hired in a slip-and-fall case, violated the rule by 
contacting the expert after the lawsuit had been filed and discussing settlement, without the consent of 
the expert’s attorney. 
Although not a disciplinary decision, a violation of Rule 4.2 by, of all people, a law firm’s ethics 
partner, was a significant factor in the affirmance of a finding of bad faith, and the awarding of 
attorney fees incurred in a successful motion to disqualify opposing counsel, by the Ninth Judicial 
District in Carnegie Cos. v. Summit Props., Inc., 2012 Ohio 1324, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1151 
(Summit). As the appellate court forcefully put it with respect to this issue: 
We further conclude that a firm which is aware of its representation of 
directly adverse clients in separate matters, yet seeks a waiver of the 
conflict directly from one client despite the firm’s knowledge that the 
client is represented by counsel from another firm, is acting in bad faith. 
By bypassing opposing counsel, the firm acts with a dishonest purpose, 
moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, and in breach of a duty, 
premised on an ulterior motive to obtain a benefit or advantage it could 
not otherwise obtain. We conclude that a firm’s designated ethics 
attorney, who has no involvement in the representation of either client, 
clearly demonstrates bad faith when he contacts a client he knows to be 
represented by another firm in an effort to obtain a conflict waiver from 
that client. 
Id. at para. 22. 
This restriction on communication with a represented person in Rule 4.2 responds to several concerns. 
See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 11.6.2 (1986) (summarizing 
underlying policies). One concern is that if ex parte communications were allowed, a lawyer might 
use them in an overreaching manner, such as to trick a person into making an unwarranted admission. 
Ohio Rule 4.2 cmt. [1]. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-20, 1990 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (Aug. 17, 1990). A related concern is that such ex parte 
communication could functionally strip the third party of the full benefit of representation and advice 
from his own lawyer that he should have in dealing with another party’s attorney. Rule 4.2 cmt. [1]. 
Finally, the Rule protects against a lawyer using the ex parte communication as a way to undercut the 
lawyer-client relationship of the third party and his lawyer. Id. 
Several aspects of this provision must be considered in applying the Rule. 
First, Ohio Rule 4.2 applies only to communications made by a lawyer during the course of his 
representation of a client “about the subject of the representation.” Communications not on the 
subject of the representation do not fall within this provision. Rule 4.2 cmt. [4]. But to steer clear of 
ethical difficulty, the Board advised in connection with former OH DR 7-104(A)(1) that a lawyer 
“refrain from any conversation [with the represented party] even remotely related to the subject 
matter of the representation,” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-32, 1988 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 15, at *3 (Dec. 16, 1988). Nor has the Ohio Supreme Court been sympathetic 
to attempts by counsel to manipulate this factor.  Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Savage, 74 Ohio St.3d 183, 
657 N.E.2d 507 (1995) (rejecting arguments that communications were not concerning subject of 
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representation). A 2006 Board opinion, however, opined that one area not within the 7-104(A)(1) 
prohibition with respect to communication “on the subject of the representation,” at least in the 
context of communication by a lawyer occupying the dual role of guardian ad litem and attorney for a 
minor child, is “[c]ommunication that is administrative in nature, such as scheduling appointments 
and meetings.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2006-5, 2006 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 3, at *1 (June 9, 2006). Two related, and more basic points, are that (1) the Rule deals with 
“communicat[ions]” not something else, see Insituform of N. Am., Inc. v. Midwest Pipelines, Inc. 
139 F.R.D. 622 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (testimony obtained in violation of former disciplinary rule 
excluded; visual observations by plaintiff’s lawyer while on defendant’s property were not), and (2) 
the lawyer’s contact with the represented person must have occurred in the course of “representing a 
client.” See Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc.2d 17, 2009 Ohio 6587, 920 N.E.2d 203 (C.P. Erie) 
(lawyer, employed by NCAA as investigator, not counsel, did not have attorney-client relationship 
with or provide legal services to NCAA). 
Second, the restriction applies only when the lawyer “knows” (including knowledge inferred from the 
circumstances, Rule 1.0(g)) that the third party is represented by counsel in the matter. Ohio Rule 4.2 
cmt. [8]. This requires knowledge of two separate factors: (1) that the person is represented by 
counsel, and (2) that this representation includes the matter to which the communication pertains. 
Without such knowledge, the communication does not violate Rule 4.2 and is instead controlled by 
Ohio Rule 4.3. See Rule 4.2 cmt. [9]. Accord ABA Formal Opinion 95-396 (July 28, 1995) (“Rule 
4.2 does not, like Rule 4.3, imply a duty to inquire.” Id. at 13.). See, e.g., under the former OHCPR, 
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Carrigan, 71 Ohio St.3d 256, 643 N.E.2d 135 (1994) (failure to show that 
lawyer had knowledge third party was represented by counsel led to dismissal of 7-104(A)(1) charge). 
But if that knowledge was present, the former rule was violated. See Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Savage, 74 
Ohio St.3d 183, 657 N.E.2d 507 (1995) (failure of opposing counsel to confirm representation in 
writing, as promised, did not absolve lawyer of his duties under disciplinary rule, since attorney 
making contact still had knowledge of the representation). Compare Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal 
Op. 88-6 (Oct. 27, 1988), which opined that where the party to be contacted has been represented by 
counsel but is attempting to terminate that relationship, the lawyer should not contact the party 
directly until he confirms that the representation has actually been terminated. Proceeding with the 
contact because the lawyer thinks he “knows” that the third party is no longer represented by counsel 
would be improper. Id. (statements by third party that she has fired her lawyer insufficient; 
confirmation should be obtained from the lawyer that his services have been terminated). 
Third, the restriction does not apply if the attorney for the third party consents to the ex parte 
communication or if it is authorized by law or court order. For example, if certain government records 
are made available to the public by statute, requesting them directly from the government rather than 
through the government’s attorney would be permitted under this exception because the 
communication is authorized by law. See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 90-91-01 (n.d.). Board Opinion 
2006-5 also makes clear that “authorized by law” under DR 7-104(A)(1) includes authorization 
“through a court rule or court order.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2006-5, 
2006 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3, at *1 (June 9, 2006). 
Where it applies, however, this prohibition is a broad one and covers both oral and written 
communications with a represented party. Under the former OHCPR, even sending the represented 
party a copy of a letter to opposing counsel violated this provision. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal 
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Op. 78-1 (Jan. 23, 1978). And communication regarding the subject of the representation is improper 
even if: 
 the other party initiates or consents to the contact. Ohio Rule 4.2 cmt. [3]. See, under the 
Code, Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Dewey, 96 Ohio St.3d 148, 2002 Ohio 3608, 772 N.E.2d 630 
(other party initiated contact). (This is the same Dewey that violated the same rule in Toledo 
Bar Ass’n v. Dewey, 92 Ohio St.3d 419, 750 N.E.2d 1118 (2001), cited above; this time, 
instead of a public reprimand, he was suspended for two years with one year stayed). But see 
State v. Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 652 N.E.2d 1000 (1995) (finding no violation of former 
rule in meeting between prosecutor and criminal defendant represented by counsel, where 
defendant initiated the conversation, was clearly informed of and waived right to have counsel 
present and where counsel was summoned upon defendant’s subsequent request). 
 
The position on this issue taken by Rule 4.2 (contrary to Frazier), is set forth in Comment [5] 
-- a government lawyer “must” comply with this Rule in dealing with the accused in a criminal 
matter, but communications authorized by law “may” include investigative activities by 
government lawyers or their agents prior to criminal or civil enforcement proceedings.  Ohio 
Rule 4.2 cmt. [5]. 
 a telephone call to executor is made by the lawyer on the other side only when the lawyer is 
unable to contact the executor’s lawyer, whose telephone had been disconnected, Cleveland 
Bar Ass’n v. Rossi, 81 Ohio St.3d 195, 690 N.E.2d 501 (1998); 
 the contact itself is accidental, Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 86 (Sept. 5, 1973); or 
 there is good cause to seek direct contact, such as when opposing counsel fails to convey a 
settlement offer to the third party. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-7, 
1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 14 (April 10, 1992) (citing, with approval, Pennsylvania 
Bar Association opinion to this effect). In this situation, court intervention may be necessary 
to assure that the offers are conveyed. 
According to the Ohio Supreme Court, a public reprimand was an appropriate sanction for direct 
communication with adverse parties represented by counsel about the subject of the representation 
and without their counsel’s consent, in violation of DR 7-104(A)(1). E.g., Richland County Bar 
Ass’n v. Bourdeau, 109 Ohio St.3d 158, 2006 Ohio 2039, 846 N.E.2d 525. 
Although the former disciplinary rule spoke of communication with a “party,” it was not so limited, 
even though used most often in the context of litigation. Instead, it was intended to address any 
circumstance in which another person was represented by counsel in a “matter” and the 
communication was directed to “the subject of the representation.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 2006-5, 2006 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 9, 2006). Rule 4.2 confirms 
this more expansive reading by making express reference to communications on the subject of the 
representation with any represented “person,” rather than a “party.” 
The prohibition against communicating with persons represented by counsel extends also to a 
lawyer’s conduct in causing another person, such as an investigator or the lawyer’s own client, to 
make contact with a represented party. Ohio Rule 4.2 cmt. [4]. See Ohio Rule 8.4(a) and section 
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8.4:200. A Code case in which this aspect of DR 7-104(A)(1) was invoked is Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Sartini, 114 Ohio St.3d 205, 2007 Ohio 3601, 871 N.E.2d 543. In Sartini the Ashtabula County 
Prosecutor and his chief assistant were involved in plea negotiations with a public defender 
representing a defendant charged with drug trafficking and aggravated vehicular homicide. At one 
point in a meeting between the prosecutors and the defendant’s mother about the facts in the case, the 
mother found out that her son had rejected a plea offer that the mother thought was fair; she asked the 
prosecutors if she could speak to her son and ask him to reconsider.  As a result, the defendant’s 
mother, outside the presence of the public defender, acted as an intermediary in plea negotiations; as 
the court put it in its holding granting the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, based on these contacts, 
“‘Rhonda Hatfield became, in effect, the agent of the State of Ohio in inducing her son to accept the 
five year plan’ and Hatfield’s right to counsel had been violated.” Id. at para. 15. The Court found 
that respondents had violated 7-104(A)(1) “by conducting a plea negotiation with Hatfield through 
his mother, and without the participation of Hatfield’s counsel,” id. at para. 17, and imposed the 
sanction “repeatedly” imposed for violation of that disciplinary rule, a public reprimand.  See id. at 
para. 18.  
While a lawyer may not cause another person to communicate with a represented party, as in Sartini, 
a lawyer is not required to advise a client, who expresses an intent to contact an opposing party 
directly, not to do so. Particularly where the parties have an ongoing relationship, such contact often 
is unavoidable and in any event does not violate the Rule. Ohio Rule 4.2 cmt. [4]. Accord ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 408 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) (“Rule 4.2 
does not restrict participants in a matter from communicating with each other directly, whether or not 
they have their own lawyers.”). In fact, the lawyer may even advise the client about the prospective 
communication, Ohio Rule 4.2 cmt. [4], and, at least under Model Rule 4.2, can take the initiative 
and suggest to the client that such a communication may be in the client’s best interest. See ABA 
Formal Op. 11-461 (Aug. 4, 2011). A violation occurs only when the lawyer causes the contact as an 
attempt to circumvent the Rule’s restrictions. See Trumbull County Bar Ass’n v. Makridis, 77 
Ohio St.3d 73, 671 N.E.2d 31 (1996) (lawyer suggested that client call opposition party to discuss 
client’s anticipated testimony at forthcoming trial and then, “forgetting” that the other party was 
represented, took over the conversation). 
If the lawyer is representing himself, does communication on the subject of the representation with 
another person who is known to be represented violate the Rule? It did under the Code; see Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Donnell, 79 Ohio St.3d 501, 684 N.E.2d 36 (1997) (“persistent” ex parte 
contacts by lawyer/party with ex-wife, known to be represented by counsel, while motions relating to 
custody of child were pending violated former 7-104(A)(1)). Interestingly, the Cameron decision, 
supra, does not mention Donnell when it states in footnote that “[a]lthough Cameron did not raise the 
issue whether an attorney who is acting pro se in a lawsuit as a party can contact the other party, we 
note that other jurisdictions have said that the contact violates a similar professional rule.” (citing 
cases). 130 Ohio St.3d 299, at 301 n.1. 
Similarly, if the lawyer occupies a dual role of guardian ad litem and attorney for a minor child, the 
anti-contact rule applies, without any attempt to parse whether the communication was made in one 
role or the other. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2006-5, 2006 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 9, 2006). 
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Finally, the reader should be aware that the ABA has issued a Formal Opinion addressing the question 
under MR 4.2 (identical to the Ohio Rule) whether that rule is violated if a lawyer involved in a 
matter with an entity can contact the entity’s in-house counsel without obtaining the prior consent of 
the entity’s outside counsel.  The answer in ABA Formal Op. 06-443 (Aug. 5, 2006) is that such 
conduct does not violate MR 4.2. While personal war-stories generally have no place in a treatise like 
this, one of the authors cannot resist the temptation to recount an event of 25 or so years ago, when he 
was under extreme time pressure to close a settlement of a litigated matter and the outside counsel 
was unavailable.  The author chose to call the in-house counsel for the corporation on the other side 
and the deal was done.  Shortly thereafter, he received a telephone call from the missing outside 
counsel, who excoriated the author for making an end-run around him in doing what needed to be 
done for the client.  Many years later, vindication!, according to Opinion 06-443: “The purpose of 
Rule 4.2 is to prevent a skilled advocate from taking advantage of a non-lawyer.  To forbid an 
opposing lawyer from contacting inside counsel is inimical to the way the legal system works 
between counsel regarding matters in dispute.”  Id. at 2. 
  
4.2:210  “Represented Person” (Contact with an Agent or Employee of a 
Represented Entity) 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.74 (1996). 
Problems arise in trying to determine who should be considered the client in actions involving a 
corporation or other entity. Like any represented party, the interests of the corporation deserve 
protection. On the other hand, if every employee, past and present, is considered to be part of the 
corporate entity, too great an impediment might be placed on those who seek information from or 
about the entity. Particularly in litigation, access is needed to get an unfiltered view of the underlying 
conduct and to secure information sufficient to determine that a suit ethically can be filed. 
Nationwide, substantial disagreement existed over which former and current corporate employees 
should be considered as part of the corporate entity for purposes of the Rule. See generally ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 413-14 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). 
Resolution of this issue by Ohio Rule 4.2 (and MR 4.2) is found in Comment [7], which provides that 
while consent of the organization’s lawyer is not required for communication with a former 
constituent, there can be no direct communication with a current constituent 
who supervises, directs or regularly consults with her organization’s 
lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the 
organization with respect to the matter or whose act or omission in 
connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for 
purposes of civil or criminal liability. 
Ohio Rule 4.2 cmt. [7]. 
This is consistent with the latest word by the BCGD on the issue under the former OHCPR in Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2005-3, 2005 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Feb. 4, 
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2005), adopting the language of MR 4.2 cmt. [7], which in turn has been adopted (except for deletion 
of cross-references to Rules 3.4(f) and 4.4) as Ohio Rule 4.2 cmt. [7]. See 2005 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 3, at *1 (syllabus) (modifying the similar test previously set forth in Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-20, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (Aug. 17, 1990), which, 
according to Opinion 2005-3, “has served well, [but] the language of the Model Rule 4.2 comment 7 
may provide more clarity to Ohio attorneys.” Id. at *6.). 
Comment [7] also addresses the issue of a current constituent who is represented in the matter “by his 
or her own counsel.” In such circumstances, “the consent by that counsel will be sufficient for 
purposes of this rule.” Ohio Rule 4.2 cmt. [7]. Presumably this applies to all current constituents. The 
comment, however, does not specifically address a former constituent known to be represented by his 
or her own counsel or by the organization’s counsel. This would seem to be covered by the black 
letter rule of 4.2 -- such a former constituent is “a person” represented by counsel within the 
proscriptions of the Rule, and direct communication relating to the matter with that person would be 
prohibited. Conversely, if not represented, a former constituent is not within the Rule 4.2 no-contact 
rule, and, as expressly stated in Comment [7], “[c]onsent of the organization’s lawyer is not required 
for communication with a former constituent.” Rule 4.2 cmt. [7]. Accord, under the former OH DR 
7-104(A)(1), Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 96-1, 1996 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 7 (Feb. 2, 1996), which opined that to the extent the former employee is not represented by 
counsel with respect to the matter, the lawyer still should be careful not to mislead the individual. 
Thus, the lawyer must (1) obtain the former employee’s consent to the interview, (2) fully explain that 
the lawyer represents a client adverse to the corporation, (3) inform the former employee not to 
divulge any communications the former employee has had with counsel, and (4) refrain from giving 
the former employee legal advice, other than the advice to seek counsel. The conclusions reached in 
Opinion 96-1 with respect to former employees were reaffirmed by the Board in Op. 2005-3, 2005 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3, which, among other things, expressly disapproved of blanket 
assertions by corporate counsel that all employees, former as well as current, were represented by 
counsel for the organization. (For a good summary of Opinion 2005-3 and the issues raised therein, 
see Philip Oliss, The “No Contact” Rule, Clev. B. J., July-Aug. 2005, at 42; see also Harry D. 
Cornett, Jr. & Tarig M. Naeem, Ex Parte Contact with Current and Former Employees of an 
Opposing Corporation, Clev. B.J., Oct. 2005, at 14.). While the steps set forth with respect to 
unrepresented former employees in Opinion 96-1 and reaffirmed in Opinion 2005-3 have not been 
expressly carried over into the new Rule, adherence to those steps probably remains the safer course 
under the new regime, particularly since those opinions have been cited with approval in the Ohio 
Code Comparison to Rule 4.2. (These matters are discussed in the context of Ohio Rule 4.2 in 
Thomas M. Horwitz, Ex Parte Communications with Adverse Organizations, Clev. Metro. B.J., 
May 2008, at 16.) 
A related problem, not addressed by these Board opinions or by Rule 4.2, is determining when a 
corporation is to be considered as being represented by an attorney in a matter. If the organization has 
in-house counsel or attorneys on retainer, is the organization always represented on any matter that 
might arise? Or, does there need to be some internal recognition that a matter has arisen and counsel 
assigned to address it before the Rule’s restrictions on ex parte communications arise? The ABA has 
taken the latter view in ABA Formal Op. 95-396 (July 28, 1995), which contains a comprehensive 
review of issues arising under Rule 4.2. 
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Assuming a violation of the Rule occurs, does this require the disqualification of offending counsel? 
This question was addressed in Smith v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 151 Ohio App.3d 373, 2003 
Ohio 286, 784 N.E.2d 158 (Cuyahoga), where plaintiff’s counsel interviewed defendant’s current 
employees who were involved in the decision resulting in plaintiff’s termination. The answer, 
according to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, was that violation of the rule should not result in 
disqualification of the offending counsel unless the violation prejudiced the employer, and in this case 
the court held that since “the record does not demonstrate the likelihood of prejudice, we conclude 
that the trial court erred” in disqualifying plaintiff’s counsel. Id. at para. 12. 
  
4.2:220  Communications “Authorized by Law” – Law Enforcement Activities 
The Rule 4.2 prohibition against communication with a person known to be represented by counsel 
does not apply if the lawyer is authorized to do so “by law or a court order.” 
This exception to the anticontact rule comes into play in the criminal-law enforcement context, where 
case law indicates that prosecutors and/or their agents (including informants) are, prior to indictment, 
“authorized by law” to use accepted techniques in conducting criminal investigations and questioning 
of represented suspects not in custody, and need not go through the suspect’s lawyer. (Cases 
reflecting varying degrees of approval of, or limitations on, application of this exception are collected 
in ABA Formal Op. 95-396 at 9-10 nn.23-29 (July 28, 1995).) There is no such authorization, 
however, after indictment or, arguably, if the suspect is in custody pre-indictment. See, e.g., United 
States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993). 
The “authorized by law” exception is also available on the civil side, in government investigations of 
possible violation of civil law. See, e.g., 29 USC § 657(a)(2) (2000) (OSHA provision permitting 
Secretary of Labor representatives to inspect work places and “to question privately” employers or 
employees); ABA Informal Op. 83-1496 (Feb. 9, 1983) (government inspector/lawyer may conduct 
authorized inspection of regulated business without prior consent of lawyer for business). See 
generally Ernest F. Lidge III, Government Civil Investigations and the Ethical Bar on 
Communicating with Represented Parties, 67 Ind. L.J. 549, 569-86 (1992) (arguing for narrow 
interpretation of authorized-by-law exception). 
This law-enforcement aspect of the authorized-by-law exception is now summarized in Ohio Rule 
4.2 cmt. [5]: 
 Communications authorized by law may include 
communications by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a 
constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the government. 
Communications authorized by law may also include investigative 
activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or 
through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or 
civil enforcement proceedings. When communicating with the accused 
in a criminal matter, a governmental lawyer must comply with this 
Rule in addition to honoring the constitutional rights of the accused. 
The fact that a communication does not violate a state or federal 
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constitutional right is insufficient to establish that the communication 
is permissible under this Rule. 
For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of the exception, see ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 418-19 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). 
Finally, it should be noted that in 1989, U.S. Attorney General Thornburgh took the position that 
federal prosecutors “could not be sanctioned [under state ethics law] for contacts with a [represented] 
defendant ‘in the course of authorized law enforcement activity.’“ Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct 
(ABA/BNA) § 71:308 (2004). The Department of Justice sought to codify this exemption, which 
purported to allow federal prosecutors to make ex parte contact with represented suspects before 
charge, arrest, or indictment, by regulations promulgated in 1994. The organized bar disputed the 
DOJ’s power, under a general grant of regulatory authority, to do so (see ABA Formal Op. 95-396 at 
23-24 (July 28, 1995) (“A general grant of regulatory authority to an agency is not sufficient to 
support the issuance of regulations that permit what other law forbids.” The opinion does concede, 
however, that preindictment contact approved by existing precedent is “authorized by law,” id. at 
12)). The courts generally agreed. See id. at 9-10 nn. 23-29. The matter was resolved in 1998, when 
Congress enacted legislation confirming that federal attorneys are subject to state ethics rules. See 28 
USC § 530B(a) (2006); see generally ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
419-20 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). Efforts to water down this legislation in the wake of 9/11 were 
unsuccessful. Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 71:308 (2004). 
  
4.2:230  Communications “Authorized by Law” - Other 
Outside the law-enforcement arena, the authorized-by-law exception comes into play where a party 
invokes sunshine or other public information laws to obtain information directly from the government. 
See Ohio Rule 4.2 cmt. [5]. This was the result under the former OHCPR as well. See, e.g., 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 90-91-01 (n.d.), which opined that a party in litigation with the 
government can obtain information available under the Ohio Public Records Act (ORC 149.43) 
without dealing with the government’s lawyer; such conduct did not violate former DR 7-104. The 
same result presumably would follow with respect to a Freedom of Information Act request under 
federal law. 
Another aspect of the “authorized-by-law” exception was explored in Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-7, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 14 (April 10, 1992). One of 
the questions presented was whether an attorney representing an interest adverse to a government 
board or commission could attend a public meeting of that board or commission and explain his 
client’s position in the absence of the government’s attorney being present. In opining that the lawyer 
could do so (after identifying himself or herself), the Board cited the public-meeting provision, ORC 
121.22(C), which declares that public meetings “are open to the public at all times.” The Board also 
quoted from former comment [1] of Model Rule 4.2, which stated that “[c]ommunications authorized 
by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government agency to speak 
with government officials about the matter.” (This sentence was deleted from Comment [1] by the 
2002 amendments and, as revised, its subject matter is now treated in the first sentence of MR 4.2 
cmt. [5]. ABA Report to House of Delegates No. 401 (Feb. 2002), Model Rule 4.2, Reporter’s 
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Explanation of Changes. This revised language likewise constitutes the first sentence of Ohio Rule 
4.2 cmt. [5]. See section 4.2:240.) 
Other examples of permissible contact with a person known to be represented by counsel include: 
 service of process on defendant, see OH Civ R 4.1; 
 contact pursuant to court order or under the supervision of the court (e.g., deposition or trial 
interrogation of a represented nonclient witness); see Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2006-5, 2006 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 9, 2006). 
 ex parte contact with members of a certified class pursuant to court order after notice and 
hearing; contact with putative class members also permitted pre-certification; and 
 contact pursuant to a contractual provision specifying that notice is to go to a designated 
nonclient, even if that individual is known to be represented. 
See generally 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. g (2000). 
  
4.2:240  Communication with a Represented Government Agency or Officer 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.73 (1996). 
Ex parte communications involving the government present a unique set of policy concerns. At least 
one commentator argues that, on the one hand, the government deserves the same protection from 
overreaching and same protection of the lawyer-client relationship as do private parties; on the other, 
the concept of openness in government and the fundamental right to petition the government for 
redress of grievances suggests that the ex parte communication ban should be drawn narrowly as 
applied to the government. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 11.6.2, at 614-15 (1986). 
Ohio Rule 4.2 deals with this aspect in the first sentence of Comment [5]: “Communications 
authorized by law may include communications by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a 
constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the government.” Rule 4.2 cmt. [5]. See 2 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 38.8, at 
38-16 (3d ed. Supp. 2011): 
[A] lawyer for a private party who is in litigation with the government 
may seek ex parte interviews with relevant government officials. If the 
normal bar of Rule 4.2 were applied stringently, the government 
agency’s lawyer could veto discussions between private parties and 
governmental officials, which is questionable policy, and might raise 
questions under the “petition for redress of grievances” clause of the 
First Amendment. 
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See also Camden v. Maryland, 910 F.Supp. 1115, 1118 n.8 (D. Md. 1996) (“Insofar as a party’s 
right to speak with government officials about a controversy is concerned, Rule 4.2 has been 
uniformly interpreted as inapplicable.”). 
Most of the prior Ohio law on the represented-government-party subject was found in an extensive 
1992 opinion of the BCGD, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-7, 1992 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 14 (April 10, 1992), in which the Board attempted to set forth the 
accommodations in this area. The Board first opined that the former 7-104(A)(1) constraints on ex 
parte communication did apply to an attorney’s communication with a government party represented 
by counsel. Special problems arose, however, in identifying who within the government should be 
considered as the party for purposes of the rule, and when the government should be considered as 
being represented on a particular matter. 
As to the first point, the Board determined that for purposes of 7-104(A)(1), a government party was 
“an employee, public official or public body with authority to bind the government to settle a litigable 
matter, or whose act or omission gave rise to the matter.” Op. 92-7, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 14, at *9. Any broader definition would inhibit the flow of information between the public 
and the government, and would too severely impede the process of gathering evidence by those 
opposing the government in litigation. See also Johnson v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 231 F. 
Supp.2d 690 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (citing Opinion 92-7 in concluding that former OH DR 7-104(A)(1) 
did not prohibit plaintiff’s counsel’s contact with retired Deputy Director of Finance and Planning of 
defendant even if he could be considered a current employee, because he did not have authority to 
bind the government or settle a matter and did not engage in conduct giving rise to the matter). 
As to the second point, the Board recognized that technically the government might be seen as always 
being represented by counsel on every matter that has arisen or may arise affecting the government. 
The Board found this interpretation too broad, in light of the policies to be accommodated, and chose 
instead a more limited approach. For purposes of the former rule, the restriction on communication 
began “once government counsel has been brought into the matter.” Op. 92-7, 1992 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 14, at *10. 
Since it may be difficult for an outside lawyer to know whether government counsel has yet been 
engaged on the matter in question, the outside lawyer should identify himself and the purpose of the 
communication when dealing with persons within the government so that they might inform the 
outside counsel whether government counsel has been brought in. Upon being informed that counsel 
has been engaged, the outside lawyer will then “know” that the government is represented, and the ex 
parte communication restrictions will attach. 
Once the restriction attaches, it works much like it would in the private setting. For example, it would 
be improper to send settlement offers or other communication directly to a government department or 
agency, even if the original is served on the government’s attorney. Id. at *17. 
Because of the need for openness in government, the Board also stated that a government department 
or agency or its counsel should not give blanket instructions to all of its employees not to 
communicate with counsel representing an adverse party unless the government’s attorney is present. 
Id. at *14. The opinion does not clearly resolve whether advising government employees that they 
need not consent to such communications would be permissible. In addition, the Board opined that 
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DR 7-104(A)(1) did not prohibit an attorney from speaking at a public meeting on behalf of an 
individual or a group of citizens, or on behalf of himself. That apparently fell within the “authorized 
by law” exception. The attorney should identify himself, however, especially if “the communication 
involves a disputed matter in which the attorney is appearing before a government party [who] has 
consulted with counsel regarding the matter.” Op. 92-7, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 14, at 
*14. 
The extent to which the guidelines set down in Opinion 92-7 survive under Rule 4.2 is unclear. This 
would appear to be one of those issues that will have to await interpretation by the Supreme Court as 
cases under Rule 4.2 arise. 
  
4.2:250  Communication with a Confidential Agent of Nonclient 
So far as we are aware, this subject is not dealt with in either the Ohio Rules or the Model Rules. It is 
touched upon in 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 102 cmt. d (2000). The 
Restatement comment states the rule of several decisions holding that 
a lawyer representing a client in a matter may not communicate 
concerning the representation with a nonclient agent who the lawyer 
knows is likely to possess extensive and relevant confidential 
information of another nonclient interested in the matter that is 
confidential with respect to the lawyer’s client. Those decisions 
typically involve a person -- for example, an expert witness or 
paralegal assisting opposing counsel -- whose employment has entailed 
exposure to extensive confidential information about the principal, 
who likely possesses little information that is not privileged, and whose 
role as confidential agent should have been apparent to the inquiring 
lawyer. 
Id. Among the cases cited in the reporter’s note to comment d is Am. Motors Corp. v. Huffstetler, 
61 Ohio St.3d 343, 575 N.E.2d 116 (1991) (ex-employee/attorney enjoined from disclosing 
privileged information of former corporate employer to lawyers opposing former employer in 
product-liability litigation and offering himself as expert witness on behalf of plaintiffs in such 
litigation), but the thrust of the case is directed to the impropriety of the conduct of the “confidential 
[ex-]agent,” not the lawyers to whom he sought to sell his wares. See also Paul v. Rawlings Sporting 
Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (denying defendant-manufacturer’s motion to 
disqualify plaintiff’s expert witness based on status of witness as former agent/expert for defendant, 
where prior role related primarily to running tests on manufacturer’s equipment, with discussion of 




OHIO LEGAL ETHICS 4.3 
Copyright © 2013 Jones Day 
Ohio Legal Ethics 
2013 Update 
IV. TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN CLIENTS
RULE 4.3  DEALING WITH UNREPRESENTED PERSON 
NOTE: This document is current through December 2013. 
4.3 
Return to Table of Contents
971
Ohio Legal Ethics 4.3  
 
 
4.3:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 4.3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 4.3 
  
4.3:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 4.3 is identical to the Model Rule. 
  
4.3:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 4.3: DR 7-104(A)(2). 
  
4.3:200  Dealing with Unrepresented Person 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 4.3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 4.3 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.75 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 71:501 
ALI-LGL § 103 
Wolfram § 11.6.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.75 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 4.3 applies in situations where a lawyer, acting on behalf of a client, deals with an un-
represented person. See also ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 423-24 (7th 
ed. 2011) (commentary) (discussing the interplay between MR 4.2 and MR 4.3 with respect to 
unrepresented employees of represented corporations or other entities). Comment [1] similarly refers 
the reader to Rule 1.13(d) regarding misunderstandings that can arise when a lawyer for an organi-
zation deals with an unrepresented constituent. Ohio Rule 4.3 cmt. [1]. See section 1.13:400. Con-
tacts with unrepresented third parties outside the context of client representation are regulated, where 
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applicable, by the advertising rules Ohio Rule 7.1 et seq., and the general restrictions on lawyer 
conduct contained in Ohio Rule 8.4. 
Ohio Rule 4.3 imposes two restrictions. First, the Rule prohibits a lawyer, in dealing on behalf of a 
client with a person unrepresented by counsel, from stating or implying that the lawyer is disinter-
ested. If the lawyer knows or should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's 
role in the matter, the lawyer must make reasonable efforts to correct that misunderstanding. Second, 
under the Rule, the lawyer shall not give any legal advice to such a person, other than to obtain 
counsel, if the lawyer knows or should know that the person's interests are or have a reasonable 
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the lawyer's client. The first limitation was not 
addressed in the former OHCPR; the second was treated in OH DR 7-104(A)(2). 
Misunderstanding the lawyer's role: One concern underlying the Rule is a fear that at times unrep-
resented parties may not understand the role of the lawyer and may believe the lawyer to be disin-
terested rather than a partisan acting on behalf of a client. The Rule places two duties on the lawyer to 
help avoid this misunderstanding. First, the lawyer can do nothing to foster such a misperception; the 
lawyer "shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested." Ohio Rule 4.3. Even without the 
lawyer's encouragement, an unrepresented party may still misunderstand the lawyer's role. If the 
lawyer "knows or reasonably should know" that such a misunderstanding has occurred, the lawyer 
must make "reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding." Id. To avoid this situation, Comment 
[1] advises the "a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client, and where necessary, 
explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person." Ohio Rule 4.3 cmt. 
[1]. 
The Board of Commissioners confronted this issue in a 1996 opinion concerning whether counsel 
retained by a tortfeasor's insurer could prepare an application for guardianship appointment and an 
application for approval of settlement and appear before the court with respect to these matters to 
secure the settlement of an unrepresented minor's injury claim. Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievance & 
Discipline Op. 96-2 (Feb. 2, 1996). In the Board's view, one of the potential pitfalls was a possibility 
that the unrepresented minor, or the minor's unrepresented parents, might believe that the lawyer was 
to some extent representing their interests in the matter. 
In response, the Board stated that the lawyer could avoid concern through a two-pronged disclo-
sure--disclosing the identity of the attorney's client to the unrepresented party and clearly stating that 
the attorney does not represent the unrepresented party. As an added precaution, the Board advised 
that, with respect to the documents, the lawyer should make clear to the unrepresented parties that the 
documents were prepared at the insurer-client's request, and that the unrepresented parties can secure 
their own counsel to review them. With respect to the court appearance, counsel should make ap-
propriate disclosure to the court to assure that the court is not misled as to the role of counsel. 
Giving advice where interests do or may conflict: In applying Ohio Rule 4.3, it is important to rec-
ognize that the Rule does not prohibit communication by the lawyer to an unrepresented third party. It 
only prohibits giving that person "legal advice" when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know 
that such a person's interests are or have "a reasonable possibility" of being in conflict with the client's 
interests. Determining which types of communication constitute "legal advice" and when the rea-
sonable-possibility-of-conflict standard has been met can be difficult. 
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The phrase "legal advice" is a limited one; not every utterance from an attorney constitutes legal 
advice. But its exact boundaries are uncertain. Comment [2] addresses this issue by identifying cer-
tain types of conduct that might be considered giving legal advice, but are not. Thus, the Rule 
does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction 
or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the 
lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is 
not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the 
terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle 
a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and 
explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the 
lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations. 
Ohio Rule 4.3 cmt. [2]. 
A lawyer is prohibited from providing legal advice only when the lawyer "knows or reasonably 
should know" that the interests of the client and unrepresented person "are or have a reasonable 
possibility of being in conflict," for it is in this situation that the chance of lawyer overreaching and 
corresponding harm to the unrepresented person's interests is the greatest. Ohio Rule 4.3 & cmt. [2]. 
The "reasonable possibility" standard is, by necessity, a fluid one, turning on the circumstances of 
each case, which may include "the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well 
as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur." Id. 
Guidance in applying this legal-advice aspect can be found in ethics opinions interpreting the anal-
ogous OHCPR provision, DR 7-104(A)(2). 
A prosecuting attorney, for example, often deals with numerous individuals in the context of a case. 
There is usually no conflict between their interests and the state's. If a conflict becomes apparent, the 
prosecutor still will need to communicate with these individuals, but must be careful that the com-
munication does not slip into the provision of advice. It is often necessary, however, for a prosecutor 
to give information about the law and its consequences to secure an individual's cooperation in the 
matter. Would this be providing legal advice and, therefore, contrary to the Rule? Under the former 
OHCPR and its similar provisions, the Ohio State Bar Association suggested that it was. In a 1981 
opinion, the OSBA found it improper for a prosecuting attorney to tell a welfare recipient that "to 
knowingly make false statements to him could be welfare fraud," where her continued receipt of 
welfare assistance was dependent on her cooperation in a state-initiated paternity and child support 
action that she did not want to bring. Ohio State Ass'n Informal Op. 81-8, at 2 (Sept. 4, 1981). The 
provision of this information was treated as the giving of advice. 
In contrast, the Cincinnati Bar Association gave an opinion that an attorney may comply with ORC 
2307.61(A)(2)(a), which provides that certain types of recovery are available in a civil collections 
matter only if a demand letter is sent to the debtor, which letter includes "an overview of the damages 
available to the plaintiff." Cincinnati Bar Ass'n Op. 93-94-02, at 1 (n.d.). As the Cincinnati Bar 
Association saw it, the letter involved making a demand, not giving legal advice. 
The Board of Commissioners dealt with the legal-advice issue in Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 96-2 (Feb. 2, 1996). Opinion 96-2 involved the settlement of a tort claim asserted by 
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a minor claimant. Neither the minor nor his parents were represented during settlement negotiations. 
The lawyer retained by the tortfeasor's insurer sought advice as to whether he could prepare the ap-
plication for appointment of guardian and for approval of the settlement, and appear before the court 
for final approval of the settlement. In responding that this would not be improper, provided certain 
disclosures were made to the minor and parents and to the court, the Board opined that 
the preparation of the documents for the court to appoint a guardian and 
to approve the guardian's settlement of a minor's claim does not con-
stitute the giving of legal advice to an unrepresented party. The doc-
uments facilitate settlement and are required by law. The documents 
record the agreement arrived at from the settlement negotiations. The 
documents are prepared at the request of the attorney's client and are 
not undertaken as a representation of the minor. 
Op. 96-2, at *3. On the facts and assumptions stated, the advice given by the Board in Opinion 96-2 is 
consistent with the standards set forth in Ohio Rule 4.3 and its comments, particularly Comment [2]. 
Decisions under DR 7-104(A)(2) on the possible-conflict issue include Cuyahoga Bar Ass'n v. 
Vitullo, 86 Ohio St.3d 549, 715 N.E.2d 1136 (1999) (rule violated by advising couple prior to rep-
resentation with respect to lawsuit on behalf of their son, despite potential that son's employer, one of 
lawyer's existing clients, could be named a defendant). Accord Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Deffet, 98 
Ohio St.3d 384, 2003 Ohio 1090, 785 N.E.2d 746 (rule violated by meeting with client and her es-
tranged husband to have them sign quitclaim deed transferring marital residence to client; respondent 
did not ask husband whether he was represented, nor did he suggest that husband consult independent 
counsel concerning the transaction). Compare Yosemite Inv., Inc. v. Floyd Bell, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 
882, 885 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (contact with unrepresented nonclient did not violate 7-104(A)(2) in 
"absence of any showing whatsoever" that nonclient's interests are adverse to those of lawyer's cli-
ents). Where the interests are or may be adverse, the concern is that the lawyer may take unfair ad-
vantage of the third party by providing advice that serves the client's interests alone, but on which the 
third party unwittingly will rely. In a 1994 Supreme Court case applying the DR 7-104(A)(2) prohi-
bition, a lawyer was found to have violated the rule when he prepared and submitted various legal 
documents on behalf of the mother and child in a paternity action, including a consent judgment entry 
dismissing the parentage action with prejudice, while representing the alleged father.  Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Rich, 69 Ohio St.3d 470, 633 N.E.2d 1114 (1994). 
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4.4:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 4.4 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 4.4 
  
4.4:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 4.4 is identical to the Model Rule, with one exception: “harass,” is added after 
“embarrass,” in division (a). 
  
4.4:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 4.4(a): DR 7-102(A)(1), 7-106(C)(2), & 
7-108(D) & (E). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 4.4(b): None. 
  
4.4:200  Disregard of Rights or Interests of Third Persons 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 4.4(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 4.4(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.104 
Commentary 
ALI-LGL § 106 
Wolfram § 12.4.4 
As noted in Comment [1], while the interests of a lawyer’s client are paramount, responsibility to the 
client “does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons.” Rule 4.4 cmt. [1]. 
Thus, Ohio Rule 4.4(a) prohibits a lawyer from using 
means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, harass, 
delay, or burden a third person, or [from using] methods of obtaining 
evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person. 
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The Rule addresses two concerns. The first, applicable in any setting, prohibits engaging in certain 
harmful conduct directed at third persons. The second is tied to evidence gathering and prohibits the 
use of methods that would violate the legal rights of the third person. See Rule 4.4 cmt. [1]. The 
former turns on the purpose of the conduct; the latter turns on whether the means used violated legal 
rights of the third party. See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 418-19 (6th 
ed. 2007) (commentary) (discussing, as within prohibition against obtaining evidence by means that 
violate rights of third persons, eliciting confidential information from others and covert information 
gathering by surreptitious copying of opposing counsel’s evidentiary documents). The ethics 
opinions cited by the ABA all arise in a litigation setting, but this “obtaining evidence” portion of 
Rule 4.4(a) is probably not so limited.  See Ronald D. Rotunda & John S. Dzienkowski, Legal 
Ethics, The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Responsibility § 4.4-2(a), at 905 (2009-10).  The 
authors see the standard as applying to “information” and evidence gathering, not only in litigation, 
but also in anticipated litigation, in internal corporate investigations, and in transactional work where 
one side is trying to obtain information about participants on the other side of the table. The 
internal-corporate-investigation aspect (specifically the use of private investigators in the 
Hewlett-Packard affair) is examined in Carol K. Metz, Do You Know What Your PI Is Doing? 
Cleve B.J., Apr. 2007, at 14.  
The Rule 4.4(a) prohibition also includes “unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such 
as the client-lawyer relationship.” Ohio Rule 4.4 cmt. [1]. 
There was one Ohio ethics opinion decided under the Code that dealt with the obtaining-evidence 
issue, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 97-3, 1997 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 
(June 13, 1997). In Opinion 97-3 the Board opined that a lawyer’s surreptitious recording of 
conversations with clients, witnesses, opposing parties, opposing counsel, or others, without their 
notification or consent, may violate DR 1-102(A)(4). The opinion recognizes exceptions to the ban on 
surreptitious recording, including lawful criminal-law enforcement activity, criminal-defense 
representation activity undertaken to protect the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, and 
“extraordinary circumstances exception (which might include attorneys’ needs to defend themselves 
or their clients against wrongdoing by another).” Id. at *7-8. Note that these exceptions are, at least in 
part, recognized under the Rules in Ohio Rule 8.4 cmt. [2A], discussed in section 8.4:400 at “In 
general.” At least two disciplinary cases under the Code involved secret taping by a lawyer. The first 
is Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson, 95 Ohio St.3d 364, 768 N.E.2d 617 (2002), in which 
the lawyer was found to have violated former DR 1-102(A)(4) by surreptitiously recording 
conversations with his client’s son and the son’s attorney. Opinion 97-3 was not cited. In the second 
case, a former prosecuting attorney secretly videotaped his meeting with Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel investigators who were pursuing allegations of unethical conduct filed against him.  Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n v. Stern, 103 Ohio St.3d 491, 2004 Ohio 5464, 817 N.E.2d 14 (acknowledging 
Opinion 97-3, and “fully agree[ing] with the proposition that attorneys generally should not employ 
surreptitious taping in the course of their legal representation,” id. at para. 21, but declining to use it 
and its exceptions as “definitive guide” in deciding case at bar, which presented “unique 
circumstances,” resolution of which (dismissal of charges) was expressly limited by Court 
“exclusively” to situation presented). The Stern case is further discussed in section 8.4:400 at 
“Misconduct in the judicial process.” 
Opinion 97-3 was withdrawn by the Board in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
978
Ohio Legal Ethics 4.4  
 
2012-1, 2012 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (June 8, 2012). While the primary focus of the advisory 
opinion is on Rule 8.4(c) (see section 8.4:200 infra for discussion of 2012-1 under that rule), with 
respect to Rule 4.4 the Board notes that surreptitious recording violates the rule if employed for no 
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, harass, delay or burden a third person, or if it is a means 
of obtaining evidence that violates a third person’s legal rights. (Although the opinion does not so 
state, the applicable subsection, 4.4(a), is conditioned on this misconduct being taken “[i]n 
representing a client.”). By statute, secret recordings of conversations by a party to the conversation 
are legal in Ohio unless done for an improper purpose. ORC 2933.52. 
Note as well that the Statement on Professionalism, issued by the Supreme Court in February 1997, 
contains aspirational statements urging lawyers to be courteous and civil in their dealings with other 
lawyers, their clients, and the courts and their staffs. It is set forth in full as an appendix to the Rules 
for the Government of the Bar at Gov Bar R App. V. 
Rule 4.4(a) is in some respects analogous to former DR 7-102(A)(1), but there are important 
differences. Thus, while 7-102(A)(1) prohibited a lawyer from taking action on behalf of a client 
when the lawyer knows or it is “obvious” that the action is taken merely to harass or maliciously 
injure another, the Rule speaks of actions “having no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, 
harass,” etc. This standard is purely objective, rather than subjective/objective, as was 7-102(A)(1). 
Further, Rule 4.4(a) can be violated even if there are other purposes for the conduct, so long as those 
purposes are not “substantial”; under 7-102(A)(1), the violation was limited to action taken “merely” 
to harass or injure another. The case law dealing with the harassment aspect of the former disciplinary 
rule is collected in this section below; improper treatment of a witness is discussed in the next section, 
4.4:210. Finally, the standards differ in their definitions of harmful conduct directed at third persons. 
The former rule focused upon actions taken merely “to harass or maliciously injure” a third party, 
whereas Rule 4.4(a) provides a more extensive list of improper purposes -- “embarrass, harass, delay, 
or burden.” This difference, however, may be of little import. Each new item in the expanded list 
might fall within the malicious injury category under the former rule and any other type of malicious 
injury under the former rule might be a “burden” under the new one. (Ohio’s addition of “harass” to 
the Model Rule list is a continuation of the harassment language contained in the analogous former 
disciplinary rules, DR 7-102(A) and 7-108(D) & (E). See the Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 4.4.) 
Case law under former OH DR 7-102(A)(1): In some instances under the former OHCPR, the 
harassing misconduct was clear. Bringing a baseless civil suit against another, in retaliation for 
defendant’s having filed a grievance against respondent, fell into this category and violated DR 
7-102(A)(1), among other provisions.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Elsass, 86 Ohio St.3d 195, 713 
N.E.2d 421 (1999). Accord Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Chandler, 81 Ohio St.3d 491, 692 
N.E.2d 568 (1998) (sanctions imposed on lawyer who sued grievant lawyer and relator bar 
association and its counsel in retaliation for being charged with disciplinary violation). Similarly, 
filing a disciplinary grievance against opposing counsel simply to gain an advantage in litigation 
violated former 7-102(A)(1).  Hecht v. Levin, 66 Ohio St.3d 458, 613 N.E.2d 585 (1993). 
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Repeated filing of malicious and harassing lawsuits by an attorney against numerous defendants also 
violated this rule.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Pollock, 100 Ohio St.3d 280, 2003 Ohio 5752, 
798 N.E.2d 594 (20 meritless state and federal lawsuits filed against an array of defendants; 
characterized as “personal crusade,” “blind determination to ruin those he seemed to consider his 
clients’ oppressors,” “‘character assassination,’“ id. at paras. 46, 48), as did a series of unfounded 
lawsuits against a single defendant in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mitchell, 118 Ohio St.3d 98, 2008 
Ohio 1822, 886 N.E.2d 222. Likewise, in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Baumgartner, 100 
Ohio St.3d 41, 2003 Ohio 4756, 796 N.E.2d 495, the filing by respondent of various unfounded 
citizen’s complaints against numerous public officials, claiming, “in what can only be described as a 
vendetta,” corruption and conspiracy, etc., etc., violated 7-102(A)(1), id. at para. 9. Accord 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009 Ohio 2870, 909 N.E.2d 1271 (multiple 
accusations of bias and corruption against state and federal judges and county prosecutor). See also 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Finneran, 80 Ohio St.3d 428, 687 N.E.2d 405 (1997) (former OH DR 
7-102(A)(1) violation for improper delay in repeatedly filing cases, taking voluntary dismissals rather 
than complying with discovery requests, and then refiling those cases -- a tactic often resorted to 
several times in the same case, all in the hope of obtaining acceptable settlement offers). The rule also 
could be violated if a lawyer filed separate and multiplicitous lawsuits in representing a client on a 
matter in which the issues involved could be resolved in pending litigation. State ex rel. Hill v. 
Niehaus, 68 Ohio St.3d 507, 628 N.E.2d 1376 (1994) (citing, inter alia, DR 7-102(A)(1) & (2) in 
support of lawyer’s obligation not to engage in such conduct). 
But a pattern and practice of malicious or harassing conduct need not be shown. For example, a 
lawyer who, after a client obtained judgment on cognovit notes signed by the lawyer in the client’s 
favor, filed a lawsuit against the client, the attorney who confessed judgment on the notes, and several 
judges, was sanctioned under former DR 7-102(A)(1).  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Meros, 83 
Ohio St. 3d 222, 699 N.E.2d 458 (1998). Accord Akron Bar Ass’n v. Catanzarite, 119 Ohio St.3d 
313, 2008 Ohio 4063, 893 N.E.2d 835 (filing action against former prospective clients for fees “to 
exact punishment for what he perceived to be an attempt to obtain free legal advice,” id. at para. 17, 
violated DR 7-102(A)(1)). And the filing of a $5,600,000 counterclaim in response to a claim brought 
in small claims court was violative of this rule.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cox, 58 Ohio 
St.3d 124, 568 N.E.2d 1219 (1991). 
The language of the former rule made clear that filing a lawsuit was not a requisite for violation if the 
lawyer “assert[ed] a position . . . or [took] other action” that would harass or maliciously injure 
another. Thus, in Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Foster, 99 Ohio St.3d 491, 2003 Ohio 4130, 794 
N.E.2d 26, respondent was sanctioned under DR 7-102(A)(1) for directing threatening and otherwise 
unprofessional email and correspondence to the brother of respondent’s pro se opponent during 
antagonistic collection proceedings. This would certainly seem to be the case as well under the 
“means” language of Rule 4.4(a). And see Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 164, 2006 
Ohio 550, 842 N.E.2d 35, where the respondent was found to have violated DR 7-102(A)(1) by 
making a harassing telephone call to the Cleveland Police Department, the employer of the party on 
the opposite side of a child-custody dispute. In rejecting respondent’s claim that “all he intended to do 
when he called the aunt’s employer on January 30 was to find out whether she was at work,” the Court 
stated as follows: 
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But respondent did not simply ask whether the aunt was on duty; he 
held on through several transfers to reach the aunt’s supervisor and 
proceeded to report the aunt’s personal troubles [regarding the custody 
award that had gone against her]. Respondent then exacerbated the 
situation by suggesting that the aunt was involved in a kidnapping. 
Thus, we defer to the panel’s determination that respondent’s 
communications with the aunt’s employer violated DR 7-102(A)(1). 
Id. at para. 26 (bracketed material added). Respondent in Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 105 Ohio 
St.3d 443, 2005 Ohio 2695, 828 N.E.2d 621, was found to have violated 7-102(A)(1) for his attempts 
to “intimidate” a former client by demanding that he cooperate with the United States Justice 
Department’s trustee in an ongoing bankruptcy, by referring to the Chapter 11 proceedings as 
“pending” before the DOJ, and by fabricating DOJ’s supposed concern about matters in which the 
former client was involved. 
The conduct in all of these disciplinary rules decisions occurred against the backdrop of litigation, 
even though the conduct was not in the litigation itself. Inasmuch as this aspect of Rule 4.4(a) does 
not implicate evidence gathering but rather is limited only by the language “[i]n representing a 
client,” it would appear that lawyer conduct violative of the “embarrass, harass, delay, or burden” 
portion of the Rule could occur in other contexts as well, such as contract negotiations. 
As with most infractions of the former OHCPR, sanctions for violating 7-102(A)(1) varied from 
public reprimand to permanent disbarment, depending on the severity of the violation and on the 
existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. For example, an attorney sanctioned for filing 
two frivolous lawsuits received only a public reprimand in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Maniscalco, 68 Ohio St.3d 483, 628 N.E.2d 1357 (1994). In contrast, an attorney who filed thirteen 
frivolous affidavits of prejudice and motions to disqualify judges, including seven against a visiting 
judge having no prior connection with the case, was disbarred.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
O’Leary, 67 Ohio St.3d 425, 619 N.E.2d 410 (1993). 
The respondent in Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Ake, 111 Ohio St.3d 266, 2006 Ohio 5704, 855 
N.E.2d 1206, was given a stayed six-month suspension on rather unusual facts.  Ake was found to 
have violated former DR 7-102(A)(1), among other provisions, for deliberately violating court orders 
during an acrimonious dissolution-of-marriage proceeding at a time when Ake was representing 
himself.  Even though the Court recognized that such conduct generally calls for an actual suspension 
under ABA standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 6.22 (1992), mitigating circumstances and the 
Court’s conviction that respondent “would not disobey a court order in any situation other than the 
charged atmosphere of ending his own marriage,” 111 Ohio St.3d 266, at para. 46, caused it to 
accept the Board’s recommendation of a stayed suspension.  Chief Justice Moyer, in writing also for 
two other justices, dissented as to the sanction.  Invoking former DR 7-106(A) (see now Rule 3.4(c)), 
a violation of which was neither found nor apparently charged, the Chief Justice argued that the “Rule 
could not be more clear: a lawyer may not violate a court order,” id. at para. 49, and that the Court’s 
precedent called for a more severe sanction.  The dissent would have imposed an actual six-month 
suspension. 
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Harassing and malicious conduct is regulated outside the disciplinary process through several 
provisions, including OH Civ R 11, OH App R 23, SCt Prac R 14.5, and ORC 2323.51 (as to all of 
which see section 3.1:300), actions for malicious prosecution and abuse of process (see section 
3.1:400), and the courts’ exercise of the contempt power (see sections 3.1:500 and 3.5:400). 
Imposition of such sanctions has been used to support a disciplinary violation.  Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Manogg, 74 Ohio St.3d 213, 658 N.E.2d 257 (1996) (judge’s final order 
sanctioning attorney under ORC 2323.51 and OH Civ R 11, subsequent appellate opinion in the 
action, and judge’s testimony used to establish DR 7-102(A)(1) violation); see Columbus Bar Ass’n 
v. King, 95 Ohio St.3d 93, 766 N.E.2d 131 (2002) (numerous violations during probationary period 
noted, including imposition of sanctions against respondent under OH Civ R 11 for pursuing action 
despite client’s acknowledgment that she had no claim; one-year suspension imposed). [Note that the 
“vexatious litigator” statute, ORC 2323.52, enacted in 1997, applies only to a “party”; it expressly 
excludes lawyers from its reach, unless the lawyer is proceeding pro se. See ORC 2323.52(A)(2)-(3), 
(D)(2). See also SCt Prac R 14.5(B) (added by amendment effective 7/1/04), the Supreme Court’s 
similar response to the vexatious litigator problem, which also is directed at “a party.”] 
One controversial issue generated by the new technology is whether it is ethical to use various 
methods of covert information gathering, such as extracting metadata embedded in documents 
received from the other side, surreptitiously using at deposition software that purports to analyze 
speech patterns for truthfulness, or, more old-fashioned, surreptitiously copying opposing counsel’s 
documents.  While there are no cases in Ohio of which we are aware, nationally there are ethics 
opinions that condemn all of these practices, although the opinions are divided on the metadata issue.  
See generally ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 418, 622-24 (7th ed. 2011) 
(commentary); Matthew Romano & Christopher J. Caryl, Mining for Metadata: Is It Ethical 
to Search for Information Protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege?, Clev. Metro. B.J., June 
2008, at 12; Jason Krause, Metadata Minefield, ABAJ, Apr. 2007, at 32.  While both of the bar 
journal articles focus on MR 4.4(b), the metadata issue appears to us to be a Rule 4.4(a) issue as well, 
as possibly implicating the use of “methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of . . . a 
[third] person.”  The gist of ABA Formal Op. 06-442 (Aug. 5, 2006), upon which Mr. Krause’s 
article is based, talks in terms of “information inadvertently” sent.  But Rule 4.4(b) (both Ohio and 
MR) deals with “document[s] inadvertently sent.” However, as Messrs. Romano and Caryl point out 
in their article, for purposes of the Rule, “document” includes “e-mail or other electronic modes of 
transmission subject to being read or put into readable form.” Rule 4.4 cmt. [2]. Does this include 
metadata? According to Romano and Caryl, “you are left to draw your own conclusions” on that one. 
The conclusion drawn in John Hocter, Ethics in the Electronic Age, Ohio Law., Jan./Feb. 2010, 
at 9, 12-13, is that the definition contained in Comment [2] includes metadata. 
Even if Rule 4.4(b) is applicable to metadata, ABA Op. 06-442 comes down clearly on the side of the 
recipient, rather than the sender: “The Model Rules . . . do not contain any specific prohibition against 
a lawyer’s reviewing and using embedded information in electronic documents, whether received 
from opposing counsel, an adverse party, or an agent of an adverse party.” Id. at 1. Ethics opinions in 
Colorado, Maryland, and the District of Columbia (unless the recipient has actual knowledge that the 
information was inadvertently sent) follow the ABA approach. Five jurisdictions (Alabama, Arizona, 
Florida, Maine, and New York) reject the approach of ABA Opinion 06-442 and find that it is an 
ethics violation to mine for metadata; the rules most often cited are the state’s equivalent of MR 8.4(c) 
and (d). Despite these early returns going against the ABA opinion, at least one national commentary 
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is not persuaded: “Although several state ethics opinions and some [unidentified] scholars have 
worried that data mining of this kind is ‘deceptive,’ the Formal Opinion [06-442] surely states the 
better view.” 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of 
Lawyering § 40.5, at 40-16-17 (3d ed. Supp. 2013). 
Numerous other Rules impact, either directly or indirectly, on the rights and interests of third persons. 
See, e.g., 
 Ohio Rule 1.2(e) (presenting or threatening criminal or disciplinary proceedings against 
another solely to obtain advantage in a civil action), see section 1.2:900. 
 Ohio Rule 3.5(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii), (a)(4) (limitations on communications with seated or 
prospective jurors), see section 3.5:220; 
 Ohio Rule 3.8(a) (prosecutor’s obligation not to charge if institution of criminal action 
known to be unsupported by probable cause); Ohio Rule 3.8(d) (prosecutor’s duty to disclose 
evidence favorable to the accused), see, respectively, sections 3.8:200 and 3.8:500; 
 Ohio Rule 4.2 (communicating directly with person known to be represented without consent 
of that person’s lawyer or authorization by law or court order); Ohio Rule 4.3 (refraining 
from giving legal advice to unrepresented person with interests adverse to lawyer’s client, 
other than advice to secure counsel), see, respectively, sections 4.2:200 and 4.3:200; 
 Ohio Rule 7.3(a)-(e) (limitations on solicitation of prospective clients), see sections 
7.3:200-:400; and 
 Ohio Rule 8.4(g) (discrimination), see section 8.4:800. 
  
4.4:210  Cross-Examining a Truthful Witness; Fostering Falsity 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 7.104 (1996). 
Rule 4.4(a) prohibits a lawyer’s use of “means that have no substantial purpose other than to 
embarrass, harass, delay, or burden a third person, or use [of] methods of obtaining evidence that 
violate the legal rights of such a person.” Although the Rule and its comment do not expressly refer to 
witnesses, it is clear that witnesses are protected “third persons.” See ABA, Annotated Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct 416 (6th ed. 2007) (commentary) (“Abusive treatment of witnesses 
similarly implicates Rule 4.4.”). See also The Task Force’s Ohio Code Comparison, noting that 
Rule 4.4(a) contains elements of former DR 7-106(C)(2), which did directly address the witness 
point (asking questions having no relevance and with intent to degrade the witness). Disciplinary 
cases under the former rule include Akron Bar Ass’n v. Markovich, 117 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008 
Ohio 862, 883 N.E.2d 1046, stressing the intent-to-degrade aspect resulting from “inappropriate” 
questioning of witnesses (no other detail given), and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Donnell, 79 
Ohio St.3d 501, 684 N.E.2d 36 (1997), where violation of the rule was predicted on respondent’s 
pursuing on cross-examination irrelevant questions concerning drug abuse and pedophilia. 
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Using methods of this kind also is regulated in a variety of ways outside the disciplinary system. If the 
conduct is sufficiently prejudicial, it can justify overturning the result of the tainted proceeding. See, 
e.g., State v. Tolliver, 16 Ohio App.3d 120, 474 N.E.2d 642 (Cuyahoga 1984) (irrelevant and 
degrading questioning regarding witness’s sex change is prosecutorial misconduct warranting 
reversal of criminal conviction). 
While neither Ohio Rule 4.4 nor the Model Rule (or their comments) speak to the specific issue in the 
heading for this section (“Cross-Examining a Truthful Witness”), the Restatement does, but in terms 
that seem inconclusive (perhaps because “[d]iscussions of cross-examining a truthful witness are 
found only in judicial dicta and academic scholarship”). 2 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 106, reporter’s note to cmt. c (2000). Comment c states the problem, but 
provides no answers: 
A particularly difficult problem is presented when a lawyer has an 
opportunity to cross-examine a witness with respect to testimony that 
the lawyer knows to be truthful, including harsh implied criticism of 
the witness’s testimony, character, or capacity for truth-telling. Even if 
legally permissible, a lawyer would presumably do so only where that 
would not cause the lawyer to lose credibility with the tribunal or 
alienate the fact finder. 
2 Restatement § 106 cmt. c, at 141. 
Hazard and Hodes also treat the matter, but with less reluctance; in their view, tactics such as 
burdening or embarrassing an adverse witness, if doing so results in it being less likely that the 
witness will be believed,  
do not violate Rule 4.4(a), . . . because there is obviously a 
“substantial” and legitimate purpose to them. Moreover, it should make 
no difference that the examining lawyer knows that the witness is 
telling the truth. Even though cross-examining a truthful witness tends 
to move a trier of fact away from the truth rather than toward it, the 
advocate may still point to a “substantial purpose” other than harassing 
the witness, namely winning the case at hand. 
2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 40.3, 
at 40-5 (3d ed. Supp. 2008) (emphasis in original) (although the authors then go to considerable 
lengths in exploring whether this should be the rule. See id. at 40-5 to 40-8). All this, however, “does 
not mean that there are no limits on what can be done”: 
An intemperate attack upon a witness violates Rule 4.4 and, if it 
disrupts the tribunal, also violates Rule 3.5(c) [now MR 3.5(d); 
3.5(a)(5) in Ohio]. Likewise, deliberately asking improper questions 
violates Rule 4.4, as well as Rules 3.5(a) [3.5(a)(1) in Ohio] and 3.4(e). 
Moreover, outrageous trial tactics are “prejudicial to the administration 
of justice,” and may therefore be held to violate Rule 8.4(d). 
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Id. at 40-8. Hazard and Hodes’ examples of conduct that crosses the line themselves indicate the 
difficulty in determining just where that line is -- what about attacks that are “intemperate” or 
questions that are “deliberately improper” in order to win the case? 
On the truthful-witness issue in the criminal context, compare ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 
(3d ed. 1991), Standard 3-5.7(b) (prosecution should not use cross-examination to discredit adverse 
witness known to be telling the truth; limited cross permitted if prosecution believes witness truthful), 
with Standard 4-7.6(b) (defense counsel’s belief or knowledge that witness is truthful does not 
preclude cross). Accord, as to defense counsel, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) 
(White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
  
4.4:220  Threatening Prosecution [see 1.2:900] 
  
4.4:300  Duty with Respect to Receipt of Documents Inadvertently Sent 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 4.4(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 4.4(b) 
Ohio Rule 4.4(b) is identical to MR 4.4(b), added by the ABA House of Delegates in 2002. Division 
(b) provides as follows: 
 A lawyer who receives a document relating to the 
representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should 
know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify 
the sender. 
Beyond that, whether the lawyer reads the document, or returns it unread, is a matter of professional 
judgment, unless other law imposes a different duty. Ohio Rule 4.4 cmt. [3]. See infra “Inadvertent 
disclosure - Waiver implications and court-imposed requirements.” 
ABA Formal Op. 05-437 (Oct. 1, 2005) is consistent with MR 4.4(b) (as well as its Ohio 
counterpart); Opinion 05-437 withdraws Formal Opinion 92-368, which had instructed the receiving 
lawyer to refrain from examining inadvertently sent materials, to notify the sender, and to abide by the 
sender’s instructions; the earlier opinion had further stated that even if the receiving lawyer had 
examined the materials before discovering they were missent, there was value in protecting the 
confidentiality that remains -- i.e., “disclosure to counsel does not have to result in disclosure to 
counsel’s client.” Id. at 4. Presumably, under the new regime, disclosure to the client is now a course 
a receiving lawyer may follow, consistent with Rule 4.4(b). 
One aspect of the inadvertently-disclosed-document issue was addressed under the OHCPR by the 
Board of Commissioners in Opinion 93-11. The Board there opined that, in the context of a public 
records search prior to litigation, a lawyer who without wrongdoing obtained a copy of an 
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inadvertently disclosed memorandum that appeared to contain privileged information, had no ethical 
duty to refrain from reading the memo or from sharing the contents with the client. The lawyer did, 
however, have a duty to notify the source of the document and return a copy upon request. Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-11, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Dec. 3, 
1993). 
This Board’s view is that within the Code, there is no express or 
implied duty to protect an opposing party’s confidences and secrets. 
Rather, the lawyer’s duty under Disciplinary Rule 4-101 is to protect 
the confidences and secrets of his or her client. 
Id. at *3. Presumably, this duty to protect only client “confidences and secrets” under the Code is 
similarly one-sided under the “information related to the representation” rubric of the Rules. 
With respect to the Opinion’s advice that the obtaining lawyer had the obligation to both notify the 
source and return the document on request, Rule 4.4(b) (assuming it applies in the 
public-records-search situation, and most likely it does) now makes clear that a recipient’s duty is 
limited to providing prompt notice to the source. The lawyer is free to return the document if she so 
chooses, but there is no obligation to do so unless other law requires. See Ohio Rule 4.4 cmt. [3] 
(setting forth this “professional judgment” rule). This issue is further discussed in section 8.4:400 at 
“Misconduct in the judicial process.” 
Inadvertent disclosure - Waiver implications and court-imposed requirements:  While the ethical duty 
under Ohio Rule 4.4(b) in dealing with inadvertently disclosed documents is limited to mere 
notification of receipt to the sender, there are also at least two Ohio state cases and a number of Ohio 
federal cases dealing with the inadvertent-disclosure-of-documents issue in the context of whether 
such conduct constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client or work-product privilege and/or what the 
duties of the receiving lawyer are. See Air-Ride, Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 2008 Ohio 5669, 
2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4761 (Clinton) (affirming trial court’s employment of balancing test in 
determining that privilege waived by inadvertent disclosure on facts presented in case at bar); 
Miles-McClellan Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Educ., 2006 Ohio 3439, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3366 
(Franklin) (reversed and remanded for mandatory hearing at which balancing test to be applied to 
determine whether waiver of privilege occurred); Evenflo v. Hantec Agents Ltd., No. 3-:05- 
CV-346, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74684 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (court, in applying balancing test, found 
that each of the factors favored finding of waiver; sender’s motion to compel return of documents 
denied); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., No. 2:05- CV-688, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40461 (S.D. 
Ohio 2006) (ordering return of work-product document inadvertently disclosed; balancing test 
applied; document not to be used by recipient for any purpose); Van Hull v. Marriott Courtyard, 63 
F. Supp.2d 840 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (denying defendant’s demand that plaintiff produce unredacted 
copy of previously disclosed privileged information and all other documents containing privileged 
information on same subject matter); Transp. Equip. Sales Corp. v. BMY Wheeled Vehicles, 930 
F. Supp. 1187 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (rejecting argument that inadvertent disclosure of privileged 
document resulted in general loss of attorney-client privilege; recipient was required, as matter of 
professional responsibility, to inform sending counsel of receipt and return it without using or 
disseminating it; court relies on ABA Formal Opinion 92-368, since withdrawn -- see discussion 
above). These cases are further discussed in sections 1.6:500 and 1.6:750. The use (or misuse) of 
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email disclaimers is explored in Karen E. Rubin, Can E-mail Disclaimers Help Avoid a Privilege 
Waiver?, Ohio Law., Nov/Dec 2009, at 9. 
The federal inadvertent disclosure cases using the balancing test have in essence now been codified in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b), adopted in 2008 (there is no Ohio counterpart), which provides 
that 
[w]hen made in a Federal proceeding or to a Federal office or agency, 
the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal or State 
proceeding if: 
(1) the disclosure is inadvertent 
(2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable 
steps to prevent disclosure; and 
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the 
error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Court 
Procedure 26(b)(5)(B). 
 
Under Federal Rule 26(b)(5)(B), upon notice to the recipient of the claim of privilege by the holder, 
the recipient must, inter alia, “promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and 
any copies” and “may not use or disclosure the information until the claim is resolved.” Ohio adopted 
the substance of this provision in its Rule of Civil Procedure 26(B)(6)(b), effective July 1, 2008. As 
noted in the Staff Notes to the 2008 amendments to the Civil Rules, 
 
[t]he amendments to [sic: promulgation of] Rule 26(B)(6)(b) do[es] not 
conflict with the new Ohio Rule Prof. Conduct 4.4(b) requirement that 
an attorney who “knows or reasonably should know that the document 
was inadvertently sent” must “promptly notify the sender.” Rather, the 
two rules work in concert: Rule 26(B)(6)(b) is triggered when actual 
notification is received from the sender that the material was 
inadvertently sent, and Ohio Rule Prof. Conduct 4.4(b) is animated 
when the recipient realizes that the material provided by an opponent is 
likely privileged. 
See further discussion of the issue in section 1.6:500 at “Inadvertent disclosure.” See also ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 432-34 (7th ed. 2011). In James M. Altman, 
Model Rule 4.4(b) Should Be Amended, 21 Prof. Law. No. 1, at 16 (2011), the author argues that 
the protection afforded by these provisions is inadequate. 
Receipt of unauthorized disclosures:  A related issue is the lawyer’s obligation when he or she 
receives documents from an unauthorized source.  Here the disclosure is not inadvertent, but rather is 
unauthorized.  According to MR 4.4 cmt. [2], in language omitted from the Ohio analog, “this Rule 
does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a document that the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know may have been wrongfully obtained by the sending person.”  One presumes 
this is also the intent of the Ohio Rule 4.4(b), but the drafters chose not to include warnings about 
what the Rule does not cover.  Given the limited scope of MR 4.4(b), the ABA in Formal Op. 06-440 
(May 13, 2006), withdrew its earlier opinion (94-382), which dealt with materials known or 
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appearing to be privileged or otherwise confidential, provided by a person not authorized to provide 
them.  Opinion 06-440 expressly states that the “Rule does not require refraining from reviewing the 
materials or abiding by instructions from the sender.”  The net result is, irrespective of whether the 
document was sent inadvertently (Opinion 05-437), or without authorization (Opinion 06-440), the 
receiving lawyer has no ethics obligations other than those set forth in MR 4.4(b) – indeed, “if the 
providing of the materials is not the result of the sender’s inadvertence,” 4.4(b) does not apply at all, 
and the receiving lawyer is not required to notify the other party or his lawyer of receipt as a matter of 
compliance with the Rules.  Formal Op. 06-440, at 2. 
While Ohio Rule 4.4(b) is silent on this matter, that does not mean the lawyer can retain or use 
documents sent to them from unauthorized sources free of ethical concerns.  While other law must be 
consulted to determine if retention or use of such documents is proper, if it is not, other ethical 
obligations can be triggered.  Receipt and or use of such documents may be seen as conversion, 
receipt or use of stolen property, or participating in the misappropriation of documents, which might 
raise Ohio Rule 8.4(b) issues.  Ohio Rule 4.4(a)’s admonition not to “use methods of obtaining 
evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person” may be implicated as well.  If the client 
procured the documents illegally, the lawyer’s use of the documents may be seen as assisting a client 
in illegal activity in violation of Ohio Rule 1.2.  Issues as to whether the documents may be used at 
trial or whether the lawyer will be disqualified for reviewing them also can arise.  See generally 1 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60 cmt. m & reporter’s note thereto 
(2000); 30 Judith A. McMorrow & Daniel R. Coquillette, Moore’s Federal Practice 
§ 809.03[2][b] (3d ed. 2011); Michael Downey, Thanks for the Headache, ABAJ, March 2010, at
p. 25. 
The latest 4.4(b) gloss by the ABA is set forth in ABA Formal Op. 11-460 (Aug. 4, 2011). If an 
employer, involved in litigation against an employee, obtains emails of privileged communications 
between the employee and her lawyer off of the employee’s workplace computer and provides them 
to the employer’s outside counsel, neither Model Rule 4.4(b) (not “inadvertently sent”) nor any other 
Rule requires the employer’s counsel to notify the employee’s lawyer of the receipt, although 
decisions, civil procedure rules, or other law, may impose such a duty. Contra Stengart v. Loving 
Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010) (violation of state’s version of 4.4(b)). 
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5.1:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.1 cmts. [2] & [3] 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.1 
  
5.1:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 5.1 differs substantially from the Model Rule. MR 5.1(a) and (b) have not been adopted in 
Ohio, although comparable standards remain as aspirational goals in the Ohio comments. MR 5.1(c) 
is adopted in Ohio, along with language making it clear that the provision applies to lawyers in a 
government agency as well as those in a law firm. 
  
5.1:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 5.1: None. 
  
5.1:200  Duty of Partners to Monitor Compliance with Professional Rules 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.1 cmt. [2] 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.1(a) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:103 
ALI-LGL § 11(1) 
Wolfram § 16.2.2 
Although MR 5.1(a) was not adopted in Ohio, the comments contain comparable language, urging 
that a law firm partner or other lawyer who has similar managerial authority in a law firm "should 
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance 
that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct." Ohio Rule 5.1 cmt. 
[2]. While failure to do so is therefore not a disciplinary violation, implementing measures that help 
assure compliance with the professional responsibility rules is nevertheless a practice to be encour-
aged. Comment 2 also catalogs the sort of measures that might be taken, which include 
those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates 
by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client 
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funds and property, and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly 
supervised. 
Id. Noting that the measures necessary to meet this goal can depend on the firm's structure and nature 
of its practice, Comment [3] contrasts "a small firm of experienced lawyers," where informal super-
vision and periodic review will ordinarily be sufficient, with "a large firm, or in practice situations in 
which difficult ethical problems frequently arise," where more elaborate controls may be necessary. 
Ohio Rule 5.1 cmt. [3]. 
This admonition applies in both law firm and government settings. 
See generally 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 11(1) & cmt. c (2000). 
  
5.1:300  Monitoring Duty of Supervising Lawyer 
Primary Ohio References 
None 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.1(b) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:103 
ALI-LGL § 11(2) 
Wolfram § 16.2.2 
Ohio did not adopt an equivalent to Model Rule 5.1(b), which provides that a lawyer with direct 
supervisory authority over the work of another lawyer in a firm must make reasonable efforts to 
ensure that the subordinate lawyer conforms to the professional conduct rules. 
 
5.1:400  Failing to Rectify the Misconduct of a Subordinate Lawyer 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.1(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.1(c) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:103 
ALI-LGL § 11(3)(b) 
Wolfram § 16.2.2 
Ohio Rule 5.1(c) makes a lawyer responsible for the acts of another lawyer if: (1) the lawyer (any 
lawyer, not just partners, managers, or supervisors, see ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Profes-
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sional Conduct 440 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary), orders or knowingly ratifies those acts, or (2) the 
lawyer (a) is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in a firm or government agency in 
which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and (b) 
knows of the conduct in question when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take 
reasonable remedial action. Id. Accord 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. 
Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 42.6, at 42-9&-10 (3d ed. Supp. 2010). This provision "expresses 
a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another," Ohio Rule 5.1 cmt. [4]; apart from 
this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of another 
partner, associate, or subordinate. Ohio Rule 5.1 cmt. [7]. 
The Board has opined that the 5.1(c)(1) obligations apply in the context of a firm’s outsourcing of 
legal work. See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2009-6, 2009 Ohio Griev. Dis-
cipline LEXIS 6, at syllabus (Aug. 14, 2009). (The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Conduct opined on outsourcing of legal services in Formal Op. 8-451 (Aug. 5, 2008).) The 
ethical implications of legal outsourcing are explored in John Hoctor, Ethics in the Electronic Age, 
Ohio Law., Jan./Feb. 2010, at 9. 
In elaborating on the duty imposed on partners, managers, and direct supervisors by division (c)(2), 
Comment [5] (identical to MR 5.1 cmt. [5]) is less clear than it might be. After stating that "[w]hether 
a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact," it provides as 
follows: 
Lawyers with managerial authority have at least indirect responsibility 
for all work being done by the firm or government agency, while a 
partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has 
supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm or government 
agency lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by 
a partner or managing partner would depend on the immediacy of that 
lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A super-
visor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of 
misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, 
if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a 
matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the 
subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension. 
Rule 5.1 cmt. [5]. 
There are two problems: First, the comment language indicates that appropriate remedial action by a 
partner or managing lawyer depends on immediacy of involvement and the seriousness of the mis-
conduct; no mention is made of knowledge, in contrast to the response of a supervisor, who is "re-
quired to intervene" if the supervisor has knowledge of the misconduct. By all authoritative readings, 
however, the (c)(2) duty to act is imposed only if a lawyer in any of the above categories of lawyers 
has knowledge. A second, and related, difficulty is that because the focus is on knowledge of a su-
pervisor, perhaps the (c)(2) duty applies to partners and managers only if they are supervisors as well. 
Hazard and Hodes argue convincingly to the contrary: 
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[P]artners and those with comparable managerial authority cannot rely 
upon the fact that they have, or had, no direct responsibility for or 
supervising authority over the lawyer engaged in wrongdoing. Partner 
status, and direct supervisory authority all equally trigger a 
responsibility to take remedial action under Rule 5.1(c)(2). 
*     *     * 
 Finally, . . . both subparagraphs of Rule 5.1(c) impose 
disciplinary liability based on a lawyer’s knowledge, not on what the 
lawyer should have known. 
2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 42.6, 
at 42-10 (3d ed. Supp. 2010) (emphasis in original). Accord ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 440 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) (partners, managers, and direct supervisors 
may be held responsible "merely by having knowledge of it"); 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 11(3)(b) & cmt. e (2000) (same). 
A further remark is in order with respect to Ohio Rule 5.1(c). As Hazard and Hodes state: 
 Model Rule 5.1(c)(1) [identical to the Ohio Rule] states a rule 
of accessorial liability for disciplinary sanction, not vicarious respon-
sibility. A lawyer who orders or ratifies the misconduct of another has 
assisted it . . . . 
*     *     * 
 Subsection (c)(2) goes beyond traditional principles of acces-
sorial liability. It imposes a duty upon partners and supervisory lawyers 
to rectify any harm actually caused by a subordinate lawyer, if there is 
still an opportunity to do so. Because “reasonable remedial action” can 
be taken only if the violation is discovered in time, the Rule is limited 
to situations where the supervisory lawyer knows about the misconduct 
but fails to take corrective action. 
2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 42.6, 
at 42-9 (3d ed. Supp. 2010) (emphasis in original; bracketed material added). Accord 1 Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 11 cmt e (2000) (noting accessorial liability with respect 
to § 11(3)(a), the Restatement analog to Ohio Rule (and MR) 5.1(c)(1). See ABA, Annotated Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 437 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) (the Rule "establishes the prin-
ciple of supervisory responsibility without introducing vicarious liability"). 
 The only Rule 5.1(c) decision of which we are aware is Disciplinary Counsel v. Stafford, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 385, 2012 Ohio 909, 965 N.E.2d 971. In Stafford, the Court affirmed both the Board’s finding 
of violation of 5.1(c)(1) and its recommendation of dismissal of the 5.1(c)(2) charge. The basis for 
both charges arose out of documents filed by one of Stafford’s new associates against a  Lake County 
Common Pleas judge who was seeking to intervene in a divorce case in which Stafford represented 
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the husband (and had sent the associate to cover a pretrial at the Lake County courthouse; for the 
related action against Stafford’s associate, see Disciplinary Counsel v Gallo, 131 Ohio St.3d 309, 
2012 Ohio 758, 964 N.E.2d 1024, discussed at section 8.2:200 infra). The board’s findings certainly 
corroborate a 5.1(c)(1) violation: 
 
 The board determined that Stafford had personally instructed 
his subordinate associate to prepare a motion to strike [Judge] Lucci’s 
motion to intervene and to prepare the affidavits claiming that Lucci 
had threatened and intimidated the husband. The board found that the 
statement regarding intimidation was completely false and irrelevant to 
the legal issues presented in the motion and that Stafford had impugned 
Lucci’s judicial integrity by accusing him of violating the Rules of 
Judicial Conduct in an improper forum. 
Id. at para. 47. In answering Stafford’s objections to the 5.1(c)(1) finding, the Court used, at least in 
part, language from Rule 5.1(c)(2) rather than 5.1(c)(1): 
 
Stafford is a partner in his firm and had supervisory authority over 
Gallo. Stafford was counsel of record in the Rymers [divorce] case and 
had personally assigned Gallo to participate in it. Stafford was lead 
counsel for the motion to strike, the motion alleged that Stafford him-
self was one of the victims of Lucci’s alleged threats, and Stafford’s 
personal affidavit regarding his past interactions with Lucci is attached 
to the motion. Finally, the record reflects that Gallo personally made 
statements that were false, inflammatory, and irrelevant to the issues 
presented. Gallo has been publicly reprimanded for his misconduct. 
Id. at para. 52. However, since the 5.1(c)(2) charge had already been dismissed, the references from 
that subsection to Stafford’s “partner” status and his “supervisory authority” over Gallo more likely 
were intended to underscore Stafford’s being in a position to have “order[ed]” Gallo to file the 
offending affidavit in violation of (c)(1). 
 
 
5.1:500  Vicarious Liability of Partners 
  
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.1 
Gov Bar R III 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.1 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:105 
ALI-LGL § 58 
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Wolfram § 5.6.6 
The leading case in Ohio on "vicarious" liability of lawyers in the ethics context is Cincinnati Bar 
Ass'n v. Schultz, 71 Ohio St.3d 383, 643 N.E.2d 1139 (1994), in which the Court held 
the majority shareholder of a legal professional association vicariously 
responsible for the disciplinary offenses of attorneys employed by the 
association . . . . 
Id. at 386, 643 N.E.2d at 1141. The Supreme Court found this determination "specifically author-
ized" by the then-applicable language of Gov Bar R III 3(C), which stated that a breach of the former 
OHCPR by a legal professional association "shall be considered a breach upon the part of the indi-
vidual participating in the breach and the shareholder, director, and officer having knowledge of the 
breach." (Emphasis added.) In the words of the Court: 
 The misconduct committed in the case resulted either from 
policies imposed by [the firm's] majority shareholder or from her spe-
cific instruction. 
Id. Accord Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Winkfield, 75 Ohio St.3d 527, 664 N.E.2d 902 (1996) (decided 
under the same version of the GBR): 
Respondent learned of Brooks's [with whom he practiced as a profes-
sional association] failure to return [the client's] overpayment . . . and is 
accountable pursuant to Gov. Bar R. III(3)(B) and (C)." 
Id. at 529, 664 N.E.2d at 904. Given the knowledge factor there set forth, this was not "pure" vi-
carious liability. In any event, the Rules for the Government of the Bar no longer impose vicarious 
disciplinary liability on lawyers, and, as Ohio Rule 5.1 cmt. [7] makes clear, a lawyer does not have 
vicarious disciplinary liability under the OHRPC, other than in situations governed by Rules 5.1 and 
8.4(a).  
A related issue is the extent to which associated lawyers are vicariously liable for civil wrongs done 
by other lawyers in the group. Gov Bar R III 4(B) renders "[e]ach member, partner, or other equity 
holder of a legal professional association, corporation, legal clinic, limited liability company, or 
registered partnership" jointly and severally liable for any liability of the firm based on acts or 
omissions in rendering of legal services, "in an amount not to exceed the aggregate of both of the 
following:" (1) if the firm does not have the per-claim professional liability insurance required by the 
Rule (at least $ 50,000 per claim multiplied by the number of attorneys practicing with the firm up to 
a ceiling of five million dollars in excess of any deductible, see Gov Bar R III 4(A)(1)), then this 
per-claim multiple applicable to the firm is operative, plus (2) the deductible amount of the insurance 
applicable to the claim. This member liability is reduced to the extent the liability is satisfied by the 
assets of the firm. Gov Bar R III 4(B). To our knowledge, there are no cases or advisory opinions 
applying the current version of the Rule, which went into effect on November 1, 1995. 
At least one Ohio case, involving assertion of a claim of vicarious civil liability against a lawyer, 
disallowed the claim on the facts presented. See Landis v. Hunt, 80 Ohio App.3d 662, 610 N.E.2d 
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554 (Franklin 1992) (rejecting assertion that liability could be predicated on vicarious liability where 
defendant lawyer was neither a partner nor a joint venturer with client's lawyer). Two other cases 
dealing with vicarious civil liability were decided under a version of Gov Bar R III 4 that no longer 
exists: see South High Dev., Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., L.P.A., 4 Ohio St.3d 1, 445 
N.E.2d 1106 (1983) (then-applicable GBR stated that a shareholder in a legal professional associa-
tion guarantees the financial responsibility of the association for its breach of any duty, whether or not 
arising from the attorney/client relationship); Riener v. Kelley, 8 Ohio App.3d 390, 457 N.E.2d 946 
(Franklin 1983) (same). 
The Restatement rule on the vicarious civil liability of law firms, of principals in general partnerships 
without limited liability, and principals in other forms of law-firm organization is set forth in 1 Re-
statement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 58 (2000). 
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5.2:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.2 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.2 
 
5.2:101  Model Rule Comparison 
With one exception, Ohio Rule 5.2 is identical to MR 5.2; Ohio has deleted the word "arguable" 
from division (b). 
  
5.2:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 5.2: None. 
  
5.2:200  Independent Responsibility of a Subordinate Lawyer 
Primary Ohio Reference 
Ohio Rule 5.2(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.2(a) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:104 
ALI-LGL § 12(1) 
Ohio Rule 5.2(a) provides that every lawyer is individually responsible for complying with the Ohio 
Rules, even if the lawyer was acting at the direction of another. Nevertheless, as noted in Comment [1] 
(identical to the Model Rule comment), the fact that she acted at the direction of a supervising lawyer 
"may be relevant in determining whether [the subordinate] had the knowledge required to render 
conduct a violation of the rules." The example given is that of filing a frivolous pleading as instructed; 
there would be no liability unless the subordinate knew it was frivolous. Ohio Rule 5.2 cmt. [1]. 
To our knowledge, no Ohio decisions or ethics opinions under the former OHCPR dealt with the 
subject of the responsibilities of a subordinate lawyer, as the topic was not addressed in the OHCPR. 
Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 5.2. 
Inasmuch as Ohio Rule 5.2(a) is identical to the Model Rule, for further guidance on this issue we 
direct the reader to the commentary on MR 5.2(a) in ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
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Conduct 443-45 (7th ed. 2011); see also 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 
12(1) & cmt. b & reporter's note thereto, at 115, 116, 117 (2000). 
  
5.2:300  Reliance on a Supervisory's Resolution of Ethical Issues 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.2(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.2(b) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:104 
ALI-LGL § 12(2) 
Under Ohio Rule 5.2(b), a subordinate is not in violation of the ethics rules if she acts in accordance 
with a supervisory lawyer's "reasonable resolution of a question of professional duty." However, if 
the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both subordinate and supervisor is 
clear, and both "are equally responsible for fulfilling it." Rule 5.2 cmt. [2]. 
As the Task Force notes in its ABA Model Rules Comparison, the text of the Ohio version of 5.2(b) 
was changed by striking the word "arguable" before "question." The Task Force further notes that the 
wording of Model Rule comment [2] has been "altered to clarify the duty of a supervisory attorney to 
resolve close calls." Thus, the language "if the question is reasonably arguable" has been changed in 
Ohio Rule 5.2 cmt. 2 to "if the resolution is unclear." 
For discussion of the MR 5.2(b) proposition that a subordinate lawyer does not violate the ethics rules 
if she acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of 
professional duty, see ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 443-45 (7th ed. 
2011) (commentary). See also 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 12(2) cmt. 
c & reporter's note thereto, at 115-16, 116-17, 117-18 (2000). Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct 
(ABA/BNA) § 91:104 (1999) cautions that "this provision [the safe harbor in MR 5.2(b)] has been 
narrowly construed." 
Indicative of a narrow construction in Ohio as well is the important 2009 decision, Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 49, 2009 Ohio 5960, 918 N.E.2d 992, in which the Court in-
cludes an extensive and instructive discussion regarding Rule 5.2(b). At issue in Smith were charges 
of professional misconduct against a subordinate lawyer, admitted to practice for two years, for 
charging an excessive fee and acting in matters without competence to do so. Much of Smith’s de-
fense was premised on his acting on the instructions of Chapman, the owner of the firm for which he 
worked. Of particular interest here is Smith’s “claim that if only his conduct had occurred more re-
cently, it would have fallen within the safe harbor of recently adopted Prof. Cond. R. 5.2.” Id. at para. 
18. The Supreme Court responded as follows: 
This assumption is incorrect. Prof.Cond.R. 5.2(a) states the general 
rule that “[a] lawyer is bound by the Ohio Rules of Professional Con-
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duct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another 
person.” The safe harbor appears in Prof.Cond.R. 5.2(b): “A subordi-
nate lawyer does not violate the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct if 
that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable 
resolution of a question of professional duty.” (Emphasis sic.) 
 Prof. Cond.R. 5.2(b) would not apply to the circumstances of 
this case regardless of its effective date. First, there was no ambiguity 
in the illegitimacy of the fees because New York law clearly prohibits 
the collection of a contingent fee from the client on PIP coverage. 
Second, respondent and Chapman were both insufficiently familiar 
with PIP coverage, and they did not properly research the question of 
attorney fees. Although respondent apparently posed the question to 
Chapman, and Chapman said he would look into it, it was unreasonable 
for respondent to rely on Chapman’s directions under the 
circumstances. The nature of PIP coverage as no-fault insurance that 
was to be paid directly to the Reigers’ medical service providers should 
have alerted respondent to the issue of attorney fees. That context, 
coupled with the relatively small disbursement check issued to the 
Reigers compared to the total recovery, should have at least prompted 
respondent to seek confirmation from Chapman that his research 
verified the permissibility of attorney fees, if not to research the 
question himself. There is no indication in the record that respondent 
ever followed up with Chapman after Chapman stated that he would 
contact another lawyer; nor did respondent verify the source of any 
information to which Chapman referred. Respondent even failed to 
take significant action after receiving complaints from the clients’ 
family and Disciplinary Counsel. Under these circumstances, 
respondent was required to verify, at least minimally, the information 
he was given before he could reasonably rely on the instructions of his 
supervisor. 
 In addition to the unauthorized assessment of a fee against the 
Reigers on PIP coverage, respondent should have recognized that the 
fees collected were excessive under the terms of the fee agreement. The 
agreement permitted a contingent fee of 40 percent only if it was 
necessary to file suit, while a lower fee of 33 1/3 percent was to be 
charged if no lawsuit was needed. Although respondent did file suit 
against Seltzer, and thereby recovered through Seltzer’s Geico liability 
policy, no action was ever filed against State Farm. State Farm made 
payments under the Reigers’ PIP coverage upon receipt of the proper 
forms. Even if legal fees could have been collected on the PIP recovery, 
the contingent-fee agreement permitted respondent to collect only 33 
1/3 percent of the recovery, rather than 40 percent he did collect. Since 
respondent signed the agreement on behalf of the law firm and 
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prepared the disbursement sheets, there would be no reasonable basis 
for him to rely on Chapman for these purposes. 
Id. at paras. 18-20. The Court further noted that “‘new lawyers are just as accountable as more 
seasoned professionals for not complying with the Code of Professional Responsibility.’ Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Johnson, 106 Ohio St.3d 365, 2005 Ohio 5323, 835 N.E.2d 354, para. 39. The same 
general rule applies to lawyers who are directly supervised by their superiors within a law firm. A 
lawyer’s obligation under the ethics rules are not diminished by the instructions of a supervisory 
attorney.” 124 Ohio St.3d 49, at para. 17. 
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5.3:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.3 
  
5.3:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 5.3 is substantively similar to the Model Rule; the differences are as follows: 
In division (a), the beginning words “a partner and” have been deleted; “comparable” has been 
deleted prior to “managerial”; “or governmental agency” has been added after “law firm” and after 
“the firm”. 
In subdivision (c)(2), the words “is a partner or” have been deleted after the beginning words “the 
lawyer”; “comparable” has been deleted prior to “managerial”; and “or government agency” has been 
added after “law firm”. 
  
5.3:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following are listed in the Correlation Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 
5.3: DR 4-101(D), EC 4-2, Disciplinary Counsel v. Ball (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 401 & Mahoning 
County Bar Ass’n v. Lavelle (2005), 107 Ohio St.3d 92. 
  
5.3:200  Duty to Establish Safeguards 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rules 5.3(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.3(a) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:205 
ALI-LGL § 11(4) 
Wolfram § 16.3 
Lawyers often are assisted in the practice of law by nonlawyers, serving in such roles as secretaries, 
paralegals, and law clerks. Ohio Rule 5.3(a) provides that a lawyer who individually or with others 
has managerial authority in a law firm or government agency “shall” make “reasonable efforts” to 
ensure the firm or agency has measures providing “reasonable assurance” that the conduct of a 
nonlawyer employed by, retained by, or associated with a lawyer “is compatible with the professional 
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obligations of the lawyer.” As reiterated in Comment [2], division (a) 
requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm or 
government agency to make reasonable efforts to establish internal 
policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that 
nonlawyers in the firm or governmental agency will act in a way 
compatible with the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Ohio Rule 5.3 cmt. [2]. Other than Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 2008 
Ohio 3340, 891 N.E.2d 749, which is discussed separately at the end of section 5.3:400, the only 
disciplinary case invoking Rule 5.3(a) thus far is Disciplinary Counsel v. Blair, 128 Ohio St.3d 384, 
2011 Ohio 767, 944 N.E.2d 1161 (lack of reasonable oversight of conduct of nonlawyer employees, 
who prepared false affidavit and forged respondent’s name on affidavit). Cf. Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Culbreath, 134 Ohio St.3d 24, 2012 Ohio 5031, 979 N.E.2d 1223. finding a 5.3 violation without 
specifying the applicable subsection. It would appear, however, that there was a failure to have the 
necessary measures in place to provide reasonable assurance that the nonlawyer’s conduct was 
compatible with the lawyer’s professional obligations, a 5.3(a) violation: 
Culbreath blamed the mistake [forgetting to contact medical providers 
after settlement for his client, sending delinquent partial payment to 
medical providers] on staffing changes at his office and a new secretary 
who mistakenly made the partial payment. 
Id. at para. 11. 
Prior to the adoption of the Ohio Rules, both the Supreme Court and the Board of Commissioners had 
cited MR 5.3(a) (as well as MR 5.3(b)) with approval. In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Ball, 67 
Ohio St.3d 401, 618 N.E.2d 159 (1993), the Court rejected respondent’s argument (premised on the 
language of MR 5.3(c)) that a lawyer’s responsibility under MR 5.3 was limited to situations in 
which the lawyer ordered, ratified, or failed to take remedial action upon learning of the employee’s 
wrongful act. In doing so, Chief Justice Moyer quoted both MR 5.3(a) and (b) (similar in substance to 
Ohio Rule 5.3(a) and identical to (b)) in support of the conclusion that respondent’s conduct 
(described in sections 5.3:300 & :400 below) failed to pass muster under either Model Rule 
provision: 
In fact, Model Rules 5.3(a) and (b) clearly indicate that it is a lawyer’s 
duty to establish a system of office procedure that ensures delegated 
legal duties are completed properly . . . . 
67 Ohio St.3d at 404, 618 N.E.2d at 162. In Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
91-9, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 21 (Apr. 12, 1991), the Board quoted both subsections in the 
course of opining that it was proper for lawyers who maintained separate practices to share nonlawyer 
personnel, such as a common secretary, provided that each attorney exercises reasonable care to 
ensure that the employee or employees did not disclose or use client confidences or secrets, as 
reflected in former OH DR 4-101(D). The opinion also referred to the advice in the comment to MR 
5.3 to the effect that a lawyer “should give instructions and supervision to assistants regarding the 
ethical aspects of employment, particularly the obligation not to disclose information relating to 
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representation of the client.” Id. at *6. (In the 2002 amendments, the ABA changed “should” to 
“must,” MR 5.3 cmt. [1]; the mandatory language is likewise incorporated in Ohio Rule 5.3 cmt. 
[1].) 
And in Lorain County Bar Ass’n v. Noll, 105 Ohio St.3d 6, 2004 Ohio 7013, 821 N.E.2d 988, at 
paras. 17-21, the comparable provisions of 1 Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing 
Lawyers § 11(4) (2000), requiring the existence of reasonable safeguards concerning conduct of 
nonlawyer employees, were invoked by the Court, which also repeated the language from Ball that “it 
is the lawyer’s duty to establish a system of office procedure that ensures delegated legal duties are 
completed properly.” 105 Ohio St.3d 6, 821 N.E.2d 988, at para. 16. The Court in Noll concluded 
that “[w]hatever safeguards respondent may have established to ensure that [his employee] performed 
her assigned duties properly were clearly inadequate.” Id. Accord Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. 
Lavelle, 107 Ohio St.3d 92, 2005 Ohio 5976, 836 N.E.2d 1214 (citing Ball, Noll, MR 5.3, and 
Restatement § 11; violation of OH DR 1-102(A)(5) & (6); respondent “at best chose to remain 
oblivious to the improper actions [altering documents; false notarizations] of the persons he hired, 
thereby violating the trust that his clients and other placed in him and his office staff,” id. at para. 
29). 
  
5.3:300  Duty to Control Nonlawyer Assistants 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rules 5.3(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.3(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 6.14 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:205 
ALI-LGL § 11(4) 
Wolfram § 16.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 6.14 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 5.3(b) obligates a supervising lawyer to make “reasonable efforts” to ensure that a 
nonlawyer’s conduct comports with the professional obligations of the lawyer. 
In a 1993 opinion, termed a case of first impression, the Ohio Supreme Court held under the former 
OHCPR that failure to provide adequate supervision of a nonlawyer employee could constitute 
“neglect” under OH DR 6-101(A)(3).  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Ball, 67 Ohio St.3d 401, 
618 N.E.2d 159 (1993). In Ball, the lawyer’s “lack of any semblance of supervisory control” over the 
work of a legal secretary/bookkeeper over a ten-year period, which resulted in the employee’s 
misappropriation of funds from various client estate and guardianship accounts, and related 
account-filing delinquencies, was found to constitute neglect on the lawyer’s part.  Id. at 405, 618 
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N.E.2d at 162. See Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Boychuck, 79 Ohio St.3d 93, 679 N.E.2d 1081 
(1997) (“[r]espondent admitted to not supervising her office properly”; violation, inter alia, of former 
OH DR 6-101(A)(3)); cf. Duggins v. Steak ‘N Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(allegations of law firm’s failure to properly supervise actions of nonlawyer “investigator”; court 
recommended that on remand, district court refer such allegations to Ohio State Bar Association). The 
Rule 5.3 duties apply with respect to all nonlawyers assisting the lawyer in the rendition of legal 
services, whether they are employees of the lawyer or independent contractors.  See Rule 5.3 cmt. [1]. 
See also Carol K. Metz, Do You Know What Your PI Is Doing?, Cleve. B.J., Apr. 2007, at 14, 15 
(discussing lawyer’s obligations under Rules 4.4 and 5.3 regarding private investigators). 
As previously noted in section 5.3:200, the Ball Court placed substantial reliance on the provisions of 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct pertaining to the lawyer’s duty to supervise 
nonlawyer employees (MR 5.3(a) and (b)), even though the OHCPR did not contain comparable 
provisions. Ball therefore provides a good indication of how the Court will treat these provisions 
under Ohio Rule 5.3. 
More recent OHCPR disciplinary cases dealing with inadequate-supervision issues are Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Young, 113 Ohio St.3d 36, 2007 Ohio 975, 862 N.E.2d 504; Lavelle; and Noll, 
decisions cited in section 5.3:200 above. In both Lavelle and Noll the Court quoted from 1 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 11(4) (2000), including the language 
emphasizing that there is no exception to the lawyer’s duty to supervise based on lack of awareness of 
the employee’s misconduct: Being busy or otherwise distracted by other important work “does not 
excuse neglecting supervisory responsibilities or ignoring inappropriate conduct on the part of the 
supervised nonlawyer.” (quoting from Restatement § 11 cmt f). The Lavelle Court also invoked MR 
5.3. As a result, Lavelle “at best chose to remain oblivious to the improper actions [including forging 
the lawyer’s signature, altering documents, and falsely notarizing them] of the persons he hired,” 
thereby violating OH DR 1-102(A)(5) & (6).  107 Ohio St.3d 92, 836 N.E.2d 1214, at para. 29. 
Similarly, Noll’s obliviousness to his assistant’s “shoddy work, and his inattentive and inadequate 
oversight” violated 102(A)(6).  105 Ohio St.3d 6, 821 N.E.2d 988, at paras. 24-25.  In Young, the 
Court emphasized that “[p]art of a lawyer’s obligation to his client is to ensure that delegated legal 
duties are completed properly. [citing Ball].  Because respondent failed to supervise his secretary, 
disciplinary measures are warranted. [citing Lavelle].” 113 Ohio St.3d 36, 862 N.E.2d 504, at para. 
27. 
  
5.3:400  Responsibility for Misconduct of Nonlawyer Assistants 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.3(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.3(c) 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:205 
ALI-LGL § 11(4) 
Wolfram § 16.3 
In addition to the obligations imposed by Ohio Rules 5.3(a) and (b), division (c) makes the lawyer 
liable for nonlawyer conduct that would violate the ethics rules if engaged in by a lawyer, if the 
lawyer either (1) orders or knowingly ratifies the conduct or (2) has managerial authority in a law firm 
or governmental agency or has direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer and fails to take 
remedial action, while knowing of the conduct at a time when its consequences could be avoided or 
mitigated. The Board has opined that the Rule 5.3(c)(1) obligations apply in the context of a firm’s 
outsourcing of support services. See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2009-6, 
2009 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6, at syllabus (Aug. 14, 2009). (The ABA Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Conduct opined on outsourcing of support services in Formal Op. 08-451 
(Aug. 5, 2008).) 
Although there was no OHCPR counterpart to Ohio Rule 5.3(c), the few Ohio cases dealing with 
discipline for supervisory failures made it clear that the lawyer was responsible in a disciplinary 
proceeding for the misconduct of nonlawyer assistants. Whether invoking former OH DR 1-102(A)(5) 
and/or (6), 6-101(A)(3), or other provisions, the Supreme Court found lawyers in violation of the 
OHCPR for failure to prevent or correct employee misdeeds. See, e.g., in addition to Lavelle and Noll, 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Maley, 119 Ohio St.3d 217, 2008 Ohio 3923, 893 N.E.2d 180. As the Court 
stated in Noll: 
Respondent continued to employ his assistant long after he knew or 
should have known that her handling of his mail, telephone messages, 
calendar, and client files was damaging his law practice and 
jeopardizing the rights and interests of his clients. The board therefore 
rightly found that respondent’s misconduct violated DR 
1-102(A)(6) . . . . 
105 Ohio St.3d at para. 25. (The ethical waters were further muddied in the Noll case by the 
lawyer’s sexual involvement with the employee whose work the lawyer had failed to monitor.) 
Moreover, at least one statement by the Board referred to MR 5.3(c) with seeming approval in the 
course of noting the obligations imposed by MR 5.3(a) and (b). See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 91-9, Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 21, at *6 (Apr. 12, 1991) (“The rule also deems 
a lawyer responsible for the conduct of the non-lawyer assistant under certain conditions. Model Rule 
5.3(c).”). 
Perhaps the most intriguing pre-Rule reference to the concept of lawyer responsibility for 
nonlawyer/assistant conduct came in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Ball, 67 Ohio St.3d 401, 
618 N.E.2d 159 (1993). In Ball, the respondent had a trusted nonlawyer employee who 
misappropriated more than $200,000 from client accounts over the course of ten years. As put by the 
Supreme Court, the “case at bar concerns the vicarious responsibility of a lawyer for the conduct of a 
nonlawyer employee and is of first impression in this state.”  Id. at 403, 618 N.E.2d at 161. Invoking 
MR 5.3(c) (and MR 5.1(c)), respondent argued that 
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a lawyer’s vicarious responsibility in a disciplinary proceeding is 
limited to those situations where the lawyer orders or with knowledge 
ratifies, or fails to take reasonable remedial action upon learning of, the 
employee’s wrongful acts. 
Id. at 404, 618 N.E.2d at 161 (emphasis by the Court). The Supreme Court, in a 5-2 opinion authored 
by Chief Justice Moyer, was not persuaded: 
The Model Rules do not condone respondent’s conduct. In fact, Model 
Rules 5.3 (a) and (b) clearly indicate that it is a lawyer’s duty to 
establish a system of office procedure that ensures delegated legal 
duties are completed properly: [quoting MR 5.3(a) and (b)]. 
Id., 618 N.E.2d at 161-62. Thus, in the view of the Ball Court, a lawyer’s responsibility for conduct 
of nonlawyers under the circumstances stated in MR 5.3(c) is in addition to the obligations imposed 
directly upon various categories of lawyers (partners, supervisors) by MR 5.3(a) and (b). The 
Supreme Court concluded that under the OHCPR, since there was a “lack of any semblance of 
supervisory control over the work delegated by respondent to [the employee, this] constitutes 
neglect . . . in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3).”  Id. at 405, 618 N.E.2d at 162 (bracketed material 
added). 
Did the Ball result and analysis place a broader disciplinary responsibility on an Ohio lawyer with 
respect to nonlawyer employee misconduct than that contained in MR 5.3, and now Ohio Rule 5.3, 
despite the absence then of any Ohio disciplinary rule speaking directly to the subject? We think not. 
The argument premised on MR 5.3(c) made by the respondent in Ball is an interesting one, primarily 
because of the way MR 5.3 is written. (MR 5.1 follows the same structure.) The only subsection of 
the Model Rule referring directly to “responsib[ility] for conduct” of a nonlawyer is subsection (c), 
which deals with ordering or ratifying such conduct (MR 5.3(c)(1)), or having knowledge of the 
conduct but failing to take remedial action when its consequences could be avoided or mitigated (MR 
5.3(c)(2)). MR 5.3 (a) and (b) lay down duties to make reasonable efforts to erect safeguards and to 
supervise, but these duties are not stated in terms of affirmative professional responsibility resulting 
from failure to fulfill these duties. Compare 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§ 11(4) (2000), which follows the MR 5.3 outline, but expressly states that a lawyer “is subject to 
professional discipline” for a failure to comply with each of the duties imposed.  
Despite the manner in which the text of MR 5.3 is written, there can be little doubt that a lawyer’s 
failure to comply with any of the paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) can result in professional discipline. See 
ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 451-54 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary), and 
the cases there cited. Thus, it would appear that Chief Justice Moyer’s reading of MR 5.3 in Ball was 
the correct one, even though, as a technical matter, the duties imposed by MR 5.3(a) and (b) are 
accessorial, not vicarious. 
The result under Ohio Rule 5.3 should be no different, inasmuch as (1) the language of the two 
versions is substantively identical for these purposes and (2) the Task Force cites the Ball decision 
with approval in its commentary. Thus, the elements required for liability under Ohio Rule 5.3(c) 
(the lawyer orders the violative conduct, or with knowledge ratifies it, division (c)(1), or the lawyer 
has managerial authority in the firm (or government agency), or has direct supervisory authority over 
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the nonlawyer, and has knowledge of the conduct at a time when the consequences of the conduct can 
be avoided or mitigated, but fails to act, division (c)(2)) are, like the obligations imposed by divisions 
(a) and (b), independent bases for liability (“all” of the following [i.e., divisions (a), (b), and (c)] 
apply”). Accordingly, the 5.3(c) requisites need not be present for a violation of either Rule 5.3(a) or 
5.3(b). 
An interesting and potentially troubling case that raises questions about the interrelationship of the 
subparts of Rule 5.3 is Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 2008 Ohio 3340, 891 
N.E.2d 749. In Lawson, the Court found that respondent had violated Rule 5.3(a) and (b) for 
authorizing employees to pay office expenses from his client trust account. According to the Court, 
[v]iolations of Prof. Cond. R 5.3(a) and (b) occur when (1) a lawyer 
orders an assistant to perform an act incompatible with professional 
obligations or knowingly ratifies such conduct, or (2) a lawyer having 
managerial or supervisory authority knows of conduct that is 
incompatible with professional obligations and could, but fails to, take 
reasonable remedial action. 
Id. at para. 40. This language, of course, is taken almost verbatim from Rule 5.3(c)(1) & (2). Why 
this produced a Rule 5.3(a) and (b) violation, rather than a violation of 5.3(c), is nowhere explained. 
And, it seems to cast some doubt on our conclusion set forth at the end of the preceding paragraph, 
that a 5.3(c) violation is not a prerequisite to a 5.3(a) or (b) violation. 
In the only other decision under Rule 5.3 to date, the Court in Disciplinary Counsel v. Crosby, 124 
Ohio St.3d 226, 2009 Ohio 6763, 921 N.E.2d 225, held that, without proper supervision or training 
by respondent, his nonlawyer assistant had misused respondent’s IOLTA account; his failure to make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the employee’s conduct comported with respondent’s professional 
obligations violated 5.3(b). Lawson was not cited. 
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5.4:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.4 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.4 
  
5.4:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 5.4 is substantively identical to the Model Rule, with the following exceptions: 
In subdivision (a)(4), the Model Rule provision allowing a lawyer to share court-awarded legal fees 
with a nonprofit corporation “that employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer in 
the matter” is limited to sharing of such fees with a nonprofit “that employed or retained the lawyer in 
the matter.” 
Subdivision (a)(5) (there is no MR 5.4(a)(5)) deals with the “recommended” aspect included in MR 
5.4(a)(4): it permits the sharing of legal fees (not just court-awarded) with a nonprofit that 
recommended employment in the matter, but only “if the nonprofit organization complies with Rule 
XVI of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio.” 
  
5.4:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 5.4(a): DR 3-102(A). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 5.4(b): DR 3-103. 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 5.4(c): DR 5-107(B). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 5.4(d): DR 5-107(C). 
  
5.4:200  Sharing Fees with a Nonlawyer 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.4(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.4(a) 
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Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 3.44, 3.46-3.53 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 41:801 
ALI-LGL § 10(3) 
Wolfram § 9.2.4 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 3.44, 3.46-3.53 (1996). 
Ohio Rules 5.4(a) and (b) substantially limit the ability of lawyers to enter into joint ventures with 
nonlawyers where a portion of the service offered through the venture is the practice of law. Rule 
5.4(a), with certain exceptions, prohibits fee splitting with nonlawyers and is discussed in this section. 
Rule 5.4(b) prohibits entering into a partnership with a nonlawyer for the practice of law and is 
discussed in section 5.4:300. 
The basic rationale for these rules is to “express traditional limitations” on fee sharing and third-party 
direction of a lawyer’s professional judgment. Ohio Rule 5.4 cmts. [1] & [2]. See also section 
1.8:710. 
Fee sharing - In general: With five stated exceptions, Ohio Rule 5.4(a) prohibits a lawyer or law firm 
from sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer. Fees may be shared with a nonlawyer only under the 
following circumstances: 
(1) pursuant to an agreement between the lawyer and the lawyer’s firm, 
partner, or associates to provide payment of money, over a reasonable 
period of time after the lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or one or 
more specified nonlawyers; 
(2) a lawyer purchasing the practice of another lawyer in accordance 
with the provisions of Ohio Rule 1.17 may pay the agreed-upon 
purchase price to the other lawyer’s estate or other representative; 
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a 
compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in 
whole or part on a profit-sharing arrangement; 
(4) a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit 
organization that employed or retained the lawyer in the matter; and 
(5) a lawyer may share legal fees with a nonprofit organization 
recommending employment of the lawyer in the matter, if the 
organization complies with Gov Bar R XVI. 
Rule 5.4(a)(3) recognizes that paying a nonlawyer’s salary is not an impermissible fee-sharing, even 
though the salary is paid from fee-generated revenue. Also, funds generated by means other than legal 
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fees may be divided with nonlawyers. For example, under the former OHCPR, the Board opined that 
if a lawyer and a nonlawyer co-sponsored a legal seminar for the public and charged a nominal 
attendance fee, the resulting income would not be legal fees, and thus a division would not be 
improper. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 94-13, 1994 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 2 (Dec. 2, 1994). 
As the Task Force states in its Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 5.4: 
 Rule 5.4 is not intended to change any of the provisions in the 
Ohio Code. Slight modifications in language between Ohio Code 
provisions and the Model Rule are intended to promote clarity of 
meaning. Rule 5.4(a) is substantially the same as [former] DR 
3-102(A). Rule 5.4(b) is identical to [former] DR 3-103. Rule 5.4(c) is 
substantially the same as [former] DR 5-107(B). Rule 5.4(d) is 
substantially the same as [former] DR 5-107(C). 
Underlying the prohibition against fee splitting is a fear that the practice may lead to other ethical 
violations that harm client interests, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 94-8, 1994 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (June 17, 1994), including encouraging the unauthorized practice of 
law by the nonlawyer, see section 5.5:300, and enhancing the possibility that the third party will 
interfere with the lawyer’s exercise of independent professional judgment on the client’s behalf. See 
Rule 1.8(f) and section 1.8:710. Such arrangements might also lead to an excessive increase in the 
fees charged the client to cover the fee-splitting arrangement. See Ohio Rule 1.5(a). In the instance of 
a private investigator who ultimately might testify in a case, such an arrangement could lead to a 
prohibited payment in exchange for witness testimony. See Ohio Rule 3.4(b) and section 3.4:310. 
At least one case decided under the Rules has invoked the prohibition on fee-splitting where the 
“nonlawyer” was a suspended Ohio attorney. See Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Axner, 135 Ohio 
St.3d 241, 2013 Ohio 400, 985 N.E.2d 1257. Other examples include respondent’s sharing 10% of a 
fee with his secretary, Disciplinary Counsel v. Folwell, 129 Ohio St.3d 297, 2011 Ohio 3181, 951 
N.E.2d 775; and with a foreclosure relief company with whom the respondent agreed to represent the 
customers of the company, Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Patterson, 124 Ohio St.3d 93, 2009 Ohio 
6166, 919 N.E.2d 206. 
Fee-sharing problems arise in a number of different contexts. The most common of these have been 
the subject of a few court decisions and various bar association opinions decided under the former 
OHCPR. Given the similarity of the two sets of rules on this subject, most of these determinations 
should be reliable indicators of the law under the Rules of Professional Conduct. These cases and 
opinions are discussed below. 
Fee sharing - Fee sharing with nonlegal employees: While a lawyer may pay an employee a salary 
that is ultimately derived from legal fees and the employee may be included in the profit-sharing 
retirement plan of a lawyer or law firm, Ohio Rule 5.4(a)(3), the lawyer may not otherwise enter into 
a fee-sharing arrangement with an employee. The respondent in Richland County Bar Ass’n v. 
Akers, 106 Ohio St.3d 337, 2005 Ohio 5144, 835 N.E.2d 29, did so in violation of OH DR 
3-102(A), the Code analog to Rule 5.4(a), when he had his former secretary prepare legal documents 
for respondent’s review and approval; upon receipt of payment of legal bills that she sent out, the 
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secretary deducted $30 per hour for her services and sent the balance of the fee to respondent. And see 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Maley, 119 Ohio St.3d 217, 2008 Ohio 3923, 893 N.E.2d 180, where 
respondent’s unsupervised secretary helped herself to client fee payments; DR 3-102(A) violated. 
Nor could a lawyer agree to split a contingency fee with a nonlawyer private investigator to secure the 
investigator’s services in the matter. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 94-8, 1994 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (June 17, 1994). See Duggins v. Steak ‘ N Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828 
(6th Cir. 1999) (remanding with recommendation that district court refer plaintiff’s former law firm 
to Ohio Bar Association concerning allegations of fee splitting with “investigator” who was firm’s 
agent/employee). In a similar case decided under Rule 5.4(a), the Ohio Supreme Court in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Folwell, 129 Ohio St.3d 297, 2011 Ohio 3181, 951 N.E.2d 775, held that 
the rule precluded respondent from splitting 10% of a contingent-fee recovery with his legal secretary. 
In Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Plymale, 91 Ohio St.3d 367, 745 N.E.2d 413 (2001), however, the panel, 
Board, and Court all found that a year-end bonus policy for the firm’s legal assistants did not violate 
the Rule, even though the policy expressly provided that a paralegal “assigned to a particular lawyer 
will be paid .004 [.4%] of the gross fees earned by the lawyer during the fiscal year . . . .”  Id. at 369, 
745 N.E.2d at 416 (bracketed material by the Court).  
Fee sharing - Impermissible structural arrangements: When a lawyer enters into an impermissible 
structural arrangement with a nonlawyer, improper fee sharing often is involved as well. 
Lawyer-nonlawyer joint ventures raise various ethical issues depending on the exact nature of the 
relationship. In addition to improper fee sharing under this section, problems that may arise include 
improper solicitation and referrals (Ohio Rule 7.2(b); see section 7.2:400), aiding the unauthorized 
practice of law (Ohio Rule 5.5(a); see section 5.5:300), creation of a partnership with a nonlawyer 
(Ohio Rule 5.4(b); see section 5.4:300), conflict of interest (Ohio Rule 1.7(a)(2)); see section 
1.7:500), and third-party influence concerns (Ohio Rule 1.8(f); see section 1.8:710). For example, if 
a lawyer were employed by a certified public accounting firm to provide legal services to clients of 
the firm, it would violate the fee-sharing provision. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, 
Op. 89-31, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Oct. 13, 1989). The joint provision of divorce 
mediation services by a lawyer and a psychologist would also constitute improper fee splitting if 
some of the fees paid were for drafting a memorandum of understanding “encompassing the terms of 
the agreement on all matters in the termination of the marriage,” a document the Ohio State Bar 
Association equated with a separation agreement. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 82-2, at 3 
(Aug. 3, 1982). Were a lawyer to participate in a living-trust seminar sponsored by an organization, 
and agree to pay some of the organization’s expenses incurred in offering the seminar out of attorney 
fees generated by related legal services provided to seminar attendees, this would constitute sharing 
legal fees with a nonlawyer. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 94-2 (Oct. 25, 1994). In each case 
the lawyer’s services would generate fees that in turn would be shared with a nonlawyer. A collection 
agency cannot employ an attorney to handle collection matters for clients of the agency. To do so 
would involve the corporation in offering legal services, which it is not authorized to do, and might 
also involve the lawyer and corporation in the sharing of legal fees. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal 
Op. 90-5 (Aug. 2, 1990); but see Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 90-91-10 (n.d.) (lawyer may be retained 
on a contingency-fee basis by a collection agency to render legal services for creditor clients of the 
collection agency). On the unauthorized-practice-by-a corporation issue, the Ohio State Bar 
Association opinion seems out of step with the more recent opinion in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., No. UPL 02-02 (Bd. of Comm’rs. On Unauthorized Practice of Law Oct. 1, 
2003, review denied, 100 Ohio St.3d 1514, 2003 Ohio 6460, 800 N.E.2d 33, opining that insurance 
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company lawyer/employees could represent the insurance company’s insured, because the insurance 
company has a “direct or primary interest” in the matter. The Allstate decision is discussed in section 
5.5:240, at “Lawyer employees of corporation serving clients of company.” It would seem that the 
collection firm would similarly have a direct or primary interest in its collection matters. 
In Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2004-2, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 
(June 3, 2004), the improper fee sharing was inherent in the structural arrangement itself. The 
proposed structural arrangement was a contract, entered into by a lawyer and a nonlawyer funding 
company, pursuant to which the lawyer would sell his legal fees to the company upon reaching a 
settlement agreement in a client’s legal matter. The lawyer would get immediate cash in an amount 
less than the full value of the fee. Upon disbursement of the settlement funds, the funding company 
would retain the difference between the full fee, paid from the settlement, and the discounted amount 
advanced to the lawyer. On such facts, the Board had little difficulty concluding: 
It is unethical for an attorney to sell his or her legal fees. An attorney 
who upon reaching a settlement agreement sells or assigns his or her 
legal fee to a funding company is dividing a legal fee with a 
non-attorney. The attorney gets only part of his or her legal fee -- the 
amount advanced by the funding company. The non-attorney funding 
company gets the rest of the attorney’s legal fee. This proposed 
conduct violates DR 3-102(A). None of the exceptions to the division 
of fees with non-lawyers, listed in DR 3-102(A)(1) through (5), 
applies. 
Id. at *4. In Core Funding Group, LLC v. McDonald, 2006 Ohio 1625, 2006 WL 832833 (App. 
Lucas), appellee law firm cited Opinion 2004-2 in support of its argument that enforcement of the 
assignment of legal fees it made to appellant funding company was against public policy. The court of 
appeals was not persuaded and concluded that, whatever the ethical consequences under MR 5.4 (the 
lawyers involved were not from Ohio) of sharing fees or contract rights to fees with a nonlawyer, 
“‘[i]t does not seem to this Court that we can claim for our profession, under the guise of ethics, an 
insulation from creditors to which others are not entitled.’” (Quoting with approval from PNC Bank 
v. Berg, 45 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 27, 1997 Del. Super. LEXIS 19, at n.5 (Del. Super. 1997).) The 
Ohio court therefore reversed the summary judgment in favor of the law firm and granted the funding 
company’s summary judgment motion against the firm for violation of the security instruments. 
Fee sharing - Linking a lawyer’s services with those of a nonlawyer: Even if the lawyer maintains 
structural independence from nonlawyers, linkage between legal services provided by the lawyer and 
other services provided by a nonlawyer may constitute impermissible fee sharing. Thus, in addressing 
the question whether a law firm, using a broker to locate a buyer or seller of a business for a client, 
could share with the broker the fee charged the client, the Board of Commissioners opined that such 
an arrangement would be improper under former DR 3-102(A): “[A] business broker’s fee must not 
come from the law firm’s legal fee. If the services of a business broker are used, the broker’s fee must 
be independent of the legal fee.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-1, 2003 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1, at *14 (Apr. 11, 2003). The OSBA determined that an attorney who 
also was a title-insurance agent could not offer reduced fees for title-insurance services in exchange 
for the client’s using the lawyer’s legal services. This arrangement amounted to a sharing of fees “if 
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the lawyer compensates a non-lawyer title examiner at his regular rate and must pay the title insurer 
the standard rate on the policy that is issued.” Ohio State Bar Ass’n Formal Op. 37, at 3 (July 3, 
1989). These payments, in essence, were seen as coming out of the legal fees obtained. Id. Paying 
nonlawyer financial planners to distribute a lawyer’s brochure to clients who need wills would violate 
a number of rules, including the prohibition against fee splitting. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 
90-6 (Aug. 2, 1990). (The opinion does not explicitly address why this was fee splitting rather than 
the mere payment of an employee for services. The latter characterization seems plausible, 
particularly since the fees paid were not contingent on a client being secured through the solicitation. 
Presumably the fee-splitting notion is that the amount paid for distribution was seen as coming from 
the fees collected from solicited clients.) Providing trust agreements to clients of a financial planner, 
with the overall fee to the financial planner divided between the planner and the lawyer, also violated 
the former Code provision. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 90-2 (July 13, 1990). Similarly, an 
arrangement whereby persons facing foreclosure actions entered into an agreement with a nonlawyer 
consultant pursuant to which the consultant secured a single fee from its clients and then used that fee 
to pay an attorney for providing legal assistance to those clients, could involve the attorney in illegal 
fee splitting. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 86-3 (Aug. 28, 1986). Accord Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 
87-1 (July 31, 1987) (following Opinion 86-3 re lawyer’s proposed arrangement with consultant that 
would involve providing medical and legal services to consultant’s clients; if consultant’s analysis is 
offered to its clients for single fee and if amounts paid by consultant’s clients for legal services is in 
excess of retainer that consultant pays lawyer, lawyer’s participation in such an arrangement would 
violate former 3-102(A)). 
In addition to Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Patterson, 124 Ohio St.3d 93, 2009 Ohio 6166, 919 
N.E.2d 206, in which the respondent was found to have violated Rule 5.4(a) by sharing fees with a 
foreclosure-avoidance company, there were a number of disciplinary cases under the Code involving 
sharing legal fees with nonlawyers. One of the more recent is Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Mullaney, 
119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 4541, 894 N.E.2d 1210, in which the three respondents, who 
provided legal services on behalf of homeowners in foreclosure proceedings, accepted a portion of 
the compensation paid by the homeowner/customers to a company in the business of attempting to 
avoid foreclosure; this arrangement violated DR 3-102(A). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Willard, 
123 Ohio St.3d 15, 2009 Ohio 3629, 913 N.E.2d 960 (citing Mullaney). Another is Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n v. Jackel, 118 Ohio St.3d 186, 2008 Ohio 1981, 887 N.E.2d 340, where the lawyer and a 
company marketing estate-planning services split fees. This arrangement also violated DR 3-102(A). 
A similar result obtained in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Willette, 117 Ohio St.3d 433, 2008 Ohio 1198, 
884 N.E.2d 581, in which respondent paid a Michigan law firm 50% of the fees he received from 
each client referred to him by the firm pursuant to a contractual arrangement for the marketing of 
living trusts and other estate-planning packages. Note that the violation involved sharing fees with a 
law firm, but the Michigan firm had “no attorneys licensed to practice in Ohio,” id. at para. 13, and 
thus was considered a nonlawyer for 3-102 purposes. In Disciplinary Counsel v. Simonelli, 113 
Ohio St.3d 215, 2007 Ohio 1535, 863 N.E.2d 1039, respondent violated DR 3-102(A) by sharing 
fees with an entity (whose president was a nonlawyer) that referred bankruptcy business to 
respondent. In Cleveland Bar Ass’n. v. Nosan, 108 Ohio St.3d 99, 2006 Ohio 163, 840 N.E.2d 
1073, respondent shared fees with a business selling debt-management services to consumers, who 
were charged by respondent for establishing their repayment plan; 75% of the fee was forwarded to 
the nonlawyer business organization; this violated former OH DR 3-102(A).  
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Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Fishman, 98 Ohio St.3d 172, 2002 Ohio 7086, 781 N.E.2d 204, concerned 
a respondent who contracted with an out-of-state nonlawyer organization (“AHC”) that was engaged 
in the sale and marketing of living trusts. Respondent played no role in the initial contacts with 
prospective customers or clients. If, after initial contact, the customer agreed to pay for preparation of 
a living trust, AHC representatives had the person execute a fee and engagement agreement, and then 
collected a fee of $1,695, with the checks made out to respondent. Respondent endorsed the checks as 
necessary, and AHC deposited the funds in an out-of-state account that was not a client trust account. 
The trust documents were prepared by AHC and sent to respondent for his review. AHC “delivery 
agents” then met with the customer and had the necessary paperwork completed. At the same time, 
the delivery agents attempted to sell annuities to the customers. For each living trust sold, ACH paid 
respondent $150 for his participation. Not surprisingly, the Board found and the Court concurred that 
respondent “impermissibly shared fees with AHC . . . .” Id. at para. 17.  
In Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Moreland, 97 Ohio St.3d 492, 2002 Ohio 6726, 780 N.E.2d 579, the 
respondent entered into a contract with a corporation that marketed legal services. The corporation 
sent direct-mail solicitations to potential clients for respondent’s estate-planning practice. 
Respondent paid the company a weekly service fee for each verified appointment with a potential 
client and received roughly 15-25% of the fee paid by potential clients who in fact signed a 
representation agreement. The rest went to the company and its sales representatives. The Board 
found that this conduct violated former 3-102(A); the Court agreed. In Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Kathman, 92 Ohio St.3d 92, 748 N.E.2d 1091 (2001), respondent, like the respondent in Fishman, 
entered into a relationship with an organization marketing living trusts. The organization prepared the 
trusts; respondent served as a “review attorney.” The organization’s customers who agreed to have it 
prepare a trust for them paid the organization’s agent by check made out to respondent. Respondent 
deducted $200 for his legal fee, with the remainder going to the organization. The Board concluded 
that this arrangement was a fee-sharing agreement between respondent and a nonattorney in violation 
of former DR 3-102(A). In Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Spitz, 89 Ohio St.3d 117, 729 N.E.2d 345 
(2000), the respondent was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for violating, inter alia, 
3-102(A) by, under an agreement with a nonlawyer, splitting a fee with the nonlawyer for preparing a 
deed and trust, and then attempting to cover up the violation with a sham invoice. 
Other “living trust” fee-sharing cases in which the respondent violated DR 3-102(A) are Cincinnati 
Bar Ass’n v. Heisler, 113 Ohio St.3d 447, 2007 Ohio 2388, 866 N.E.2d 490, and Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Wheatley, 107 Ohio St.3d 224, 2005 Ohio 6266, 837 N.E.2d 1188. But the Court in 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Plymale, 91 Ohio St.3d 367, 745 N.E.2d 413 (2001), found no violation 
where the lawyer and nonlawyer discussed a fee-sharing arrangement but never entered into an 
agreement to do so. Noting that the rule prohibited sharing fees with a nonlawyer, which did not occur, 
the majority concluded that even if there had been an agreement, this “does not in and of itself 
constitute a violation of DR 3-102(A).”  Id. at 370, 745 N.E.2d at 416. The justices split 4-3 on this 
issue. 
The Heisler case goes into some detail with respect to the appropriate sanction in such cases, and 
finds that the respondent in neither Heisler nor Disciplinary Counsel v. Kramer, 113 Ohio St.3d 
455, 2007 Ohio 2340, 866 N.E.2d 498 (another living-trust disciplinary case, but not involving 
fee-sharing) “completely surrendered his professional judgment for the sake of sales,” id. at para. 18; 
this exercise of independent judgment was in contrast to the Kathman and Fishman cases.  
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Moreover, unlike the lawyers in Fishman and Wheatley, the Heisler and Kramer respondents 
“eventually came to understand the dangers inherent in affiliations with living trust sales enterprises.”  
Id.  Because of these differences, the Heisler/Kramer respondents were given stayed six-month 
suspensions, in contrast to the six-month actual suspension in Kathman and Wheatley and the 
one-year actual suspension in Fishman. The sanction imposed in Fishman was more severe than that 
imposed in Moreland or Kathman; the Court seemed particularly troubled that respondent Fishman, 
who had been in practice for more than thirty-five years, “remains oblivious to the full significance of 
his unprofessional conduct.” Id. at para. 20.  Writing for the three-justice dissent in Heisler, Chief 
Justice Moyer read the precedent differently and would have imposed a six-month actual suspension, 
because “I am unable to distinguish respondent’s misconduct from the actions discussed in 
[Wheatley and Kathman].”  Id. at para. 23. 
Fee sharing - Acquiring the practice of another: Ohio Rule 1.17 (incorporating the provisions of 
former OH DR 2-111), permits a lawyer or law firm to sell or purchase a law practice so long as the 
transaction is effected in accordance with the provisions of the Rule. See sections 1.17:200-:300. DR 
3-102(A) was amended at the same time by adding new subpart 2 [DR 3-102(A)(2)], which expressly 
recognized that a transaction involving the purchase of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer’s 
practice in accordance with what is now Ohio Rule 1.17 “may provide for the payment of money, 
over a reasonable period of time, to a nonlawyer.” The operative language is now found in Ohio Rule 
5.4(a)(2), which permits the payment of “the agreed-upon purchase price to the estate or other 
representative of that lawyer.” 
In Informal Opinion 81-9, the Ohio State Bar Association addressed the question whether a lawyer 
taking over the practice of a suspended attorney could compensate that attorney, in part, with a 
percentage of future case income. The OSBA found that because the suspended attorney was 
considered a nonlawyer during the time of the suspension, a payment of this kind would constitute 
impermissible fee sharing. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 81-9 (Nov. 4, 1981). 
Fee sharing - Referral fees: Referral fees present another problem in this area. As addressed in Ohio 
Rule 7.2(b), a lawyer is not permitted to give “a person” anything of value for the referral of cases, 
although a de minimis exception probably exists, along with the express exception for “usual charges” 
of a legal-services plan or lawyer referral service set forth in Rule 7.2(b)(2) and (3). See section 
7.2:400. In addition to violating Rule 7.2(b), such payments would likely also constitute 
impermissible fee splitting with a nonlawyer. The Supreme Court so held under the Code analog to 
Rule 5.4(a) in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Haas, 83 Ohio St.3d 302, 699 N.E.2d 919 (1998), where the 
respondent had an arrangement to split fees in return for personal-injury referrals. Accord Cleveland 
Bar Ass’n v. Reed, 94 Ohio St.3d 139, 761 N.E.2d 9 (2002) (splitting fees on cases referred to 
respondent by Pennsylvania lawyer not admitted in Ohio violated 3-102); Greater Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n v. Protus, 53 Ohio St.2d 43, 372 N.E.2d 344 (1978) (nonlawyer company in business of 
estimating and adjusting fire-loss claims solicited business for respondent’s law firm, which collected 
fee provided for in employment contract and thereafter paid portion of fee to nonlawyer company; 
3-102(A) violated, among other provisions); Toledo Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 86-9, at 1 (1986) 
(treating referral fee as fee-sharing issue and stating: “[F]ee sharing may be in the form of a gift of 
property or other emoluments as well as in the form of money. . . . [T]he test is whether a reasonable 
man would believe that the gift was of such a substantial value that it constituted a fee sharing, rather 
than a token of appreciation,” which is permissible). 
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Although there was once some question whether a lawyer’s paying a percentage of legal fees earned 
to a qualified lawyer referral service would constitute improper fee sharing with a nonlawyer, the 
Code of Professional Responsibility was amended in 1996 to allow this practice. OH DR 3-102(A)(5). 
The Staff Notes to that amended rule stated that the intent was to negate Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline, Op. 95-6, 1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (June 2, 1995), which had 
opined that a lawyer receiving a percentage of the fee earned from a referral by a nonprofit referral 
organization other than a bar association violated the pre-amendment version of DR 3-102(A). As 
stated by the Task Force, Rule 5.4 is not intended to change the analogous OHCPR provisions, such 
as OH DR 3-102(A). Note, however, that 5.4(a)(5) permits fee sharing with such referral 
organizations, without use of the “calculated-as-a-percentage” language of former 3-102(A)(5), 
which provided that the permitted fee was to be calculated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the 
lawyer. With respect to sharing court-awarded legal fees with nonprofit organizations that employed 
or retained the lawyer in the matter, see Ohio Rule 5.4(a)(4). 
In Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-2, 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 
(Apr. 6, 2001), the Board set forth guidelines concerning whether a lawyer’s payment of 
compensation to a company in exchange for an on-line attorney directory listing was a permissible 
payment for advertising under former DR 2-101, or a prohibited payment for a referral under former 
2-103(B). See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2000-5, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 5 (Dec. 1, 2000) (improper for lawyer to enter into agreement with out-of-state law firm 
operating on-line referral service unless service complied with DR 2-103(C) and the Lawyer Referral 
and Information Services Regulations (“LRIS”), published at Gov Bar R App VII). 
For discussion of fee sharing/referral fees between lawyers not in the same firm, see section 1.5:800. 
Fee sharing - Creative fee arrangements: The problem of fee sharing with a nonlawyer should not be 
confused with entering into creative fee arrangements with clients. For example, the Ohio State Bar 
Association was asked whether a lawyer could enter into a contract with a county agency to provide 
legally-mandated child-support enforcement services to eligible parents. Under the arrangement the 
county would pay the attorney an hourly rate, but would be reimbursed from any court-awarded 
attorney fees the lawyer received. The OSBA indicated that this arrangement would fall outside the 
ambit of DR 3-102(A). Rather than sharing of legal fees, this arrangement was “simply the county 
guaranteeing that the attorney will in fact be paid.” Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 86-3, at 3 
(Apr. 30, 1986). More broadly, the OSBA felt that this kind of transaction was not the sort the rule 
was meant to prevent: 
The purpose of the prohibition against the fee sharing is so that 
nonlawyers are not aided or incouraged [sic] to practice law.  
 . . . The purpose of [this] . . . arrangement is obviously 
beneficial to the public and the Committee does not find any 
“fee-splitting” problem presented. 
Id. at 2 (bracketed material added). 
The OSBA reached a like result in Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 76-10 (Aug. 24, 1976). In 
the situation posed, attorneys would provide reduced-fee representation to clients in public-interest 
1019
Ohio Legal Ethics 5.4 
  
cases referred to them from a nonprofit legal-aid office. In turn, they would remit some or all of any 
court-awarded attorney’s fees to the organization. The bar association, finding no impermissible fee 
splitting, approved this arrangement: 
[T]he thrust of the disciplinary rule is, insofar as we are concerned here, 
to prevent the lay organization from exploiting the legal services of the 
lawyer and practicing law. But we see no danger of that in the situation 
presented. There is no sale or exploitation of the lawyers [sic] services 
since they are not performed for the employer, the Foundation, but for 
the client. The Foundation merely agrees with the lawyer as to the 
amount of the fee for his representation of the client. . . . However, 
where a fee is to be paid or allowed by a court, the lawyer should 
inform the court as to all relevant aspects of the fee arrangements to 
insure that the court is not misled. 
Id. at 3 (bracketed material added). The arrangements examined in these OSBA opinions are 
expressly recognized under Rule 5.4(a)(4).  
Similarly, the Cleveland Bar Association opined that a law school instructor handling cases through 
the law school’s legal clinic could assign any court-awarded attorney fees to the legal clinic. 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 144 (Mar. 28, 1980). Although it felt that this practice technically was a 
sharing of legal fees with a nonlawyer in violation of DR 3-102(A), the bar association determined 
that prohibiting it would violate public policy and possibly might constitute an antitrust violation as 
well. Moreover, prohibiting the practice arguably would be in conflict with Gov Bar R II, which the 
association felt should take precedence over the disciplinary rule in question. Again, Rule 5.4(a)(4) 
would permit such an arrangement. See also Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
90-23, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (Dec. 14, 1990) (placement of temporary lawyers by 
agency for fee, based on percentage of lawyer’s compensation, did not violate 3-102(A), but opinion 
suggests that law firm’s payment of hourly wage to temporary lawyer and fixed fee to agency would 
be better course). 
In a 2011 opinion the Ohio State Bar Ass’n opined that a firm that engages a PEO (professional 
employer organization) to handle its payroll, benefits, etc., for an administrative-type fee would not 
violate 5.4(a) so long as the fee is not “a direct function of client fees paid to the firm for specific legal 
matters” or “contingent on client payments.” Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 2011-02 (Dec 2, 
2011). 
And, while there is to our knowledge nothing yet in Ohio, at least three state bar associations (New 
York, North Carolina and South Carolina) have opined that lawyers advertising “Groupon”-type 
discounts on fees for legal services do not run afoul of their states’ version of 5.4(a), because amounts 
collected by the website operator are properly viewed as the reasonable cost of permitted advertising 
or, even if considered fee-splitting, do not result in any exercise of control by the website over the 
lawyer’s independent judgment. See Stephanie Francis Ward, Coupon, You’re On, ABAJ, May 
2012, at 24. 
Fee-sharing problems also might arise if a collection agency is hired to secure delinquent legal fees 
and is paid based on a percentage of the fees collected. Nevertheless, the Board of Commissioners 
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approved this practice under the Code, as long as the fees to be collected were fully earned prior to 
referral. According to the Board, such payments were for the collection agency’s services, not the 
splitting of a legal fee. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievance & Discipline, Op. 91-16, 1991 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 13, at *9-10 (June 14, 1991). In a 1994 opinion, the Board contrasted this situation 
with a proposed arrangement whereby an attorney would pay a finance company a certain percentage 
of any legal fee earned from a prospective client, at a set rate of interest, to enable the client to pay the 
attorney fees. While acknowledging that some states have approved such arrangements by 
characterizing them as mere business deals or finance arrangements, the Board refused to do so and 
instead treated the situation as an impermissible fee division. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline, Op. 94-11, 1994 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Oct. 14, 1994). 
Exceptions to the prohibition against fee splitting - Ohio Rule 5.4(a) exceptions: As noted above, the 
Rule recognizes five exceptions to the general prohibition against sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer. 
The first deals with payments made to a nonlawyer arising out of the death of an attorney. A lawyer 
may enter into an agreement with other lawyers with whom he or she works whereby upon death 
payments will be made over a reasonable time to the lawyer’s estate or other designated persons. 
Ohio Rule 5.4(a)(1). (But note that in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-12, 
2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (Oct. 4, 2002), the Board opined that the analogous exception 
in DR 3-102(A) did “not permit an attorney’s intervivos transfer of shares in a legal professional 
association into an irrevocable trust to be held by a [lawyer] trustee for non-attorney beneficiaries to 
receive income during and after the life of the attorney.” Id. at *13.) Under the second exception, an 
agreement to purchase the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may provide for the 
payment of the agreed-upon purchase price to the estate or other representative of that lawyer. Ohio 
Rule 5.4(a)(2). The third exception specifies that nonlawyer employees can be included in the 
profit-sharing compensation or retirement plan of a lawyer or law firm. Ohio Rule 5.4(a)(3). The 
fourth exception allows an attorney to share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization 
that “employed or retained the lawyer in the matter.” Ohio Rule 5.4(a)(4). The final exception 
permits a lawyer to share legal fees with a nonprofit organization that recommended employment of 
the lawyer, if the organization complies with Gov Bar R XVI. Ohio Rule 5.4(a)(5). The differences 
between Ohio Rules 5.4(a)(4) and (5) and MR 5.4(a)(4) are set forth in section 5.4:101 supra. 
These five exceptions are recognized because fee sharing in these circumstances does not contravene 
the policies underlying the general prohibition; i.e., they do not aid or encourage nonlawyer practice 
of law. 
(For a thorough, common-sense analysis of the nonlawyer fee-sharing issue, in the context of a 
lawyer in a Model Rule state sharing fees with a firm in a jurisdiction where sharing fees with a 
nonlawyer is permitted (i.e., the District of Columbia), see ABA Formal Op. 464 (Aug. 19, 2013). 
Opinion 464 concludes that such an arrangement by the Model Rules lawyer does not violate 5.4(a), 
unless, however unlikely, the arrangement results in actual interference by a nonlawyer with the 
Model Rules lawyer’s independent professional judgment.) The opinion, and “slippery slope” 
criticism of it, is discussed in James Podgers, Second Time Around, ABAJ, Dec. 2013, at 20. 
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5.4:300  Forming a Partnership with Nonlawyers 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.4(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.4(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 3.45 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:401 
ALI-LGL § 10(2) 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 3.45 (1996). 
The structure of the lawyer/nonlawyer relationship: Lawyers are free to practice not only as solo 
practitioners or in traditional partnerships, but also through a legal professional association, 
corporation, or legal clinic or a limited liability company or partnership. Gov Bar R III 1. See 
generally Herbert B. Levine, John C. Goheen & Michael J. Shapiro, One More Reason for 
Partners to Have a Happy New Year - Amendment to Rule III of the Rules for the Governance 
of the Bar (effective November 1, 1995), Clev. B.J., Dec. 1995, at 10 (discussing the requirements, 
advantages, and disadvantages of the different organizational forms). In doing so, however, the 
attorney must avoid improper entanglement with nonlawyers. 
Ohio Rule 5.4(b) prohibits a lawyer from “form[ing] a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the 
activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.” See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 99-7, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (Dec. 2, 1999) (no ethical bar to lawyer not 
licensed in Ohio from being partner, member, or “other equity holder” in Ohio firm, but lawyer must 
be licensed in another state to avoid proscriptions of DR 3-103). (Such a licensed out-of-state lawyer, 
however, could not practice on a regular basis out of the offices of the Ohio firm without raising 
questions under Rule 5.5(b). See section 5.5:300.) 
The reference in Rule 5.4(b) to forming a “partnership” with a nonlawyer should not be read as being 
so limited; “it is clear that the prohibition extends to all forms of business relationships” involving the 
practice of law. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 2011-02 (Dec. 2, 2011), at n.4. In Opinion 
2011-02, the bar association’s Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct considered 
whether a law firm may contract with a professional employer organization (“PEO”) to assume and 
manage its human resources and personnel responsibilities to the firm’s lawyers (even though it is, 
under the implementing statute, a “co-employer” of the firm’s lawyers and staff). While admonishing 
that conduct prohibited by Rule 5.4(b) would have to be avoided, the opinion stated that “[t]he role of 
a conventional PEO in providing employee management services to a law firm is not likely to 
encroach on the exclusive prerogative of lawyers to engage in the practice of law.” Id. at 3. (Nor 
would 5.4(c) be violated so long as the PEO does not “interfere with the lawyers’ advice and 
judgment on behalf of their clients, or [is not] involved in directing or controlling the manner in which 
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lawyers provide legal services.” Id. at 2.) 
Violation of former DR 3-103(A), which contained language identical to that in Rule 5.4(b), took 
many forms, including 
 business agreements with nonlawyers: Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 
412, 2008 Ohio 4541, 894 N.E.2d 1210 (working agreement between respondents and Ohio 
corporation in business of helping its customers attempt to avoid foreclosure on their homes; 
by “partner[ing] with Foreclosure Solutions in representing debtors facing foreclosure,” id. at 
para. 22, they violated DR 3-103(A)); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Nosan, 108 Ohio St.3d 99, 
2006 Ohio 163, 840 N.E.2d 1073 (respondent’s affiliation with and legal work on behalf of 
out-of-state nonlawyer corporation providing consumer-debt consolidation services violated 
3-103(A)); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2004-9, 2004 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 11 (Oct. 8, 2004) (establishing mutual referral agreement with chiropractor, 
compensating chiropractor for referrals, or requesting chiropractor to recommend the 
lawyer’s services to others would constitute business relationship with chiropractor involving 
practice of law in violation of DR 3-103(A)); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 2002-1, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 1, 2002) (law firm’s business 
relationship with real-estate agency, pursuant to which firm paid agency annual fee and 
offered discounted legal services to agency’s customers in exchange for agency’s promotion 
of firm as service provider in real estate benefits program, violated 3-103(A)); Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op.  2000-1, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 
(Feb. 11, 2000) (ethically improper under former OH DR 3-103(A) for lawyer to accept  fee 
from financial services group for referring clients in need of financial services to group); see 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 97-1, 1997 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 
(Feb. 14, 1997) (entering into franchise agreement with nonlawyers in nationwide network of 
franchised law firms violated 3-103(A)). See also Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 99-9, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 10 (Dec. 2, 1999) (cautioning that 
on-line service to answer legal questions for fee cannot be joint business effort between 
lawyer and nonlawyer). 
 joint ventures involving living trusts: Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 94-2 (Oct. 25, 
1994) (joint venture between lay organization sponsoring living-trust seminars and attorney 
providing legal services resulting from seminars constitutes impermissible partnership in 
violation of rule); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 91-92-06 (n.d.) (joint venture by lawyer and 
financial planner, whereby lawyer created living trusts for clients who then had option of 
talking to financial planner about asset enhancement techniques with respect to trust, violated 
DR 3-103(A) and 5-107(C)). 
 formation of in-house law firms: Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 95-14, 
1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1, at *13-14 (Dec. 11, 1995) (participation by 
attorney-employees of insurance company in “in-house” law firm established by insurance 
company to represent insureds and practicing under a separate name violated 3-103(A) 
“because the insurance company and the attorneys are improperly joined together as an 
‘in-house law firm’ in the practice of law.”); accord Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 94-9, 1994 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (Aug. 12, 1994). 
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Note, however, that there is a separate, closely-related line of authority that reaches a different 
result. In Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. UPL 02-02 (Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Oct. 1, 2003), the Board ruled that Allstate was not engaged 
in the unauthorized practice of law when its lawyer employees represented the interests of the 
company’s insureds in defending them in litigation in accordance with Allstate’s contractual 
obligation under its insurance policies. The parties stipulated for purposes of the case that 
Allstate exercised no direction, control, or supervision of its staff attorneys that would impair 
the attorney’s use of independent judgment in representing the policy holders. It was further 
stipulated that staff lawyers in so acting were protecting Allstate’s direct and primary 
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation involving its insureds. The Board expressly 
recognized that while a corporation cannot practice law indirectly through employment of 
lawyers, there is a recognized exception where the corporation has a direct or primary interest, 
citing Judd v. City Trust & Sav. Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937), and Land 
Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934). As a result, 
the bar association’s action was dismissed. Accord Strother v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 5 Ohio 
Supp. 362, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 550 (C.P. Hamilton 1939), aff’d without opinion. Strother has 
never been cited in any reported Ohio decision; nor did the UPL Board in Allstate refer to, cite, 
or distinguish the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline opinions discussed 
in the preceding paragraph. Perhaps the characteristic distinguishing the two lines of authority 
is the establishment of an “in-house” law firm practicing under a “firm name” using one or 
more of the names of the attorneys in the two BCGD opinions finding a violation of former 
DR 3-103(A); this mechanism was not used in either Allstate or Strother. Given the stamp of 
approval given by Allstate to straightforward staff attorney employee representation of 
insureds, and the Supreme Court’s denial of review, such devices would now seem to be 
obsolete in any event. This issue and UPL Opinion 02-02 are discussed in greater detail at 
section 5.5:300. 
 
Allstate was, quite properly, dealing only with the unauthorized-practice-of-law issue; it did 
not decide whether such arrangements constitute forming a partnership with a nonlawyer. 
 
One final note about the UPL Allstate decision. It is not reported anywhere, including on 
Westlaw or LEXIS. All UPL opinions formerly were reported in Ohio Misc.2d and N.E.2d, 
but this is no longer the case. We have been advised that the current practice is as follows: 
UPL Board findings of a violation go to the Supreme Court for review and the only published 
decision is that of the Supreme Court. Dismissals of a charge of unauthorized practice do not 
automatically go to the Court, but relators can seek discretionary review (as in Allstate; see 
100 Ohio St.3d 1514, 2003 Ohio 6460, 800 N.E.2d 33, where review was denied). The 
general rule, again as in Allstate, is that UPL Board opinions of dismissal are not published 
anywhere. 
In sum, a lawyer should not practice law “in association” with a nonlawyer. The Ohio State Bar 
Association, for example, determined that if the joint offering of mediation services by a lawyer and 
psychologist in any way involved the provision of legal services, it would be improper for them to 
enter into “an association, partnership or other organization” for that purpose. Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
Informal Op. 82-2, at 3 (Aug. 3, 1982). But nationally, there is significant, more recent, support for 
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a move in the opposite direction -- that providing mediation services is not the practice of law. See 
ABA Section on Dispute Resolution, Resolution on Mediation and the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law (Feb. 2, 2002): 
Mediation is not the practice of law. Mediation is a process in which 
an impartial individual assists the parties in reaching a voluntary 
settlement. Such assistance does not constitute the practice of law. 
Id. at 1. The Resolution cites a number of state rules, reports, and ethics opinions supportive of this 
position, and further notes that the existence of an attorney-client relationship is essential to most 
definitions of the practice of law. “Because mediators do not establish an attorney-client relationship, 
they are not engaged in the practice of law when they provided mediation services.” Id. at 2. See 
Ohio Rule 2.4. See also 1 Sarah R. Cole, Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Mediation - 
Law, Policy, Practice § 10.2 (2d ed. Supp. 2008-09) at 185-86 (discussing ABA Resolution). It 
must be remembered that the foregoing deals with the lawyer acting as a third-party neutral in the 
mediation process. Representation of a client involved in the mediation process, of course, is the 
practice of law. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Alexcole, Inc., Ohio St.3d 52, 2004 Ohio 6901, 822 
N.E.2d 348 (participation in mediation hearings by nonlawyer on behalf of clients is unauthorized 
practice of law). 
In a lengthy opinion summarizing much of the national debate regarding the propriety of business 
arrangements between lawyers and nonlawyers generally, the Cincinnati Bar Association described 
the test in the following terms: 
All of the opinions stand basically for the same proposition: a lawyer 
cannot enter a business relationship with a non-lawyer where it 
involves the lawyer’s practice of law or his holding himself out as a 
lawyer. It is clear from various ethics opinions dealing with lawyers in 
a relationship with a non-lawyer that relationships are only ethically 
permissible when the lawyer either employs the non-lawyer or the 
lawyer is not performing a legal function. 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 91-92-06, at 7 (n.d.) (Opinion 91-92-06 involved joint venture between 
lawyer and financial planner). Sharing office space with a nonlawyer is permissible, as long as the 
practices are kept separate and the lawyer complies with the advertising rules and other provisions of 
the disciplinary rules. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 90-09, 1990 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 16 (June 15, 1990). 
See also Ohio Rule 5.4(d), which prohibits a lawyer from practicing “with or in the form of a 
professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit” if a nonlawyer owns an 
interest in the organization, is an officer or director of the organization, or has the right to direct or 
control the lawyer’s professional judgment. See section 5.4:510. (An exception is made for a 
nonlawyer fiduciary of the estate of a lawyer, who may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a 
reasonable time during administration of the estate. Ohio Rule 5.4(d)(1). 
Treatment of attorneys who are retired, suspended, or on inactive status as nonlawyers: The 
prohibition on practicing law in association with a nonlawyer still applies when a lawyer practices 
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with another lawyer who is retired, suspended, or has taken inactive status. See Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievance & Discipline, Op. 96-3, 1996 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (Apr. 12, 1996) (attorney 
who takes inactive registration status cannot continue to hold shares in a legal professional 
association because shares may be held only by one “authorized to practice law”; an attorney on 
inactive status is licensed to practice law, but is not authorized to do so). The same logic applies to 
lawyers who are suspended or retired and extends to prohibit their maintaining equity interests in any 
form the legal practice may take. See Gov Bar R III 3(B); Gov Bar R VI 3(A); Gov Bar VI 6(B). 
Relationships not involving the practice of law: Ohio Rule 5.4(b) does not prohibit a lawyer from 
participating in a partnership with a nonlawyer where the partnership or other business relationship is 
not engaged in the practice of law. See, under the former OHCPR, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline, Op. 94-7, 1994 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 17, 1994) (approving joint 
ownership of business that provided law-related services, as long as those services did not constitute 
practice of law). 
 
5.4:400  Third Party Interference with a Lawyer’s Professional Judgment 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.4(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.4(c) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.140-5.142 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 51:901 
ALI-LGL § 10(1) 
Wolfram § 8.8 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.140-5.142 (1996). 
Third-party direction of the lawyer’s legal judgment - In general: Ohio Rule 5.4(c) addresses the 
distance the lawyer must maintain from a third party who “recommends, employs, or pays” the 
attorney to provide legal services on behalf of another. While third parties often are involved in 
creating and supporting the lawyer-client relationship for another, the lawyer must maintain complete 
loyalty and responsibility to the client. The lawyer cannot allow the third party “to direct or regulate 
the lawyer’s professional judgment” in carrying out the representation. Id. Accord Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n Informal Op. 2011-02 (Dec. 2, 2011), discussed supra in section 5.4:300. This happened in 
Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Patterson, 124 Ohio St.3d 93, 2009 Ohio 6166, 919 N.E.2d 206, 
where a foreclosure-avoidance outfit usurped respondent’s independent professional judgment in 
violation of Rule 5.4(c). See also Disciplinary Counsel v. Mamich, 125 Ohio St.3d 369, 2010 Ohio 
1044, 928 N.E.2d 691, where respondent permitted a client to direct the course of respondent’s 
representation of the client’s daughter. 
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As former OH EC 5-24 explained, there are numerous instances in which a third party who 
recommends, employs, or pays for an attorney may have economic interests or social goals different 
from those of the client receiving the services. In reviewing and advising on the client’s case, the 
lawyer must put those third-party interests aside. The best approach is to handle the case as though no 
third party is involved at all. The lawyer should serve the client as though the client came to the 
lawyer independently and is paying the lawyer directly. Failure to heed this advice has led to 
disciplinary action. 
A classic example is Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Carretta, 72 Ohio St.3d 42, 647 N.E.2d 471 
(1995). In Carretta, a lawyer was contacted by his former church’s pastor to represent an elderly 
widow who lived in a nursing home. The pastor was a long-time friend of the client and held the 
client’s power of attorney, which he shared with two others. In preparing a will and trust for the client, 
the lawyer relied completely on the representations of the pastor, without ever speaking to the client 
herself, and included in the documents clauses conferring benefits on the pastor, purportedly in 
accord in the client’s wishes as conveyed by the pastor to the lawyer. The Court found a violation of 
DR 5-107(B) (now Ohio Rule 5.4(c)), in that the lawyer allowed the person who recommended his 
employment to direct his professional judgment in providing legal services to the client.  
In Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Bradley, 76 Ohio St.3d 1, 665 N.E.2d 1089 (1996), the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that “[a]n attorney should avoid even the perception that his or her work can be 
influenced or controlled by a party other than the client.”  Id. at 2, 665 N.E.2d at 1091. The attorney 
in Bradley was publicly reprimanded because he allowed a financial planner to gather information 
from the client and set the initial fee before either the planner or the client consulted the lawyer. In 
permitting this, the lawyer “allowed the client to perceive that the setting of a fee, the obtaining of 
information, and the possible refund of the fee could be controlled by a non-lawyer.” Id. 
See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2000-3, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 
(June 1, 2000), where the Board opined that it was improper for an insurance defense attorney to 
abide by the insurance company’s litigation management guidelines when they directly interfered 
with the lawyer’s professional judgment by requiring prior approval by the insurer of the lawyer’s 
engaging in legal research, discovery, motion practice, et al. 
In the criminal-law context, a trial court should explore potential conflicts of interest that arise from 
third-party payment of a defendant’s legal fees, to assure that due process and 
effective-assistance-of-counsel values are not compromised. For example, a payer’s interest in 
avoiding being implicated in the crime, or in using the case to set a legal precedent, may conflict with 
the defendant-client’s interest in avoiding or limiting punishment. In contexts such as these, questions 
of attorney loyalty will arise. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981). 
Third-party direction of the lawyer’s legal judgment - Lawyer/third-party joint ventures: Problems 
often arise when a lawyer’s services are involved with the provision of nonlegal services by a third 
party who typically refers the clients to the lawyer. Depending on how the relationship is structured, 
the lawyer runs the risk of numerous ethical violations, including improper referral arrangements (see 
section 7.2:400), unauthorized practice of law concerns (see section 5.5:300), improper fee sharing 
and structural arrangements (see sections 5.4:200-:300), and various conflict-of-interest problems 
(see section 1.7:500). Among the conflict-of-interest issues is the very real concern that the lawyer’s 
advice to the client might be directed or regulated by the third party involved, in violation of Ohio 
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Rule 5.4(c). 
Whether the concern is sufficient to invalidate the joint arrangement turns on the extent and nature of 
the connection between the lawyer and the third party. If the third party, rather than the client, 
compensates the lawyer, directly or indirectly, for the provision of services, or if the third party’s 
activities serve as a basis for the legal work ultimately performed, these raise warning flags that the 
third party’s influence may be too great. 
One type of joint venture that has received considerable attention involves an arrangement between a 
lawyer and a financial planner to offer clients both legal and financial-planning services. Taken 
together, the advisory opinions issued under the former OHCPR on this topic well illustrate the 
concerns raised by joint ventures with third parties: 
 Were a lawyer to provide legal services, such as drafting wills, living wills, and powers of 
attorney, through a business corporation that markets those services, the lawyer would violate 
numerous provisions, including OH DR 5-107(B) (the Code analog to Rule 5.4(c)), since this 
arrangement was likely to allow the corporation to influence the provision of legal services to 
the client. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-15, 1992 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 6 (Aug. 14, 1992). See also Lillback v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 94 Ohio 
App.3d 100, 640 N.E.2d 250 (Montgomery 1994) (attorney/life insurance agent who sold 
life insurance and investments for insurance company to clients and offered those clients free 
will and trust drafting violated 5-107(B) if insurance company encouraged lawyer, through 
payments or prospect of greater commissions, to give particular sort of legal advice or to 
render particular kind of legal service). 
 A lawyer could not be employed by a financial-planning business to draft revocable living 
trusts for clients, where nonlawyers first convinced the clients of the desirability of the trust 
and acquired the basic information regarding the trust. Under this arrangement, the initial 
advice would be given by a nonlawyer, which in turn would compromise the lawyer’s ability 
to exercise his independent professional judgment on the matter. Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
Informal Op. 90-2 (July 13, 1990). 
 To the extent the lawyer maintains more distance from the corporation, however, the 
likelihood of a problem lessens. An attorney who represents a financial consulting firm, for 
example, may also independently represent clients of that firm in estate-planning matters, as 
long as the clients will pay the lawyer directly for those services. Even then, the lawyer still 
must make sure that his independent legal judgment is not directed or regulated by the firm in 
any way. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 79-6 (Sept. 20, 1979). 
As these opinions reflect, whether any particular arrangement is prohibited depends on a case-by-case 
assessment of the degree of entanglement involved. At a minimum, caution is required before 
entering into arrangements of this kind. 
While many of the advisory opinions in this area focus on joint ventures involving arrangements 
between a lawyer and a financial planner to offer clients both legal and financial planning services, 
problems have arisen in other contexts as well: 
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 A lawyer could not be employed by an accounting firm to perform legal services for the 
accounting firm’s clients, in part because the firm, a third party, would, as a practical matter, 
direct or regulate the lawyer in the exercise of his professional judgment. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-31, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (Oct. 13, 1989) 
(fee-sharing and referral problems also were recognized). 
 A lawyer could not be employed by a collection business to write demand letters and file suit 
for creditors, in part because the business, a third party, would, as the employer, functionally 
direct or regulate the lawyer in the exercise of his professional judgment. Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n Informal Op. 90-5 (Aug. 2, 1990). But see Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 90-91-10 (n.d.) 
(approving such relationship as long as collection agency’s involvement is sufficiently 
tangential so as not to interfere with lawyer’s professional judgment). 
 lawyer could be paid by a bank for advising the lawyer’s clients in connection with the 
administration of the bank’s small-trust program, but the lawyer had to make sure that 
professional judgment was in no way influenced by the bank. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievance 
& Discipline Op. 90-22, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Oct. 12, 1990). 
These opinions bear on the multidisciplinary practice (MDP) issue, which came to a head in Ohio on 
May 17, 2000, when the Ohio State Bar Association concluded that MDP should not be authorized. 
73 Ohio St. B. Ass’n Rep. 553, 561 (May 29, 2000). The ABA likewise rejected MDP at its 2000 
annual convention. See ABA J, Sept. 2000, at 92. The issue was considered again by the ABA 
Commission on Ethics 20/20, but in April 2012 the Commission announced that it would not submit a 
proposal regarding nonlawyer ownership to the House of Delegates, inasmuch as “there does not 
appear to be a sufficient basis for recommending a change . . . .” James Pogers, Summer Job, ABAJ, 
June 2012, at 27, 28. The MDP issue is further discussed at section 5.5:240, and its history at the 
ABA level is traced in Thomas E. Spahn, Making Sense of MDP, ALPS, and ABS, 22 Experience 
No. 2, 2012, at 46. 
At times, the financing arrangement a client undertakes in order to pay the lawyer’s fee, if facilitated 
by an agreement between the lawyer and a third-party payer, may raise Ohio Rule 5.4(c) concerns. 
For example, under the former OHCPR analog, DR 5-107(B), the Board determined that a plan 
whereby an attorney would pay to a finance company a percentage of the legal fee to be earned from 
a client, in exchange for the company’s making a loan to the client to cover the fees, implicated the 
former disciplinary rule. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 94-11, 1994 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 4 (Oct. 14, 1994) (Board also found that plan as structured involved an impermissible 
division of legal fees with a nonlawyer. See section 5.4:200). The Board feared that this entanglement 
might influence the lawyer in terms of whether to enter into a lawyer-client relationship with a 
particular client. The decision would turn, in part, on the finance company’s view of the client, rather 
than on an independent assessment by the lawyer. Further, decisions on the degree of effort to expend 
on the case might be influenced by the fact that a percentage of the fees earned would need to be paid 
to the company. Independent financing options for the client were stressed as a better course. 
Third-party direction of the lawyer’s legal judgment - Organizational intermediaries in the provision 
of legal services: Potential problems may also arise when the lawyer’s client contact is filtered 
through an intermediary organization other than a law firm, such as a referral service or a 
temporary-lawyer placement firm. Similar problems occur when the lawyer’s activities are indirectly 
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affected by an oversight organization such as in the legal-services or legal-aid context. 
While the Ohio Rules explicitly allow appropriate lawyer referral services (Ohio Rule 7.2(b)(3) & 
cmt. [6]), caution must be exercised to assure that the referring entity does not impermissibly 
interfere with the professional relationship between the lawyer and client. See, under the former 
OHCPR, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-25, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 31 (Aug. 18, 1989) (providing that although legal-aid society may refer cases in which it has 
conflict to volunteer lawyers’ project funded through society, care should be taken to avoid 
third-party influence on volunteer lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment). A referral 
organization’s requirement that an attorney could co-counsel only with another attorney who was on 
the referral panel violated DR 5-107(B), because it allowed the third party to direct the attorney’s 
professional judgment as to the best co-counsel relationship for the client. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-1, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 20 (Feb. 14, 1992). Both 
5-107(B) and 2-103(D) were violated by a lawyer who participated in a group legal services plan paid 
for by a church to provide estate-planning services to its members, where the plan provided that the 
church would bear the cost of the lawyer’s preparation of self-trusteed revocable trusts only if the 
trust contained a provision that, upon the member’s death, the church would receive $20,000 or 20% 
of the proceeds of the trust, whichever was greater. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 2002-11, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 12 (Aug. 9, 2002). “The provision jeopardizes the 
lawyer’s independent professional judgment in providing legal services that meet the client’s needs 
because the group legal services plan requires that the church’s needs be given consideration in every 
client matter involving a self-trusteed revocable trust.” Id. at *10. 
Similar problems can arise in the operation of a lawyer-placement service that provides lawyers, law 
firms, or in-house legal departments with lawyers to be employed on a temporary basis. Such 
placement services have been approved where certain ethical guidelines are met, including provisions 
to insure that the placement agency does not interfere with the lawyer’s exercise of professional 
judgment on the client’s behalf, contrary to former DR 5-107(B) and 5-107(C)(3). Bd. of Comm’rs 
on Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-23, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (Dec. 14, 1990) (other 
concerns that arose involved fee splitting and protection of client confidences). The Board declared 
that the placement agency “must” execute an agreement with each temporary lawyer stating to the 
effect that the agency “will not exert any control or influence over the exercise of professional 
judgment by the lawyer, including limiting or extending the amount of time the lawyer spends on 
work for the clients of the employing firm.” Id. at *4. 
Yet another example of improper use of an organizational intermediary occurred in Bd. of Comm’rs 
on Grievance & Discipline Op. 97-5, 1997 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Oct. 10, 1997), where 
the Board opined that attorneys forming an ancillary business serving small and medium sized 
businesses to negotiate legal fees between each business and its retained counsel violated OH DR 
5-107(B), because the ancillary business “would be improperly attempting to exert influence on the 
attorneys who represent the businesses and would be interfering with a fee contract between attorneys 
and clients.” Id. at *6. 
And see Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-5, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 5 (June 14, 2002), holding that a lawyer’s agreement with a charitable organization to 
provide legal services to an unknown winning bidder or ticket holder could, under DR 5-107(B), 
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improperly limit the lawyer’s exercise of independent judgment as to whom to accept as a client and 
what services to provide. 
Multiple-firm affiliation: On several occasions under the former OHCPR, the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline stated: “An attorney at law may not practice with more 
than one legal professional association or law firm in Ohio at the same time.” Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-35, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5, at *1 (Dec. 15, 1989) 
(syllabus); accord Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-1, 1993 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 11 (Feb. 12, 1993) (treating the joint operation by two law firms of a 900 number 
providing legal information on employment law as the impermissible practice of law in more than one 
firm at a time. 
Among the ethical problems involved is a concern that dual practice may lead to conflicting loyalties, 
where the affiliation with one firm may influence the lawyer in the exercise of independent 
professional judgment for clients of the other firm. Opinion 89-35 (citing former OH EC 5-1, EC 
5-13, and EC 5-24, and noting additional problems under DR 2-101, 4-101(B), and Gov Bar R III 
3(D) (as then in effect)). This prohibition did not extend to a mixture of private practice and 
government employment. See generally sections 1.7:310 and 1.7:320. Despite the deletion in 1995 of 
what had been Gov Bar R III 3(D) (prohibiting multiple firm affiliation) the Board subsequently, in 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 99-7, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (Dec. 
2, 1999), announced its intention to “stand[] by the advice offered within Op. 89-35 that an attorney 
should not practice with more than one firm.” Id. at *10. In Opinion 99-7, the Board emphasized that 
its prior opinion was grounded in numerous Code provisions, not just the language of Gov Bar R III 
3(D) as it then existed.  
Despite the seeming soundness of the rationale for the one-firm rule, all that has now been swept 
aside. In Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2013-1, 2013 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 1 (April 4, 2013), the Board opines that practice in more than one firm is permissible, so long 
as the lawyer complies with his or her ethical obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Board’s Conclusion summarizes its view and the supporting rationale as follows: 
The Board no longer believes that a lawyer may not practice with more 
than one firm in Ohio at the same time, and withdraws the Board’s 
previous position on this issue as stated in Advisory Opinions 89-35, 
97-2, and 99-7. The Board has changed its view for the following 
reasons: 
 The Supreme Court repealed former Gov.Bar R. III(3)(D)’s prohibition against 
multiple professional associations in 1995; 
 Neither the Rules for the Government of the Bar nor the Rules of Professional 
Conduct currently prohibit simultaneous practice in multiple firms; 
 In Opinion 2008-1, the Board sanctioned multiple “of counsel” relationships 
with multiple firms: 
 The prevailing view from other jurisdictions is that practice in multiple firms is 
permissible; 
 Due to the expansive definition of “firm” in Prof.Cond.R. 1.0(c), which 
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includes legal aid, public defender, and legal services organizations, a ban on 
practice in multiple firms would prohibit a lawyer with a private practice from 
also choosing to promote access to the legal system through work in such 
organizations; and  
 For financial reasons, and especially in smaller communities, lawyers may 
have to maintain more than one part-time position to create the equivalent of 
full-time employment. 
 
The Board’s current position is that a lawyer may practice in more than 
one firm at the same time if the practice otherwise complies with the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. For purposes of this Opinion, a “firm” 
is defined as stated in Prof.Cond.R. 1.0(c). 
A lawyer who engages in simultaneous practice in multiple firms must 
recognize the potential ethical issues associated with such practice. The 
lawyer has to be diligent in avoiding conflicts of interest, and 
imputation of conflicts will apply across all “firms” of practice. 
Practice in more than one firm may not be used to eschew the duty of 
client loyalty, and the lawyer is advised to notify all firms of any 
multiple associations. Client confidences must be scrupulously 
maintained in regard to all associated firms. As part of the lawyer’s 
duty to refrain from false, misleading or nonverifiable communications 
about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services, the lawyer shall inform his or 
her clients of all multiple firm associations. A lawyer should decline 
any additional firm associations if the lawyer’s obligations to any one 
of the firms would interfere with professional independence and 
judgment. 
Id. at * 16-18. 
Even under the Code, a lawyer could maintain a passive interest in one professional association while 
practicing in another. In Colaluca v. Climaco, Climaco, Seminatore, Lefkowitz & Garofoli Co., 
L.P.A., 72 Ohio St.3d 229, 648 N.E.2d 1341 (1995), the Ohio Supreme Court held that a lawyer who 
formerly had been associated with a legal professional association could retain a share of stock in that 
legal professional association while subsequently practicing with another. Finally, a lawyer affiliated 
with a firm may be “of counsel” to another firm or firms, provided the necessary “continuing 
relationship” exists as to all firms with respect to which the lawyer is “of counsel.” Bd. of Comm’rs 
on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-1, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 1, 2008). Note 
as well that an out-of-state attorney may be an equity holder in an Ohio firm, Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 99-7, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (Dec. 2, 1999), and may be 
“of counsel” to an Ohio firm, provided the relationship complies with Ohio disciplinary rules and 
laws, just as an Ohio lawyer may be “of counsel” to an out-of-state firm, so long as the arrangement 
does not violate the disciplinary rules of the other state. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2004-11, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Oct. 8, 2004). Accord, under the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2008-1, 2008 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 8, 2008). 
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5.4:500  Nonlawyer Ownership or Control of Profit-Making Legal-Services 
Organizations 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.4(d) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.4(d) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 5.143-5.144 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:409 
ALI-LGL § 10(1) 
Wolfram § 16.5 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 5.143 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 5.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from practicing “with or in the form of a professional 
corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit” if the lawyer might be required to 
subordinate his independent legal judgment to that of a layperson. (Practice arrangements with a 
nonlawyer also can involve the lawyer in supporting the unauthorized practice of law, see section 
5.5:300, and in violating Ohio Rule 5.4(b), see section 5.4:300.) Rule 5.4(d) identifies three areas of 
concern -- where: 
 (1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a 
fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or 
interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration; 
 (2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or 
occupies a position of similar responsibility in any form of association 
other than a corporation; or 
 (3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the 
professional judgment of a lawyer. 
Ohio Rule 5.4(d)(1)-(3). See also Gov Bar R III 3(B). 
The Board of Commissioners issued an opinion finding that the exception contained in former OH 
DR 5-107(C)(1) (identical to Ohio Rule 5.4(d)(1)) did not apply to an intervivos irrevocable trust set 
up by a lawyer in a legal professional association in which another lawyer acted as trustee and held 
the lawyer’s shares in the legal professional association for the benefit of the lawyer’s nonlawyer 
minor children. “Individuals not licensed to practice law, who are the beneficiaries of a trust whose 
assets are shares of a legal professional association, would have what DR 5-107(C)(1) identifies as 
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‘any interest’ in a legal professional association.” See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievance & Discipline 
Op. 2002-12, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13, at *12 (Oct. 4, 2002). 
In Thomas E. Spahn, Making Sense of MDP, ALPS, and ABS, 22 Experience No. 2, 2012, at 46, 
the author contrasts the U.S. (including Ohio) view expressed in Rule 5.4(d)(1) with the Alternative 
Business Structures permitted in the U.K.; “while these passive investors cannot have any managerial 
authority and may not influence the lawyer’s independent judgment on behalf of their clients, the 
investors can share in the law firms’ profits.” Id. at 47. 
It is important to recognize that Ohio Rule 5.4(d) limits only a lawyer’s practicing in a “professional 
corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit.” It does not prohibit partnership or 
association with a nonattorney in a nonlegal or ancillary enterprise. See Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievance & Discipline Op. 94-7, 1994 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 17, 1994). See also 
section 5.5:300. For example, it is permissible for a lawyer to partner with laypersons in a corporation 
that provides title searches for others, as long as the title work undertaken does not involve the 
practice of law. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 94-95-01 (n.d.). For a discussion of when title work 
becomes the practice of law, see section 5.5:210. 
Nor does Ohio Rule 5.4(d) address the situation of a lawyer employed in-house by a business 
corporation or other entity to provide the entity legal advice, because such entities are not “authorized 
to practice law.” While a lawyer may work in such an organization, the lawyer still must decline 
direction of his professional judgment by laypersons. See former OH EC 5-25. Of course, the 
attorney in the in-house setting still owes deference to the client, the organization, on matters of 
business policy within the client’s control; often, nonlawyer officers and directors will make those 
decisions on behalf of the organization. Id. See section 1.2:320. While there would appear to be no 
authority on the point in Ohio, ABA Formal Op. 87-355, at 3 n.3 (Dec. 14, 1987) notes that MR 
5.4(d) is not directly applicable to for-profit prepaid legal services plans because such plans, “as the 
Committee understands, are sponsored by entities not authorized to practice law.” 
In addition, because of the Rule’s focus on the practice of law “for a profit,” Ohio Rules 5.4(d) does 
not speak to the many lawyers employed in nonprofit settings such as government or legal aid. See 
section 5.4:520 below. 
  
5.4:510  Group Legal Services 
Pursuant to Ohio Rule 7.2(b)(2) and Rule 7.2 cmts. [6] & [7], group legal-services plans, through 
which an organization may facilitate access by its members or beneficiaries to lawyers, are authorized 
in Ohio. Under Gov Bar R XVI 5, the organization offering the legal-services plan can be for-profit 
or nonprofit. Id. at 5(A). In either case they must be operated so that the organization derives no profit 
from the rendition of legal services by lawyers. Id. If the organization is for-profit, lawyers employed, 
directed, supervised, or selected by the organization cannot not render legal services except in matters 
in which the organization itself bears the ultimate liability of its member or beneficiary. Id. Other 
constraints, applicable to group legal-services plans of both for-profit and nonprofit sponsoring 
organizations, are set forth in Gov Bar R XVI 5(B)-(H). For further discussion, see section 7.2:400. 
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5.4:520  Nonprofit Organizations Delivering Legal Services 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 5.144 (1996). See also section 5.4:510. 
Inasmuch as Ohio Rule 5.4(d) by its terms applies only to “a professional corporation or association 
authorized to practice law for a profit,” the strictures of the Rule are inapplicable to nonprofit 
organizations delivering legal services. As Hazard and Hodes state, 
[t]his means that a lawyer may freely practice under through [sic] 
prepaid legal services plans operated under the auspices of trade unions, 
civil rights groups, and other not-for-profit organizations. 
2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 45.9, 
at 45-17 (3d ed. Supp. 2011-1). 
It should be noted, however, that former OH EC 5-13 went further than the disciplinary rules to warn 
the lawyer about being part of “any organization of employees,” such as a union, “that undertakes to 
prescribe, direct, or suggest when or how” the lawyer should fulfill his professional obligations to the 
individual or organization employing him as a lawyer. Membership in employee organizations was 
not in itself improper. It was only when the organization infringed on the lawyer’s paramount duty to 
exercise independent judgment for the client that the prohibition arose. See ABA Informal Op. 1325 
(Mar. 31, 1975); Santa Clara County Counsel Att’ys Ass’n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142 (Cal. 
1994). Particularly in the context of intense labor negotiations, there is a possibility that the union 
leadership would attempt to pressure individual attorneys to strike and thereby delay or sabotage an 
employer/client’s work in order to gain bargaining leverage with that client. Allowing such 
third-party pressure to affect the lawyer’s independent professional judgment in handling the case 
clearly was improper under the Code. See ABA Informal Op. 1325. While not violative of Ohio 
Rule 5.4(d)(3) for the reason stated above, such conduct might well violate other provisions, such as 
Rule 5.4(c). 
Problems of this type also may develop in the relationship between a legal-services attorney and the 
organization’s governing board. To what extent can the governing board set policy, without 
contravening the lawyer’s duty to provide independent professional judgment to each client? It is 
appropriate for the governing board to set priorities in terms of the kinds of cases an office should 
handle and establish other general guidelines. Interference with the handling of particular cases, 
however, would be improper under, inter alia, former DR 5-107(B) (now Ohio Rule 5.4(c)). Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-004, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 11 (Feb. 17, 
1989). Accord former OH EC 5-25 (recognizing that prohibition against directorships for 
nonlawyers in professional legal corporation did not apply in legal-aid context, but stressing that it in 
no way allowed third party to interfere with lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment in individual 
cases on client’s behalf). 
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5.5:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.5 
Gov Bar R I 9, VI-VII, IX, XI, XII 
ORC 4705.01, 4705.07, 4705.99 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.5 
  
5.5:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 5.5, which in divisions (a) and (b) is identical to the Model Rule, thereafter differs in a 
number of respects. 
The changes in division (c) are as follows: After “lawyer” in the first line, the words “who is” have 
been added; after “jurisdiction” in the first line, the following phrase has been added: “is in good 
standing in the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted,”; after “and” in the second line, the words 
“not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction,” have been deleted and the words 
“regularly practices law” inserted; and, in the last line of the opening paragraph, the word “that” has 
been deleted and “if one or more of the following apply:” has been added. 
In each of the first three subdivisions of (c) ((c)(1), (2), and (3)), the 
subdivision starts with the newly added words “the services” and the 
words “in or” after “are” have been stricken. 
In subdivision (c)(4), the beginning words “are not within paragraphs 
(c)(2) or (c)(3) and” have been deleted and the following words have 
been substituted: “the lawyer engages in negotiations, investigations, 
or other nonlitigation activities that”. 
In division (d), the following changes have been made: the words “and in good standing” have been 
added after “admitted” in the first line, and the phrase “, and not disbarred or suspended from practice 
in any jurisdiction,” has been deleted; in the last line “that” has been replaced by “in either of the 
following circumstances:”. 
In subdivision (d)(1), the beginning words “are provided to the 
lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services” 
have been deleted and the following has been substituted in their place: 
“the lawyer is registered in compliance with Gov. Bar R. VI, Section 3 
and is providing services to the employer or its organizational 
affiliates”. After “for which”, the words “the forum requires” have 
been deleted and the following has been substituted in their place: “the 
permission of a tribunal to appear”. Finally, “admission” has been 
deleted after pro hac vice and “is not required” has been substituted in 
its place. 
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In subdivision (d)(2), the first word “are” has been deleted and “the 
lawyer is providing” substituted in its place; and “federal law or other 
law of this jurisdiction.” has been replaced with “federal or Ohio law.” 
  
5.5:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 5.5(a): DR 3-101. 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 5.5(b): None. 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 5.5(c): None. 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 5.5(d): None. 
  
5.5:200  Engaging in Unauthorized Practice 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.5(a) & (b) 
Gov Bar R I, VI-VII 
ORC 4705.01, 4705.07(A) 
UPL Regs. 100-400 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.5(a) & (b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 3.9-3.13, 3.22, 3.33, 
3.35 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §§ 21:8001, :8201 
ALI/LGL § 4 
Wolfram § 15.1 
Introduction: The area of unauthorized practice of law is multifaceted. The most obvious culprit -- a 
layperson practicing law or holding himself out as a lawyer -- is not covered by the Rules at all (nor 
was it by the Code), but rather by statutory provisions, see ORC 4705.01, 4705.07, and by Gov Bar 
R VII 2(A). The layperson-unauthorized-practice cases are discussed in section 5.5:210. Nor do the 
Rules apply to a lawyer licensed to practice in the District of Columbia and the Northern and Southern 
Districts of Ohio, but not admitted in Ohio; such a lawyer is not “subject to the disciplinary authority 
of this court: ‘Because [respondent] is not a  member of the Ohio bar and has not taken the oath to be 
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bound by the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, these rules do not apply to him; rather, his conduct 
is subject to review by the Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (‘UPL Board’).” Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Harris, 137 Ohio St.3d 1, 2013 Ohio 4026, 996 N.E.2d 921, at para. 1. In so holding, 
the Court does not attempt to reconcile the seemingly contrary language in Rule 8.5 that a “lawyer not 
admitted in Ohio is also subject to the disciplinary authority of Ohio if the lawyer provides or offers to 
provide any legal services in Ohio,” despite relator’s express reliance on this rule in arguing that 
Harris was subject to Ohio disciplinary authority; the panel and Board so concluded.  
Ohio Rule 5.5 addresses lawyer conduct constituting unauthorized practice and a lawyer’s assisting 
others in doing so. Thus, under Rule 5.5(a), a lawyer cannot “practice law in a jurisdiction in 
violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction [see section 5.5:220], or assist 
another in doing so.” “Another” in this context includes both laypersons and lawyers not authorized to 
practice in Ohio. See section 5.5:240. Nor can a lawyer not admitted in Ohio 
(1) establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in 
this jurisdiction for the practice of law [unless authorized by these rules 
or other law]; [or] 
(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is 
admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. 
Rule 5.5(b)(1) & (2) (the virtually identical language of MR 5.5(b) was added as a part of the ABA 
2002 amendments to the Model Rules). Ohio Rule 5.5(b) is discussed in section 5.5:300. 
The remainder of Rule 5.5 is devoted to specific situations in which a lawyer admitted elsewhere can 
practice in Ohio on either a temporary or continuous basis. In slightly different language, these 
multijurisdictional practice segments were also added to MR 5.5 as part of the 2002 amendments; the 
Ohio provisions are examined below in sections 5.5:400-:500.  MR 5.5 is discussed in Thomas 
Spahn, Multijurisdictional Practice, Experience, Winter 2008, at 42. 
  
5.5:210 Practice of Law by Nonlawyers 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 3.9-3.13, 3.22, 3.29-3.31 (1996). 
Nonlawyer practice of law - In general: The core concern behind prohibitions against the 
unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers is that those individuals will not be qualified to render 
legal services. See Ohio Rule 5.5 cmt. [2]. This concern was clearly evident in the Ohio Supreme 
Court’s decision in Akron Bar Ass’n v. Frank, 88 Ohio St.3d 152, 724 N.E.2d 399 (2000), where 
the Court stated as follows: 
 What is clear from the document respondent has filed before us 
is that respondent has no idea of judicial procedure, no concept of how 
to present facts, and is unable to interpret case law. Respondent 
presents unsupported conclusions, takes words and phrases out of 
context, and liberally uses legal jargon without understanding its 
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meaning. Respondent is a living example of why we require character 
and fitness reviews, examinations of legal ability, and continuing 
education of those who are permitted to give legal advice and appear in 
our courts. Respondent is hereby ordered to discontinue any and all 
activities that constitute the practice of law. 
88 Ohio St.3d at 153-54, 724 N.E.2d at 401. Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Kafele, 108 Ohio 
St.3d 283, 2006 Ohio 904, 843 N.E.2d 169 (Frank’s “living example” quote used; respondent’s 
“misguided attempts” to prepare legal documents on behalf of a limited liability company “illustrate 
why the practice of law must be strictly limited to licensed attorneys,” id. at para. 19). 
A secondary concern is that nonlawyers are not regulated like lawyers and hence clients will not 
receive the protections that lawyer regulation and discipline afford. 
As noted above, Rule 5.5 deals with lawyer conduct; with respect to nonlawyers, statutory provisions 
provide for punishment of nonlawyers who engage in the unauthorized practice of law. See ORC 
4705.01 (prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law); ORC 4705.07(A) (prohibiting one “not 
licensed to practice law in this state” from (1) holding him or herself out as an attorney or (2) as 
authorized to practice law or (3) from committing any act prohibited by the Supreme Court as the 
unauthorized practice of law); and ORC 4705.99 (making violation of ORC 4705.07(A)(1) or (2) a 
misdemeanor of the first degree). Accord Gov Bar R VII 2(A).  
In addition to these provisions, the Ohio Constitution “confers on this court original jurisdiction over 
all matters related to the practice of law, including allegations of laypersons practicing law without a 
license”; this authority permits the Ohio Supreme Court “to enjoin the unauthorized practice of law 
before federal courts in this state,” as well as state courts, “‘except to the limited extent necessary for 
the enforcement of the federal objectives.’” Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Baron, 106 Ohio St.3d 259, 
2005 Ohio 4790, 834 N.E.2d 343, at para. 6 (preparing legal documents for filing in bankruptcy 
court; inner quotation from Sperry v. Fla. ex rel. Fla. Bar Ass’n, 373 U.S. 379, 402 (1963)). In 2003, 
the Rules for the Government of the Bar were amended to provide for the imposition by the Court of 
civil penalties of up to $10,000 per offense for unauthorized practice; for example, in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Pratt, 127 Ohio St.3d 293, 2010 Ohio 6210, 939 N.E.2d 170, the layperson respondent 
was fined $60,000 for his “‘outrageous, brazen, fraudulent, and deceitful’” acts involving multiple 
occurrences over a period of time “committed flagrantly.” Id. at para. 11. Pratt also violated RC 
4705.07(A)(1) and (2) by holding himself out as an attorney at law and representing that he was 
authorized to practice. See also “Sanctions for nonlawyer unauthorized practice,” this section infra. 
For another “holding out” case, see Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. McGinnis, 137 Ohio St.3d 166, 
2013 Ohio 4581, 998 N.E.2d 474 (distributing flyer advertising respondent’s services as 
“Forrestine’s Law, Inc.”). As the Court noted, use of “law” in connection with an advertisement by 
one not licensed to practice, “the evident purpose of which is to induce others to believe that person to 
be an attorney,” is a violation of ORC 4705.07(B)(1). See also GovBarR VII 2(A)(4). (Effective 
September 15, 2004, an amendment to ORC 4705.07 added division (C), subsection (C)(2) of which 
provides for a private right of action for damages to those injured by another who is found by the 
Supreme Court to have violated 4705.07(A)(3) (unauthorized practice of law) as a result of conduct 
occurring after the effective date of the amendment. There was no common-law right of action for the 
unauthorized practice of law prior to the amendment. Greenspan v. Third Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
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122 Ohio St.3d 455, 2009 Ohio 3508, 912 N.E.2d 567 (syllabus one).) 
The body directly responsible for hearing complaints against nonlawyers concerning the 
unauthorized practice of law is the Board of Commissioners on the Unauthorized Practice of Law. 
Gov Bar R VII 2. (Complaints against lawyers for unauthorized practice or assisting in the 
unauthorized practice of law remain under the jurisdiction of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline.) Pursuant to Gov Bar R VII 16, the Supreme Court adopted Final 
Regulations for the Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, effective June 1, 2006. See 109 Ohio 
St.3d CXLV-CLIV. Included in the Regulations are provisions for the issuance of UPL Advisory 
Opinions. See UPL Reg 300. The first such opinion issued since the regulations were promulgated is 
UPL 2008-1 (Feb. 7, 2008), dealing with lawyer and nonlawyer representation of labor organizations 
in collective bargaining and labor-grievance arbitration. See generally Eugene P. Whetzel, Advisory 
Opinions Provide Guidance, Ohio Law., May/June 2008, at 26. Two additional opinions were 
issued on December 12, 2008: UPL 2008-2 (nonattorney employee of bank or lending institution may 
complete standard form mortgage by filling in blanks for employer without supervision of Ohio 
attorney) and UPL 2008-03 (nonlawyer doing business as online legal document service cannot draft 
or prepare legal documents and pleadings and cannot select and complete legal forms for Ohio 
resident). See generally Eugene P. Whetzel, A Cautionary Tale for Lawyers, Ohio Law., 
May/June 2009, at 26, 27.  
Effective November 1, 2007, the Supreme Court also approved the addition of Gov Bar R VII 5b.  It 
permits parties with matters pending before the Board to submit a proposed resolution in the form of 
a settlement agreement or consent decree. Disciplinary Counsel v. Spates, 128 Ohio St.3d 435, 
2011 Ohio 1526, 945 N.E.2d 1049, and Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Pinnacle Title Corp., 122 Ohio 
St.3d 592, 2009 Ohio 4206, 913 N.E.2d 451, are representative cases using the Gov Bar VII 5b 
consent decree procedure.  
In all UPL cases the allegations of unauthorized practice of law by an individual or entity “must be 
supported by either an admission or specific evidence of an act constituting the infraction.”  
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. CompManagement, Inc., 111 Ohio St.3d 444, 2006 Ohio 6108, 857 
N.E.2d 95, at para. 26 (emphasis by the Court).  Accord id. at syllabus one. 
The nonlawyer-practice-of-law cases come in all sizes and shapes, from garden-variety attempts to do 
so by individuals to those involving legislative action purporting to bestow this power in limited 
circumstances on nonlawyers. In exploring these cases, three questions need to be asked: (1) Who is a 
nonlawyer? (2) What is the practice of law? (3) When is the practice of law unauthorized? 
Who is a nonlawyer: The answer to the first question is relatively straightforward; a nonlawyer is a 
person or entity not licensed to practice law. Inasmuch as only individuals may be so licensed, 
attempts by entities such as corporations to engage in the practice are by definition attempts by 
nonlawyers. Only licensed lawyers on active status are authorized to practice; thus, 
unauthorized-practice concerns can be implicated as well by lawyers who are suspended or on 
inactive or retired status. The cases dealing with such lawyers are discussed in section 5.5:220. The 
layperson and entity cases are treated in this section. 
Gov Bar R II provides for limited legal practice by a certified legal intern, typically under the 
supervision of a supervising attorney.  As one might expect, attempts by a nonlawyer to pose as a 
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legal intern and purport to act in that capacity are equally unavailing and will result in an order 
enjoining the respondent from unauthorized practice. Disciplinary Counsel v. Casey, 137 Ohio 
St.3d ___, 2013 Ohio 5284, ___ N.E.2d ___ ($1,000 civil fine imposed in addition to injunction). 
A nonlawyer case involving considerable chutzpa on the part of the respondent is Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Robson, 116 Ohio St.3d 318, 2007 Ohio 6460, 878 N.E.2d 1042.  Robson graduated 
from law school but never passed the bar.  Nevertheless, he held himself out to the law firm that hired 
him as licensed to practice by fabricating fictitious attorney-registration numbers for Ohio and North 
Carolina.  While so employed, he engaged in the unauthorized practice by holding himself out as an 
attorney to clients, by advising a client on corporate structuring strategies, and by representing 
another client’s interests in settlement negotiations.  When the law firm discovered respondent’s 
fraud, it fired him.  Since this fraud outweighed mitigating factors, a $1,000 fine was imposed in 
addition to the injunction against acting as a lawyer.  As part of the parties’ stipulation, respondent 
“has agreed never to reapply for admission to the Ohio bar.  Our order enjoining the filing of such an 
application will ensure that he does not.”  Id. at para. 38. 
An equally egregious instance occurred in Disciplinary Counsel v. Brown, 121 Ohio St.3d 423, 
2009 Ohio 1152, 905 N.E.2d 163, where the respondent was a disbarred New York lawyer who had 
never been admitted in Ohio. Despite these facts, Brown made a habit of practicing law in Ohio – 
giving legal advice, preparing legal documents, accepting retainers, and generally giving his “clients” 
and others the false impression that he was a lawyer. He was enjoined from doing so, fined $50,000 
for his transgressions, and ordered to show cause why he ought not be held in contempt for violating 
an earlier unauthorized-practice order by the Court. 
What is the practice of law: With respect to the second question, “[t]he definition of the practice of 
law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, 
limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal 
services by unqualified persons.” Ohio Rule 5.5 cmt. [2]. See also ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 473 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) (states often reluctant to adopt 
comprehensive definition; “[n]evertheless, each jurisdiction has identified – whether in decisional 
law, statutes, or court rules – certain activities that constitute the practice of law.” The Ohio 
jurisprudence on the subject follows. 
Perhaps the most often cited definition is that found in the Ohio Supreme Court’s seminal decision in 
Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934) (syllabus 
one): 
 The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in 
court. It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers 
incident to actions and special proceedings and the management of 
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and 
courts, and in addition conveyancing, the preparation of legal 
instruments of all kinds, and in general all advice to clients and all 
action taken for them in matters connected with the law. 
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In addition to Dworken, another commonly cited definition of the practice of law provides: 
 It is clear that a licensed attorney in the practice of law 
generally engages in three principal types of professional activity. 
These types are legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them 
of their rights and obligations; preparation for clients of documents and 
papers requiring knowledge of legal principles which is not possessed 
by an ordinary layman; and appearance for clients before public 
tribunals, which possess the power and authority to determine rights of 
life, liberty and property according to law, in order to assist in the 
proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 
Special Master Comm’rs v. McCahan, 83 Ohio Law Abs. 1, 11, 167 N.E.2d 541, 550 (C.P. Stark 
1960). Accord Sharon Village Ltd. v. Licking County Bd. of Revision, 78 Ohio St.3d 479, 481, 
678 N.E.2d 932, 934 (1997) (quoting the three McCahan categories with approval). 
Consistent with this test, “one who purports to negotiate legal claims on behalf of another and advises 
persons of their legal rights and the terms and conditions of settlement engages in the practice of law.” 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Henley, 95 Ohio St.3d 91, 92, 766 N.E.2d 130, 131 (2002). Accord 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Foreclosure Solutions, L.L.C., 123 Ohio St.3d 107, 2009 Ohio 4174, 914 
N.E.2d 386, at paras. 25-26. Foreclosure Solutions is the layman-unauthorized-practice companion 
case to Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 4541, 894 N.E.2d 1210, 
where the lawyers working with Foreclosure Solutions were sanctioned for aiding the unauthorized 
practice of law. Mullaney is discussed infra in section 5.5:240, at “Participation in a joint venture or 
other relationship with a nonlawyer.” 
Two other important cases bearing on the meaning of the practice of law in the administrative context 
are Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. CompManagement, Inc., 104 Ohio St.3d 168, 2004 Ohio 6506, 818 
N.E.2d 1181, and Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. CompManagement, Inc., 111 Ohio St.3d 444, 2006 
Ohio 6108, 857 N.E.2d 95, discussed this section infra at “Lay representation before administrative 
tribunals.” 
Whether an activity constitutes the practice of law also depends on the recipient of the service. Gov 
Bar R VII 2(A), as amended effective September 1, 2010 and January 1, 2011, defines the 
unauthorized practice of law as “[t]he rendering of legal services for another by any person” (1) not 
admitted to practice in Ohio (unless certified as a legal intern under Gov Bar R II, granted corporate 
status under R VI, certified under R IX to temporarily practice, registered as a foreign legal 
consultant under R IX, or granted permission to appear pro hac vice in accordance with R XII), or (2) 
any disbarred, resigned, or retired Ohio lawyer, or (3) any suspended or inactive Ohio lawyer. 
(emphasis added). In Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-018, 1988 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 1, at *1 (Aug. 12, 1988), the Board opined that “because a legal research and writing 
service for other lawyers does not involve representing or advising clients, it should not be considered 
the practice of law.” The Ohio Board of Commissioners on the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
determined that holding oneself out as a lawyer when not entitled to do so technically is not the 
practice of law because it does not involve representing others.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Brown, 61 Ohio Misc.2d 792, 584 N.E.2d 1391 (Bd. of Comm’rs on Unauthorized Practice of 
Law 1992). Such conduct, however, is still subject to legal sanction under ORC 4705.07. 
1043
Ohio Legal Ethics 5.5  
  
Further, the fact that the layperson “‘received no remuneration for his actions is irrelevant’ to the 
determination of whether he engaged in the unauthorized practice.”  Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Henley, 
95 Ohio St.3d 91, 92, 766 N.E.2d 130, 131 (2002) (quoting Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Canfield, 
92 Ohio St.3d 15, 16, 748 N.E.2d 23, 24 (2001)). Accord Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Jackim, 121 
Ohio St.3d 33, 2009 Ohio 309, 901 N.E.2d 792. It may, however, be a factor favoring a lower civil 
penalty. See Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. McGinnis, 137 Ohio St.3d 166, 2013 Ohio 4581, 998 
N.E.2d 474, at paras. 15, 17. 
When is the practice of law unauthorized: Applying these basic definitions, some cases are relatively 
easy. Nonlawyer representation of another by appearing on the other’s behalf in a court action, 
whether civil or criminal in nature, obviously is the unauthorized practice of law.  Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n v. Para-Legals, Inc., 106 Ohio St.3d 455, 2005 Ohio 5519, 835 N.E.2d 1240 (attempting to 
represent out-of-state corporation in court through “sham authority” of power of attorney; also 
advertised “We Are Not Attorneys; We Just Do All of the Work!” Id. at paras. 5, 8); Columbus Bar 
Ass’n v. Purnell, 94 Ohio St.3d 126, 760 N.E.2d 817 (2002) (entry of appearance, without 
supervision of attorney, by paralegal on behalf of minor in personal-injury matter); Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n v. Smith, 62 Ohio Misc.2d 776, 610 N.E.2d 671 (Bd. of Comm’rs on Unauthorized 
Practice of Law 1993) (nonlawyer representation of others in criminal cases); Cf. Akron Bar Ass’n 
v. Coombs, 85 Ohio St.3d 391, 709 N.E.2d 108 (1999) (respondent charged with violation of 
various disciplinary rules (but not with unauthorized practice) based on his representation of a client 
in several legal matters (including appearance in a criminal matter) prior to his admission to the Ohio 
bar. Respondent argued below that he had not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; in 
affirming the Board’s finding of violations as charged, the Court went out of its way to note that 
“[c]ontrary to respondent’s assertions at the hearing,” the practice of law encompasses activities such 
as those engaged in by respondent.  Id. at 392, 709 N.E.2d at 109). 
Nor is there any doubt that the filing of pleadings and other papers in a court of law by a nonlawyer is 
the unauthorized practice of law. E.g., Lorain County Bar Ass’n v. Kocak, 121 Ohio St.3d 396, 
2009 Ohio 1430, 904 N.E.2d 885. 
Also constituting the unauthorized practice of law is a nonlawyer’s provision of legal advice, 
consultation on legal matters, or drafting of legal documents, whether intended for use in court or 
otherwise. E.g., Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Pinnacle Title Corp., 122 Ohio St.3d 592, 2009 Ohio 
4206, 913 N.E.2d 451 (providing advice concerning legal implications of deeds and preparing real 
estate deeds); Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Newburn, 119 Ohio St.3d 96, 2008 Ohio 3823, 892 N.E.2d 
431 (nonlawyer professional surveyor’s preparation of documents granting reciprocal easements to 
two of his clients); Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Martin, 118 Ohio St.3d 119, 2008 Ohio 1809, 886 
N.E.2d 1809 (advising others on their legal rights and giving aid in the preparation and completion of 
legal documents and forms); Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Canfield, 92 Ohio St.3d 15, 748 N.E.2d 
23 (2001) (former attorney who had resigned from practice of law but who prepared land-installment 
contract and notarized the contract with the legend “commission has no expiration date,” which can 
be used only by an attorney admitted to practice, engaged in unauthorized practice of law); Akron 
Bar Ass’n v. Singleton, 60 Ohio Misc.2d 19, 573 N.E.2d 1249 (Bd. of Comm’rs on Unauthorized 
Practice of Law 1990) (syllabus) (sale of “dissolution kit” by nonattorney, combined with 
preparation of petition for dissolution of marriage, separation agreement, decree of dissolution, 
visitation order, and child support forms for filing in court, and issuance of advice and counseling of 
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Ohio residents concerning the laws of Ohio on divorce and dissolution of marriage).   
Other examples of the unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers include: 
 Marketing, sale or preparation of immigration forms, including applications, petitions and 
supporting forms, Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Immigration Assocs., L.L.C., 132 Ohio St.3d 
476, 2012 Ohio 3304, 974 N.E.2d 86. 
 Preparing, signing and filing affidavits for mechanic’s liens for third parties, Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n v. Lienguard, 126 Ohio St.3d 400, 2010 Ohio 3827, 934 N.E.2d 337. 
 Appraisal company agreed to and did defend its own appraisals, provided to Ohio county 
auditors, in hearings before various boards of revision, examined witnesses at such hearings, 
and rendered advice regarding the conduct of such hearings. Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. 
Appraisal Research Corp., 125 Ohio St.3d 508, 2010 Ohio 2204, 929 N.E.2d 446. 
 Representation of clients by foreign corporation and its nonlawyer/sole shareholder in 
securities arbitration and mediation proceedings.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Alexcole, Inc., 
105 Ohio St.3d 52, 2004 Ohio 6901, 822 N.E.2d 348. 
 “[R]epresentation by a nonattorney who advises, counsels, or negotiates on behalf of an 
individual or business in the attempt to resolve a collection claim between debtors and 
creditors.” Ohio St. Bar Ass’n v. Kolodner, 103 Ohio St.3d 504, 2004 Ohio 5581, 817 
N.E.2d 25, at para. 15. 
 “Contracts in which collection agencies are allowed to prosecute claims before a court of 
justice on behalf of creditors are generally unenforceable since they authorize a collection 
agency to practice law. The collection agency practices law by interposing itself as an 
intermediary between a licensed attorney and a client. In effect, the collection agency 
becomes the client of the attorney when it is not. This creates an absence of the attorney-client 
relationship that diverts the interest of the attorney from the entity whose real interests are at 
stake in the proceedings, thereby giving rise to a possible conflict of interest.” Med Controls, 
Inc. v. Hopkins, 61 Ohio App.3d 497, 499, 573 N.E.2d 154, 155 (Cuyahoga 1989) 
(citations omitted). 
 “Medicaid Planning” – essentially estate planning – for “[i]ndividuals in need of long-term 
care often use estate tools such as trusts, gifts, and asset transfers to meet Medicaid income 
and resource-eligibility thresholds. Such estate planning requires specialized legal training, 
skill, and experience because it incorporates analysis, interpretation, and the preparation of 
legal documents.” UPL Op. 2011-01 (Oct. 7 2011) at 6 (but document review to determine 
“countable resources” for Medicaid purposes not practice of law; moreover federal law, 
authorizing preparation of Medicaid applications and attendance at hearings on behalf of 
another, preempts any conclusion under state law that such conduct constitutes unauthorized 
practice of law). 
Permissible law-related conduct by nonlawyers:  It is clear that nonlawyers may play some role in 
support of individuals involved in court actions, estate planning, commercial transactions, and the 
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like. The problem is one of drawing the line. 
From a review of the major Ohio Supreme Court cases on this topic (discussed more fully this section 
infra at “Lay employee assistance in the practice of law”), two variables seem most important. The 
first goes to the skills necessary to do the task. To the extent the work is ministerial or, although more 
advanced, is something a person could do without legal training, doing such work by nonlawyers 
would be permissible. When the issue turns on advising a client or sharing information with them, 
problems arise when the nonlawyer moves from sharing general information or information from the 
public record to providing legal information or advice specific to the individual represented.  See 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Palmer, 115 Ohio Misc.2d 70, 761 N.E.3d 716 (Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Unauthorized Practice of Law 2001) (nonlawyer’s website that dispensed general 
legal information and replied to inquiries with general responses not rising to the level of legal advice 
was not practice of law). Additional factors come into play when a nonlawyer represents a client 
before administrative tribunals. See discussion in this section infra at “Lay representation before 
administrative tribunals.”  
In a number of decisions, the Ohio Supreme Court has tried to spell out in more detail the distinction 
between the unauthorized practice of law and the permissible performance of law-related activities by 
nonlawyers.  In a 2006 decision, Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Burdzinski, Brinkman, Czanzasty & 
Landwehr, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 107, 2006 Ohio 6511, 858 N.E.2d 372, in addition to finding that 
drafting legal documents does constitute the unauthorized practice of law, the Court spelled out three 
areas that did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law in the context presented.  Thus, although 
respondents gathered information indicating why employees may want a union and developed 
strategies to respond to that information, 
[g]athering information, even on a matter that may come before a court 
of law, is not the practice of law.  The strategies developed appear to be 
business-oriented, such as how to communicate with employees.  
Strategic planning of this nature is not the practice of law. 
Id. at para. 16.  Also, while advising a client how to comply with a regulatory scheme would 
normally be the practice of law, it was not in this case, where the “NLRB has already performed that 
function.”  Following the strict NLRB guidelines, without analysis or interpretation, is permitted; 
“[p]resenting prepackaged legal advice of this nature is not the practice of law.”  Id. at para. 18.  
Finally, the respondents negotiated on behalf of their customers.  While negotiation can be the 
practice of law,  
[r]espondents here are not negotiating the settlement of a legal dispute, 
nor are they negotiating a business or real-estate contract in which all 
elements of the contract are negotiable.  Rather, there is a clearly 
defined scope of allowable subjects for negotiation.  Because of the 
close federal regulation and the limited subjects for negotiation, we 
conclude that respondent’s conducting of negotiations on behalf of 
their clients with employees or employees’ representatives during 
collective bargaining is not the practice of law. 
Id. at para. 20. 
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In Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Lender’s Serv., Inc., 40 Ohio St.3d 96, 532 N.E.2d 120 (1988), the 
Supreme Court addressed the question of the extent to which nonlawyers could perform title searches 
and report on the results without being guilty of the unauthorized practice of law. The Court drew a 
distinction between conducting a title search, which can be performed by nonlawyers, and examining 
or rendering opinions on titles, which cannot. The former practice is permissible because it simply 
involves a search of the public record and reporting what was found without expressing any opinion 
as to its legal significance. It is the expression of opinion of the legal significance of what was found 
that converts the activity into the practice of law. The Court went on to conclude: 
 The mere use of legal terms of art as headings on a title abstract 
or similar form does not, standing alone, operate as an expression of an 
opinion by the title searcher as to the legal effect of entries made under 
such headings, and thus does not constitute the practice of law. 
Id. at 96, 532 N.E.2d at 120 (syllabus). 
Similarly, in Gustafson v. V.C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio St. 392, 35 N.E.2d 435 (1941) (cited 
with approval in Lender’s Service), the Court adopted the “simple instrument” doctrine in approving 
the filling in of preprinted real estate purchase contracts by real-estate brokers. As the Court presented 
the question: 
[D]oes the filling of these printed blank forms require the exercise of 
legal skill, or does it constitute merely the clerical service of recording 
the stated agreement of the parties to the transaction? 
The Court concluded that 
the supplying of simple, factual material such as the date, the price, the 
name of the purchaser, the location of the property, the date of giving 
possession and the duration of the offer requires ordinary intelligence 
rather than the skill peculiar to one trained and experienced in the law. 
Id. at 397, 35 N.E.2d at 437. Compare Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Verne, 99 Ohio St.3d 50, 2003 
Ohio 2463, 788 N.E.2d 1064 (CPA drafted articles of organization of limited liability company, 
using forms from Secretary of State’s office. “For a layperson to draft documents creating a business 
entity on another’s behalf is unquestionably the unauthorized practice of law. . . . This undertaking is 
hardly the clerical service that respondent insists he performed and that is permissible under 
[Gustafson]. To the contrary, respondent’s advice about which business structure they should choose 
is just what Gustafson determined to be the unlicensed practice of law.” Id. at paras.  4-5.) Accord 
Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Stewart, 116 Ohio St.3d 289, 2007 Ohio 6461, 878 N.E.2d 628. 
Indeed, the Court has held that the preparation of legal documents, even though copied from a form 
book, is the unauthorized practice of law. “[T]he fact is that respondent completed those forms not for  
himself, but for the benefit of another.”  Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Canfield, 92 Ohio St.3d 15, 
15, 748 N.E.2d 23, 24 (2001) (land-installment contract for sale of real estate). Accord, with respect 
to employment contracts and collective-bargaining agreements, Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Burdzinski, 
Brinkman, Czanzasty & Landwehr, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 107, 2006 Ohio 6511, 858 N.E.2d 372, 
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at para. 23 (“The drafting or writing of a contract or other legal instrument on behalf of another is the 
practice of law, even if the contract is copied from a form book or contract previously prepared by a 
lawyer.”).  Of these cases, Canfield, involving as it did a real-estate contract, comes perilously close 
to reaching a result opposite to that reached in Gustafson on very similar facts, including that the 
contract was, as in Canfield and Burdzinski, prepared “on behalf of another.”  Perhaps the 
distinction is that Gustafson involved the purely mechanical, “clerical” process of filling in the date, 
price, and name of the purchaser, etc., but it would have been helpful if the Canfield Court had 
provided some basis for distinguishing Gustafson, which was not even cited. 
In Green v. Huntington National Bank, 4 Ohio St.2d 78, 212 N.E.2d 585 (1965), the Court dealt 
with the provision of estate-planning advice by a bank or trust company. The Court found this service 
to be the giving of legal advice and thus the unauthorized practice of law, at least to the extent that the 
bank provided specific legal information regarding the specific facts of the particular person’s estate 
intended to maximize the legal benefits for the estate upon death. The Court appeared to distinguish 
this service from the giving of more general advice and from taking legal action in the administering 
of an estate already established. This distinction was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Trumbull 
County Bar Ass’n v. Hanna, 80 Ohio St.3d 58, 684 N.E.2d 329 (1997), which found that it is the 
unauthorized practice of law for a nonlawyer to advise a client to employ an inter vivos trust for estate 
planning purposes, arrange for the drafting of the trust documents, and oversee their execution. See 
also Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Beaman, 60 Ohio Misc.2d 17, 574 N.E.2d 599 (Bd. of Comm’rs 
on Unauthorized Practice of Law 1990) (holding that nonattorney who explains tax and estate law 
to clients, advises clients about their situation, and drafts legal documents to carry out their will is 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law). 
In Akron Bar Association v. Miller, 80 Ohio St.3d 6, 684 N.E.2d 288 (1997), the Ohio Supreme 
Court applied this standard to nonlawyers providing services pertaining to living trusts. While 
acknowledging that merely gathering information to be used to prepare legal documents might not be 
the practice of law, when the nonlawyer becomes involved in providing individual advice about the 
suitability of living trusts, answering related legal questions, and drafting legal documents, the 
activity clearly goes too far. Nor does the self-serving declaration at the end of the form stating that 
“[n]o legal counsel, legal advice, or tax advice has been offered by the agent” change the analysis.  Id. 
at 8, 684 N.E.2d at 291. Accord Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Mid-South Estate Planning, L.L.C., 121 
Ohio St.3d 214, 2009 Ohio 747, 903 N.E.2d 295 (corporation and its nonlawyer owner solicited 
Ohio residents for sale of living trusts and other estate-planning devices prepared by laypersons). 
(The lawyer involved in this “trust-mill” was one Daniel Heisler; his violation of DR 3-101(A) for 
assisting in the unauthorized practice is noted in section 5.5:240 at “Participation in a joint venture or 
other relationship with a nonlawyer”; the case is Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Heisler, 113 Ohio St.3d 
447, 2007 Ohio 2338, 866 N.E.2d 490.) 
The latest “living trust” unauthorized practice case is Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Am. Family Prepaid 
Legal Corp., 123 Ohio St.3d 353, 2009 Ohio 5336, 916 N.E.2d 784, in which the bar association 
sought and obtained an order to enforce a consent agreement previously entered into but allegedly not 
complied with. The Court extensively documents the abuses by respondents at the expense of their 
customers, mostly elderly Ohioans, and thoroughly reviews the prior precedent in this unauthorized 
practice “industry,” both from the side of the lay operation or enterprise (Sharp) and from the side of 
the lawyers who assisted them in their unauthorized practice (e.g., Kathman, Fishman, both of 
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which are discussed in section 5.5:240 infra). As in prior cases, the Court held in Am. Family that by 
advising prospects on the benefits of the company’s estate-planning tools, the layperson employees 
were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. A paragraph at the beginning of the opinion sums 
up the matter nicely: 
 For this reason [foisting products often not needed by and 
sometimes harmful to the “customers” of such trust mills], we have 
repeatedly held that these enterprises, in which laypersons associate 
with licensed practitioners in various minimally distinguishable ways 
as a means to superficially legitimize sales of living-trust packages, are 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. We have also repeatedly 
held that by facilitating such sales, licensed lawyers violate 
professional standards of competence and ethics, including the 
prohibition against aiding others in the unauthorized practice of law. 
Today, we reaffirm these holdings and admonish those tempted to 
profit by such schemes that these enterprises are unacceptable in any 
configuration. 
Id. at para. 3. For the civil penalties imposed in the Am. Family case, see the next subsection. 
Another “living trust” case is Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Sharp Estate Servs., Inc., 107 Ohio St.3d 
219, 2005 Ohio 6267, 837 N.E.2d 1183. Both the finding of unauthorized practice (nonlawyers 
advising customers of legal consequences) and the finding that respondents’ use of so-called “review 
attorneys” (who did not review) failed to insulate them from a violation are not surprising. (For other 
disciplinary cases involving “review attorneys,” who were found to have violated OH DR 3-101(A) 
by assisting some of these same nonlawyers in unauthorized practice, see the Wheatley and 
Kathman decisions, discussed below in section 5.5:240 at “Participation in a joint venture or other 
relationship with a nonlawyer.”) The big news in Sharp involved the sanctions imposed; that aspect 
is discussed in the next subsection.  
Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Martin, 118 Ohio St.3d 119, 2008 Ohio 1809, 886 N.E.2d 827, involved 
issues of franchisee-franchisor unauthorized practice arising out of the operation of a document 
preparation service. The individual franchisees conceded that they engaged in the unauthorized 
practice by providing advice to their customers on the customers’ legal rights and by assisting in the 
preparation of documents and forms to be submitted to courts. The current franchisor also conceded 
that it had engaged in the unauthorized practice by giving email advice to one of the franchisees’ 
customers and by advising the franchisees how to advise their customers regarding probate forms. 
The interesting issue in Martin, however, involved the culpability of the former franchisor (which in 
2005 had sold its assets, including the Martin franchise agreement, to the current franchisor). The 
theory of liability adopted by the Board was one of apparent agency, a theory that the Court examined 
and rejected on the facts before it. As the Court explained, the focus under apparent agency or 
apparent authority is on the alleged principal: 
Under an apparent-authority analysis, an agent’s authority is 
determined by the acts of the principal rather than by the acts of the 
agent. The principal is responsible for the agent’s acts only when the 
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principal has clothed the agent with apparent authority and not when 
the agent’s own conduct has created the apparent authority. 
Id. at para. 41. In the case at bar, the former franchisor had taken pains to inform the franchisees that 
they could not practice law without a license to do so, that they should post signs in their store 
informing the public that they were not licensed, that the franchisees should not select forms for 
customers or tell them how to complete the forms, that giving advice and selecting forms would be 
construed as unauthorized practice, and that legal questions should be referred by the franchisees to 
the former franchisor’s supervising attorney or a lawyer of the customer’s choice. Given this factual 
record, 
there is no evidence that [the former franchisor] represented to the 
[franchisees] or their customers that the [franchisees] were authorized 
to commit any of the acts that constituted the unauthorized practice of 
law in the [two] matters [at issue]. Accordingly we cannot impute the 
[franchisees’] unauthorized practice of law in these matters to [the 
former franchisor]. 
Id. at para. 44. 
Sanctions for nonlawyer unauthorized practice: For many years the typical result in a case finding that 
a layperson had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law was a prohibitory injunction 
commanding the violator not to do it again. Costs could also be imposed. In 2003, Gov Bar R VII 
19(D) was amended by the Supreme Court, expressly confirming its authority to impose a civil 
penalty “not to exceed ten thousand dollars per offense,” “regardless of whether the Board 
recommended imposition of the penalty.” VII 19(D)(1)(c). See also VII 8(B). Since that time (and 
even with respect to conduct occurring before the amendment -- see the discussion of Sharp and 
Bailey infra), the imposition of civil penalties in addition to the traditional injunction has become 
more common and can be expected to continue. See, e.g., Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. McGinnis, 
137 Ohio St.3d 166, 2013 Ohio 4581, 998 N.E.2d 474 (reducing recommended penalty of $20,000 
for three offenses (filing two papers in court for “client” and preparing advertising flyer holding 
herself out as offering legal services) to total of $6,000); Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Allen, 107 Ohio 
St.3d 180, 2005 Ohio 6185, 837 N.E.2d 762 ($40,000 fine imposed). Compare Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n v. Chiofalo, 112 Ohio St.3d 113, 2006 Ohio 6512, 858 N.E.2d 378 (adopting Board 
recommendation of no civil penalty, Court noted that respondent had committed only one offense and 
had cooperated in investigation, two of the factors set forth in Gov Bar R VII 8(B)(1) & (2) as 
relevant to determination of whether civil penalty should be imposed). The Court likewise declined to 
impose a civil penalty “under the circumstances” in Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Haig, 129 Ohio 
St.3d 601, 2011 Ohio 4271, 955 N.E.2d 352, where the violations by a nonlawyer loan officer were 
committed unwittingly and caused no harm to respondent’s customers. Id. at para. 9. 
The sanctions imposed in the Sharp case, 107 Ohio St.3d 219, 2005 Ohio 6267, 837 N.E.2d 1183, 
were, to say the least, substantial -- over one million dollars in civil penalties (computed by 
multiplying the 468 plans known to have been sold in Ohio by an average price per plan of $2,195). In 
addition, a permanent injunction was issued, precluding respondents from selling or marketing living 
trusts in Ohio. With respect to the UPL Board’s order that respondents disclose the names of their 
Ohio customers, which had not been complied with, the Court ordered that the disclosure be made 
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within seven days of issuance of the Court’s order. “Beginning on the eighth day after the order, a fine 
of $25,000 per day will be imposed until all Ohio clients have been disclosed.” Id. at para. 14. The 
Court obviously thought strong measures were necessary in dealing with these “trust-mill 
operations,” pursuant to which respondents had “willfully defrauded their customers.” Id. at para. 
15. 
In imposing the monetary fine, the Court brushed aside the respondent’s argument that imposition of 
the monetary fine was unconstitutional, because the case had been filed before the amendment to the 
Rules for the Government of the Bar expressly allowing the imposition of monetary penalties. As the 
Court saw it, “[n]othing in the Ohio Constitution prohibited this court from imposing monetary 
penalties prior to the adoption of former Gov. Bar R. VII(8)(D).” Id. at para. 16.  Accord Cincinnati 
Bar Ass’n v. Bailey, 110 Ohio St.3d 223, 2006 Ohio 4360, 852 N.E.2d 1180 (rejecting respondent’s 
argument that Gov Bar R penalty provisions could not constitutionally be applied retroactively to 
conduct occurring prior to amendment; Sharp followed). 
The “landmark” Sharp decision, authored by Justice Pfiefer for a unanimous Court, is discussed in 
Michael Hughes, A Million Reasons to Avoid the Unauthorized Practice of Law, Clev. B.J., Jan. 
2006, at 30 (noting that it was “the largest fine ever imposed by the Ohio Supreme Court and, it is 
believed, the largest fine ever imposed in a UPL case in the United States.”). The quote from the 
Hughes article is no longer accurate, even in Ohio, as a result of the fines imposed in the Am. Family 
case, the largest of which was well over six million dollars. 
It should also be noted that if the respondent is a repeat offender, he will be ordered to show cause 
why he should not be held in contempt for violation of the prior injunction against unauthorized 
practice. See, e.g., Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Boyd, 121 Ohio St.3d 36, 2009 Ohio 305, 901 
N.E.2d 795. 
The “jailhouse lawyer”:  Because of federal constitutional overtones (arising from Johnson v. Avery, 
393 U.S. 483 (1969)), the jailhouse lawyer unauthorized practice cases are sui generis. The Ohio 
Supreme Court dealt with these issues for the first time in Disciplinary Counsel v. Cotton, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 113, 2007 Ohio 4481, 873 N.E.2d 1240, which produced a 3-1 (concurring in judgment 
only)-3 set of four opinions (there were two dissenting opinions) resulting in dismissal of the charges 
against respondent, who assisted other inmates by preparing and signing pleadings, doing legal 
research, and providing legal advice. Under the U.S. Constitution, the state cannot preclude such 
assistance (other than that regarding signing pleadings) unless it provides inmates a “reasonable 
alternative” to jailhouse lawyers, which alternative provides inmates with meaningful access to the 
courts.  The plurality and the dissents reached different conclusions about whether the London 
Correctional facility’s law library and related accoutrements rose to the level of a “reasonable 
alternative.”  The plurality, of course, thought it did not; the concurring justice, Justice Lanzinger, 
found no need to resolve that issue; she asserted that the concerns of protection of the public, courts, 
and profession that are at the core of UPL matters are not predominant inside a prison’s walls: 
[W]ithin the prison universe, where the availability of licensed 
attorneys is generally nonexistent, the UPL Board’s interest in 
regulating the legal profession is overridden by the need for prison 
inmates to have help in obtaining access to the courts. 
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Id. at para. 25.  Justice Lundberg Stratton’s dissent, in contrast, argued that 
[i]nmates deserve the same protection from untrained, unqualified 
persons who act as lawyers dispensing legal advice that we afford to 
the public. 
Id. at para. 50.  Fascinating case. 
Lay representation before administrative tribunals: The Supreme Court has provided the latest 
judicial word on nonlawyer representation before administrative agencies in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
CompManagement, Inc., 104 Ohio St.3d 168, 2004 Ohio 6506, 818 N.E.2d 1181 
(CompManagement I), and Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. CompManagement, Inc., 111 Ohio St.3d 
444, 2006 Ohio 6108, 857 N.E.2d 95 (CompManagement II) (reaffirming CompManagement I 
and applying it to facts developed after remand).   
In CompManagement I the Court held that 
 [n]onlawyers who appear and practice in a representative 
capacity before the Industrial Commission and the Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation in conformity to Industrial Commission Resolution No. 
R04-1-01 are not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 
104 Ohio St.3d at 169, 818 N.E.2d at 1181 (syllabus). (Resolution No. R04-1-01 in subpart (A) 
permits, by third-party administrators, union representatives, or employees, (1) investigation of facts 
regarding a claim and reports regarding the facts, (2) assistance in administration of a claim and filing 
claims and appeals, (3) attendance at hearings before the Industrial Commission for various purposes, 
(4) submission of records, (5) filing protests, (6) preparing reports for employers regarding risks, and 
(7) advising employees or injured workers to seek legal representation. The Resolution, in subpart (B), 
does not permit a nonlawyer to ((1) engage in examination or cross-examination, (2) cite, file, or 
interpret law, (3) give legal interpretation regarding testimony, evidence, etc., (4) file a brief or other 
pleading “beyond the forms actually provided by the Commission or the Bureau,” (5) opine on 
evidence, credibility, etc., (6) give legal advice to claimants and employers, (7) give legal opinions or 
cite case law or statutes to injured workers and employers, or (8) charge a fee for stand-alone 
representation at hearing without providing other services.) 
The Court held that activities permitted under Resolution No. R04-1-01(A) did not constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law. In doing so, after noting the state’s estimation that “nonlawyers 
represent at least one party in approximately 95 percent of the hearings held each year and that ‘in 
almost half of all Industrial Commission hearings . . ., the employer’s only representative is an 
actuary,’” id. at para. 37, the Court rejected the recommendation of the Board of Commissioners on 
the Unauthorized Practice of Law. In the Court’s words, the Board’s recommendation “would purge 
the workers’ compensation system of nonlawyer representatives.” Id. at para. 38. 
Against this background, the Court found that 
while this court unquestionably has the power to prohibit lay 
representation before an administrative agency, it is not always 
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necessary or desirable for the court to exercise that power to its full 
extent. The power to regulate includes the authority to grant as well as 
the authority to deny, and in certain limited settings, the public interest 
is better served by authorizing laypersons to engage in conduct that 
otherwise might be viewed as the practice of law. 
Because the “public interest factors” that the board declined to 
consider are so prevalent in this case, a more sophisticated approach to 
resolving the present inquiry is required than simply ascertaining 
whether respondents’ conduct falls within some abstract or generalized 
definition of the practice of law. Of course, Gov. Bar R. VII is built on 
the premise that limiting the practice of law to licensed attorneys is 
generally necessary to protect the public against incompetence, divided 
loyalties, and other attendant evils that are often associated with 
unskilled representation. But not all representation requires the level of 
training and experience that only attorneys can provide, and in certain 
situations, the protective interest is outweighed by other important 
considerations. 
Id. at paras.  39-40. 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Resnick quoted extensively (paras.  41-44) from Justice Gibson’s 
opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in In re Unauthorized Practice of Law, 175 Ohio 
St. 149, 154-55, 192 N.E.2d 54, 58-59 (1963), and (paras. 45-53), from Henize v. Giles, 22 Ohio 
St.3d 213, 216-17, 218-20, 490 N.E.2d 585, 588, 589, 590 (1986) (approving certain lay 
representation in unemployment-compensation setting). 
In CompManagement II, the Court elaborated on its holding in CompManagement I, which 
rejected the charge that third-party administrator CompManagement (“CMI”) had engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law by assisting employers with claims before the Industrial Commission or 
the Bureau of Worker’s Compensation.  The Court reiterated the rule that a layperson generally may 
not take legal action on behalf of a corporation before a court or administrative agency.  When, 
however, this “protective interest [is] outweighed by other important considerations” (quoting 
CompManagement I) of public policy, limited lay representation within circumscribed limits can be 
permitted.  (111 Ohio St.3d 444, at para. 23, citing Pearlman, CompManagement I, and Heinze). 
Consistent with this reasoning, the Court stated that it would consider the allegations in this case 
“under a more fluid approach, which allows third-party administrators to offer general claims of 
assistance as long as that assistance does not involve legal analysis skill, citation, or interpretation.”  
111 Ohio St.3d 444, at para. 49.  
In reviewing each of the UPL Board’s specific findings regarding unauthorized practice, the Court 
ruled as follows: 
 preparation, signing, and filing of documents.  The Board found that this activity was 
expressly allowed by R04-1-01; the Court adopted the finding of the Board. 
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 negotiation of settlements.  The Board found that this activity constituted the unauthorized 
practice of law; in reversing, the Court held that CMI could suggest a settlement amount based 
on actuarial data, so long it makes no legal determinations in doing so.  Id. at para. 62. 
Accord syllabus two. 
 examination of witnesses.  The Court found that the record did not support the Board’s finding 
that CMI had violated § (B)(1) of the Resolution by direct or indirect examination or 
cross-examination of witnesses.  See syllabus three (“a third-party administrator who has not 
asked a question of the witness has not conducted an ‘examination’ of the witness . . . .”) 
 other acts in the hearing room.  In this category, the Board found unauthorized practice of law 
in six actions by CMI.  The Court rejected each of these findings: 
- Stating employee concerns.  Not the practice of law.  No 
independent legal determinations made by CMI as to what issues to 
raise.  Id. at para. 73. Accord syllabus three. 
- Preparing and making arguments.  While a third-party 
administrator may not make legal arguments, CMI merely presented 
the employer’s concerns, which does not constitute the practice of law.  
“[M]erely pointing to facts in the record without attempting to 
persuade that those facts have a particular implication or legal 
significance is not ‘argument.’”  Id. at para. 77. 
- Determining legal significance of facts.  “The record in this 
case reveals that CMI representatives do not make determinations as to 
the legal significance of any facts in the file.  Instead, they merely 
decide which facts are relevant to the list of employer’s concerns.”  Id. 
at para. 88. 
- Commenting on evidence.  No evidence to support Board 
finding that CMI did so.  See id. at paras. 89-92. 
- Summations of evidence and closing statements.  Restating 
employer’s concerns, pointing to facts in file, or requesting final 
outcome desired by employer is not the practice of law; no evidence 
that CMI did otherwise.  See id. at paras. 93-95. 
- Counseling clients.  While “counseling of a witness prior to 
entering the hearing room likely crosses the line into the practice of 
law,” no specific instance of such conduct supported by the record.  Id. 
at para. 99.  As with other alleged violations, generalized evidence 
insufficient. 
 recommendations regarding appeals and other legal action.  Record failed to show that 
“CMI . . . committed the unauthorized practice of law by evaluating legal options, such as 
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appeal, and giving advice relating to those options.”  Id. at para. 110. 
 evaluation, advice, or recommendation on retaining counsel.  “Section (A)(9) [of the 
Resolution] specifically allows a third-party administrator to advise an employer to seek legal 
counsel, and there is no evidence in the record that any CMI representative ever did anything 
but this specific act.”  Id. at para. 114. 
Lay representation before administrative tribunals - Reconciling past precedent:  In 
CompManagement I the Court attempted to clarify the quagmire created by the four prior Supreme 
Court cases dealing with lay representation before the Industrial Commission. All four found the 
activity at issue to be the practice of law and precluded it: Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Estep, 74 Ohio 
St.3d 172, 657 N.E.2d 499 (1995) (contingent-fee representation of workers’ compensation 
claimant);  In re Unauthorized Practice of Law, 175 Ohio St. 149, 192 N.E.2d 54 (1963) (same); 
State ex rel. Nicodemus v. Indus. Comm’n, 5 Ohio St.3d 58, 448 N.E.2d 1360 (1983) (advising 
clients of legal ramifications of commission orders); Goodman v. Beall, 130 Ohio St. 427, 200 N.E. 
470 (1936) (preparation of court record). 
Each of these cases involved conduct “clearly beyond any acceptable bounds of lay representation,” 
but included some general statements about appearances and practice before the commission that 
have generated confusion, 104 Ohio St.3d 168, 818 N.E.2d 1181, at para. 55, as has the language in 
Henize “mistakenly conclud[ing] that our past decisions in the workers’ compensation area ‘have 
held that representatives of parties must be licensed attorneys.’” Id. at para. 56. 
But the plain truth is that this court has never held that only lawyers 
may practice in a representative capacity before the Industrial 
Commission. Nor has the court ever concluded that nonlawyers are 
unauthorized to provide the kind of representative services in the 
workers’ compensation setting that the court in Henize authorized them 
to provide in the unemployment context. 
Id. 
In summary, the Court found that the four prior cases “do not prohibit lay representation before the 
Industrial Commission but instead mark the outer boundaries of permissible lay conduct.” Moreover, 
and significantly, “the thicket created by our ambivalent use of the term ‘practice of law’ can be 
avoided by simply recognizing that in certain cases there are multiple interests to consider in 
determining whether a particular legal activity is acceptably performed by nonlawyers. In this way, 
we can freely assume that all representative conduct at the administrative level falls within the broad 
definition of the practice of law, yet still authorize lay representatives to perform certain functions in 
the administrative setting when the public interest so demands.” Id. at para. 69. 
The majority’s analysis is to be contrasted with the dogmatic view espoused in the dissent, where 
Justice Pfiefer states, “I believe that the practice of law is the practice of law. . . .” Id. at para. 73. 
The prior case most like CompManagement I in approach is Henize v. Giles, 22 Ohio St.3d 213, 
490 N.E.2d 585 (1986), in which the Court determined that nonlawyer representation of the parties in 
an action for unemployment benefits before the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services and the 
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Unemployment Compensation Board of Review did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. 
In reaching this determination, the Court characterized the role of the lay participants as limited. They 
helped assure that “appropriate personnel records, staff, and other documents” were present at the 
hearing and they “[served] as an adjunct to the claimant or employer in the sharing of their respective 
versions of the circumstances attendant to the claim,” which was permissible, but they did not “render 
legal advice” or “[provide] interpretations of board orders,” which would be the unauthorized practice 
of law.  Id. at 217, 490 N.E.2d at 588. In drawing this distinction, however, the Court clearly 
acknowledged that it was moved, at least in part, by pragmatic factors. It quoted a 1940 Minnesota 
case that observed: 
“[I]t is the duty of this court so to regulate the practice of law and to 
restrain such practice by laymen in a common-sense way in order to 
protect primarily the interest of the public and not to hamper and 
burden such interest with impractical technical restraints no matter how 
well supported such restraint may be from the standpoint of pure 
logic.” 
Id. at 218, 490 N.E.2d at 589 (quoting Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 647, 290 N.W. 795, 797 
(1940)). 
The Court then articulated several reasons for allowing lay practice in this setting. It stressed the 
special nature of the proceeding, a primarily fact-finding hearing conducted by an actively 
participating referee rather than a neutral judge. The Court noted that legal argument usually was not 
necessary in such proceedings and concluded that “attorneys are simply not required.” Henize, 22 
Ohio St.3d at 217, 490 N.E.2d at 588. If anything, the Court observed, the presence of attorneys 
might be a negative, turning the hearing into an adversarial and protracted proceeding. Further, given 
the limited monetary stakes involved in the proceedings and the fact that regulations restricted 
allowable attorney fees, lawyer participation was unlikely. Thus, barring nonattorney representatives 
might impair meaningful access to the system for the parties by precluding their receiving any 
representation as a practical matter. The Court also recognized and deferred to the executive branch’s 
desire to allow lay representation. Finally, the Court was influenced by the fact that the practice had 
been going on without apparent harm to the public since the inception of the program in 1936 and by 
the common use of similar practices in other states. 
Ohio Supreme Court decisions coming down on the other side of the issue include Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n v. Woodman, 98 Ohio St.3d 436, 2003 Ohio 1634, 786 N.E.2d 865 (nonlawyer respondents, 
trustees of nonprofit corporation, found to have engaged in unauthorized practice of law by filing with 
PUCO nine separate complaints, challenging Ohio Bell’s telephone service rates on behalf of 
numerous federal and state agencies and officials, as well as Ohio municipalities, without the consent 
of the “complaining” parties), and Sharon Village and its progeny, discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
In 1997, in Sharon Village Ltd. v. Licking County Bd. of Revision, 78 Ohio St.3d 479, 678 
N.E.2d 932 (1997), the Ohio Supreme Court resolved a major split in the lower courts and found that 
the actions of nonlawyer representatives in property-tax-reduction proceedings before a county board 
of revision constituted the practice of law. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed both the 
procedures employed in proceedings before such a board and the potential consequences of actions 
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taken in the proceedings. On the procedural side, the Court highlighted the quasi-judicial nature of the 
proceedings, which provide for such things as the filing of a complaint, giving of notice, taking of 
evidence, filing of briefs, keeping of a record, and certification of a transcript for appeal. In order to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the board of revision, the taxpayer or his lawyer agent must file a verified 
complaint in accordance with ORC 5715.13; the failure to do so will result in dismissal of the action. 
In terms of consequences, the Court noted that procedural errors could lead to the loss of the right to 
seek a property reevaluation for up to three years; failure to present evidence before the board would 
bar its consideration on appeal; and by initiating a proceeding, the property owner runs the risk that 
the property will be valued more highly than at present, leading to a tax increase. Given these 
procedural complexities and the interests at stake, the Court decided that such actions should be 
handled by attorneys. Accord Worthington City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. 
of Revision, 85 Ohio St.3d 156, 707 N.E.2d 499 (1999) (following Sharon Village in holding that 
nonlawyer corporate and school-board officers who prepared, signed, and filed complaints and 
counter-complaints regarding real-property assessments were engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law, but finding that in one of the cases on appeal the signing and review by the nonlawyer tax 
manager for the corporation, of a complaint prepared and filed by one of the corporation’s attorneys, 
did not violate the requirements of Sharon Village; the tax manager did not engage in the practice of 
law by signing and reviewing the complaint prepared and filed by a lawyer). 
A further gloss was put on the issue in Bd. of Educ. v. Hamilton County Bd. of Revision, 91 Ohio 
St.3d 308, 744 N.E.2d 751 (2001). In this case, a nonlawyer corporate officer drafted the complaint 
and verified the factual allegations it contained. He then sent it to the corporation’s attorney to review 
and file. The attorney did so. Given these facts, the Court found no violation of the Sharon Village 
rule, which held that a nonattorney who both prepares and files a complaint has engaged in the 
practice of law. Here, the lawyer’s signing and filing of the complaint was sufficient to protect the 
conduct of the nonlawyer from constituting the unauthorized practice of law. 
In State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Elections, 80 Ohio St.3d 
302, 306, 686 N.E.2d 238, 242 (1997), the Court restated the Sharon Village factors and applied 
them to county board of election proceedings involving statutory protests of local liquor option 
petitions. In finding that the preparing and filing of such protests constitutes the practice of law, the 
Court summarized the factors it relied on in Sharon Village, where 
we relied on several factors, including that (1) the board of revision is a 
quasi-judicial body, (2) in order to invoke its jurisdiction, it is 
necessary to file a verified complaint, (3) the board must give notice to 
property owners and boards of education when a complaint is filed by 
other parties, and (4) preparation and filing of the complaint contained 
statutorily defined jurisdictional requirements that, if not properly met, 
barred the rights of owners to contest their valuations. 
Attempts by entities to practice law through their nonlawyer constituents: There are a number of 
decisions dealing with efforts by corporations or other entities, through their nonlawyer officers, 
trustees, or other constituents, to engage in conduct that constitutes the practice of law. These efforts 
have been generally rebuffed pursuant to the “corporate representation rule,” which permits entity 
representation only by licensed attorneys. (There are a few narrow exceptions; they are discussed in 
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the subsection immediately following, “Constitutionality of legislation empowering nonlawyers to 
practice law in certain limited circumstances.”) It is settled that business corporations and other such 
entities are prohibited from practicing law, which is a privilege granted to individuals, not entities. 
(Obviously, a law firm, whether a partnership or other entity, practices law, but it does so through its 
licensed individual attorneys who are authorized to practice in the jurisdiction. See, e.g., ORC 
1785.02.) 
Ohio decisions reflecting these views include both cases in which the constituent/entity is attempting 
to represent the entity’s interests, such as 
 Disciplinary Counsel v. Givens, 106 Ohio St.3d 144, 2005 Ohio 4104, 832 N.E.2d 1200, at 
para. 7 (“a nonlawyer may not practice law in defense of a [here, nonprofit] corporate entity 
merely because he holds some official corporate position”); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Shrode, 95 Ohio St.3d 137, 2002 Ohio 1759, 766 N.E.2d 597 (nonlawyer filing pleadings on 
behalf of corporation as statutory agent); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Clapp & Affiliates Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 509, 764 N.E.2d 1003 (2002) (court filings by nonlawyer on 
behalf of corporation of which he was sole shareholder and CEO constituted practice of law); 
Williams v. Global Constr. Co., 26 Ohio App.3d 119, 498 N.E.2d 500 (Franklin 1985) 
(nonattorney trustee cannot represent trust in court). Cf. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Lawlor, 92 Ohio St.3d 406, 750 N.E.2d 1107 (2001) (inactive, suspended lawyer who was 
corporation’s president engaged in unauthorized practice when he filed pleading on 
corporation’s behalf), 
and cases in which the constituent/entity is attempting to represent the interests of others, such as 
 Disciplinary Counsel v. Alexcole, Inc., 105 Ohio St.3d 52, 2004 Ohio 6901, 822 N.E.2d 
348 (representation of “clients” in securities arbitration and mediation proceedings; “a 
corporation cannot lawfully engage in the practice of law, and it cannot lawfully engage in the 
practice of law through its officers who are not licensed to practice law.” Id. at para. 8); 
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Chelsea Title Agency, 100 Ohio St.3d 356, 2003 Ohio 6453, 800 
N.E.2d 29 (title company preparing deeds for its title customers was engaged in unauthorized 
practice of law). 
For cases involving representation of clients of the entity by entity lawyer/employees, see section 
5.5:240, at “Lawyer employees of corporation serving clients of company.” 
Efforts by the General Assembly to permit nonlawyers, including representatives of entities, to make 
court appearances and the Court’s recognition of a “narrow exception” to the “corporate 
representation rule” are explored in the next subsection. 
Constitutionality of legislation empowering nonlawyers to practice law in certain limited 
circumstances: From time to time, the Ohio legislature has passed laws purporting to authorize 
nonlawyers to practice law, at least in limited respects. Until recently, these efforts have met with 
little success. 
The Supreme Court opinion in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Picklo, 96 Ohio St.3d 195, 2002 Ohio 3995, 
772 N.E.2d 1187, is representative. In Picklo, the respondent was charged with the unauthorized 
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practice of law in filing forcible entry and detainer complaints and appearing in housing court on 
behalf of property owners in these cases. Respondent’s defense to the charge was that pursuant to 
ORC 1923.01(C)(2) a “landlord” could invoke the court’s jurisdiction in such cases, and “landlord” 
was broadly defined to include the agent of the owner or lessor. See also ORC 5321.01(B), to similar 
effect. The Court agreed with the Board of Commissioners on the Unauthorized Practice of Law that 
these statutes were unconstitutional invasions of the Supreme Court’s original and exclusive 
jurisdiction to define the practice of law. 
While intermediate appellate decisions can be cited to the same effect (e.g., Alliance Group, Inc. v. 
Rosenfield, 115 Ohio App.3d 380, 685 N.E.2d 570 (Hamilton 1996) (Painter, J.) (holding ORC 
1925.17, which permits nonlawyer officer or employee of corporation to file and present claim or 
defense in small-claims court, unconstitutional)), these decisions are no longer good law in light of 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Pearlman, 106 Ohio St.3d 136, 2005 Ohio 4107, 832 N.E.2d 1193. In 
Pearlman, the Supreme Court abrogated Alliance and other such cases and held that the ORC 
1925.17 provisions allowing corporate officers or employees to represent the corporation in small 
claims court are constitutional, so long as (as expressly provided in the statute) “the individual does 
not engage in cross-examination, argument, or other acts of advocacy.” Id. at syllabus. Given the 
identical language in ORC 1925.18, which permits representation of county departments of human 
services by nonlawyer employees of the department, provided they do not engage in 
cross-examination, etc., the earlier cases holding ORC 1925.18 unconstitutional, such as 
Washington County Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Rutter, 100 Ohio App. 3d 32, 651 N.E.2d 1360 
(Washington 1995), are almost certainly overruled as well. 
In finding the ORC 1925.17 provisions constitutional, Pearlman “recognize[d] an exception, albeit a 
narrow one, to the general rule that corporations may be represented only by licensed attorneys.” 106 
Ohio St.3d 136, 832 N.E.2d 1193, at para. 26. In doing so, Justice Lanzinger relied heavily on the 
Court’s opinion in CompManagement I allowing limited nonlawyer representation in workers’ 
compensation cases. See Pearlman at paras. 9-15, noting, inter alia, that in CompManagement I 
“we explained that an uncompromising approach to unauthorized-practice-of-law cases may not 
always be appropriate.” Id. at para. 10. Emphasizing the informality of small-claims proceeding (no 
jury, small jurisdictional monetary limits, Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure inapplicable, id. at 
para. 15) and the limitations built into the statute against cross-examination, argument, and other acts 
of advocacy (id. at paras. 19, 23), the Court concluded: 
 Rather than view R.C. 1925.17 as intruding on our authority to 
regulate the practice of law or our rule-making power, we see it as a 
mere clarification, stating that corporations may use small claims 
courts as individuals may, i.e., without attorneys, so long as their 
representatives do not otherwise act as advocates. 
Id. at para. 24. 
A similar result was reached in the more recent case of Dayton Supply & Tool Co. v. Montgomery 
County Bd. of Revision, 111 Ohio St.3d 367, 2006 Ohio 5852, 856 N.E.2d 926.  The Court in 
Dayton Supply held that a nonlawyer corporate officer is not engaged in the unauthorized practice by 
preparing and filing a complaint on behalf of the corporation with a board of revision or by presenting 
the claimed value of the property before the board, so long as the officer does not make legal 
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arguments, examine witnesses, or undertake other conduct that can be performed only by a lawyer.  Id. 
at syllabus.  In so deciding, the Court concluded that ORC 5715.19, a statutory provision that had 
been held unconstitutional in Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision, 2002 Ohio 1256, 
2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1228 (Franklin Mar. 19, 2002), and in C.R. Truman, L.P. v. Cuyahoga 
County Bd. of Revision, No. 76713, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3388 (Cuyahoga July 27, 2000), 
could be read in a constitutional manner, subject to the limitations imposed on the officer’s conduct 
by the Dayton Supply opinion.  Thus, where no legal issues are presented (the Court specifically 
notes that often the only issue before the BOR is the nonlegal issue of the fair market value of the real 
estate) and the matter does not involve the examination of witnesses or any other task that can be 
performed only by an attorney, then the 5715.19 grant to the corporate officer to file valuation 
complaints on behalf of the corporation does not cross the line into the unauthorized practice of law. 
This same analysis served to distinguish the Court’s prior Sharon Village decision: 
Sharon Village is distinguishable from the instant case to the extent that 
Sharon Village involved a third-party agent and envisioned a courtlike 
hearing before the BOR that involved witnesses and resolution of legal 
issues, while the case at bar involves a corporate officer and does not 
involve consideration of any legal issue. 
Id. at para. 25.  This reasoning also limited the Court’s prior decision in Worthington City School 
Dist. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision, 85 Ohio St.3d 156, 707 N.E.2d 499 (1999), that a 
corporate officer is always prohibited from filing a BOR complaint. 
The Dayton Supply Court continued to acknowledge the general rule that corporations may be 
represented only by licensed attorneys, but, having found a “narrow exception” to this rule in 
Pearlman (where “no special legal skill is needed” in small-claims court), it found the same 
exception appropriate on public-interest grounds in the case at bar, even though “preparing and filing 
a complaint and participating in BOR proceedings on behalf of another fall within the broad 
definition of the practice of law.” Dayton Supply at para. 30.  The Court made clear, however, that 
the exception was far from open-ended: 
 Yet consistent with our public-interest exception cases, we 
temper our holding with the admonition that a corporation must hire an 
attorney if any of the proceedings before the BOR, including the 
preparation and filing of the complaint, involve more than the factual 
issue of the value of the property, and issues exist or arise that require 
an attorney to resolve. 
Id. at para. 31. 
Interestingly, neither the Pearlman nor the Dayton Supply majorities even cited Picklo; it seems to 
have pretty much disappeared from the judicial radar screen (other than in the dissent in each case).  
Moreover, the reliance by Pearlman on ORC 1925.17’s withholding from the nonlawyer the right to 
conduct cross-examination, argument, or other acts of advocacy, and the comparable gloss used in 
Dayton Supply, will be highly relevant to any subsequent litigation involving the General 
Assembly’s extension of the practice of law to nonlawyers in certain proceedings. (The same 
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strictures in Industrial Comm’n Resolution R04-1-01 were important to the similar result in 
CompManagement I and II; see discussion supra at “Lay representation before administrative 
tribunals.”) 
See also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Molnar, 57 Ohio Misc.2d 39, 567 N.E.2d 1355 (Bd. of 
Comm’rs on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (1990), which, although not raising 
constitutionality concerns, is instructive. At issue in Molnar was nonlawyer respondent’s 
representation of “clients” before the State Liquor Control Commission, an agency governed by the 
procedures set forth in ORC 119.13. That section provides in certain instances for representation “by 
an attorney or such other representative as is lawfully permitted to practice before the agency in 
question,” but “at a hearing at which a record is taken which may be the basis for an appeal to court,” 
representation is limited to attorneys. Since a record is taken at liquor control commission 
proceedings and they may be appealed, Molnar was found to have engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law. 
In sum, the Supreme Court has now allowed, pursuant to or consistent with limited statutory grant, 
nonlawyer representation before administrative bodies in CompManagement I and II (workers’ 
compensation) and Henize (unemployment compensation), and before small-claims courts and 
boards of revision by officers or employees of corporations. Pearlman; Dayton Supply. The refusal 
to allow such representation by the landlord’s authorized agent in housing-court cases (Picklo) seems 
out of step with these decisions, but perhaps can be explained by the apparent absence of the 
limitations on cross-examination, argument, and the like in the statutes held unconstitutional in 
Picklo, in contrast to the presence or deemed presence of such limitations in the other most recent 
Supreme Court unauthorized-practice-of-law decisions, CompManagement I and II, Dayton 
Supply, and Pearlman. 
The right of self-representation: The well-recognized exception to the general rule against the practice 
of law by laypersons is that a nonlawyer has the right of self-representation. See generally 1 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 4 cmt. d (2000) (right recognized in 
“[e]very jurisdiction”). As stated in Gov Bar R VII 2(A), unauthorized practice is “the rendering of 
legal services for another” by a person not admitted in Ohio or not having active status under Rule VI 
(emphasis added). This exception is consistent with those opinions holding that the unauthorized 
practice of law involves the “rendering of legal services for others.” Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Brown, 61 Ohio Misc.2d 792, 794, 584 N.E.2d 1391, 1392 (Bd. of Comm’rs on Unauthorized 
Practice of Law 1992). Arguments that the United States Constitution’s guarantees of freedom of 
speech, freedom of association, due process, or the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 
counsel create a right to representation by unlicensed persons, beyond the right to self-representation, 
have been rejected by the Ohio courts. See, e.g., State v. Studer, No. CA91-06-101, 1991 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5622 (Butler Nov. 25, 1991). 
Even if a close personal relationship, such as that of husband and wife, exists between the party and 
the nonlawyer representative, legal representation by the nonlawyer is impermissible.  Palmer v. 
Bates, No. L94-138, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3085 (Lucas July 15, 1994). Accord In re D.L., 189 
Ohio App.3d 154, 2010 Ohio 1888, 937 N.E.2d 1042 (Ottawa) (fathers attempting to represent sons 
in juvenile matter.) In Grenga v. Bank One, N.A., 2005 Ohio 4474, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 4047 
(Mahoning), one of the grounds upon which the court affirmed the imposition of sanctions under 
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Ohio Civ R 11 was the nonlawyer-husband’s unauthorized practice of law in representing his wife by 
filing documents on her behalf in civil litigation. (The Grenga case is indicative of the fact that 
unauthorized practice concerns can arise in settings other than the disciplinary process. In Ohio, for 
example, a statutory private right of action now exists for those injured by conduct found by the 
Supreme Court to be the unauthorized practice of law; see section 5.5:210, at “Nonlawyer practice of 
law - In general.” See generally Arthur F. Greenbaum, Multijurisdictional Practice and the 
Influence of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 – An Interim Assessment, 43 Akron L Rev 
729, 762 (2010).) 
Another recurring attempt to evade the unauthorized-practice rules involves a nonlawyer who claims 
the ability to act pro se because he or she has a power of attorney from the assignor. The Ohio 
Supreme Court put this ploy to rest in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Coleman, 88 Ohio St.3d 
155, 724 N.E.2d 402 (2000). In Coleman, the Court exposed the “sophistry” of such an argument, 
noting that historically persons holding a power of attorney cannot appear in court, that any such 
argument would render meaningless the supervisory control granted by the Ohio Constitution to the 
Supreme Court over control of the practice of law, and that any such attempted use of a power of 
attorney violates the laws of Ohio [citing Dworkin]. As a result, 
[w]hen a person not admitted to the bar attempts to represent another in 
court on the basis of a power of attorney asserting pro se rights, he is in 
violation of this statute [ORC 4705.01]. A private contract cannot be 
used to circumvent a statutory prohibition based on public policy. 
Id. at 158, 724 N.E.2d at 404. Accord, e.g., Lorain County Bar Ass’n v. Kocak, 121 Ohio St.3d 
396, 2009 Ohio 1430, 904 N.E.2d 885. Not surprisingly, the power-of-attorney argument, asserted 
independently of the right of self representation, is likewise unavailing. Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. 
Heath, 123 Ohio St.3d 483, 2009 Ohio 5958, 918 N.E.2d 145 (“a general power of attorney does not 
grant authority to prepare and file papers in court on another person’s behalf,” id. at para. 23). 
Neither can the self-representation exception be used by a suspended lawyer to acquire partial 
assignments of the claims of others and then to pursue those claims pro se. Toledo Bar Ass’n v. 
Ishler, 44 Ohio St.2d 204, 339 N.E.2d 828 (1975). Nor can a suspended lawyer file court documents 
that purport to be pro se papers of his client. Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Elsass, 86 Ohio St.3d 195, 713 
N.E.2d 421 (1999) (such conduct violates OH DR 3-101(B)). Further, the self-representation 
exception is limited to natural persons; see discussion of unsuccessful efforts by business 
corporations and other entities to practice law in this section supra at “Attempts by entities to practice 
law.” 
Lay employee assistance in the practice of law: Rule 5.5 cmt. [2] recognizes that the Rule “does not 
prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, 
so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work.” Under 
these circumstances, the work of the nonlawyer is not an end in itself, but only a preliminary product 
for which the lawyer is ultimately responsible. As such, the nonlawyer is not engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law, and the lawyer therefore is not assisting in the unauthorized practice of 
law. See, under the former OHCPR, Cmty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tracy, 73 Ohio St.3d 371, 653 N.E.2d 
220 (1995). But when these lines were crossed, the disciplinary rule was violated. See Columbus Bar 
Ass’n v. Thomas, 109 Ohio St.3d 89, 2006 Ohio 1930, 846 N.E.2d 31 (respondent paralegal took it  
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upon himself to sign and file documents in court without his lawyer/employer’s permission or review; 
violation found even through employee mistakenly thought he had lawyer’s permission to act during 
latter’s illness). 
In using lay employees, special care must be taken to ensure that they are properly supervised (Ohio 
Rule 5.3; see section 5.3:300) and that they protect client confidences, secrets, and property (Ohio 
Rules 1.6 and 1.15; see sections 1.6:220 and 1.15:200). 
Even though use of lay employees is appropriate, there are restrictions on what the lay employee may 
do. For example, with one limited exception for supervised law-student practice (see Gov Bar R II, a 
2009 amendment to which allows legal interns to represent, under an attorney’s supervision, felony 
defendants and juveniles in matters that would be felonies if by an adult), lay employees cannot 
appear in court for a client or before a tribunal where lawyer representation is required. Cleveland 
Bar Ass’n Op. 95, at 2 (Sept. 5, 1973) (citing ABA opinion indicating that nonlawyer employees 
may not “appear in formal proceedings which are a part of the judicial process” or “counsel clients 
about law matters”). Of course, as reflected in Rule 5.5(c)(2), lawyers licensed to practice law in 
other states may, with leave of court, make such appearances in Ohio courts. See section 5.5:420. 
Outside the courtroom setting, the permissibility of delegating tasks to a nonlawyer depends on the 
extent of the delegation and the degree to which the lawyer maintains supervisory control over the 
nonlawyer employee. When the delegation goes too far and/or the supervision is inadequate, the 
lawyer can be found to have assisted in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Rule 5.5(a). 
See discussion at section 5.5:240. 
Other opinions that addressed the permissibility of nonlawyer employee activities under the Code 
generally have approved the conduct in question. For example, nonlawyer employees of a Child 
Support Enforcement Agency could perform client intake and initial interviews and fill in 
information on pre-printed legal forms, as long as the work was approved by an attorney and the 
employees refrained from giving legal advice. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
90-10, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 17 (June 15, 1990). They could call debtors as part of a 
lawyer’s collection practice to attempt to arrange payment by the debtor, provided the lawyer took 
full responsibility in advising the client and in handling any litigation that might ensue. Cleveland 
Bar Ass’n Op. 95 (Sept. 5, 1973). Nonlawyer law clerks could even do legal research for attorneys. 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 89 (Sept. 5, 1973) (permitting lawyer to employ law student, through 
student-operated research organization, to do legal research). 
To the extent nonlawyer employees deal with the public directly, special precautions may be 
necessary to assure that others are not misled into believing that the nonlawyer employee is a lawyer. 
See Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 95, at 3 (Sept. 5, 1973) (warning that if nonlawyer employee contacts 
debtors about collection of debt, care must be taken so that debtor is “not misled into believing that 
the layman is a lawyer” but then continuing: “Although a layman employed by a legal firm must take 
care not to hold himself out as an attorney, there appears to be no ethical reason requiring the layman 
to make an affirmative representation that he is not an attorney [when contacting a debtor about a 
collection matter], at least if he or she initiates the conversation with a debtor by saying that he is 
calling on behalf of the particular attorney responsible for the matter.”). A nonlawyer employee of a 
law firm can sign letters using the law firm’s letterhead without engaging in the unauthorized practice 
of law, as long as the nonlawyer status is clearly identified. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
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Discipline Op. 89-11, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 18 (Apr. 14, 1989). But cf. Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n Op. 95 (Sept. 5, 1973) (letters going out under firm name should be signed by attorneys rather 
than lay employees). Opinion was divided over whether the names of nonlawyer employees could be 
listed on a law firm’s letterhead and business cards, as long as their nonlawyer status was clearly 
noted. Compare Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 89-1 (Aug. 25, 1989) (allowing this practice but 
suggesting that should it occur, lawyer’s duty to ensure nonlawyers do not engage in practice of law is 
heightened), with Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-16, 1989 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 23 (June 16, 1989) (allowing business cards but finding inclusion on letterhead to 
violate OH DR 2-102(A)(4)). 
For a helpful summary of unauthorized practice issues, see Allen Asbury, Changing Landscape of 
the Unauthorized Practice of Law in Ohio, Clev. B.J., Feb. 2006, at 14. 
  
5.5:220  Practice of Law by Lawyers Not Authorized to Do So 
As relevant here, lawyers not authorized to practice can fall in any one of three categories -- Ohio 
lawyers not authorized to practice in Ohio; Ohio lawyers not authorized to practice in another 
jurisdiction; and lawyers admitted elsewhere who are not authorized to practice in Ohio. The first 
category is discussed here. The second and third categories will be discussed in section 5.5:230. 
By definition, an Ohio lawyer is one who is admitted to the bar in Ohio. To render such a lawyer’s 
practice of law authorized, however, the lawyer must not only be admitted but also have active status 
under Gov Bar R VI. Thus, an admitted Ohio lawyer who has been suspended, or who has taken 
inactive or retired status or has resigned, is not authorized to practice. 
Ohio attorneys suspended from practice: An attorney who continues to practice while his license is 
under suspension is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. E.g., under the Rules, Toledo Bar 
Ass’n v. Woodley, 132 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012 Ohio 2458, 969 N.E.2d 1192 (violation of Rule 
5.5(a)); Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabroff, 123 Ohio St.3d 182, 2009 Ohio 4205, 915 N.E.2d 307 
(violation of 5.5(a) and Gov Bar R V 8(E)), and under the former OHCPR, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Higgins, 117 Ohio St.3d 473, 2008 Ohio 1509, 884 N.E.2d 1070. See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Henderson, 108 Ohio St.3d 447, 2006 Ohio 1336, 844 N.E.2d 348 (continuing to practice in 
defiance of suspension order; for some reason, violation of former OH DR 3-101(B) not charged). 
And, if a lawyer continues to practice while under suspension but immediately ceases on becoming 
aware of it, a 2012 decision holds that a two-year stayed suspension is appropriate when mitigating 
factors outweigh aggravating factors, as in Disciplinary Counsel v. Meehan, 133 Ohio St.3d 51, 
2012 Ohio 3894, 975 N.E.2d 972 (citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Carson, 93 Ohio St.3d 137, 753 
N.E.2d 172 (2001), where respondent mistakenly thought he had taken the necessary steps to return 
to practice; the sanction there was two years with one year stayed). 
Practicing while suspended often violated not only DR 3-101(B), now Rule 5.5, but also the 
applicable Rule for the Government of the Bar, Disciplinary Counsel v. Friedman, 114 Ohio St.3d 
1, 2007 Ohio 2477, 866 N.E.2d 1076 (violation of 3-101(B) and what is now Gov Bar R VI 5(C) 
(prohibiting practice while summarily suspended for failing to register)), and/or the terms of the 
lawyer’s suspension from practice, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mbakpuo, 98 Ohio St.3d 177, 
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2002 Ohio 7087, 781 N.E.2d 208. This conduct was often found to violate DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6) 
as well. E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Lord, 114 Ohio St.3d 466, 2007 Ohio 4260, 873 N.E.2d 273 
(entering appearance and filing motions while under attorney-registration suspension). Accord, under 
the Rules, Disciplinary Counsel v. Jarabek, 121 Ohio St.3d 257, 2009 Ohio 748, 903 N.E.2d 624 
(practicing while under interim suspension; violation of 5.5(a), 8.4(d) & (h)). Practicing law in 
violation of an indefinite suspension order also violates Gov Bar R V 8(E) (setting forth duties of 
disbarred or suspended attorney). Sabroff supra; Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Moushey, 104 Ohio St.3d 
427, 2004 Ohio 6897, 819 N.E.2d 1112 (violation of DR 3-101(B) not charged). (One case decided 
under the Code found that unauthorized practice resulted not only in DR 3-101(B) and 1-102(A)(6) 
violations, but, in addition, 1-102(A)(4). Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Squeo, 133 Ohio St.3d 536, 2012 
Ohio 5004, 979 N.E.2d 321.) 
“Absent any mitigating factors, the normal penalty for . . . continuing to practice while under 
suspension is disbarment.” Sabroff, 123 Ohio St.3d 182, at para. 21; Henderson, 108 Ohio St.3d 
447, at para. 15; Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson, 107 Ohio St.3d 182, 2005 Ohio 6178, 837 
N.E.2d 764, at para. 42 (numerous instances of continuing in practice while suspended; coupled 
with prior violations, respondent’s misconduct established a “recidivism of a dimension rarely 
seen.”). 
With Sabroff, Henderson and Watson, compare Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Winkfield, 107 Ohio 
St.3d 360, 2006 Ohio 6, 839 N.E.2d 924 (significant mental-health mitigating factors; indefinite 
suspension imposed); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zingarelli, 89 Ohio St.3d 210, 729 N.E.2d 
1167 (2000) (practicing while under suspension; indefinite suspension only, based on respondent’s 
bipolar disorder, which contributed to his misconduct). In a case decided only one month after 
Zingarelli, the Supreme Court approved an indefinite suspension where there were no mitigating 
factors -- indeed, the suspended lawyer misrepresented to the court before which he was appearing 
that he had been reinstated.  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Connors, 89 Ohio St.3d 370, 731 N.E.2d 1127 
(2000). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Higgins, 117 Ohio St.3d 473, 2008 Ohio 1509, 884 N.E.2d 
1070 (no mitigating factors; indefinite suspension only, even though respondent also failed to 
cooperate in the investigation in violation of Gov Bar R V 4(G)). This trend toward indefinite 
suspension as the norm for practicing while under suspension was most recently reflected in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 126 Ohio St.3d 389, 2010 Ohio 3824, 934 N.E.2d 328 (four 
aggravating factors; no mitigating factors; relator sought indefinite suspension, not disbarment.) 
Where the suspension is for noncompliance with registration or CLE obligations, there is authority 
indicating that indefinite suspension, rather than disbarment, is the appropriate sanction for 
unauthorized practice, even when coupled with failure to cooperate with the investigation of the 
misconduct. E.g., Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Squeo, 133 Ohio St.3d 536, 2012 Ohio 5004, 979 
N.E.2d 321; Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Van Sickle, 128 Ohio St.3d 376, 2011 Ohio 774, 944 N.E.2d 
677 (registration); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Crandall, 98 Ohio St.3d 444, 2003 Ohio 1637, 786 N.E.2d 
872 (CLE).  
In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. DeLong, 98 Ohio St.3d 470, 2003 Ohio 1743, 786 N.E.2d 
1280, the respondent continued to practice as general counsel for a corporation after being suspended 
for CLE noncompliance. Despite this and his misrepresentation, for more than nine years, to the client 
of his status as an attorney in good standing, the Court nevertheless approved an 18-month suspension. 
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Mitigating factors included respondent’s receipt of a Bronze Star for military service in Vietnam. An 
even more lenient sanction was imposed in Disciplinary Counsel v. Seabrook, 133 Ohio St.3d 97, 
2012 Ohio 3933, 975 N.E.2d 1013, where the respondent practiced law while under registration 
suspension. Even though this was coupled with failure to cooperate, and even though the 
indefinite-suspension-CLE/registration cases were acknowledged (id. at para. 13), Seabrook 
received only a two-year suspension with the second year stayed on conditions. 
In Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-06, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 13, at *4 (Apr. 20, 1990), the Board opined that a suspended lawyer could work as a 
nonlawyer paralegal or in a similar position under the supervision of a practicing lawyer, if the 
suspended lawyer does not practice law and the employing lawyer is responsible for the suspended 
lawyer’s work, so long as the conduct is not restricted “by the specific language of the Supreme 
Court’s Order of Suspension.” This position is similar to that espoused by the Ohio State Bar 
Association, which found that, unless the reason for the suspension involved gross abuse of the law, 
serial fraud, embezzlement, or other extreme misconduct, a law office could employ a suspended 
lawyer “for the purpose of doing research, writing briefs and memorandums of law, specifically for 
members of the law firm and for maintaining the law library, provided that in no event does the 
suspended lawyer come in contact with clients or court attaches [personnel], or give legal advice to 
clients of the law firm.” Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 78-9, at 2-3 (Nov. 15, 1978). If the 
suspended lawyer were allowed to go beyond these restrictions, the employing lawyer would be 
subject to sanctions for aiding the unauthorized practice of law. See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Fehler-Schultz, 64 Ohio St.3d 452, 597 N.E.2d 79 (1992), discussed in section 5.5:230. 
Because of amendments to the Rules for the Government of the Bar in 1999, Opinion 90-6 is now 
listed as “Not Current.” It is, however, difficult to discern any real substantive difference between the 
1999 amendments and Opinion 90-6. Under Gov Bar R V 8(G) as amended in 1999, if a lawyer hired 
a suspended attorney they both had to register with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel on a form that 
included statements affirming that the suspended attorney would not perform work constituting the 
practice of law and that the employing lawyer would supervise and be responsible for the suspended 
attorney’s work. The bottom line, apart from the additional paperwork required, appears to be that a 
suspended lawyer under the 1999 GBR could be employed by an Ohio lawyer authorized to practice, 
as was the case under Opinion 90-6. 
Pursuant to a further amendment to Gov Bar R V 8(G) effective September 1, 2008, more detailed 
obligations are now in place.  First, the new provisions deal with employment of a disqualified as well 
as a suspended attorney.  A disqualified attorney is one who has been disbarred or who has resigned 
with discipline pending.  Id. at 8(H). Second, a disqualified or suspended attorney can have no direct 
client contact (other than as an observer) or be involved with client funds or property. Id. at V 8(G)(1). 
Third, a disqualified attorney cannot enter into an employment relationship with his or her former 
firm. Id. at 8(G)(2). Fourth, the onus of reporting the relationship is now placed on the employing 
firm. Id. at 8(G)(3). Fifth, if the disqualified or suspended attorney will perform work on any client 
matter, the employing attorney/law firm must inform the client in writing. Id. at 8(G)(6). These 
provisions are reiterated and elaborated upon in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discip. Op. 
2008-7, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (Dec. 5, 2008). 
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In a case of first impression (so far as we are aware), the Court in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Dugan, 
113 Ohio St.3d 370, 2007 Ohio 2077, 865 N.E.2d 895, invoked the 1999 version of Gov Bar V 
8(G)(1) in finding that respondent had transgressed the ethics rules by failing to register the 
employment of a suspended lawyer as a paralegal.  Because respondent was unaware of his V 8(G)(1) 
obligation, he received only a public reprimand. 
Should an attorney under suspension engage in the representation of a criminal defendant, 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel concerns may be raised, depending on the rationale for the 
suspension and the stage of the proceeding at which the representation occurs. See State v. Allen, 121 
Ohio App.3d 666, 700 N.E.2d 682 (Cuyahoga 1997). 
Rule 5.5 prohibits not only practicing law where not authorized to do so (5.5(a), like its predecessor, 
DR 3-101(B)), but also holding one’s self out to the public or otherwise representing that he or she is 
admitted to practice in Ohio (5.5(b)(2)). For a case in which both of these provisions were invoked 
against a suspended lawyer, see Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Squeo, 133 Ohio St.3d 536, 2012 Ohio 
5004, 979 N.E.2d 321. The Rule 5.5(b)(2) charge arose out of a traffic accident in which respondent 
was a passenger in one of the vehicles. In the course of seeking to avoid having the police called in 
and “[t]o bolster his credibility,” he told the driver of the other car that he was a lawyer and would pay 
for the damage himself. He “handed them a business card for Squeo Companies, L.L.C. . . . bearing 
the name Marco J. Squeo, Esq., and identifying him as an attorney at law.” Id. at para. 6. 
Ohio attorneys on inactive or retired status: Practice by a member of the bar who has taken “inactive” 
or “retired” status also constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. Gov Bar R VI 2, 6(A)(1) & (D). 
See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Cantrell, 125 Ohio St.3d 458, 2010 Ohio 2114, 928 N.E.2d 1100 
(inactive); Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 06-01 (Feb. 16, 2006) (retired). Until recently, these 
lawyers were prohibited from “render[ing] any legal service for an attorney granted active status.” 
Former Gov Bar R VI 2-3(A). Strangely, unlike Opinion 90-06 with respect to suspended attorneys, 
the Board opined that inactive and retired attorneys were precluded by this language from working as 
paralegals or law clerks. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-4, 1992 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 17 (Feb. 14, 1992). Amendments to former sections 2 and 3(A) of Gov Bar R VI, 
deleting the language quoted above and thereby allowing an inactive or retired lawyer to be employed 
by an active attorney (for example, as a paralegal) so long as the employment does not constitute the 
practice of law, were adopted by the Supreme Court, effective June 1, 2002. With considerably 
greater justification than with respect to Opinion 90-6, Opinion 92-4 has likewise been labeled “Not 
Current.” 
In Disciplinary Counsel v. Motylinski, 134 Ohio St.3d 562, 2012 Ohio 5779, 983 N.E.2d 1314, an 
Ohio lawyer on inactive status continued to practice. He was charged with violating Rules 5.5(a) and 
5.5(b)(2). The panel found a 5.5(b)(2) violation but not 5.5(a). The Board and Court reversed that 
finding: there was a 5.5(a) violation “by engaging in the practice of law while on inactive status,” but 
no infraction of 5.5(b)(2) “which prohibits a lawyer from holding out that he or she is admitted to the 
practice of law in this jurisdiction, because Motylinski was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio 
even though he was on inactive status.” Id. at para. 8. The 5.5(b)(2) charge was dismissed. Note, 
however, that this analysis seems contrary to the provisions of Rule 5.5 cmt. [7], which provide that 
the word “admitted” “excludes a lawyer who while technically admitted is not authorized to practice, 
because, for example, the lawyer is on inactive status.” Comment [7] was not cited in the Motylinski 
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decision. 
The provisions on retirement, formerly in Gov Bar R VI 3, have now been incorporated in a new 
section VI 6, which deals with both retirement and resignation from the practice of law.  A lawyer 
who resigns from the practice is of course likewise not authorized to practice.  Gov Bar R VI 6(A)(1).  
Section 6 became effective on September 1, 2007.  These amendments are discussed in more detail in 
section 0.2:240 at “Special disciplinary provisions - Retirement or resignation from the practice of 
law.” 
One other status can result in an Ohio lawyer not being authorized to practice in Ohio, and that is the 
lawyer who is unregistered. Under Gov Bar R VI 1, an Ohio lawyer must obtain and keep current a 
Certificate of Registration to practice. Failure to do so will lead to summary suspension under Gov 
Bar R VI 5. Continued practice while under summary suspension constitutes the unauthorized 
practice of law. Such conduct violated former OH DR 3-101(B), Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Gettys, 90 Ohio St.3d 250, 737 N.E.2d 29 (2000) (practicing while not registered), and violates Gov 
Bar R VI as well. Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Doyle, 68 Ohio St.3d 24, 623 N.E.2d 37 (1993).  Pursuant to 
amendments effective September 1, 2007, attorneys on inactive status are exempt from the biennial 
registration requirement.  See Gov Bar R VI 2(B). 
And at least one case has found a Rule 5.5(a) violation based, in part, on a lawyer’s continuing to 
practice in violation of a court order prohibiting same without prior written permission from the court. 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Jarabek, 121 Ohio St.3d 257, 2009 Ohio 748, 903 N.E.2d 624. 
 
5.5:230  Performing Legal Services in Another Jurisdiction 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 3.32 (1996). 
In addition to the Ohio lawyer not authorized to practice in Ohio, there are two other circumstances 
that fall under the Rule 5.5(a) prohibition against a lawyer practicing “in violation of the regulation of 
the legal profession in that jurisdiction”; they are mirror images of one another. The first involves a 
lawyer from another jurisdiction practicing in Ohio without proper Ohio credentials. The second 
deals with Ohio lawyers who practice in another jurisdiction where they are not admitted. Both types 
of conduct are now expressly recognized in Ohio Rule 8.5(a) as subjecting the lawyer to the 
disciplinary authority of Ohio. (But see the Harris case, discussed below, which appears to ignore the 
words of 8.5(a) giving Ohio “disciplinary authority” over an out-of-state lawyer practicing in Ohio.) 
And, as the same Rule recognizes, “[a] lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both 
Ohio and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.” 
The Ohio cases in the first category are few. In addition to Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Doan, 
77 Ohio St.3d 236, 673 N.E.2d 1272 (1997) (Kentucky counsel working as in-house counsel for 
Ohio corporation), which is more appropriately treated in section 5.5:510, we found five: 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Harris, 137 Ohio St.3d 1, 2013 Ohio 4026, 996 N.E.2d 921; Ohio State 
Bar Ass’n v. Jackel, 118 Ohio St.3d 186, 2008 Ohio 1981, 887 N.E.2d 340; Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 114, 2003 Ohio 2568, 789 N.E.2d 210; Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Moore, 87 Ohio St.3d 583, 722 N.E.2d 514 (2000); and Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Misch, 82 Ohio 
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St.3d 256, 695 N.E.2d 244 (1998). 
Prior to Harris, the cases reflected some confusion over the proper body to handle unauthorized 
practice of law complaints against lawyers licensed in another state but not in Ohio. One of the cases 
came up through the Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline, Ohio State Bar Assn’ v. 
Jackel, 118 Ohio St.3d 186, 2008 Ohio 1981, 887 N.E.2d 340; others came up through the Board of 
Commissioners on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Brown, 
99 Ohio St.3d 114, 2003 Ohio 2568, 789 N.E.2d 210. Given the language of Rule 8.5, which 
expressly extends Ohio’s “disciplinary authority” to out-of-state lawyers providing legal services in 
Ohio, and given the jurisdictional reach of the UPL Board set forth in GovBarR VII 4(A), it appeared 
that both bodies had jurisdiction in this area. In Disciplinary Counsel v. Harris, 137 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2013 Ohio 4026, 996 N.E.2d 921, however, the Supreme Court concluded otherwise and found that 
the BCGD disciplinary process does not extend to out-of-state lawyers practicing in Ohio; 
accordingly, only the UPL Board has jurisdiction to resolve unauthorized practice of law complaints 
against such lawyers. For a detailed discussion of Harris, see section 8.5200 infra. Compare In e/c  
Nadel, 2013 De. LEXIS 606, ___ A.3d ___ (Del. 2013) (holding that, in Delaware, UPL complaints 
against an out-of-state lawyer can be prosecuted before either the state’s UPL Board or its Board on 
Professional Responsibility). 
It should be further noted that in Harris the Court does not directly address respondent’s argument 
“that Prof.Cond.R 5.5(a)—which prohibits a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation 
of its regulation of the legal profession—applies only to attorneys licensed in Ohio who practice in 
another jurisdiction.” Id. at para. 6. Whether Rule 5.5(a) applies of its own accord to be 
administered by the UPL Board is irrelevant, however, for Gov Bar R VII 2(A) itself, with 
exceptions not applicable here, authorizes UPL proceedings against “any person not admitted to 
practice in Ohio” (emphasis added), as do the Court’s UPL precedents directed against “‘a lawyer 
admitted to practice in another state, but not authorized to practice in Ohio,’” Harris, at para. 4, 
quoting Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Moore and Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Misch. 
An Ohio attorney who practices law in another jurisdiction, without compliance with that 
jurisdiction’s legal professional regulations, also violates Ohio Rule 5.5(a). Such a lawyer, in the 
language of division (a), is practicing “in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal 
profession in that jurisdiction.” See, under the comparable Code rule (OH DR 3-101(B)), 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Simmons, 120 Ohio St.3d 304, 2008 Ohio 6142, 898 N.E.2d 943 
(respondent attempted to appear on behalf of clients in Michigan matters, where he was not licensed 
to practice (and, in two of the matters, while he was suspended from practice in Ohio); one-year 
suspension with six months stayed); Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Good, 114 Ohio St.3d 204, 2007 Ohio 
3602, 871 N.E.2d 542 (six incidents of unauthorized practice in Florida by Ohio lawyer; 
consent-to-discipline six-month suspension imposed); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Meros, 83 
Ohio St.3d 222, 699 N.E.2d 458 (1998) (attorney suspended for, inter alia, involvement in federal 
court action in West Virginia, where he was not licensed to practice and where he failed to file motion 
for admission pro hac vice). Maintaining an office for the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction in 
which the lawyer was not licensed to practice also violated the disciplinary rule, unless the foreign 
jurisdiction approved the practice. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 74-7 (Mar. 22, 1974) (Ohio 
lawyer, not licensed in California, maintained office in San Francisco to facilitate handling of cases 
there on behalf of Ohio residents; unless approved by State Bar of California, maintenance of such 
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office in lawyer’s name was “ethically improper”). See Rule 5.5(b)(1). 
If permitted by the other state, however, an Ohio attorney can take a deposition in a state where the 
Ohio attorney is not licensed to practice. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-4, 
2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 14, 2002). 
  
5.5:240  Assisting in the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Ohio Rule 5.5(a) also mandates that a lawyer “shall not . . . assist another in” practicing “law in a 
jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction.” 
As the comment makes clear, this “does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of 
paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated 
work and retains responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3.” Ohio Rule 5.5 cmt. [2]. Moreover, 
 [a] lawyer may provide professional advice and instruction to 
nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of the law; for 
example, claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial 
institutions, social workers, accountants, and persons employed in 
government agencies. Lawyers may also assist independent 
nonlawyers, such as paraprofessionals, who are authorized by the law 
of the jurisdiction to provide particular law-related services. In addition, 
a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se. 
Rule 5.5 cmt. [3]. See section 5.5:210 at “Lay employee assistance in the practice of law.” But 5.5(a) 
is violated when the lawyer assists corporations in the foreclosure-avoidance business by filing 
answers on behalf of the “client” borrowers and agrees to procedures whereby the company, not the 
lawyer, engages in negotiations with the lender, and none of the corporate representatives acting as 
negotiators is admitted to practice law. Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Harwood, 125 Ohio St.3d 31, 2010 
Ohio 1466, 925 N.E.2d 965. Harwood follows the pattern of similar cases decided under the Code; 
see “Participation in a joint venture or other relationship with a nonlawyer,” this section infra. This 
aspect of Rule 5.5(a) is violated also by partnering with an Ohio lawyer suspended from practice 13 
years previously. Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Axner, 135 Ohio St. 3d 241, 2013 Ohio 400, 985 
N.E.2d 1257. 
This “assistance” aspect of Rule 5.5(a) is substantively identical to the prohibition in former OH DR 
3-101(A) against “aiding a non-lawyer” in unauthorized practice. The discussion below reviews the 
case law decided under the OHCPR provision. 
There are a number of ways in which a lawyer can be seen as assisting in the unauthorized practice of 
law. Two concerns predominate. 
The first focuses on whether the lawyer has stated or implied that a nonlawyer employee is acting as a 
lawyer in the representation. Such conduct impermissibly assists in the unauthorized practice of law.  
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Culbreath, 88 Ohio St.3d 271, 725 N.E.2d 629 (2000) (lawyer referred to 
nonlawyer as “my partner” during closing argument of criminal case in which lawyer permitted 
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nonlawyer to make opening statement and examine witnesses during trial); Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Willis, 96 Ohio St.3d 142, 2002 Ohio 3614, 772 N.E.2d 625 (lawyer permitted 
employee disbarred by state of New York to act as if he were licensed during depositions, pre-trial 
conference, and in meeting with lawyer’s clients); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Reed, 94 Ohio St.3d 139, 
761 N.E.2d 9 (2002) (respondent leased office space in Ohio to Pennsylvania attorney (Moore) not 
admitted in Ohio, listed Moore on his letterhead and placed yellow pages ads that created impression 
that Moore was attorney associated with respondent). Where the lawyer knows that the client 
misunderstands the nonlawyer’s status, the lawyer should correct the misunderstanding. Cf. Portage 
County Bar Ass’n v. Mitchell, 101 Ohio St.3d 1, 2003 Ohio 6449, 800 N.E.2d 1106 (client under 
impression that respondent’s convicted-felon nonlawyer employee, who among other things signed 
contract with client on behalf of “firm,” was lawyer associated with respondent; respondent failed to 
disclose employee’s true status until confronted with facts by client). 
 
The second concern focuses on the tasks the nonlawyer is performing. A lawyer can delegate tasks to 
a nonlawyer employee, as long as adequate supervision is provided. Ohio Rule 5.5 cmt. [2]. For a 
case where the rule was violated because supervision was inadequate, see Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Gaba, 98 Ohio St.3d 351, 2003 Ohio 1012, 785 N.E.2d 437 (failure to adequately supervise 
nonlawyer employees who on various occasions gave legal advice, provided estimates of legal fees, 
and left impression that clients were speaking with licensed attorney). At times, the degree of 
delegation may be such as to constitute assisting the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer cannot 
completely delegate the operation of his practice to a nonlawyer. Stark County Bar Ass’n v. George, 
45 Ohio St.2d 267, 268, 344 N.E.2d 132, 132 (1976) (disbarment of lawyer who, among other 
violations, went out of state for an extended period of time and “left his office in the care, custody and 
control of his brother, a non-lawyer, who had been instructed by respondent to receive clients, prepare 
work sheets, accept fees and costs, and refer clients to other lawyers and split fees.”). But conduct that 
extreme was not required before a violation of former OH DR 3-101(A) was found. Allowing a 
nonlawyer employee to engage in extensive counseling of the client on legal matters and to engage in 
extensive dealings with others on the client’s behalf violated this provision as well.  Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Fehler-Schultz, 64 Ohio St.3d 452, 597 N.E.2d 79 (1992). Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Maley, 119 Ohio St.3d 217, 2008 Ohio 3923, 893 N.E.2d 180, where “[r]espondent granted broad 
authority to the secretary to deal with and work directly for clients.… [and] either knew or should 
have known that she was taking money from clients and performing legal work for them.” Id. at para. 
14. Further, some tasks are so intimately tied to the practice of law that they can be provided only by 
a lawyer, regardless of the degree of supervision provided. See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2002-4, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 14, 2002) (improper under OH 
DR 3-101(A) to delegate taking of deposition to paralegal; attorney who instructs paralegal to take 
deposition, prepares questions for paralegal to use, supervises paralegal in taking of deposition, or 
instructs paralegal to represent deponent at deposition is assisting in unauthorized practice of law). 
There are instances in which excessive delegation comes about because the lawyer is suffering from 
an illness that disables the lawyer from handling his practice. That excuse, however, does not 
legitimize the conduct; it still is assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. See Columbus Bar 
Ass’n v. Watson, 106 Ohio St.3d 298, 2005 Ohio 4983, 834 N.E.2d 809 (bedridden respondent 
relied on paralegal to help him manage law practice during his illness, but paralegal overstepped his 
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authority in filing and signing documents; DR 3-101(A) violated (as admitted by respondent); given 
extenuating circumstances, sanction was stayed six-month suspension). 
Inadequate supervision of out-of-state attorney not admitted in Ohio: In Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Pavlick, 89 Ohio St.3d 458, 732 N.E.2d 985 (2000), the Supreme Court publicly 
reprimanded a principal in a Cleveland law firm who, as the partner most responsible for supervising 
and monitoring an out-of-state attorney/”consultant” not admitted in Ohio, negligently failed to do so, 
even though he knew the attorney was not admitted in Ohio. (The out-of-state attorney in question 
was the lawyer who was the subject of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Misch, 82 Ohio St.3d 256, 695 N.E.2d 244 (1998), discussed in section 5.5:240 above.) The parties 
stipulated that to the extent respondent authorized Misch to use firm resources, created in 
correspondence a confusion as to Misch’s status, and failed to inform firm clients that Misch was not 
an Ohio lawyer, respondent bore some of the responsibility for Misch’s misconduct. 
In deciding that respondent Pavlick violated OH DR 3-101(A) as stipulated, a unanimous Court left 
no doubt that the language of the rule (“[a] lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized 
practice of law’ (emphasis added),” 89 Ohio St.3d at 460-61, 732 N.E.2d at 987) “prohibits Ohio 
attorneys from aiding either laypersons or attorneys unlicensed in Ohio in the unauthorized practice 
of law.”  Id. at 461, 732 N.E.2d at 987-88 (emphasis by the Court). The Court further noted that this 
reading of OH DR 3-101(A) is consistent with the definition of “unauthorized practice of law” set 
forth in the Rules for the Government of the Bar. See Gov Bar R VII 2(A). See also Gov Bar R VI 
3(D). The Court then, as it did in Misch, reviewed the various avenues through which an out-of-state 
attorney can properly practice in Ohio.  89 Ohio St.3d at 462-64, 732 N.E.2d at 988-90. See sections 
5.5:400-:500. 
Lawyer employees of corporation serving clients of company: The general rule has long been that a 
lawyer who, as an employee of a general corporation, provided legal services to clients or customers 
of the corporation was involved in aiding the unauthorized practice of law, because general (nonlegal) 
corporations are precluded from practicing law. There is a recognized exception, however, when the 
corporation has a direct or primary interest in the matter. This exception was applied in Cincinnati 
Bar Ass’n v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. UPL 02-02 (Bd. of Comm’rs on Unauthorized Practice of 
Law Oct. 1, 2003), review denied, 100 Ohio St.3d 1514, 2003 Ohio 6460, 800 N.E.2d 33, in which 
the Board ruled that lawyer employees of insurance companies may represent the employer’s 
insureds with respect to policies issued by the company. Although older BCGD opinions (e.g., Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 95-14, 1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Dec. 1, 
1995)), condemning “in house” law firms made up of lawyer employees practicing within an 
insurance company under a firm name comprised of one or more of the lawyers, may or may not still 
be good law, the straightforward representation of insureds by insurance company staff attorneys was 
blessed by the UPL Board in Allstate. The Board there dismissed the complaint lodged by the 
Cincinnati Bar Association, which had charged that Allstate was engaged in the unauthorized practice 
of law by utilizing this employee-representation practice. The essence of the Board’s opinion is found 
in Conclusions of Law 3 and 4: 
 3. A corporation cannot lawfully engage in the practice of law, 
and it cannot do so indirectly through employment of qualified lawyers.  
Judd v. City Trust & Savings Bank (1937), 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 
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288; Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken (1934), 129 Ohio St. 
23, 1 O.O. 313, 193 N.E. 650. Both the Judd and Dworken opinion [sic] 
recognize, however, that corporate attorneys are permitted to work on 
matters where the corporation has a direct or primary interest.  
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. at 23, 193 N.E. at 651 (offering opinions and 
advice for the benefit of others, are acts falling within the practice of 
law, and may not be performed by corporations except wherein they 
have a direct or primary interest); Judd, 133 Ohio St. at 92-93, 12 
N.E.2d at 293 (so long as the corporation’s activities are confined to 
performing services beneficial to itself in the prosecution of their [sic] 
approved business, the necessary appurtenant benefits of a legal 
complexion to other persons does not make such pursuit unlawful). As 
a related matter, both Dworken and Judd reviewed and upheld lower 
court injunctions that were limited to proscribing in house legal 
counsel activity where the corporation had no direct or primary interest 
in the legal dispute. 
 4. The Board finds that the situation presented in this record and 
based on the factual stipulations of the parties falls within the exception 
found in Dworken and Judd where the corporation has a direct interest 
in the outcome of litigation. Indeed, as noted above, the parties 
stipulated that “[s]taff counsel employed by Allstate to represent 
Allstate insureds are protecting Allstate’s direct and primary pecuniary 
interest in the outcome of litigation in which Allstate’s insureds are 
involved.” [citation to stipulation omitted.] Based on the stipulations 
and arguments of counsel, the Board concludes that relator has failed to 
establish that respondent has engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law. 
Slip op. at 4-5 (bracketed material added). This conclusion is consistent with prior Ohio authority. 
See Strother v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 5 Ohio Supp. 362, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 550(C.P. Hamilton 1939), 
aff’d without opinion; see Dowling v. Ins. Co. of N.A., No. 32527 (Ohio App. Cuyahoga Nov. 16, 
1973) (“An insurance company can use house counsel to handle the defense of a case [on behalf of an 
insured under the policy], if the insurance company has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of 
the lawsuit.” Id. at 4 (citing Strother)). This is the rule in the great majority of U.S. jurisdictions. See 
Jan A. Saurman, How to Succeed as Staff Counsel - Issues in Ohio, The Brief (ABA Tort Trial 
& Practice Section), Spring 2004, at 28, 31 (noting that 19 of 21 jurisdictions addressing the issue 
have approved the practice). 
See also discussion of Allstate at section 5.4:300. For discussion of attempts by entities and their 
nonlawyer constituents to represent the entity or third parties, see section 5.5:210, at “Attempts by 
entities to practice law through their nonlawyer constituents.” 
Participation in a joint venture or other relationship with a nonlawyer: Problems may also arise from a 
lawyer’s direct provision of legal services if the services are offered as part of a joint venture with a 
nonlawyer. Lawyer-nonlawyer joint ventures can raise a host of ethical issues depending upon the 
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exact nature of the relationship. Problems that arise include, in addition to aiding in the unauthorized 
practice of law, improper solicitation and referrals (Rules 7.2(b), (d), 7.3(a)-(d); see sections 
7.2:400, :600 & 7.3:200-:400), creation of a partnership with a nonlawyer (Rule 5.4(b); see section 
5.4:300), improper fee sharing (Rule 5.4(a); see section 5.4:200), conflict of interest (e.g., Rule 1.7; 
see sections 1.7:200-:500), and third-party influence concerns (Rules 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) & (d); see 
sections 1.8:710-:720 and 5.4:400-:500).  
See also Rule 5.7 (responsibilities regarding law-related businesses).  
For example, the Ohio State Bar Association concluded that if an Ohio attorney entered into an 
arrangement in which a nonlawyer financial planner secures clients, acquires the basic information 
from the clients necessary for the preparation of a revocable living trust, and then sends the clients to 
the attorney to complete the trust, the arrangement would involve the lawyer in assisting in the 
unauthorized practice of law. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 90-2, at 2 (July 13, 1990) (the 
plan “would constitute a marketing of your legal services by the financial planner, and allowing him 
to do so would be aiding in the unauthorized practice of law”). The Cincinnati Bar Association 
reached the same conclusion on similar facts, although there, in addition, the insurance company 
marketing the living trusts also arranged for a document service to create master document provisions 
pertaining to living trusts, and the lawyer, in deciding on the optimal trust configuration for the client, 
was required to choose living trust provisions from among those approved by the insurance company. 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 92-93-01 (n.d.). 
Numerous disciplinary cases decided by the Ohio Supreme Court confirm the result in these ethics 
opinions. Thus, in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Nosan, 108 Ohio St.3d 99, 2006 Ohio 163, 840 N.E.2d 
1073, respondent associated with a company offering consumer-debt consolidation and relief services. 
The company provided respondent with an office and support staff; although respondent seldom met 
with his “clients,” he “allowed nonattorneys in his office to counsel clients about how to protect their 
legal interests through bankruptcy or some other financial plan.” Id. at para. 16. This arrangement 
violated former DR 3-101(A) (as well as 3-102(A) and 3-103). 
In Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Kathman, 92 Ohio St.3d 92, 748 N.E.2d 1091 (2001), the Court 
concluded that an Ohio attorney, engaged as a “review attorney” by an Ohio corporation engaged in 
marketing living trusts prepared by a Nevada corporation, violated DR 3-101(A): 
[W]e have not clearly defined whether an attorney, licensed to practice 
law in the state of Ohio, aids in the unauthorized practice of law when 
he or she assists nonattorneys to market or sell living trusts. We hold 
that an attorney violates DR 3-101(A) when the attorney assists a 
nonattorney, as respondent assisted the nonattorneys, in the marketing 
and selling of living trusts. 
Id. at 96, 748 N.E.2d at 1095 (six-month suspension imposed). Accord Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 4541, 894 N.E.2d 1210 (by doing business with 
company in foreclosure-avoidance business – representing the company’s customers in court while 
company’s agents continued to negotiate with lenders – respondents “facilitated nonlawyers’ 
negotiations with the creditors of debtors facing foreclosure by doing business with Foreclosure 
Solutions,” id. at para. 20, and thereby aided it in the unauthorized practice of law); Ohio State Bar 
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Ass’n v. Jackel, 118 Ohio St.3d 186, 2008 Ohio 1981, 887 N.E.2d 340 (performing estate-planning 
services for clients sent to her by direct mail marketing company with whom she was associated; two 
year suspension). (The Kathman, Mullaney, and Jackel cases are discussed in Eugene P. Whetzel, 
A Cautionary Tale for Lawyers, Ohio Law., May/June 2009, at 26; the Mullaney decision is 
reviewed in Steven Seidenberg, Playing with Fire, ABAJ, July 2009, at 26, 27.) In a case 
involving similar conduct, the Court shed further light on why such an arrangement violated DR 
3-101(A).  Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Fishman, 98 Ohio St.3d 172, 2002 Ohio 7086, 781 N.E.2d 204. 
In answer to respondent’s contention that his supervision over lay representatives of the marketing 
corporation (AHC), with which the lawyer had entered into an agreement to market living trusts to 
elderly customers, was sufficient to avoid violation of 3-101(A), the Supreme Court had this to say: 
[I]t is not enough for an attorney to look over the shoulders of 
nonattorneys in a process through which clients are advised about and 
accede to a living trust. In that situation, the reviewing attorney enters 
the relationship too late -- the nonattorney has already processed 
information for the client about his or her affairs and has generated a 
legal solution of which the client is already convinced. [citing 
Kathman]. Compound this scenario with the fact that the nonattorney 
has a financial stake in the legal solution, and there can be no real 
confidence in the attorney. The attorney’s status as the client’s personal, 
yet objective advocate has been sacrificed for the sake of the sale. 
 It is manifest from the evidence in this case that AHC 
representatives not only explained legal principles relative to wills and 
trusts, they also manipulated those principles in directing prospective 
clients to choose living trusts. Such client consultation is, at its most 
elemental, the practice of law. [citation omitted]. Respondent therefore 
unquestionably also aided nonattorneys in the unauthorized practice of 
law. 
Id. at paras. 14-15 (emphasis by the Court; more severe sanction (one-year suspension) than that 
imposed in Kathman, because, inter alia, “respondent remains oblivious to the full significance of 
his unprofessional conduct.” Id. at para. 20). 
The rule of the Kathman line of cases has been applied where the relationship or affiliation of the 
lawyer with the purveyor of living trusts was apparently that of an employee, as opposed to a joint 
venturer.  Thus, in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Heisler, 113 Ohio St.3d 447, 2007 Ohio 2338, 866 
N.E.2d 490, the respondent, who “worked for” two such companies and was paid a salary, was found 
to have aided the unauthorized practice of law in violation of former 3-101(A) “by helping [the 
companies] sell the preparation of living-trust agreements and associated documents to 
customers . . . .” Id. at para. 16.  Another case decided the same day, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Kramer, 113 Ohio St.3d 455, 2007 Ohio 2340, 866 N.E.2d 498, involved a respondent who was 
first an employee of the living-trust corporation and then went into private practice, where the bulk of 
his clients came from referrals from the corporation.  With respect to the 3-101(A) violation, the 
Court focused on his acceptance in private practice of referrals from employees of the company, who 
had already convinced the client to purchase a living trust.  Quoting from Kathman, the Supreme 
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Court stressed that the 
“nonattorney has already given legal advice to the client regarding the 
client’s legal matters . . . . By the time the attorney enters the 
transaction, the unauthorized practice of law has already occurred and 
anything the attorney does thereafter aids the prohibited conduct.” 
Id. at para. 22 (ellipsis added). 
Similarly, in Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 88-3 (Feb. 3, 1988), the OSBA warned a lawyer 
that agreeing to draft wills in response to referrals from a nonlawyer organization that gives 
presentations on estate planning, collects detailed information from participants, and counsels some 
of those individuals on a personal basis could, depending on the facts, involve the lawyer in aiding the 
unauthorized practice of law. 
The problem also has arisen with respect to the joint offering of divorce mediation services by a 
lawyer and psychologist. Whether such an association involves the unauthorized practice of law 
depends on the exact nature of the services rendered by the psychologist. Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
Informal Op. 82-2 (Aug. 3, 1982). But see ABA Section on Dispute Resolution, Resolution on 
Mediation and the Unauthorized Practice of Law 1 (Feb. 2, 2002) (providing mediation service 
does not constitute practice of law). See generally 1 Sarah R. Cole, Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. 
McEwen, Mediation - Law, Policy, Practice § 10:05 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2008-09) (discussing 
unauthorized practice of law problems that arise in nonlawyer and out-of-state lawyer provision of 
mediation services). 
Ultimately, the propriety of lawyer involvement in a law-related business with a nonlawyer becomes 
a judgment call. Lawyer ownership with a nonlawyer of an ancillary business that provides 
law-related services is not per se barred, but it can stray across the line if the services provided are 
deemed the practice of law. In this regard, it must be recognized that certain conduct permissibly 
carried out by a nonlawyer can become the practice of law when carried out by an attorney. This issue 
was addressed in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 94-95-01 (n.d.). As the opinion drafters noted, 
conducting a title search without rendering an opinion on the legal significance of the findings is not 
the practice of law when conducted by a nonlawyer. In contrast, if the conduct is carried out by a 
lawyer, it may be considered the practice of law, if the client is likely to rely on the fact that the 
individual performing the service is a lawyer. This distinction becomes important to the extent the 
lawyer is performing the service in connection with nonlawyers. If the conduct is treated as the 
practice of law, then improper fee splitting with a nonlawyer (OH DR 3-102(A); see section 5.4:200), 
or improper practice with a nonlawyer (OH DR 3-103, 5-107(C); see section 5.4:300) might be 
involved, as well as the lawyer being seen as supporting the unauthorized practice of law. To avoid 
these violations, the organization offering the service must make clear that the individual offering the 
service is not doing so in a legal capacity. As the Cincinnati Bar Association suggested: 
To prevent this reliance, the lawyer must ensure that the corporation 
makes it clear to the ultimate users that the title searches are merely 
mechanical, that they reflect no legal opinions or judgments and no 
representations as to the status of titles and they should not be relied on 
as legal work. 
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Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 94-95-01, at 6 (n.d.).  See as well Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 
79-6 (Sept. 20, 1979), discussed this section infra at “Lay organization as conduit for a lawyer’s 
advice.” 
In its interim report, the Ohio State Bar Association Special Committee on Multidisciplinary Practice 
(MDP) and the Legal Profession defined the threshold question as follows: 
“Can the public interest be well served through the offering of 
multidimensional (multidisciplinary) services, e.g., law, accounting, 
financial, insurance, and investment, without sacrificing or 
compromising the traditional and sacred core values of the legal 
profession, those being professional independence of judgment, 
protection of confidential client information and undivided client 
loyalty through avoidance of conflict of interest?” 
Quoted in Robert N. Farquhar, Law “Practice” of the Future, Ohio Law., May/June 2000, at 8, 
12. The final report of the Special Committee to the OSBA Council of Delegates was adopted, as 
amended, on May 17, 2000. Therein, MDP was rejected. The ABA reached the same result at its 
annual convention on July 11, 2000. ABAJ, Sept. 2000, at 92. In April 2012, the ABA Committee on 
Ethics 20/20 decided not to present the latest MDP proposal to the House of Delegates, given the lack 
of a “sufficient basis” for doing so. See James Pogers, Summer Job, ABAJ, June 2012, at 27, 28. 
Lay organization as conduit for a lawyer’s advice: Former OH DR 3-101(A) also was implicated 
when a lawyer provided legal advice to a lay organization that then used the advice to engage in the 
unauthorized practice of law. This situation was addressed in Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 
79-6 (Sept. 20, 1979). Under the facts considered, the OSBA assumed a nonlawyer company was 
providing estate-planning services that constituted the unauthorized practice of law. The opinion 
concluded that the lawyer was free to advise the company on legal matters affecting the company, but 
the lawyer could not provide advice that would help the company engage in the unauthorized practice 
of law. Such conduct would violate 3-101(A). See also Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 87-1 (July 31, 
1987) (similar analysis applied where nonlawyer consultant employed attorney to review client 
personnel policies and then offered opinion on their legality based on lawyer’s work). The OSBA 
opinion goes beyond this, however, to endorse a more substantial limit on lawyer conduct: 
 The fact that a lay organization may be able to perform a 
particular service to its clients unaided by any advice from a lawyer 
without being engaged in the unauthorized practice of law does not 
necessarily protect the lawyer on retainer if he aids in the performance 
of such service. When the advice of the lawyer on retainer is sought by 
his employer, the lay organization, to enable the latter to render service 
to a client, whether the lawyer is aiding or making possible the practice 
of law by the lay organization is to be judged, not on the basis of the 
nature of the conduct of the lay organization when it proceeds unaided 
by the lawyer, but rather on the basis of whether the advice given by the 
lawyer would involve the practice of law if given by him directly to a 
client. 
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Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 79-6, at 3-4 (Sept. 20, 1979). 
See also Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-2, 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 2 (Apr. 6, 2001) (lawyers contacted by commercial web-site offering to provide online (1) 
exclusive listing within zip codes in exchange for compensation, and (2) site that provides prompts to 
“make your will online now,” are cautioned not to participate if the entity is engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law; “[w]henever a law-related web site is offering services that go beyond 
merely a ministerial function of providing a legal form to users, the attorney should be on the alert that 
the company may be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.” Id. at *2.). 
Hybrid situations: At times, the lawyer’s affiliation with and conduct for an organization engaged in 
the unauthorized practice of law may raise both joint venture and conduit concerns. In Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-15, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (Aug. 
14, 1992), the Board addressed such a situation. Under the proposed scheme, a law firm would be 
involved in preparing legal forms and videotapes for a business corporation’s marketing of wills, 
living wills, and durable powers of attorney to customers, conduct that involves the unauthorized 
practice of law. The lawyers also would answer customer requests for information and assist 
customers in preparing finished documents. As such, the lawyer would be allowing the corporation to 
serve as the conduit for legal advice, to the extent the lawyer was not directly involved with the 
customer, and as a joint-venturer in the provision of legal services, to the extent the lawyer had 
contact with the customers being served. The Board found this conduct to violate numerous 
provisions of the Code, including former DR 3-101(A). 
OH DR 2-103(D) organizations: Former DR 2-103(D) identified a limited class of organizations, 
such as lawyer-referral services and legal-service plans, that could permissibly pay for and market a 
lawyer’s services to third parties. (Under the Rules, see Ohio Rule 7.2(b)(2) & (3) and discussion at 
section 7.2:400.) Lawyer participation in such organizations was not considered aiding the 
unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., under the Code, Azzarello v. Legal Aid Soc., 117 Ohio App. 
471, 185 N.E.2d 566 (Cuyahoga 1962). In contrast, participating in a nonqualified organization was 
prohibited. See, e.g., Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Gold Shield, Inc., 52 Ohio Misc. 105, 369 
N.E.2d 1232 (C.P. Cuyahoga 1975). Accord Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 94-95-02 (n.d.) 
(participation would violate DR 3-101(A) (aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law), 
3-102(A) (sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer), and 3-103(A) (forming a partnership to practice law 
with a nonlawyer)). 
 
5.5:300  Unauthorized Practice in Ohio by Out-of-State Lawyers 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.5(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.5(b) 
Lawyers admitted in other jurisdictions but not in Ohio also are prohibited from engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law in Ohio, although the ability to practice here in conformity with Ohio 
law has been significantly enhanced by Ohio Rules 5.5(c) and (d). These divisions of the Rule in 
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substance pick up the multijurisdictional practice of law provisions of MR 5.5 as amended in 2002. 
See sections 5.5:400 & :500. Nevertheless, Rule 5.5(b) sets the baseline for non-Ohio lawyers and 
prohibits them, subject to the division (c) and (d) safe harbors, from “establishing an office or other 
systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law” or from holding out to 
the public or otherwise representing that they are admitted in Ohio. Rule 5.5(b)(1) & (2). 
Systematic and continuous presence can be shown both by conduct in the state and by outside conduct 
directed toward the state. “For example, advertising in media specifically targeted to Ohio residents 
or initiating contact with Ohio residents for solicitation purposes could be viewed as a systematic and 
continuous presence,” even though the lawyer is not physically present in the state. Ohio Rule 5.5 
cmt. [4]. Board Opinion 2011-2, discussed infra in section 5.5:440, specifically notes that “virtual” 
(internet) presence can violate Rule 5.5(b)(1) and may implicate the “holding out” provisions of (b)(2) 
as well. 
Rule 5.5(b) is consistent with the provisions of Gov Bar R VI 3(D), which states, with respect to an 
attorney not admitted in Ohio who is “employed by, associated with, or a partner in an Ohio law 
firm,” that, until admitted, “the attorney may not practice law in Ohio, hold himself or herself out as 
authorized to practice in Ohio, or practice before any nonfederal court or agency in this state on behalf 
of any person except himself or herself, unless granted leave by the court or agency.” 
While there are some unauthorized practice cases under the former OHCPR that now fall by the 
wayside, given the multijurisdictional safe harbors created in divisions (c) and (d), there are a few 
Code decisions involving conduct that still would be condemned as unauthorized practice under 
division (b). Those cases are discussed here; the Code cases that seem consistent with the new safe 
harbors are discussed in sections 5.5:400-:500. 
One such case that would come within the prohibitions of Rule 5.5(b) is In re Stage, 81 Ohio St.3d 
554, 692 N.E.2d 993 (1998), in which an out-of-state lawyer awaiting admission in Ohio engaged in 
conduct implying that she was already admitted in Ohio. The Supreme Court found that using 
letterheads stating “General Counsel” and “Attorney at Law,” absent a disclaimer accompanying use 
of these titles, constituted the unauthorized practice of law under the “holding out” provisions of 
ORC 4705.07. At a minimum, this would violate division (b)(2) (holding oneself out as authorized to 
practice in Ohio). Accord Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-37, 1989 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (Dec. 15, 1989) (lawyer awaiting Ohio admission cannot hold himself or 
herself out as licensed to practice in Ohio or to give legal advice to Ohio clients prior to admission). 
Other decisions involving conduct that would violate Rule 5.5(b)(1) or (2) or both include: Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 114, 2003 Ohio 2568, 789 N.E.2d 210 
(“[r]espondent wrongfully held himself out as an attorney licensed to practice law in this state”); 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Moore, 87 Ohio St.3d 583, 722 N.E.2d 514 (2000) (office in Ohio and 
holding himself out as authorized to practice in Ohio). 
As discussed in section 5.5:510, Gov Bar R VI 3(A)-(B) provides that upon proper registration, a 
non-Ohio attorney may perform legal services for a nongovernmental Ohio employer if the attorney is 
a full-time employee of that employer under “corporate status,” although he or she cannot appear in 
that capacity before a court or agency unless leave is granted. But performing such services without 
registering constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, see Gov Bar R VI 3(C); Office of 
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Disciplinary Counsel v. Doan, 77 Ohio St.3d 236, 673 N.E.2d 1272 (1997), and would violate 
5.5(b) as well. “Corporate status” is not available to a lawyer not admitted in Ohio who is employed 
by, associated with, or a partner in an Ohio law firm. Gov Bar R VI 3(D). 
It must be remembered that, in addition to any action taken by Ohio with respect to conduct of an 
out-of-state attorney, the licensing jurisdiction of the out-of-state attorney can determine whether the 
conduct violates its own rules of professional responsibility. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 27 Ohio St.3d 31, 34, 501 N.E.2d 617, 620 (1986) (recognizing that “an attorney may 
be disciplined in both his home state and the state in which he appeared pro hac vice.”). Accord Ohio 
Rule 8.5(a) (see section 8.5:200). See generally ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 485 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) (lawyers engaged in multijurisdictional practice subject 
to discipline both in states where they practice and in states of licensure). 
 
5.5:400  Provision of Legal Services on Temporary Basis 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.5(c) 
Gov Bar R XII 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.5(c) 
Commentary 
ALI-LGL § 3 
Over the years the needs of clients have become increasingly multijurisdictional. Local clients often 
have dealings with parties from other jurisdictions or conduct business in many jurisdictions. To 
accommodate these changing needs, lawyers were increasingly called upon to work on matters in 
states where they were not licensed to practice. State unauthorized-practice-of-law rules, however, 
were slow to respond. This disconnect was addressed by the ABA in its 2002 amendments to the 
Model Rules on multijurisdictional practice, and the resulting changes are largely incorporated in 
Ohio Rule 5.5(c). This division, along with division (d), permits multijurisdictional practice on the 
terms there stated. Division (c) sets forth four situations in which an out-of-state lawyer may practice 
temporarily in Ohio; division (d) specifies two instances in which such a lawyer may establish an 
office or other continuous presence in Ohio. The latter are discussed in sections 5.5:500-:520 infra; 
the former are discussed here.  A helpful summary of Ohio Rule 5.5(c) & (d) is found in Brian F. 
Toohey, Road Work: MJP Five Years Later, Clev. B.J., Dec. 2007, at 10. For an extensive 
treatment of multijurisdictional practice from a national perspective, see Arthur F. Greenbaum, 
Multijurisdictional Practice and the Influence of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 – An 
Interim Assessment, 43 Akron L Rev 729 (2010). 
The body of division (c) provides as follows: 
 A lawyer who is admitted in another United States jurisdiction, 
is in good standing in the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted, 
and regularly practices law may provide legal services on a temporary 
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basis in this jurisdiction if one or more of the following apply: [setting 
forth the four categories, which are discussed hereafter in sections 
5.5:410-:440]. 
The goal of the drafters was to identify a limited array of instances in which practice in Ohio by an 
out-of-state lawyer would serve client needs without creating an “unreasonable risk to the interests 
of . . . clients, the public or the courts.” Ohio Rule 5.5 cmt. [5]. Three concerns animate the Rule. 
The first is the need for some assurance that the out-of-state lawyer will provide competent 
representation. To this end, the lawyer must be admitted in another United States jurisdiction, be in 
good standing in that jurisdiction, and regularly practice law. Ohio Rule 5.5(c). Thus, a lawyer, even 
though admitted in the other jurisdiction, must not be disbarred or suspended in that jurisdiction, as 
that lawyer would not be in good standing; nor can the lawyer be on inactive status, as that lawyer 
would not be “admitted” for purposes of division (c) or involved in regularly practicing law. Ohio 
Rule 5.5 cmts. [5] & [7]. (Comment [7] adds the gloss that “admitted” “excludes a lawyer who while 
technically admitted is not authorized to practice, because, for example, the lawyer is on inactive 
status.”) 
There is one ambiguity of note here. Suppose a lawyer is admitted in multiple jurisdictions, but is not 
in good standing in one of them. From the language of the Ohio Rule, the out-of-state lawyer still 
appears eligible for practice in Ohio, as the lawyer is “admitted in another jurisdiction, is in good 
standing in the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted, and regularly practices law.” Under the 
analogous Model Rule, in contrast, temporary out-of-state practice is allowed only if the out-of-state 
lawyer has not been “disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction.” Model Rule 5.5(c). 
Whether the drafters intended this departure from the Model Rule is unclear. It is not mentioned in the 
ABA Model Rules Comparison to Rule 5.5, a surprising omission for so substantial a change. 
Further confusing the issue, in Comment [5] to the Ohio Rule, the Model Rule language quoted above 
is employed. Ohio Rule 5.5 cmt. [5]. 
A related concern about competence is addressed in Comment [20]. It notes that the duty of 
communication in Ohio Rule 1.4 may at times require an out-of-state lawyer to inform the client that 
he is not licensed in Ohio, such as where Ohio law dominates the matter at hand. Ohio Rule 5.5 cmt. 
[20]. This acknowledgement will help alert the client to a possible mismatch between the needs of the 
case and the background of the attorney. 
The second limitation on practice in Ohio by an out-of-state lawyer pursuant to division (c) is that it 
occur only on a “temporary basis.” The exact contours of that phrase, however, are far from clear. As 
Comment [6] provides: 
 There is no single test to determine whether a lawyer’s services 
are provided on a “temporary basis” in this jurisdiction, and may 
therefore be permissible under division (c). Services may be 
“temporary” even though the lawyer provides services in this 
jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of time, as 
when the lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation 
or litigation. 
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Ohio Rule 5.5 cmt. [6]. Do the statewide pro hac vice rules (GovBarR XII) adopted by the Supreme 
Court, effective January 1, 2011 (see section 5.5:420 infra), provide insight as to how the Court might 
draw the parameters of “temporary” practice in Ohio? Pursuant to those rules, an out-of-state attorney 
is limited to three in-state representations in any given calendar year. See GovBarR XII 2(A)(5). 
The third limitation is on the circumstances under which temporary practice is allowed. As discussed 
in the sections that follow, the Rule identifies four instances in which temporary practice is 
permissible. On its face the list might appear exclusive:  only if the practice is temporary, and only if 
one of the four conditions is met, is the practice authorized. The comments, however, suggest that 
these four safe harbors do not constitute an exhaustive list. As Comment [5] states, “[t]he fact that 
conduct is not so identified [in the four situations set forth in the Rule] does not imply that the conduct 
is or is not authorized.” Ohio Rule 5.5 cmt. [5]. 
Note that while an out-of-state lawyer’s engaging in temporary practice within the state under a 5.5(c) 
safe harbor is expressly excluded from the definition of unauthorized practice of law set forth in 
GovBarR VII 2(A) (see 2(A)(1)(f): rendering legal service in accordance with Rule 5.5 is not 
unauthorized practice), that same out-of-state lawyer practicing here pursuant to a 5.5(c) safe harbor 
is  subject to the state’s disciplinary authority. Ohio Rule 5.5 cmt. [19] (a non-Ohio lawyer practicing 
in Ohio “pursuant to divisions (c) and (d) or otherwise is subject to the disciplinary authority of this 
jurisdiction. See Rule 8.5(a).”) 8.5(a) is examined at section 8.5:200 infra. Has this seemingly 
straightforward proposition in the Rules been thrown in doubt by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Harris, 137 Ohio St.3d 1, 2013 Ohio 4026, 996 N.E.2d 921, holding that 
the respondent, an out-of-state lawyer practicing in Ohio, was not subject to disciplinary authority in 
Ohio? Perhaps not, since Harris was not practicing here in accordance with a 5.5(c) or (d) safe harbor. 
Note, however, that Comment 19 purports to extend Ohio’s disciplinary authority not only to 
non-Ohio lawyers who practice here “pursuant to divisions (c) or (d)” but also to those, like Harris, 
who “otherwise” practice in Ohio. The troublesome Harris decision is further discussed at length in 
section 8.5:200. 
The first advisory opinion by the Board of Commissioners dealing with Rule 5.5 is Bd. of Comm’rs 
on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2011-2, 2011 Ohio Griev. Discp. LEXIS 2 (Oct. 7, 2011); it 
concerns Rule 5.5(c)(4) and is discussed in section 5.5:440 infra. 
  
5.5:410  Services Undertaken in Association with Ohio Lawyer 
Pursuant to Ohio Rule 5.5(c)(1), a regularly practicing out-of-state lawyer in good standing in the 
jurisdiction where admitted may provide temporary legal services in Ohio where 
 the services are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is 
admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in 
the matter. 
As stated in Comment [8]: 
 Division (c)(1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the 
public are protected if a lawyer admitted only in another jurisdiction 
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associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. For 
this provision to apply, however, the lawyer admitted to practice in this 
jurisdiction must actively participate in and share responsibility for the 
representation of the client. 
Rule 5.5 cmt. [8]. ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 482 (7th ed. 2011) 
(commentary), emphasizes that the local lawyer “cannot serve ‘merely as a conduit’” for the 
out-of-state lawyer, but must “actively participate[]” in and share “actual responsibility” for the 
representation. 
 
5.5:420  Authorization to Appear in Pending or Potential Proceeding Before 
Tribunal (Pro Hac Vice Admission) (see also 8.1:240) 
Ohio Rule 5.5(c)(2) authorizes temporary practice in the state by an out-of-state lawyer in two 
circumstances. One is the situation in which the lawyer is involved in a proceeding before a tribunal 
outside the state but needs to conduct certain activities within Ohio in support of that out-of state 
proceeding. The second is the situation in which an out-of-state lawyer is admitted to practice in Ohio 
by an in-state tribunal for a particular case, so called pro hac vice admission. 
 
In either instance, the lawyer must be “authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or 
reasonably expect[] to be so authorized.” Id. If one lawyer involved in the representation fits this 
description, ethical permission is extended to those assisting that lawyer. Id. As noted in Comment 
[11], division (c)(2) “permits conduct by lawyers who are associated with that [authorized] lawyer in 
the matter, but who do not expect to appear before the court or administrative agency. For example, 
subordinate lawyers may conduct research, review documents, and attend meetings with witnesses in 
support of the lawyer responsible for the litigation.” Rule 5.5 cmt. [11]. 
In-state activity in support of an out-of-state proceeding: In many instances, to carry out litigation in 
one forum, a lawyer will need to work in others -- to interview witnesses, take depositions, review 
documents, meet with clients, and so on. Ohio Rule 5.5(c)(2) approves such temporary practice in 
Ohio by out-of-state lawyers. See also Ohio Rule 5.5 cmt. [10]. Accord Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-4, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 14, 2002) (opining 
that lawyer not licensed in Ohio may take deposition in Ohio incidental to litigation in jurisdiction 
where lawyer admitted (but pro hac vice admission required if litigation to take place in Ohio)). 
Pro hac vice admission - In general: Out-of-state lawyers often are admitted to practice before Ohio 
tribunals to handle particular cases. If a lawyer has been admitted for this purpose, or reasonably 
expects to be, then the lawyer may take actions in the state reasonably related to that proceeding. 
Ohio Rule 5.5(c)(2). Thus, the Rule clearly authorizes work done before as well as after formal 
admission on a case, so long as the pre-admission conduct was done with reasonable expectation of 
subsequent admittance on the matter. 
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The steps necessary to secure such status are set forth in Gov Bar R XII, which was adopted by the 
Supreme Court on September 1, 2009, effective January 1, 2011. (We found nothing that addressed 
the unusually long length of time between adoption and effective date, other than that the effective 
date of the proposed rule was January 1, 2010.) Rule XII is both detailed and potentially onerous.  
Although the tribunal (broadly defined as “a court, legislative body, administrative agency, or other 
body acting in an adjudicative capacity,” XII 1(A)) before which the lawyer wishes to appear still 
exercises discretion in the matter (see XII 2(A), (E)), the rule sets forth a formidable number of steps 
that a prospective and existing  pro hac vice lawyer must take and adhere to; failure to do so will result 
in “automatic exclusion from practice within this state.” Rule XII 4 & 5.  The rule is discussed in 
Eugene P. Whetzel, Uniform Pro Hac Vice Standards Adopted, Ohio Law., Jan./Feb. 2010 at 26 
and in Sandra J. Rosenthal, Pro Hac Vice Admission: Newly Adopted Procedural 
Requirements, Cleveland Metro BJ, June 2011, at p. 30. (Interestingly, the ABA has put out for 
comment the question “whether rules on admission by motion should be revised to make it easier for 
lawyers to practice in jurisdictions where they are not already licensed.” James Rogers, Talking 
Points, ABAJ, May 2011, at p. 16.) 
Pro hac vice admission - Applying for pro hac vice status: In accordance with new Rule XII, an 
out-of-state pro hac vice applicant must be a lawyer in good standing and admitted to practice before 
the highest court of a state, commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, or the District 
of Columbia, or before the courts of a foreign state. Rule XII 2(A). Such an attorney is eligible if he 
or she 
 neither resides in or is regularly employed in an office in Ohio; 
 is registered for corporate status under Gov Bar R VI 3; 
 resides in Ohio but practices from offices elsewhere; 
 maintains an office or other continuous presence in Ohio per ORPC 5.5(d)(2); or 
 has permanently relocated to Ohio in the last 120 days and is an applicant pending admission 
under Gov Bar R I. 
Rule XII 2(A)(1). 
An attorney cannot be granted pro hac vice admission if he or she has failed the Ohio bar, has been 
denied admission to the bar without examination, or has had admission denied on character and 
fitness grounds in the last five years. Id. at 2(A)(2). The attorney must apply for registration with the 
Office of Attorney Services, pay an annual fee of $100.00, and have been issued a certificate of pro 
hac vice registration, which shall include the information specified in Rule XII 2(A)(3)(a)-(d), 
including an affidavit stating the applicant has never been disbarred and whether he or she is currently 
under suspension or has resigned with discipline pending in any admitting jurisdiction. 
An attorney admitted pro hac vice can participate in no more than three matters in the same calendar 
year, not counting appeals, transfer, or consolidation.  Id. at 2(A)(5). 
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The final subdivision of Section 2(A) states that the attorney may file a motion for permission to 
appear, together with a copy of the certificate of registration from the Office of Attorney Services; 
information comparable to that set forth in 2(A)(3)(a)-(d) must be included in the motion. Id. at 
(2)(A)(6)(a)-(e). Further requirements regarding leave to file a motion instanter (3); filing of a notice 
of permission to appear (4); annual renewal of registration (5); and reinstatement after exclusion 
based on failure to comply with sections 4 or 5 (6), are set forth in the Rule. 
Prior to the effective date of Gov Bar XII in 2011, a lawyer seeking pro hac vice admission had to 
comply with applicable local rules, which varied from court to court, on such matters as: 
 Whether the motion must be made by an attorney admitted to practice in Ohio; compare SCt 
Prac R 1.2(B) and 8th Dist. (Cuyahoga County) Ct App Loc R 44(C)(2) (imposing such a 
requirement), with Hamilton County CPR 10(F) (silent on this issue). 
 The contents of the motion or other papers that must be filed; compare SCt Prac R 1.2(B) 
(motion must state attorney’s qualifications), with Franklin County CP Gen R 91 (applicant 
must file written oath and certification of familiarization with applicable court rules and be 
sponsored in writing by licensed Ohio attorney). 
 Whether the out-of-state attorney must affiliate with Ohio co-counsel. Compare Franklin 
County CP Gen R 91 (requiring Ohio co-counsel), and Lucas County CP Gen R 1.03(A) 
(same), with Hamilton County CPR 10(F) (court may require local counsel), and 
Montgomery County CP Gen R 1.31 V (same). 
Failure to follow the applicable local rules could result in the court’s rejecting the pro hac vice 
admission request. See, e.g., White v. Wyeth Labs., 38 Ohio St.3d 707, 533 N.E.2d 360 (1988) 
(motion to appear pro hac vice denied for failure to comply with Supreme Court rule requiring 
co-signing of motion by member of Ohio bar). Cf.  In re Reza, 138 B.R. 190 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
1992) (motion denied for failure to follow local bankruptcy rule requiring statement in form of 
pleading that pro hac vice applicant was qualified to practice before court). 
And, needless to say, following generally applicable state-wide rules was also essential (and is even 
more so today, given new Rule XII). Thus, in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Fucetola, 93 Ohio 
St.3d 145, 753 N.E.2d 180 (2001), the respondent filed a complaint for a client simultaneously with 
his motion for admission pro hac vice. The case proceeded as if he had been admitted, but a year later 
the court denied the motion for admission, even though respondent asserted that the party being 
represented was a long-time client. The lawyer also filed two other actions on behalf of the same 
client in the same court, but without filing motions to appear pro hac vice. The Supreme Court, noting 
that out-of-state attorneys not admitted in Ohio may appear with the permission of the judge hearing 
the cause under Gov Bar R I 9(H), found that respondent did not have the permission of the judge to 
appear in any of the three cases and enjoined him from further activity constituting the unauthorized 
practice of law in Ohio. Under the Rules, it would seem that – at least as to the first instance in 
Fucetola (where the out-of-state lawyer did file for pro hac vice status) – 5.5(c)(2) would offer 
protection, so long as the lawyer “reasonably expected” his motion to be granted. 
It is not clear whether new Gov Bar R XII supersedes the local requirements. To the extent the local 
and Rule XII provisions are in conflict, the Rule XII provisions will presumably control. To the 
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extent they are cumulative, the safe course will be to comply with both. 
Pro hac vice admission - Court discretion: Attorneys not admitted to the practice of law in Ohio, who 
seek to represent a client before an Ohio tribunal, may, after satisfying the Rule XII registration 
requirements, request permission from the tribunal to appear pro hac vice. In Royal Indemnity Co. v. 
J.C. Penney Co., 27 Ohio St.3d 31, 501 N.E.2d 617 (1986), the Court held that the decision to 
permit out-of-state counsel to appear pro hac vice is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
courts. Furthermore, the right of an out-of-state attorney to appear pro hac vice in Ohio is not a 
protectable interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Leis v. Flynt, 439 
U.S. 438 (1979) (no due process right to hearing before pro hac vice status denied). Therefore, an 
attorney challenging the denial or revocation of pro hac vice status must demonstrate that the decision 
of the court amounted to an abuse of discretion.  Royal Indem. Co. v. J.C. Penney Co., 27 Ohio 
St.3d 31, 501 N.E.2d 617 (1986). For a case in which denial of pro hac vice admission was held to be 
an abuse of discretion, see Martinez v. Yoho’s Fast Food Equip., No. 00 AP-441, 2000 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5946 (Franklin Dec. 19, 2000). Compare LMC Weight Loss, Inc. v. Victory Mgmnt., Inc. 
182 Ohio App.3d 228, 2009 Ohio 2287, 912 N.E.2d 175, where the denial was held not to be an 
abuse of discretion. Gov Bar R XII confirms both that pro hac vice admission is a matter within the 
tribunal’s discretion (A), (E), and that it “may” order a hearing on a pro hac vice motion. (E).  
As noted in the Rule 5.5 Comparison to former Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, as 
revised to reflect the adoption of GovBarR XII effective January 1, 2011, pro hac vice admission 
“was formerly a matter within the sole discretion of the tribunal before which the out-of-state lawyer 
sought to appear, without any registration requirements.” In connection with the exercise of this 
discretion (in addition, of course, to enforcing the standards now set forth in Rule XII, which must be 
met in any event), Ohio courts have articulated several nonexclusive factors that may be considered in 
determining whether such an admission is warranted. (Presumably, these factors continue to coexist 
with Rule XII.) E.g., State v. Ross, 36 Ohio App.2d 185, 304 N.E.2d 396 (Franklin 1973); accord 
Walls v. City of Toledo supra (applying the Ross factors). First, the court may consider the nature of 
the personal relationship between the out-of-state counsel and the party seeking representation. A 
“long-standing personal relationship” between the out-of-state counsel and the client appears to 
militate in favor of the granting of pro hac vice admission.  Ross, 36 Ohio App.2d at 197, 304 
N.E.2d at 404. See Martinez v. Yoho’s, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5946, at *11, 15 (overturning trial 
court’s denial of pro hac vice admission in part because court failed to consider “established 
attorney/client relationship”). A second factor that courts may consider is whether the out-of-state 
counsel is the usual or customary counsel for the party in states where the out-of-state counsel is 
admitted to the practice of law. Third, courts should determine whether alternative counsel, already 
admitted to the practice of law in Ohio, are competent to represent the party in the case at hand. In 
addition, the court will assess whether the out-of-state lawyer can competently and ethically handle 
the matter at hand. State v. Ross supra (denying pro hac vice admission to out-of-state counsel whose 
conduct raised ethical concerns). See also Ross v. Reda, 510 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding state 
court’s refusal in State v. Ross to admit out-of-state counsel pro hac vice on the proffered grounds 
did not violate appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel; denial of writ of habeas corpus 
affirmed).  
In Westfall v. Cross, 144 Ohio App.3d 211, 759 N.E.2d 881 (Belmont 2001), the trial court had 
denied a motion, made on the eve of trial, of one of the defendants for pro hac vice admission of his 
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out-of-state attorney. The lower court concluded both that the three Ross factors were not present and 
that “exceptional circumstances” need be present to support the grant of such a motion. Seizing on the 
exceptional circumstances basis for denial, the defendant/appellant argued that this was a new legal 
standard, was not a sound reasoning process, and therefore was an abuse of discretion. The court of 
appeals sidestepped the “exceptional circumstances” rationale and focused on the three nonexclusive 
Ross factors; it concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the Ross 
factors had not been met, particularly the third factor (whether other Ohio attorneys were available to 
represent him, as to which appellant provided no evidence at all). Noting that the case against 
appellant had been pending for a year and a half before the pro hac vice motion was filed two weeks 
before the trial setting, the court concluded that the denial of the motion was therefore soundly 
grounded and affirmed. 
Pro hac vice admission - Revocation of status: With respect to revocation of pro hac vice status, the 
Ohio Supreme Court has made it clear that a trial court has inherent authority to regulate the practice 
of law before it and pursuant to this authority reserves the right to revoke an out-of-state attorney’s 
pro hac vice privileges, Royal Indem. Co. v. J.C. Penney Co., 27 Ohio St.3d 31, 501 N.E.2d 617 
(1986); this proposition is restated in Rule 8.5, cmt. [1A]. Cf. Walls v. City of Toledo supra, where, 
in a state case removed to federal court, the out-of-state counsel was granted pro hace vice status by 
the federal court, but on remand, such status was denied for, inter alia, conduct violative of the Ohio 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel’s attempt to invoke law of the case, based on his admission by the 
federal court, was rebuffed, inasmuch as the doctrine renders legal determinations by a reviewing 
court controlling in subsequent proceedings.  “‘The federal trial court is not a reviewing court of the 
state trial court’s decision.’” 116 Ohio App.3d 349, at para. 19 (citation omitted).   
At a minimum, the courts have determined that conduct that would justify the disqualification of an 
attorney admitted to practice in Ohio will also justify the revocation of pro hac vice status. See id.; In 
re Northern Ohio Tireworkers, 92 Ohio App.3d 69, 634 N.E.2d 249 (Summit 1993). Thus, an 
attorney whose participation in a trial creates an actual or potential conflict of interest should not be 
permitted to appear pro hac vice. Royal Indem., 27 Ohio St.3d 31, 501 N.E.2d 617. Similarly, an 
attorney who cannot take part in the court proceedings with a reasonable degree of propriety, or who 
engages in egregious conduct that is likely to adversely affect future proceedings, should expect to 
have his pro hac vice privileges revoked. Id. However, the courts have not yet addressed the issue 
whether the standards for revocation of pro hac vice status are identical to the standards employed for 
the disqualification of an attorney admitted to practice in Ohio. See id. In other words, it is still an 
open question whether conduct short of justifying disqualification would nevertheless support a pro 
hac vice revocation. 
A related concern is whether an attorney appearing pro hac vice is entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
before pro hac vice status is revoked. It appears relatively well-settled that sufficient evidence must 
be presented to the trial court in order to justify revocation, which would seem to carry with it the 
right to an evidentiary hearing, either oral or by written submission.  See In re N.B. & S.B., Nos. 
CA93-09-183, CA93-09-184, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3363 (Ohio App. Butler Aug. 1, 1994) 
(referee failed to develop sufficient factual basis to support the revocation of pro hac vice status); 
Tireworkers, 92 Ohio App.3d 69, 634 N.E.2d 249 (trial court erred in ruling there was sufficient 
evidence to find attorney had engaged in egregious conduct). In one of only two cases we have found 
directly addressing the hearing/revocation issue, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals held that the 
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trial court had abused its discretion in revoking the attorney’s pro hac vice status without first 
ordering an evidentiary hearing.  In re N.B. & S.B. supra. The court emphasized the gravity of the 
complaints levied against the out-of-state counsel as well as the important rights at stake in the 
underlying proceeding. In the other, Davis v. Marcotte, 193 Ohio App.3d 102, 2011 Ohio 1189, 
951 N.E.2d 117 (Franklin), the court aptly summarized the rule applied there in affirming the court 
of claims’ revocation of the lawyer’s pro hac vice status: “Regardless of whether the hearing that the 
Ohio Court of Claims held on the motion to revoke Fieger’s admission was styled as an ‘evidentiary 
hearing’ per se, it provided appellants with a meaningful opportunity to be heard,” id. at para. 35, and 
that was sufficient. (In likewise deciding that the revocation did not violate Fieger’s constitutional 
rights, the court of appeals shed further light on the hearing issue: The hearing lasted over an hour and 
“Fieger was invited to present evidentiary material in support of his request to serve as counsel. He 
did not present that material.” Id. at para. 12. 
For a case distinguishing the N.B. & S.B. decision, see Swearingen v. Waste Tech. Indus., 134 
Ohio App.3d 702, 731 N.E.2d 1229 (Columbiana 1999), where the court found that even if a 
hearing may be appropriate when pro hac vice status is revoked, as in N.B. & S.B., there is no such 
requirement when a pro hac vice motion is denied. Accord LMC Weight Loss, Inc. v. Victory 
Mgmt., Inc. 182 Ohio App.3d 228, 2009 Ohio 2287, 912 N.E.2d 175 (denial of pro hac vice status 
without hearing upheld). 
Note that, in addition to a court’s inherent authority to revoke the pro hac vice status of a lawyer 
appearing before it, revocation can also be effected as a result of disciplinary proceedings. This 
occurred in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 4541, 894 N.E.2d 
1210, where the sanction imposed on the respondent, admitted in Kentucky and before various Ohio 
courts pro hac vice, was to enjoin him from practicing in Ohio, pro hac vice or otherwise, for two 
years. 
Pro hac vice admission - Appeal of denial or revocation of pro hac vice status: The final issue 
concerning pro hac vice admission to gain the attention of the courts is whether the denial or 
revocation of pro hac vice privileges is an appealable decision. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that 
an order denying permission for out-of-state counsel to appear pro hac vice meets the statutory 
definition of a final, appealable order set forth in ORC 2505.02.  Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, 17 
Ohio St.3d 88, 477 N.E.2d 630 (1985). The Court emphasized the fact that an order denying pro hac 
vice status could not be effectively reviewed at the conclusion of the trial since prejudicial error would 
be difficult to prove. It should be noted that ORC 2505.02 was amended in 1998. Given that the 
amendment generally expanded the definition of final, appealable orders, it is unlikely to undercut the 
continuing validity of the Guccione decision. See Klein v. Streicher, 93 Ohio St.3d 446, 755 
N.E.2d 880 (2001) (court of appeals holding that denial of motion for admission pro hac vice was not 
final appealable order summarily reversed on authority of ORC 2505.02 and Guccione); accord 
Martinez v. Yoho’s Fast Food Equip., No. 00 AP-441, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5946 (Ohio App. 
Franklin Dec. 19, 2000) (following Guccione rule under amended statute). A penetrating look at this 
issue under the amended version of ORC 2505.02 is provided by the Seventh District Court of 
Appeals in Westfall v. Cross, 144 Ohio App.3d 211, 759 N.E.2d 881 (Belmont 2001). In Westfall, 
a defendant sought to have an out-of-state attorney admitted pro hac vice as his lead counsel. The trial 
court denied the motion. On appeal, the court first looked to ORC 2505.02(B)(2) and concluded that 
the “special proceeding” requisite was not present, because the right to appear pro hac vice is 
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conferred by common law, not by statute as the definition of special proceeding requires. Under ORC 
2505.02(B)(4), however, the court found that the denial satisfied the statutory test of a final 
appealable order. Thus, (1) it denied a provisional remedy -- one ancillary to the underlying action, (2) 
it conclusively determined the issue by unqualifiedly denying the motion to appear, and (3) it denies 
the appealing party any meaningful remedy on later appeal, because it cannot be effectively reviewed 
following final judgment, as to which the court cited Guccione among other cases.  Swearingen v. 
Waste Tech. Indus., 134 Ohio App.3d 702, 731 N.E.2d 1229 (Columbiana 1999), likewise relied 
on ORC 2505.02(B)(4) in finding a denial of pro hac vice status to be a final appealable order. In 
another case subsequent to Guccione, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that where an attorney 
was denied permission to appear pro hac vice as co-counsel, as opposed to trial counsel, the order is 
not subject to interlocutory appeal.  In re Myers, 107 Ohio App.3d 489, 669 N.E.2d 53 (Hamilton 
1995). The court distinguished this situation from the usual case because the order did not preclude 
the out-of-state counsel from remaining on the case in an of-counsel capacity and continuing to advise 
the client. In other words, the order denying the out-of-state counsel’s motion to appear pro hac vice 
as co-counsel did not substantially affect the right of the litigant to counsel of his choice since the 
out-of-state attorney was free to remain involved in the case. 
The appeal of a denial or revocation must (at least in the Tenth District Court of Appeals) be taken by 
the aggrieved party, not the lawyer whose denial or termination of pro hac vice status is at issue. 
Davis v. Marcotte, 193 Ohio App.3d 102, 2011 Ohio 1189, 951 N.E.2d 117 (Franklin) (lawyer 
dismissed as party; case considered on appeal of party aggrieved by revocation). 
  
5.5:430  Services Related to Arbitration or Mediation Proceedings 
Ohio Rule 5.5(c)(3) authorizes temporary practice in Ohio by an out-of-state lawyer where three 
conditions are met: 
[1] the services are reasonably related to a pending or potential 
arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution 
proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, [2] if the services arise out of 
or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in 
which the lawyer is admitted to practice and [3] are not services for 
which the forum requires pro hac vice admission. 
The first factor seems largely open-ended. If the services are reasonably related to any alternative 
dispute resolution proceeding, that condition is met. 
The second condition, that the services “arise out of or reasonably related to” the lawyer’s practice in 
a state where the lawyer is admitted, is explored in Comment [14]. There the drafters identify several 
indicia of the necessary relationship (which is a requisite of Rule 5.5(c)(4), as well as (c)(3)). 
Some turn on the client. Examples of when a lawyer may service clients outside the jurisdiction in 
which they are licensed would include a client, now outside the jurisdiction, who has a preexisting 
relationship with the lawyer, or a client with a substantial connection to the jurisdiction in which the 
lawyer is admitted. In these circumstances, there is a reason for this lawyer to be engaged by these 
clients for a matter in a state outside the lawyer’s licensure. 
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In other instances the relationship is shown by the nature of the matter. As Comment [14] provides: 
The matter, although involving other jurisdictions, may have a 
significant connection with that jurisdiction [in which the lawyer is 
admitted]. In other cases, significant aspects of the lawyer’s work 
might be conducted in that jurisdiction or a significant aspect of the 
matter may involve the law of that jurisdiction. The necessary 
relationship might arise when the client’s activities or the legal issues 
involve multiple jurisdictions, such as when the officers of a 
multinational corporation survey potential business sites and seek the 
services of their lawyer in assessing the relative merits of each. 
Rule 5.5 cmt. [14] (bracketed material added). 
The comment also acknowledges that on some issues expertise trumps local concerns. Thus a 
sufficient relationship may be shown where the lawyer has 
recognized expertise developed through the regular practice of law on 
behalf of clients in matters involving a particular body of federal, 
nationally-uniform, foreign, or international law. 
Id.  (In February 2007, prompted by the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the ABA adopted a Model Court 
Rule regarding provision of legal services on a temporary basis following a major disaster; MR 5.5 
cmt. [14] was amended at the same time to cross-reference to this Model Court Rule.) 
The third factor is that the forum does not require pro hac vice admission for the services involved. 
Ohio Rule 5.5(c)(3). If such admission is required, Ohio Rule 5.5(c)(2) controls. For example, a 
lawyer “must obtain admission pro hac vice in the case of a court-annexed arbitration or mediation or 
otherwise if court rules or law so require.” Rule 5.5 cmt. [12]. 
  
5.5:440  Transactional Matters Reasonably Related to the Lawyer’s Practice 
The final subdivision of Rule 5.5(c) permits cross-border practice on a temporary basis where 
 the lawyer engages in negotiations, investigations, or other 
nonlitigation activities that arise out of or are reasonably related to the 
lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to 
practice. 
Ohio Rule 5.5(c)(4). These services, according to Comment [13], “include both legal services and 
services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by 
lawyers.” Rule 5.5 cmt. [13]. 
In addition to the “temporary” requisite applicable to all subsections of Rule 5.5(c), the major 
limitation in subsection (c)(4) is that the activities must “arise out of or [be] reasonably related to” the 
lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted to practice. As remarked in ABA, 
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Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 486 (5th ed. 2003) (commentary), the 
pre-amendment version of MR 5.5 was “particularly unfair to transactional lawyers” who, by 
definition “do not appear before tribunals or agencies and therefore could not provide services in 
other jurisdictions pursuant to existing pro hac vice mechanisms.” The provision is intended to extend 
approval for temporary out-of-state practice in these circumstances by transactional lawyers. ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 482 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) (subsection 
(c)(4) “permits the temporary cross-border provision of legal services that do not involve litigation or 
ADR proceedings if they ‘arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice’ where the 
lawyer is admitted.” It fills the gap for services not covered by Ohio Rule 5.5(c)(2) or (3). Ohio Rule 
5.5 cmt. [13]. 
A Board of Commissioners opinion that fits reasonably comfortably within the confines of the (c)(4) 
transactional exception (even though it speaks in terms of an out-of state “firm,” rather than lawyer) is 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-12, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 19 
(Aug. 17, 1990). In its syllabus the Board stated: 
An out-of-state law firm does not engage in the unauthorized practice 
of law by representing out-of-state lending institutions regarding loans 
made to persons and entities in Ohio secured by property located in 
Ohio. The law firm may prepare the loan documents, negotiate the 
terms of the agreement with the borrower’s counsel, and offer legal 
advice to the lending institution regarding Ohio law. The law firm may 
also represent the lending institution in Ohio at the loan closing. This 
board cannot address any issues regarding the legal liability stemming 
from this type of practice. 
Id. at *1. The Board went on to delineate the general boundaries of acceptable practice by an 
out-of-state firm. The opinion provided that lawyers in an out-of-state firm could advise clients on 
Ohio law and prepare documents to be given legal effect in Ohio, assuming they have the requisite 
competence to do so. They also may engage in limited practice in the state if the practice is an 
“isolated occurrence” of limited duration, or if it is more extensive but incidental to a multistate 
problem. Appearance in court is permissible if the attorney gains pro hac vice admission. See section 
5.5:420. Opinion 90-12 was cited with approval by the Ohio Supreme Court in Cleveland Bar Ass’n 
v. Misch, 82 Ohio St.3d 256, 695 N.E.2d 244 (1998). 
The 90-12 opinion, decided under the Code, was also cited with approval in the most recent 
pronouncement by the Board on this general subject (and the first Rule 5.5 advisory opinion), Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2011-2, 2011 Ohio Griev. Disc. LEXIS 2 (Oct. 7, 
2011). In Opinion 2011-2, however, the result was different. 
At issue in Opinion 2011-2 was the propriety, under the temporary practice provisions of Rule 5.5(c), 
of out-of-state lawyers providing debt-settlement legal services to Ohio clients who contracted with 
the out-of-state “national firm” to represent them regarding debt settlement, having first located the 
firm’s advertisement of such services on the internet. The Board quickly dismissed the applicability 
of any of the safe harbors in (c)(1), (2) and (3) – the services were not being provided in association 
with Ohio lawyers, and there were no related tribunal or ADR proceedings. 
1091
Ohio Legal Ethics 5.5  
  
 This left (c)(4), the section designed to provide some relief to transactional lawyers. The Board found 
that (c)(4) could not be utilized to exempt the debt settlement work, because the nonlitigation activity  
at issue did not “arise out of” nor was it “reasonably related to” the lawyers’ home state practice. The 
Board found  
[p]articularly telling . . . the Commission’s [ABA Commission on 
Multijurisdictional Practice] statement regarding a client’s hiring of a 
lawyer for the first time: “[W]ork for an out-of-state client with whom 
the lawyer has no prior professional relationship and for whom the 
lawyer is performing no other work ordinarily will not have the 
requisite relationship to the lawyer’s practice where the matter involves 
a body of law in which the lawyer does not have special expertise.” 
Id. at *11. 
 
In so opining, the Board was at pains to make clear that “it is not the Board’s intention to reconstruct 
the geographical barriers documented in Opinion 90-12”: 
temporary practice by out-of-state lawyers serves the interests of the 
public and clients when there is a connection to a home state matter, an 
existing client-lawyer relationship, or a recognized expertise in an area 
of federal, nationally-uniform, foreign or international law. 
Id. at *14. It should be noted, however, that in the interest of not “reconstruct[ing] the [old] 
geographical barriers,” the Board might have acknowledged and given weight to Comment 5, which 
makes clear that the four subsections of 5.5(c) do not necessarily exhaust the circumstances 
sanctioning temporary practice under section c: “The fact that the conduct is not so identified does not 
imply that the conduct is or is not authorized.” The Board’s statement at *6-7 that the conduct is the 
unauthorized practice of law “unless it falls within one of the four temporary practice exceptions set 
out in Prof.Cond. Rule 5.5(c)” is difficult to reconcile with Comment 5, which the Board does not 
cite. 
 
The Board also volunteered in “dictum” that the lawyers’ conduct might “potentially violate” 
5.5(b)(1) through a “systematic and continuous presence,” which includes “both physical and virtual 
presence in Ohio, id. at *15, and 5.5(b)(2), since their internet advertising “may have” held out to the 
public that they were licensed here. Id. This advisory opinion, together with other MJP/UPL issues, is 
discussed in Brian F. Toohey, The ABCs of MJP and UPL, Clev. Metro. B.J., Oct 2012, at 28. 
  
5.5:500  Provision of Legal Services by Out-of-State Lawyers on Regular Basis 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.5(d) 
Gov Bar R VI 3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.5(d) 
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Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 3.37 
Commentary 
ALI-LGL § 3 
  
5.5:510  Providing Legal Services to Lawyer’s Employer -- Corporate Counsel 
Status 
Ohio Rule 5.5(d)(1) permits a lawyer admitted and in good standing in another jurisdiction to 
provide legal services on an ongoing basis in Ohio where 
 the lawyer is registered in compliance with Gov. Bar R. VI, 
Section 3, and is providing services to the employer or its 
organizational affiliates for which the permission of a tribunal to 
appear pro hac vice is not required. 
This is one of the two circumstances under division (d) in which an out-of-state lawyer in good 
standing in his or her jurisdiction “may establish an office or other systematic and continuous 
presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law as well as provide legal services on a temporary 
basis.” Rule 5.5 cmt. [15]. Such a lawyer, however, under the Ohio Rule, must “comply with the 
registration requirements set forth in Gov. Bar R. VI, Section 3,” Rule 5.5 cmt. [17], for corporate 
counsel status. A lawyer granted corporate counsel status “may perform legal services in Ohio solely 
for the nongovernmental employer, as long as the attorney is an employee of that employer.” Gov 
Bar R VI 3(A). (Prior to November 1, 2013, subdivision (d)(1), Comment [17], and the Governing 
Bar Rule did not mesh smoothly. In division (d)(1), the final version struck the language “is a fulltime 
employee of a nongovernmental Ohio employer.” Comment [17] struck the word “fulltime” but 
retained “employed by a nongovernmental entity.” Rule VI 3(A) spoke in terms of a lawyer 
“employed full-time by a nongovernmental Ohio employer.” Most of these discrepancies have now 
been cured by amendments to GovBarR VI 3(A), effective November 1, 2013. The amended version 
now refers to a lawyer “employed by a nongovernmental employer; and, as a result of that 
employment, has a systematic and continuous presence in Ohio as permitted pursuant to Prof.Cond.R. 
5.5(d)(1) shall register for corporate counsel status . . . .” 
As noted, Gov Bar R VI 3(A) clearly authorizes an out-of-state in-house attorney to provide legal 
services for his employer in Ohio, provided the “corporate status” registration requirements of the Bar 
Rule are satisfied; Rule 5.5(d)(1) further requires that the services must be limited to those not 
requiring pro hac vice status. See generally 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§ 3 cmt. f (2000). This does not preclude a lawyer admitted on corporate status from appearing pro 
hac vice. It simply means that such status does not itself secure admission to the tribunal. That must 
be independently sought. Gov Bar R VI 3(B). 
As is equally clear from Gov Bar R VI 3(C), however, such a lawyer, 
who performs legal services in Ohio for the attorney’s employer, but 
fails to register in compliance with this section or does not qualify to 
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register under this section, may be referred for investigation of the 
unauthorized practice of law under Gov. Bar R. VII . . . . 
This is what happened to the respondent in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Doan, 77 Ohio St.3d 
236, 673 N.E.2d 1272 (1997); he was an admitted Kentucky lawyer who worked in-house for an 
Ohio corporation in Cincinnati but “had not registered for corporate status under [what was then] Gov. 
Bar R. VI(4)(A).”  Id. at 237, 673 N.E.2d at 1273. Based on these facts, the Court found that 
respondent had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. See also Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Misch, 
82 Ohio St.3d 256, 695 N.E.2d 244 (1998) (Illinois attorney employed as officer of Ohio corporation 
who did not seek admission or corporate status engaged in unauthorized practice, but opinion is 
premised almost entirely on his equally unauthorized “consulting” work for Cleveland law firm. See 
discussion of Misch at section 5.5:230. And see In re Application of Webber, 137 Ohio St.3d 67, 
2013 Ohio 4514, 997 N.E.2d 528, discussed in section 8.1:230 infra. 
  
5.5:520  Provision of Legal Services on Regular Basis as Authorized by Federal or 
Other Law 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 3.37 (1996). 
Where authorized by law, both lawyers and nonlawyers can engage in practice within the state. Ohio 
Rule 5.5(d)(2) codifies that principle with respect to lawyers. It permits a lawyer admitted and in 
good standing in “another United States jurisdiction” (i.e., including “the District of Columbia and 
any state, territory, or commonwealth of the United States,” Rule 5.5 cmt. [7]) to provide legal 
services in Ohio if: 
the lawyer is providing services that the lawyer is authorized to provide 
by federal or Ohio law. 
Nonlawyers: With respect to nonlawyers, if federal law authorizes nonlawyer representation in 
certain situations such practice is permissible and cannot be treated by a state as the unauthorized 
practice of law. There is no question that, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, the federal government 
may authorize individuals to practice law who are not licensed by the state to do so. For example, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office permits nonlawyers to practice before it under the 
designation “patent attorney.” Accordingly, an individual may carry on such a practice in Ohio as 
long as the practice is limited to that authorized by federal law.  Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida 
Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Harpman, 62 Ohio Misc.2d 573, 608 
N.E.2d 872 (Bd. of Comm’rs on Unauthorized Practice of Law 1993). If the individual’s conduct 
goes beyond the scope of the conduct authorized by federal law and necessary to the federal practice, 
however, such conduct would probably be the unauthorized practice of law, despite Rule 5.5(d)(2), 
since the Rule addresses only conduct by out-of-state lawyers. 
Another related question arises when a layperson appears on behalf of another in an Ohio federal 
court proceeding. Does Ohio have jurisdiction over the matter or is it solely a federal concern? 
Pre-Rule Ohio decisions held that Ohio had authority to treat such conduct as the unauthorized 
practice of law.  Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Rector, 62 Ohio Misc.2d 564, 608 N.E.2d 866 
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(Bd. of Comm’rs on Unauthorized Practice of Law 1992) (nonlawyer corporate officer’s 
representation of corporation and corporation witnesses at deposition in federal court case constituted 
unauthorized practice of law). Since the Rules, including the 5.5(d)(2) safe harbor, are directed at 
lawyer, not layperson, conduct, the Rector holding is probably still viable. 
Lawyers: A lawyer admitted and in good standing in another United States jurisdiction may provide 
legal services in Ohio where authorized by federal law or the law of Ohio. As elaborated in Comment 
[15], such a lawyer “may establish an office or other systemic and continuous presence in this 
jurisdiction for the practice of law as well as provide legal services on a temporary basis.” Rule 5.5 
cmt. [15]. (Except as provided in subdivisions (d)(1) and (2), a lawyer cannot establish an office or 
other continuous presence in Ohio unless admitted to practice generally here. Id.) 
With respect to federal-law authorization, it is unclear whether Ohio Rule 5.5(d)(2) changes the law 
in this area. The basic issue is how do we treat an out-of-state lawyer who practices “exclusively” 
before a federal tribunal or is otherwise engaged in a solely federal practice. 
The Rule implies that such a practice is permissible, but prior cases and ethics opinions in Ohio cast 
doubt on this conclusion. In Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-6, 1991 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 24 (Apr. 12, 1991), the Board declared that “[a]n attorney not admitted in 
Ohio who sets up an office within the state for the practice of federal law is engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law . . . .” Id. at syllabus. The decision was based on a conclusion that it is 
often impossible to participate in a purely federal practice. Citing law from a variety of other 
jurisdictions, the Board observed: 
These courts reason that the “practice” of law necessarily involves 
more than advising clients on federal law, preparing federal court 
documents and appearing before federal courts. For example, 
screening clients and representing only those whose matters require 
suit or defense in a federal court, requires interview, research, analysis, 
and explanation of legal rights which would constitute the practice of 
law. . . . Further, “conducting of the business management of a law 
practice” -- the handling of client’s money, the requirements of IOLTA, 
and other management matters -- are part of the total process of 
practicing law and are subject to the state’s control over the profession. 
Id. at *7 (internal citations omitted). 
In an opinion that is not a model of clarity, the Ohio Supreme Court seemed to suggest a similar result 
in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Chavers, 80 Ohio St.3d 441, 687 N.E.2d 415 (1997). The facts 
in Chavers are clear -- the lawyer was suspended in Ohio throughout the time in question, but in 
federal court he was in good standing until 1992, at which time he was suspended in federal court as 
well. The panel found a 3-101(B) violation in respondent’s “continued practice of law in 1990 and 
later years” in federal bankruptcy court, “even after being suspended from practice in that district.”  
Id. at 443, 687 N.E.2d at 416. The findings and conclusions of the panel were adopted by the Board 
and in turn by the Court. The Court’s analysis, however, focused, first, on the fact that “respondent 
continued to practice in the bankruptcy court after being suspended” there, which violated 3-101(B). 
Id. But then the Court seemed to shift gears and emphasized, much like Board Opinion 91-6, that 
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appearing solely in federal court entails other activities in carrying out 
the practice of law that are not solely federal in nature and warrant state 
regulation. To file a bankruptcy case, a lawyer must counsel his client 
on Ohio law relating to exemptions and preferential and fraudulent 
transfers, among other matters. Respondent, therefore, by necessity 
counseled his client on Ohio law while he was suspended and not in 
good standing [in Ohio? in both Ohio and federal court?], although he 
filed the case in the bankruptcy court. 
Id. at 44, 687 N.E.2d at 416-17 (bracketed material added). This analysis would seem to taint 
respondent’s federal practice prior to the federal suspension as well as after, but the Court never 
expressly so states. The bottom line is that Chavers is probably in accord with Opinion 91-6, but this 
is not entirely clear. 
With Chavers, compare  In re Desilets, 291 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2002), holding that an out-of-state 
attorney (licensed in Texas) could practice bankruptcy law before a federal bankruptcy court in 
Michigan and maintain an office in Michigan, even though not licensed to practice in Michigan. 
Desilets is cited with approval in the discussion of MR 5.5(d)(2) in ABA, Annotated Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct 484-85 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). 
Also on the other side of the ledger from Chavers is Gov Bar R VI 3(D), which, after stating that 4(A) 
corporate status does not apply to an out-of-state attorney in an Ohio law firm, goes on to specify that 
such attorneys in Ohio firms, until admitted in Ohio, “may not . . . practice before any nonfederal 
court or agency in this state on behalf of any person other than himself or herself . . . .” (Emphasis 
added.) The word “nonfederal,” added in 1992, would seem to have opened up practice before federal 
courts and agencies for such a lawyer. The language of Rule 5.5(d)(2) is consistent with this result, 
although the Chavers case, decided years after the amendment adding “nonfederal,” certainly is not. 
The Task Force in its Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 5.5 states that “[n]o change in Ohio law or 
ethics rules is intended by adoption of Rule 5.5”; it also says that “the boundaries of permitted 
activities in Ohio by a lawyer admitted elsewhere are currently reflected in case law and the Supreme 
Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio.” Id. Does the “case law” (Chavers) trump the 
Bar Rules (Rule VI 3(D))? Or can they be “reconciled” by saying the lawyer can appear in federal 
court but can’t do any other lawyering necessary to that appearance? Definitive resolution of the issue 
will have to await the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Rule 5.5(d)(2). 
As to state law authorization, the “Ohio law” exception “includes statute, court rule, executive 
regulation, or judicial precedent,” Rule 5.5 cmt. [18], although no concrete examples of such 
authorization on a regular, rather than temporary, basis have been found. (Pro hac vice admission, of 
course, comes to mind as an example of temporary practice authorized by court rule or precedent.) 
Suspended lawyers: Just as in Ohio Rule 5.5(c), Ohio Rule 5.5(d) authorizes in-state conduct by 
lawyers not licensed in Ohio who are “admitted and in good standing in another United States 
jurisdiction.” Once again, this diverges from the corresponding Model Rule, which applies only if the 
lawyer is “admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from 
practice in any jurisdiction.” Under the Model Rule formulation, a lawyer could be admitted in 
jurisdictions X and Y, but suspended in jurisdiction Y. That lawyer would fail the MR 5.5(d)(2) test, 
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whereas under a literal reading of the Ohio counterpart he or she would not, so long as “good 
standing” had not been taken away in jurisdiction X. 
This problem plays out in a special way if the lawyer is suspended in Ohio, but is admitted to practice 
before a federal court in the state. Arguably such a lawyer may proceed under the Rule, inasmuch as 
the lawyer is admitted and in good standing in another United States jurisdiction. Yet this result is 
difficult to reconcile with the Ohio Supreme Court’s language in the Chavers case and to the Task 
Force’s stated intent that the adoption of the Rule involves “no change in the Ohio law or ethics rules” 
(Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 5.5). See Chavers, 80 Ohio St.3d 441, 687 N.E.2d 415 
(seemingly finding that conducting federal bankruptcy practice while suspended in Ohio constituted 
the unauthorized practice of law; see caveat about the Chavers decision supra). But see the 
“nonfederal” language in Gov Bar R VI 3(D), also discussed above. 
In contrast to Chavers, an opinion out of the Eastern District in Pennsylvania held that under the 
Supremacy Clause Pennsylvania could not keep a Pennsylvania lawyer from setting up a Philadelphia 
office for the sole purpose of representing clients before the federal court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, at a point in time when he was still under suspension by the state but had been 
reinstated by the federal court.  Surrick v. Killion, No. 04-5668, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6755 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 18, 2005). The Supremacy Clause/preemption analysis was affirmed by the Third Circuit in 
Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing, inter alia, Desilets), although the Court of 
Appeals also emphasized the importance of comity and Pennsylvania’s “compelling interest” in 
regulating the practice of law within its borders.  Id. at 530. Contra as to the Supremacy 
Clause/preemption issue, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Marcone, 855 A.2d 654 (Pa. 2004) 
(suspended Pennsylvania lawyer who had been readmitted to practice before federal court could not 
maintain law office in commonwealth so long as he was unauthorized to practice before Pennsylvania 
state courts). (The Killion and Marcone cases are discussed in Stephanie Francis Ward, Pulling on 
a Fine Line, ABAJ, Jan. 2007, at 24-25.) Query whether Killion (and Desilets), rather than 
Chavers, are not more in tune with the language of Ohio Rule 5.5(d)(2). 
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The material in these introductory paragraphs is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.167 (1996). 
Restrictions on practice in general: As a matter of both individual lawyer autonomy and client 
freedom to select counsel of choice, lawyers should be able to accept employment from any 
prospective client, as long as the employment is consistent with the lawyer's ethical responsibilities. 
At times, however, other people have a real incentive to restrict the clients a lawyer might serve. If a 
lawyer ends a professional association with other lawyers, for example, the other lawyers might want 
to limit the defecting lawyer's ability to compete for business. In negotiating a contested matter, those 
on the other side of the dispute might be willing to settle a controversy in exchange for the lawyer's 
agreement not to handle such matters in the future. In both of these situations, Ohio Rule 5.6 treats 
lawyer autonomy and client-freedom interests as paramount. See Ohio Rule 5.6 cmt. [1]. See also Bd. 
of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-3, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 27 (Feb. 8, 
1991) (recognizing these as the primary policies underlying OH DR 2-108, the Code predecessor to 
Rule 5.6). To protect those interests, agreements such as these are prohibited. See sections 
5.6:200-:300 below. 
It is important to recognize that Rule 5.6 addresses only practice restrictions arising from 
employment termination or the settlement of a claim or controversy. Restrictions that might apply 
during a particular professional relationship, such as a decision by a firm with which a lawyer is 
affiliated not to take cases in a particular area that the lawyer might otherwise wish to pursue, are not 
prohibited. See, under the former OHCPR, Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
89-004, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 11 (Feb. 17, 1989). 
  
5.6:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.6 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.6 
  
5.6:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 5.6 is substantively identical to the Model Rule, with the exception of the substitution of 
"claim or" for "client" in division (b). 
  
5.6:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 5.6(a): DR 2-108(A). 
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The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 5.6(b): DR 2-108(B). 
  
5.6:200  Restrictions on Lawyers Leaving a Firm 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.6(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.6(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.168 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 51:1201 
ALI-LGL § 13(1) 
Wolfram § 16.2.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.168 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 5.6(a) prohibits a lawyer from "participating in offering or making . . . a partnership, 
shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a 
lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits on 
retirement." 
An agreement imposing practice restrictions on lawyers leaving a firm "not only limits their 
professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer." Rule 5.6 cmt. [1]. 
Other than the retirement exception and those contained in Comment [3] (restrictions that may be 
included in terms of sale of law practice under Rule 1.17), the Rule places an absolute prohibition on 
agreements restricting practice, and presumably is not subject to waiver by the participants. 
The Rule is specifically focused on restrictions on the right to practice law; thus, a non-competition 
clause clearly would be barred. See, under the analogous OHCPR provision, Bd. of Comm'rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-14, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 21 (Aug. 17, 1990); cf. Bd 
of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-3, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 27 (Feb. 8, 
1991) (recognizing that restrictive covenants placing limits on practice in particular geographic area 
had long been recognized as impermissible). Indirect restrictions were prohibited as well. In a 1991 
opinion, for example, the Board found that an employment agreement that required departing 
associates to pay the firm a percentage of the fees earned from former firm clients who chose to 
become clients of the departing lawyer violated former OH DR 2-108. While not an explicit 
limitation on practice, that was its "practical effect." Op. 91-3, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 27, 
at *4 (agreement also constituted improper division of fees in violation of DR 2-107). 
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A related concern is the extent to which a lawyer who ends an employment relationship with other 
lawyers can pursue the former firm's clients. See section 7.3:220. See generally Robert W. Hillman, 
Hillman on Lawyer Mobility: The Law and Ethics of Partner Withdrawals and Law Firm 
Breakups (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2009) (providing an in-depth analysis of the conflicting nationwide 
case law on the numerous issues that arise in this context). On the one hand, any restriction on this 
practice would seem like a limitation on the lawyer's right to practice law. On the other, in some 
circumstances such conduct might be seen as tortious interference with a business relationship or 
breach of fiduciary duty owed the firm. See Madorsky v. Bernstein, 89 Ohio App.3d 550, 626 
N.E.2d 694 (Cuyahoga 1993) (recognizing that claim for tortious interference with business 
relationship could apply to activities that undercut an attorney-client relationship). One court of 
appeals held that, to the extent the departing lawyer contacted firm clients that he or she personally 
had been representing, the conduct was permissible, Sonkin & Melena Co., L.P.A. v. Zaransky, 83 
Ohio App.3d 169, 614 N.E.2d 807 (Cuyahoga 1992) (rejecting tortious-interference claim in such 
situation), but doubt is cast on this determination by the Ohio Supreme Court's subsequent decision in 
the Fred Siegel case, discussed in the next paragraph. Use of a firm's client list to identify those to 
contact might constitute conversion of a trade secret. Sonkin supra (rejecting such claim because 
facts did not establish client list as trade secret). 
The latest word from the Supreme Court on these issues is found in Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter 
& Hadden, 85 Ohio St.3d 171, 707 N.E.2d 853 (1999). With respect to the misappropriation-of- 
trade-secrets aspect, the Court held that the court of appeals correctly reversed a summary judgment 
for the defendant attorneys (a migrating lawyer and her new firm) on plaintiff's claim; there were 
genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether plaintiff had adequately protected its client list for the 
list to qualify as a trade secret and (2) whether defendants had created their own list or had simply 
used plaintiff's list. With respect to the tortious-interference-with-contract aspect, the Siegel Court 
likewise affirmed the court of appeals' reversal of summary judgment for the defendants, where the 
lawyer sent mailings to her former firm's clients, for whom she had worked, inviting them to become 
her clients at her new firm. The Court held that the disciplinary rules (DR 2-102(A)(2) & 2-110(A)(2)) 
relied on by the migrating lawyer did not protect her conduct and concluded that there was a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether, in the language of 4 Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts § 768 
(1979), she and her new firm had employed "wrongful means" (i.e., utilization of protected trade 
secrets), thereby precluding summary judgment in their favor on the tortious-interference claim. 
Siegel is further discussed at sections 1.1:390 and 7.3:220. 
For a discussion and explanation of the "retirement benefit" exception under MR 5.6(a) (identical in 
this respect to Ohio Rule 5.6(A)), see ABA Formal Op. 06-444 (Sept. 13, 2006), which opines, 
among other things, that a firm could, consistent with 5.6(a), "properly require that the lawyer 
receiving bona fide 'retirement benefits' cease the practice of law permanently."  Id. at 5. 
The only Ohio judicial decision in which Rule 5.6 has been cited (unsuccessfully, by the defendants), 
is Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P. v. Bonasera, 157 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 2010 Ohio 
1677, 926 N.E.2d 375 (C.P. Franklin). In Bonasera, the defendants (individual lawyers comprising 
one of the firm's offices) sought summary judgment on the firm's claim against them for defecting en 
masse and joining another firm. Among other arguments, the lawyers contended (1) that since one 
lawyer could leave a firm without liability, then all lawyers in the firm have this right, and (2) that the 
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lawyers' hourly rates, billable hours and business-generation data are not trade secrets (a "novel 
argument" in the court's view) because, in the words of the defendants, 
"[A]n attorney seeking to explore the possibility of joining a new law 
firm must have some right to convey information related to his or her 
practice, as a complete ban would infringe on Ohio Rule of 
Professional Conduct 5.6." 
Id. at para. 41 (bracketed material by the court). In rejecting both prongs of this argument without 
further discussing the Rule 5.6 assertion explicitly (which seems to us a bit of a stretch), the court 
held, first, that the one-for-all, all-for-one argument was overly "simplistic"; "the law is more 
nuanced," id. at para. 42; and second, that  
[r]ecognizing the lengths to which Buckingham went to restrict access 
to such trade-secret information internally ["internal business, 
personnel, and financial data"], and that significant amounts of data 
were shared with direct competitors in the Columbus marketplace 
where Buckingham had made a long-term, sizeable investment, the 
court cannot say that a reasonable jury would never conclude that the 
alleged misuse of information breached the fiduciary duty owed to the 
Buckingham firm. 
Id. at para. 44 (bracketed material added). 
5.6:300  Settlements Restricting a Lawyer's Future Practice 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.6(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.6(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.169 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 51:1209 
ALI-LGL § 13(2) 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.169 (1996). 
Particularly in litigation, institutional litigants facing numerous suits over a particular type of conduct, 
such as suits against a car manufacturer for a specific design defect, might be tempted to induce 
certain opposition lawyers not to participate in future cases because those lawyers are too talented or 
have acquired too much expertise on the particular issues at hand through past representations. To 
accomplish this, the institutional litigant might offer to settle the case on terms favorable to its 
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opponent in exchange for an agreement that the opponent’s lawyer handle no more such cases against 
it. Arrangements such as these are prohibited by Rule 5.6(b). Such practice also creates a potential 
personal conflict of interest for the lawyer--the duty to reach the best result for this client conflicts 
with the lawyer's desire to remain free to secure future employment. See ABA, Annotated Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 493-94 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) (quoting ABA Formal Ethics 
Op. 93-371 (1993)). 
Note, however, that division (b) of the Ohio Rule is not limited to litigation settlements; nor is it 
limited to settlement on behalf of a client: Any such agreement restricting a lawyer's right to practice 
contained in settlement of any "claim or controversy" is barred. See ABA Model Rule Comparison 
to Rule 5.6. For a trenchant analysis and criticism of this seemingly innocuous change from the 
Model Rule template (MR 5.6(b) prohibits restrictions on practice as part of the settlement of "a 
client controversy"), see Philip Oliss, Settlement Agreements That Restrict a Lawyer's Right to 
Practice, Clev. B.J., June 2006, at 22. 
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5.7:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.7 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.7 
  
5.7:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Division (a) of Ohio Rule 5.7 is substantively identical to MR 5.7(a). 
Divisions (b), (c), and (d) have been added to Ohio Rule 5.7; they have no Model Rule counterpart. 
Division (e) of Ohio Rule 5.7 is comparable to MR 5.7(b); it differs only in that it deletes the “and in 
substance are related to” language contained in MR 5.7(b) following “in conjunction with”. 
  
5.7:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 5.7: None. 
  
5.7:200  Applicability of Ethics Rules to Ancillary Business Activities 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 5.7 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 5.7 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:410 
Provision of law-related services - In general: Lawyers at times engage in both legal and “law-related 
services,” which Ohio Rule 5.7(e) defines as 
services that might be reasonably performed in conjunction with and in 
substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not 
prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a 
nonlawyer. 
1105
Ohio Legal Ethics 5.7  
  
Examples of such services are set forth in Rule 5.7 cmt. [9]; they “include providing title insurance, 
financial planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic 
analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical, or environ-
mental consulting.” 
Allowing lawyers to engage in both legal and law-related services, however, may potentially harm 
clients in two ways. First, when a lawyer performs law-related services or owns or controls an entity 
that does, the client may not fully understand that when the lawyer engages in these activities the full 
protections that normally attach to the client-lawyer relationship may not apply. Ohio Rule 5.7 cmt. 
[1]. This concern can arise even when the lawyer provides no legal services. Ohio Rule 5.7 cmt. [2]. 
Merely being associated with the law-related services entity could be enough to confuse the client. 
Second, if the lawyer owns or controls a business to provide law-related services, there may be im-
permissible steering of clients between the lawyer and entity providing law-related services, thereby 
undercutting informed client choice. See Ohio Rules 5.7(b) & (c). 
Ohio Rule 5.7 addresses both of these concerns. 
Provision of law-related services - Client confusion as to lawyer’s status: To assure that clients are not 
misled as to the role the lawyer is playing and the protections, like confidentiality, that may attach, the 
Rule provides that the rules of professional conduct apply when the services are not distinct from the 
provision of legal services (5.7(a)(1)) and in other circumstances when provided by an entity con-
trolled or owned by the lawyer individually or with others, if the lawyer does not take reasonable 
steps to assure that the person receiving the services knows that the services are not legal services and 
that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist. Rule 5.7(a)(2). If the provisions of 
the Rule are met, then only those professional conduct rules that apply to conduct regardless of the 
context, such as Ohio Rule 8.4, apply. Ohio Rule 5.7 cmt. [2]. Of course other law may still apply to 
regulate the provision of the law-related services. Ohio Rule 5.7 cmt. [11]. 
The Rule itself does not address how to determine if the provision of legal services and the provision 
of law-related services are “distinct,” but the comments provide some guidance. Comment [3] dis-
cusses structural arrangements that may help make the services distinct from each other. This could 
be done “for example through separate entities or different support staff within the law firm.” Ohio 
Rule 5.7 cmt. [3]. Nevertheless, “under some circumstances the legal and law-related services may 
be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other” and hence cannot be made 
distinct. Ohio Rule 5.7 cmt. [8]. 
Nor does the Rule address how one measures whether a lawyer “controls” the law-related services 
entity within the meaning of the Rule, but Comment [4] states that “control of an entity extends to the 
ability to direct its operation” which, in turn, depends “upon the circumstances of the particular case.” 
Ohio Rule 5.7 cmt. [4]. 
The comments also give some guidance on the “reasonable measures” that need be taken to assure 
that persons dealing with an entity providing law-related services owned or controlled by a lawyer 
know that the services are not legal services and that the protections arising from a client-lawyer 
relationship do not apply. Notice should be given “before entering into an agreement” to provide the 
law-related services and “preferably should be in writing.” Ohio Rule 5.7 cmt. [6]. 
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Hazard and Hodes note that if a practicing lawyer were to provide financial-planning services directly 
to persons who are not law-practice clients, this is apparently not covered by Rule 5.7: The finan-
cial-planning 
services can be said to be “distinct” from the legal services the lawyer 
normally provides; moreover, the services are not being provided 
through “an entity controlled by the lawyer.” In this situation, therefore, 
the literal language of Rule 5.7(a) neither prohibits the delivery nor 
regulates the lawyer’s conduct.  
2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 48.3, 
at 48-8 (3d ed. Supp. 2011-1). If anything, this unintended result would seem to be even clearer 
under the slightly different language used in Ohio Rule 5.7(a) (lawyer subject to Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct in providing law-related services if such services are provided “in either of the fol-
lowing circumstances:” (1) not distinct from provision of legal services or (2) through separate en-
tity). 
Provision of law-related services - Improper cross-referrals: To guard against improper referrals 
between a lawyer and a law-related services entity owned or controlled by the lawyer, Ohio Rules 
5.7(b) and (c) impose several restrictions. First, the provision of services by either the lawyer or the 
law-related services entity cannot be conditioned on a requirement that the client use the services of 
the other. Second, the Rule imposes a notice requirement before services may be provided. The 
provider must disclose to the client the overlapping interest and the fact that the client may obtain 
those services from another provider. These provisions, like division (d), have no counterpart in the 
Model Rules. 
Additional restrictions may arise from Ohio Rule 1.8(a), which regulates business transactions with 
clients. See section 1.8:220. As Comment [5] points outs, “[w]hen a client-lawyer relationship exists 
with a person who is referred by a lawyer to a separate law-related services entity controlled by the 
lawyer, individually or with others, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.8(a).” Ohio Rule 5.7 cmt. 
[5]. 
Provision of law-related services - Persons regulated: The Ohio Rule, unlike the Model Rule, extends 
beyond the individual lawyer. It applies to every lawyer in a firm that owns or controls a law-related 
services entity and every lawyer in a firm that knows another lawyer in the firm does so. Ohio Rule 
5.7(d). See Ohio Rule 5.7 cmt. [12]. 
Provision of law-related services before the adoption of the Ohio Rules: Although there was nothing 
in the former OHCPR analogous to either Ohio Rule 5.7 or MR 5.7, there are two Board of Com-
missioners’ opinions that cited, discussed, and agreed with the Model Rule. Thus, in both Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-1, 2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Apr. 11, 
2003), and Op. 2000-4, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Dec. 11, 2000), the Board, after quoting 
MR 5.7, noted that while the Model Rule did not (then) “govern Ohio attorneys, the ABA rule pro-
vides guidance” and stated as follows: 
ABA Model Rule 5.7(a) acknowledges that lawyers may provide 
law-related services either in circumstances that are not distinct from 
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the lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients or through a separate 
entity. The rule identifies law-related services as services that might 
reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are re-
lated to the provision of legal services. The rule requires that lawyers 
who provide law-related services must comply with professional rules 
of conduct. 
Op. 2003-1, 2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1, at *8; Op. 2000-4, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 4, at *4. In Opinion 2003-1, the Board opined that a law firm representing a seller or a buyer 
of a business may assist the seller/buyer client by helping to locate a buyer/seller, so long as the rules 
of professional conduct are adhered to. In Opinion 2000-4 the Board concluded that the former 
OHCPR did not prohibit a lawyer from providing financial-planning services through his law firm to 
business and estate-planning clients of the firm, so long as the law-related services were provided in 
connection with and were related to the provision of legal services. A lawyer who did so was subject 
to the OHCPR and had to heed applicable state and federal laws governing the law-related service. 
Thus, “Ohio attorneys may, as they have by tradition and perhaps by unspoken [now spoken] rule, 
provide law-related services as part of the practice of law to legal clients of the law firm.” Id. at *5. 
Presumably, these Board opinions are generally good law under Ohio Rule 5.7, although any limi-
tation in Opinion 2000-4 requiring that the law-related services be provided in connection with the 
provision of legal services is now superseded by the express terms of Ohio Rule 5.7(a)(2). One 
should also remember that Ohio Rule 5.7 contains provisions (divisions (b), (c), and (d)) not found in 
the Model Rule. 
The Task Force in its Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 5.7 does not refer to either of these BCGD 
opinions; instead it notes that the Rule is consistent with Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Disci-
pline Op. 94-7, 1994 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (June 17, 1994), which generally approved of a 
lawyer’s provision of law-related services through a separate entity. Opinion 94-7 is cited with ap-
proval in both Opinions 2003-1 and 2000-4, as well as in Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 
2011-02 (Dec. 2, 2011), in which the State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct 
blessed a law firm’s ownership and operation of a professional employer organization (“PEO”) as an 
ancillary business of the firm, so long as the strictures of 5.7(b) and (c) are adhered to. (Since the 
function of a PEO typically is to provide the firm with payroll, benefits and similar human resources 
services for the firm’s lawyers and staff, the provisions of 5.7(a) would not come into play because 
the customer or recipient of the law-related services provided by the PEO is the firm, not a client or 
other party that might need to be informed that the law-related services are not legal services and that 
the protections of the attorney-client relationship do not exist.)
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6.2:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 6.2 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 6.2 
  
6.2:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 6.2 is substantively identical to the Model Rule, except that "court" is substituted for 
"tribunal" in the introductory language and MR 6.2(c) is deleted. 
 
6.2:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 6.2: EC 2-25, 2-26, 2-27, 2-28, 2-29, 2-30, 
2-31 & 2-32. 
  
6.2:200  Duty to Accept Court Appointment Except for Good Cause 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 6.2 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 6.2 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer's Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.179 
Becker, Guttenburg & Snyder, The Law of Professional Conduct in Ohio § 9.07[9][a] 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:6201 
ALI-LGL § 14 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer's 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.179 (1996). 
An individual's right to a lawyer in certain types of cases can be compromised if the individual is 
unable to afford legal services or if the individual or the cause is too unpopular. To fill this gap, courts 
have the authority to appoint lawyers to undertake such representation. State ex rel. Butler v. Demis, 
66 Ohio St.2d 1213, 420 N.E.2d 116 (1981). 
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Two principal issues arise in this context. The first, addressed in Ohio Rule 6.2, concerns the ethical 
limits on when a lawyer may permissibly refuse such an appointment. The second is the extent to 
which a court may force a lawyer to take such an appointment. 
Ethically permissible grounds for avoiding appointment: As a general matter, a lawyer "cannot seek 
to avoid appointment by a tribunal." Ohio Rule 6.2. It is the professional duty of every lawyer to 
agree to court appointments in the usual case. Nevertheless, the Rule recognizes that instances may 
arise in which "good cause" exists to decline such an appointment; where that is the case, it is not 
unethical to do so. Rule 6.2 identifies two such instances in which good cause would lie -- (a) where 
the representation is likely to result in a violation of the Ohio Rules or other law and (b) where it is 
likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer. While the Rule identifies only these 
two instances, the language of the Rule (it allows an exception from the general duty "for good cause, 
such as either of the following" (emphasis added)) -- suggests that other grounds for good cause 
might also arise. Id. 
One limitation, applicable to both provisions, is that good cause is met only where representing the 
client is "likely" to cause the violation of the Ohio Rules or other law, or to pose an unreasonable 
financial burden. How "likely" it has to be is an open question. 
The first exception covers a lot of ground. If representation is likely to violate any of the Ohio Rules 
of Professional Conduct, or any other law, that ends the matter. Common problems that might arise 
include questions of competence or conflict of interest. Ohio Rule 6.2 cmt. [2]. One exception 
recognized in the Model Rule, but not in the text of the Ohio Rule itself, finds good cause where "the 
client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship 
or the lawyer's ability to represent the client." MR 6.2(c). Nevertheless, as Comment [2] makes clear, 
such a situation still constitutes good cause, because in that circumstance either the competence or 
conflict-of-interest provisions would come into play. Ohio Rule 6.2 cmt. [2] ("so repugnant . . . as to 
be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client"). If the 
representation is repugnant, but not so repugnant that the representation will be compromised, good 
cause does not lie. Ohio Rule 6.2 cmt. [1]. 
As to the second exception, the text of the Rule speaks of "an unreasonable financial burden." Ohio 
Rule 6.2(b). It is silent, however, on the degree of burden that can be imposed before it becomes 
"unreasonable." Some guidance is provided by the comment, which, in illustrating this exception, 
speaks of "a financial sacrifice so great as to be unjust." Ohio Rule 6.2 cmt. [2]. It should also be 
noted that while the Rule itself speaks to financial burden, the comment intimates a broader category 
-- burden generally: "A lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if acceptance would be 
unreasonably burdensome, for example, when it would impose a financial sacrifice so great as to be 
unjust." Id. (emphasis added). This could be read as suggesting that the financial aspect is but one 
example of a burden meeting the "good cause" standard. 
Does a lawyer violate Rule 6.2(a) if he or she should, but does not, invoke the good cause exception? 
The answer, it would appear, is yes, according to Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 
603, 2011 Ohio 4381, 955 N.E.2d 354. In Williams, the respondent failed to competently and 
diligently represent two clients in criminal matters in which he had been appointed as defense counsel. 
(In one case he failed to file an appellate brief; in the other, he failed to appear for trial.) At the time of 
this conduct he was smoking marijuana regularly and was despondent – "he suffered bouts of crying, 
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became less productive, and could not force himself to do the work that needed to be done." Id. at 
para. 13. As to the failure to appear for trial, "[r]espondent testified that when it came time for him to 
go to court, he just did not leave his office." Id. at para. 7. On such facts the Court found numerous 
rules violations, including 1.1, 1.3, 1.16(a)(2) and 6.2 "(permitting a lawyer to seek to avoid 
appointment by a court to represent a person if representation of the client is likely to result in 
violation of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct or other law)." Id. at para. 8. 
A comment is in order concerning the Rule 6.2 aspect of the Williams case. Comment [2] states that 
the option to decline appointment is permissive: "For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an 
appointment. . . ." Under Williams, however, the failure to do so is a disciplinary violation, if the facts 
show, as they did in Williams, that the lawyer was not fit to accept the appointment and therefore 
should seek to decline. Does this reading apply when the "good cause" is a repugnance for the client's 
cause such as is likely to affect the lawyer's ability to represent the client, as indicated in Comment [2]? 
The definitive answer will have to await another day, but it does seem prudent to make mandatory the 
effort to decline when circumstances render the lawyer incapable of providing competent 
representation, as the Court held in Williams. 
This result is consistent with that in an earlier Ohio appellate case, State v. Gasen, discussed in the 
next subsection, where the Court held that the failure of a lawyer to decline representation when he or 
she cannot for legitimate reasons adequately prepare the party's case "may result in disciplinary 
measures being taken against him," as they were in Williams. 
The other side of this coin is seen in the Mallard case, also discussed in the next subsection, where 
the United States Supreme Court held that under 28 USC §1915(d) a court cannot force an unwilling 
attorney to accept an indigent client appointment, since the operative word in the statute – "request" – 
was precatory not mandatory. Despite the tension existing between these two results, flowing from 
"precatory" language in each, the conclusion in each case seems to us to be sound – a court on its part 
should not be able to force an unwilling lawyer to accept an appointment that he is not competent to 
undertake; and that same lawyer on his part should have a duty to seek to avoid the appointment or 
withdraw from it. 
Judicial power to force attorneys to accept appointment: To our knowledge, the only Ohio authority 
that can fairly be viewed as dealing with the issue of forcing a lawyer to undertake court-appointed 
representations is State v. Gasen, 48 Ohio App.2d 191, 356 N.E.2d 505 (Hamilton 1976). In Gasen, 
the public defenders who were representing defendants on a felony charge were not in the courtroom 
when the case was called for preliminary hearing. Two other public defenders had the misfortune of 
entering the courtroom at that time and each was summarily appointed by the court to represent one of 
the two defendants and ordered immediately to commence cross-examination, even though they had 
no knowledge of the defendants or their case. The appellate opinion expressly states that "Gasen 
declined to accept the appointment,"  id. at 192, 356 N.E.2d at 506, and the other appellant 
(Rosenwald) in effect did so as well, on the ground that to accept without any knowledge whatever of 
the case would violate their obligations under the former OHCPR and deny the defendants effective 
representation of counsel. "Upon their continued refusal to represent the Stovalls, both Gasen and 
Rosenwald were incarcerated pending a hearing on a charge of contempt for refusal to obey the 
court's order."  Id. at 192-93, 356 N.E.2d at 506-07. At the hearing, appellants were found in 
contempt; on appeal, the court reversed and held the contempt order contrary to law because it refused 
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to recognize counsels' duties under the OHCPR: 
 Clearly, the ethics of the legal profession demand that any 
attorney, private or public, decline to represent a party when such 
attorney is unable, for valid reasons, to fully and adequately prepare 
such party's case, or when such a party is already represented by 
competent counsel. Failure of an attorney to decline to perform such 
representation may result in disciplinary measures being taken against 
him. 
Id. at 193-94, 356 N.E.2d at 507 (emphasis by the court). 
Beyond Ohio, by far the most significant case on this issue is that of the United States Supreme Court 
in Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989). Although decided on narrow 
statutory grounds, the Court spoke in dictum to the larger issue as well. In Mallard, an attorney newly 
admitted to practice before the district court and having expertise in bankruptcy and securities law, 
was appointed to represent one former and two current federal-prison inmates who alleged that prison 
officials had violated 42 USC § 1983 by, inter alia, filing false disciplinary reports against them. 
Mallard moved to withdraw as counsel, citing his lack of familiarity with and experience in the 
matters presented and of the skills required by the case. In appealing the magistrate's denial of his 
motion, Mallard emphasized to the district court that he was "not a litigator by training or 
temperament," 490 U.S. at 300, and thus could not be effective in litigating the case at hand. 
Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that he was competent and that 28 USC § 1915(d) empowered 
the federal court to compel a lawyer to accept appointments to represent indigents in civil actions. 
After the Eighth Circuit denied without opinion Mallard's writ of mandamus to compel the district 
court to permit him to withdraw, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 
On the dispositive statutory issue, the Court held 5-4 that the operative word in § 1915(d) -- "request" 
-- was precatory, not mandatory, and thus § 1915(d) does not "authorize[] a federal court to require an 
unwilling attorney to represent an indigent litigant in a civil case." 490 U.S. at 298. In part IV of the 
majority opinion, Justice Brennan went on to speak to the broader ethical issue in the following 
words: 
We do not mean to question, let alone denigrate, lawyers' ethical 
obligation to assist those who are too poor to afford counsel, or to 
suggest that requests made pursuant to § 1915(d) may be lightly 
declined because they give rise to no ethical claim. On the contrary, in 
a time when the need for legal services among the poor is growing and 
public funding for such services has not kept pace, lawyers' ethical 
obligation to volunteer their time and skills pro bono publico is 
manifest. 
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Id. at 310. The Court expressed no opinion whether federal courts possess inherent authority to 
require lawyers to serve, id., or whether statutes like 18 USC § 3005, providing for "assignment" of 
counsel in capital cases, authorize the courts "to compel an unwilling attorney to render service. Nor 
do we offer an opinion on the constitutionality of compulsory assignments."  Id. at 306 n.6. 
Commentary on the debate with respect to compulsory appointment is extensive. Laws. Man. on 
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) §§ 91:6202-11 (2011) both reviews the case law and provides a good 
source of the commentary available pro and con. 
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6.5:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 6.5 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 6.5 
  
6.5:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 6.5 is substantively identical to the Model Rule. 
  
6.5:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 6.5: None. 
  
6.5:200  Exception to Conflict Rules for Limited Pro-Bono Legal Services 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 6.5 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 6.5 
Ohio Rule 6.5, like its ABA counterpart (added to the Model Rules by amendment in 2002), provides 
for a particular form of "unbundled" legal services -- legal assistance on a specific aspect or aspects of 
a case or transaction. See Task Force Report at 21. As stated in ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 510 (6th ed. 2007) (commentary), "[s]hort-term limited legal services are 
subject of the 'limited-scope' representation contemplated by Rule 1.2(c); they are limited in duration 
as well as scope." 
Pursuant to the Ohio Rule, a lawyer providing short-term, limited legal services under the auspices of 
a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or a court, without expectation by either the lawyer 
or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter, is not subject to Ohio 
Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) unless the lawyer "knows" the representation involves a conflict of interest (Ohio 
Rule 6.5(a)(1)), and is not subject to Ohio Rule 1.10 unless the lawyer "knows" that another lawyer 
associated with him or her is disqualified with respect to the matter by Ohio Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a). Ohio 
Rule 6.5(a)(2). Other than as stated in Ohio Rule 6.5(a)(2), Ohio Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a 
representation governed by this rule. Ohio Rule 6.5(b). Thus, "[a] lawyer's participation in a 
short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or 
continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the 
program's auspices." Ohio Rule 6.5 cmt. [4]. And, except as provided in the Rule, the Rules of 
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Professional Conduct apply to such representations; moreover, a lawyer providing such representa-
tion must communicate with the client, preferably in writing, regarding the limited scope of the 
representation. Ohio Rule 6.5 cmt. [2]. If such limited representation is not reasonable in the cir-
cumstances, the lawyer may offer advice but must advise the client of the need for further legal as-
sistance. Id. 
The purpose here is to encourage limited pro-bono consultation by means of legal-advice hotlines, 
advice-only clinics, and the like, instances in which a thorough conflicts check is not feasible. Ohio 
Rule 6.5 cmt. [1]. 
Elaborating on the inapplicability of Rule 1.10 (except under the terms of division (a)(2)), Comment 
[4] states that since the risk of conflict with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm is sig-
nificantly reduced by the limited nature of the representation, under Rule 6.5(b) 
a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program 
will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the 
representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being rep-
resented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disquali-
fication [under division (a)(1)] of a lawyer participating in the program 
be imputed to other lawyers [in the lawyer's firm] participating in the 
program. 
Ohio Rule 6.5 cmt. [4]. Remember also that, even if the lawyer "knows" that another lawyer in the 
firm is disqualified and is thus, in accordance with division (a)(2), subject to Rule 1.10, Ohio's Rule 
1.10(d), unlike MR 1.10, permits screening and notice to avoid the imputation with respect to matters 
other than those in which the lawyer had "substantial responsibility" for a former client under Rule 
1.10(c). Whether a firm would choose to implement screening for such limited representations seems 
unlikely, however, as a practical matter. 
Finally, Comment [5] advises that if, after commencing limited short-term representation pursuant to 
Rule 6.5, "the lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 
1.9(a), and 1.10 become applicable." Ohio Rule 6.5 cmt. [5].
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7.1:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.1 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.1 
  
7.1:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 7.1 is quite similar, but not identical, to the Model Rule. The differences are as follows: 
Ohio inserts “or use” after “make” in the first sentence and, instead of “false or misleading”, inserts 
“false, misleading, or nonverifiable” before “communication”, also in the first sentence. 
  
7.1:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as being related to Ohio Rule 7.1: DR 2-101. 
  
7.1:200  Lawyer Advertising--In General 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.1 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.1 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.13, 2.16-2.17, 
2.19-2.24, 2.53 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 81.1 
Wolfram § 14.2 
In earlier times and smaller communities, potential clients often knew the local lawyers by reputation 
and would select a lawyer accordingly. Former OH EC 2-6 concluded that this process “worked well 
because it was initiated by the client and the choice was an informed one.” As communities have 
grown larger and the number of attorneys has multiplied, this is often no longer the case. When 
coupled with the greater specialization within the bar and the transient nature of the population, it is 
increasingly difficult for laypersons to make an intelligent choice of counsel for particular problems 
from community reputation alone. More and more, prospective clients select attorneys through 
advertising. 
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The Ohio Rules allow, but place limits upon, lawyer advertising and solicitation. One is a limitation 
on making false or misleading statements to secure clients. This includes not only direct false or 
misleading communication (Ohio Rule 7.1) but also limitation on claims of specialization (Ohio 
Rule 7.4) or the use of firm names or letterheads (Ohio Rule 7.5) that might be misleading. A second 
is a limitation on the lawyer’s direct solicitation of clients where fear of lawyer overreaching requires 
special controls. (Ohio Rules 7.2 & 7.3). 
Subject to the restrictions set forth in Rules 7.1 (false, misleading, or unverifiable communications), 
7.3 (direct-solicitation limitations), and 4.3 (prohibition on advice to unrepresented of person other 
than advice to secure counsel), a lawyer can offer his services to potential clients who have not sought 
the lawyer’s advice, for example by letter, consistent with Rule 7.2. See, under the former OHCPR, 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-2, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 19 (Feb. 
14, 1992) (class counsel may recommend himself for employment by mail to nonclient class 
members or prospective class members without violating former OH DR 2-103(A)); Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-26, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Dec. 6, 
1991) (attorney may contact business by mail to offer services through general representation or as 
in-house counsel). To the extent the prospective client approaches the lawyer about possible 
employment, the lawyer is of course free to promote his own services. See Rule 7.3 cmt. [7]. With 
respect to solicitation of firm clients by a lawyer departing the firm, see section 7.3:220. 
  
7.1:210  The Commercial-Speech Doctrine 
The material in this section is excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide 
to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.13 (1996). 
For many years, the states nationwide prohibited all but the most limited forms of lawyer advertising. 
Beginning with Bates v. Ariz. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), however, the United States Supreme 
Court continually cut back on the authority of the states to regulate lawyers’ advertising and found 
that many of the regulations at issue violated the First Amendment protection accorded commercial 
speech. The former disciplinary rules pertaining to lawyer advertising and solicitation (OH DR 2-101 
to 2-105) to a large degree were shaped by, and were amended in response to, those Supreme Court 
decisions. An interesting discussion of Bates and what it has wrought can be found in Roy F. Hofer, 
Lawyer Advertising[:]  Bates Revisited, 20 Experience No. 2 (2010), at 37. 
Although articulated in slightly different terms in different decisions, the basic constitutional 
standards that limit the states’ regulation of lawyer advertising are generally settled. A state is free to 
ban commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading. Commercial speech that is not false, 
deceptive, or misleading “can be restricted, but only if the State shows that the restriction directly and 
materially advances a substantial state interest in a manner no more extensive than necessary to serve 
that interest.” Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994). See also  
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (“[T]he State must assert a substantial interest and the 
interference with speech must be in proportion to the interest served.”); accord Peel v. Attorney 
Registration & Discipline Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990). Communication of information that is only 
potentially misleading cannot be absolutely prohibited by a state if the information also can be 
presented in a way that is not deceptive.  In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191; accord Peel, 496 U.S. 91 
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(quoting R.M.J. with approval). 
Mere assertions by a state that various forms of advertising may harm professionalism or the quality 
of legal services, or may mislead the public, have not been sufficient to meet this burden.  Bates, 433 
U.S. 350; cf. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (discussing proof required). 
Regulation and the resulting discipline are permissible only if the particular advertising, given its 
content or form, either is inherently likely to deceive or can be shown on the record to be actually 
deceptive.  R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191. 
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, has recognized the need for regulation in this area, where 
consistent with the First Amendment. As the Court stated in R.M.J.: 
Indeed, the Court recognize[s] the special possibilities for deception 
presented by advertising for professional services. The public’s 
comparative lack of knowledge, the limited ability of the professions to 
police themselves, and the absence of any standardization in the 
“product” renders advertising for professional services especially 
susceptible to abuses that the States have a legitimate interest in 
controlling. 
Id. at 202. 
  
7.1:220  False and Misleading Communications 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.16-2.17, 2.19-2.20, 2.22-2.24, 2.53 
(1996). 
In lieu of the elaborate restrictions on lawyer publicity detailed in former OH DR 2-101, Ohio Rule 
7.1 states merely that: 
 A lawyer shall not make or use a false, misleading, or 
nonverifiable communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. 
A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material 
misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the 
statement considered as a whole not materially misleading. 
As stated in Comment [2], a statement can be misleading, even if true, if it omits a material fact. Rule 
7.1 cmt. [2]. An example of such a 7.1 violation by omission is Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Mezher & 
Espohl, 134 Ohio St.3d 319, 2012 Ohio 5527, 982 N.E.2d 657, where respondent had approved her 
firm’s website information, which truthfully advertised a free consultation. As summarized by the 
Court, “Mezher’s advertising of a free consultation, by itself, is not the problem. The advertisement 
was misleading because it omitted a key piece of information – the free consultation ended (and 
billing began) with the signing of the fee agreement.” Id. at para. 15. 
Comment [3] continues the discussion of what may be misleading, even if truthful. Examples are 
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advertisements reporting achievements on behalf of clients “if presented so as to lead a reasonable 
person to form an unjustified expectation that the same results could be obtained for other clients in 
similar matters without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances of each client’s 
case.” Unsubstantiated comparisons of services or fees with those of another lawyer can also be 
misleading “if presented with such specificity as would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the 
comparison can be substantiated.” Disclaimers or qualifying language “may” preclude a finding of 
unjustified expectations or that the statement is otherwise misleading. Rule 7.1 cmt. [3]. 
Finally, Comment [4] states that characterization of rates or fees chargeable by the lawyer or firm by 
use of terms “such as ‘cut-rate,’ ‘lowest,’ ‘giveaway,’ ‘below cost,’ ‘discount,’ or ‘special’ is 
misleading.” (To the same effect under the Code, see Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 2005-9, 2005 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 11 (Dec. 2, 2005) (advertising with coupons for free 
consultation or dollars off the cost of legal services is a characterization of fees as “discount” or 
“special” in violation of former OH DR 2-101(A)(5)).) 
While the Rule is principally directed to advertising, it applies to any “communication” about “the 
lawyer or the lawyer’s services.” See Ohio Rule 7.1 cmt. [1]. Making a misleading comment about 
yourself or your practice to another violates this provision. Thus, a solo practitioner, in sending a 
solicitation letter to a prospective client, “used the phrase ‘Attorneys at Law’ in the letterhead, listed 
eight separate office locations for Westfall Legal Services in Cuyahoga and neighboring counties, and 
repeatedly used the term ‘we’ when referring to the firm. In doing so, Westfall ran afoul of Rule 7.1’s 
prohibition against false and misleading communications about the lawyer or his services.” 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Westfall, 134 Ohio St.3d 127, 2012 Ohio 5365, 980 N.E.2d 982, at 
para. 8. 
False or misleading statements made by a lawyer on other topics are addressed in Ohio Rule 3.3 
(candor to the tribunal), 4.1 (truthfulness in statements to others) and 8.4(c) (general prohibition 
against conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).  
The Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 7.1 is both helpful and confusing. Helpful in that it makes clear 
that (subject always to the false and misleading ban) the prohibitions in former DR 2-101 against 
client testimonials and self-laudatory claims are no longer present; nor are the directives of 2-101(B) 
(micromanaging what a lawyer may do in the way of advertising), 2-101(D) (the fourteen items of 
non-fee information that constituted safe harbors), 2-101(E) (safe-harbor information regarding fees), 
and 2-101(G) (prohibition against buying publicity from the media in a news item). The confusion 
comes from the statement that the Rule does not contain “the definition of misleading found in DR 
2-101(C) (see comment [2] of Rule 7.1).” But Rule 7.1 does not omit the definition from 2-101(C)(1); 
it incorporates it verbatim in the second sentence of the Rule. While the remaining two subsections of 
2-101(C) are not incorporated verbatim in the Rule or its comments, unjustified expectations are 
treated in Comment [3], as are lawyer comparisons, and stating or implying an ability to achieve 
results by means that violate the Rules or other law is now contained in Rule 8.4(e). See Rule 7.1 cmt. 
[5]. 
Given the decidedly narrower approach as to what is now prohibited, a sizeable portion of the case 
law dealing with the minutiae of the OHCPR (self-laudatory, client testimonials, etc.) is no longer 
relevant. The primary focus, however, then and now, is on false or misleading communications, and 
prior precedent on that subject will now be considered. (There is no constitutional impediment to state 
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regulation of such statements; see Bates v. Ariz. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977), recognizing a 
state’s right “to correct omissions that have the effect of presenting an inaccurate picture.”) 
Misleading statements concerning professional status: Some opinions in this area under the Code 
dealt with communications that might confuse the public as to the lawyer’s professional status. For 
example, it was misleading for a person, licensed to practice law only in another state but employed in 
Ohio as a company’s collections manager, to use “Esq.” after his name when signing business 
correspondence. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-24, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 5 (Oct. 18, 1991). Use of the term would likely make the recipient believe the author was an 
attorney licensed to practice law in the state and as such was intended to create additional pressure on 
the debtor. 
Other cases and opinions focused on communications that misled the public concerning the nature of 
the lawyer’s affiliation with other attorneys. See also section 7.5:500. For example, consistent with 
the Westfall decision, decided under Rule 7.1 and discussed in this section supra, use in a firm name 
of the phrase “and Associates” by one who is in solo practice is improper under this standard. The 
phrase implies that the lawyer is involved in an employment relationship with other attorneys and 
thus it cannot be used to describe office sharing or co-counsel arrangements with other attorneys or to 
denote that the lawyer has nonlawyer support personnel in his employ. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 95-1, 1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (Feb. 3, 1995). Accord 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Watson, 98 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002 Ohio 7088, 781 N.E.2d 212 
(solo lawyer’s use of “Watson and Watson” misleading). 
Special problems can arise where lawyers who share office space use a common phone line. If a 
receptionist mentions the names of the lawyers in answering the phone, it may mislead the public into 
believing that the lawyers are practicing in the same firm. To avoid this, the receptionist should 
answer the phone “law offices” or by the phone number. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 95-1, 1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (Feb. 3, 1995). Lawyers wishing to have 
their names mentioned when the phone is answered should establish separate telephone listings. Id. 
Group advertising raised similar concerns if it falsely implied that the lawyers behind the 
advertisement were affiliated in some fashion when they were not. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 91-7, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 23 (Apr. 12, 1991). 
Simultaneous practice with more than one legal professional association or law firm in Ohio was 
declared improper by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline in part because it 
could be misleading or confusing to the public. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
99-7, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (Dec. 2, 1999); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 93-1, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 11 (Feb. 12, 1993) (discussing issue in 
context of proposed multi-firm operation of a 900 service for providing legal advice). But see 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 90-1 (Aug. 26, 1990) (expressly rejecting Board Opinion 89-35, arguing 
that concern of Disciplinary Rules is truthfulness of statements made, not fact of simultaneous 
practice; if lawyer is engaged in actual practice with each firm, generally and regularly available to 
render services to clients of each firm, then simultaneous practice is permitted, although 
confidentiality and conflicts problems must be avoided). 
Misleading communications about competence or methods: Communications that have a tendency to 
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create unjustified expectations about the results the lawyer can achieve are also misleading. See Rule 
7.1 cmts. [3] & [5]. Equally misleading would be use of a domain name on a firm’s website such as 
“willwineverycaseforyou.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 99-4, 1999 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4, at *6 (June 4, 1999). 
Thus, commercials touting a firm’s past successes, even though not inaccurate, were “inherently 
misleading.” Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Shane, 81 Ohio St.3d 494, 496, 692 N.E.2d 571, 
573 (1998) (no way to measure objectively results achieved). 
In a 1993 opinion, the Board of Commissioners addressed whether a former judge returning to private 
law practice may use statements as to prior judicial positions held, or titles such as “Judge,” 
“Honorable,” or “Former Judge,” in various types of communication and advertising. Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-8, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Oct. 15, 
1993) (Board did not address issue in context other than former judge assuming position in private 
practice). The Board indicated that the context in which the information was presented is important. 
The Board found the conduct misleading, and thus improper under DR 2-101(A)(1), if the statements 
were included on letterhead or business cards used in connection with the practice of law. The Board 
felt the use of such terms was misleading “by creating the appearance that an attorney can use the 
prestige of past judicial experience to assure a client’s success [and] falsely indicates that a former 
judge has influence over others to achieve desired ends or favorable treatment for the client.” 1993 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4, at *4. In contrast, the Board approved the inclusion, on a professional 
announcement card or in a professional law directory, of a factual statement of prior judicial positions 
held. The Board explained that given the different, largely legal audience intended for these devices, 
the inclusion of such information was likely to be informative, not misleading. Without deciding the 
issue directly, the Board suggested that even in this setting the use of titles, such as “Judge,” 
“Honorable,” or “Former Judge” might be improper, whereas a factual statement of former status 
clearly would not be. [Query how the title “Former Judge” is something other than a factual statement 
of former status.] See Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 7.5: “The Rules of Professional Conduct 
should not preclude truthful statements about a lawyer’s professional status, other business pursuits, 
or degrees.” 
This same question can be asked about Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2013-3, 
2013 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 6, 2013), where, under the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
the Board reached the same result as that reached in Op. 93-8 under the Code, but did not limit it to 
returning to private practice. Under Op. 2013-3, the prohibition against use of judicial titles applies as 
well to any Ohio lawyer/former judge “engaging in law-related or other business activities, working 
in government or other public sector positions, or providing charity or community services.” Id. at * 
1. The analysis by which Op. 93-8 reached the conclusion that such practice was “misleading” (“by 
creating the appearance that an attorney can use the prestige of past judicial experience to assure a 
client’s success [and] falsely indicates that a former judge has influence over others to achieve desired 
ends or favorable treatment for the client”) is confirmed and repeated in Op. 2013-3 in support of its 
conclusion that the use of “Former Judge” by a former judge is misleading, and therefore violative of 
Rules 7.1, 7.5 and 8.4(c). Id. at * 8-9. The Board also invokes Rule 8.4(e), inasmuch as 
“[i]dentifying oneself as a judge [and presumably as a former judge] in the practice of law further 
implies to clients and the public an ability to influence the courts and other public entities or 
officials . . . .” Id. at * 7. (The Board’s use of ABA Formal Op. 95-391 as an “Accord” is a touch 
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disingenuous. Op. 95-391 dealt with the much easier issue of the propriety of the use of “judge,” not 
“former judge;” moreover, it was decided when Model Rule 7.1 contained a specific provision 
defining “misleading” as including the implication of being able to achieve improper results.) 
The Cleveland Bar Association, under the OHCPR, saw the issue differently. While recognizing the 
possibility that advertising concerning prior judicial positions could create unjustified expectations of 
competence or results, the bar association indicated such statements would be acceptable, whether in 
advertising or in professional announcements, but that care should be taken in how the material is 
presented. “The reference should always be factual and should be made in such a way that it is used to 
emphasize experience or competence of a general nature, or to refresh or enlighten the minds of the 
public as to past employment,” not to mislead or suggest specialized knowledge. Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n Op. 89-6 (Mar. 30, 1990). This seems to be a fair import of what the Task Force intended in its 
Ohio Cole Comparison, quoted above, but, as noted above, the Board of Commissioners in Opinion 
2013-3 opted to reaffirm the former judge analysis adopted in Opinion 93-8. 
In addition to opining on the situations in which the appellation “former judge” cannot be used, 
Opinion 2013-3 enumerates instances in which use of the title is permitted. Thus a former judge 
sitting as “retired assigned, acting, and private judges may use judicial titles in case-related entries, 
orders, decisions and correspondence.” Id. at syllabus. A former judge is likewise free to describe her 
judicial service in biographical sketches, resumes and the like. 
The creation of unjustified expectations is discussed further in section 7.1:230. Unsubstantiated 
comparisons with other lawyers are treated in section 7.1:240. See also section 8.4:600 (discussing 
lawyer discipline for stating or implying an ability to improperly influence governmental officials). 
Misleading communication - Nonverifiable claims: In addition to the Model Rule “false or 
misleading” language, Ohio Rule 7.1 has retained from the Code the prohibition against making a 
“nonverifiable communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.” Under the OHCPR, for 
example, the Supreme Court held that a statement in an advertisement that “We Do It Well” violated 
this standard because it was not verifiable.  Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Grieselhuber, 78 Ohio 
St.3d 373, 678 N.E.2d 535 (1997). Likewise violative of, inter alia, former 2-101(A)(4)) was an 
advertisement placed by the respondent in a local publication stating as follows: 
“Tom Furth * * * Nationally noted. Amazingly affordable. Incredibly 
dedicated. He’s our neighbor and he’s known from coast to coast. Top 
notch legal services with a GUARANTEE of satisfaction and 24 hour a 
day access.” 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth, 93 Ohio St.3d 173, 177, 754 N.E.2d 219, 225 (2001) 
(emphasis in original). The Court, rejecting the dismissal of this count by the panel and Board, 
concluded that these statements by respondent “are clearly unverifiable and self-laudatory.”  Id. at 
186, 754 N.E.2d at 232. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Shane, 81 Ohio St.3d 494, 692 
N.E.2d 571 (1998) (no way to objectively determine what results were achieved by firm). In 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Willette, 117 Ohio St.3d 433, 2008 Ohio 1198, 884 N.E.2d 581, 
respondent had a contract with an out-of-state marketing firm and conceded that the firm’s direct mail 
marketing on his behalf was “misleading, false, or unverifiable.” Rejecting respondent’s argument 
that these activities were unknown to him, the Court found that he did have such knowledge. In 
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addition, it emphasized that a lawyer in respondent’s position, who made no effort to supervise or 
review the mailings, “cannot evade responsibility for these mailings by maintaining a willful 
ignorance of their content.” Id. at para. 24. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
2005-6, 2005 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (Aug. 8, 2005), probably falls in the unverifiable 
category as well; therein the Board opined that a lawyer should not participate in a local television 
program entitled and advertised as “Ask the Expert,” because “[l]awyers may not hold themselves out 
as experts.” Id. at *1. The Board focused on DR 2-105(A)(6), where special competence could not be 
claimed unless the lawyer had been certified in a particular field or was engaged in federal patent, 
trademark, or admiralty practice. In the Board’s words, under the Code there was “no leeway for 
attorneys to use the term ‘expert’ in advertising,” id. at *3, and we believe that use of “expert” and its 
variations is one step beyond “specialization” and would similarly run afoul of both Rule 7.1 and 7.4, 
the latter of which was amended in 2009 to restore the limitations of former 2-105(A)(6); under Rule 
7.4(e) as amended, the term “specialist” can be used only by those who are certified. See further 
section 7.4:200 at “Claims of specialization.” 
Verifiable truthful communication, in contrast, is generally permissible, even if there is some chance 
the comments may mislead the public, unless that chance is too great. See Rule 7.1 cmt. [2]. For 
example, a statement that a lawyer has been certified by a particular bona-fide group is a verifiable 
fact, rather than an unverifiable opinion of quality or ultimate success.  Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. 
& Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (use of the term “certified” in describing that a lawyer is a 
Certified Financial Planner is not inherently misleading; mere use of the term does not suggest that 
the lawyer has been certified by the government); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Discipline 
Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (statement that lawyer was certified as “Civil Trial Specialist” by 
National Board of Trial Attorneys approved). Truthful statements about the nature of a practice, such 
as that the lawyer is presently representing clients in a particular area of litigation, is a verifiable fact.  
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (statement that lawyer currently 
was representing plaintiffs in Dalkon Shield litigation). Such statements are not prohibited simply 
because some members of the public might infer from the statements that the lawyer is more qualified 
than others without those experiences, which would be a nonverifiable fact. 
In 1992, the Board addressed whether a lawyer’s advertisement in a farming trade journal stating 
“Being a farmer of over 20 years experience, I understand farmers and I understand their problems,” 
was misleading. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-12, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 9, at *1 (June 19, 1992). The Board found that it was not. The first clause was a verifiable 
fact and the second, while potentially self-laudatory (no longer prohibited), seemed reasonable and 
not misleading given the lawyer’s twenty years of experience. 
Misleading communication - Fee advertising - Language restrictions: Lawyers are not prohibited 
from including fee information in their advertising. Comment [4], however, brands some phrases 
used in fee advertising as misleading. Thus, the comment prohibits a lawyer’s involvement in public 
communications that contain “characterization” of a lawyer’s rates or fees “such as ‘cut-rate,’ 
‘lowest,’ ‘giveaway,’ ‘below cost,’ ‘discount,’ ‘special.’” Use of similar terms were also 
impermissible under the former Code rule, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 98-1, 
1998 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Feb. 13, 1998) (finding phrases such as “low cost,” 
“discounted,” and “below regional cost” impermissible), and in all likelihood suffer a similar fate 
under Comment [4], since it is essentially identical to DR 2-101(A)(5). See, under the Code, 
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Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Dugan, 113 Ohio St.3d 370, 2007 Ohio 2077, 865 N.E.2d 895 (offering a 
coupon on website for 10% discount off first consultation fee violated 2-101(A)(5)). 
DR 2-101(A)(5) specifically authorized the use of two such characterizations; rates or fees could be 
described as “reasonable” or “moderate.” See generally Bates v. Ariz. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) 
(upholding right of lawyer to advertise fees as “very reasonable” when, in fact, they were so). 
“Reasonable” or “moderate” will surely pass muster under Rule 7.1, and similar phrases also are 
likely to be acceptable. 
Other than the provisions of Comment [4], there are no explicit restrictions on fee information such as 
were included in DR 2-101(E). Of course, the overarching false or misleading prohibition applies to 
fee information; see Rule 7.1 cmt. [3], noting that unsubstantiated comparisons of a lawyer’s fees 
with those of other lawyers may be misleading. See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 536 (7th ed. 2011) (discussing omissions regarding lawyer’s fees and citing favorably Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 01-03, at 1 (June 1, 2001) to effect that lawyer cannot advertise “[n]o 
attorney fee in personal injury cases, unless we get money for you” without statement clarifying 
whether client responsible for costs and expenses if no recovery). See section 1.8:610, for a 
discussion of client cost/fee obligations in a contingent-fee context. 
Statements soliciting clients for subsequent referral: DR 2-101(A)(2) restricted a lawyer’s 
involvement in making public communications “[s]eeking employment in connection with matters in 
which the lawyer or law firm does not intend to actively participate in the representation, but intends 
to refer to other counsel.” This concern is now addressed in Ohio Rule 7.2(d). See section 7.2:600. 
Communications by lawyers practicing multiple professions: DR 2-102(E) provided that 
 [a] lawyer who is engaged both in the practice of law and 
another profession or business shall not so indicate on the lawyer’s 
letterhead, office sign, or professional card, nor shall the lawyer 
identify himself or herself as a lawyer in any publication in connection 
with his or her other profession or business. 
This provision also has been dropped from the Rules; in the words of the Task Force, “[t]he Rules of 
Professional Conduct should not preclude truthful statements about a lawyer’s professional status, 
other business pursuits, or degrees.” Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 7.5. Among other reasons why 
this is so is that such prohibitions are unconstitutional. See Ibanez, v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l 
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (overturning reprimand of lawyer/CPA for referring to her certified 
financial planner status on her stationary and business cards). 
 
7.1:230  Creating Unjustifiable Expectations 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.16 (1996). 
In numerous ways lawyers may create unjustifiable expectations about the results they can achieve. 
Such conduct may be prohibited as misleading under Comment [3]. For example, under the OHCPR, 
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an offer of a money-back guarantee in intellectual property matters violated the disciplinary rule by 
creating unjustified expectations regarding the results that the firm could achieve and implied that the 
firm had improper influence or control over the legal system. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2003-2, 2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS (Apr. 11, 2003). And incomplete 
statements about the law in an advertisement could be both misleading in general and also create an 
unjustified expectation concerning results. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 90-18 (Aug. 30, 1990) 
(misstatements in yellow pages ad concerning bankruptcy). 
Statements about a lawyer’s past successes, even if true, may be misleading if presented in a way that 
leads a reasonable person to have unjustified expectations of future performance. Rule 7.1 cmt. [3]. 
The rationale for restricting such comments was well-stated by the Ohio Supreme Court under the 
OHCPR in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Shane, 81 Ohio St.3d 494, 692 N.E.2d 571 (1998): 
[T]here is no way to objectively determine whether the results achieved 
by the firm were exceptional, adequate, or poor, or even whether the 
firm was instrumental in the outcome of the cases. Comments about 
past successes may create unjustified expectations of similar outcomes 
in the future without taking into account the peculiarities of the 
particular cases. 
Id. at 496, 692 N.E.2d 573. Accord Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-2, 2003 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS (Apr. 11, 2003) (proposed use of statistics regarding number of 
intellectual property cases won, lost, and settled by firm “creates unjustified expectations that the law 
firm is able to control the outcome of cases,” id. at *5; money-back guarantees also create unjustified 
expectations “that the lawyer has improper control or influence over the legal system.” Id. at *11.); 
see Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-7, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 
(June 14, 2002) (improper under DR 2-101(A)(1) & (4) to include in advertisements such statements 
as “Trip/Fall sidewalk-brain injury, $1,000,000 verdict” or “Dog bite $50,000 settlement,” id. at *1; 
in addition to being misleading and self-laudatory, such statements create unjustified expectations). 
While 2-101(A)(3) prohibited a lawyer’s involvement in public communications that contained 
testimonials of past or present clients pertaining to the lawyer’s capability, that prohibition is no 
longer applicable. See the Task Force’s Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 7.1. Indeed, on January 24, 
2005, the Ohio Supreme Court issued an order precluding enforcement of DR 2-101(A)(3) by the 
Board or state and local bar associations until further order of Court. 104 Ohio St.3d 1457, 2005 
Ohio 235, 821 N.E.2d 574 (2005). (The rule had been challenged on First Amendment grounds by 
the plaintiff in Adams v. Bus. First of Columbus, Inc., No. 2:04 CV 264 (S.D. Ohio); in exchange 
for the Court’s order, Adams agreed to dismiss his case without prejudice.) The issue in the Adams 
case is now moot, given the freedom under the Rules to use client testimonials (subject of course to 
the ever-present false or misleading prohibition). See ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 537-38 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). 
  
7.1:240  Comparison with Other Lawyers 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.16 (1996). 
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Rule 7.1 cmt. [3] discusses making comparisons of a lawyer’s services or fees with those of other 
lawyers. Unless the comparisons can be factually substantiated, such comparisons may be misleading 
“if presented with such specificity as would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the comparison 
can be substantiated.” Id. Does this mean that unsubstantiated comparisons made without specificity 
are permissible? Would a general claim that “I am the best at what I do” pass muster? It seems 
unlikely, if for no other reason than that such a claim is nonverifiable. See ABA, Annotated Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 538 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). Under the Code, it was opined 
that “[c]ommunication that states or implies that an out-of-state lawyer has special abilities to get 
results or special competence is false and misleading. Communication that unverifiably praises self 
and denigrates other lawyers is false and misleading.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 92-2, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 19, at *8 (Feb. 14, 1992) (comments made in context of 
addressing permissibility of communications between class counsel and non-client members or 
potential members of the class). 
Comments suggesting that a lawyer is highly ranked relative to other lawyers, such as the description 
that “as a certified specialist in family relations, he’s the most qualified lawyer in Ohio,” Columbus 
Bar Ass’n v. Dugan, 113 Ohio St.3d 370, 2007 Ohio 2077, 865 N.E.2d 895, at para. 10 (emphasis 
by the Court) (such comment violative of DR 2-101(A)(1) as self-laudatory), and describing oneself 
as a “leader in the creation of quality living trust documents,” Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Bradley, 82 Ohio St.3d 261, 262, 695 N.E.2d 248, 248 (1998) (same), may well be suspect under 
Comment [3]. Once again, although the prohibition on self-laudatory statements is no longer present, 
these cases would likely come out the same way because such claims are nonverifiable.  
Another aspect of this issue is the comparatively recent development and publication of lists of 
“Super Lawyers,” “Best Lawyers in [fill in the blank],” etc. There has been litigation elsewhere, with 
First Amendment commercial-speech implications but, so far as we are aware, there is nothing yet in 
Ohio. Perhaps the most extensive examination of the issue to date comes from the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in In re Opinion 39, 961 A. 2d 722 (N.J. 2008), which vacated an ethics opinion that 
had opined that such designations were violative of New Jersey’s Rule 7.1(a)(2) & (3). (Unlike the 
Model and Ohio Rule, New Jersey makes the unjustified expectation ((a)(2)) and comparison ((a)(3)) 
aspects subparts of the rule itself, rather than treating these subjects in Comment [3]. The court sent 
the matter back to the state rules committee for further consideration; as a result, New Jersey Rule 
7.1(a)(3) (comparative advertising prohibition), was modified to permit comparisons, so long as 
specified conditions are satisfied. See Brian A. Benko & Corrine Morrissey, Is It Ethical To Be a 
Super Lawyer?, 20 Prof. Law. No. 1, at 25 (2010). The Super Lawyer subject is also discussed in 
Jacqueline Jackson, Looking Back at Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: The Dawn of the Attorney 
Advertisement, Cleve. Metro. B.J., April 2008, at 14. See also Mark Hansen, Plotting Course: 
ABA Commission Ponders Its Strategy for Ranking Lawyers, ABAJ, December 2010, at p. 26. 
  
7.1:250  Permissible Communication 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.21, 2.23 (1996). 
Permissible communication of non-fee information: Former OH DR 2-101(D) provided a list of 
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information that lawyers could convey “acceptable for dissemination under these rules.” Such 
information was “presumed to be informational,” and therefore proper, rather than “solely 
promotional or self-laudatory,” which was prohibited. Even if the information conveyed fell within 
the 2-101(D) list, it still was subject to two restrictions. The information had to be both accurate and 
conveyed in a dignified manner. 
DR 2-101(D) has not been included in Rule 7.1. See Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 7.1. 
The basis for the provision -- to distinguish permitted “informational” statements from prohibited 
“solely promotional or self-laudatory” ones -- no longer exists, because the ban on promotional or self 
laudatory statements itself no longer exists under the Rules. Id. Nevertheless, we repeat the list here, 
if for no other reason than to remind that this information would now be permitted a fortiori, given the 
greater freedom of lawyers under the Ohio Rules to disseminate information about their services, so 
long as it is not false, misleading, or nonverifiable. Rule 7.1. 
The fourteen items in former OH DR 2-101(D) were: 
(1) Name or names of lawyer, law firm, and professional associates, together with their addresses and 
telephone numbers, with designations such as “Lawyer,” “Attorney,” “Law Firm.” (Now see Rule 7.2 
cmt. [2].) Restrictions on law firm names are addressed in Rule 7.5. See sections 7.5:200-:500. 
(2) Field or fields of practice, limitations of practice, or areas of concentration, but only to the extent 
permitted by former OH DR 2-105. (Now see Rule 7.2 cmt. [2]; see section 7.4:200.) 
(3) Date and place of birth. 
(4) Dates and places of admission to the bar of the state and federal courts. See  In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 
191 (1982) (striking down state’s prohibition on lawyers’ identification of jurisdictions in which they 
are licensed to practice). 
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation and degrees conferred. 
(6) Legal teaching positions held at accredited law schools. 
(7) Authored publications. 
(8) Memberships in bar associations and other professional organizations. 
(9) Technical and professional licenses. 
(10) Military service. 
(11) Foreign language abilities. (Now see Rule 7.2 cmt. [2].) 
(12) Subject to former OH DR 2-103, prepaid or group legal service programs in which the lawyer or 
firm participates. (Now see Rules 7.2(b)(2) and 7.3(f); see sections 7.2:400, 7.3:210, and 7.3:500.) 
(13) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted. (Now see Rule 7.2 cmt. [2].) 
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(14) Office and telephone answering services hours. 
Even under the Code, the items listed did not include all of the information lawyers might properly 
convey in public communications, see Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2000-6, 
2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (Dec. 1, 2000) (OH DR 2-101(D) list is illustrative, not 
exhaustive); restrictions defining permissible subjects of communication and prohibiting all others 
have been struck down as an unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment.  In re R.M.J., 
455 U.S. 191 (1982) (striking down state’s requirement that lawyers use specific words to describe 
particular areas of practice). 
Although not mentioned in the list, it was not inappropriate for a lawyer to advertise the names of 
regular clients. E.g., Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2000-6, 2000 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 6 (Dec. 1, 2000) (approving listing client names in public communications -- 
specifically, inclusion on law firm web site -- but cautioning that client consent should be obtained). 
Such a practice, with the client’s consent, is expressly recognized Rule 7.2 cmt. [2]. 
Permissible communication of fee information: DR 2-101(E)(1) identified three types of information 
concerning fees and charges that a lawyer could advertise: (1) the fee for an initial consultation; (2) 
the availability, upon request, of a written fee schedule or fee estimate for specific services; and (3) 
the rates for services, whether computed on a contingency, fixed, or hourly basis. 
In contrast, Ohio Rule 7.2 cmt. [2] states generally that a lawyer may provide “the basis on which the 
lawyer’s fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit 
arrangements.” 
Permissible communication and the dignity requirement: Both DR 2-101(D) and (E) emphasized that 
permitted communications had to be “presented in a dignified manner.” While the organized bar 
nationwide has in the past shown special concern that lawyer advertising be dignified, it is not clear 
that such a restriction is constitutional. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 
648 (1985), the Court stated: “we are unsure that the State’s desire that attorneys maintain their 
dignity in their communications with the public is an interest substantial enough to justify the 
abridgement of their First Amendment rights.” There is no “dignity” requirement under the Rules. 
See Rule 7.2 cmt. [3], noting that questions of “taste” are speculative and subjective. 
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7.2:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.2 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.2 
  
7.2:101  Model Rule Comparison 
The differences between Ohio Rule 7.2 and the Model Rule are as follows: 
Division (b) differs in the following respects: the introductory 
paragraph adds, after “may”, “pay any of the following:” 
Subdivision (b)(1) deletes the word “pay” at the beginning of the 
subdivision. 
Subdivisions (b)(2) & (3) cover the subject of MR 7.2(b)(2) -- legal 
service plans and lawyer referral services -- in different language. 
Subdivision (b)(2) drops the word “pay” at the outset as well as all of 
the Model Rule language following “the usual charges of a legal 
services plan”. Subdivision (b)(3) substitutes the following for the 
lawyer referral services language in paragraph (b)(2) of the Model Rule: 
“the usual charges for a nonprofit or lawyer referral service that 
complies with Rule XVI of the Supreme Court Rules for the 
Government of the Bar of Ohio;”. 
Subdivision (b)(4) is identical to MR 7.2(b)(3), other than the deletion 
of “pay” at the outset and “and” at the end. 
MR 7.2(b)(4), added in 2002 and dealing with nonexclusive reciprocal 
referral agreements, is not included in Ohio Rule 7.2. 
Ohio has added a new division (d) (dealing with matters intended to be 
referred to other counsel), which is not included in the Model Rule. 
  
7.2:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 7.2: DR 2-101, DR 2-103, DR 2-104(B). 
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7.2:200  Permissible Forms of Lawyer Advertising 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.2(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.2(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.26-2.29, 2.31, 
2.87 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 81.1 
Wolfram § 14.2 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.26-2.29, 2.31, 2.87 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 7.2(a) permits a lawyer to “advertise services through written, recorded, or electronic 
communication, including public media,” subject only to the requirements of Rule 7.1 (false, 
misleading, or nonverifiable communications) and Rule 7.3 (direct solicitation). (Pursuant to the 
2003 amendment adopted in Ohio in conjunction with then-new OH DR 2-111 (sale of law practice), 
the OHCPR analog to Rule 7.2(a) (former DR 2-101(B)(1)) included “the sale of a law practice” in 
addition to “services,” but that addition has not been carried forward to the new Rules.) In its Ohio 
Code Comparison to Rule 7.2, the Task Force provides generally instructive information about 
Rules 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3: After again emphasizing that Rules 7.1 and 7.3 need to be consulted, it 
provides a check-list of former OHCPR provisions that have not been included in Rule 7.1, 7.2, or 
7.3: 
 The specific reference to types of fees or descriptions, such as “give-away” or “below-cost” 
found in DR 2-101(A)(5), although Rule 7.1, Comment [4] expressly states that these 
characterizations are misleading; 
 Specific references to media types and words, as set forth in DR 2-101(B)(1) and (2)[;] 
 Specific reference that brochures or pamphlets can be disclosed to “others,” as set forth in DR 
2-101(B)(3); 
 The list of items that were permissible for inclusion in advertising, contained in DR 2-101(D). 
[Now see Rule 7.2 cmt. [2].] 
The singling out of the elimination of “others” from the 2-101(B)(3) language providing that 
brochures and pamphlets can be disseminated “to clients, members of the bar, or others,” seems 
strange. Even though there is no longer any specific mention in the Rule either to brochures or 
pamphlets or to their distribution to specific recipients, there is of course no prohibition under the 
Rules against a lawyer’s dissemination of such materials to anyone, including “others” -- i.e., 
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prospective clients. (Indeed, Rules 7.1-7.3 say nothing explicit about dissemination of such materials 
to “clients or members of the bar” either.) Comment [2] refers to a nonexclusive list of information 
that lawyers can disseminate, including matters that might very well be in a firm’s brochure or 
pamphlet. It also expressly approves of dissemination of “other information that might invite the 
attention of those seeking legal assistance,” a group obviously included within “others.” Rule 7.2 cmt. 
[2]. 
Comment [1] states the rationale (the people’s “need to know about legal services”) for permitting 
lawyer advertising, “contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele.” The public need 
for such information “ought to prevail over considerations of tradition.” Rule 7.2 cmt. [1]. 
Comment [2] provides a noninclusive listing of information that may be publicly disseminated, 
similar to the “approved” lists in DR 2-101(D) & (E) (without the “dignified” limitation of the former 
rule). Some of the information is identical to the former list (e.g., lawyer’s foreign language ability; 
fees for specific services); some (e.g., credit agreements, names of regular clients, provided their 
consent is obtained) were not found in the prior listings. Comment [2] is expressly open ended -- it 
specifies that the dissemination can include “other information that might invite the attention of those 
seeking legal assistance.” Rule 7.2 cmt. [2]. This is a very broad standard indeed; apart from false or 
misleading matter, pretty much “anything goes” in general advertising by lawyers, as anyone who 
watches television or peruses attorney advertising in the yellow pages can attest. 
Comment [3] deals with matters of taste, largely by stating in a polite way that it’s not a business the 
ethics rules should be in. Thus, as noted above, the former requirement that advertising be presented 
in a “dignified” manner has been dropped. In a nutshell, “[q]uestions of effectiveness and taste in 
advertising are matters of speculation and subjective judgment.” Television advertising is approved, 
because to prevent it would, again, “impede the flow of information to many sectors of the public,” 
“particularly persons of low and moderate income.” Moreover, efforts to limit the kinds of things that 
can be advertised likewise impedes the information flow and “assumes that the bar can accurately 
forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant.” Finally, the comment states 
that “lawful communication by electronic mail is permitted by this rule.” Ohio Rule 7.2 cmt. [3]. 
Comment [4] notes that neither Rule 7.2 nor 7.3 “prohibits communications authorized by law, such 
as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.” Under the Code, the lawyer could not seek 
employment from those contacted, but could accept employment arising from such contacts. DR 
2-104(A)(5). This authorization was limited to situations where “success in asserting rights or 
defenses of the lawyer’s client in litigation in the nature of a class action is dependent upon the joinder 
of others.” Id. See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-2, Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 19, at *3 (Feb. 14, 1992). 
Given the greatly liberalized approach to advertising contained in Rule 7.2, together with the 
elimination of most of the micromanaging of what could and could not be done under the former 
OHCPR, opinions decided under the Code are not particularly helpful in interpreting the Rules. Thus, 
there is no longer any question (if there ever was) that a lawyer can advertise services through written 
communication, including public media; such advertisements are expressly permitted by 7.2(a) (as 
are recorded and electronic communication), so long as the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3 are met. 
This obviously includes advertising in telephone directories and in brochures and pamphlets, both of 
which were specifically addressed in the Code. Comment [5A] expressly includes within “advertising 
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and communications permitted by this rule,” “print directory listings, on-line directory listings, 
newspaper ads, television and radio airtime, domain-name registrations, sponsoring fees, banner ads, 
and group advertising.” Rule 7.2 cmt. [5A]. Inasmuch as advertising to the general public is now 
essentially unrestricted (again, subject to 7.1 and 7.3), advertising to other members of the profession, 
as by law directories or lists, and by professional announcements, is a given and is no longer 
encumbered by constraints limiting it to information that has “traditionally appeared” in such 
publications or on condition that the presentation be “dignified.” “Dignity,” like “taste,” is no longer a 
relevant factor. 
In addition to the approved methods of advertising listed above, the Board of Commissioners has 
made clear, in a comprehensive advisory opinion dealing with direct solicitation by text messaging, 
that texting prospective clients to solicit professional employment is “[g]enerally permissible” under 
Rule 7.2(a), as an “electronic communication” permitted by the rule, subject to adherence to the 
requirements of 7.1 and 7.3. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2013-2, 2013 Ohio 
Griev Disc. LEXIS 1 (April 5, 2013) [this is not a typo – LEXIS has labeled Op. 2013-1 as LEXIS 2 
and Op. 2013-2 as LEXIS 1.]. Thus, “a plain reading of Prof.Cond.R. 7.2(a) [i.e., from both 
“electronic communication” and “written communication”] indicates that lawyers may use text 
messaging to advertise their services. This conclusion is consistent with the forward-thinking 
commentary to Prof.Cond.R. 7.2.” Id. at *4-5. Again, any such message cannot be false, misleading 
or nonverifiable in violation of Rule 7.1 and must comply with the requisites of 7.3 as well. (The 7.3 
aspect of Opinion 2013 is discussed in sections 7.3:200, :300, & :400 infra.) 
In Opinion 2013, the Board also provides three practical considerations for lawyers using text 
messaging to directly solicit clients. First, “[i]f the lawyer is unable to verify that a text message 
solicitation will not result in a cost to the prospective client, he or she should employ ‘Free to End 
User’ (FTEU) text messaging, by which the initiator of the text message is responsible for the cost of 
both delivery and receipt.” Id. at *15. Second, the age of the recipient is important: “even though 
[Ohio Rule 7.3] does not explicitly prohibit the direct solicitation of minors as in some states, the 
Board discourages the solicitation of minors via text message.” Id. at *15-16. And, “lawyers must use 
due diligence to ensure that any text message advertisement or solicitation complies with applicable 
federal and state telemarketing laws.” Id. at *16. 
(Note that the micromanaging approach that existed under the Code apparently still exists in some 
jurisdictions. According to Thomas Spahn, Circuit Courts Start Invalidating State Marketing 
Rules, 21 Experience No. 1, 2011, at p. 46, Florida is the champion in the micromanaging 
department. According to one of Spahn’s examples, “a Florida lawyer commits an ethics violation by 
advertising that she is a member of the Florida Bar!” if she is also a member of other Bar(s) but does 
not list them in her advertisement. Id.) 
Two subjects that are not touched on by the new Rules are news coverage of an attorney and public 
speaking and writing by an attorney. They will be briefly discussed here. 
As to the former, lawyers often are the focus of news coverage, whether it be in the context of 
representing a particular client or in a story about the legal profession itself. While the lawyer need 
not shun media coverage as a general rule, restrictions do at times apply to what the lawyer can say to 
the media. See, e.g., section 3.6:200 (concerning trial publicity). Further, under the Code, a lawyer 
was not permitted to buy media coverage that is not advertising. DR 2-101(G). This provision was 
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not carried forward as such into the Rules (see Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 7.1: Rule 7.1 does 
not contain “the directives found in DR 2-101(D), (E), and (G)”). Be that as it may, there can be no 
doubt that such conduct -- essentially, bribing the media to provide professional publicity in the guise 
of a news item -- is ethically unacceptable. See Rules 8.4(b), (c), (d) & (h). As to the latter subject -- 
public speaking and writing on legal topics -- DR 2-104(A)(4) stated that a lawyer could do so, “so 
long as the lawyer does not emphasize the lawyer’s own professional experience or reputation and 
does not undertake to give individual advice.” The first restriction seems out-of-touch with what a 
lawyer may legitimately do in the way of advertising today (not to mention the relevance here of the 
First Amendment); the second, giving individual advice, seems akin to interpersonal contact under 
Rule 7.3, but Comment [7] thereto states that none of the 7.3 requirements “applies to 
communications sent in response to requests from clients or prospective clients.” One who chooses to 
attend a public presentation, whether in-person, on TV, or through the internet, seems fairly described 
as having requested to hear whatever the lawyer has to say, although one can imagine scenarios in 
which a lawyer might abuse the occasion and attempt to use it as an opportunity to engage in direct 
solicitation violative of Rule 7.3. (Cf. Rule 4.3, which prohibits a lawyer, dealing with an 
unrepresented person on behalf of a client, from giving advice other than to secure counsel, if the 
interests of the nonrepresented person and the client are in likely conflict and the lawyer knows or 
should know it.) Written publications on legal topics would be even less likely to be subject to abuse 
and seem as a general matter not to be an appropriate subject of ethics regulation. 
  
7.2:300  Retaining Copy of Advertising Material 




Ohio Rule 7.2 does not require the lawyer to retain copies of advertising material or maintain records 
of when and where it was used. (The ABA deleted this provision (former MR 7.2(b) as a part of its 
amendments to the Model Rules in 2002.) 
  
7.2:400  Paying to Have Services Recommended 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.2(b) 
Gov Bar R XVI 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.2(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.63-2.69, 2.71, 
2.73 
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ABA/BNA § 81.1 
Wolfram § 14.2 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.63-2.69, 2.71, 2.73 (1996). 
Recommendation of professional employment - In general: Ohio Rule 7.2(a) addresses permissible 
advertising. See section 7.2:200. Rule 7.2(b) controls the recommendation process. As a general 
matter, recommendations are most reliable if they come from disinterested parties. Division (b) seeks 
to assure that the recommendations received are, for the most part, disinterested. It therefore 
precludes a lawyer from giving anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services, 
other than (1) the reasonable cost of permitted advertising; (2) the usual charges of a legal-service 
plan or a lawyer-referral service; and (3) payment for a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17. 
Third-party referrals - In general: Through their many clients and dealings in the community, lawyers 
often have numerous third parties who can provide them with client referrals. This practice is not only 
common, but is encouraged. An individual who has had extensive dealings with a lawyer may be well 
situated to recommend that attorney to another. 
Concern arises where the lawyer is seen as influencing the third party to make the referral. If the 
referral is the product of such influence, then it lacks the reliability that disinterested 
recommendations ordinarily carry. See e.g., under the former OHCRP, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Haas, 83 Ohio St.3d 302, 304, 699 N.E.2d 919, 920 (1998) (“While many persons refer counsel to 
others, when such a referral is the result of monetary influence, it lacks the reliability of a 
disinterested recommendation.”). Rule 7.2(b) regulates third-party referrals, as discussed below. 
Giving anything of value in exchange for recommendation: The basic rule, as set forth in Ohio Rule 
7.2(b), is that a lawyer cannot 
give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s 
services, 
with four exceptions discussed below. On its face, the provision is violated when a lawyer exchanges 
something of value for a recommendation, whether or not the recommendation bears fruit. See, under 
the former OHCPR, Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Timens, 62 Ohio St.2d 357, 405 N.E. 2d 1038 (1980) 
(lawyer sanctioned for requesting referrals even though no referrals made). The provision speaks 
broadly, prohibiting, in exchange for a recommendation, not only direct payments to third parties, but 
also such practices as gift-giving or buying a meal, although a de minimis exception may be 
recognized. Also included within the prohibition are reciprocal referral agreements (exclusive or 
nonexclusive) between lawyers or between a lawyer and a nonlawyer. Rule 7.2 cmt. [5]. See as well 
Rule 5.7(b) & (c) (lawyer involved in law-related services business cannot require customer of 
law-related services business to agree to legal representation by the lawyer as a condition of doing 
business; nor can the lawyer require a client to use the business as a condition of representation of that 
client). See section 5.7:200. 
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Examples of violation involving payment in exchange for recommendations include, under the Rules, 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mason, 125 Ohio St.3d 29, 2010 Ohio 1467, 925 N.E.2d 963 (referral fees 
paid by law firm to nonlawyer for referring eight clients to firm in 2007) and, under the Code, e.g., 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Chasser, 124 Ohio St.3d 578, 2010 Ohio 956, 925 N.E.2d 595 (splitting 
fee with another lawyer who referred personal injury claim to respondent; violation of DR 2-103(B)); 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Willette, 117 Ohio St.3d 433, 2008 Ohio 1198, 884 N.E.2d 581 
(respondent paid Michigan firm to refer estate-package clients to him); Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-1, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 1, 2002) (payment 
of annual fee to real-estate agency for promoting law firm as part of agency’s real-estate benefits 
program; likewise, discounting of fees to customers of program is giving thing of value). 
Participation in a scheme in which outside counsel kicked back a portion of his fees in return for the 
referral of the company’s legal work was deemed particularly reprehensible. See Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n v. Kanter, 86 Ohio St.3d 554, 715 N.E.2d 1140 (1999) (disciplinary action against outside 
counsel; condemning practice and detailing harm it causes to clients and profession). See also Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel v. Linick, 84 Ohio St.3d 489, 705 N.E.2d 667 (1999), and Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n v. Zuckerman, 83 Ohio St.3d 148, 699 N.E.2d 40 (1998), the first of which was a disciplinary 
action against the inside counsel involved in Kanter, and the second, a disciplinary action against 
another outside counsel involved with Linick in another kickback scheme. The Kanter, Linick, and 
Zuckerman cases are further described in section 1.5:800. 
Giving a client free legal services in exchange for a referral also would violate the Rule. See, under 
the Code, Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Potts 65 Ohio St.3d 297, 603 N.E.2d 986 (1992). So too would 
paying a financial consulting firm to hand out to its clients brochures about the lawyer, Ohio State 
Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 90-6 (Aug. 2, 1990), or paying a sponsoring organization’s expenses 
incurred in offering a public seminar in which the lawyer’s services are to be recommended. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 94-2 (Oct. 25, 1994); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 94-95-05 (n.d.) 
(co-sponsorship or cost-sharing of a financial-planning seminar out of which a financial planner will 
recommend services of participating lawyer as one of a number of lawyers recommended violated 
DR 2-103(B)). Making periodic voluntary contributions to a nonprofit social-service agency that 
refers both pro-bono and fee-generating clients to a lawyer violated this provision as well. Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-19, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 10 (Aug. 16, 
1991). Whether a lawyer and client each providing links to the other on their world-wide-web home 
pages is giving “anything of value” has been described as “an interesting legal question.” Cincinnati 
Bar Ass’n Op. 96-97-01, at 6 (May 20, 1997).  
In a number of situations, opinions have stressed that a lawyer’s conferring even an indirect benefit on 
the referrer violated the Code provision. A lawyer for a corporation could not provide private legal 
representation to the corporation’s clients on matters relating to issues on which the corporation had 
worked if the client was recommended to the attorney by a corporate officer or employee, in part 
because to do so would add value to the corporate services and thus improperly compensate the 
corporation for a recommendation of employment. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 92-17, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Oct. 16, 1992). Nor could a lawyer give a free 
consultation to a surviving spouse or child referred to the lawyer as part of a funeral package offered 
by a funeral director. Such activity was giving the funeral director something of value, the increased 
value the service added to the funeral package in exchange for the referral. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
1139
Ohio Legal Ethics 7.2 
 
 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-012, Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 24 (June 17, 1988). This advice, 
however, has not been universal. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 93-7 (May 14, 1993) (lawyer could accept 
such referrals from insurance agent/financial advisor who informed seminar attendees at living-trust 
and insurance seminars, given by the agent/financial advisor, that he could refer them to competent 
attorney). 
A major difference between Rule 7.2(b) and the prior law under the Code should be noted. The 
trigger for a 7.2(b) violation is “giving anything of value,” as in former OH DR 2-103(B); the Code in 
DR 2-103(C) also prohibited requesting a person or organization (other than those listed in former 
OH DR 2-103(D), i.e., a qualified lawyer referral service) to recommend or promote the use of the 
lawyer’s services. E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Willard, 123 Ohio St.3d 15, 2009 Ohio 3629, 913 
N.E.2d 960 (oral agreement with foreclosure avoidance company, whereby company solicited 
business from customers and referred cases to respondent); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Mullaney, 119 
Ohio St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 4541, 894 N.E.2d 1210 (business relationship with another company 
offering foreclosure-avoidance services, pursuant to which company referred all legal work 
defending foreclosure actions on behalf of its customers to respondents; DR 2-103(C) violated); 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Willette, 117 Ohio St.3d 433, 2008 Ohio 1198, 884 N.E.2d 581 (using 
out-of-state firm to market his services for living trusts and other estate packages violated 2-103(C)); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kramer, 113 Ohio St.3d 455, 2007 Ohio 455, 2007 Ohio 2340, 866 
N.E.2d 498, (characterizing the 2-103(C) violation in terms of “engaging” another to promote the 
lawyer’s services). Such a request would not violate 7.2(b), unless tied to payment therefor. 
Exceptions to the prohibition against giving anything of value for recommendation or referral: Rule 
7.2(b) contains four exceptions to the prohibition against paying for recommendations. A lawyer may 
pay 
 (1) the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications 
permitted by this rule; 
 (2) the usual charges of a legal service plan; 
 (3) the usual charges for a nonprofit or lawyer referral service 
that complies with Rule XVI of the Supreme Court Rules for the 
Government of the Bar of Ohio; [and] 
 (4) for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17. 
Exception (1) - advertising: Comment [5A] provides a noninclusive list of paid items permitted by the 
advertising/communication exception, such as directory listings, airtime on TV and radio, newspaper 
ads, and group advertising. Rule 7.2 cmt. [5A]. It goes on to note that lawyers may compensate those 
“who are engaged to provide marketing or client-development services, such as publicists, 
public-relations personnel, business-development staff and website designers.” Id. 
In a 2001 opinion, under the former OHCPR, the Board clearly enunciated the factors to be 
considered in drawing the line between permissible advertising and impermissible payments for 
referrals in the context of a web site steering potential clients to the attorney. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-2, 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (Apr. 6, 2001). The 
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Board stressed three factors that distinguish the two situations: (1) The payment arrangement -- 
Advertising generally involves a fixed fee for services performed over a set period of time. Referrals 
generally involve payments based on the actual number of people that contact or hire the attorney or a 
percentage of the fees generated from the third-party’s efforts. (2) The services provided by the third 
party -- With advertising, the services performed by the third party provider are largely ministerial, 
basically placing information before the public. In a referral, the third party will go beyond the 
ministerial function of merely placing the lawyer’s information before the public. (3) Public 
perception -- In advertising, the third party will make clear that the material presented is an 
advertisement and not a referral or recommendation. In a referral, the third-party provider will not 
clarify that the information is an advertisement, but will instead make the information appear as if the 
provider is referring and recommending the lawyer. ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 546 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary) quotes Opinion 2001-2 (at *10) in describing the 
difference between payments for advertising and payments for referrals: 
when lawyer “pays an entity to perform only the ministerial function of 
placing the attorney’s name, address, phone number, fields of practice, 
and biographical information into the view of the public that is 
considered payment for an advertisement, not payment for a referral.” 
Exceptions (2) & (3) - Payment of usual charges to legal service plans and to lawyer referral services: 
As set forth in Comment [6], a legal service plan “is a prepaid or group legal service plan or a similar 
delivery system that assists prospective clients to secure legal representation,” whereas a lawyer 
referral service “is any organization that holds itself out to the public as a lawyer referral service.” 
Ohio Rule 7.2 cmt. [6]. Rule 7.2(b)(3) permits a lawyer to pay the usual charges only “of a nonprofit 
or qualified lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is one that is approved 
pursuant to [Gov Bar R] XVI.” Rule 7.2 cmt. [6]. Note that this limitation to “usual charges” raises 
the question whether this includes both membership or representation fees and the percentage of legal 
fees that such a service could require the lawyer to pay under former DR 2-103(C)(2)(a), discussed 
below. Note further that the reference to “nonprofit or qualified lawyer referral service” appears to be 
inconsistent with Rule 5.4(a)(5), which permits the sharing of fees with a qualified legal referral 
service only if it is “a nonprofit organization.” See section 5.4:200. 
Comment [7] obligates a lawyer accepting legal-service-plan or lawyer-referral-service referrals to 
“act reasonably to assure that the activities of the plan or service are compatible with the lawyer’s 
professional obligations.” For example, the plan or service may communicate with prospective clients, 
but such communication cannot be false or misleading, “as would be the case if the communications 
of a group advertising program or a group legal services plan would mislead prospective clients to 
think that it was a lawyer referral service sponsored by a state agency or bar association. Nor could a 
lawyer allow in-person, telephonic, or real-time [electronic] contacts that would violate Rule 7.3.” 
Ohio Rule 7.2 cmt. [7]. 
Legal service plans under the Rules: References to legal service plans, in addition to those in 
Comments [6] and [7] noted above, occur in Rule 7.3(f) and Rule 7.3 cmts. [4], [6], & [8]. Division 
(f), further discussed in section 7.3:500, permits a lawyer to participate in a plan operated by an 
organization that uses interpersonal contact to solicit memberships in such a plan, so long as the 
persons contacted are not known to be in need of legal services. Comment [4] emphasizes that a 
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lawyer may participate in such plans of “public or charitable legal service organizations or bona fide 
political, social, civic, fraternal, employee, or trade organizations whose purposes include providing 
or recommending legal services to its members or beneficiaries.” Rule 7.3 cmt. [4]. See section 
7.3:210. Comments [6] and [8] contain, respectively, an explanation of why lawyer contact of 
organizations interested in establishing a group or prepaid legal plan is not prohibited by Rule 7.3, 
and further elaboration on lawyer participation regarding such plans pursuant to division (f). Both 
Rule 7.2 cmts. [6] & [8] are further discussed in section 7.3:500. 
A comprehensive definition of a legal service plan is found in Gov Bar R XVI 4(A): 
 A plan of prepaid legal services insurance authorized to operate 
in Ohio or a group or prepaid legal plan, whether operated by a union, 
trust, mutual benefit or aid association, corporation or other entity or 
person, that provides unlimited or a specified amount of telephone 
advice or personal communication at no charge, other than a periodic 
membership or beneficiary fee, to the members or beneficiaries and 
furnishes to or pays for legal services for its members or beneficiaries. 
This language was formerly found in the Lawyer Referral and Information (“LRIS”) Regulations at 
LRIS Reg 100(C)(1); simultaneously with the adoption of revised Gov Bar R XVI effective April 
30, 2007, which now includes the provisions of the former LRIS Regulations, the Regulations were 
repealed. 
See Gov Bar R XVI 5 for a more extensive discussion of the requirements applicable to legal-service 
plans. 
Lawyer referral services under the Rules: Rule 7.2(b)(3) speaks of lawyer referral services that 
comply with Gov Bar R XVI. While there previously was a disconnect between the Professional 
Conduct Rule and the Governing Bar Rule, (the compliance provisions were in the LRIS Regulations, 
not the Bar Rule), that has now been cured by amended Rule XVI, effective April 30, 2007, which 
now contains the compliance provisions that had been set forth in the repealed Regulations. See Gov 
Bar R XVI (1)(B), 2-3. 
The background of this change was set forth by the Task Force in its Report at 27: 
The provisions contained in [former] DR 2-103 have the salutary 
purpose of ensuring that Ohioans who are in need of legal services will 
receive appropriate and quality referrals from an entity that satisfies or 
exceeds certain minimum standards. However, because these 
provisions focus on the operation of the referral services themselves, 
rather than the conduct of participating lawyers, the Task Force 
suggests that these provisions are misplaced in the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
In addition, the Task Force recommends that in adopting Rule 7.2, 
which addresses the obligation of an Ohio lawyer when participating in 
a lawyer referral service, the Court include a cross-reference to the 
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requirements of Gov. Bar R. XVI. The Task Force further recommends 
that the Supreme Court amend Gov. Bar R. XVI to incorporate the 
provisions currently found in DR 2-103(C) [comparable to the repealed 
LRIS Regulations] that regulate the manner in which the lawyer 
referral services operate. 
With the adoption of amended Gov Bar R XVI, these recommendations have now been effected. 
Permissible conduct: There are two types of organizations as to which the Rule 7.2(b) 
payment-of-anything-of-value restriction with respect to referrals does not apply. They are: 
a nonprofit or lawyer referral service that complies with Gov Bar R 
XVI, and 
a legal service plan. 
Rule 7.2(b)(2) & (3). 
(There were other organizations listed in former DR 2-103(D) -- a legal aid or public defender’s 
office, and a military legal assistance plan. Presumably, lawyers can continue to obtain referrals from 
such organizations so long as, consistent with Rule 7.2(b), nothing of value is given by the lawyer in 
return.) 
Requirements of legal service plans:  As is set forth in Gov Bar R XVI 5, a legal-service plan – i.e., 
“[a]ny bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to its members or 
beneficiaries,” must satisfy all of the following: 
(A) The organization, including any affiliate, is organized and 
operated so that no profit is derived by it from the rendition of legal 
services by lawyers, and that, if the organization is organized for profit, 
the legal services are not rendered by lawyers employed, directed, 
supervised, or selected by it except in connection with matters where 
the organization bears ultimate liability of its member or beneficiary. 
(B) Neither the lawyer, the lawyer’s partner, associate, or any other 
lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm, nor any 
nonlawyer, shall have initiated or promoted the organization for the 
primary purpose of providing financial or other benefit to the lawyer, 
partner, associate, or affiliated lawyer. 
(C) The organization is not operated for the purpose of procuring 
legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a private practitioner 
outside of the legal services program of the organization. 
(D) The member or beneficiary to whom the legal services are 
furnished, and not the organization, is recognized as the client of the 
lawyer in the matter. 
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(E) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal 
services furnished or paid for by the organization, if such member or 
beneficiary so desires, may select counsel other than that furnished, 
selected, or approved by the organization; provided, however, that the 
organization shall be under no obligation to pay for the legal services 
furnished by the attorney selected by the beneficiary unless the terms of 
the legal services plan specifically provide for payment. 
(F) Any member or beneficiary may assert a claim that 
representation by counsel furnished, selected, or approved by the 
organization would be unethical, improper, or inadequate under the 
circumstance of the matter involved.  The plan shall provide for 
adjudication of a claim under division (E) of this section and 
appropriate relief through substitution of counsel or providing that the 
beneficiary may select counsel and the organization shall pay for the 
legal services rendered by selected counsel to the extent that such 
services are covered under the plan and in an amount equal to the cost 
that would have been incurred by the plan if the plan had furnished 
designated counsel. 
(G) The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that the 
organization is in violation of applicable laws, rules of court, and other 
legal requirements that govern its operations. 
(H) The organization has filed with the Supreme Court Office of 
Attorney Services, on or before the first day of March each year, a 
report with respect to its legal service plan, if any, showing its terms, its 
schedule of benefits, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, 
and financial results of its legal service activities. 
Lawyer referral services: One way for a prospective client to locate an attorney who takes cases in the 
client’s area of need is through a lawyer referral service. Under such a system, the lawyer can pay the 
service, acting as a clearing house, a fee for such referrals. 
Gov Bar R XVI 1 imposes a number of requirements on lawyer referral services that must be met 
before a lawyer ethically can participate in them. On the whole, these requirements serve to protect 
both clients and participating lawyers. 
As a threshold requirement, a lawyer referral service has to be operated “in the public interest.” Id. at 
(A)(1). Referrals can be made not only to lawyers, but also to pro bono and public service programs as 
well as government and other agencies that can provide needed assistance. In making referrals, the 
service was to take into account the client’s “financial circumstance, spoken language, any disability, 
geographical convenience, and the nature and the complexity of their problem.” Id. The core idea 
underlying this provision was that referral services must be responsive to client needs rather than 
simply serving as a mechanism to churn cases for participating lawyers.  
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The Bar Rule goes on to require that any such service has to call itself “a lawyer referral service or a 
lawyer referral and information service.” Id. at (A)(2). This requirement assists prospective clients in 
finding a service when they need one. 
Several provisions within the Bar Rule speak to eligibility requirements for participating attorneys. 
All attorneys who meet those requirements have to be allowed to participate in the service if they 
choose to do so. Id.  at (A)(3). This subsection imposes five requirements that have to be met before a 
lawyer can participate in a qualified lawyer referral service. The first involves licensure. The 
participating lawyer has to be licensed and admitted to practice law in the state of Ohio. The second 
restriction is geographical. The lawyer has to have an office in the area served by the service. The 
third restriction relates to the lawyer’s qualifications. The lawyer has to meet any reasonable, 
objectively determined experience requirements established by the service. The fourth restriction 
pertains to fee requirements for participation in the service. The lawyer has to pay any reasonable 
registration and membership fees established by the service. The fifth restriction speaks to the ability 
of the lawyer to satisfy any claims that might arise out of the representation. The lawyer has to 
maintain a policy of errors and omissions insurance in an amount established by the service. To the 
extent the service establishes subject-matter panels, it can set eligibility criteria for them as long as 
they are based on “experience and other substantial, objectively determinable criteria.” Id. at (A)(7). 
One special concern involves the potential for misconduct that can arise if the lawyers receiving 
paying referrals have an ownership or operational interest in the lawyer referral service. To meet this 
concern, Gov Bar R XVI 1(A)(6) provides that lawyer referral services must promulgate “rules that 
prohibit the making of a fee generating referral to any lawyer who has an ownership interest in, or 
who operates or is employed by the lawyer referral service, or who is associated with a law firm that 
has an ownership interest in, or operates or is employed by the lawyer referral service.” Rule XVI 1 
also affirmatively states that the referral service cannot make a fee-generating referral to any such 
lawyer.  Id. at (A)(9). 
Built into the rule are several additional safeguards for clients. It requires the lawyer referral service 
to establish rules that would prohibit a lawyer from charging a referred client fees and costs in excess 
of those that have been charged had the lawyer referral service not been involved. Id. at (A)(4). This 
is intended to keep the lawyer from passing on the costs of participation in the service to the client. 
Procedures also have to be in place to admit, suspend, and remove lawyers from the lawyer referral 
service’s rolls, id. at (A)(6), as well as procedures to investigate and act upon consumer complaints 
about the service, its employees, or participating lawyers. Id. at (A)(5). Lawyer referral services also 
are required to establish procedures to survey clients periodically to determine client satisfaction with 
the service. Id. 
A new lawyer referral service must register with the Supreme Court Office of Attorney Services 90 
days before beginning operation, and all lawyer referral services must file an annual report with that 
Office.  Id. at (B). 
In addition to these mandatory provisions, the rule also provides three optional requirements that 
lawyer referral services may impose on participating lawyers. First, in addition to the payment of a 
membership or registration fee, a lawyer can be required to pay to the referral service a percentage of 
the legal fees the lawyer earns on referred matters. Id. at (C)(1). See, under the Code, Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2000-5, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (Dec. 1, 
1145
Ohio Legal Ethics 7.2 
 
 
2000) (DR 2-103(C) requirements applicable to online referral services). See also former DR 
3-102(A)(4) (providing that such payments are an exception to the rule against dividing legal fees 
with a nonlawyer), now set forth in Ohio Rule 5.4(a)(5), which limits the exception to sharing with 
nonprofit organizations that are in compliance with Gov Bar R XVI. See generally section 5.4:200. 
However, subsection (c)(1) of Gov Bar R XVI 1 restricts the use the lawyer referral service can make 
of such percentage fees. The income shall be used only to pay the reasonable operating expenses of 
the service and to fund public service pro bono activities of the service or its sponsoring organization. 
A second requirement that a lawyer referral service can impose as a condition of participating in the 
service is the lawyer’s agreement to submit any fee disputes with a referred client to mandatory fee 
arbitration. Id. at (C)(2).  Third, the service may require participating lawyers to “[p]articipate in 
moderate and no-fee panels and other panels established by the service that respond to the referral 
needs of the consumer public.”  Id. at (C)(3). 
Under this regime a lawyer can request referrals and may of course undertake representation based on 
referrals from such an organization, but the lawyer must make sure that he or she remains free to 
exercise independent professional judgment on the client’s behalf. Ohio Rule 5.4(c). See section 
5.4:400, at “Third-party direction of the lawyer’s legal judgment - Organizational intermediaries in 
the provision of legal services.” A requirement that a lawyer may co-counsel only with other lawyers 
on the referral panel would undermine this principle. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 92-1, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 20 (Feb. 14, 1992). As a consequence, lawyer referral 
services are prohibited from imposing such a requirement. Gov Bar R XVI 1(A)(8). 
In Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2000-5, 2000 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 
(Dec. 1, 2000), the Board opined that (1) if an online referral service was in compliance with DR 
2-103 and the LRIS regulations, an Ohio attorney could enter into a referral agreement with an 
out-of-state law firm operating the service, and (2) the applicable provisions of former 2-103 and 
3-102 expressly permitted payment by an attorney of a membership or registration fee to a qualified 
online referral service as well as a fee calculated on a percentage of the legal fee earned. See, under 
the OHRPC, Rules 7.2(b)(3) and 5.4(a)(5). 
Pursuant to the terms of Rule 7.2(b)(3), if the lawyer referral service is both for-profit and not 
qualified under Gov Bar R XVI, a lawyer is subject to the 7.2(b) prohibition against giving anything 
of value for a referral. See Rule 7.2 cmt. [6]. 
In addition to the foregoing, Gov Bar R XVI now includes (from the former LRIS Regulations) 
provisions that must be set forth in agreement governing lawyer participation, id. at 2(A)-(C) (e.g., 
professional-liability insurance requirements; provisions for removing from further participation 
disbarred or suspended lawyers and lawyers charged with a crime “involving moral turpitude or 
dishonesty”; notice obligations of the participating attorney; and arbitration or mediation of 
lawyer-service fee disputes.  See section 2 for the complete listing.  Section 3 deals with notice of and 
possible disclosure of information relating to the client’s case.  Finally, Section 4 of Gov Bar R XVI 
makes clear that the provisions of sections 1-3 do not apply to legal service plans, attorney-to-attorney 
individual referrals, attorney joint advertising solely to solicit clients for themselves, or pro bono 
assistance programs not accepting fees from attorneys or clients for referral. 
Exception (4) - Paying for a law practice: Nationally there has been significant debate over the 
propriety of a lawyer selling his practice to another. See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
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Discipline Op. 92-19, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (Oct. 16, 1992) (acknowledging the 
debate within the profession). To the extent that entailed the sale of client files and client lists, the 
practice was prohibited in Ohio, Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Patterson, 64 Ohio St.2d 163, 413 
N.E.2d 840 (1980) (purchase of law practice violated 2-103(B)), but that was changed by the 
adoption of DR 2-111, effective February 1, 2003. It permitted the purchase and sale of a law practice, 
including the good will of the practice, on certain conditions specified in the disciplinary rule; those 
provisions have been incorporated in Ohio Rule 1.17. See sections 1.17:200-:300. 
Although such a transaction was not included in the exceptions to the prohibition against giving 
anything of value for a recommendation in DR 2-103(B), an express exception is made in the new 
Rules, in Rule 7.2(b)(4), presumably to ward off any argument that the purchase of a law practice 
constitutes or involves an improper payment for referrals. 
 
7.2:500  Identification of a Responsible Lawyer 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.2(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.2(c) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 81.1 
Wolfram § 14.2 
Like MR 7.2(c), Ohio Rule 7.2(c) requires that any communication made pursuant to this rule must 
“include the name and office address of at least one lawyer or law firm responsible for its content.” 
There was no comparable provision under the former OHCPR. 
Rule 7.2(c) comes into play in Board of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2013-2, 2013 
Ohio Griev. Disc. LEXIS 1 (April 5, 2013), dealing with text messaging to solicit professional 
employment. (Other aspects of the Board’s opinion are discussed in sections 7.2:200 and 
7.3:200, :300 & :400). While the Board states generally that such texting is “generally permissible” 
under Rule 7.2(a), it notes that “[b]ecause text message advertising is written or electronic 
communication made pursuant to Prof.Cond.R. 7.2, the text message must include the name and 
office address of the lawyer or law firm responsible for the message.” Id. at *14. But as the opinion 
also notes at the outset “SMS text messages are typically limited to 160 characters,” id. at *2, and 
longer messages, if transmitted, will be sent in multiple segments. Id. As a practical matter, the 
lawyer-name-and-address requirement in and of itself will invariably require multiple messages 
(unless the lawyer has a very short name and address, or unless sender and receiver have enhanced 
messaging, which allows up to 1,000 characters), a fact which may tend to detract from the 
effectiveness of the text messaging technique as a solicitation device. 
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7.2:600  Advertising for Matters to be Referred 
Primary Ohio References 




Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.17 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.17 (1996). 
In a provision not found in the Model Rules, division (d) carries forward the prohibition of former 
OH DR 2-101(A)(2) against a lawyer’s advertising for matters that he or she intends to refer to 
another lawyer or firm. Under division (d), a lawyer cannot 
seek employment in connection with a matter in which the lawyer or 
law firm does not intend to participate actively in the representation, 
but that the lawyer or law firm intends to refer to other counsel. 
Ohio Rule 7.2(d). 
Typically, a lawyer would do so with the expectation of a referral fee. Limitations on referral fees are 
set forth in Rule 1.5(e). 
There are two exceptions to the Rule 7.2(d) prohibition: First, “it does not apply to organizations 
listed in Rules 7.2(b)(2) or (3)”; second, it does not apply “if the advertisement is in furtherance of a 
transaction permitted by Rule 1.17.” 
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7.3:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.3 
  
7.3:101  Model Rule Comparison 
The differences between Ohio Rule 7.3 and MR 7.3 are as follows: 
 
Divisions (a) and (b) are substantively identical to the Model Rule, 
with minor changes in wording. 
In division (c), the clause “Unless the recipient of the communication is 
a person specified in division (a)(1) or (2) of this rule” is placed at the 
beginning of the first paragraph, rather than at the end, as in the Model 
Rule. Division (c) also substitutes “whom the lawyer reasonably 
believes” for “known” before “prospective client” in the opening 
paragraph. Finally, after the words “in a particular matter” in the 
opening paragraph, division (c) deletes the Model Rule language “shall 
include the words ‘Advertising Material’ on the outside envelope, if 
any, and at the beginning and ending of any recorded or electronic 
communication,” and in lieu thereof states: 
“shall comply with all of the following: 
(1) Disclose accurately and fully the manner in which the lawyer 
or law firm became aware of the identity and specific legal need 
of the addressee; 
(2) Disclaim or refrain from expressing any predetermined 
evaluation of the merits of the addressee’s case; 
(3) Conspicuously include in its text and on the outside envelope, 
if any, and at the beginning and ending of any recorded or 
electronic communication the recital - ‘ADVERTISING 
MATERIAL’ or ‘ADVERTISEMENT ONLY.’“ 
Division (d) has no counterpart in MR 7.3 and sets forth steps that must 
be taken before making a solicitation pursuant to division (c). 
Division (e) likewise has no counterpart in MR 7.3 and states that a 
solicitation sent within thirty days of an accident or disaster giving rise 
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to a potential personal injury or wrongful death claim shall include the 
document entitled “Understanding Your Rights,” the full text of which 
is set forth in division (d). 
Division (f) is substantively identical to MR 7.3(d). 
 
7.3:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 7.3: DR 2-104(A). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 7.3(a): DR 2-101(F)(1). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 7.3(b): None. 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 7.3(c): DR 2-101(F)(2). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 7.3(d): DR 2-101(F)(4). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 7.3(e): DR 2-101(H). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 7.3(f): DR 2-103(D)(4). 
  
7.3:200  Prohibition of For-Profit In-Person, Live Telephone, and Real-Time 
Electronic Solicitation 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.3(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.3(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.64, 2.84-2.86, 
2.168 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 81:2001 
Wolfram § 14.2.5 
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The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.64, 2.84-2.86 (1996). 
Solicitation - In general: Beyond the general restrictions on lawyer advertising (Rule 7.2) and on false, 
misleading, or nonverifiable claims (Rule 7.1), substantial additional controls are imposed on (1) 
solicitation by in-person, live telephone, real-time electronic contact (e.g., “chat rooms”), and (2) 
direct mail, recorded, or electronic solicitation. The former are treated in this section. The latter are 
addressed in section 7.3:400.  Section 7.3:300 deals with additional restrictions applicable to all 
forms of solicitation. 
For-profit, in-person, live telephone, and real-time electronic contact: In a number of cases, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has stressed that the perils associated with in-person solicitation undertaken for 
pecuniary gain justify allowing a state to ban such practices. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). Two principal concerns emerge. 
The first is the significant possibility of overreaching that might arise in this interactive context. An 
individual may be hard pressed to ignore the persuasive arguments of a trained advocate, particularly 
where the argument can be tailored at the moment to the individual’s reservations about 
representation. This is particularly true for the individual whose judgment may be impaired by the 
stress of the life events that have sparked the lawyer’s solicitation in the first place. Direct in-person, 
live telephone, or real-time electronic contact places pressure on a prospective client to make an 
immediate yes-or-no decision about representation rather than reflecting on the matter. Such 
solicitation may also involve an invasion of privacy in a way that media advertising or mail does not. 
Second, while in-person, live telephone, and real-time electronic solicitation will not always be 
abusive, problems of proof make it hard to determine on a case-by-case basis exactly what occurred in 
the exchange. It would be the lawyer’s word against the client’s, should a dispute arise. Other forms 
of advertising, in contrast, leave a written trail. Taken together, the increased potential for abuse and 
difficulties of proof warrant greater regulation of in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain than for 
other forms of advertising and solicitation.  Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (making 
these distinctions in upholding lawyer’s right to engage in targeted-mail solicitation); Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (drawing these distinctions to uphold lawyer’s 
right to solicit clients through newspaper advertising containing legal advice). 
Given the freedom to regulate in this area, Ohio has chosen in Rule 7.3(a) to ban a lawyer from 
making an “in-person, live telephone, or real-time electronic contact [to] solicit professional 
employment from a prospective client when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the 
lawyer’s pecuniary gain,” unless the target is a lawyer ((a)(1)) or has family, close personal, or a prior 
professional relationship with the contacting lawyer ((a)(2)). (Division(f) excepts contact made in 
connection with a prepaid or group legal services plan from the prohibitions of division (a). See 
section 7.3:500.) 
Comments [1]-[3] discuss the rationale underlying the 7.3(a) prohibition -- in sum, it is the “potential 
for abuse inherent in direct in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact by a lawyer with a 
prospective client known to need legal services. . . . The situation is fraught with the possibility of 
undue influence, intimidation, and overreaching.” Rule 7.3 cmt. [1]. “This potential for abuse . . . 
justifies its prohibition, particularly since lawyer advertising and written and recorded 
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communication permitted under Rule 7.2 offer alternative means of conveying necessary information 
to those who may be in need of legal services.” Rule 7.3 cmt. [2]. Comment [3] further states the case 
for use of advertising and written, recorded, or electronic communication in transmitting information 
to a prospective client. Rule 7.3 cmt. [3]. Note, however, that Comment [1] limits its argument for the 
7.3(a) prohibition to situations involving a prospective client “known to need legal services.” Rule 
7.3(a) itself, however, is not so limited and precludes all interpersonal solicitations significantly 
driven by pecuniary gain, other than those excepted by Rule 7.3(a)(1) & (2). 
Comment [4] articulates the basis for the exceptions set forth in Rule 7.3(a)(1) & (2), which 
exceptions apply to communications under division (c) as well -- that “[t]here is far less likelihood 
that a lawyer would engage in abusive practices against an individual who is a former client, or with 
whom the lawyer has [a] close personal or family relationship.” The comment notes that the 
likelihood is also less “in situations in which the lawyer is motivated by considerations other than the 
lawyer’s pecuniary gain” or when the recipient is a lawyer. Comment [4] also makes clear that 
division (a) does not prohibit a lawyer from participating in the constitutionally protected activities of 
public or charitable legal-service organizations or bona fide political, civic, or other organizations 
“whose purposes include providing or recommending legal services to its members or beneficiaries.” 
Rule 7.3 cmt. [4]. 
And Comment [5] reminds that “even permitted forms of solicitation can be abused,” and thus are 
subject to the Rule 7.1 ban on false, misleading, or nonverifiable information, the Rule 7.3(b)(2) ban 
on coercive or harassing solicitation, and the Rule 7.3(b)(1) ban on soliciting a person who has made 
known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited. 
Finally, as Comment [7] makes clear, 
 none of the requirements of Rule 7.3 applies to 
communications sent in response to requests from clients or 
prospective clients. [Nor do] [g]eneral announcements . . . including 
changes in personnel or office location . . . constitute communications 
soliciting professional employment from a client known to be in need 
of legal services within the meaning of this rule. 
Rule 7.3 cmt. [7] (emphasis and bracketed material added). 
Cases involving lawyers who were sanctioned for violating the analogous restriction on solicitation in 
former DR 2-101(F)(1) (direct in-person or telephone solicitation)) under the Code include 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Willette, 117 Ohio St.3d 433, 2008 Ohio 1198, 884 N.E.2d 581 
(telemarketer for firm with whom respondent had contractual relationship telephoned potential clients 
to solicit business for respondent); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth, 93 Ohio St.3d 173, 754 
N.E.2d 219 (2001) (respondent responsible for actions of his employee, whose original telephone 
solicitation violated DR 2-101(F)(1), followed by six-page fax letter from respondent, which violated 
2-104(A)). DR 2-103(A) was also invoked in response to such conduct. E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. 
McNamee, 119 Ohio St.3d 269, 2008 Ohio 3883, 893 N.E.2d 490, where the respondent 
recommended himself as the prospective clients’ lawyer for a development project. Accord 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Rafidi, 114 Ohio St.3d 336, 2007 Ohio 3674, 872 N.E.2d 265 (in-person 
solicitation of criminal suspect charged with drug-trafficking violated 2-103(A)). 
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Numerous bar opinions also cautioned against such conduct in a variety of settings. E.g., Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 99-5, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (Oct. 8, 1999) 
(in-person distribution of law firm brochures violated DR 2-101(F)(1)); Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-26, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Dec. 6, 1991) (finding 
telephone solicitation of potential business clients impermissible). See Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-6, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (June 14, 2002) (use of 
in-person or telephone communication to inquire whether out-of-state corporate party is represented 
by counsel improper under 2-101(F)(1)). And, to the extent a lawyer offered dial-a-lawyer services 
whereby the lawyer gives legal advice to callers over the phone for a fee, in instances in which the 
lawyer was unable to provide the advice sought over the phone, the attorney had to so inform the 
telephone client. Moreover, the lawyer should not recommend that the client retain the lawyer or 
someone associated with him or her, unless the caller asked for advice regarding employment of a 
lawyer. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievance & Discipline Op. 92-10, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 
11 (Apr. 10, 1992). Accord Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 99-9, 1999 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 10 (Dec. 2, 1999) (offering the same advice with respect to follow-up to 
on-line provision of legal services). Excluded from this restriction were lawyer-to-lawyer 
communications through which one lawyer solicited work on a matter being handled by the contacted 
attorney. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-6, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 6 (June 14, 2002) (opining that such communication was ethically appropriate; “DR 
2-101(F)(1) does not apply to a lawyer’s communication with another lawyer.” Id. at *5.). As noted, 
the lawyer exclusion is now contained in Ohio Rule 7.3(a)(1). 
Opinion 2013-2 of the Board of Commissioners provides the first comprehensive look at this area of 
regulation under the Rules of Professional Conduct, as covered by Rules 7.1 – 7.3, in the context of 
solicitation of prospective clients by means of text messaging. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2013-2, 2013 Ohio Griev. Disc. LEXIS 1 (April 5, 2013). (See also discussion at 
sections 7.2:200 & :500 and 7.3:200, :300 & :400.) In its discussion of the applicability of Rule 7.3(a) 
to text messages, the Board reasoned as follows: Such a solicitation is not an “in-person 
communication;” nor is it a “live telephone” conversation. It is an “electronic communication,” but, 
according to the Board, does not take place in real-time. Thus the prohibition of 7.3(a) does not apply. 
In concluding that text messaging is not done in “real-time,” the Board found texting to be “more akin 
to an email than a chat room communication,” which is a real-time electronic contact. “Accordingly, 
a typical text message is not a ‘real-time’ electronic contact. Lawyers may likewise solicit clients 
using test [sic] messages so long as the technology used to implement the text message does not 
generate a real-time or live conversation.” Id. at *8-9. 
One case decided under the Code presents facts that would be a close call under Rule 7.3. In 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Ross, 107 Ohio St.3d 191, 2005 Ohio 6179, 837 N.E.2d 773, respondent 
visited a seriously injured accident victim in the hospital a few days after the accident. Respondent 
recommended that the victim allow respondent to represent him in pursuing claims arising out of the 
accident. The Supreme Court found that in doing so, Ross had violated DR 2-103(A) and 2-104(A). 
For these and numerous other violations, Ross was disbarred. The interesting question under Rule 
7.3(a) arises from the fact that Ross was married to the victim’s cousin, and thus, arguably at least, the 
Rule 7.3(a)(2) exception to the prohibition against in-person solicitation of professional employment 
would have applied, since the person contacted “ha[d] a family, close personal, or prior professional 
relationship with the lawyer.” (A similar exception existed under DR 2-104(A)(1), but the Court did 
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not address the issue.) Since the word “close” modifies “personal . . . relationship,” but not “family . . . 
relationship,” being married to the victim’s cousin might be sufficient to invoke the exception. Even 
if so, however, the surrounding facts -- visiting a seriously injured person in the hospital just a few 
days after the accident, apparently without anyone else present -- strongly suggests that another part 
of Rule 7.3 would have been applicable: Rule 7.3(b)(2) prohibits solicitation, even of family 
members, if “the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harassment.” One could persuasively argue 
that such a solicitation in the circumstances was conducive to overreaching and coercion. See 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 460-68 (1978) (upholding discipline of lawyer who 
visited accident victim in hospital armed with employment contract). 
Giving unsolicited legal advice: Although the Task Force’s Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 7.3 
states that 7.3 “embraces the provisions of DR 2-104(A),” it does so only by inference. The basic 
prohibition of former DR 2-104(A), against accepting employment from a nonlawyer to whom the 
lawyer has given unsolicited advice that the nonlawyer should seek counsel or take legal action, 
nowhere appears in Rule 7.3 or its comments. The focus of Rule 7.3 is on solicitation, not on advice 
or acceptance of employment as a result of that advice. Nevertheless, some of the exceptions to the 
general 2-104(A) prohibitions show up indirectly in the Rule 7.3 scheme. Thus, Code exception (1) 
(the lawyer could accept employment from a close friend, relative, or former client) is now reflected 
in Rule 7.3(a)(2), permitting direct interpersonal solicitation of persons in these categories. (Rule 
7.3(a)(1) allows similar solicitation if the prospective client is a lawyer.) The exceptions set forth in 
former DR 2-104(A)(2) & (3) are comparable to the recognition of lawyer participation in prepaid or 
group legal-service plans in Rule 7.3(f). Exception (4) was not really an exception to accepting 
employment; it merely allowed a lawyer to speak or write publicly on legal topics “[w]ithout 
affecting the lawyer’s right to accept employment.” The final 2-104(A) exception, (5), allowed a 
lawyer to accept but not seek employment of persons contacted for the purpose of obtaining their 
joinder in a class action. While Ohio Rule 7.3 does not address the class-action issue expressly, ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 555 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary), states that the 
advertising and solicitation rules “do not prohibit ‘communications authorized by law, such as notice 
to members of a class in class action litigation,’“ citing MR 7.2 cmt. [4] (which is identical to Ohio 
Rule 7.2 cmt. [4]). See also, under the former OHCPR, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 92-2, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 19 (Feb. 14, 1992), discussed in section 
7.3:300, at “Class actions.” 
The bottom line under the Rules is that a lawyer can offer unsolicited legal advice, so long as it does 
not run afoul of Rules 7.1-7.3 or of Rule 4.3, which prohibits such advice to an unrepresented person 
with whom the lawyer’s client is known or reasonably should be known to have the possibility of 
conflicting interests, other than the advice to secure counsel. 
 
7.3:210  Solicitation by Non-Profit Public-Interest Organization 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.64 (1996). 
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The Ohio Rule 7.3(a) restriction on in-person, live telephone, or real-time electronic solicitation is 
limited to instances in which “a significant motive . . . is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain . . . .” If the 
lawyer has no significant pecuniary motive, such solicitation is permissible. See  In re Primus, 436 
U.S. 412 (1978) (drawing this distinction; ACLU lawyer soliciting client by mail to offer free legal 
services). 
Two policies support this distinction. The first is an assumption that the likelihood for abuse is 
substantially lessened where the lawyer is motivated by considerations other than pecuniary gain. 
Ohio Rule 7.3 cmt. [4]. The second is a recognition that representation undertaken for other than 
pecuniary gain is often motivated by social, political or associated concerns afforded special 
protection under the Constitution. “Thus, lawyers affiliated with a group formed to further a group 
right or ‘ideological’ interest may claim greater constitutional protection than is accorded under the 
commercial-speech analysis to lawyers soliciting primarily for personal gain.” ABA, Annotated 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 555 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). See further, as to legal 
service organizations, Rule 7.3(f), discussed at section 7.3:500. 
In this regard, Comment [4] provides that 
division (a) is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from participating in 
constitutionally protected activities of public or charitable legal service 
organizations or bona fide political, social, civic, fraternal, employee, 
or trade organizations whose purposes include providing or 
recommending legal services to its members or beneficiaries. 
Rule 7.3 cmt. [4]. 
Under the former OHCPR, the Board of Commissioners recognized that such solicitation not for 
pecuniary gain is constitutionally protected. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-2, 
1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Feb. 23, 1990) (citing Primus). And in Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-11, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 18 (June 15, 1990), the 
Board determined that an in-person offer by a legal-aid lawyer to represent an indigent defendant, 
whom the lawyer observed in court, was not prohibited under the Code. In construing DR 2-103(A), 
the Board stated that 
the [OHCPR] does not prohibit a lawyer from communicating with 
persons whose legal rights may be in jeopardy when the lawyer is not 
thereby intending to gain paying clients. Prohibited solicitation would 
occur if the lawyer recommends employment for herself as a private 
practitioner. 
Op. 90-11, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 18, at *1. The Board found that not only did the 
conduct not violate either DR 2-103(A) or 2-104(A), but it promoted the important value of providing 
legal services to those who cannot afford them. 
It should be noted that the distinction here is not whether the lawyer receives monetary remuneration 
for the representation. Some actions taken on a pro bono basis to further a cause, for example, may 
result in a court award of attorney fees, but that in and of itself does not trigger the Ohio Rule 7.3(a) 
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prohibitions. The key is the motivation behind the solicitation. Only if pecuniary gain was a 
“significant” motivation do the prohibitions in Ohio Rule 7.3(a) apply. See  In re Primus, 436 U.S. 
412 (1978) (finding solicitation by ACLU in case in which court-awarded attorney fees were 
requested did not establish a significant pecuniary motivation for the solicitation). 
  
7.3:220  Solicitation of Firm Clients by a Departing Lawyer 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.168 (1996). 
An important concern is the extent to which a lawyer who ends an employment relationship with 
other lawyers can pursue the former firm’s clients. On the one hand, any restriction on this practice 
would seem like a limitation on the lawyer’s right to practice law and the client’s right to counsel of 
choice. On the other hand, in some circumstances, such conduct might be seen as tortious interference 
with a business relationship or a breach of fiduciary duty owed the firm. See Madorsky v. Bernstein, 
89 Ohio App.3d 550, 626 N.E.2d 694 (Cuyahoga 1993) (recognizing that claim for tortious 
interference with business relationship can apply to activities that undercut an attorney-client 
relationship). One court of appeals held that, to the extent the departing lawyer contacted firm clients 
the lawyer had been personally representing, the conduct was permissible, Sonkin & Melena Co., 
L.P.A. v. Zaransky, 83 Ohio App.3d 169, 614 N.E.2d 807 (Cuyahoga 1992) (rejecting tortious 
interference claim in such situation), but doubt is cast on this conclusion by the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent decision in Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St.3d 171, 707 N.E.2d 
853 (1999), where on similar facts the Supreme Court upheld reversal of the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment on the tortious interference count. Use of a firm’s client list to identify those to 
contact can also constitute conversion of a trade secret. See Siegel, 85 Ohio St.3d 171, 172-73, 707 
N.E.2d 853, 856 (syllabi five & six) (trial court granted summary judgment for defendant lawyer, 
who allegedly used her old firm’s client list in making solicitation mailings, and for her new law firm, 
also a defendant, on trade-secret misappropriation count; the Supreme Court affirmed the court of 
appeals’ reversal and remand for trial). Compare Sonkin & Melena (rejecting such a claim because 
facts did not establish client list as trade secret). Siegel is further discussed at sections 1.1:390 and 
1.2:400. 
Several ethics opinions have approved departing-lawyer communications soliciting business from 
clients with whom the lawyer worked at the former firm. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 98-5, 1998 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (Apr. 3, 1998) (when a lawyer departs 
from a firm, both lawyer and firm can alert their clients of the change and, without disparaging the 
competence of the other, express their desire to continue the representation). Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court ruled in Siegel that acting in accordance with the ethical rules does not immunize such 
conduct from civil claims for tortious interference with contract.  85 Ohio St.3d 171, 178-79, 707 
N.E.2d 853, 859 (compliance with OHCPR is relevant in determining whether tortious interference 
occurred, but it provides no absolute defense to such actions). Both the tortious interference and 
trade-secrets aspects of the Siegel opinion are discussed in section 1.1:390. 
As a general rule, contacts with former clients of the lawyer are more likely to be permissible than 
contacts with firm clients the lawyer did not represent. Although addressing a slightly different issue 
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(what lawyer-client relationship is required to trigger DR 2-110(A)(2) duties upon withdrawal), the 
Siegel Court, in that context, adopted a restrictive definition of “client.” Firm clients on whose 
matters an associate works are not “clients” of the associate, but clients of the firm. As the Court saw 
it, the associate “never entered into a contractual agreement with those clients under which she 
personally was obligated to provide legal services.”  85 Ohio St.3d at 177, 707 N.E.2d at 859. For 
further consideration of the potential liability that might arise from particular contacts attendant to 
changing employment, see generally Robert W. Hillman, Hillman on Lawyer Mobility: The Law 
and Ethics of Partner Withdrawals and Law Firm Breakups (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2013) 
(providing an in-depth analysis of the conflicting nationwide case law on the numerous issues that 
arise in this context). 
  
7.3:300  Prohibitions Applicable to All Forms of Solicitation 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.3(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.3(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.30, 2.88 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 81:2001 
Wolfram § 14.2.5 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.30, 2.88 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 7.3(b) states two instances in which any sort of solicitation -- whether “by written, 
recorded, or electronic communication or by in-person, [live] telephone or real-time electronic 
contact even when not otherwise prohibited by division (a),” and whether or not targeted or 
untargeted -- is banned. They are: 
 (1) [if] the prospective client has made known to the lawyer a 
desire not to be solicited by the lawyer; [or] 
 (2) [if] the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harassment. 
Ohio Rules 7.3(b)(1) & (2). 
The exact contours of the first prohibition are a bit unclear. In a few instances the desire of a 
prospective client not to be solicited may be stated quite directly to the lawyer. For example, a client 
having received an initial solicitation may ask not to be contacted again. Or a client that has a falling 
out with its attorney may make such a request. Sometimes the communication is not so direct, but is 
still reasonably clear. If a prospective client is registered on a “Do Not Call” list, for example, that 
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listing should be respected and would thus limit at least one method of communicating with the 
prospective client. Cf. Ohio Rule 7.3 cmt. [2]. In discussing the permissibility of email solicitation, 
the Board of Commissioners opined under the Code that, in making such contact, a lawyer should 
provide the recipient with a way to opt out from receiving further emails, Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2004-1, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 13, 2004), which if 
exercised must then be honored.  There is no reason to think that under the Rules a lawyer may not, if 
he so chooses, give a prospective client an opt-out option. However, the lawyer apparently need not 
do so. A 2013 Board advisory opinion, which addresses the applicability of Rule 7.3(b) (among other 
provisions policing solicitation) to text messaging, tracks the language of Rule 7.3(b) in placing the 
initial burden on the recipient rather than the sender. Thus, in addition to coercive or harassing text 
messages proscribed by subsection (b)(2), under subsection (b)(1) “[l]awyers must honor requests of 
prospective clients not to be solicited by text messaging or otherwise, and should refrain from 
additional solicitations if the prospective client does not respond. See Prof.Cond.R. 7.3, Comment [5]. 
Because most text messages are received on cellular phones, which are often carried on one’s person, 
lawyers should be sensitive to the fact that a text message may be perceived as more invasive than an 
email.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2013-2, 2013 Ohio Griev. Disc. LEXIS 
1 (April 5, 2013), at *9-10. 
A more difficult situation arises where the lawyer is aware that a particular prospective client does not 
wish to be contacted, but the lawyer is sending out a large untargeted mailing or e-mail to every 
person or entity in a particular group of which that prospective client is a member. Under the Rule, the 
lawyer would appear to be under a duty to purge the prospective client from the larger group before 
sending out the solicitation. But suppose the lawyer does not know that the prospective client is in the 
group being solicited. Since the Rule prohibits all solicitations to one whose desire not to receive 
them is known, presumably even such solicitations inadvertently sent would technically violate the 
Rule.  
Comment [5] warns that “any further efforts” made to contact a prospective client after receiving no 
response to a letter or other communication “may violate the provisions of Rule 7.3(b).” Ohio Rule 
7.3 cmt. [5]. The implication is either that such follow-up may constitute a form of harassment under 
7.3(b)(2) or that it may violate the do-not-solicit-me-further inhibition of 7.3(b)(1), or both. 
By its terms, the division (b) prohibitions apply across the board, even when the person contacted is a 
lawyer or is a person with a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with the 
contacting lawyer, and irrespective of the mode of contact. While both the Model Rule and Ohio 
Rule 7.3(b) delete the word “live” before “telephone,” it must be read in, inasmuch as it is only “live 
telephone” contact that is “prohibited by division (a)” and recorded messages are separately 
mentioned in the division (b) listing. 
Regardless of the means of communication used, the solicitation can be either targeted or untargeted, 
and Rule 7.3(b) applies to both. Divisions (c) and (d), and in most cases division (e) as well, are 
limited to targeted communications and are dealt with in section 7.3:400. 
An untargeted communication is one sent to individuals or entities in situations where the soliciting 
lawyer has no knowledge that the recipient is in need of legal services in a particular matter. A mass 
mailing is a typical example. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-26, 
1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (Dec. 6, 1991) (approving mail solicitation to potential business 
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clients without a specific known need). This sort of solicitation was treated as general advertising.  
That interpretation, however, has been called into question by a Board opinion issued under the Rules, 
Opinion 2007-5, which is extensively discussed (and criticized) in section 7.3:400 infra. 
Other solicitations are directed to individuals who are known to have particular legal problems. Rule 
7.3(c) describes this as “written, recorded, or electronic communication from a lawyer soliciting 
professional employment from a prospective client whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be in 
need of legal services in a particular matter.” This solicitation is targeted and potentially presents 
more problems of overreaching than does untargeted general solicitation. Therefore, additional 
restrictions are imposed on its use. These restrictions are addressed in section 7.3:400. 
Although not expressly set forth in Rule 7.3(b) itself, Comment [5] reminds that any solicitation that 
is false or misleading within the meaning of Rule 7.1 is also prohibited, in addition to the conduct 
proscribed by divisions (b)(1) & (2). 
Constitutional considerations: It seems reasonably certain that Ohio Rule 7.3(b) -- precluding written, 
recorded, or electronic solicitation that is coercive, harassing, or contrary to the recipient’s wishes -- 
is within the range of constitutionally permissible state regulation. See 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. 
William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 57.8, at 57-15 (3d ed. Supp. 2013) 
(“[c]ertainly this content-neutral restriction [MR 7.3(b)(1)] would be upheld”; authors express 
vagueness concerns as to MR 7.3(b)(2), but conclude that it is “probably constitutional” in light of 
drafter’s contemplation that it referred to “communications sent immediately after a death to the 
decedent’s survivors, and others of that nature,” “but should not be stretched further.” Id. at 57-16) 
This analysis of the Model Rule is not directly transferable to the same language in Ohio Rule 
7.3(b)(2), inasmuch as Ohio Rule 7.3(e) permits such solicitation within thirty days of an accident 
causing death or injury, but only if the text of “Understanding Your Rights,” set forth in division (e), 
is included with the solicitation.  See section 7.3:400.  In our opinion, a solicitation sent within thirty 
days of death or injury is probably “immediate” enough to fit within the Hazard and Hodes conclusion 
that (b)(2) is constitutional, particularly given the additional protections afforded by the mandatory 
“Understanding Your Rights” language.  Apart from Rule 7.3(e), however, we are not persuaded that 
the “coercion, duress, or harassment” language of Ohio Rule 7.3(b)(2) raises constitutional 
vagueness concerns in any event. 
  
7.3:400  Additional Requirements for Targeted Written, Recorded, and 
      Electronic Solicitation 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.3(c)-(e) 
Background References 
ABA Mode Rule 7.3(c) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.30 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 81:2011 
Wolfram § 14.2.5 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 2.30 (1996). 
In order to assure that targeted solicitations are not misleading or overreaching, Ohio Rule 7.3 
imposes five additional requirements beyond those placed on untargeted solicitation. Rule 7.3(c)-(e). 
Many of these restrictions help address the potential harms arising from targeted direct-mail 
solicitation recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) 
-- that a personalized, targeted letter could imply greater familiarity with the case than the lawyer has 
or that the recipient’s problem is more dire than it is in fact. The Court also raised as a concern that an 
inaccurately targeted and personalized letter could tell a person they have a problem when they do not, 
or might, because it is misdirected, give erroneous legal advice under the circumstances.  Id. at 476. 
The first three requirements are set forth in subdivisions (c)(1)-(3); unless the recipient is a person 
specified in divisions (a)(1) (lawyer) or (a)(2) (family, personal, or prior professional relationship 
with sender), they apply to all targeted solicitations -- i.e., 
every written, recorded, or electronic communication from a lawyer 
soliciting professional employment from a prospective client whom the 
lawyer reasonably believes to be in need of legal services in a particular 
matter . . . . 
Rule 7.3(c). This provision is comparable to former OH DR 2-101(F)(2) with two important 
differences: First, under the Rule, the prospective client must be one whom the lawyer “reasonably 
believes” to be in need of legal services in a particular matter, 7.3(c), and about whom the lawyer is 
“aware of the . . . specific legal need of the addressee.” 7.3(c)(1). In contrast, under the former 
disciplinary rule, the obligations were imposed with respect to a person or persons who “may” be in 
need of specific legal services because of a condition or occurrence that is “known or, upon 
reasonable inquiry, could be known” to the soliciting lawyer. This change would appear to narrow 
significantly the instances in which a lawyer will have to comply with the targeted-solicitation 
provisions. See, for example, the discussion of Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
2006-4 (Apr. 7, 2006) later in this section. Alas, this seemingly straightforward language of 7.3(c) 
was ignored by the Board in its Opinion 2007-5, 2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (June 8, 2007), 
also discussed this section infra. Second, the Rule, while more limited in the first respect, applies to 
all such communications, whether written, recorded or electronic; the old rule was limited to written 
solicitation. (For a targeted-mail disciplinary decision under the Code, see Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Yurich, 78 Ohio St.3d 315, 677 N.E.2d 1190 (1997) also discussed this section infra.) 
The three requirements that must be met under Rule 7.3(c) are: First, the communication must 
“[d]isclose accurately and fully the manner in which the lawyer or law firm became aware of the 
identity and specific legal need of the addressee.” Rule 7.3(c)(1). This disclosure helps recipients 
understand how they were selected by the attorney and protects recipients from assuming that they 
have a relationship with the lawyer if one has not been established previously. 
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Second, the communication must “[d]isclaim or refrain from expressing any predetermined 
evaluation of the merits of the addressee’s case.” Rule 7.3(c)(2). This restriction on a predetermined 
evaluation of the merits protects recipients from being swayed into contacting the lawyer on the basis 
of puffing about the strength of their claim. It also serves to reinforce the notion that every case is 
unique and cannot be evaluated accurately until sufficient factual investigation has been undertaken. 
Third, the communication must “[c]onspicuously include in its text and on the outside envelope, if 
any, and at the beginning and ending of any recorded or electronic message the recital - 
‘ADVERTISING MATERIAL’ or ‘ADVERTISEMENT ONLY.’“ Rule 7.3(c)(3). See Shapero v. 
Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 477 (1988) (suggesting state could require direct mail advertising to be 
marked as advertising). (Former micromanaging under DR 2-201(F)(2)(e) on font size and print color 
has been eliminated and replaced by the “conspicuous” requirement. Former guidance in Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievance & Discipline Op. 2004-1, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 13, 
2004), on the appropriate notification in electronic messages has likewise been superseded by the 
Rule.) 
By requiring the “advertising material/advertisement only” language, the Rule helps assure that the 
recipient will not treat the communication as official in nature.  In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 n.20 
(1982) (Court endorsed use of such labeling to assure that nonlawyers receiving unrequested mail 
from lawyers would not be “frighten[ed]” by this unusual event). It also allows the recipient to throw 
it away unopened if so inclined. 
The recital requirement poses difficulties where a lawyer seeks to send a multi-purpose 
communication, such as a letter asking an individual to serve as a witness in a pending action and also 
soliciting the individual’s business as an additional claimant. As an advertisement, the 
ADVERTISEMENT ONLY designation would have to go on the envelope. But to do so would harm 
the interests of the existing client, since the recipient might be more likely to discard the letter and 
thereby remain unaware of the request for testimony on the existing client’s behalf. Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n Op. 95-96-04 (Nov. 21, 1995). 
The only two disciplinary decisions of which we are aware involving Rule 7.3(c) (specifically 
7.3(c)(3)) are Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Freeman, 128 Ohio St.3d 416, 2011 Ohio 1447, 945 
N.E.2d 515, and Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Snyder, 136 Ohio St.3d 320, 2013 Ohio 3688, 995 
N.E.2d 222. In Freeman, the parties stipulated and the panel and Board found a violation of 7.3(c)(3) 
(requiring the “ADVERTISING/ADVERTISEMENT” message). The Supreme Court, however, 
dismissed the charge because the facts demonstrated that respondent’s conduct consisted of sending 
the allegedly offending letter to a couple with whom he had a prior professional relationship, which 
falls within the exception to the applicability of the rule set forth in Rule 7.3(a)(2). In Snyder, the 
Court found a violation, even though the envelopes used with the solicitation letter “conspicuously 
showed that the enclosed letter was an advertisement,” id. at para. 7. The Rule, however, requires 
that the capitalized recital “ADVERTISING MATERIAL” or “ADVERTISEMENT ONLY” must 
appear on both the envelope and in the text of the solicitation, and respondent failed to comply with 
the latter requirement. 
Over and above the requisites of division (c), a targeted communication to a person who is a 
defendant in a civil action cannot be sent until the defendant has been served in the action. To assure 
this, the lawyer must check the docket of the court where the action was filed and verify that service 
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has been perfected or service by publication completed. Rule 7.3(d). Failure to do so is subject to 
sanction.  See Akron Bar Ass’n v. Amourgis, 113 Ohio St.3d 32, 2007 Ohio 974, 862 N.E.2d 501 
(decided under comparable language of former DR 2-101(F)(4)). By its terms, Rule 7.3(d) does not 
apply with respect to defendants who are debtors in a potential or actual bankruptcy action. 
The requirements of divisions (c) and (d) are inapplicable if the recipient is a lawyer or “has a family, 
close personal, or prior professional relationship with the lawyer,” as specified in division (a)(1) or 
(2). Cf. Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St.3d 171, 707 N.E.2d 853 (1999) 
(noting that the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has approved mail solicitation 
of existing clients without inclusion of the advertising recital). (Former DR 2-101(F)(3), stating that 
these provisions do not apply to qualifying legal aid and public defender offices, has not been retained 
in the new Rules.) 
Finally, Ohio Rule 7.3(e) requires that any communication soliciting professional employment sent 
to accident or disaster victims or their relatives within thirty days of the event must include an 
“Understanding Your Rights” disclosure, the text of which is included in Rule 7.3(e). This consists of 
a noninclusive nine-point checklist designed to inform the victim of “some of the important issues 
you should consider,” such as the appropriateness of hiring an attorney (6), how to find a lawyer (7), 
checking the lawyer’s qualifications (8), and the matter of cost (9). 
The rationale for inclusion of division (e) (which is not a part of the Model Rule), is set forth in 
Comment [7A]. Regulation in this area must accommodate two competing principles: 
 The use of written, recorded, and electronic communications to 
solicit prospective clients who have suffered personal injuries or the 
loss of a loved one can potentially be offensive. Nonetheless, it is 
recognized that such communications assist potential clients in not 
only making a meaningful determination about representation, but also 
can aid potential clients in recognizing issues that may be foreign to 
them. 
Ohio Rule 7.3 cmt. [7A]. Ohio Rule 7.3(e) imposes a restriction in this situation -- the 
“Understanding Your Rights” information must be conveyed with any solicitation made within thirty 
days of an occurrence giving rise to a potential personal injury or wrongful death claim. Id. With the 
inclusion of this mandatory disclosure as a safeguard, the drafters evidently determined that the need 
for timely information trumped concern that recipients might find such contact offensive. 
In its advisory opinion 2013-2, the Board explained how it reads Rule 7.3(e) as applied to text 
messaging solicitation: 
Due to the limited number of characters available in a standard text 
message, including the entire “Understanding Your Rights” statement 
may cause the message to be split into multiple messages or fail to 
transmit in its entirety. Likely for this reason, some Ohio lawyers have 
included an internet link in their text message solicitations that allows 
the prospective client to view the “Understanding Your Rights” 
statement on the lawyer’s website. In the Board’s view, simply 
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providing an internet link to the “Understanding Your Rights” 
statement does not comply with Prof.Cond.R. 7.3(e). Similarly, the 
Board believes that attachments or photographs containing the 
statement fail to satisfy Prof.Cond.R. 7.3(e). The rule requires that the 
statement be “included with the communication” and the Supreme 
Court’s announcement at [*13] the end of the statement similarly 
indicates that the solicitation “must include” the statement. Comment 
[7A] also addresses the “Understanding Your Rights” statement, which 
“must be communicated to the prospective client or a relative of a 
prospective client.” Given the language “included with the 
communication,” “must include,” and “must be communicated to,” that 
the Supreme Court employed in Prof.Cond.R. 7.3(e) and Comment 
[7A], the Board concludes that the “Understanding Your Rights” 
statement must appear in the body of the lawyer’s communication, and 
not as an internet link, attachment, photograph, or other item requiring 
additional action to access the statement. Although this may create 
multiple messages, it ensures that all recipients, regardless of the 
features on their cellular phones or service plans, have immediate 
access to the information. As with any solicitation sent to prospective 
clients within thirty days of an accident or disaster, the lawyer has the 
duty to ensure that the “Understanding Your Rights” statement is 
communicated to the text message recipient. Prof.Cond.R. 7.3, 
comment [7A]. 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2013-2, Ohio Griev. Disc. LEXIS 1 (April 5, 
2013), at *12-13. 
In January 2006, the Ohio Supreme Court published for comment an amendment to DR 2-101(H), the 
Code analog to Rule 7.3(e), that would have prohibited such contact with accident or disaster victims 
or a relative of that person until thirty days after the accident or disaster. The responsive comments, 
however, were overwhelmingly negative, and the Court withdrew the proposal. See, T.C. Brown, 
Court Drops Lawyer-Solicitation Rule, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 1, 2006, at B1. See 
generally on the subject, Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (approving Florida 
restriction prohibiting lawyer from sending targeted direct-mail solicitation to accident or disaster 
victim or that person’s relative for 30 days following the accident or disaster). 
An ethics opinion addressing the “targeted” communication issue under the Code is Bd. of Comm’rs 
on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2006-4, Ohio Griev. Disc. LEXIS 7 (Apr. 7, 2006). In Opinion 
2006-4, the attorney asked whether, in connection with opening a new law practice, he could send a 
personalized letter and biography to members of the bar and to potential business-entity clients. 
While “wide berth” was given to the sending of announcement cards and biographical information, 
such was not the case with personalized letters. Whereas the former information could be provided to 
both fellow members of the bar and to business entities, if coupled with a personalized letter the result 
varies with the addressee. Such a letter to members of the bar, “[a]nnouncing the opening of a law 
practice through a personalized letter to members of the bar does not trigger the requirements for 
direct mail solicitation in DR 2-101(F)(2). The letter is going to a group who practices law, not a 
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group in need of legal services.” Id. at *5. But 
[a]nnouncing the opening of a law practice through a personalized 
letter to business entities who may need legal services in the 
attorney[‘]s areas of legal practice triggers the requirements for direct 
mail solicitation in DR 2-101(F)(2). It is in essence a solicitation by 
direct mail addressed to persons or groups of persons who may be in 
need of specific legal service by reason of a circumstance, condition, or 
occurrence that is known or, upon reasonable inquiry, could be known 
to the soliciting lawyer or law firm . . . . The lawyer is not sending a 
general mailing to all businesses, if so he or she would not use a 
personalized letter. The attorney is targeting businesses needing legal 
services in areas [in which] the attorney practices. 
Id. (bracketed material and ellipsis added for clarity). The Board cited to none of its five prior 
targeted-communication opinions (discussed infra), four of which support the opposite conclusion. 
Irrespective of whether the Board may have been drawing too fine a line in imposing the direct-mail 
solicitation provisions of the Code on the personalized letter to businesses, it seems reasonably clear 
that such a mailing should not trigger the requirements of Rule 7.3(c), inasmuch as there was no 
indication that the lawyer had a reasonable belief that the recipient was “in need of legal services in a 
particular matter” or that the lawyer was aware of the . . . specific legal need of the addressee.” 
It did not take the Board of Commissioners long to conclude otherwise.  In Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2007-5, 2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (June 8, 2007), the 
Board confronted this very issue.  As the Board framed the question: 
Is a lawyer’s or law firm’s advertising of legal services through a 
personalized letter addressed to a contact person of a prospective 
business client a direct mail solicitation subject to the requirements of 
Rule 7.3(c), or a general announcement not subject to the requirements 
of Rule 7.3(c)? 
Id. at *1.  In its answer, the Board saw the basic distinction as one between direct mail and general 
announcements.  The determining factor for the Board was whether the communication involves a 
letter personalized to the recipient.  If it does, the restrictions on direct mail should apply.  Underlying 
this determination was the belief that “[p]ersonalization implies a familiarity with the recipient and 
the recipient’s matters, whether general legal needs or specific legal needs.”  Id. at *8. 
In doing so, however, the Board expressly disregarded the language of the Rule, which imposes the 
restrictions only when the lawyer reasonably believes the recipient to be in need of legal services “in 
a particular matter.”  Even though the Board conceded that 
there is no indication that the lawyer or law firm would have a 
reasonable belief that the businesses listed on the membership list of a 
trade organization would be in need of legal services in a “particular 
matter,” 
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id. at *7-8, it is likely that there would be a reasonable belief that the businesses “would have a 
‘general need’ for the legal services that the lawyer or law firm provides.” Id. at *8 (emphasis added; 
the Board does not explain why it has placed quotation marks around “general need”; that phrase, 
unlike “specific legal need,” is not found in the Rule). Given this “general need,” 
the personalization of an advertising letter to a prospective client, even 
in the absence of a reasonable belief of legal needs in a “particular 
matter,” is enough to trigger the direct mail solicitation requirements of 
Rule 7.3(c). 
Id.  At its core, the Board’s opinion asks the wrong question.  The dichotomy in this situation is not 
between general announcements and personalized direct mail; rather, it is between personalized direct 
mail that addresses a “particular matter” and that which addresses mere “general need.”  A letter that 
says “you were in a traffic accident and I can help you” is very different from a letter that says “I know 
you are a business and therefore may need tax advice – I do tax work.”  Personalization of the 
addressee simply isn’t the test the Rule articulates. 
The Board’s opinion is also flawed in its failure to make any attempt to harmonize the Ohio Rule with 
the identical “particular matter” language in the Model Rule.  As is clearly stated in Laws. Man. on 
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 81:601 (2007), the MR 7.3(c) requisites apply “[i]f a prospective 
client is known to be in need of legal services in a particular matter.”  Hazard and Hodes reach the 
same conclusion, in a more detailed analysis of the MR 7.3(c) language.  Thus, they leave no doubt 
that a “targeted” advertisement is one “directed to particular individuals who were known or thought 
by lawyers to be in need of legal services in a particular matter”; such communications “contemplate 
a specific legal matter.”  2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,  W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The 
Law of Lawyering § 57.7, at 57-13, -14 (3d ed. Supp. 2013).  To underscore their point, the authors 
further state that 
the labeling requirement [for targeted mailings] does not apply to 
advertising material sent to people not known to need legal services in 
a particular matter.  This means that a general announcement about a 
law firm’s services could be sent to a recipient list that was generated 
otherwise than by some particular need for legal services [precisely the 
circumstance addressed in Opinion 2007-5]. 
Id. § 57.9, at 57-19 (emphasis in original; bracketed material added). 
Even more troubling is the Board’s failure to acknowledge relevant precedent decided under the 
similar Code provision, DR 1-102(F)(2) (possible need of “specific legal service by reason of a 
circumstance, condition, or occurrence that is known, or upon reasonable inquiry, could be known to 
the soliciting lawyer”), which precedent is another touchstone for interpreting Rules having 
comparable Code analogs.  These include disciplinary decisions by the Ohio Supreme Court as well 
as the Board’s own prior advisory opinions – the great majority of which were contrary to the advice 
dispensed in Opinion 2007-5.   
Two Supreme Court opinions are pertinent; first, in Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 85 
Ohio St.3d 171, 707 N.E.2d 853 (1999), the Court stated that the “Advertisement Only” and other 
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(F)(2) limitations applied to “written direct mail solicitations . . . made to persons who may be in need 
of specific legal services . . . .”  Id. at 177, 707 N.E.2d at 859.  The other Supreme Court opinion, 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Yurich, 78 Ohio St.3d 315, 677 N.E.2d 1190 (1997), undermines 
the Board’s attempt in Opinion 2007-5 to equate personalization with targeting (see Op. 2007-5, at 
*8, quoted above); Yurich makes clear that these are distinct attributes: 
Respondent not only “targeted” his mailing, but through the 
conveniences of computer programming, he also was able to 
“personalize” it . . . . 
Id.  at 318, 677 N.E.2d at 1192.  The Court then drew on language of the United States Supreme 
Court in Shapero, which also noted that the two concepts are not the same:  “‘A letter that is 
personalized (not merely targeted) to the recipient presents an increased risk of deception, intentional 
or inadvertent.’“  Id. (quoting 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988)). 
In addition, we are aware of six Board opinions which dealt with the specific-legal-need issue under 
the Code; four of these are contrary to the conclusion reached in Opinion 2007-5.  The other two 
(Opinions 2006-4 and 2004-1, which are discussed, respectively, above and below) are consistent 
with the Board’s advice in 2007-5, but none of the six are even cited.  The authority contrary to 
Opinion 2007-5 is substantial, and nothing in the Task Force’s comparison of the former Code rule 
(DR 2-101(F)(2)) with Rule 7.3(c) suggests that the drafters intended to make any change in the 
approach reflected in the opinions that follow – indeed, the Comparison expressly states that the 
“provisions of DR 2-101(F)(2) have been incorporated in division (c).”   
Thus, in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-20, 1992 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 1 (Dec. 4, 1992), the Board considered whether the special restrictions on targeted direct mail 
should apply to a lawyer who wished to mail a personalized cover letter and accompanying newsletter 
to a wide group including local businesses.  Interpreting the Code provision placing restrictions on 
direct mail solicitations, the Board determined that the mere personalization of the letter did not 
trigger those restrictions.  Instead, the Board stressed the language of DR 2-101(F)(2), which, by its 
terms, applied only to the solicitation of persons “who may be in need of specific legal service by 
reason of a circumstance, condition or occurrence” known or which, upon reasonable inquiry, could 
be known to the lawyer.  Second, in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 94-13, 1994 
Ohio Griev. Disc. LEXIS 2 (Dec. 2, 1994), the Board opined that a lawyer must comply with 
2-101(F)(2) “if the letters are targeted to ‘persons or groups of persons who may be in need of specific 
legal service by reason of a circumstance, condition, or occurrence that is known or, upon reasonable 
inquiry, could be known to the soliciting lawyer or law firm.’“  Id. at *13-14.  Third, the Board stated 
in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-6, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 
(June 14, 2006), that 
[t]he restrictions of DR 2-101(F)(2) and DR 2-101(F)(4) are applicable 
to the question presented [because] [t]he attorney knows that the 
corporation is in need of specific legal services and the corporation is 
named as a defendant in a civil suit. 
Id. at *11 (bracketed material added).  Fourth and finally, there is Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2004-9, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Oct. 9, 2004), in which it is stated with 
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respect to a lawyer’s personalized letter to chiropractors asking for the opportunity to meet to provide 
information about the lawyer’s legal services: 
The rule restricting targeted direct mail solicitation, DR 2-101(F)(2) 
does not apply, because the letter is not directed to individuals in need 
of legal services. 
Id. at *8. 
Based on the foregoing, it is difficult to reach any conclusion other than that the Board has rewritten 
Rule 7.3(c).  Accord Eugene P. Whetzel, Change as a Constant: Review of The Judicial Code 
and Other Clarifications, Ohio Law., Sept./Oct. 2007, at 28, 29 (Opinion 2007-5 “apparently 
expands the scope of Rule 7.3(c)”). 
Indeed, the Board’s conclusion produces the incongruous result that Rule 7.3(c) applies to 
circumstances in which it is impossible for the soliciting lawyer to comply with it.  The Board says 
that the lawyer’s knowledge of a “general need” for legal services in sending a personalized letter is 
sufficient to trigger the 7.3(c) requirements. But one of those requirements is that the lawyer must 
disclose “accurately and fully” how the lawyer or the firm became aware of “the specific legal need of 
the addressee.”  Rule 7.3(c)(1) (emphasis added).  This of course will be impossible in those instances 
in which the lawyer or the firm is aware only of a “general,” rather than a “specific,” legal need of the 
recipient; nonetheless, says the Board, in all such instances, “the safeguards of Rule 7.3(c)(1) through 
(3) are applicable.”  Id. at *8.  Like Joseph Heller, the Board has written a “Catch 22.” 
Email and other electronic solicitation: The internet has opened up a new avenue of communication 
for lawyers, along with everyone else. Ohio Rule 7.3 addresses internet communication thoroughly, 
from “real-time electronic contact” in division (a) to “electronic communication” in divisions (b), (c), 
(d), and, by implication, in division (e). While we know of no Ohio court decisions under the former 
OHCPR dealing with the propriety of internet solicitation and other usage by lawyers, a few ethics 
opinions addressed the issue, and there is now under the Rules an important advisory opinion dealing 
with text messaging and Rule 7.3(c) (as well as Rule 7.1 and 7.2, and other aspects of Rule 7.3). See 
sections 7.2:200 & :500, 7.3:200 & :300 supra. 
The opinion is Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2013-2, 2013 Ohio Griev. Disc. 
LEXIS 1 (April 5, 2013). Lawyers using text messaging to solicit a prospective client when the 
lawyer has a reasonable belief that that person is in need of legal services in a particular matter must in 
the message (1) disclose how the sender became aware of the identity and specific legal need of the 
recipient; (2) refrain from giving any predetermined evaluation of the matter; and (3) include 
“ADVERTISING MATERIAL” or “ADVERTISEMENT ONLY” at the beginning and end of the 
message. 
As discussed elsewhere in this section with regard to the space limitations of normal text messaging 
(160 characters), these requirements will necessitate that multiple messages be sent in order to 
comply with 7.3(c). (In addition, under 7.3(d), if the person solicited pursuant to 7.3(c) is a defendant 
in a civil action, the lawyer cannot send a text message without first verifying that the person has been 
served with notice of the action.) 
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The most comprehensive opinion under the Code was the most recent (and, with respect to “targeted” 
communications, we believe erroneous, for the reasons set forth below). Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2004-1, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 13, 2004). In 
Opinion 2004-1, the questions posed were (a) whether it was proper for attorneys to advertise legal 
services by sending unsolicited emails to potential clients, and (b) whether lawyers could participate 
in lawyer-advertising services or lawyer-referral services that did so. The Board noted at the outset 
that there were no ethical rules under the OHCPR addressing unsolicited email advertising. In such a 
setting, the Board counseled that lawyers were not barred from such solicitation but discouraged them 
from doing so, either directly or through lawyer-advertising services or lawyer-referral services. If a 
lawyer did engage in such solicitation, the advertising rules (former DR 2-101 through 2-105) would 
apply. 
The Board opined that the practice of sending unsolicited emails to prospective clients constituted 
“targeted direct mail,” which was subject to the restrictions of former DR 2-101(F)(2), (F)(4), and 
(H)(1). According to the Board, DR 2-101(F)(2) applied “regardless of whether or not the e-mail 
recipient has a specific legal need known to the sender/attorney” (even though that requirement was 
expressly stated in the rule).  Id. at *1, 14-15.  There is no analysis or justification given for this 
conclusion; it is just stated without more. 
The Board also stated that a lawyer participating in a lawyer-advertising service that sends unsolicited 
commercial emails should review the email material to determine compliance with existing 
advertising rules and applicable law. A lawyer participating in a lawyer-referral service should review 
whether the referral service is in compliance with former DR 2-103(C); the Board further suggested 
that the referral service emails should conform to the OHCPR lawyer-advertising rules. 
Opinion 2004-1 reviewed federal and state legislation regulating unsolicited commercial email. See 
id. at *5, discussing the “Can-Spam Act of 2003,” 15 USC §§ 7701-7713 (2006), and ORC 2307.64 
(regulating electronic mail advertisements). The Board further noted the preemption provision in the 
Can-Spam Act, 15 USCA § 7707(b), which supersedes state regulation of commercial email except 
to the extent that the state statute, regulation, or rule prohibits falsity or deception. (Both the 
Can-Spam Act and Opinion 2004-1 are discussed in Henry R. Chalmers, New Law Restricts 
E-Mail Advertisements, Litig. News, July 2004, at 6.) 
In Opinion 2004-1, the Board also listed its prior opinions dealing with email issues, in which it had 
opined that: 
 a lawyer could communicate with established clients via email, Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievance & Discipline Op. 99-2, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (Apr. 9, 1999); 
 a lawyer could receive and respond to email legal questions from visitors to the firm’s web site, 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 99-9, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 
10 (Dec. 2, 1999); 
 a lawyer could communicate by email with other attorneys to express interest in serving as 
counsel in a matter, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-6, 2002 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (June 14, 2002); and 
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 email solicitation of prospective clients “known to have a legal need” are subject to regulation 
under DR 2-101(F)(2).  Id.  [Actually, Opinion 2002-6 spoke in terms of knowledge of a 
“need for specific legal services,” not just “legal need.”  Id. at *10.] 
The restrictions imposed by Opinion 2004-1 with respect to advertising legal services by sending 
unsolicited emails to “an individual or hundreds or thousands of prospective clients at once” seem 
dubious at best under the Rules. Unless there has been a “don’t-call-or-write-or e-mail” instruction 
from the prospective client under division (b)(1), or unless the solicitation is harassing, coercive, etc. 
under division(b)(2) (nothing in Opinion 2004-1 indicates that either was the case), then the emails 
under consideration would appear to pass muster under Rule 7.3(b) and not be subject to the strictures 
of divisions (c), (d), or (e). (Nor were they, of course “real-time electronic contact” under Rule 7.3(a).) 
While the opinion refers to the communications as “targeted direct mail,” the facts presented rather 
clearly indicate that the communications were not targeted, but, rather, general electronic 
advertisements.  
The Board reasoned that this was “targeted direct mail” subject to former DR 2-101(F)(2), (F)(4), and 
(H)(1), because “[w]hen a person receives an e-mail addressed to his or her electronic mail address, 
the person is a direct target of the sender.” Id. at *5. While that may be an acceptable use of the word 
“targeted” in a general sense, it ignores the distinction between “personalization” and “targeting” (see 
Yurich, 78 Ohio St.3d 315, 677 N.E.2d 1190 (1997), discussed above) and is just plain wrong in the 
context of this ethics issue and the relevant rules. 
First of all, it proves too much -- under the Board’s reasoning any written, recorded, or electronic 
communication directed to a particular individual at her residence or business address, to her 
telephone answering machine, or her email address would be “targeted” in the sense used by the 
Board; such an interpretation is inconsistent, not only with other Board opinions (including one cited 
by the Board, Opinion 2002-6) but with respected commentary as well. See Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-6, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (June 14, 2002) (DR 
2-101(F)(2) & (F)(4) applicable to email because sender knew corporate recipient was in need of 
legal services and was defendant in a civil action); see also Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2004-9, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. 9 (Oct. 9, 2004) (DR 2-101(F)(2) restrictions did 
not apply to personalized letter to chiropractor “because the letter is not directed to individuals in need 
of legal services,” id. at *8); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievance & Discipline Op. 94-13, 1994 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (Dec. 2, 1994) (opining that 2-101(F)(2) places restrictions on “targeted 
direct mailings” to those known to be in need of legal services; mailing for legal seminar addressing 
known legal problems of invitees would be subject to (F)(2) restrictions; if that factor not present, 
communication “would not be considered a targeted direct mail solicitation subject to the restrictions 
within DR 2-101(F)(2).” Id. at *13); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 92-20, 1992 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Dec. 4, 1992) (language of (F)(2) limits its scope to “direct mail 
addressed to targeted persons or groups of persons” -- those in need of specific legal services arising 
from specific circumstances known to lawyer; firm newsletter with personalized cover letter to “an 
untargeted broad group of people” having general interest in information not subject to (F)(2) 
restrictions, id. at *4). Accord 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, 
The Law of Lawyering § 57.9, at 57-19 (3d ed. Supp. 2013) (MR 7.3(c) “labeling requirement does 
not apply to advertising material sent to people not known to need legal services in a particular 
matter.” (emphasis in original)); see ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 538 
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(6th ed. 2007) (commentary) (MR 7.3(c) requires “Advertising” label for “targeted 
communications”; comparing Ohio Board Opinion 92-20 with Opinion 2004-01). 
Second, as the Board opinions cited in the preceding paragraph make clear, the relevant disciplinary 
rule, DR 2-101(F)(2), was implicated only if there was actual or constructive knowledge by the 
soliciting lawyer of a “circumstance, condition, or occurrence by reason of [which the recipient] “may 
be in need of specific legal service.” In Opinion 2004-1, the Board acknowledged the existence of this 
requirement, see id.  at *10, but opined, without explanation, directly to the contrary. 
The bottom line under the Rules is that the restrictions imposed by Ohio Rule 7.3(c) should not be 
imposed on the sort of indiscriminate email message -- not sent to those known to be in need of legal 
services in a particular matter, which is what “targeted” means in this context -- that was the subject of 
Opinion 2004-1. On the point under discussion, the communication at issue in Opinion 2004-1 should, 
under the Rules, properly be addressed by Rule 7.3(b), not Rule 7.3(c), and should be permitted, so 
long as neither subdivision (b)(1) (client makes known to lawyer desire not to be solicited) nor (b)(2) 
(coercive solicitation) is implicated.  As previously discussed, however, this is not the way the Board 
reads Rule 7.3(c) in Opinion 2007-5. 
7.3:500  Solicitation by Prepaid and Group Legal Services Plans 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.3(f) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.3(d) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 81:2503 
Wolfram § 16.5.5 
Under Ohio Rule 7.3(f), 
a lawyer may participate with a prepaid or group legal service plan 
operated by an organization not owned or directed by the lawyer that 
uses in-person or telephone contact to solicit memberships or 
subscriptions for the plan from persons who are not known to need 
legal services in a particular matter covered by the plan. 
This activity is expressly excluded from the prohibitions of division (a). Thus, the solicitation activity 
approved by division (f) permits such an organization to avail itself of direct interpersonal encounters 
but only as to “persons not known to need legal services in a particular matter covered by the plan” 
and, interestingly, only by use of “in-person or telephone contact,” not real-time electronic contact. 
Because of the former limitation, the strictures of division (c) do not apply. But, as noted in the last 
sentence of Rule 7.3 cmt. [8], the participating lawyer “must reasonably ensure that the plan sponsors 
are in compliance” with Rule 7.3(b), as well as Rules 7.1 and 7.2. 
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Comment [8] goes on to give further details. Not only must the organization not be owned or directed 
by the participating lawyer, as stated in the Rule, but the personal contact made to solicit members for 
the group or prepaid legal service plan cannot be “undertaken by any lawyer who would be a provider 
of legal services through the plan.” Rule 7.3 cmt. [8]. With respect to ownership or direction, the 
comment states that 
division (f) would not permit a lawyer to create an organization 
controlled directly or indirectly by the lawyer and use the organization 
for the in-person or telephone solicitation of legal employment of the 
lawyer through memberships in the plan or otherwise. 
Id. Communication permitted by such organizations “is to be designed to inform potential plan 
members generally of another means of affordable legal services,” id., and, as stated in the Rule, 
cannot be directed to those known to be in need of legal services in a particular matter. 
Comment [6] further provides that Rule 7.3 
is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from contacting representatives of 
organizations or groups that may be interested in establishing a group 
or prepaid legal plan for their members, insureds, beneficiaries, or 
other third parties for the purpose of informing such entities of the 
availability of and details concerning the plan or arrangement that the 
lawyer or lawyer’s firm is willing to offer. 
Rule 7.3 cmt. [6]. This type of communication, not directed to a prospective client, is addressed to 
representatives acting in a fiduciary capacity and is “functionally similar to and serve[s] the same 
purpose as advertising permitted under Rule 7.2.” Id. 
After noting that solicitation by legal service programs sponsored by organizations is constitutionally 
protected (see United Transp. Union v. Mich. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971)), ABA, Annotated 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 554 (5th ed. 2003) (commentary), goes on to say that 
section (d) (division (f) in Ohio) goes beyond associational-rights protection; it “authorizes prepaid 
and group legal services plans generally,” so long as they are not owned or directed by lawyers 
providing the services and do not engage in solicitations targeted to persons known to be in need of 
legal services in a particular matter covered by the plan. In the words of Hazard and Hodes, “targeted 
solicitations are not allowed”; this means 
that prepaid legal services plans -- even those operated for profit -- may 
aggressively market general “memberships” in the nature of insurance 
policies against future needs for legal services, but may not use the 
same in-person solicitation techniques to sign up new members in 
order to ensure that they [sic their] existing (known) legal needs are 
met. 
2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 57.10, 
at 57-22 (3d ed. Supp. 2013) (emphasis in original; bracketed material added). 
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7.4:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.4 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.4 
  
7.4:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 7.4 is similar in many respects to the Model Rule but contains the following differences: 
In division (a), Ohio adds the language “or limits his or her practice to 
or concentrates in particular fields of law.” at the end of the sentence. 
Ohio has added a new division (c), dealing with trademark practitioners. 
With this addition, former division (c) (MR 7.4(c)) is relettered 
division (d) and former division (d) (MR 7.4(d)) is relettered division 
(e). 
In division (e), the words “both of the following apply” are added after 
“unless”; in subdivision (e)(1), after “organization”, Ohio substitutes 
“approved by the Supreme Court Commission on Certification of 
Attorneys as Specialists;” in lieu of the Model Rule language. 
And, by amendment effective April 1, 2009, the words “certified as” 
have been deleted from the first sentence of division (e). 
  
7.4:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 7.4: DR 2-105. 
  
7.4:200  Regulation of Claims of Certification and Specialization 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.4 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.4 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.94-2.98 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 21:4001 
Wolfram § 14.2.4 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.94-2.98 (1996). 
Practice limitations in general: Many lawyers limit their practice to a particular area of law. Potential 
clients, seeking to employ a lawyer to handle a specific problem, would certainly benefit from a 
system that permits clients to identify lawyers who practice in their area of need and to exclude those 
who do not. 
The concern is that laypersons may equate a limitation in practice with special competence in the area. 
While limiting a practice to a particular area may lead to special competence, that is not necessarily 
the case. Thus, there is a possibility that the public may be misled. Nevertheless, under the Rules, the 
balance struck permits a lawyer not only to advertise the areas in which he does or does not practice 
but also the particular limitation or concentration of his practice.  
In this area the U.S. Supreme Court has held that, so long as not misleading, a lawyer’s choice of 
words to describe his practice (“personal injury”) cannot be foreclosed by the state’s requirement of 
use of a different descriptive term (“tort law”).  In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982). Nor can a state 
preclude a lawyer from factually describing his experience in a particular area, even though this might 
cause a reader to infer expertise.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
Such communication is commercial speech and is subject to restriction only if “the particular content 
or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved 
in fact such advertising is subject to abuse.” R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. See ABA, Annotated Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 562 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). 
Against this constitutional backdrop, Ohio Rule 7.4 provides as follows: 
First, Rule 7.4(a) affirms that a lawyer may communicate that the lawyer 
 does or does not practice in particular fields of law [and/or] 
 limits his or her practice to or concentrates in particular fields of law. 
Obviously enough, “this permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in communications about the 
lawyer’s services. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in a 
specified field or fields, the lawyer is permitted to so indicate.” Rule 7.4 cmt. [1]. 
Claims of specialization: Unlike the former OHCPR, under which a lawyer could not use terms such 
as “specialist” unless certified as such under Gov Bar R XIV 5(A), Rule 7.4 as originally adopted 
provided three tiers of “specialization.” In addition to certain historical specialties and the certified 
specialist recognized under the Code, both of which are carried forward by Rules 7.4(b)-(e) and 
discussed further in this section below, Rule 7.4 cmt. [1] provided that a lawyer could “state that the 
lawyer is a ‘specialist,’ practices a ‘specialty,’ or ‘specializes’ in particular fields,” so long as such 
statements were not false or misleading.  
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But effective April 1, 2009, Rule 7.4 was amended to change the language of 7.4(e) from “shall not 
state or imply that a lawyer is certified as a specialist” (unless certified) to “shall not state or imply 
that a lawyer is a specialist” unless certified, and to delete the Comment [1] sentence quoted above. 
The closest we have been able to come to anything resembling “legislative history” is an unattributed 
comment in the Ohio St. B. Ass’n Rpt (March 2, 2009), at 174, to the effect that as originally 
adopted “Rule 7.4 has resulted in confusion with the terms ‘specialist’ and ‘certified specialist’ for the 
consumers of legal services.” As a result of this amendment, Rule 7.4 becomes one more instance in 
which Ohio departs from the Model Rules template. 
Given this change, cases and opinions such as Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth, 93 Ohio 
St.3d 173, 174, 754 N.E.2d 219, 223 (2001) (emphasis in original) (“my entire specialty is 
representing children and young adults in (often major) criminal matters”); Trumbull County 
Bar Ass’n v. Joseph, 58 Ohio St.3d 258, 569 N.E.2d 883 (1991) (advertisement in classified 
telephone directory claimed that lawyer “specialized in” particular area of law); Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 99-4, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (June 4, 1999) (use of 
“specializedpersonalinjurylawyers” on firm’s web-site); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 88-4, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 32 (Apr. 25, 1988) (allowing name to be 
included in listing of firms by specialty) -- all of which found violations of DR 2-105(A) and which 
under the original 7.4 were no longer good law -- have now apparently been resuscitated by the April 
2009 amendment. 
Historically recognized fields of specialization: Second, the law has traditionally recognized 
specialties in patent, trademark, and admiralty law, and has allowed lawyers practicing in these areas 
to hold themselves out as specialists. See Ohio Rule 7.4 cmt. [2]; see also former DR 2-105(A)(1). 
Ohio Rules 7.4(b), (c), and (d) continue this practice by allowing lawyers engaged in patent practice 
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office to use the designation “Patent Attorney” or a 
substantially similar designation (division (b)), lawyers engaged in trademark practice to use the 
designation “Trademarks,” “Trademark Attorney,” or a substantially similar designation (division 
(c)), and lawyers engaged in admiralty practice to use “Admiralty,” “Proctor in Admiralty,” or a 
substantially similar designation. Division (d). These specialization categories, as well as that of 
certified specialists, discussed below, are unaffected by the April 1, 2009 amendment. 
Certified specialists: Third, pursuant to Rule 7.4(e), a lawyer may “state or imply that the lawyer is 
certified as a specialist in a particular field of law” only if the lawyer has been so certified by an 
organization approved by the Supreme Court Commission on Certification of Attorneys as Specialists 
(division (e)(1)) and the name of the certifying organization is clearly identified in the communication, 
division (e)(2). 
As stated in Comment [3], 
[c]ertification signifies that an objective entity has recognized an 
advanced degree of knowledge and experience in the specialty area 
greater than is suggested by general licensure to practice law. 
Rule 7.4 cmt. [3]. The comment goes on to note that certifying organizations are expected to apply 
standards such that “a lawyer’s recognition as a specialist is meaningful and reliable.” Id. 
Identification of the name of the certifying organization is required by Rule 7.2(e)(2) “to ensure that 
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consumers can obtain access to useful information about an organization granting certification.” Id. 
The Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association was 
presented with a specialization/certification query in its Informal Advisory Op. 2012-02. In that 
opinion, the committee responded to the question “May lawyers use the title ‘Advanced Collaborative 
Practitioner’ in marketing their family-law practices?”. The answer was no, because the list of the 
areas subject to specialization designation, as set forth in Gov Bar R App VI, does not include 
specialist certification in this area of the law. This result obtained even though the practitioner was 
“certified” by an Ohio organization that set compliance standards and training requisites that had to 
be met before one was designated an “Advanced Collaborative Practitioner.” The designating 
organization, however, had not been approved by the Supreme Court Commission on Certification of 
Attorneys as Specialists as an agency qualified to certify Ohio lawyers as specialists. As a result, there 
was a failure to comply with that requisite of  Rule 7.4(e). The Committee did, however, indicate that 
“if truthful, a lawyer may indicate in brochures and on the lawyer’s website, for example, that the 
lawyer is a member of the Organization.” 
As a constitutional matter, any blanket ban on a lawyer’s communication of his or her certification as 
a specialist violates the First Amendment.  Peel v. Attorney Registration & Discipline Comm’n, 
496 U.S. 91 (1990). The degree to which the Constitution permits a state to regulate lawyer claims of 
specialty certification is unsettled.  Peel, 496 U.S. 91 (on variety of issues pertaining to certification, 
Court split without majority opinion). 
Procedure for certification in Ohio: Ohio Rule 7.4(d)(1) recognizes a single path by which lawyers 
can become certified as specialists and communicate that fact -- certification by an organization 
approved by the Supreme Court Commission on Certification of Attorneys as Specialists. (While 
there is no express prohibition against certification by an organization that has not received 
Commission approval (a path that was recognized under DR 2-105(A)(5)), there is absolutely no 
reason for any lawyer to take that route under the Rules, since a lawyer can state or imply certification 
as a specialist only if the certifying organization is one that is approved by the Commission. Rule 
7.4(d)(1).) The Ohio Supreme Court created the Commission on Certification and charged it with the 
responsibility to approve qualifying private organizations that offer specialty certification. Gov Bar 
R XIV. Lawyers receiving certification from approved organizations may hold themselves out as 
specialists, but only as Rule 7.4(e) and the Rules for the Government of the Bar allow. Gov Bar R 
XIV 5(A) provides: 
 A specialist certified under this rule may communicate the fact 
that he or she is certified by the certifying agency as a specialist in the 
field of law involved. A specialist shall not represent, expressly or 
impliedly, that he or she is certified by the Supreme Court or the 
Commission or by an entity other than the certifying agency. A 
specialist may represent that the certifying agency is approved by the 
Commission, but shall not represent that the certifying agency is 
approved by the Supreme Court of Ohio. 
The Rules for the Government of the Bar make clear that certification is not required to practice in an 
area of the law, nor are specialists limited to practice in the areas in which they are certified. Gov Bar 
R XIV 5(B) & (C). Further, certifications in multiple areas of the law are allowed. Gov Bar R XIV 
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5(D). 
In deciding whether to accredit a certifying organization, the Commission applies its Standards for 
Accreditation of Specialty Certification Programs for Lawyers, (ASCP Stds), which are set forth at 
Gov Bar R App IV. 
Substantial requirements pertaining to the organization’s purpose, capabilities, governance, and 
certification requirements are imposed to help assure that the organization is a bona fide one. ASCP 
Std 4. To be approved, the organization must adopt lawyer-certification criteria set forth in that 
Standard. For example, approved certification programs must require “that the time spent practicing 
the specialty [by the lawyer seeking certification] be at least twenty-five percent of the total practice 
of a lawyer engaged in a normal full-time practice throughout the three-year period immediately 
preceding the lawyer’s application.” ASCP Std 4.02(F). The lawyer also will have to pass a written 
examination “of suitable length and complexity” that tests “knowledge and skills of the substantive 
and procedural law in the specialty area.” ASCP Std 4.02(H). In addition, the applicant must have 
completed a minimum of thirty-six hours of continuing legal education in the specialty area in the 
three years preceding application for certification. ASCP Std 4.02(I). Finally, the standards require 
that the organization apply its certification requirements uniformly to those seeking certification, as 
well as implement a nondiscrimination policy. ASCP Std 4.02(D). 
As part of its mission, the Commission on Certification is authorized to identify, and recommend to 
the Ohio Supreme Court for adoption, fields of law subject to specialization designation. Gov Bar R 
XIV 2(C)(1). Identifying particular areas of law as suitable for specialty designation, together with 
providing a definition of the practice in each of those areas, standardizes the information provided and 
thereby protects the public. It assures that if a qualified lawyer properly identifies himself as a 
specialist in a particular area, there will be a common understanding of what that area entails. Those 
areas currently approved as fields of law subject to specialization designation, and their definitions, 
set forth at Gov Bar R App VI, are listed below. 
 Administrative Agency Law is the practice of law that 
involves the activities of agencies at the local, state and federal levels, 
including, but not limited to: licensing, regulation and government 
benefits. For purposes of this certification, it includes matters involving 
the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act (RC Chapter 119), local 
government administrative matters governed by RC Chapter 2506, and 
proceedings pursuant to the federal Administrative Procedures Act. It 
also includes, without limitation, the representation of clients before 
administrative agencies, the practice of law within those agencies, and 
administrative/judicial proceedings involving those agencies. 
 Appellate Law deals primarily with practice before state and 
federal appellate courts. It is distinct from, although complementary to, 
trial advocacy. Appellate Law emphasizes critical analysis and written 
advocacy but includes oral advocacy skills as well. This discipline 
includes consultation regarding the identification and preservation of 
error at all stages of litigation, and the analysis of public policy goals 
and constitutional principles in the highest state and federal courts. 
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Appellate Law embraces actions within the original jurisdiction of 
appellate courts, as well as those matters within the courts’ appellate 
jurisdiction. 
 Business Bankruptcy Law is the practice of bankruptcy law 
when the debtor is a corporation, a partnership, an individual currently 
engaged in business, or an individual formerly engaged in business 
whose debts are primarily incurred for business purposes; including but 
not limited to business bankruptcies, reorganizations, liquidations, and 
the rights, obligations, and remedies of debtors and creditors. 
 Business, Commercial and Industrial Real Property Law is 
the practice of law that involves acquisition, ownership, leasing, 
management, financing, developing, use, transfer and disposition of 
investment, business, commercial and industrial real property, 
including title examination and determination of property rights. 
 Civil Law Trial Advocacy is the practice of law that involves 
litigation of civil controversies in all areas of substantive law before 
state courts, federal courts, administrative agencies, and arbitrators. In 
addition to actual pretrial and trial process, “civil law trial advocacy” 
includes evaluating, managing, and resolving civil controversies prior 
to the initiation of suit. 
 Consumer Bankruptcy Law is the practice of bankruptcy law 
when the debtor is an individual or husband and wife and where the 
debts are primarily non-business related. The matters are typically filed 
under Chapters 7 and 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. [11 USC §§ 701 
et seq. & §§ 1301 et seq.]. 
 Creditors’ Rights/Debt Collection is the practice of law that 
involves all aspects of debt collection under state and federal law as it 
applies to the rights of creditors. 
 Criminal Law Trial Advocacy is the practice of law that 
involves the defense and prosecution of misdemeanor and felony 
crimes in state and federal trial and appellate courts. 
 Elder Law is the legal practice of counseling and representing 
older persons and their representatives about the legal aspects of health 
and long-term care planning, public benefits, surrogate 
decision-making, older persons’ legal capacity, the conservation, 
disposition and administration of older persons’ estates and the 
implementation of their decisions concerning such matters, giving due 
consideration to the applicable tax consequences of the action, or the 
need for more sophisticated tax expertise. 
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 Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law is the practice of 
law that involves analysis and planning for the conservation and 
disposition of estates during lifetime and at death, preparing legal 
instruments to effectuate such planning, and counseling fiduciaries, 
while giving due consideration to the applicable trust, probate, income, 
estate, and gift tax laws. 
 Family Law Trial Advocacy [the only evidence that this 
specialty exists is on the Commission’s website, where it is listed at the 
outset with all other specialties, and then prior to the Family Relations 
Law definition we are told that that “(definition is also for family law 
trial advocacy)”. We have been unable to find any evidence of when or 
how this addition was effected.] 
 Family Relations Law is the practice of law that involves 
counseling clients in the resolution of disputes and with [sic] the 
termination of marriage by divorce, dissolution or annulment and all 
related issues, such as legal separation; paternity; child support and the 
allocation of parental rights and responsibilities; division of property; 
and spousal support both in alternative dispute resolution processes and 
in court. 
 Federal Taxation Law is the practice of law in the areas of 
individual, partnership, corporate, and fiduciary Federal Income Tax, 
estate and gift tax, tax-exempt organizations, qualified plans and other 
federal taxes requiring a substantive and procedural knowledge of the 
Internal Revenue Code [26 USC] and Regulations, Internal Revenue 
Service Rulings, and Federal Taxation case law. 
 Insurance Coverage Law is the area of law involving issues 
between insured and policy holders concerning the rights and 
responsibilities that arise under insurance policies. 
 Labor and Employment Law is the practice of law that 
involves the relationships among employers, employees, and their 
labor organizations, except workers’ compensation. It includes all 
aspects of labor relations (private and public sectors), occupational 
safety and health, employment discrimination, wage and hour, 
employee benefits and employment-related torts and contracts. It 
further includes all forms of labor and employment litigation, 
arbitration, mediation, negotiation and other forms of alternative 
dispute resolution before all federal, state and local courts, agencies 
and private tribunals. 
 Residential Real Property Law is the practice of law that 
involves acquisition, ownership, leasing, financing, use, transfer and 
1181
Ohio Legal Ethics 7.4  
 
disposition of residential real property by individuals, including title 
examination and determination of property rights. 
 Social Security Disability Law is the practice of law that 
involves representation of claimants for Social Security disability, 
survivors’ and retirement benefits. Lawyers in this field routinely 
represent claimants throughout the administrative hearings and appeals 
process and into the federal courts. 
 Workers’ Compensation Law in Ohio is the practice of law 
that involves employees’ rights, employers’ defenses, and benefits 
provided for workplace accidents. The procedural scope of Ohio 
Workers’ Compensation practice includes all activities before the Ohio 
Industrial Commission and Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, as well 
as jury trials and attendant appellate practice. 
The fields of law subject to specialization designation (FLS) are listed on the Ohio Supreme Court 
website at <http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Boards/certification/definitions/>. 
Lawyer referral services: With respect to working through a lawyer referral service, DR 2-105(A)(2) 
allowed a lawyer to have his name listed in “lawyer referral service” offices from which he or she 
would accept referrals. The Ohio State Bar Association interpreted the phrase “lawyer referral 
service” in 2-105 to refer back to lawyer referral service participation allowed under DR 2-103(D). 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n Formal Op. 27-A (n.d.). 
OH DR 2-105(A)(2) was not carried forward, but there would appear to be nothing in the Rules that 
would prevent a lawyer from doing that which 2-105(A)(2) allowed. See Rule 7.2(b)(3) and section 
7.2:400. 
Communications to other lawyers: DR 2-105(A)(3) provided that a lawyer could communicate to 
other lawyers his availability to act as a consultant or associate in a particular branch of law or legal 
service through a dignified announcement of availability distributed to other lawyers or published in 
legal journals. The Board approved of such a letter in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 87-004, 1987 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 25 (Oct. 16, 1987), with the caveat that the 
announcement should not contain representations of “any special competence or experience.” Id. at 
*2. 
Again, such communications are not referenced in Rule 7.4 but seem generally compatible with it, 
other than the limitation in Opinion 87-004 concerning “dignity.” See Rule 7.2 cmt. [3]. Query 
whether the limitation on references to “special competence or experience,” in lawyer-to-lawyer 
communications, survive under the Rules. 
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7.5:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.5 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.5 
  
7.5:101  Model Rule Comparison 
While Ohio Rule 7.5(c) and (d) are identical to the comparable sections of the Model Rule, divisions 
(a) and (b) are different -- division (a) significantly so. 
After the first sentence, which is identical to the Model Rule, division (a) basically restates former 
OH DR 2-102(B). Division (a) deletes all of the second (and last) sentence of MR 7.5(a) and in lieu 
thereof inserts the following: 
A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade name, a 
name that is misleading as to the identity of the lawyer or lawyers 
practicing under the name, or a firm name containing names other than 
those of one or more of the lawyers in the firm, except that the name of 
a professional corporation or association, legal clinic, limited liability 
company, or limited liability partnership shall contain symbols 
indicating the nature of the organization as required by Gov. Bar R. III. 
If otherwise lawful, a firm may use as, or continue to include in, its 
name the name or names of one or more deceased or retired members 
of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line of succession. 
Division (b) differs from the Model Rule in the following respects: instead of the Model Rule 
language “may use the same name or other professional designation in each jurisdiction, but 
identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm” following “in more than one jurisdiction”, Ohio 
uses the following language: “that lists attorneys associated with the firm.” At the end of the division, 
instead of “not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located, Ohio’s language is 
“not licensed to practice in Ohio.” 
  
7.5:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 7.5: DR 2-102. 
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7.5:200  Firm Names and Trade Names 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.5(a) 
Gov Bar R III 
ORC 1701.05(A)(1), 1705.05(A), 1775.62(A) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.5(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.45-2.49, 2.52 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 81:3001 
Wolfram § 14.2.4 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.45-2.49, 2.52 (1996). 
Scope of the provision: Often the first introduction a prospective client has with a law firm is through 
the law firm’s name. If lawyers were allowed the freedom of a retail business in choosing a firm name, 
the fear is that the name chosen might be misleading or crassly commercial. To avoid this, Ohio Rule 
7.5(a) substantially limits the firm name that lawyers in private practice may use. 
It is important to recognize that this provision applies only to lawyers engaged in private legal 
practice. (The second sentence of Rule 7.5(a) expressly so states.) For example, a lawyer who 
markets litigation-support services and legal research and writing directly to other attorneys is not 
engaged in the practice of law, and thus is not bound by the Rule’s restrictions. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-018, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Aug. 12, 1988) (decided 
under former OH DR 2-102(B)). In contrast, all lawyers who are involved in private legal practice 
must comply with the limitations set forth in Rule 7.5(a). These limitations are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
The restrictions apply only to firm names, not to a law firm’s domain name in its world-wide-web 
address. Ohio Rule 7.5 cmt. [1] (“A lawyer or law firm may also be designated by a distinctive 
website address or comparable professional designation.”). Accord, under the Code, Bd. of Comm’rs 
on Grievances & Discipline Op. 99-4, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (June 4, 1999). To the 
extent a law firm offers legal advice through the web, its on-line service must be advertised by the 
firm name rather than a trade name. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 99-9, 1999 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 10 (Dec. 2, 1999). As to use of trade names, see immediately below. 
Trade names: Unlike MR 7.5(a), which permits use of trade names, with limitations, Ohio Rule 7.5(a) 
prohibits a lawyer in private practice from practicing under a trade name. The 7.5(a) no-trade name 
rule was applied in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2010-1, 2010 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 5, 2010) in providing a negative response to a practitioner who inquired 
whether he could use as the name of his law firm his surname followed by the words Intellectual 
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Property or the initials IP. See, e.g., under the former OHCPR, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Heisler, 113 
Ohio St.3d 447, 2007 Ohio 2338, 866 N.E.2d 490 (respondent violated DR 2-102(B) by operating 
under trade names “Mid-South Estate Planning” and “Senior Estate Planning Services”). Such 
regulation has been found to pass constitutional muster. See Medina County Bar Ass’n v. 
Grieselhuber, 78 Ohio St.3d 373, 678 N.E.2d 535 (1997) (upholding constitutionality of restriction 
on lawyer use of trade names under former OHCPR). Cf.  In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) 
(recognizing that prohibition on use of trade names has been upheld, at least in some settings). But see 
Michel v. Bare, 230 F. Supp.2d 1147 (D. Nev. 2002) (holding Nevada rule prohibiting law firms 
[other than non-profit legal services organizations] from using trade names violated First Amendment 
commercial speech rights; case has no subsequent history). Comment [1] to Ohio Rule 7.5 observes 
that “any firm name including the name of a deceased partner is, strictly speaking, a trade name [but] 
[t]he use of such names to designate law firms has proven a useful means of identification.” Ohio 
Rule 7.5 cmt.[1]. 
Several ethics opinions under the OHCPR applied this restriction on trade names. For example, it 
was opined to be improper to practice under a name such as “Debt Relief Clinic.” Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-4, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 26 (Feb. 8, 1991) (use of 
name would violate OH DR 2-102(B) as both trade name and misleading name). Using the name 
“Corporate Legal Services of ‘X’“ would violate this provision as well. Toledo Bar Ass’n, Op. 91-16 
(July 26, 1991). 
A firm apparently can practice under a name using terms that reflect the structure of the practice 
without violating this provision. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-4, 1991 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 26 (Feb. 8, 1991) (approving use of the name “X and Associates”). Accord Bd. 
of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 95-1, 1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 13 (Feb. 3, 
1995) (“and Associates” may be used if attorney employs other attorneys, but not otherwise). The 
Board relied in part on Opinion 95-1 in putting its stamp of approval on a lawyer’s use of “The X Law 
Group” as its name, when “X” was the lawyer’s surname and the lawyer employed two lawyers as 
associates. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2006-2, 2006 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 2 (Feb. 10, 2006) (also opining that “Group” or “Law Group” should not be used in law-firm 
name to refer to paralegals or other nonattorney personnel, office-sharing attorneys, or “of counsel” 
attorneys. 
Further, the Rule expressly requires that “the name of a professional corporation or association, legal 
clinic, limited liability company, or limited liability partnership shall contain symbols indicating the 
nature of the organization as required by Gov. Bar R. III.” Gov Bar R III 2 in turn provides, in part: 
 The name of a legal professional association, corporation, legal 
clinic, limited liability company, or limited liability partnership shall 
comply with Rule 7.5 of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct. The 
name of a legal professional association or legal clinic shall end with 
the legend, “Co., LPA” or shall have immediately below it, in legible 
form, the words “A Legal Professional Association.” The name of a 
corporation, limited liability company, or limited liability partnership 
shall include a descriptive designation as required under sections 
1701.05(A), 1705.05(A), or 1776.82, respectively, of the Revised 
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Code. 
A corporation must include the designation “company,” “co.,” “corporation,” “corp.,” 
“incorporated,” or “inc.” ORC 1701.05(A)(1). A limited liability company must include the 
designation “limited liability company,” “LLC,” or “L.L.C.,” “limited,” “ltd.,” or “ltd”. ORC 
1705.05(A). A limited liability partnership must include the designation “registered limited liability 
partnership,” “registered partnership having limited liability” or “limited liability partnership,” or the 
abbreviation “R.L.L.P.,” “P.L.L.,” “L.L.P.,” or “RLLP,” “PLL,” “LLP” in its name. ORC 1776.82. 
This requirement of using a designation descriptive of the entity involved also was invoked in 
response to the lawyer who wanted to use “IP” or “Intellectual Property” after his surname as the law 
firm name, rather than LLC or other designation appropriate for a firm formed as a limited liability 
company. See Bd. of Comm’rs. on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2010-1, 2010 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 1 (Feb. 5, 2010), also cited at the outset of this subsection. 
While a law firm cannot practice under a trade name, it apparently may use something similar to a 
trade name in its advertising along with its firm name. For example, the Board approved the use by a 
law firm, offering a 900 telephone service to provide legal advice to callers, of a descriptive name for 
the service, as long as the descriptive name was followed by the words “a service of X Firm.” Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-1, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 11 (Feb. 12, 
1993) (approving the use in advertising of “Employment Information Line, a service of X firm”). 
Similarly, the Toledo Bar Association indicated that a law firm might advertise a portion of its firm as 
the “Technology Law Group” as long as care was taken to make sure that prospective clients do not 
confuse this with the firm name. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 90-5 (Feb. 21, 1990). Caution must be 
exercised, however. Use of the trade name “Body Injury Legal Centers,” accompanied by the 
misleading words “Pierre A. Grieselhuber and Affiliates” (he was a sole practitioner), violated both 
DR 2-101(A)(1) and 2-102(B).  Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Grieselhuber, 78 Ohio St.3d 373, 
678 N.E.2d 535 (1997). 
Lawyers’ names: Instead of proceeding under a trade name, lawyers must use a firm name that 
contains the names of one or more of the lawyers in the firm. Ohio Rule 7.5(a). Such lawyers need 
not be licensed to practice in Ohio, provided the jurisdictional limitations are enumerated in the firm 
letterhead and other permissible listings. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-4, 
1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 26 (Feb. 8, 1991). See section 7.5:300. 
Limitations arise with respect to the use of the names of lawyers not presently affiliated with the firm. 
Rule 7.5(a) provides that a firm name cannot contain the names of lawyers who are not currently 
lawyers in the firm, except the names of “deceased or retired members of the firm or of a predecessor 
firm in a continuing line of succession.” This provision was violated by the respondent in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. McCord, 121 Ohio St.3d 497, 2009 Ohio 1517, 905 N.E.2d 1182, who 
used a variety of misleading firm names, including the name of a lawyer with whom he was never in 
a firm and involving the use of “Associates” when there were none. (The use of the other lawyer’s 
name in McCord, Pryor & Associates and other variations also violated the prohibition in 7.5(d) 
against stating or implying that they practiced together in a partnership or other organization when 
that was not the fact.) See, under the identical OHCPR language, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Stidham, 
87 Ohio St.3d 455, 721 N.E.2d 977 (2000) (respondent violated 2-102(B) by practicing under firm 
name containing name of lawyer not his partner or member of same firm, but with whom he merely 
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shared office space). As noted in Comment [1], “it is misleading to use the name of a lawyer not 
associated with the firm or a predecessor of the firm or the name of a nonlawyer.” Ohio Rule 7.5 cmt. 
[1]. Cf. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 87-048, 1987 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 3 (Dec. 18, 1987) (where son starts practice at location where his father used to practice 
before assuming judgeship, son may not use father’s name since they never practiced together). 
In drawing these distinctions, the Rule attempts to achieve a balance. On the one hand, the presence of 
an individual name in the firm name suggests that that lawyer works at the firm and will be involved 
in the representation directly or indirectly. Allowing the use of names of those not affiliated with the 
firm thus would be misleading. On the other hand, a firm builds up a going-concern reputation based 
upon its name. If a name change were required every time a lawyer included in the firm name died or 
retired, that would create unnecessary confusion for the public. 
While the Rule does not itself define the phrase “retired members of the firm” whose names may be 
used in the firm name, several ethics opinions address the matter. The names of lawyers who were in 
the firm name, but subsequently took retired registration status, can be used. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-18, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 11 (Aug. 16, 1991). If, 
however, the retired partner becomes “of counsel” to the firm, her name as “of counsel” can be 
retained in the firm name only if she remains on active registration status, because “of counsel” 
denotes that the lawyer is authorized to practice law. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 2008-1, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 8, 2008). In contrast, continued use of the 
name of a lawyer who withdraws from the firm but continues to practice law outside the firm would 
be improper. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 95-1 (Feb. 21, 1995). See also Toledo Bar Ass’n 
Op. 90-17 (n.d.) (even when that lawyer dies, name cannot then be used by those with whom he was 
formerly affiliated because there was not continuing line of succession). Using the name of a lawyer 
who has taken inactive registration status would also be improper. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 96-3, 1996 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (Apr. 12, 1996) (modifying Opinion 
91-18 to the extent it allowed the continued use of a lawyer’s name in the firm name where the lawyer 
had taken inactive registration status). 
Former Gov Bar R III 2(A) had been interpreted to preclude inclusion of a nonshareholder’s name in 
the name of a law firm practicing as a professional corporation.  Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Bosco, 67 
Ohio St.3d 459, 619 N.E.2d 1023 (1993); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
88-016, 1988 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 21 (June 17, 1988). The operative language of this 
Governing Bar Rule was eliminated in 1995, but neither the Bosco case nor the Board’s ethics 
opinion has been overruled or withdrawn. (The present status of Opinion 88-016 is listed as “CPR 
Opinion.”) 
Misleading names: As a catch-all, Rule 7.5(a) prohibits use of “a name that is misleading as to the 
identity of the lawyer or lawyers practicing under the name.” See, under the former OHCPR, e.g., 
Akron Bar Ass’n v. Amourgis, 113 Ohio St.3d 32, 2007 Ohio 974, 862 N.E.2d 501 (use of 
“Phillips Edwards McCormick, P.C.” violated DR 2-102(B); “[t]here is no person currently or 
formerly involved with the law firm with the name Phillip or Edwards or McCormick,” id. at para. 5); 
Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 102 Ohio St.3d 260, 2004 Ohio 2548, 809 N.E.2d 659 (use of 
“Baker & Baker, Attorneys at Law” by sole practitioner violated 2-102(B)). But continued use in the 
firm name of one’s maiden name, after it has been legally changed upon marriage, is not “misleading” 
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within the meaning of the disciplinary rule. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 97-7 (Dec. 31, 
1997). 
Under this standard, it is also impermissible to use the phrase “and Associates” in the firm name of 
one who is in solo practice.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth, 93 Ohio St.3d 173, 754 
N.E.2d 219 (2001) (use in letterhead). The phrase implies that the lawyer is involved in an 
employment relationship with other attorneys and cannot be used to describe office-sharing or 
co-counsel arrangements with other attorneys, or to denote that the lawyer has nonlawyer support 
personnel in his employ. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 95-1, 1995 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 13 (Feb. 3, 1995). To do so is misleading. 
Legal clinics: Among the permitted structural forms in which lawyers practice law is the legal clinic 
organized “for the purpose of providing standardized and multiple legal services.” Ohio Rule 7.5 cmt. 
[4]. Comment [4] places specific limitations on the name a legal clinic may use, although many of the 
restrictions mirror those applicable to lawyers practicing in other arrangements. The name of the legal 
clinic must include the names of one or more of the active lawyers in the organization. Id. The name 
of any active lawyer in a clinic may be retained in the legal clinic’s name after the lawyer’s death, 
retirement, or inactivity because of age or disability. Id. The clinic’s name may also include the 
phrase “legal clinic” or words of similar import. Id. See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 89-27, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 33 (Aug. 19, 1989) (approving use of the 
phrase “legal center” by a legal clinic). See generally Bates v. Ariz. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 
(1977) (overturning state’s prohibition against lawyer’s using the phrase “legal clinic” to describe a 
practice “geared to provide standardized and multiple services”). The use of a trade name, or a name 
including geographical or other type of identification or description, is prohibited. Ohio Rule 7.5 cmt. 
[4]. See Op. 89-27, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 33 (finding “Austintown Legal Center” to 
violate this standard). In addition, “the name must otherwise conform to other provisions of the 
[OHRPC] and The Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio.” Ohio Rule 7.5 
cmt. [4]. Finally, the clinic cannot be owned by, or profits or losses shared with, nonlawyers or 
lawyers not actively engaged in the practice of law in the organization. Id. 
Query whether these naming restrictions have (or ought to have) any application to legal clinics 
operated by law schools throughout the state. Arguably not, given that the limitations set forth in the 
comment are directed to “legal clinic[s] operated by one or more lawyers.” 
  
7.5:300  Law Firms with Offices in More Than One Jurisdiction 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.5(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.5(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.43, 2.50 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 81:3005 
Wolfram § 15.4 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.43, 2.50 (1996). 
Multijurisdictional firm name: Under the OHCPR, to the extent an Ohio law firm operated in more 
than one state, Ohio expressly permitted the firm to use the same name as that used in other 
jurisdictions, even if the named lawyers were not admitted to practice in Ohio. Former OH DR 
2-102(D). Such a rule helps the public by accurately stating office affiliations across states. Cf. Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline Op. 91-4, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 26 (Feb. 8, 
1991) (firm name may contain name of partner not licensed in Ohio). 
While this language for some reason was not carried forward into Ohio Rule 7.5(b), and even though 
MR 7.5(b) does expressly so state, it is inconceivable that this is not still the law under the Ohio Rules. 
As is stated in the Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 7.5, the Rule is comparable to DR 2-102, “[w]ith 
the exception of DR 2-102(E) and (F).” There is no mention of 2-102(D) or of any intent to alter its 
meaning. Perhaps the single-name concept was thought to be implicit in the language of Rules 7.5(a) 
and (b) themselves (“A lawyer shall not use . . . . a firm name containing names other than those of 
one or more of the lawyers in the firm or one or more deceased or retired members of the firm or a 
predecessor firm in a continuing line of succession” and “[a] law firm with offices in more than one 
jurisdiction that lists attorneys associated with the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on 
those not licensed to practice in Ohio.).” From this language, it would appear that if the firm does not 
list individual attorneys, the operative rule would be that stated in Rule 7.5(a). In any event, there is 
no explanation of the change that we could find. The deletion was made in the draft of April 2005, 
reflecting action taken at the Task Force meeting of March 10-11, 2005. Unfortunately, the meeting 
minutes shed no light on why this change was made. 
Multijurisdictional firm listings: Many firms are comprised of lawyers licensed to practice in 
different jurisdictions. As a result, it may be difficult to ascertain exactly where the lawyer retained is 
licensed to practice. Laypersons might erroneously assume that each lawyer is authorized to practice 
wherever the firm has an office. Rule 7.5(b) allows lawyers to practice in such multistate firms, but 
seeks to protect the public by requiring that a firm that lists attorneys in the firm (such as on its 
letterhead) “shall” indicate the jurisdictional limitations on all lawyers not licensed to practice in Ohio. 
See also Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 99-7, 1999 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 
8 (Dec. 2, 1999) (confirming that the OHCPR and Governing Bar Rules contemplate Ohio and 
non-Ohio lawyers joining in various forms of professional association, but suggesting that state 
corporation law be looked to for possible limitations on the practice); Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-4, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 26 (Feb. 8, 1991) (applying 
this principle in situation where named partner in firm is not licensed in Ohio, but other lawyers are). 
Solo practitioners and jurisdictional limits: The OHCPR was silent as to any requirement of a solo 
practitioner to indicate jurisdictional limits on the letterhead. Nevertheless, DR 2-102(A)(4) was 
invoked to sanction an Ohio lawyer who opened an office in Washington, D.C. and failed to indicate 
on his D.C. office letterhead that he was licensed to practice only in Ohio and in a federal district court 
in Maryland.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mbakpuo, 73 Ohio St.3d 292, 652 N.E.2d 976 
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(1995). While Rule 7.5 similarly does not address the issue expressly, there would seem to be little 
doubt that such practice or comparable listing on other materials is misleading and thus would be 
violative of the first sentence of 7.5(a). 
Letterhead of federal practitioners not licensed, but residing, in Ohio: An attorney who is not licensed 
to practice law in Ohio, but who resides here and appears in federal court, should specify in his 
letterhead those federal courts to which he is admitted and include a disclaimer as to admission in 
Ohio. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-6, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 24 
(Apr. 12, 1991). See section 5.5:520 (discussing unauthorized-practice-of-law implications of failure 
to do so). 
  
7.5:400  Use of the Name of a Public Official 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.5(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.5(c) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.41, 2.48 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 81:3005 
Wolfram § 14.2.4 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.41, 2.48 (1996). 
Firm names: Rule 7.5(c) addresses the effect that a lawyer’s moving to public life should have on the 
name of the firm with which the lawyer was associated. The Rule provides: 
 The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not be used 
in the name of a law firm . . . during any substantial period in which the 
lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing law with the firm. 
See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 87-048, 1987 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 
(Dec. 18, 1987) (applying the similar standard under former DR 2-102(B)). 
The concern of the Rule is two-fold. One is that the public will be misled into thinking they can secure 
the assistance of the lawyer in question, who, by virtue of public office, is no longer available to 
handle private matters. Second, the continued presence of the lawyer’s name in the name of the firm 
might suggest that the firm can exercise some special influence with the lawyer in his or her new 
position. Such a suggestion is improper and should be avoided. See also Ohio Rule 8.4(e) (providing 
that a lawyer should not “state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or 
official”), discussed at section 8.4:600. Under the OHCPR, to the extent that a lawyer was permitted 
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by law to remain in private practice with the firm while carrying out his or her public duties, these 
restrictions did not apply. See former OH EC 2-11. Rule 7.5 does not speak directly to this issue, but 
since the Rule applies only to a period in which the lawyer “is not actively and regularly practicing in 
the firm,” it would seem to exempt those who remain in active practice while serving in a public 
office. 
Unlike former DR 2-102(B), which both obligated the lawyer/public official not to permit such a 
misuse of his or her name, and prohibited any firm member from in fact misusing it, Rule 7.5(c) is 
directed solely to the firm and/or its lawyers (“shall not be used”). 
Professional Announcements: Likewise, the name of a firm lawyer who has taken public office 
cannot be used in communications on the firm’s behalf during any substantial period in which the 
lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing law as a member of the firm. Rule 7.5(c). The Rule 
would not bar a former judge (or other public official) returning to private practice from including a 
factual statement about his or her former position on professional announcement cards. Accord, under 
the OHCPR, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-8, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 4 (Oct. 15, 1993), discussed below. 
Letterhead: Given the prohibition in the Rule against use of the name of a lawyer holding public 
office “in communications on [the law firm’s] behalf” during any substantial period when the lawyer 
is not practicing with the firm, it is reasonably clear that such a lawyer’s name cannot be used in the 
firm’s letterhead. Rule 7.5(c). 
In Opinion 93-8, the Board opined that a former judge returning to private practice could not include 
statements about his former position or use titles, such as “Judge,” on his letterhead or business card, 
but could do so in professional announcement cards or law directory listings. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-8, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Oct. 15, 1993). The 
distinction was based on the likely effect of the communication on its intended audience. Letterhead 
and business cards are directed toward the public, who might be misled into thinking the judge can 
use the prestige of past office to secure client success or to gain improper influence. In contrast, 
professional announcement cards and directory listings are generally directed to others within the 
profession, who are unlikely to be misled by the information. The Board has reaffirmed these 
distinctions and restrictions under the Rules of Professional Conduct in Opinion 2013-3, 2013 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 6, 2013). Opinions 93-8 and 2013-3 are further discussed in section 
7.1:220 at “Misleading communications about competence or methods.” 
  
7.5:500  Misleading Designation as Partnership, etc. 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 7.5(d) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.5(d) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.43-2.44, 2.51 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 81:3008 
ALI-LGL § 58 
Wolfram § 14.2.4 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 2.43-2.44, 2.51 (1996). 
Firm names and firm structure: Lawyers in private practice enter into numerous different 
arrangements with other lawyers, from office sharing to various forms of partnership and corporate 
status. Several different forms are permitted, but all lawyers involved must take care to be sure the 
public is not misled. The Rules also require that particular designations be used in the firm name if the 
lawyer’s practice is organized as a corporation, partnership, professional association, legal clinic, 
limited liability company, or registered partnership. Ohio Rule 7.5(a) & Gov Bar R III 2. See 
section 7.5:200. 
To the potential client, a lawyer who is practicing in a partnership or corporate form with others may 
be seen as having the greater resources of other lawyers to call upon in carrying out the representation. 
Clients also may feel that this gives them an added financial protection should the representation go 
awry. See generally Gov Bar R III 4 (requiring that lawyers organized as a legal professional 
association, corporation, legal clinic, limited liability company, or registered partnership maintain 
insurance or financial reserves, under a formula spelled out in the Rule, for any liability of the firm 
incurred in rendering legal services). See also section 5.1:500. Given that a reasonable client may 
choose a lawyer based in part on the fact that the lawyer is part of a partnership or other association of 
attorneys, the ethics rules allow a lawyer to state or imply that he or she practices in a partnership or 
other organization “only when that is the fact.” Ohio Rule 7.5(d). See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
McCord, 121 Ohio St.3d 497, 2009 1517, 905 N.E.2d 1182, discussed in section 7.5:200 at 
“Lawyers’ names.” The Court so held under the similar language of the OHCPR in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Character, 129 Ohio St.3d 60, 2011 Ohio 2902, 950 N.E.2d 177 (respondent, a solo 
practitioner, represented herself as an attorney with the firm of “Character, Character & Associates,” 
whose “‘associates’ were attorneys outside her office with whom she co-counseled on a regular 
basis,” id. at para. 10; DR 2-102(C) (and (B)) violated); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Smith, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 497, 2002 Ohio 6728, 780 N.E.2d 584 (violation of 2-102(C) where respondent’s letterhead 
represented that he practiced in partnership with another lawyer who was not his partner).  
Comment [2] underscores that lawyers who are merely sharing office space cannot use a designation 
such as “‘Smith and Jones,’ for that title suggests that they are practicing together as a firm.” 
Moreover, “[t]he use of a disclaimer such as ‘not a partnership’ or ‘an association of sole 
practitioners’ does not render the name or designation permissible.” Ohio Rule 7.5 cmt. [2]. 
Applying the comparable OHCPR standard, an express misrepresentation on the letterhead -- that the 
lawyer was associated with others with whom he was not -- clearly violated 2-102(C).  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Conese, 102 Ohio St.3d 439, 2004 Ohio 3888, 812 N.E.2d 944; Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Mbakpuo, 73 Ohio St.3d 292, 652 N.E.2d 976 (1995). (While under indefinite 
suspension imposed by the 1995 decision, Mbakpuo again engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law and again violated former DR 2-102(C), by using letterhead falsely holding himself out as a 
member of a firm that did not exist. This time around, Mbakpuo was disbarred.  Office of 
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Disciplinary Counsel v. Mbakpuo, 98 Ohio St.3d 177, 2002 Ohio 7087, 781 N.E.2d 208.) It also 
was improper to employ a common firm name that connoted a formal relationship when there was no 
such relationship. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 95-1, 1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 13 (Feb. 3, 1995) (improper for lawyer in solo practice to use firm name such as “X and 
Associates, L.P.A.” where lawyers involved merely shared office space or served as co-counsel, but 
were not otherwise associated). Similarly, if a partnership dissolved, but the lawyers remained in an 
office-sharing relationship, they could not continue to practice under the old firm name, as that would 
imply a continuing partnership. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 88-019, 1988 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2 (Aug. 12, 1988). 
Note, however, the Ohio State Bar Association opinion that group advertising was permissible by 
lawyers in different firms as long as care was taken to assure that the public was not misled as to the 
separate nature of the practices involved. Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 88-1 (May 4, 1988). 
Beyond disciplinary concerns, improper practices in this area could subject lawyers to liability for the 
conduct of others with whom they appear to be, but are not, affiliated, under various theories of 
apparent agency or agency by estoppel. See Estate of Holmes v. Ludeman, No. L-00-1294, 2001 
Ohio App. LEXIS 4501 (Ohio App. Lucas Oct. 5, 2001) (issues of fact existed with respect to 
whether lawyer defendants were conducting business as partnership in fact or partnership by estoppel; 
summary judgment for attorneys reversed). Cf. Trimble-Weber v. Weber, 119 Ohio App.3d 402, 
695 N.E.2d 344 (Geauga 1997) (in defamation action against law firm and “of counsel” lawyer to 
firm, court examines possible liability of law firm under apparent agency and agency by estoppel 
theories (based on lawyer’s name in firm letterhead as of counsel and in firm’s Martindale-Hubbell 
listing) but finds no liability because plaintiff “allegedly suffered injury as a result of [of counsel’s] 
actions that were unrelated to [law firm’s] alleged purported manifestation concerning the agency 
relationship.”  Id. at para. 8.). See generally the nonlawyer cases of Shaffer v. Maier, 68 Ohio St.3d 
416, 627 N.E.2d 986 (1994) (apparent agency), and Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health 
Ctr., 68 Ohio St.3d 435, 628 N.E.2d 46 (1994) (agency by estoppel). 
Letterhead: Even if the firm name does not misdescribe the organizational affiliations of attorneys, 
letterhead practices of those attorneys may mislead the public, and, if they do, those practices are 
improper under division (d). For example, it was opined under the Code that lawyers who shared 
office space could not use a common letterhead, as that implied partnership or other association when 
that was not the case. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-36, 1989 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 6 (Dec. 15, 1989). The problem cannot be cured by disclaimer. Id. (rejecting 
disclaimers as potentially misleading to laypersons in this context). Accord, as to disclaimers, Rule 
7.5 cmt. [2], discussed above. An overview of letterhead naming issues may be found in Kathryn A. 
Thompson, Naming Rights and Wrongs, ABAJ, Dec. 2004, at 28. 
Letterhead - Lawyers on retired or inactive registration status: Under the OHCPR, a law firm could 
list on its letterhead attorneys who had taken retired registration status, as long as the letterhead 
designated them as retired, and they had been on the letterhead prior to taking retired registration 
status. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-18, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 
11 (Aug. 16, 1991). In contrast, lawyers taking inactive registration status could not be listed on the 
letterhead. Id. While this issue is not expressly addressed by Rule 7.5, it is addressed in the present 
version of Gov Bar R VI, which states that both inactive status and retired status lawyers may be 
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listed on the firm letterhead if (1) the name had been included prior to the lawyer’s change from active 
status, (2) the lawyer was not under suspension, and (3) the letterhead denotes that the lawyer in 
question is “inactive” or “retired.” Gov Bar R VI 2(C) (inactive); Gov Bar R VI 6(D) (retired). 
Letterhead - Of-counsel designation: Some lawyers are affiliated with a firm in a relationship other 
than as a partner or associate. In accordance with Rule 7.5 cmt. [3], such lawyers may be designated 
“Of Counsel” if “the lawyer has a continuing relationship with a lawyer or law firm.” Note that, 
unlike the prior disciplinary rule, Comment [3] does not limit the use of such designation to 
letterhead. 
In February 2008, the Board of Commissioners issued a comprehensive opinion dealing with “of 
counsel” issues under the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2008-1, 2008 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 8, 2008). This opinion confirms 
and carries forward all of the prior opinions by the Board under the Code dealing with “of counsel” 
issues, particularly the comprehensive Opinion 2004-11, as discussed below. On the letterhead issue, 
it restates the view of Opinion 2004-11 that use of the name of an out-of-state lawyer as “of counsel” 
on an Ohio firm’s letterhead should include the listed lawyer’s jurisdictional limitation. Opinion 
2008-1, together with Rule 7.5 cmt. [3], should be the starting point for anyone having questions 
relating to “of counsel” matters under the Ohio Rules. 
Traditionally, the four principal uses of the term “of counsel” included part-time practitioners who 
had changed from full-time status, retired partners who remained available for consultation and 
advice, probationary partners-to-be (typically joining the firm as a lateral hire), and those who had a 
permanent status at a firm but were not partners of it. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline 
Op. 91-18, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 11 (Aug. 16, 1991) (relying for guidance on ABA 
Formal Op. 90-357 (May 10, 1990)). Under the Rule 7.5 cmt. [3] definition, it would appear that all 
of these categories would qualify, although the “continuing relationship” may not be quite as strong in 
the case of the retired partner available for consultation. Note, however, as discussed this section infra, 
the retired “of counsel” partner cannot have taken retired registration status under the Bar rules; one 
who does so is not authorized to practice law and may not hold oneself out as authorized to do so. See 
Gov Bar R VI 3(A). A lawyer may maintain “of counsel” status with multiple firms, if the lawyer 
maintains sufficient contacts with each and structures the relationship to avoid conflict-of-interest 
problems. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline Op. 97-2, 1997 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 7 (Apr. 11, 1997).  
The last word on “of counsel” issues under the Code was Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2004-11, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Oct. 8, 2004). The Board there stated 
that an “of counsel” attorney does not function or practice as a member of the firm to which he or she 
serves as “of counsel” but rather is “unique from a member in a law firm.” Op. 2004-11, at *5 (except 
on conflict-of-interest disqualification issues, id.). Thus, a lawyer, whether “a sole practitioner, office 
sharing attorney, member, associate, partner, shareholder, or an attorney employee of a multi-lawyer 
law practice[,] may serve as ‘of counsel’ to another lawyer or law firm.” Id. at *3. This includes an 
Ohio lawyer who is “of counsel” to a firm in another state, an out-of-state lawyer who is “of counsel” 
to an Ohio firm, and, of course, an Ohio lawyer as “of counsel” to another Ohio firm, provided that in 
each instance the disciplinary rules of the state in which the lawyer is “of counsel” are adhered to. See 
id. at *1 (syllabus). 
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To qualify for “of counsel” status under the Board’s reading in Opinion 2004-11 (which seems more 
stringent than that in Rule 7.5 cmt. [3] but which was nevertheless reconfirmed in Opinion 2008-1 
under the Rules), the attorney must have “a close, regular, and personal relationship” with the firm, 
other than that of partner or associate. 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9, at *2. Using an “of 
counsel” designation for a lawyer who did not maintain such a relationship was false and misleading 
advertising in violation of former 2-101(A)(1). Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
97-2, 1997 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 (Apr. 11, 1997). An attorney on inactive or retired 
registration status cannot be listed as “of counsel.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
91-18, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 11 (Aug. 16, 1991); accord Gov Bar R VI 6(D) (attorney 
taking retired registration status cannot be listed on letterhead “as ‘of counsel’ or otherwise be 
represented as able to engage in the practice of law in Ohio”). Although VI 6(D) speaks of “a retired 
attorney,” this must be read as a reference to a lawyer who has taken retired registration status. A 
lawyer who retires from a firm but maintains active registration status remains authorized to practice 
law despite his retirement. Nor is it appropriate to list a partner or an associate of the firm as “of 
counsel.” Op. 91-18, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 11. It also may be inappropriate to list one 
law firm as “of counsel” to another. Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 92-7 (May 10, 1992). 
Letterhead - Senior Attorney designation: Under the Code, the Board approved the use of the phrase 
“Senior Attorney” on the letterhead to designate an attorney who had practiced for a number of years, 
merged his office with another law firm, and became a salaried employee of the firm. Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-03, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 20 (Apr. 20, 
1990). 
Letterhead - Inclusion of nonlawyers: Under the OHCPR, a split of authority existed with respect to 
the propriety of listing nonlawyer employees on the law firm’s letterhead. The Cleveland Bar 
Association approved the practice, as long as the nonlawyer employees were clearly identified as 
such. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 89-1 (Aug. 25, 1989). The Board, however, concluded otherwise in 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-16, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 23, at 
*2 (June 16, 1989) (reaching this conclusion on finding that former DR 2-102(A)(4) was meant to 
provide “an exhaustive list” of what could be included on letterhead, and it did not provide for 
inclusion of nonlawyers).  
However, on June 8, 2012, the Board withdrew its Opinion 89-16, and inclusion of nonlawyers on 
letterhead is now permitted under the Rules, provided they are clearly identified as nonlawyers. Bd. 
of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2012-2 (June 8, 2012). In doing so, the Board 
reaffirmed its earlier approval in Opinion 89-16 of use of nonlawyer names on business cards, once 
again if the cards clearly show that the person named therein is not licensed to practice law. More 
important, the Board expressly includes this general approval of listing of nonlawyers on a firm’s 
website, provided the listing is not false, misleading or nonverifiable. Thus, an accurate reference to a 
nonlawyer on letterhead, business card or website is now appropriate in Ohio. Accord ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 569 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary).  
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Lawyer’s inclusion on client letterhead: DR 2-102(A)(4) also addressed when a lawyer or law firm 
could be listed on the stationery of a client. According to the disciplinary rule, a lawyer could be listed 
on a client’s stationery as “General Counsel” or an equivalent designation, if the lawyer or firm 
“devotes a substantial amount of professional time in the representation of that client.” The rule 
provided no guidance on how much time this should entail. See Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 92-8 (n.d.) 
(finding, strangely, that even though firm provided all of business client’s legal representation, where 
no firm member spent majority of his or her time on client’s work, commitment was insufficient to 
justify listing as general counsel!). 
Other conditions, not expressed in the rule, also could be applicable. Relying on a 1972 ABA 
informal opinion, the Board suggested that a lawyer’s name could appear on a client’s letterhead and 
the lawyer could sign letters on client stationery as client’s counsel only if: (1) counsel did not suggest 
the listing, (2) the listing was clearly and primarily in the client’s interest, and (3) the client did not 
exploit the listing for business or competitive purposes. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 90-13, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 20 (Aug. 17, 1990). If these conditions 
were satisfied, listing as general counsel or under some equivalent designation was appropriate. Id. 
Use of the phrase “of counsel” was not an equivalent designation, however, since that title applies to 
a special affiliation with a law firm, not a client. Id. The lawyer also could sign correspondence under 
the client’s letterhead, whether or not the lawyer was listed there, as long as the lawyer’s professional 
status was clearly designated. Id. 
Consistent with its exclusive focus on lawyers and law firms, Ohio Rule 7.5 does not speak to the 
client-letterhead issue at all, but the Board addressed it in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2009-5, 2009 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (June 12, 2009), and found the use of 
“General Counsel” on client letterhead permissible, so long as the lawyer or firm named represents 
the client in “all or most” of its legal matters, devotes a “substantial amount” of professional time to 
the client, and is given the title by the client. The designation and its use in signing correspondence on 
behalf of the client is proper under Rule 7.5 and 7.1, provided the communication is truthful.  
Finally, on a related subject, if an out-of-state attorney not yet licensed in Ohio was hired to fill a 
general counsel position, the attorney could use the title only if its use was accompanied by a 
disclaimer that the lawyer was not licensed to practice in Ohio.  In re Stage, 81 Ohio St.3d 554, 692 
N.E.2d 993 (1998) (disclaimer required in any written or oral communication where title used). 
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THE NOTE TO RULE 7.6 STATES THAT MR 7.6 IS NOT ADOPTED IN OHIO BECAUSE 
"THE SUBSTANCE OF MODEL RULE 7.6 IS ADDRESSED BY PROVISIONS OF THE 
OHIO ETHICS LAW, PARTICULARLY R.C. 102.03(F) AND (G), AND OTHER 
CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS RELATIVE TO BRIBERY AND ATTEMPTS TO 
INFLUENCE THE CONDUCT OF ELECTED OFFICIALS. A LAWYER OR LAW FIRM 
THAT VIOLATES THESE STATUTORY PROVISIONS WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF 
OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE OHIO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, SUCH AS 
RULE 8.4." 
  
7.6:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
None 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.6 
  
7.6:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio did not adopt MR 7.6 and substituted nothing in its place. See introductory paragraph above. 
  
7.6:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
See section 7.6:101. 
  
7.6:200  The "Pay-to-Play" Prohibition 
Primary Ohio References 
None 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 7.6 
A brief summary of MR 7.6 is as follows: MR 7.6 is limited to political contributions. If made or 
solicited by a lawyer or law firm, that lawyer or firm cannot accept a government legal engagement or 
appointment by a judge if the contribution or solicitation was made for the purpose of obtaining or 
being considered for such engagement or appointment. An overview of this "pay-to-play" prohibition 
and its pros and cons are set forth in 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. 
Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering §§ 60.1-60.4 (3d ed. Supp. 2008). 
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8.1:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.1 
Gov Bar R I 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.1 
  
8.1:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 8.1 differs in a number of respects from the Model Rule. Those differences are as follows: 
Ohio deletes the Model Rule introductory language (“An applicant for admission to the bar, or a 
lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter 
shall not:”) and substitutes the following: 
In connection with a bar admission application or in connection 
with a disciplinary matter, the lawyer shall not do any of the 
following: 
Division (a) is identical to the Model Rule. 
Division (b) differs in the following respects: Ohio inserts at the outset “in response to a demand for 
information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,” before “fail to disclose”; substitutes after 
“fail to disclose” “a material fact” in lieu of the Model Rule language “a fact necessary to correct a 
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter,”; after “knowingly fail to 
respond”, deletes the Model Rule language “to a lawful demand for information from an admissions 
or disciplinary authority”. 
  
8.1:102  Model Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 8.1: DR 1-101. (Although not mentioned in 
the table, DR 1-103(B) also is related to Rule 8.1(b).) 
  
8.1:200  Bar Admission 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.1 
Gov Bar R I 
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Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.1 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 1.7 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 21:101 
Wolfram §§ 15.2, 15.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 1.7 (1996). 
The very first Ethical Consideration in the former Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility stated as 
a “basic tenet” that “every person in our society should have ready access to the independent 
professional services of a lawyer of integrity and competence.” OH EC 1-1. Assuring that lawyers 
meet this standard starts with controls on admission to the bar. See Gov Bar R I, discussed below in 
sections 8.1:210-:240. 
Admission is justified only if “the applicant’s record of conduct justifies the trust of clients, 
adversaries, courts and others with respect to the professional duties owed to them and demonstrates 
that the applicant satisfies the essential eligibility requirements for the practice of law as defined by 
the Board [of Commissioners on Character and Fitness].” Gov Bar R I 11(D)(3). 
Ohio Rule 8.1, in turn, speaks more specifically to the duties of a lawyer with respect to the lawyer’s 
own application or the application of others for admission to the bar. These rules are discussed in 
sections 8.1:300-:400, together with the similar duties imposed with respect to disciplinary matters. 
  
8.1:210  Bar Admission Agency 
There are two state-wide bar admission agencies in Ohio. The first is the Board of Bar Examiners, 
consisting of eighteen members of the Ohio Bar; it is “responsible for examination of applicants for 
admission to the practice of law in Ohio,” including preparing and grading bar examination essay 
questions. See Gov Bar R I 4(B), 5. The second agency is the Board of Commissioners on Character 
and Fitness, consisting of twelve Ohio Bar members, one from each appellate district. It 
“[s]upervise[s] and direct[s] the regional or local bar association admission committees in the 
investigation of the character, fitness, and moral qualifications of applicants for admission to the 
practice of law.” Gov Bar R I 10(B)(2). It also hears appeals by applicants who have been given 
something other than an unqualified approval (which means they have been disapproved, see Gov 
Bar R I 11(F)(1)) by a local admissions committee. Id. at I 12. The role of the regional and local bar 
association admissions committees is set forth at Gov Bar R I 11. 
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8.1:220  Bar Admission Requirements 
Admission to the practice of law in Ohio is dealt with in Gov Bar R I. That rule covers preliminary 
registration requirements (I 2), application for the bar exam (I 3), bar examiners (I 4; see section 
8.1:210), the bar examination (I 5; see section 8.1:210), the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Exam (MPRE) (I 6), application for reexamination (I 7), induction (I 8), admission without 
examination (I 9; see section 8.1:230), Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness (I 10; see 
section 8.1:210), character investigations by admission committees (I 11), appeals to Board of 
Commissioners on Character and Fitness (I 12; see section 8.1:210), confidentiality of character and 
fitness matters (I 13), admissions fund (I 14), and publication of list of applicants for admission (I 15), 
in addition to the general requirements for admission in Gov Bar R I 1, set forth below. 
The general requirements of Gov Bar R I 1 are as follows: the applicant must 
 be at least 21 years of age 
 have an undergraduate bachelor’s degree 
 have a J.D. or L.L.B. degree 
 demonstrate and be approved as to requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications 
 pass the Ohio bar examination and the MPRE (or be approved for admission without 
examination under I 9; see section 8.1:230); and 
 take the oath of office set forth in I 8(A). 
Of these, the necessity to show the requisite character, fitness and moral qualifications is the one most 
open to interpretation.  In assessing an applicant’s showing in this regard, the Board of 
Commissioners on Character and Fitness considers the following “essential eligibility requirements 
for the practice of law”: 
1. The cognitive capacity to learn, to recall what has been learned, to reason and to 
analyze. 
2. The ability to communicate clearly with clients, attorneys, courts, and others; 
3. The ability to exercise good judgment in conducting one’s professional business; 
4. The ability to conduct oneself with a high degree of honesty, integrity, and 
trustworthiness in all professional relationships and with respect to all legal 
obligations; 
5. The ability to conduct oneself with respect for and in accordance with the law and the 
Code of Professional Responsibility [the reference will presumably be changed at 
some point to the Rules of Professional Conduct]; 
6. The ability to avoid acts that exhibit disregard for the health, safety and welfare of 
others; 
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7. The ability to conduct oneself diligently and reliably in fulfilling all obligations to 
clients, attorneys, courts, and others; 
8. The ability to use honesty and good judgment in financial dealings on behalf of oneself, 
clients, and others; 
9. The ability to comply with deadlines and time constraints; and 
10. The ability to conduct oneself professionally and in a manner that engenders respect 
for the law and the profession. 
 
Ohio Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness, Definitions of Essential Eligibility 
Requirements for the Practice of Law (which can be found online at 
www.sconet.state.oh.us/AttySvcs/admissions/pdf/ESSENTIAL_ELIGIBILITY_REQUIREMENTS.
pdf).  The Ohio Supreme Court also has looked to these requirements when reviewing bar admission 
cases that turn on character and fitness issues.  See, e.g., In re Application of Head, 114 Ohio St.3d 
29, 2007 Ohio 2550, 867 N.E.2d 824, at para. 19. 
In addition, the Board has identified a list of factors to be considered in making a recommendation as 
to a candidate’s character and fitness and the weight such factors should be given: 
Factors Considered in Making Character and Fitness Determinations 
Before making a recommendation about an applicant’s character, fitness, and moral 
qualifications, the factors to be considered by an Admissions Committee or the Board “shall 
include, but are not limited to, all of the following:” 
  1) commission or conviction of a crime; 
  2) evidence of an existing and untreated chemical (drug or alcohol) dependency; 
  3) commission of an act constituting the unauthorized practice of law; 
  4) violation of the honor code of the applicant’s law school or any other academic 
misconduct; 
  5) evidence of a mental or psychological disorder that in any [way] affects or, if 
untreated, could affect the applicant’s ability to practice law in a competent 
and professional manner; 
  6) a pattern of disregard of the laws of Ohio, another state, or the United States; 
  7) failure to provide complete and accurate information concerning the 
applicant’s past; 
  8) false statements, including omissions; 
  9) acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; 
10) abuse of legal process; 
11) neglect of financial responsibilities; 
12) neglect of professional obligations; 
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13) violation of an order of a court; 
14) denial of admission to the bar in another jurisdiction on character and fitness 
grounds; and 
15) disciplinary action by a lawyer disciplinary agency or other professional 
disciplinary agency of any jurisdiction. 
 
Weight and Significance Given to Prior Conduct 
The review of an applicant focuses on the applicant’s present character, fitness, and moral 
qualifications.  The following factors are considered in assigning weight and significance to 
an applicant’s prior conduct: 
  1) age of the applicant at the time of the conduct; 
  2) recency of the conduct; 
  3) reliability of the information concerning the conduct; 
  4) seriousness of the conduct; 
  5) factors underlying the conduct; 
  6) cumulative effect of the conduct; 
  7) evidence of rehabilitation; 
  8) positive social contributions of the applicant since the conduct; 
  9) candor of the applicant in the admissions process; and 
10) materiality of any omissions or misrepresentations. 
 
Ohio Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness, Summary of Character and Fitness 
Process in Ohio (emphasis in original). (The Summary can be found online at 
www.sconet.state.oh.us/Board/characterFit/CFProcess.pdf).  These two lists are also set forth in Gov 
Bar R I 11(D)(3) & (4). In In re Application of Burch, 133 Ohio St.3d 82, 2012 Ohio 3935, 975 
N.E.2d 1001, the Court referred to these factors, set forth in Gov Bar R I 11(D)(3) & (4), as 
“nonexhaustive lists,” id. at para. 18, even though (D)(4) does not contain the “shall include, but 
shall not be limited to” language appearing in (D)(3). 
In the character and fitness investigative process, the burden is on the applicant to prove “by clear and 
convincing evidence” that he or she “possesses the requisite character, fitness, and moral 
qualifications for admission to the practice of law.” Gov Bar R I 11(D)(1). A case in which this strict 
standard seemed to play a part in the Court’s decision not to approve an application for admission is 
In re Application of Wagner, 119 Ohio St.3d 280, 2008 Ohio 3916, 893 N.E.2d 499. Ms. Wagner 
had a DUI on her record and her explanation of it and related matters in submissions to the character 
and fitness investigators left “some reservations about her willingness to accept responsibility for her 
conviction and initial nondisclosure.” Id. at para. 5. Despite these reservations, her application was 
initially approved, but the Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness exercised its authority 
sua sponte to investigate further, Gov Bar R I 10(B)(2)(e), and deferred the date when she would be 
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permitted to take the bar from February 2008 to July 2008. In adopting the Board’s disposition, the 
Court expressly noted that the Board, “citing the lack of clear and convincing evidence,” found that 
applicant’s shortcomings ‘“bring into question her trustworthiness, diligence, and reliability.’” 
Continuing, 
“her conduct can be construed as reflecting dishonesty or at 
least a failure to provide complete and accurate information 
about her past. Her failure to pay her [DUI] fines promptly 
suggests perhaps a neglect of financial responsibilities. The 
totality of the evidence presented suggests a failure to accept 
the responsibilities placed upon her and a lack of mature respect 
for the law.” 
Id. at paras. 17-18 (emphasis added).  As the italicized words indicate, “applicant has yet to sustain 
her burden of proof.” Id. at para. 19. 
A representative sampling of some of the more recent Ohio Supreme Court decisions illustrating how 
various of these factors have been applied follows. 
Numerous cases address materially false statements or omissions in the admission or disciplinary 
process, as well as the failure to respond to a demand for information from admission or disciplinary 
authorities.  This case law is set forth below in sections 8.1:300 (false statements, including omissions) 
and 8.1:400 (duty to respond). 
In addition, the following categories present themselves with some regularity: 
Criminal activity or other conduct reflecting disregard for the law or other rules of conduct.  
E.g., In re Application of Acton, 121 Ohio St.3d 155, 2009 Ohio 499, 902 N.E.2d 966 
(application disclosed 11 speeding violations, plus four additional speeding convictions since 
application filed; numerous other traffic violations; other non-traffic convictions, such as 
assault, criminal damaging, and disturbance of the peace); In re Application of Rogers, 119 
Ohio St.3d 43, 2008 Ohio 3191, 891 N.E.2d 736 (DUI charge, which was ultimately 
dismissed; also pleaded no contest to charge of sexual imposition; these episodes of “serious 
wrongdoing in his past,” together with problems relating to candor and financial 
responsibility, causes Court to defer the time when Rogers can reapply to February 2009). In 
re Application of Howard, 111 Ohio St.3d 220, 2006 Ohio 5486, 855 N.E.2d 865 (failure to 
provide clear and convincing evidence of requisite character; “applicant’s . . . admission 
materials are saturated with these three ethical impediments,” id. at para. 6, i.e., the factors 
listed in Gov Bar R I 11(D)(3)(a), (d) & (f) (commission of crimes, academic misconduct, 
and habitual disregard for the law)); In re Application of Olterman, 106 Ohio St.3d 383, 
2005 Ohio 5324, 835 N.E.2d 370 (failure to show requisite fitness based, inter alia, on 
“applicant’s record of criminal and traffic violations and his dishonesty [about these matters] 
on his law school application.”  Id. at para. 13.).  Some of the cases discussed in section 
8.1:300 (false statements and/or omissions) involved lying about criminal or other 
misconduct.   
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Financial neglect.  Failure to meet financial responsibilities often figures in the denial or 
postponement of the admissions process.  Illustrative cases include: Rogers supra (poor credit 
card history); In re Application of Kline, 116 Ohio St.3d 185, 2007 Ohio 6037, 877 N.E.2d 
654 (“A bar applicant’s tendency toward fiscal irresponsibility makes him a risk for 
entrustment with the duties owed clients, adversaries, and other in the practice of law.” Id. at 
para. 10); In re Application of Stewart, 112 Ohio St.3d 415, 2006 Ohio 6579, 860 N.E.2d 
729 (applicant’s “neglect of financial responsibilities weighs against the approval”; 
“[f]inancial irresponsibility alone is enough to disapprove a bar candidacy or bar exam 
application . . .,” id. at paras. 18, 19); In re Application of Ford, 110 Ohio St.3d 503, 2006 
Ohio 4967, 854 N.E.2d 501 (referring to applicant’s “long-standing pattern of living beyond 
his means” and “tendency toward financial irresponsibility,” id. at paras. 18, 22); In re 
Application of Conrad, 109 Ohio St.3d 302, 2006 Ohio 4483, 853 N.E.2d 307 (one of a 
number of factors resulting in denial was applicant’s inability to address satisfactorily his 
“tax-related financial obligations,” id. at para. 14). 
An interesting 2007 decision on the financial responsibility factor is In re Application of 
Holbrook, 116 Ohio St.3d 248, 2007 Ohio 6095, 877 N.E.2d 984.  The applicant in the 
Holbrook case, along with her husband, got into financial difficulties on a variety of fronts, 
ending with the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The evidence showed among other things, that, 
after failing to make further payments on the Kentucky house they owned, which went into 
foreclosure, they moved to Ohio, bought a house for $500,000+, and applicant enrolled as a 
student at Capital University Law School.  While there, she drove a Mercedes Benz, did not 
work or seek employment, and the couple accumulated additional debt, including applicant’s 
law school tuition.  After failing to make the required payments on the Ohio house, the couple 
moved into a motel and then rented.  Given this sorry state of financial affairs, the issue was 
essentially one of whether her husband’s compulsive gambling was a significant cause of their 
financial downfall and the extent to which applicant had knowledge thereof. The Board found 
that the gambling did not cause their financial situation, of which applicant had “some 
understanding”; the Court disagreed.  As a result, applicant’s ability to reapply for Ohio 
admission was moved forward to February 2008 rather than July 2008, as the Board had 
recommended.  In support of this modification, the Court concluded that applicant was 
unaware of her husband’s “staggering gambling losses [which] had jeopardized the financial 
health of his company and his family’s personal finances.” Id. at para. 13. 
Another one, decided in 2011, is a cautionary tale regarding student loans and the catch-22 
that a graduate may face in being denied the right to seek admission to the bar because of “the 
lack of feasible plan to satisfy his financial obligations.” The Court unanimously so decided in 
In re Application of Griffin, 128 Ohio St.3d 300, 2011 Ohio 20, 943 N.E.2d 1008, at para. 
1, against the background, duly noted by the Court, of an applicant with $170,000 in student 
loan obligations upon graduation from law school, who had been allowed to sit for the bar 
exam three previous times and who had chosen to maintain his part-time employment with the 
Public Defender’s Office rather than seek full-time employment, which he conceded would 
have provided a better opportunity to pay down his debt. 
Chemical dependency problems.  E.g., In re Application of Alban, 116 Ohio St.3d 190, 
2007 Ohio 6043, 877 N.E.2d 658 (history of alcohol and drug abuse and related criminal 
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offenses (DUI, “attempted” possession of crack cocaine) while in law school; reapplication 
permitted at later date in order for applicant to demonstrate continued compliance with his 
recent contract with OLAP); In re Application of Conrad, 110 Ohio St.3d 302, 2006 Ohio 
4483, 853 N.E.2d 307 (even where applicant had become “drug free,” a “history of drug and 
alcohol use, and the criminal and traffic charges that resulted . . ., raise some concern about 
[applicant’s] fitness to practice law,” id. at paras. 9, 13); In re Application of Ralls, 109 
Ohio St.3d 487, 2006 Ohio 2996, 849 N.E.2d 36 (“‘This is a case where the applicant does 
not get it.  The applicant appears to have an alcohol problem but refuses to accept that fact,’” 
id. at para. 10 (quoting the panel)). 
Three cases in which all three of the above concerns were raised are In re Application of Poignon, 
132 Ohio St.3d 395, 2012 Ohio 2915, 972 N.E.2d 580 (felony drug convictions, disregard of his 
family’s financial affairs, failure to seek gainful employment, as well as prior revocation of his 
license as a pharmacist), In re Application of Grachanin, 122 Ohio St.3d 537, 2009 Ohio 3605, 
912 N.E.2d 1128 (criminal charges, including DUI, substantial unpaid student loans and $12,000 in 
credit card debt, alcoholism; application for taking bar deferred to February 2011 to assure 
applicant’s continued progress with substance abuse programs), and In re Application of Phelps, 
116 Ohio St.3d 312, 2007 Ohio 6459, 878 N.E.2d 1037 (applicant had DUI arrests and possible 
related substance-abuse problems, and failed to satisfy two civil judgments against her, as well as 
“having received several parking tickets, many of which were still unpaid,” id. at para. 2; 
reapplication permitted in July 2008). Significantly, unlike the applicants Grachanin and Phelps (and 
the great majority of other denial-of-admission cases), applicant Poignon was “forever precluded 
from reapplying,” 132 Ohio St 395, at para. 24, because his 
flouting of the standards of the pharmacy profession, his 
violation of the laws of this state, his ongoing failure to accept 
responsibility for his behavior and its consequences, his 
inability or unwillingness to maintain stable, gainful 
employment, his neglect of his own financial responsibilities, 
and his apparent ignorance of his own family’s serious financial 
and legal matters constitute a persistent and ongoing pattern of 
bad behavior spanning at least 20 years. 
Id. at para. 23.  
 
(Another instance in which the track record of the applicant persuaded the Court to “forever bar him 
from applying for the privilege to practice law in this state” is In re Application of Wiseman, 135 
Ohio St.3d 267, 2013 Ohio 763, 985 N.E.2d 1279 (history of criminal conduct; violation of judiciary 
duties as trustee; past-due debts; “pervasive pattern of lies and omissions throughout this admission 
process.” Id. at para. 24)). 
 
Mental health problems.  E.g., In re Application of Bell, 112 Ohio St.3d 530, 2007 Ohio 610, 
861 N.E.2d 533 (applicant, under treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder, could not 
establish requisite fitness to practice, given her “outbursts” during and after panel hearing and 
her refusal to authorize further medical/psychological evaluation of cause of such outbursts); 
see In re Application of Corrigan, 123 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009 Ohio 4183, 915 N.E.2d 300 
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(applicant’s inability to hold employment (more than 17 different jobs over ten-year period) 
found by Board to be “evidence of a possible mental or psychological disorder that could 
impair the applicant’s ability to practice law,” id. at para. 14); In re Application of Rogers, 
119 Ohio St.3d 43, 2008 Ohio 3191, 891 N.E.2d 736 (instances of being “unable to 
appropriately manage his behavior,” such as 4:00 a.m. visit to apartment of woman whose 
affections he was apparently seeking to keep or regain and pounding on her door for 20 
minutes); In re Application of Dickens, 106 Ohio St.3d 128, 2005 Ohio 4097, 832 N.E.2d 
725 (paranoid testimony, described in Corrigan supra as “bizarre and incoherent,” evidenced 
possible untreated mental or psychological condition). 
A most unusual mental health case was presented in In re Application of Blackwell, 116 
Ohio St.3d 530, 2007 Ohio 6041, 880 N.E.2d 886. Blackwell’s July 2005 bar exam results 
were disqualified for failure to follow testing protocol – i.e., he continued to write after time 
had been called.  The Court found applicant to be psychologically unfit for the practice of law 
and approved the like conclusion of the character and fitness board.  He was permitted to 
reapply to take the February 2009 exam, on conditions set by the Court.  The background facts 
were as follows:  Applicant had failed the bar exam in July 2000, February 2001, and July 
2003.  The July 2003 exam also had resulted in charges that he had continued to write after the 
allotted time.  After the 2005 exam and the charge that applicant had again violated testing 
protocol, the Board invoked its sua sponte authority to investigate this second instance.  The 
investigation disclosed that applicant had changed one word in his answer to an essay question 
after time had expired.  He did so, according to his testimony, because he wanted his answer to 
be “perfect.”  But then, after the exam, he obsessed over it and sought to change the answer 
back, because he did not want to have undue advantage over other applicants.  A psychologist, 
testifying at the hearing at applicant’s request, stated that applicant’s obsessive/compulsive 
personality traits rendered him impaired under six of the ten Essential Eligibility 
Requirements for the practice of law.  Moreover, applicant had also failed to provide essential 
information on his updated questionnaire about being sued for unpaid tuition by his law 
school or about his four arrests for traffic violations.  Given all of these facts, it is not 
surprising that the Court upheld the recommendation of the character and fitness board’s 
conclusion that Blackwell did not possess the requisite character and fitness.  As the matter 
was summed up by the Court, 
[i]n addition to the manifestations of his inability to comply 
with time constraints generally, he has demonstrated eccentric 
and irrational thinking that [the psychologist] attributes to his 
psychological disorder and abnormal personality traits. . . .  We 
therefore . . . agree that the severity of applicant’s condition 
warrants the character and fitness board’s recommended 
disapproval. 
Id. at para. 33. See In re Application of Nwankwo, 121 Ohio St.3d 72, 2009 Ohio 260, 902 
N.E.2d 16 (similar violation of testing protocol by continuing to work after time called but no 
indication that mental disorder involved). 
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Another unusual case involving character and fitness issues in this category is In re 
Application of Head, 114 Ohio St.3d 29, 2007 Ohio 2550, 867 N.E.2d 824.  The applicant 
sought special accommodations when sitting for the Ohio bar exam. During her first semester 
law school exams, cognitive abnormalities had caused her to panic, resulting in her not being 
able to complete the exams within the allotted time.  The special provisions subsequently 
provided by the law school (50% more time allotted while taking exams in a room by herself) 
were those she sought with respect to the bar exam.  The Board of Bar Examiners denied her 
request but advised her that an appeal to the Board chairman was available.  The applicant had 
had prior social contact with the chairman, primarily through her social and professional 
relationship with the chairman’s wife, who was an attorney at the firm where applicant was a 
law clerk.  Applicant sent the chairman an extensive email, ostensibly for the purpose of 
asking advice on how to present her case, but in fact inappropriately seeking to take advantage 
of their acquaintance through “impassioned pleas and repeated references to [the chairman’s] 
wife.”  Id. at para. 12.  This conduct reflected adversely on the applicant’s character and 
fitness, resulting in disapproval of the application to take the next available examination.  As 
stated by the Court: 
 The applicant disregarded these requirements [those set 
forth in Gov Bar R I 11(D)(3) and in Definitions of Essential 
Eligibility Requirements for the Practice of Law Nos. 3, 4, 5, 
and 10] when she used her friendship with the Morrisons to 
urge the Chairman of the Board of Bar Examiners to grant her 
request for special accommodations.  The board thus 
appropriately recommended disapproval of the applicant’s 
application to take the February 2007 bar examination.  But 
citing the strength of her character evidence, the board further 
recommended that the applicant be permitted to apply to take 
the July 2007 bar examination.  We also accept this 
recommendation. 
Id. at para. 19. 
Yet another unconventional mental health case is In re Application of Zimmerman, 134 
Ohio St.3d 268, 2012 Ohio 5644, 981 N.E.2d 854. After the applicant failed the 2011 bar 
exam, the board investigated her fitness to practice, based on her unresponsive answers. In the 
words of the Court, Zimmerman’s bar exam answers, 
instead of analyzing the fact patterns presented in the exam, . . . 
expounded upon God, her religion, and her belief that the 
United States and the legal system have strayed from the laws 
of God and defiled his name. 
Id. at para. 4. Not surprisingly, this gave the examiners pause as to her mental equilibrium, as 
did her “rambling” testimony at the hearing involving, among other things, a sign from God 
the night before the exam to the effect that “the Lord forbade her to practice law.” Id. at para. 
8. Zimmerman was permitted to reapply for the July 2014 bar exam, on condition that, among 
other things, she submit to a mental health evaluation. (Another strange aspect of the case is 
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that Zimmerman appeared pro se to argue her case in furtherance of admission and yet she 
testified at the character and fitness hearing “that she no longer wants to practice law.” Id. at 
para. 5.) 
While uncontrolled substance abuse or mental illness may result in a denial of admission on 
character and fitness grounds, a good faith showing that the applicant recognizes the problem 
and is attempting to deal with it often results only in postponement of the date when the 
applicant can sit for the bar. E.g., In re Application of Olterman, 106 Ohio St.3d 383, 2005 
Ohio 5324, 835 N.E.2d 370. 
A decision in which the applicant had problems under all of the foregoing danger areas is In re 
Application of Gueli, 132 Ohio St.3d 39, 2012 Ohio 1907, 968 N.E.2d 479. Gueli, who 
from the record appears to have been a disturbed young man, had previously been admitted in 
Florida. He resigned from his job with the Florida state attorney’s office after being 
reprimanded for filing criminal charges without clearance from his supervisor. He then 
entered private practice “and apparently became increasingly delusional” id. at para. 4 (suing 
President George W. and Governor Jeb Bush, among others, for violating the RICO Act and 
interfering with his mail; making wild accusations to the FBI, etc.). While in Florida he had a 
DUI arrest and had complaints filed against him by the Florida Bar. In response, he threatened 
to sue the Bar. Back in Ohio, Gueli was evaluated as having “major depression with psychotic 
features.” Id. at para. 8. He also had alcohol problems, for which he entered into an OLAP 
contract, with which he did not comply. The panel also had concerns about the applicant’s 
financial responsibility, inasmuch as he lived with and was totally supported by his parents, 
and presented no evidence of having tried to obtain employment, despite credit card and 
student loan debt of over $100,000. 
While all of the above is bad enough, the biggest problem with Gueli was that he was a 
compulsive liar. He lied to his treating professionals, he lied at the panel hearing. In sum, “he 
creates his own facts, which differ significantly from reality.” Id. at para. 21.  
Despite all of the above, the Court, while disapproving his present application, entered an 
order allowing Gueli to submit a new application to register as a candidate no sooner than 
November 1, 2013 and permitting him to sit for the July 2014 bar examination, provided he 
continues his medical and psychiatric treatment and enters into and fully complies with a new 
OLAP contract. 
Other.  The biggest problem facing the applicant in In re Application of Burch, 133 Ohio 
St.3d 82, 2012 Ohio 3935, 975 N.E.2d 1001, was her failure to show that she recognized the 
impropriety and unprofessionalism of certain of her actions while a law student and that she 
accepted responsibility therefor. (We suspect that the applicant also did not advance her cause 
by testifying, among other things, before the character-and-fitness panel that “I mean, now is 
the time to be modest, but I am one of the most talented people you will ever meet.” Id. at 
para. 13.) 
In In re Application of Kohler, 115 Ohio St.3d 11, 2007 Ohio 4261, 873 N.E.2d 818, the 
applicant had passed the February 2006 bar examination.  He was not admitted, however, 
because subsequent to passing the bar, applicant’s law-firm employer (applicant had worked 
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there as a law clerk) informed the Bar Admissions Office that the applicant had 
misrepresented matters to the firm and clients of the firm – he was expected to prepare and file 
bankruptcy papers for firm clients but did not, even though he reported that he had.  Upon 
receipt of this information, the Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness invoked its 
continuing investigative authority under Gov Bar R I 10(B)(2)(e) and, after a panel hearing, 
denied his admission.  The Court affirmed, stressing that “[h]onesty is the cornerstone of all 
obligations incumbent on all members of the legal profession,” id. at para. 10, and Kohler 
had failed to meet that standard: 
Kohler misled the clients and his supervisor from October 2005 
until March 8, 2006, by repeatedly lying in response to requests 
for status reports.  He fabricated documents, including two 
notices for creditor meetings and a court order allowing a 
continuance of a creditor meeting, complete with a forged 
signature purporting to be that of the bankruptcy court clerk. 
Id.  at para. 6.  Because the applicant admitted his wrongdoing, reported it to his supervisor at 
the firm, and showed contrition for it, and because it occurred in large part due to his 
inexperience, the Court did not permanently bar him from admission, but rather allowed him 
to reapply for admission in February 2008, including again undergoing the character and 
fitness examination, without having to retake the bar exam. 
Another case in which the applicant’s failure to pass the character and fitness test was 
grounded in a “‘record manifesting a significant deficiency in . . . honesty,’” is In re 
Application of Martin, 134 Ohio St.3d 154, 2012 Ohio 5427, 980 N.E.2d 1005, at para. 12 
(quoting Gov Bar R I(11)(D)(3)). The most serious charge involved applicant Martin’s 
provision of false information to a police officer during a traffic stop in an attempt to avoid 
responsibility for driving on an expired license. Accord In re Application of Wilson, 134 
Ohio St.3d 168, 2012 Ohio 5480, 980 N.E.2d 1018 (failure to disclose on his Detroit Law 
School application that he had been dismissed for poor academic performance from a 
previously attended law school). Honesty, or the lack thereof, also played a major role in the 
denial in In re Application of Goodstein, 137 Ohio St.3d 461, 2013 Ohio 4586, 1 N.E.3d 
328, where the applicant committed unemployment compensation fraud by obtaining benefits 
as a result of “making false representations about his employment status and earnings for 
period of at least 17 weeks,” and then, during the admissions proceedings, attempted to 
characterize the overpayment as a misunderstanding. These “significant and repeated 
instances of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, resulted in the disapproval of 
Goodstein’s application, with leave to apply to take the bar exam in July 2015.” 
In re Application of Stewart, 112 Ohio St.3d 415, 2006 Ohio 6579, 860 N.E.2d 729, 
involved an applicant who was disapproved because of his litigiousness and combativeness, 
which were negative factors under Essential Eligibility Requirements Nos. 5 – ability to 
conduct oneself with respect for and in accordance with law and Code – and 10 – ability to 
conduct oneself professionally and in manner engendering respect for law and profession. In a 
similar vein is In re Application of Mitchell, 119 Ohio St.3d 38, 2008 Ohio 3236, 891 
N.E.2d 732, where Mitchell’s application to take the bar was disapproved, based on, acting 
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pro se, his persisting in lodging questionable legal claims and accusations, such as fraud, 
against counsel who had opposed him in his failed suit for wrongful discharge. As the 
Supreme Court stated, “the applicant’s unwarranted attacks against opposing counsel and 
repeated and unfounded contentions in the [discharge] litigation revealed a singular lack of 
the good judgment necessary to the practice of law.” Id. at para. 18. 
An interesting 2003 case involving the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications is 
In re Application of Singh, 101 Ohio St.3d 8, 2003 Ohio 6622, 800 N.E.2d 1112. The 
applicant, born and educated in India, applied for admission to the Ohio bar. His application 
was denied, primarily because of his seeming inability to communicate effectively in English. 
(There were potential moral/character problems in the background, but his less-than-adequate 
attempt to deal with these seemed to flow largely from the language deficiency.) The Board 
found that Singh lacked the requisite “fitness” to practice in Ohio, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed: 
 The board was correct to distinguish the concept of 
fitness from that of character. Our precedents teach that the 
concept of fitness to practice law is not limited to the 
applicant’s moral fitness [citing cases denying application 
based upon applicant’s mental health fitness]. 
 In light of this applicant’s deficiencies in speaking and 
writing English and, in comprehending the speech and writing 
of others, we share the board’s doubts about his fitness to 
practice law. Communication skills are central to the practice of 
law. 
Id. at paras. 57-58. 
As might be expected, if an applicant does not cooperate in the character and fitness evaluation, he or 
she cannot expect to meet the burden of demonstrating the requisite character and fitness. Thus, when 
an applicant failed to appear at a character and fitness hearing, rescheduled at the applicant’s request, 
the application to apply for the Ohio bar was disapproved in In re Application of Reynolds, 127 
Ohio St.3d 331, 2010 Ohio 5947, 939 N.E.2d 846. 
Suppose an applicant’s character and fitness have been approved, she has taken and passed the bar 
exam, but was subsequently found to have violated the bar-exam rules by continuing to write after the 
expiration of time, resulting in her character and fitness being subsequently disapproved. Upon 
satisfying the character and fitness test and all other requirements, does she have to retake the bar 
exam? In re Application of Parker, 135 Ohio St.3d 200, 2013 Ohio 190, 985 N.E.2d 476, says she 
does not: 
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Because she has already passed the bar exam, despite having 
been penalized for her misconduct with a score of zero on one 
essay question, upon approval of her character and fitness and 
the satisfactory completion of all other requirements, Parker 
may be sworn in as a member of the bar. 
Id. at para. 14. 
Gov Bar R I 10-13 were amended effective February 1, 2003 to address the character and fitness 
standards and the review process for bar applicants with felony records. Gov Bar R I 11(D)(5) was 
added, and other amendments, referencing (D)(5), were made. As stated in the Staff Comments: 
While the amendments do not create a per se admissions bar for 
applicants with felony records, they do impose additional 
substantive and temporal requirements on those applicants. 
19 Page’s Ohio Rev Code Ann 234 (2010). Further adjustments of the details set forth in Rule I 
11(D)(5) were made by amendment effective May 1, 2010. See 83 OBAR No. 19, May 10, 2010, at 
xxxix-xliv. Thus, under the amendments, no felon is eligible for admission until after release from 
parole, probation, community control, post-release control, or from prison if no post-release control 
or probation was imposed. GBR I 11(D)(5)(a)(i). Also, any felon/applicant must without exception 
undergo review by the Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness. For the details of these and 
other requirements, see Gov Bar R I 10-13. An example of application of Gov Bar R I 11(D)(5)(a), 
requiring the felon/applicant to submit to review by the Board of Commissioners on Character and 
Fitness under GBR I 12, is In re Application of Worthy, 136 Ohio St.3d 142, 2013 Ohio 3018, 991 
N.E.2d 1131. 
In In re Application of Daubenmire, 137 Ohio St.3d 435, 2013 Ohio 4977, 999 N.E.2d 669, the 
Court had to decide, as a matter of first impression, “whether an applicant can satisfactorily 
demonstrate that he possesses the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications to take the 
Ohio bar exam while he is under a continuing duty to register as a sexually oriented offender.” Id. at 
para. 18. (The applicant had been convicted of pandering obscenity involving a minor via 
downloading and sharing with others pornographic images from the internet.) The Court conceded 
that Gov Bar R I 11(D)(5)(a)(i) “does not mandate the disapproval of applicants who remain 
obligated to register as sex offenders during the pendency of their applications.” Id. Nevertheless, the 
Court was “troubled by the nature of Daubenmire’s conduct,” and, despite the lack of language in 
11(D)(5)(a)(i) requiring disapproval of such an applicant prior to termination of the duty to register, 
“we conclude that it is in the best interest of the public and the profession that we do so here.” Id. at 
para. 19. Weighing heavily on the side of disapproval was the Court’s concern over “the very real 
possibility that admitting a presently registered sex offender to the practice of law will adversely 
affect the public’s perception of the profession as a whole.” Id. See also para. 17. Daubenmire was 
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8.1:230  Admission on Motion 
Admission on Motion (termed “Admission Without Examination” in Ohio) is covered in Gov Bar R 
I 9. To apply, an applicant must 
 be admitted in another jurisdiction; 
 have practiced, judged, or taught law school for five of the last ten years prior to application; 
 not have taken and failed an Ohio bar examination; 
 not have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; 
 be a U.S. citizen or resident alien; 
 be 21 years of age and have an undergraduate bachelor’s degree and a J.D. or L.L.B. degree 
from an accredited law school; and 
 if applicable, have registered pursuant to Gov Bar R VI 3 (corporate status). 
Gov Bar R I 9(A)(1)-(7), (B)(1)-(5). Other procedural steps that must be met are set forth in id. at 
9(C)-(E), including submission of a certificate in good standing from the jurisdictions in which the 
applicant is admitted to practice, Gov Bar R I 9(C)(3), and review and approval as to character, 
fitness, and moral qualifications. Gov Bar R I 9(D). See also Gov Bar R I 1(D) (requiring 
demonstration of requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications prior to taking the Ohio bar or 
“[p]rior to . . . being admitted without examination pursuant to Section 9 . . . .” For a case in which an 
applicant for admission without examination was disapproved for failing to demonstrate the required 
character, fitness, and moral qualifications, see  In re Application of Manayan, 102 Ohio St.3d 109, 
2004 Ohio 1804, 807 N.E.2d 313 (citing Gov Bar R I 9(D), Court disapproved applicant who, while 
resident in Hawaii, had failed to pay federal and state income taxes for a number of years, even 
though he had satisfied his delinquencies by time of Supreme Court review; “the fact remains that he 
seriously mismanaged his expenses to the extent he could not pay the taxes on his income as a 
practicing lawyer. This mismanagement certainly reflects poorly on applicant’s character, fitness, and 
morals. The board thus justifiably disapproved his application for admission.” Id. at para. 16.). 
The Supreme Court reviews all applications for admission without examination and “in its sole 
discretion shall approve or disapprove” same. Gov Bar R I 9(F). In  In re Application of Stage, 81 
Ohio St.3d 554, 692 N.E.2d 993 (1998), the Supreme Court exercised that discretion to approve an 
application (or at least the character and fitness aspect of it), even though the applicant was found to 
have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. (As noted above, Gov Bar R I 9(A)(4) provides 
that the applicant for admission without examination may apply if he or she “has not engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law.”) The applicant had used the term “General Counsel” on the letterhead 
of the agency where she had been hired as general counsel and the title “Attorney at Law” on her 
personal stationery. The Court nevertheless held as follows: 
 In the case at bar, there was no evidence that Stage 
actively engaged in the unauthorized practice of law beyond 
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mere use of the inappropriate designations. Because the 
circumstances do not indicate a deliberate attempt to mislead 
and because the applicant has either ceased using or added a 
disclaimer to the inappropriate designations, we find that the 
applicant has the requisite character, fitness, and moral 
qualifications for admission to the practice law in the state of 
Ohio. The court will now consider her pending application for 
admission without examination pursuant to Gov. Bar R. I 
(9)(F). 
Id. at 559, 692 N.E.2d at 996-97. See also  In re Application of Fletcher, 82 Ohio St.3d 191, 694 
N.E.2d 1323 (1998) (subsequent to being approved for admission without examination, but before 
presentation to Supreme Court, lawyer was reported to have left state permanently and failed to 
respond to inquiries made in investigation of whether that was so; based on these facts, applicant not 
approved for current admission but permitted to reapply in two year’s time, conditioned on 
explanation of his failure to pursue current application). 
A 2013 case that has implications for both admission on motion and corporate status is In re 
Application of Webber, 137 Ohio St.3d 67, 2013 Ohio 4514, 997 N.E.2d 528. The applicant in 
Webber was a Michigan lawyer who failed to disclose two DUI convictions in his application for 
admission without examination. The application was denied, and when the matter reached the 
Supreme Court, it remanded “to investigate Webber’s intervening registration for corporate status,” 
id. at para. 1, since there were inconsistencies between the evidence in the case at bar and the 
information he submitted with his certificate of registration for corporate status in September 2011. 
Specifically, in this case, Webber’s affidavit stated that he had “served as corporate counsel for an 
Ohio corporation located in Ashland, Ohio, beginning in July 2009.” Since this was an admission that 
he had practiced in Ohio without authorization and since Gov Bar R I 9(A) includes as a requisite 
that the applicant has not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, his application was denied. But 
the ramifications did not stop there. This admitted unauthorized practice also brought into play Gov 
Bar R VI 3(C), which stated, among other things, that an out-of-state attorney who performs legal 
services in Ohio for an employer without having registered for corporate status “shall be precluded 
from applying for admission without examination under Gov.Bar R. I.” (Emphasis added.) There is 
more. In addition to forfeiting his right to admission without examination, Webber’s corporate status 
was terminated. Until completing the full admission process, including passing the bar examination, 
Webber “shall not seek admission pro hac vice, register for corporate status, or otherwise practice law 
in this state.” Id. at para. 12. (It should be noted that amendments to Gov Bar R VI 3(C), effective 
November 1, 2013, now provide that such a lawyer practicing in Ohio for his or her employer who has 
failed to register or qualify for corporate counsel status “at the discretion of the Chief Justice, may be 
precluded from applying for admission without examination under Gov.Bar R. I.” (Emphasis added.)) 
 
Effective January 1, 2013, a new form of “admission without examination” was extended to military 
personnel admitted in another jurisdiction and stationed in Ohio as an attorney providing legal 
services to military clients. For the details see Gov Bar R VI 4 (“Military Legal Assistance 
Attorney Registration”).  
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8.1:240  Admission Pro Hac Vice [see also 5.5:420] 
In Gov Bar R I 9, the section dealing with admission without examination (see section 8.1:230), 
subsection (H) makes clear that, while such an applicant cannot practice in Ohio prior to his or her 
presentation to the Supreme Court in accordance with subsection I 9(G), this limitation does not 
apply “to participation by an attorney not yet admitted to practice in Ohio in a cause being litigated in 
Ohio when such participation is with leave of the judge hearing such cause.” I 9(H). This pro hac vice 
(“for this occasion only”) exception is, of course, not limited to attorneys applying for admission to 
the Ohio bar without examination and “not yet admitted,” but can be granted to any attorney not 
licensed in Ohio, for purposes of the Ohio litigation in which the lawyer is involved. 
Ohio authority dealing with pro hac vice admission, including Gov Bar R XII, is set forth in section 
5.5:420. That section also deals with revocation of pro hac vice status. 
  
8.1:300  False Statement of Material Fact in Connection with Admission or 
Discipline 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.1(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.1(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.8, 1.9 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA §§ 21:301, 101:201 
Wolfram § 15.3.1 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.8, 1.9 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 8.1(a) prohibits a lawyer from “knowingly making a false statement of material fact” in 
connection with a bar admission application or a disciplinary matter. 
The 8.1(a) obligation not to make knowingly false statements of material fact is absolute; it applies to 
all information the lawyer provides in connection with a bar admission application or a disciplinary 
matter, irrespective of whether the lawyer is volunteering information or is responding to a request or 
demand for information. The duty under Rule 8.1(b) is more narrowly tailored; it applies only when 
the lawyer is responding to a “demand” from an admissions or disciplinary authority and does so by 
failing to disclose a material fact or knowingly failing to respond. Of course, virtually every instance 
involving submission of information to an admissions or disciplinary agency is in response to an 
official inquiry or to forms that must be filled out -- in other words a “demand” that potentially 
implicates 8.1(b) as well as the ever-present 8.1(a) obligation. Whether Rule 8.1(a) or (b) applies will 
almost always turn on the nature of the lawyer’s response: lying about or omitting material facts 
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invokes 8.1(a), failing to disclose a material fact in response to a demand, or not responding at all, 
falls under 8.1(b). 
Comment [1] states that the Rule 8.1 duty “applies to a lawyer’s own admission or discipline as well 
as that of others.” Rule 8.1 cmt. [1]. The Model Rules Comparison to Rule 8.1 notes, however, that 
 Rule 8.1(a) is modified to strike the provision that that 
would make the rule applicable to bar applicants. The 
constraints and obligations placed upon applicants for 
admission to the bar are more appropriately and distinctly 
addressed in [Gov Bar R I]. 
Thus, all aspects of the bar application process by applicants will continue to be governed by the 
provisions of Gov Bar R I, which in its directive regarding investigation of the applicant’s character 
and fitness expressly includes among the relevant factors whether the applicant has made any “[f]alse 
statements, including omissions.” Gov Bar R I 11(D)(3)(h). See In re Application of Howard, 111 
Ohio St.3d 220, 2006 Ohio 5486, 855 N.E.2d 865 (“applicant also tended to avoid or shade the truth 
during the character and fitness proceedings, which constitutes a false statement or omission to be 
considered under … (D)(3)(h),” id. at para. 9). 
Bar admission: As a result of this modification of the Model Rule language, Ohio Rule 8.1 applies 
with respect to bar admission applications to lawyers only after the fact -- if, after having been 
admitted, the lawyer is found to have made material misrepresentations or omissions on his own 
admission application (or in connection with an application on behalf of another), the Rule applies as 
stated in Comment [1], and such a lawyer is subject to discipline therefor. One such case, decided 
under the former OHCPR analog to Rule 8.1 (DR 1-101(A)) was Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ewing, 
75 Ohio St.3d 244, 661 N.E.2d 1109 (1996), in which an admitted attorney was sanctioned for 
having concealed, in response to bar application questions, that he had a real-estate license that had 
been suspended. 
While there were few reported cases involving former DR 1-101(A) directly, the concerns addressed 
there are evidenced in the case law involving the bar application process itself. In numerous instances 
individuals have been denied bar admission or had their licenses revoked because of misstatements or 
omissions made in the application process, or because of failure to respond adequately to requests for 
information. As a general principle, a falsehood or deliberate failure to disclose requested information 
is improper, as long as the information is material. A flagrant example of failure to meet this basic 
standard of honesty and to supply required information is  In re Application of Aboyade, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 318, 2004 Ohio 4773, 815 N.E.2d 383. Among other things, Aboyade falsified her law school 
grade transcript, changing her grade-point average from a respectable 2.96 to an honors-level 3.505 
by switching twelve Cs to As and Bs. She then presented this fabricated transcript to potential 
employers, who relied on it in offering her a position as an associate. Sensing that all was not well, 
Aboyade sought to withdraw her Ohio bar application; her request was denied. Shortly thereafter, the 
state of South Carolina, where she was admitted, disbarred her, based on the transcript misconduct 
and other false statements. Not surprisingly, the Ohio Supreme Court permanently denied the 
applicant from applying for admission to the Ohio bar. In doing so, it cited the panel’s finding that 
applicant had failed to carry her burden under Gov Bar R I 11(D)(1) as to her requisite character and 
fitness, and quoted with approval the following language from the panel’s recommendation: 
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 “[Applicant] has been dishonest with her transcript, her 
employers * * *, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina. 
Honesty is one of the basic and most important characteristics 
needed by a lawyer. [Applicant] has repeatedly demonstrated 
she completely lacks any shred of honesty. There is nothing 
* * * to show that she has made any effort to change or to 
commence being truthful.” 
Id. at para. 14 (ellipses and bracketed material in original). Likewise, in  In re Application of Hayes, 
81 Ohio St.3d 88, 689 N.E.2d 547 (1998), the applicant was found unfit to practice and the Court’s 
ruling prohibited him from ever being admitted in Ohio, where the panel, the Board, and the Court 
found that applicant was not truthful, that he repeatedly lied 
under oath, that he lied to each group interviewing him, 
including the board’s panel, as well as in depositions and 
transcripts introduced into evidence, and that he purposefully 
omitted relevant information from his Bar Application. 
Id. at 88-89, 689 N.E.2d at 547. In accord, regarding the failure adequately to disclose facts that the 
admissions committee obviously thought were material, are In re Application of Ferguson, 128 
Ohio St.3d 382, 2011 Ohio 552, 944 N.E.2d 1159 (falsely representing, during altercation with 
police, that he was a lawyer or an assistant attorney general, together with his lack of candor regarding 
same during character and fitness interview), and In re Application of Cureton, 87 Ohio St.3d 53, 
717 N.E.2d 285 (1999), where the Court found the application deficient because the applicant, inter 
alia, had failed to provide certain information in his initial application, including the resolution of 
criminal charges pending against him, and in supplemental applications had again failed to provide all 
of the information requested. Similarly, in In re Application of Cvammen, 102 Ohio St.3d 13, 2004 
Ohio 1584, 806 N.E.2d 498, the Court in at 4-to-3 decision barred the applicant from ever taking the 
bar in Ohio, as a result of what the majority concluded were “ethical infractions so permeat[ing] the 
admissions process that the applicant’s honesty and integrity are shown to be intrinsically 
suspect . . . .”  Id. at para. 22. (The Court found that in his bar-application responses and subsequent 
interviews applicant had lied and given hedged and inconsistent testimony concerning an 
“under-the-table” payment (unreported on his tax return) he had taken from a tenant in his job with a 
commercial real-estate leasing company.) The dissent thought the penalty too severe: “A permanent 
refusal is the equivalent of disbarment. Had the respondent committed similar acts after becoming an 
attorney, we would have given him at most an indefinite suspension . . . . [T]here was no theft 
involved and no clients harmed although the conduct involved dishonesty.”  Id. at para. 23. 
In In re Application of Zatik, 126 Ohio St.3d 397, 2010 Ohio 3828, 934 N.E.2d 335, the applicant 
disclosed on his bar application his prior adjudication of juvenile delinquency and two misdemeanor 
convictions. However, he had failed to make these disclosures on his application to law school, and in 
his bar application Zatik “answered the question, ‘Have you ever failed to answer fully and truthfully 
all questions on an application for admission to any educational institution?’ in the negative.” Id. at 
para. 2. Needless to say, disclosure of X on the application did not save Zatik when in the same 
application he stated that he did not fail to disclose X in applying for law school; his pending 
application was disapproved and he was permitted to apply to sit for the bar exam in July 2012. 
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Another case in which the applicant was less than forthcoming and paid the price therefor is In re 
Application of McKinney, 134 Ohio St.3d 260, 2012 Ohio 5635, 981 N.E.2d 847. McKinney was a 
lessee who needed to terminate her lease. Someone told her she could sublet or cancel the lease if her 
employer transferred her. In a nutshell, 
 Instead of attempting to sublease the property, 
McKinney planned to fake an employment transfer by 
fraudulently producing two documents on her employer’s 
letterhead – one to verify her transfer from Louisville to 
Cincinnati, and the other to acknowledge that she accepted the 
transfer. Both letters were purportedly drafted for the firm by 
employee Kelly Richards, but Kelly Richards did not exist. 
Concerned that the landlord would call the firm to verify her 
transfer, and believing that the landlord would recognize her 
voice, McKinney changed the voicemail on a phone used by her 
sister to state that the caller had reached the desk of Kelly 
Richards. McKinney’s sister would then call back and pretend 
to be Ms. Richards. 
Id. at para. 5. She was fired, but said on her bar application that it was because of using company 
email for personal reasons, and failed to fully disclose the fake employment episode, even though the 
investigators asked questions designed to give her the opportunity to make full disclosure. Her 
testimony was evasive, contradictory and lacking candor in other respects as well. Given this track 
record, the Character & Fitness Board not only denied her application but recommended that she not 
be permitted to reapply. The Court, finding positive evidence in McKinney’s law school performance, 
volunteer work and favorable references from law professors and her current employer, relented and 
sustained her objection to the permanent bar on taking the exam and permitted her to sit for the July 
examination. 
While these issues involving false statements and omissions of material fact most often arise in 
considering an initial application for admission to the bar, they can arise in other contexts as well. For 
example, see Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Lockhart, 95 Ohio St.3d 135, 2002 Ohio 1758, 766 N.E.2d 596, 
where a suspended lawyer’s petition for reinstatement was denied after she failed to notify the Court 
that at the time she verified in her petition that she possessed the requisite moral qualifications, she 
was under indictment for felony theft. And in  In re Application of Sandler, 63 Ohio St.3d 372, 588 
N.E.2d 779 (1992), the license of a recently admitted lawyer was revoked pursuant to the 
Commission on Character and Fitness’s “sua sponte investigative authority under [Gov Bar R I 
9(B)(2)(e)]” (now Gov Bar R I 10(B)(2)(e)), because he 
(1) lied on his applications, (2) knowingly failed to promptly 
rectify those admissions and misrepresentations, (3) exhibited 
continued dishonesty during the investigation, and (4) lied 
while under oath during the hearing. . . . The panel stressed . . . 
that “[t]he record is replete with instances in which this 
applicant demonstrated a complete lack of honesty and 
integrity.” 
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Id. at 373, 588 N.E.2d at 780 (ellipses added).  
A similar revocation case is  In re Dabney, 107 Ohio St.3d 40, 2005 Ohio 5834, 836 N.E.2d 573, in 
which the lawyer had failed to disclose on her application that she had been arrested and convicted 
five times for prostitution-related offenses in 1995; each time she falsified her identity to the arresting 
officers. (She had been admitted to the Ohio bar in 2003.) The Board on Character and Fitness 
recommended that her license to practice be revoked, pursuant to its authority to investigate “any 
matter brought to the attention of the Board after an applicant has been admitted . . . and alleging that 
the applicant made a materially false statement in, or deliberately failed to disclose any material fact 
in connection with, the applicant’s application for admission to the practice of law.” Gov Bar R I 
10(B)(6) (emphasis and ellipsis added). The Supreme Court adopted the Board’s recommendation, 
despite evidence of Dabney’s rehabilitation. The Court emphasized that the history of dishonesty 
lasted eight years, “and that history rightly prompted the board to question whether Dabney had met 
her burden of proving [by clear and convincing evidence] her character and fitness to practice law.” 
Id. at para. 13 (bracketed material added). Dabney was allowed to reapply for admission in February 
2006 or later, at which time she would have to undergo a new character-and-fitness investigation. 
Approval of her character and fitness at that time would entitle her to readmission without having to 
retake the bar examination. 
Often the misstatements or omissions involve an attempt to avoid full disclosure about criminal 
charges the applicant has faced. For example, in  In re Application of Bagne, 102 Ohio St.3d 182, 
2004 Ohio 2070, 808 N.E.2d 372, the applicant had shot a jogger in the neck with a BB gun from a 
moving car eleven years previously. His explanations of the incident, both in response to the 
Michigan bar (which denied him admission and concluded he could not reapply there until 2006) and 
to the Ohio Board on Character and Fitness, were incomplete and rife with inconsistencies: 
 Upon review, the board concluded that applicant 
seemed unwilling to consistently tell the truth or genuinely 
accept the consequences for his acts, however many years ago 
those acts occurred. The board was struck by applicant’s need 
to correct even his own witness as to the degree of applicant’s 
responsibility for shooting the jogger in 1991. 
* * * * 
 
 . . . Thus, upon review, we agree that applicant has not 
demonstrated his current character, fitness, and moral 
qualifications for admission to the Ohio law. And because this 
record reveals more than one instance of applicant’s reluctance 
to respond with total honesty, we modify the board’s 
recommendation to a more commensurate disposition 
[reapplication in February 2005, rather than February 2004]. 
Id. at paras. 18, 23. 
Accord  In re Application of Barilatz, 91 Ohio St.3d 396, 746 N.E.2d 188 (2001) (applicant 
permanently disapproved for admission, based on panoply of material omissions in response to 
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application questions, including earlier rejection for admission to bar, failure to reveal that he was 
Florida resident, that he had been jailed for child-care arrearages and for contempt of court, and that 
he had pled guilty to misdemeanor after being charged with carrying concealed weapon); In re 
Application of VanDenBossche, 88 Ohio St.3d 158, 724 N.E.2d 405 (2000) (failure to provide full 
and credible account of various criminal charges precludes applicant from sitting for current bar 
examination); In re Application of McGraw, 47 Ohio St.3d 172, 538 N.E.2d 112 (1989) 
(application for admission to bar denied in part because of failure to list certain criminal convictions 
as required by questions in original applications for registration and examination). 
The mere fact that the criminal records have been expunged or sealed does not affect the disclosure 
duty. As the Court explained in  In re Application of Watson, 31 Ohio St.3d 220, 509 N.E.2d 1240 
(1987): 
When [the bar application forms ask] the applicant to “[s]tate 
whether your have been, or presently are . . . (1) a party to any 
action or legal proceeding, including civil, criminal, 
quasi-criminal, administrative, or any proceeding in a juvenile 
court,” the question must be fully answered regardless of 
expungements, bond forfeitures, dismissals or similar 
terminations and must include all actions or legal proceedings 
occurring in any court including juvenile court. Failure to do so 
will constitute grounds for denial of an application for 
registration as a candidate for admission to the practice of law, 
or to take the bar examination, in the state of Ohio. 
Id. at 221, 509 N.E.2d at 1241-42 (first bracketed material added). Similarly, the bar admission rules 
and procedure require the applicant to disclose to admissions committees and the Board of 
Commissioners on Character and Fitness expunged criminal records, Gov Bar R I 11(D)(1) & I 
12(C)(6), as well as to provide authorization and release forms, GBR I 2(B)(7), granting access to 
sealed criminal records, see State v. Greene, 61 Ohio St.3d 137, 573 N.E.2d 110 (1991). 
The misstatement or omission need not involve criminal activity; for example, material omissions 
with respect to financial obligations is a not uncommon basis for disapproval of an applicant. E.g., In 
re Application of Acton, 121 Ohio St.3d 154, 2009 Ohio 499, 902 N.E.2d 966 (insufficient 
disclosure on application of default on credit card debt); In re Application of Calim, 82 Ohio St.3d 
96, 694 N.E.2d 896 (1998) (omissions on application with respect to applicant’s employment and 
financial history, and adverse judgment, and misrepresentation regarding status of child-support 
obligations). Other instances include In re Application of Ferguson, 128 Ohio St.3d 382, 2011 
Ohio 552, 944 N.E.2d 1159 (applicant, who had job offer as assistant attorney general, failed to 
disclose to AG Office the fact that he had been denied permission to sit for bar exam), and In re 
Application of Creighton, 117 Ohio St.3d 253, 2008 Ohio 852, 883 N.E.2d 433, in which the 
applicant had been terminated from his job as public school teacher for improprieties with female 
students.  Both on his law school application forms and on a supplement thereto, he falsely denied that 
he had ever been disciplined for unethical conduct as a member of any profession; as the Board stated, 
“‘[t]he statements on his application to register for admission to the Bar are similarly incomplete and 
misleading.’”  Id. at para. 23.  In In re Application of Ireland-Phillips, 71 Ohio St.3d 609, 646 
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N.E.2d 453 (1995), a bar applicant who lied about prior involvement in a civil action concerning an 
alleged forged check was found to lack the character and fitness to practice law at that time. Accord 
In re Application of Brown, 125 Ohio St.3d 354, 2010 Ohio 1863, 928 N.E.2d 445 (failure to 
disclose on application existing copyright infringement action against applicant; answered “No” to 
question requiring disclosure of any such actions; application disapproved with permission to 
resubmit and apply for bar exam at later date). See In re Application of Williams, 95 Ohio St.3d 107, 
766 N.E.2d 143 (2002) (applicant disapproved for admission, based on false statement on application 
that he had left employment with city police department pursuant to “disability retirement” and on 
assertion to bar association interviewers that this information on application was true as stated; in 
doing so “Williams did not disclose in a forthright and honest manner the details surrounding his 
resignation from the Huber Heights police force.”  Id. at 108, 766 N.E.2d at 144.). 
Misconduct with respect to bar application of another: As noted above, the Rule 8.1(a) duty applies 
as well in connection with the bar admission application of others. See Rule 8.1 cmt. [1]. There 
appear to be no cases under the former disciplinary rule (1-101(B)) dealing with this subject. 
Disciplinary investigations: Cases thus far applying Rule 8.1(a) in a disciplinary context include 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Kealy, 125 Ohio St.3d 238, 2010 Ohio 1554, 927 N.E.2d 591, 
where the respondent told a bar association investigator during an interview that he had not received 
notices of the pretrial or trial dates in a case involving one of Kealy’s clients, when in fact he had 
received written notice of both from the court, Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Zaffiro, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 5, 2010 Ohio 4830, 935 N.E.2d 836, where the respondent agreed to provide to relator 
information on his professional liability insurance “when no such policy existed . . . .,” id. at para. 6, 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson, 127 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010 Ohio 5709, 938 N.E.2d 1021, where 
the respondent made inconsistent and false statements regarding material facts throughout his 
disciplinary proceeding, Disciplinary Counsel v. Gilder, 134 Ohio St.3d 374, 2012 Ohio 5641, 982 
N.E.2d 704, where respondent provided relator during its investigation with fabricated, backdated 
letters purportedly sent to the client, as well as copies of other letters and checks to the client that were 
never sent to the client, and Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Gruttadaurio, 136 Ohio St.3d 283 
2013 Ohio 3662, 995 N.E.2d 190, in which respondent lied to relator’s investigator that he had filed 
appeal documents in the Supreme Court on behalf of his client.  
Unlike Rule 8.1, there was no provision under the Code expressly dealing with false statements made 
to disciplinary agencies investigating a grievance. Instead, the Code analog to Rule 8.4(c) (DR 
1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation)) was 
used to police false statements and misleading omissions in connection with disciplinary matters. See, 
e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Florez, 98 Ohio St.3d 448, 2002 Ohio 1730, 786 N.E.2d 875 
(providing false representations and fabricated evidence in response to disciplinary inquiry); 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Spitz, 89 Ohio St.3d 117, 729 N.E.2d 345 (2000) (respondent split fee with 
nonlawyer and then lied to bar association in letter denying that he had done so, submitted falsified 
invoice to bar association concerning payment to nonlawyer, and lied under oath about these matters 
at deposition by relator; indefinite suspension imposed). And see Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Stern, 103 
Ohio St.3d 491, 2004 Ohio 5464, 817 N.E.2d 14, discussed in section 8.4:400 at “Misconduct in the 
judicial process.”  
  
1223
Ohio Legal Ethics 8.1 
  
8.1:400  Duty to Respond to Demand for Information 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.1(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.1(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 1.45 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 1.45 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 8.1(b) is more limited than MR 8.1(b) in two respects. First, the duty is imposed on 
lawyers only, not lawyers and bar applicants. Second, under the Model Rule there is a duty to 
volunteer information necessary to correct a misapprehension known to have arisen in the matter, in 
addition to the duty to not knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an 
admissions or disciplinary authority. Ohio Rule 8.1(b) requires only that in response to “a demand 
for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,” the lawyer 
shall not . . . fail to disclose a material fact or knowingly fail to 
respond, 
with respect to information other than that protected by Rule 1.6. 
The following comments are in order: First, the placement of “knowingly.” As written, the Rule is 
violated by the failure to disclose a material fact in response to a demand for information, whether the 
failure is inadvertent or otherwise, whereas a total failure to respond is a violation only if done 
“knowingly.” Should not the knowingly requirement apply to both?  Cf. In re Application of Hayes, 
81 Ohio St.3d 88, 689 N.E.2d 547 (1998) (violation of Gov Bar R I premised, inter alia, on fact that 
applicant “purposefully” omitted material information, id. at 89, 689 N.E.2d at 547). Compare MR 
8.1(b). 
Second is the deletion of the Model Rule word “lawful” before “demand.” Most likely this is 
adherence to the Code formulation of failing to disclose information “requested,” rather than 
“lawfully requested,” in former DR 1-101(A). It would have been helpful if this point had been 
directly addressed and explained, particularly since our research indicates that Ohio stands alone 
among Model Rule states in striking the word “lawful.” It seems indisputable that the “lawful” 
requirement is implicit -- surely Ohio is not intending to impose a duty to respond to unlawful 
demands. 
It should be further noted that the case law generally does not read “lawful demand” as requiring a 
subpoena or other order; letters from disciplinary or admissions agencies requesting information 
constitute “lawful demands” under the Model Rule formulation. See ABA, Annotated Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct 584-85 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). Likewise in Ohio, case law now 
makes clear that the “demand” requirement is met by requests for information or inquiries made by an 
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admissions or disciplinary agency. Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Wilson, 127 Ohio St.3d 10, 2010 Ohio 
4937, 935 N.E.2d 841 (ignoring “requests” for meeting and “repeated attempts to obtain 
information” by relator violated demand-for-information language in Rule 8.1(b)).  Accord Morosan, 
Allerding, and Marshall, discussed this section infra at “Rule 8.1(b) cases.” 
Third, the Task Force provides an explanation for deleting the Model Rule language obligating a 
lawyer to volunteer information necessary to correct a known misapprehension, but the explanation 
strikes us as unpersuasive. The ABA Model Rules Comparison to Rule 8.1 states that Rule 8.1(b) is 
modified for “clarity.” To the Task Force, the Model Rule language dealing with correction of a 
misapprehension “is too unwieldy and creates a standard too difficult for explanation and 
comprehension.” Does this mean that Ohio lawyers are presumed to be unable to grasp the meaning 
of words that other jurisdictions have found intelligible? (So far as we are aware, only one other 
Model Rule state in the country has deleted this language.) If the Model Rule language is not to be 
incorporated, surely there are better reasons than this. Nor does the Task Force’s follow-up sentence 
in the Model Rule Comparison make sense. It states that the elimination of the Model Rule language 
“does not lessen the standard of candor expected of a lawyer in bar admission or disciplinary 
matters.” To say that elimination of the duty to volunteer information to correct a misapprehension 
does not “lessen the standard of candor” is a nonsequitur. 
While the federal and state constitutional right against self-incrimination may of course be invoked in 
the bar admission or disciplinary setting, “a person relying on such a provision in response to a 
question . . . should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to 
comply with this rule.” Rule 8.1 cmt. [2]. While not readily apparent from the language of the 
comment (identical to MR 8.1 cmt. [2]), if the lawyer reasonably thinks the information demanded 
raises the prospect of criminal proceedings, the lawyer cannot be disciplined for refusal to testify 
about the conduct in question. 
A demand for testimony in the regulatory proceeding that is not 
accompanied by constitutionally sufficient use immunity for 
the testimony is not a “lawful” demand for purposes of Model 
Rule 1.8(b) [sic 8.1(b)]. . . . Of course, if a lawyer is granted 
immunity, the Fifth Amendment will no longer apply, and the 
lawyer can be forced to testify. 
2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering § 62.6, 
at 62-11 (3d ed. Supp. 2008) (bracketed material and ellipsis added). Although this explanation, 
utilizing the Model Rule “lawful demand” language, is not directly transferable to the Ohio 
formulation omitting “lawful,” Fifth Amendment considerations take precedence, whether “lawful” 
is present or not. Thus a disciplinary or admissions authority may demand answers to incriminating 
questions only if immunity from criminal prosecution has been put in place. At that point, the 
expected results flowing from violation of Rule 8.1 are triggered: If the lawyer lies in response, he has 
violated 8.1(a); if he tells the truth and in the process reveals some other violation of the Rules, he 
may be disciplined for that violation; if he refuses to testify, he violates Rule 8.1(b). Hazard & 
Hodes, at 62-11, 62-12. Irrespective of use immunity, while invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
cannot itself be the basis for imposing discipline, it does not preclude a finding of disciplinary 
violation, if the charge is independently proven.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio 
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St.3d 521, 2008 Ohio 91, 880 N.E.2d 467, at paras. 26-30, where the Court imposed sanctions 
despite respondent’s self-incrimination Fifth Amendment argument regarding his refusal to cooperate 
(by first agreeing to provide federal income tax returns but then refusing to do so), because, among 
other reasons, he was found guilty of several other disciplinary violations over and above failure to 
cooperate.  “Thus, unlike the attorney in Spevack [Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967)], 
respondent was not sanctioned solely on the basis of his invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege.”  Id. 
at para. 29. 
In addition to the cases cited in section 8.1:300 involving failure to disclose a material fact in 
response to a request/demand for information, resulting in an omission of a material fact, e.g., In re 
Application of Cvammen, In re Application of Cureton, there are numerous opinions under the 
former OHCPR involving an applicant’s failure to make any response to a request by an admissions 
body for information. They include In re Application of Sherman, 117 Ohio St.3d 528, 2008 Ohio 
1472, 885 N.E.2d 233 (applicant ignored all requests and notices and failed to appear for 
character-and-fitness hearings); In re Application of Bonetti, 117 Ohio St.3d 113, 2008 Ohio 503, 
881 N.E.2d 1249 (same; “[h]aving failed to participate in the character-and-fitness-review process, 
the applicant is unable to sustain his burden of proof under Gov. Bar R. I(12)(C)(6) . . . .”  Id. at para. 
12.  We suspect that Bonetti’s lack of cooperation may have stemmed from the fact that his chances 
weren’t all that good in any event – the sua sponte investigation by the Board was prompted by a 
report of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, United States Department of the Treasury, 
that he had misappropriated funds over a seven-month period while working at National City Bank.  
Also included in the background facts was an order from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System “barring the applicant from further participation in the banking industry.”  Id. at 
para. 6.); In re Application of Phelps, 116 Ohio St.3d 312, 2007 Ohio 6459, 878 N.E.2d 1037 
(after appealing the adverse recommendation of the admissions committee, the matter was set for 
hearing, at which applicant failed to appear; “Phelp’s failure to appear before the panel is in and of 
itself sufficient grounds for disapproving her application,” citing Gov Bar I 12(C)(6).  Id. at para. 
7.); In re Application of Mefford, 104 Ohio St.3d 324, 2004 Ohio 6591, 819 N.E.2d 684 (failure to 
provide requested information concerning financial responsibility; application to sit for current 
examination disapproved); In re Application of Wessel, 94 Ohio St.3d 212, 761 N.E.2d 1036 (2002) 
(failure to respond to request for additional information concerning arrest for possession of cocaine 
and charges of domestic violence and traffic offense; respondent permanently denied right to apply 
for bar admission); In re Application of Bland, 93 Ohio St.3d 414, 755 N.E.2d 342 (2001) (refusal 
to provide requested information about default on student loans; application to register for admission 
denied). 
Rule 8.1(b) cases: The first case applying Rule 8.1(b) is Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Marosan, 119 
Ohio St.3d 113, 2008 Ohio 3882, 892 N.E.2d 447; Marosan was disbarred, given his extensive prior 
disciplinary record and his current violations, which included ignoring “relator’s investigative 
inquiries and fail[ure] to file an answer to the complaint,” thereby violating “Gov.Bar.R. V(4)(G) and 
Prof.Cond.R 8.1(b) (both requiring a lawyer to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation).” Id. at para. 
13. Accord Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Freeman, 128 Ohio St.3d 421, 2011 Ohio 1483, 945 
N.E.2d 1034 (failure to cooperate; no written response to any of eight grievances; over 50 ethical 
violations; disbarment ordered); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Allerding, 123 Ohio St.3d 382, 2009 Ohio 
5589, 916 N.E.2d 808 (failing to respond to two letters of inquiry from relator about clients’ concerns; 
failure to appear when relator attempted to secure deposition of respondent; strong mitigating 
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evidence resulted in two-year stayed suspension); Warren County Bar Ass’n v. Marshall, 121 
Ohio St.3d 197, 2009 Ohio 501, 903 N.E.2d 280 (ignoring grievance committee’s requests for 
response to grievances; ignoring relator’s request for admissions; disbarment). And note that ignoring 
a request for information regarding a grievance and failure to file an answer in response to the 
allegations in the complaint relating to that grievance can violate Rule 8.1(b), even if the relator – 
because of inability to obtain an affidavit from a grievant who decided to withdraw her grievance – 
ultimately “moved to dismiss the alleged violations related to the underlying grievance.” Columbus 
Bar Ass’n v. Troxell, 129 Ohio St.3d 133, 2011 Ohio 3178, 950 N.E.2d 555, at para. 12. 
The 8.1(b) violation found in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 122 Ohio St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 2371, 907 
N.E.2d 1172, is something of a mystery. It occurred in Count IX (see paras. 22-26), setting forth 
violations in connection with respondent’s alleged conversion of settlement funds owing to 
Washington Mutual Bank. The parties stipulated to a violation of Rule 8.1(b), among numerous 
others, but there is nothing in the opinion indicating that in this connection he failed to disclose a 
material fact or knowingly failed to respond to a demand from a disciplinary authority, as the rule 
requires. 
Differences between Rule 8.1 and former disciplinary rules: While former OH DR 1-101(A) and 
1-103(B) cover essentially the same ground as Ohio Rule 8.1, the differences are significant. First, 
the DR 1-101(A) prohibition against materially false statements of fact and/or failure to disclose upon 
request was limited to the lawyer’s own bar admission.  (DR 1-101(B) prohibited a lawyer from 
“furthering” the application for admission of an unqualified candidate; this language has not been 
carried forward to the Rules.) The analogous Rule 8.1 ban on false statements of material fact and/or, 
in response to a demand, failure to disclose a material fact or to respond to the demand, is imposed 
with respect to both bar admission and disciplinary proceedings, and, as stated in Rule 8.1 cmt. [1], 
“applies to a lawyer’s own admission or discipline as well as that of others.” Second, the reporting 
obligation under DR 1-103(B) to supply unprivileged information upon proper request applied only 
to information about “another lawyer or a judge”; under Rule 8.1 a lawyer is also obligated to respond 
to a demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary body concerning the lawyer upon 
whom the demand is made. (Applicable under both regimes is Gov Bar R V 4(G), pursuant to which 
a lawyer must cooperate in disciplinary proceedings brought against that lawyer, as well as in 
proceedings against other lawyers. For a discussion of the duty to cooperate and the extent of the 
relevant subpoena power, see section 0.2:240.) 
To our knowledge, there were no cases applying OH DR 1-103(B). 
See also Ohio Rule 8.3 (duty to volunteer unprivileged knowledge of violation of Rules). 
Protection from civil liability: An absolute privilege from civil liability applies to any statement made 
in connection with a disciplinary proceeding, as long as the statement bears some reasonable relation 
to the proceeding.  Hecht v. Levin, 66 Ohio St.3d 458, 613 N.E.2d 585 (1993) (noting that this 
protection encourages lawyers to report attorney misconduct in accordance with DR 1-103(A) (see 
now Rule 8.3(a)) “without hesitation or fear of retaliation,”  id. at 463, 613 N.E.2d at 589). See 
sections 0.2:240, 1.1:510. 
  
8.1:410  Protecting Client Confidential Information 
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As stated in Ohio Rule 8.1(b), “this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise 
protected by Rule 1.6.” 
A lawyer representing a bar applicant or a respondent in a disciplinary matter is governed, not by 
Rule 8.1, but by “the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship, including Rule 1.6 and, in 
some cases, Rule 3.3.” Ohio Rule 8.1 cmt. [3]. 
1228
OHIO LEGAL ETHICS 8.2 
Copyright © 2013 Jones Day 
Ohio Legal Ethics 
2013 Update 
VIII MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION  
RULE 8.2  JUDICIAL AND LEGAL OFFICIALS 
NOTE: This document is current through December 2013. 
8.2 
Return to Table of Contents
1229
Ohio Legal Ethics 8.2  
 
 
8.2:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.2 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.2 
  
8.2:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 8.2(a) differs from the Model Rule in the following respects: 
After “integrity of a”, Ohio inserts “judicial officer, or candidate for 
election or appointment to judicial office.” for the Model Rule 
language “judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a 
candidate for election or appointment to judicial or public office.” 
Ohio Rule 8.2(b) differs from the Model Rule as follows: 
the words “not violate” are substituted for “comply with” after “shall”; 
“applicable” is deleted before “provisions”; “Ohio” is added before 
“Code”; and “applicable to judicial candidates.” is added after 
“Conduct”. 
  
8.2:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 8.2(a): DR 8-102. 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 8.2(b): DR 2-102(A)(1) [sic DR 
1-102(A)(1)]. 
  
8.2:200  False Statements About Judges or Candidates for Judicial Office 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.2(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.2(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 8.27-8.29 
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Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 101:601 
ALI-LGL § 114 
Wolfram § 11.3.2 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, The 
Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 8.27-8.29 (1996). 
Under Ohio Rule 8.2(a), a lawyer shall not make a statement “that the lawyer knows to be false or 
with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judicial 
officer, or candidate for election or appointment to judicial office.” Other offensive comments 
directed at a judicial officer or a candidate for judicial office may be subject to sanction under Ohio 
Rule 8.4(d) as “prejudicial to the administration of justice.” See section 8.4:500. 
The similar prohibitions in MR 8.2(a) are broader in scope -- in addition to judges and judicial 
candidates, the Model Rule precludes such statements by a lawyer about public legal officers and 
candidates for legal office (e.g., prosecutor, attorney general, public defender). According to the Task 
Force in its ABA Model Rules Comparison to Rule 8.2, these officers were not included because 
they were not included in former DR 8-102 and because “disciplinary authorities should not be 
responsible for investigating statements made during campaigns for county attorney, attorney general, 
or any other public legal position.” The Ohio Rule also appears narrower than the former disciplinary 
rule on point, which prohibited a lawyer from making false statements against “a judge or other 
adjudicatory officer.” OH DR 8-102(B). The Ohio Rule focuses upon “judicial officers” and 
candidates for such offices. It would appear that agency personnel handling adjudicative 
administrative proceedings were covered by the former language, but may not be covered by Rule 
8.2(a). 
The question of the scope of Rule 8.2(a) is made murkier by the decision in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Watterson, 114 Ohio St.3d 159, 2007 Ohio 3615, 870 N.E.2d 1153. In Watterson, the Court held 
that the respondent violated DR 8-102(B) (as well as Gov Bar R IV 2 (duty of lawyer to maintain 
respectful attitude toward “courts”)) by knowingly making false accusations against the Stark County 
Bar Association Grievance Committee, which had been investigating alleged violations by 
respondent until it recused itself.  Although it did not make any explicit analysis of the issue, the 
Court’s holding clearly reads “other adjudicatory officer” as including members of a grievance 
committee.  Can the words “judicial officer” in Rule 8.2(a) be read as broadly?  It would seem a bit of 
a stretch, but the Task Force in its Ohio Code Comparison stated that 8.2(a) is “comparable to DR 
8-102 and does not depart substantively from that rule.” 
Under former DR 8-102, which prohibited a lawyer from “knowingly” making false accusations 
about judges and other adjudicatory officers, it was decided in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003 Ohio 4048, 793 N.E.2d 495, that “knowingly” was intended to 
incorporate an objective standard, rather than the subjective actual-malice standard used to test 
allegedly defamatory statements made against public figures. See the discussion of the Gardner case, 
this section infra. See also ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 592-94 (7th ed. 
2011) (commentary) (setting forth the developing national case law in favor of the objective 
standard). Inasmuch as Ohio Rule 8.2(a) “is comparable to DR 8-102 and does not depart 
substantively from that rule” (Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 8.2), it seemed reasonable to assume 
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that “knows” under Rule 8.2(a) would be similarly interpreted. That has proven to be the case. The 
Supreme Court squarely so held in Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallo, 131 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012 Ohio 
758, 964 N.E.2d 1024, at paras. 19, 30:  
In Gardner . . . we adopted an objective standard to determine whether 
an attorney has made a statement about a judicial officer with 
knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity. Under that standard, we 
consider the nature of the statements and the context in which they 
were made and determine whether the attorney had a reasonable factual 
basis for making them. 
*    *    * 
Given the evidence that Gallo acted on and the minimal effort that he 
undertook to confirm the identity of the man in the hallway before 
making serious allegations against Judge Lucci, we do not find that he 
had a reasonable factual basis for his statements. 
For further on Gallo, see below. 
The Rule is narrower than the prior provision with respect to the types of false statements that might 
trigger discipline. Under the Code, a lawyer could not knowingly make “false statements of fact 
concerning the qualifications of a candidate for judicial office,” nor “false accusations” against a 
judge or adjudicatory officer. OH DR 8-102. Under Ohio Rule 8.2(a), in contrast, the focus is limited 
to false statements concerning the “qualifications or integrity” of judicial officers and candidates for 
judicial office. 
Comment [1] emphasizes the importance of assessments by lawyers in evaluating judges -- such 
assessments are relied on to ascertain professional and personal fitness of those being considered for 
judicial office; thus, a lawyer’s expression of “honest and candid opinions . . . contributes to 
improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly 
undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.” Ohio Rule 8.2 cmt. [1]. 
Comment [3] encourages lawyers “to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly 
criticized.” Rule 8.2 cmt. [3]. 
The 8.2(a) standard was found to have been violated in Disciplinary Counsel v Gallo, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 309, 2012 Ohio 758, 964 N.E.2d 1024, a case teaching that one ought never make accusations 
against a judge unless one does thorough due diligence as to their accuracy. In Gallo, the respondent 
made false accusations about a judge in an affidavit and in a motion to strike the judge’s motion to 
intervene in a domestic relations case (respondent represented the husband; the wife was living with 
the judge). This all came about after Gallo had been told on short notice by his firm to handle a pretrial 
in the divorce case. He had never met his client or the judge who sought to intervene in the 
proceedings. While standing in the courthouse corridor, a man, who had repeatedly been in and out of 
that judge’s chambers, came out and stared at the husband, Gallo’s client. This made the husband feel 
uncomfortable and intimidated. While in the corridor, the wife’s lawyer handed Gallo a copy of the 
judge’s motion to intervene. Gallo then called his boss and the firm and told him what was going on. 
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The boss told Gallo that the description of the person doing the staring sounded like the judge in 
question. Moreover, the husband told Gallo that the person doing the staring was the judge. Before 
filing the affidavit, Gallo also looked at the judge’s picture on the Internet and “believed the picture to 
be consistent with the man he had observed in the courthouse that morning.” Id. at para. 10. Despite 
this “evidence,” the person doing the staring was the judge’s bailiff, not the judge; and after the 
affidavit and the motion to strike, the judge filed a grievance against Gallo for falsely accusing him of 
abusing his office. Later a video recording of the corridor made clear that the starer was the bailiff, not 
the judge. Gallo moved to withdraw his affidavit. 
Had Gallo done enough to avoid violating Rule 8.2(a)? He had not. Although the Board found he had 
not acted “knowingly” and was “under considerable pressure from his employer when he filed the 
documents containing the accusations,” he had acted “recklessly by failing to independently verify 
the identity of the man he had observed in the hallway before raising such serious allegations against 
[the judge].” Id at para. 11. The identification efforts Gallo did make were characterized by the 
Court as “minimal” – not sufficient, under the Gardner objective standard, to provide him with a 
reasonable basis for his allegations. 
Gallo ended up with a public reprimand. (Disciplinary Counsel sought an actual six-month 
suspension for this bizarre sequence of events, and tried to use the Gardner case, where the 
respondent had attacked as biased and corrupt an appellate court that affirmed the conviction of his 
client, as applicable precedent.) Two justices dissented and would have dismissed. In the view of 
Justice Lundberg Stratton (joined by Justice O’Donnell),  
 Gallo had been practicing law for less than a year before he was 
called in to handle the pretrial conference representing Jeffery Rymers. 
Gallo had never seen or talked to Judge Lucci or his bailiff, had never 
been in Judge Lucci’s courtroom or chambers, and had never even met 
the Stafford firm’s own client, Mr. Rymers, until the day in question. 
 The man who was mistaken for Judge Lucci had gone into and 
out of Judge Lucci’s chambers multiple times that morning and had 
been seen staring in the direction of Gallo and his client, and Mr. 
Rymers mistakenly confirmed that the man was Judge Lucci. Gallo 
was aware that Judge Lucci was involved in a relationship with Mr. 
Rymer’s wife and that she and the Rymerses’ children were living in 
the judge’s home. It was reasonable for Gallo to believe that his client 
would recognize Judge Lucci. 
 But Gallo did not rely solely on the identification by his client 
when he prepared his affidavit accusing the judge. He also relied on the 
identification made by one of the partners in the Stafford firm, who 
confirmed that the man described by Gallo was Judge Lucci. In 
addition, Gallo compared the judge’s official photograph on the Lake 
County Common Pleas Court website to his memory of the man he had 
seen in the hallway. In my view, Gallo took reasonable steps to verify 
the identity of the person in question. 
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*    *    *    * 
 In my view, Gallo made a simple, good-faith mistake – a 
mistake that was reasonable, not reckless. 
Id. at paras. 24-26, 28. 
 
In a related case, Disciplinary Counsel v. Stafford, 131 Ohio St.3d 385, 2012 Ohio 909, 965 
N.E.2d 971, Gallo’s boss was also found to have violated Rule 8.2(a) as a result of his having acted 
with reckless disregard of the truth under the Garner objective standard in failing to verify the truth 
of the affidavits that Stafford directed Gallo and the husband to prepare against Judge Lucci. In 
addition, in a memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss or strike Judge Lucci’s motion to 
intervene in the divorce case and in support of a motion for sanctions and attorney fees pursuant to 
O.R.C. 2323.51 and Rule 11, 
Stafford himself made false statements regarding the integrity of Lucci 
as a judicial officer in his memorandum [which asserted that the judge 
had “engaged in a pattern of harassing and threatening conduct toward 
respondent”] . . . and failed to withdraw the memorandum even after 
the falsity of the statements had been exposed and after the supporting 
affidavits of Gallo and [the husband] had been withdrawn. 
Id. at para. 57. The Court also rejected respondent’s claim that Lucci made additional threats through 
his lawyer’s letter to Stafford: “a reasonable attorney would believe that Stafford’s statement was 
false because the statements, when read in context, conveyed no threat whatsoever.” Id. at para. 58. 
Finally as to 8.2(a), the Court made clear that the rule applies even though Lucci was not acting in his 
official judicial capacity; the focus is on the attorney’s conduct. “A judge need not be acting in his 
official capacity for an attorney to violate the prohibition against making a recklessly false statement 
concerning that judge’s integrity as a judicial officer.” Id. at para. 53. 
By far the most significant decision dealing with false accusations made against a judicial officer 
under former DR 8-102(B) was Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 
2003 Ohio 4048, 793 N.E.2d 425. In Gardner, the respondent in a motion for reconsideration made 
accusations of dishonesty and bias about a panel of the Eighth District Court of Appeals after a 
decision adverse to his client was handed down by the panel. (Among other comments, respondent 
asserted that the panel “did not give ‘a damn about how wrong, disingenuous, and biased its opinion 
is.’“ Id. at para. 4.) As a result, a disciplinary action was commenced, and the Supreme Court 
imposed a six-month suspension from the practice of law. In so doing, the Court held that 
respondent’s tirade directed to the appellate panel was not protected by the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution or the free-speech clause of the Ohio Constitution, and that an objective standard 
applied in determining whether respondent’s accusations of judicial impropriety were made 
“knowingly” in violation of 8-102(B). 
With respect to the federal constitution, the Court concluded that 
the First Amendment does not insulate an attorney from professional 
discipline even for expressing an opinion, during court proceedings, 
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that a judge is corrupt when the attorney knows that the opinion has no 
factual basis or is reckless in that regard. 
Id. at para. 16. ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 590-92 (7th ed. 2011) 
(commentary), sets forth the national precedent (including Gardner) and commentary on the 
constitutionality of such limits. 
Pursuant to the free-speech clause of the state constitution (Art I, § 11), “[w]hen the statement in 
question cannot reasonably be interpreted by the ordinary reader as stating actual facts about an 
individual, the statement is protected as the free expression of opinion under Section 11.” Id. at para. 
19. This means that “certain false statements of opinion are protected,” id., and thus the court must 
determine whether the statement is one of fact, sanctionable under former OH DR 8-102(B), or 
protected opinion. The test is an objective one, based on the totality of the circumstances. Finding that 
charges of criminal conduct are sufficiently specific to constitute fact, the Court concluded that 
accusations that an appellate court affirmed a conviction “out of prosecutorial bias and corruption is 
no less specific. Such allegation are charges of criminal or unethical activity and, therefore, constitute 
classic examples of statements having a well-defined meaning.” Id. at para. 21. Finally, in support of 
its conclusion on the state constitutional issue, the Supreme Court noted that a “courtroom is not a 
forum for personal or political grandstanding” and that, “in the context of his motion and that appeal, 
respondent’s statements are reasonably understood to be factual assertions of the appellate court’s 
corruption and prosecutorial bias.” Id. at para. 22. (The Gardner Ohio constitutional analysis was 
followed by the Court in rejecting respondent’s freedom of speech defense of her unfounded 
assertions of bias, etc., against judges in Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009 
Ohio 2870, 909 N.E.2d 1271.) 
The third issue may be the most interesting of the three. Even though 8-102(B) provided that a lawyer 
shall not “knowingly” make false accusations against a judge or court, Gardner held that an objective 
test, not the subjective actual-malice defamation test (knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of its 
falsity) of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
64 (1964) (New York Times test applied in libel action against district attorney, premised on his 
statements about Louisiana judges), is applicable. Finding support in the commentary to MR 8.2(a) 
(Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 566 (4th ed. 1999) [in Seventh Edition (2011) 
see p. 592-93]) and “the majority of courts that have addressed this issue,” 99 Ohio St.3d 416, at 
para. 26, the Ohio Supreme Court 
similarly conclude[d] that the state’s compelling interest in preserving 
public confidence in the judiciary supports applying a standard in 
disciplinary proceedings different from that applicable in defamation 
cases. Under the objective standard, an attorney may still freely 
exercise free speech rights and make statements supported by a 
reasonable factual basis, even if the attorney turns out to be 
mistaken. . . . Accordingly we hold that an attorney may be sanctioned 
for making accusations of judicial impropriety that a reasonable 
attorney would believe are false. 
Id. at para. 31 (citation omitted). Once again, Frost is in accord. Contra 2 Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers § 114 cmt. b, at 198 (2000) (New York Times actual-malice standard 
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should be applied in lawyer discipline cases). 
Finally, in rejecting the recommended sanction of both the panel (public reprimand) and the board 
(six-month stayed suspension), the Gardner Court imposed a six-month suspension without stay: 
“Unfounded attacks against the integrity of the judiciary require an actual suspension from the 
practice of law.” Id. at para. 36. This “absolute” rule, however, can be softened if  “sufficient 
mitigating factors are present.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Proctor, 131 Ohio St.3d 215, 2012 Ohio 
684, 963 N.E.2d 806, at para. 18. While the Court in Proctor did in fact impose an actual suspension 
a la Gardner (aggravating factors in Proctor outweighed mitigating factors), it noted that despite the 
Gardner “absolute” language, it had done otherwise in the presence of sufficient mitigating factors, 
citing DiCato (six-month stayed suspension) and presumably would do the same in the future. In this 
respect, the Court analogized the Rule 8.2(a) sanction analysis to the Fowerbaugh rule under 8.4(c) 
– that dishonest or deceitful conduct will merit an actual suspension – and noted that that “absolute” 
rule is now “presumptive” only and can be overcome with significant mitigating evidence, as will be 
the case under 8.2(a). 
In Disciplinary Counsel v. Shimko, 134 Ohio St.3d 544, 2012 Ohio 5694, 983 N.E.2d 1300, this 
dichotomy between the Gardner absolute rule of actual suspension and the Proctor recognition that 
a lesser sanction may be appropriate based on sufficient mitigating factors is less than clear. In 
Shimko, the respondent was given a stayed one-year suspension for his statements regarding visiting  
Judge Markus, before whom Shimko had appeared in litigation on behalf of defendants.  Judge 
Markus declared a mistrial based in part on respondent’s perceived misconduct during the trial. 
Shimko’s accusations in post-trial appellate briefs impugned Markus’s integrity, accusing him of 
“‘fabricating allegations,’ ‘completely fabricating the basis for his decision,’ ‘deliberately 
misrepresenting,’ ‘contriving a reason,’ and ‘personally invested in the outcome.’” Id. at para. 18. 
Although the panel and Board recommended a six-month actual suspension, citing Gardner and 
Proctor, a 4-3 majority found that Shimko’s comments were not the equivalent of Gardner’s “rant” 
against three court of appeals judges and therefore issued a one-year suspension fully stayed. Unlike 
virtually every other Supreme Court disciplinary case discussion of appropriate sanction, in Shimko 
there is no itemization of the BCGD Proc Reg 10 aggravation and mitigation factors. Instead, the 
majority provides a narrative that identifies plus and minus factors as follows: 
AGGRAVATION, MITIGATION, AND SANCTION 
 Shimko made written statements accusing a judicial officer of 
dishonesty and improper motives in his rulings. These statements were 
deliberate and calculated and made over a nine-month period. Some 
were part of an apparent strategy to convince the court of appeals to 
overturn Judge Markus’s decision. Shimko was unapologetic and did 
not acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. He continues to 
maintain the reasonableness of his accusations of Judge Markus’s bias 
and of his commitment to serve his client. Shimko received a public 
reprimand on June 23, 2009, from the Arizona Supreme Court for 
which he was reciprocally disciplined in Ohio. Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Shimko, 124 Ohio St.3d 1201, 2009-Ohio-6879, 918 N.E.2d 1007. 
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 Shimko was cooperative in the disciplinary process and no 
apparent damage has been done to Judge Markus’s reputation. Shimko 
has an excellent reputation with the bench and bar, and is an intelligent, 
accomplished, and competent attorney who zealously represents his 
clients to the best of his ability. Based on his demeanor, the board 
determined that he subjectively, yet honestly, believes in the 
rightfulness of his position. Consequently, the board did not conclude 
that his motives were dishonest. Finally, his sanctionable statements 
were made in a forum in such a way that it is likely that only the bench 
and opposing counsel would see them; at no time was the sanctionable 
activity shown to the jury or general public. 
Id. at paras. 29-30. Our sense is that, from this narrative at least, the aggravating and mitigating 
factors were fairly evenly balanced, not significantly tilted to the mitigation side. Nevertheless, a fully 
stayed sanction was found appropriate. The vigorous dissent, authored by Chief Justice O’Connor, 
minces no words in finding the majority’s sanction to be out of step with the Gardner 6-1 majority 
and based largely on the lone Gardner dissent by Justice Pfiefer, who is also the author of the 
Shimko majority opinion. 
Based on the Shimko decision, lawyers thinking about unloading on a judge should pause and 
remember, first, that identifying the “fine line between vigorous advocacy on behalf of one’s client 
and improper conduct . . . is an inexact science.” Id. at para. 34. As such, this is inherently dangerous 
territory. Moreover, while “[a]ttorneys should be free to challenge, in appropriate legal proceedings, a 
court’s perceived partiality,” and has a “right to allege bias in his affidavits and in his appellate 
briefs,” any such allegations should be presented “one at a time, pointing to the record and using 
words that were powerful but less heated,” id. at paras. 32, 35, than the “rough, unnecessary and 
ultimately unproductive” comments utilized by Shimko against Judge Markus. Id. at para. 34. 
Finally (while this seems something of a makeweight), the Court in staying the suspension noted that 
the court filings in which the sanctionable comments appeared, although public documents, “would 
receive about as much scrutiny from the public if [they] were written on the wind,” id. at para. 33.  In 
contrast, those to which the public has ready access (e.g., via newspaper, TV, internet) presumably 
would be more likely to undercut the integrity of the judiciary. 
Cases other than Gardner under DR 8-102(B) include Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. West, 85 
Ohio St.3d 5, 706 N.E.2d 760 (1999), and Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Batt, 78 Ohio St.3d 189, 677 
N.E.2d 349 (1997). In West, the respondent was suspended for eighteen months, with twelve months 
stayed (respondent’s clinical depression was a mitigating circumstance), for knowingly and falsely 
accusing a federal bankruptcy judge of criminal misconduct. At a hearing in federal district court, 
respondent stated that the judge had a financial interest in the case in which respondent was 
representing the bankrupt. According to respondent, the judge was receiving kickbacks from the 
bankruptcy trustee, whose fees were increased by the scheduling of numerous unnecessary hearings. 
Respondent subsequently admitted at the disciplinary hearing that his accusations were unfounded. In 
Batt, at a hearing before the Ohio Hazardous Waste Facility Board, respondent “publicly called the 
presiding judge a ‘marginal incompetent,’ and implied that panel members bought their appointments, 
were biased, and were responding to political measures.” 78 Ohio St.3d at 190, 677 N.E.2d at 351. 
The panel found numerous violations of the OHCPR, including 8-102(B), resulting from this 
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conduct. Without focusing on the 8-102(B) violation in particular and making no mention of the 
rule’s “knowingly” requirement (the Court merely noted that respondent’s “bullying tactics toward . . . 
the board . . . have no place in our jurisprudence,”  id. at 192, 677 N.E.2d at 352), the Court adopted 
the Disciplinary Board’s recommendation of permanent disbarment. Accord Akron Bar Ass’n v. 
Holder, 105 Ohio St.3d 443, 2005 Ohio 2695, 828 N.E.2d 443, at para. 36 (DR 8-102(B) violated 
by respondent’s “falsely accusing the bankruptcy judge of not acting impartially”). 
In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Baumgartner, 100 Ohio St.3d 41, 2003 Ohio 4756, 796 
N.E.2d 495, the respondent was charged with violating, among other rules, former DR 8-102(B), 
based on her “vendetta” against numerous public officials, including judges, pursuant to which she 
made unfounded charges of corruption, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice. Because of her 
“seemingly inexhaustible campaign to retaliate against anyone and everyone who defied her,” 
including “public officials whose integrity she attacked if they resisted her demands,” id. at para. 27, 
respondent was permanently disbarred. In rejecting her argument that she was being punished for 
“whistle blowing” and reporting and combating corruption, the Court had this to say: 
We disagree. Respondent has made innumerable false accusations of 
wrongdoing that a reasonable attorney in her situation would know 
were false. There is no protection for such statements and attorneys are 
subject to discipline for them. [citing the Gardner case, discussed 
above]. Moreover, when an attorney repeatedly harms her clients’ 
interests, manipulates the legal system to harass and intimidate, and 
publicly accuses dozens of people of criminal wrongdoing, our 
constitutional duty to regulate the legal profession for the public’s 
protection compels us to impose the most extreme sanction: 
disbarment. 
Id. at para. 46 (bracketed material added). Compare Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 
219, 2009 Ohio 2870, 909 N.E.2d 1271 (comparable conduct accusing various state and federal 
judges of bias and other improprieties; because misconduct not as pervasive as that in Baumgartner, 
where respondent was permanently disbarred, but not as restricted as single outburst in Gardner, 
where six-month suspension imposed, “intermediate” sanction of indefinite suspension found 
appropriate). 
In contrast to the foregoing cases, if a lawyer has proper grounds for serious complaint that a judge 
has violated the Judicial Code, the lawyer should file a grievance with the proper authorities. Gov 
Jud R IV 2. It has even been suggested that failure to file a grievance in such circumstances may 
itself be grounds for discipline against the lawyer. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 92-3 (Apr. 16, 1993) 
(intimating that failure to file grievance might violate former DR 1-102(A)(5) as conduct prejudicial 
to the administration of justice). For a disciplinary case finding violation of that part of Gov Bar R IV 
2 requiring lawyers to maintain a respectful attitude toward the courts, as well as violation of DR 
8-102(B), see Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Vogel, 117 Ohio St.3d 108, 2008 Ohio 504, 881 N.E.2d 
1244 (making false accusations that judge in criminal case was colluding with prosecutor to the 
detriment of his alleged client). Accord Frost supra. 
As members of the Bar, sitting judges are subject to the strictures of Ohio Rule 8.2(a). See, under the 
former OHCPR, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferreri, 85 Ohio St.3d 649, 710 N.E.2d 1107 
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(1999), where a judge in the juvenile division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas was 
given an eighteen-month suspension from the practice of law, with the final twelve months stayed, 
and was suspended from his position as judge for six months without pay. Included in respondent’s 
numerous inappropriate remarks were his statements to the media that 
the [juvenile court] administrative judge was engaged in a conspiracy 
with officials of the detention center to “cover up” violations, that the 
administrative judge failed to provide leadership in solving the 
problems of the detention center, and that juvenile court was “out of 
control” . . . . 
Id. at 653, 710 N.E.2d at 1110. The Court determined that “those comments which were specifically 
directed at a judge violated the Disciplinary Rules [i.e., 8-102, the only DR violation charged].”  Id. at 
654, 710 N.E.2d at 1111 (bracketed material added).  
Much of the substantive content of a former ethical consideration, OH EC 8-6, is now found in Ohio 
Rule 8.2 cmt. [3], discussed above, and in the Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities. As 
previously noted, Comment [3] urges lawyers to defend judges unjustly criticized. Paragraph 5 of the 
Preamble further states (as did EC 8-6) that 
[a]djudicatory officials, not being wholly free to defend themselves, 
are entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjustified 
criticism. Although a lawyer, as a citizen, has a right to criticize such 
officials, the lawyer should do so with restraint and avoid intemperate 
statements that tend to lessen public confidence in the legal system. 
This last admonition would seem to raise freedom of speech concerns, see Charles W. Wolfram, 
Modern Legal Ethics § 11.3.2, at 601-02 (1986), but we are unaware of any Ohio cases on point. 
Note that ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 582 (5th ed. 2003) 
(commentary), remarks that “certain Code requirements that arguably discouraged lawyer criticism” 
have been deleted in the Model Rules, including the “appropriate language” admonition of EC 8-6. 
As seen above, however, Ohio’s version of Preamble para. 5 (unlike para. 5 of the Model Rule 
Preamble), retains the flavor of former OH EC 8-6. 
In at least one Code case, the aspirational (rather than mandatory) nature of EC 8-6 played a role in 
the decision. In Crawford County Bar Ass’n v. Nicholson, 66 Ohio St.3d 585, 613 N.E.2d 1025 
(1993), the Board panel that heard the case based its proposed sanctions in part on respondent’s letters 
to the editor in which he criticized the rulings of local judges in language the panel characterized as 
“intemperate.” The Supreme Court refused to find a violation on these grounds because the conduct 
did not violate a disciplinary rule. Compare, however, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. West, 85 
Ohio St.3d 5, 706 N.E.2d 760 (1999), where the Court, in finding a violation of DR 8-102(B), quoted 
in support the language from former EC 8-6 concerning the manner in which criticism of 
adjudicatory officials should and should not be made.  Id. at 6-7, 706 N.E.2d at 761. The Court 
likewise looked to EC 8-6 in finding an DR 8-102(B) violation in Gardner: 
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A failure to investigate charges of judicial impropriety when EC 8-6 
admonishes attorneys to “be certain” that their criticism has merit 
demonstrates reckless disregard for the truth. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003 Ohio 4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, 
at para. 33. 
  
8.2:300  Lawyer Candidates for Judicial Office 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.2(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.2(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 1.17 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 101:610 
ALI-LGL § 114 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, The 
Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 1.17 (1996). 
Under Ohio Rule 8.2(b), a lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office “shall not violate the 
provisions of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct applicable to judicial candidates.” “Judicial 
candidate,” as defined in CJC Rule 4.6(F), 
means a person who has made a public announcement of candidacy for 
judicial office, declared or filed as a candidate for judicial office with 
the election authority, or authorized the solicitation or receipt of 
contributions or support for judicial office, whichever occurred first. 
In broad terms, the restrictions on the conduct of judicial candidates set forth in former Canon 7 
[Canon 4 of the 2009 CJC] limit the content of candidate communications, campaign funding 
practices, and participation in partisan political activity. See, e.g., Berger v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 
598 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (finding that former CJC Canon 7(B)(1)(c) [now see CJC Rule 
4.1(A)] does not prohibit criticism of judicial administration and incumbents by judicial candidates, 
provided the criticism is truthful and not misleading). Canon 7 matters were also extensively 
discussed in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2003-8, 2003 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 8 (Dec. 5, 2003) (permitting magistrate who is judicial candidate to appear in judicial robe in 
campaign advertising for judicial seat so long as he or she is accurately identified as magistrate of 
court on which magistrate serves; prior Board Opinion 96-8 to the contrary withdrawn; additional 
instructions for judicial candidates as to what they can and cannot do set forth); and in Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2002-8, 2002 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 11 (Aug. 9, 
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2002) (eleven guidelines, arising from mandatory rules of former Canon 7, stated). The rules under 
Canon 4 of the 2009 CJC should be consulted for more detail. 
A number of pre-Rule cases dealt with the subject matter of DR 8-102(A) -- false statement of fact 
concerning the qualifications of judicial candidates -- but since they involved statements made by 
lawyers who were themselves candidates and/or judges in the course of campaigns for judicial office, 
the cases proceeded under the rubric of the OH CJC, not the OHCPR. This pattern can be expected 
to continue under the terms of Rule 8.2(b) and the 2009 CJC. One of the more well-known pre-Rule 
cases is  In re Complaint Against Judge Harper, 77 Ohio St.3d 211, 673 N.E.2d 1253 (1996), 
which involved conduct of a sitting judge. In Harper, an advertisement, placed on behalf of and 
approved by respondent about her opponent in an election for the seat on the Ohio Supreme Court 
then held by the opponent, falsely accused the incumbent of associating with dishonest lawyers intent 
on corrupting the legal system. The Court (comprised in this case of appellate judges from each 
appellate district, pursuant to Gov Jud R II 4) found that the conduct violated OH CJC Canon 2(A) 
(conduct that diminishes confidence in the judiciary) [now see CJC Rule 1.2] and CJC Canon 
7(B)(1)(a) (requiring judge to maintain dignity of judicial office) [now see CJC Rule 4.2(A)(1) 
(requiring candidate to act in manner consistent with independence, integrity, and impartiality of 
judiciary)], and imposed a public reprimand. 
Like cases include  In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Brigner. 89 Ohio St.3d 1460, 732 
N.E.2d 994 (2000) (sitting domestic relations judge falsely claimed in fund-raising letter that 
opponent “has never handled a divorce case,” id.; OH CJC Canon 7(E)(1) [now CJC Rule 4.3(A)] 
violated);  In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Carr, 76 Ohio St.3d 320, 667 N.E.2d 956 
(1996) (allegation that candidate for municipal court knowingly misrepresented qualifications of 
opponent by reference in campaign letter to opponent’s having never handled single housing-court 
case; panel’s finding of clear violation of CJC Canon 7(B)(2)(f) [now CJC Rule 4.3(F)], when Carr 
failed to appear and charges and supporting testimony went unrefuted, affirmed);  In re Judicial 
Campaign Against Hein, 95 Ohio Misc.2d 31, 706 N.E.2d 34 (Comm’n of Judges Appointed by 
Supreme Court 1999) (candidate’s press release improperly labeled opponent as “soft on crime” and 
“liberal”; Canon 7(E)(1) violated; court also held that CJC governs conduct of prosecuting attorney 
running as judicial candidate -- no exception exists for candidates who hold another public office). 
What about misleading statements about one’s own campaign as a judicial candidate? Once again, the 
pre-Rule cases that dealt with this issue were decided under the OH CJC. See, e.g., Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kaup, 102 Ohio St.3d 29, 2004 Ohio 1525, 806 N.E.2d 513 (violation of 
CJC Canons 7(D) and 7(E) [now CJC 4.3] where judicial candidate “deliberately misled voters by 
using a deceptive name for his campaign committee and then circulated advertisements that would 
lead voters to believe that an independent organization had examined the credentials of all of the 
candidates and concluded that respondent was the best-qualified candidate,” id. at para. 13; 
six-month stayed suspension imposed as in Evans infra); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans, 
89 Ohio St.3d 497, 733 N.E.2d 609 (2000) (candidate violated Canon 7(E)(1) by claiming he was 
“Endorsed by Southern Ohio’s Top Prosecutors and Sheriffs!” when in fact only a minority of the 
district’s prosecuting attorneys and sheriffs had endorsed him). (The Kaup and Evans cases are 
discussed in the context of what judicial candidates may and may not say about party affiliation or 
endorsement, opined upon in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2009-8, 2009 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (Oct. 10, 2009).) 
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In summary, Rule 8.2(a), and only 8.2(a), applies to lawyers who are not judges or judicial candidates. 
And 8.2(b) applies only to lawyers who are judicial candidates. Does the 8.2(a) 
known-false-statement prohibition apply as well to lawyer/candidates and lawyer/judges? Former 
DR 8-102(B) was invoked at least once against a lawyer/judge for making false accusations about 
another judge ( Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferreri, 85 Ohio St.3d 649, 710 N.E.2d 1107 
(1999), discussed in section 8.2:200), but all of the pre-Rule cases against lawyer/judicial candidates 
discussed herein were decided under the provisions of the Judicial Code. While a case can be made 
that Rule 8.2(a), read literally, is applicable to lawyer/judicial candidates, the more likely result is 
that the judicial-candidate cases will continue to be the exclusive preserve of Rule 8.2(b) and, as 
incorporated by reference therein, the provisions of the OH CJC “applicable to judicial candidates.” 
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8.3:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.3 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.3 
  
8.3:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Each of the three divisions of Ohio Rule 8.3 contains provisions different from the Model Rule. The 
differences are as follows: 
Division (a): after “A lawyer who”, Ohio substitutes “possesses 
unprivileged knowledge of” for the Model Rule language “knows that 
another lawyer has committed”. After the insertion of “Ohio” before 
“Rules”, Ohio division (a) deletes the word “substantial” before 
“question”; it further substitutes “any” for “that” before “lawyer’s”; 
and it substitutes “a disciplinary authority empowered to investigate or 
act upon such a violation.” for the Model Rule language “the 
appropriate professional authority.” 
Division (b): After “A lawyer who”, Ohio substitutes “possesses 
unprivileged knowledge” for the Model Rule language “knows”; adds 
the words “the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct or” after “violation 
of”; and deletes the Model Rule language “that raises a substantial 
question as to the judge’s fitness for office” after “judicial conduct”. 
Division (c): This division has been completely rewritten. Ohio Rule 
8.3(c) states: 
Any information obtained by a member of a committee 
or subcommittee of a bar association, or by a member, 
employee, or agent of a nonprofit corporation 
established by a bar association, designed to assist 
lawyers with substance abuse or mental health problems, 
provided the information was obtained while the 
member, employee, or agent was performing duties as a 
member, employee, or agent of the committee, 
subcommittee, or nonprofit corporation, shall be 
privileged for all purposes under this rule.”, 
in lieu of the MR 8.3(c) language: 
This Rule does not require disclosure of information 
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6 or information gained 
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by a lawyer or judge while participating in an approved 
lawyers assistance program. 
  
8.3:102  Model Code Comparison 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 8.3: DR 1-103. 
  
8.3:200  Mandatory Duty to Report Serious Misconduct 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.3(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.3(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.40-1.44, 1.47 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 101:201 
ALI-LGL § 5 
Wolfram § 12.10 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.40-1.44, 1.47 (1996). 
The duty to report - In general: Ohio Rule 8.3 addresses the duty of an attorney to report lawyer 
misconduct. Rule 8.3(a) deals with the duty of a lawyer to volunteer information about lawyer 
misconduct in certain circumstances and is discussed in this section. Rule 8.3(b) is concerned with 
reporting misconduct by judges and is discussed in section 8.3:300. Division (c) provides that 
information received by members, employees, and agents of lawyer-assistance organizations helping 
lawyers with substance abuse or mental-health problems is privileged under the Rule. Division (c) 
and the privilege issue as applied in Rule 8.3 matters is discussed in section 8.3:400. Rule 8.1(b) sets 
forth the duty to respond to demands from disciplinary authorities concerning another lawyer or judge 
and is discussed in section 8.1:400. Other provisions in the Rules contain reporting requirements not 
directly addressing lawyer misconduct, but possibly including it, such as Rule 3.3(b) (requiring 
disclosure of fraud or criminal conduct by a client or other person, relating to a proceeding before a 
tribunal) and Rule 3.5(b) (requiring disclosure, inter alia, of improper conduct directed toward jurors, 
prospective jurors, or their families). For a discussion of these provisions, see sections 3.3:610 and 
3.5:500, respectively. 
The idea underlying Ohio Rule 8.3 is that as part of a self-regulating profession lawyers should police 
the conduct of their peers, both because of a professional duty to promote the integrity of the 
profession and because, as a practical matter, they are in the best position to identify violations that 
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occur. See, under the former OHCPR, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-09, 
1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 16 (Apr. 14, 1989). 
The very first ethics advisory opinion considering and interpreting the Ohio Rules of Professional 
Conduct deals with Rule 8.3.  This Opinion, Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
2007-1, 2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 9, 2007), will be referred to as appropriate 
throughout this discussion. 
For a thorough examination of reporting of lawyer misconduct generally, and suggested 
improvements to the existing system, see Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney's Duty to Report 
Professional Misconduct:  A Roadmap for Reform, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 259 (2003). 
Comparison of Ohio Rule 8.3(a), MR 8.3(a), and former OH DR 1-103(A): The major differences 
from the Model Rule are (1) the Ohio Rule requires self reporting; MR 8.3(a) does not. (2) In Ohio 
the modifier “substantial” before “question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects” has been deleted. (This change is noted, but not explained, in the Task 
Force’s Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 8.3.) (3) The Ohio Rule excepts “privileged knowledge” 
from the disclosure requirement; in the Model Rule, the exception is phrased in terms of “information 
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.” MR 8.3(c). See discussion at section 8.3:400. Read literally, the 
former Code provision, OH DR 1-103A, required self-reporting (but see Ohio Code Comparison to 
Rule 8.3, discussed below). DR 1-103(A) also called for reporting of any violation, not just those 
raising a question as to honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness in other respects. 
The misconduct that must be reported: Ohio Rule 8.3(a) requires a lawyer to report any violation of 
the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct where the lawyer has “unprivileged knowledge” of the 
violation and the violation is one that “raises a question as to any lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” As to the former, see this section infra at “The certainty required 
that a violation occurred”; as to the latter see Bd. of Comm’rs Op. 2007-1, 2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 1, at *11-12 (noting that review of disciplinary cases will provide “ample guidance” and that 
if lawyer has doubts whether the misconduct raises questions as to honesty, etc., he or she should err 
on side of reporting). 
Self-reporting: Since the Rule requires a lawyer to report the specified misconduct of “any” lawyer, 
this includes the lawyer’s own misconduct; failure to do so would constitute a separate offense. 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Newman, 127 Ohio St.3d 123, 2010 Ohio 5034, 937 N.E.2d 81 (violation 
of Rule 8.3(a) charged and found, for respondent’s failure to report his felony conviction to any 
disciplinary authority); Bd. of Comm’rs Op. 2007-1, 2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1, at *18-19. 
See Disciplinary Counsel v. Rohrer, 124 Ohio St.3d 65, 2009 Ohio 5930, 919 N.E.2d 191 
(although no 8.3(a) violation charged, Court notes that under the rule “respondent himself had a duty 
to report his own professional misconduct to a disciplinary authority.” Id. at n. 3.). And in Cincinnati 
Bar Ass’n v. Harwood, 125 Ohio St.3d 31, 2010 Ohio 1466, 925 N.E.2d 965, the Court, in its 
discussion of mitigating factors, took note of the fact that “[i]n addition, the parties stipulated that 
respondent reported his misconduct himself . . . .” Id. at para. 12. Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Peterson, 135 Ohio St.3d 110, 2012 Ohio 5719, 984 N.E.2d 1035 (expressly listing respondent’s 
self-reporting as a mitigating factor); Disciplinary Counsel v. Potter, 126 Ohio St.3d 50, 2010 Ohio 
2521, 930 N.E.2d 307 (characterizing the 10(B)(2)(d) mitigating factor as “his full cooperation in the 
investigation and his self-reporting to Disciplinary Counsel,” id. at para. 9). Compare Disciplinary 
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Counsel v. Schmidt, 134 Ohio St.3d 557, 2012 Ohio 5712, 983 N.E.2d 1310 (noting that 
respondent self-reported but not listing it as a mitigating factor). 
While self-reporting was rare under the Code, it was not unheard of. See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Farrell, 119 Ohio St.3d 529, 2008 Ohio 4540, 895 N.E.2d 800 (at urging of wife’s attorney, 
“respondent reported his fabrications and forgery to relator,” id. at para. 13); Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Markijohn, 99 Ohio St.3d 489, 2003 Ohio 4129, 794 N.E.2d 24, at para. 2 
(“[r]espondent initiated the investigation that led to this complaint by advising relator of his illicit 
reporting practices relative to his former law firm’s retirement plan”); Stark County Bar Ass’n v. 
Miller, 44 Ohio St.3d 134, 134, 541 N.E.2d 607, 608 (1989) (respondent “filed a grievance against 
himself.”). When the lawyer does self-report, it is often noted as a mitigating factor. E.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Grigsby, 128 Ohio St.3d 413, 2011 Ohio 1446, 945 N.E.2d 512; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Niermeyer, 119 Ohio St.3d 99, 2008 Ohio 3824, 892 N.E.2d 434 (full 
disclosure to relator by respondent of his fabrication of supposedly timely-filed workers’ 
compensation refiling on behalf of client; Court emphasizes self-reporting aspect in staying 
suspension for 1-102(A)(4) violation, which ordinarily calls for actual suspension); Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. DeLong, 98 Ohio St.3d 470, 2003 Ohio 1743, 786 N.E.2d 1280 (fact that 
respondent belatedly “reported his own misconduct” after practicing for over nine years while license 
to practice suspended noted as mitigating factor). Cf. Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly, 121 Ohio St.3d 
39, 2009 Ohio 317, 901 N.E.2d 798 (respondent self-reported her misconduct, but “intentionally 
minimized the extent of her wrongdoing. Respondent revealed that she had ‘spent unauthorized 
expenditures’ but without mentioning the $42,000 figure that by that time had been determined 
through investigation and audit.” Id. at para. 16.); See also Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Fidler, 83 Ohio 
St.3d 396, 700 N.E.2d 323 (1998) (OH DR 1-103(A) violation found for lawyer’s failure to report 
his past criminal conviction when specifically questioned by disciplinary authorities about past 
crimes). Compare Disciplinary Counsel v. Bein, 105 Ohio St.3d 62, 2004 Ohio 7012, 822 N.E.2d 
358, where the Court stated without further comment that 
the panel . . . found that the alleged violation of DR 1-103(A) 
[respondent’s failure to report that he had pled guilty to and been 
convicted of two federal felonies] had not been proven by clear and 
convincing evidence. That charge was therefore dismissed. 
Id. at para. 7 (bracketed material added). (Perhaps this improbable result can be explained by the fact 
that respondent was disbarred anyway, based on numerous other violations, including OH DR 
1-102(A)(3) (illegal conduct involving moral turpitude).) 
In its Ohio Code Comparison to Rule 8.3, the Task Force states that one of the differences between 
Rule 8.3 and DR 1-103 is that “Rule 8.3 requires a lawyer to self-report.” But so did DR 1-103(A), as 
both the disciplinary rule itself and the case law discussed above attest. Compare the language of DR 
1-103(A) (“A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall report”), 
with that of DR 1-103(B) (“A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge or evidence concerning 
another lawyer . . . shall fully reveal such knowledge . . . upon proper request”) (emphasis added). See 
Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap 
for Reform, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 259, 294 (2003) (citing ABA Informal Op. 1279 (1973), 
which interpreted the 1-103(A) language as requiring self-reporting).  The 3/11/05 minutes of the 
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Task Force correctly noted that self-reporting “is required by existing DR 1-103(A).” (While 
self-reporting under 1-103(A) was facially limited to violations of DR 1-102, remember that 1-102 
itself was all-encompassing, since one of its provisions stated that a lawyer shall not violate “a 
Disciplinary Rule . . . .” DR 1-102(A)(1).) 
The certainty required that a violation occurred: The major limitation on this otherwise broad duty to 
report is that the duty arises only where the lawyer has “unprivileged knowledge” of a violation. Ohio 
Rule 8.3(a). The “unprivileged” portion of the test is discussed in section 8.3:400. “Knowledge” is 
addressed here. 
Under this standard, which is identical to that in former DR 1-103(A), the lawyer need not speak 
unless he has “knowledge” that a violation has taken place; a mere suspicion, however strong, is not 
enough. As is stated in Ohio Rule 1.0(g), “actual knowledge of the fact in question” is required, but 
“[a] person’s knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.” Bd. of Comm’rs Op. 2007-1, 
2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1, at *18. See generally, under the Code, Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-1, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8, at *4 (Feb. 23, 1990) 
(“The knowledge requirement seems to exclude the lawyer ‘who has good faith questions about 
whether a violation has actually occurred.’“). See also Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 90-11, at 2 (n.d.) 
(“‘Knowledge’ does not mean information that results in an absolute certainty of the truth. It should, 
however, rise above a mere suspicion.”). For example, where the only information an attorney has of 
another lawyer’s misconduct is derived from a written memorandum of a third person now deceased, 
that “at best constitutes a suspicion, but, does not constitute knowledge of a violation.” Cleveland 
Bar Ass’n Op. 85-1, at 4 (Mar. 29, 1985). Note, however, that the Supreme Court did not pause over 
the knowledge element in finding that a lawyer’s “concern” that a lawyer with whom he shared office 
space had abandoned his practice triggered the duty to report, “as required by DR 1-103(A).” 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. McCorkle, 105 Ohio St.3d 430, 2005 Ohio 2588, 828 N.E.2d 99, at para. 
4. 
The Ohio Supreme Court further addressed the “knowledge” issue in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003 Ohio 6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117. In Statzer, one of the counts against 
respondent was that she violated DR 1-103(A) by failing to report the misconduct (allegedly directing 
a legal assistant to testify falsely) of respondent’s former associate. The panel found no clear and 
convincing evidence of a violation, and the Board adopted the panel’s finding. In the Supreme Court, 
relator argued that this count should not have been dismissed. The Court’s response was as follows: 
We disagree, . . . out of deference to the panel. The panel found that the 
allegations in Count II depended “in large part” on the legal assistant’s 
“frail credibility.” We take it from this that the panel considered the 
legal assistant’s claim so inherently unreliable that, in retrospect, it did 
not invoke the reporting requirement in DR 1-103(A), regardless of 
whether the claim ultimately turned out to be true. Moreover, the panel 
found that respondent’s counsel did report to relator other allegations 
of misconduct against the associate that were based on respondent’s 
personal experience. Accordingly, relator’s . . . objection is . . . 
overruled, and Count II is dismissed. 
Id. at para. 10 (ellipses added). 
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Even if the lawyer knows that another attorney has engaged in certain conduct, a secondary question 
that must be addressed is whether such conduct in fact violates the Rules. The degree of certainty 
required was described in former OH EC 1-4 as one in which the lawyer knew of conduct that the 
lawyer “believes clearly to be in violation of the disciplinary rules.” See generally Toledo Bar Ass’n 
Op. 96-1(n.d.) (noting this standard). 
The time frame in which the duty to report must be exercised: While neither Rule 8.3(a) nor DR 
1-103(A) set any time period in which reporting must take place, the Board of Commissioners 
interpreted the former disciplinary rule as requiring reporting “within a reasonable time” after the 
lawyer acquires unprivileged knowledge of a violation. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 90-1, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8, at *3 (Feb. 23, 1990). As is demonstrated 
by Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Bozanich, 95 Ohio St.3d 109, 766 N.E.2d 145 (2002) 
(knowledge that judge committed extortion in 1992 but respondent did not report it to disciplinary 
authorities until 1999), a seven-year delay did not constitute reporting within a “reasonable time.” 
Instead, a reasonable time is probably measured in weeks or months, not years. See  In re Anderson, 
769 A.2d 1282 (Vt. 2000) (nine months too long). See generally ABA, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 600 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). Nationwide, there is some debate over 
whether waiting until the end of the proceeding to report misconduct observed in litigation constitutes 
reporting “within a reasonable time.” See Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report 
Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 259, 298-300 (2003). 
The entity to which the report should be made: Where a duty arises, Rule 8.3(a) provides that the 
lawyer is to report the misconduct to “a disciplinary authority empowered to investigate or act upon 
such violation.” This would include the Office of Disciplinary Counsel or a bar association’s certified 
grievance committee. Bd. of Comm’rs Op. 2007-1, 2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1, at *6-9 
(Feb. 9, 2007) (also noting that, while 8.3 duty to report is not satisfied by reporting to tribunal, there 
may be instances when such disclosure to tribunal also is required, pursuant to Rule 3.3 (candor 
toward tribunal)). If the conduct calling for reporting to disciplinary authorities involves commission 
of a felony, there is an independent statutory duty imposed on all persons, including lawyers, to report 
that knowledge, unless the information is privileged, to appropriate law enforcement officials. ORC 
2921.22(A), (G)(1). See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 86-001, 1987 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 29 (May 5, 1987) (applying this concept to felonies discovered by Certified 
Grievance Committee during the course of a disciplinary investigation).  
The individual nature of the duty to report: The duty to report attorney misconduct is an individual 
obligation of each lawyer. The fact that another lawyer also may have the duty does not absolve an 
attorney of the duty to report. See Columbus Bar Ass’n v. McCorkle, 105 Ohio St.3d 430, 2005 
Ohio 2588, 828 N.E.2d 99, at para. 4 (“Topper, an attorney with whom respondent shared office 
space, became concerned that respondent had abandoned his practice, and as required by DR 
1-103(A), he reported the problem to relator.”). Cf. Howard v. Spore, 91 Ohio St.3d 131, 742 
N.E.2d 649 (2001) (writ of mandamus to compel judge to report misconduct denied because 
complaining lawyer had adequate remedy at law by filing grievance himself). Whether one should be 
allowed to report on behalf of another is discussed in Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty 
to Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 259, 
320-22 (2003). 
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Attorney status and role and the duty to report: It has been opined that the duty to report attaches to 
lawyers licensed to practice in the state regardless of whether they are on active status. As the Toledo 
Bar Association commented, the duty to report attaches, regardless of registration status, “until a 
lawyer ceases to be admitted to the practice of law in Ohio by virtue of death, resignation, or 
disbarment.” Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 96-1 (n.d.). On the one hand, given the problematical aspect of 
enforcement of this Rule as a general matter, such a reading seems a bit unrealistic. If the reporting 
rule is for the most part not acted on or enforced by the profession as a whole, see Charles W. 
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 12.10.1, at 683 (1986) (“[p]robably no other professional 
requirement is as widely ignored by lawyers subject to it”), does it make sense to impose such a duty 
on a lawyer who is on inactive or retired status? And what is the sanction to be for such a violation? 
Even a public reprimand seems like overkill in the circumstances; suspensions of whatever length 
appear to be meaningless, inasmuch as inactive or retired status lawyers are not authorized to practice 
law in any event. But cf. Disciplinary Counsel v. Taft, 112 Ohio St.3d 155, 2006 Ohio 6525, 858 
N.E.2d 414 (public reprimand imposed on inactive lawyer for violation of former DR 1-102(A)(6)), 
and Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Greenberg, 112 Ohio St.3d 138, 2006 Ohio 6519, 858 N.E.2d 400, 
where the Court attempted to avoid or reduce the “meaninglessness” of suspending a retired lawyer 
by ordering that the imposed 18-month suspension commence on the date respondent resumes active 
status, if he ever chooses to do so. Accord, as to the effective date of a six-month sanction imposed on 
an inactive attorney, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Rose, 114 Ohio St.3d 177, 2007 Ohio 3606, 870 
N.E.2d 1168. On the other hand, the duty to report is arguably at the core of the profession’s right of 
self-regulation. While practicing lawyers are not obligated to report privileged knowledge of such 
conduct, inactive or retired lawyers, having no clients, might be expected to report more freely. At 
bottom, it may come down to whether it is fair or unfair to ask lawyers on inactive or retired status to 
choose between severing their connection with the profession or following the duty to report. Taft, 
Greenberg and Rose, while not cases involving violation of the reporting rule, would certainly seem 
to provide support for the view that retired or inactive lawyers carry with them the ethical duties 
imposed by the Code (and now the Rules), including, presumably, the duty to report.  The plot 
concerning sanctions thickens, however, with the amendments to the Rules for the Government of the 
Bar, effective September 1, 2007.  While a lawyer on inactive status (such as Rose) can still be 
granted reinstatement, Gov Bar R VI 2(A), this is no longer the case for an attorney (such as 
Greenberg) who chooses to retire.  Gov Bar R VI 6(A)(1)(c) now provides that retirement is 
“irrevocable”; thus the sanction imposed in Greenberg would indeed be “meaningless” under current 
Gov Bar R VI 6(A). 
The duty to report applies not only to lawyers but to judges as well. See, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Gueli, 119 Ohio St.3d 434, 2008 Ohio 4786, 894 N.E.2d 1231 (grievance filed by judge); Jones v. 
Am. Employers Ins. Co., 106 Ohio App.3d 636, 641 n.3, 666 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 n.3 (Hamilton 
1995) (applying duty). The reporting duty of judges is addressed further in OH CJC Rule 2.15(B). 
See generally Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-6, 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 7 (Dec. 7, 2001) (discussing judicial reporting of prosecutorial misconduct under both the 
Code and the CJC). In its most detailed opinion on the subject of judicial reporting of lawyer 
misconduct, the Board of Commissioners advised that a judge need not be disqualified for reporting 
misconduct of those appearing before the court; the duty is absolute and is not evidence of partiality. 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 89-32, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 2, at *2 
(Oct. 13, 1989). The Board also commented that the judge was under no duty to inform the parties 
when the judge reported misconduct to disciplinary authorities. Id. 
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The duty to report applied: Sometimes the duty arises with respect to opposing counsel. For example, 
where opposing counsel lies in discovery, denying the existence of an insurance policy applicable in 
the litigation, that conduct violated DR 1-102, and if the lawyer knew that her opponent was guilty of 
misconduct, it had to be reported because it was based on unprivileged information. Toledo Bar 
Ass’n Op. 90-11 (n.d.). See also Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 02-01 (Mar. 15, 2002) (duty 
to report attached where attorney had unprivileged knowledge that opponent forged his clients’ 
signatures on settlement releases). 
At other times the duty arises from knowledge of the activities of others in the legal community. For 
example, under the former OHCPR, where a lawyer knew that a criminal defense attorney was 
employed in the same law firm as the county prosecutor and was therefore precluded from handling 
criminal defense work because of that association, the lawyer had a duty to report such knowledge to 
a tribunal or other body authorized to act upon the matter. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 89-09, 1989 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 16 (Apr. 14, 1989). 
Occasionally the duty to report arises from knowledge about co-workers. Where partners reviewing 
the partnership records found that one of the partners padded his expense account with the partnership 
and claimed false reimbursements, that misconduct should be reported because the underlying 
conduct involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation under former DR 1-102(A)(4), and 
the information was unprivileged because it was not obtained in a lawyer-client relationship. Toledo 
Bar Ass’n Op. 90-12 (May 23, 1990). From a practical perspective, of course, reporting co-workers 
can be particularly difficult. Not only are friendships and a sense of loyalty compromised, but 
associates may fear they will be fired, particularly if the reporting involves a partner, and partners 
may fear expulsion from the partnership. See generally Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s 
Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 259, 
320 (2003) (discussing these issues). While there is substantial variation nationwide on whether a 
lawyer may be able to sue if fired for carrying out the duty to report, at least some Ohio case law 
suggests an action will lie in this state. Cf. Chapman v. Adia Servs., Inc., 116 Ohio App.3d 534, 
688 N.E.2d 604 (Hamilton 1997) (recognizing public-policy exception to employee-at-will doctrine 
in wrongful discharge case brought by nonlawyer fired for consulting attorney; OHCPR (right of 
access to attorney) cited as source from which to derive public policy). See generally Kulch v. 
Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 677 N.E.2d 308 (1997) (recognizing common-law 
public-policy exception to employment-at-will doctrine). 
Reporting duties of disciplinary authorities: In the context of investigating alleged lawyer misconduct, 
those involved may uncover possible criminal violations by lawyers. In Opinion 86-001, the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline sought to rationalize this provision with the privacy 
provision governing the conduct of disciplinary investigations, which, in its current form, provides: 
“All proceedings and documents relating to review and investigation of grievances made under these 
rules shall be private [with exceptions not relevant here].” Gov Bar R V 11(E)(1). Once a complaint 
has been certified to the Secretary of the Board by a probable cause panel, however, the complaint and 
all subsequent proceedings are for the most part public. Gov Bar R V 11(E)(2). Thus, at that point the 
conflict is no longer present. Stressing the fact that under ORC 2921.22 all persons knowing a felony 
has been committed are required to report that fact to law enforcement authorities and that the Rules 
for the Government of the Bar are to be construed for the protection of the public, the Board 
determined that disclosure considerations outweighed the privacy interests involved. Bd. of 
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Comm’rs Op. 86-001, 1987 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 29 (May 5, 1987). 
Protections for reporting: Ohio law recognizes an absolute privilege from civil liability for any 
statement made in connection with a disciplinary proceeding, as long as the statement bears some 
reasonable relation to the proceeding.  Hecht v. Levin, 66 Ohio St.3d 458, 613 N.E.2d 585 (1993); 
Pursuing such a civil liability claim in the face of the privilege may itself warrant discipline.  
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Elsass, 86 Ohio St.3d 195, 713 N.E.2d 421 (1999) (conduct may violate 
DR 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 7-102(A)(1) (filing 
a suit, asserting a position, or taking action knowing that such action would serve merely to harass or 
maliciously injure another), and 7-102(A)(2) (knowingly advancing an unwarranted claim)). See 
sections 3.1:200 and 8.4:500. 
Abuses of the reporting duty: Filing a grievance simply to gain an advantage over opposing counsel in 
civil litigation was a disciplinary offense under the Code, Hecht v. Levin, 66 Ohio St.3d 458, 613 
N.E.2d 585 (1993), and remains so under the Rules. See Ohio Rule 1.2(e) and section 1.2:900. 
Compromising one’s duties to one’s client to avoid an opponent’s threat to file disciplinary charges 
also would violate the Rules. See Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Buckley, 94 Ohio St.3d 333, 763 N.E.2d 
116 (2002) (finding that such conduct violated numerous provisions of former OHCPR). 
  
8.3:300  Reporting the Misconduct of a Judge 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.3(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.3(b) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 101:206 
ALI-LGL § 5 
Wolfram § 12.10 
The former OH DR 1-103(A) duty to report lawyer misconduct was read as applying to misconduct 
by a judge. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Bozanich, 95 Ohio St.3d 109, 766 N.E.2d 
145 (2002) (lawyer disciplined, inter alia, for failure to report in timely fashion that judge had 
extorted money from the lawyer). 
Ohio Rule 8.3(b) now expressly deals with the matter and obligates a lawyer possessing unprivileged 
knowledge that a judge has violated any Rule of Professional Conduct or applicable rule of judicial 
conduct to “inform the appropriate authority.” This duty runs to “any ethical violation by a judge,” see 
the Task Force ABA Model Rules Comparison to Rule 8.3, not just those that raise “a substantial 
question as to the judge’s fitness for office,” as in MR 8.3(b). 
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8.3:400  Exception Protecting Confidential Information 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.3(a)-(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.3(c) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.42, 1.46 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 101:204 
ALI-LGL § 5 
Wolfram § 12.10 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.42, 1.46 (1996). 
Duty limited to instances where lawyer has unprivileged knowledge: The duty to report attaches only 
when an attorney’s knowledge of a disciplinary violation by an attorney is “unprivileged.” The 
knowledge aspect of the test is addressed in section 8.3:200. The “unprivileged” aspect is addressed 
here.  
Disagreement exists nationally over how broad the “privilege” exception to the reporting requirement 
should be.  Under MR 8.3(c), reporting is not required if it would require the disclosure of 
“information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6 . . . .” MR 1.6, subject to certain exceptions, sets forth a 
broad standard that protects from disclosure “any information relating to the representation.” 
In adopting its version of the reporting rule, Ohio did not use the Model Rule formulation but instead 
retained language from OH DR 1-103 that limited the lawyer’s reporting duty to one who possesses 
“unprivileged knowledge” of the reportable misconduct.  That phrase, in turn, had been interpreted 
under the Code to exclude both confidences (defined in the OHCPR as information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege) and secrets (defined in the OHCPR as other information gained in the 
professional relationship that the client has asked to be kept confidential or the release of which would 
likely embarrass or otherwise harm the client), OH DR 4-101(A), because confidences and secrets 
were “privileged information” and thus were excepted from the duty to report “unprivileged 
knowledge.”  E.g., Bd. of Comm’rs Op. 90-1, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8, at *1 (Feb. 23, 
1990) (“A lawyer is not required to report privileged information obtained in a confidential 
relationship.  Privileged information would include both confidences and secrets as defined in DR 
4-101(A).”  That interpretation was the common one for all states employing the “unprivileged 
knowledge” language except Illinois, which, in a highly controversial decision, In re Himmel, 533 
N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988), limited the exception to confidences alone.  That is, disclosure was required 
under Himmel unless knowledge of the violation to be reported flowed from information protected 
by the attorney-client privilege. 
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The Ohio Supreme Court’s intent in retaining the DR 1-103 language is murky at best.  One could 
argue that “unprivileged knowledge” was meant to encompass all the information not protected by 
Ohio Rule 1.6.  After all, “unprivileged knowledge” under the OHCPR was interpreted to exclude 
all information then treated as confidential under the ethics rules.  Ohio Rule 1.6 certainly expands 
the information now to be treated as confidential, but the policy of weighing client rights to 
confidentiality over the system’s need for reporting remains the same.  Some support for this comes 
from Comment [15] to Ohio Rule 1.6 which cites the reporting rule [Ohio Rule 8.3] as a rule that 
requires disclosure of information relating to the representation only if such disclosure is otherwise 
allowed by Ohio Rule 1.6(b).  Nevertheless, since the drafters consciously chose to diverge from the 
Model Rule language that clearly ties the reporting disclosure limit to Rule 1.6, this interpretation 
seems unlikely. 
The better interpretation is that since the “unprivileged knowledge” language was taken from the 
former OHCPR, the phrase was intended to retain the same meaning as it had been previously given.  
This is supported by the Ohio Code Comparison section accompanying Ohio Rule 8.3.  It points out 
alleged differences between the former provision and the current one but makes no mention that the 
scope of “unprivileged knowledge” was meant to change.  As noted, under the OHCPR the language 
had been interpreted to exclude from the reporting duty both confidences and secrets. Accord Susan J. 
Becker, Jack A. Guttenberg, Lloyd Snyder, The Law of Professional Conduct in Ohio 
§ 4.04[2][c], at 4-12 (2009-10 ed.) (“common understanding” under Code was “that it barred 
disclosure of all confidential information granted by a lawyer in the course of representing a client”). 
Surprisingly, in Bd. of Comm’rs Op. 2007-1, 2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1, at *15-16, the 
Board, choosing yet a different interpretation of Ohio Rule 8.3(c), expanded the meaning of 
“unprivileged knowledge” to all information other than that which falls within the evidentiary 
attorney-client privilege or is learned in a lawyer’s assistance program under 8.3(c).  In reaching this 
conclusion the Board rejected the first interpretation above, but did not even address the second (even 
though its prior Opinion 90-1, construing the identical language in DR 1-103, was directly on point).  
Nor did it acknowledge that its interpretation (yet again) made Ohio an outlier, with Illinois, in 
severely limiting the scope of information to be protected from disclosure in the reporting context.  
Instead, it found that the comparison between Ohio Rule 8.3 cmt. [2] (reporting not required “where 
it would involve the disclosure of privileged information”) and MR 8.3 cmt. [2] (reporting not 
required “where it would involve violation of Rule 1.6”) called for the narrower reading.  This 
explanation, however, seems to us to read too much into the use of “privilege” in the Ohio comment, 
particularly given its meaning in this context under the OHCPR.  Since the language of the Ohio Rule 
requires reporting of “unprivileged” information, it is neither surprising nor substantively significant 
that, as the comment reminds, disclosure is not required of information that is not “unprivileged,” i.e., 
“privileged.”  
If the view of the Board on this issue is ultimately sustained by the Supreme Court, the result will be 
that the exception to the reporting duty in Ohio Rule 8.3 will be not only narrower than that in MR 
8.3, but also narrower than the interpretation given the identical “unprivileged knowledge” language 
in the former Code analog, DR 1-103, which was construed as excluding both confidences and secrets 
from the reporting duty.  See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 90-1, 1990 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (Feb. 23, 1990) (expressly rejecting the more restrictive interpretation of the 
privilege exception reached in Himmel). See generally Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 96-3 (n.d.) (lawyer 
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who discovered misconduct of another attorney while representing client had no duty to report where 
client requested that information gained in the professional relationship not be disclosed); Cleveland 
Bar Ass’n Op. 96-01 (n.d.) (attorney for bank who uncovered another lawyer’s misuse of IOLTA 
account with bank had no duty to report because bank’s confidentiality policy concerning customer 
accounts made this information a “secret”). 
For contrasting commentary on Board Opinion 2007-1, compare Thomas M. Horwitz, File That 
Grievance or Else . . ., Clev. B.J., Nov. 2007, at 8 (criticizing), with Harry D. Cornett & Lloyd B. 
Snyder, The Duty to Report Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Alternative Views, 
Clev. B.J., Feb. 2008, at 12 (defending). 
Even if the lawyer’s knowledge is based on privileged information, the client has the right to waive 
the privilege. If the client does so, a duty to report then will arise. See, under the Code, Bd. of 
Comm’rs Op. 90-1, 1990 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 8 (Feb. 23 1990); Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 
90-13 (May 25, 1990). Lawyers certainly have the authority to consult their clients concerning the 
possibility of waiver and to suggest it where waiver will do no harm to the client. Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n Op. 96-01 (n.d.). Even if harm might arise, the lawyer may still raise the issue and point out the 
competing concerns so that the client is fully informed. Id. The Rules expressly state that “a lawyer 
should encourage a client to consent to disclosure where it would not substantially prejudice the 
client’s interests.” Rule 8.3 cmt. [2]. 
Confidentiality and bar-approved substance-abuse committees: As an aid to lawyers with 
substance-abuse and mental-health problems, the Ohio State Bar Association has established a 
statewide lawyers’ assistance committee to provide counseling in these matters. In the course of their 
work, lawyers who serve on this committee frequently obtain information about individual attorneys 
that, if obtained in other circumstances, would have to be reported to disciplinary authorities under 
Rule 8.3(a). To encourage lawyers with substance-abuse and mental-health problems to seek the aid 
of lawyers’ assistance committees, Ohio Rule 8.3(c) provides that information obtained by a lawyer 
while serving on such a committee is privileged “for all purposes under this rule” and thus need not be 
disclosed. The privilege protection also extends to members of a bar committee or subcommittee 
designed to assist lawyers with substance-abuse problems as well as to any member, employee, or 
agent of a nonprofit corporation established by the bar association for such purposes. See Bd. of 
Comm’rs Op. 2007-1, 2007 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1, at *17-18. 
The Ohio provision appears less protective than its Model Rule counterpart, which exempts from 
disclosure information gained by a lawyer or judge “participating” in an approved lawyers assistance 
program. MR 8.3(c). Communications between lawyers being treated under such programs as might 
arise in the context of group therapy, for example, are clearly covered by the Model Rule but appear 
to fall outside the coverage of the Ohio Rule, unless those participants can be treated as “agents” of 
the treating organizations. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report 
Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 259, 313-314 (2003). 
Confidentiality and lawyers acting as mediators: To the extent one serves as a mediator or facilitator 
as an approved adjunct to the lawyer-discipline process, all knowledge acquired in that role “shall be 
privileged for all purposes under Rule 8.3.” Gov Bar R V 11(E)(2)(a). 
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But suppose a lawyer acts as a mediator in other settings or participates in any other role in any 
mediation. How does the duty to report lawyer misconduct apply where knowledge of reportable 
events arises from conduct in mediation? 
Under Ohio law, mediation communications in most settings (see ORC 2710.02) are privileged in 
subsequent proceedings. ORC 2710.03. Proceedings include “judicial, administrative, arbitral, or 
other adjudicative process, including related pre-hearing and post-hearing motions, conferences, and 
discovery.” ORC 2710.01(G)(1). 
Several issues arise in trying to determine the intersection between this privilege and the duty to 
report lawyer misconduct. Presumably lawyer disciplinary actions fall within the “other adjudicative 
process” definition of a “proceeding” in which the mediation privilege applies. Less clear is whether 
the act of reporting itself falls within that protection. The statute identifies acts outside the proceeding, 
but related to it, that are covered, and lists “pre-hearing and post-hearing motions, conferences, and 
discovery.” Reporting is none of these. Nevertheless, the statutory language can be read as providing 
leeway for other actions related to a proceeding to fall within the privilege as well. 
Even if the privilege attaches, does it trump the duty to report? Perhaps information gleaned from 
mediation communications is “privileged knowledge” under Ohio Rule 8.3 and thus does not trigger 
a duty to report. It is not at all clear, however, that the drafters had this privilege in mind when using 
the phrase in Rule 8.3. 
Even if the mediation communications are privileged, exceptions are provided to the mediation 
privilege which, if applicable, would make the knowledge “unprivileged.” Exceptions to mediation 
communication confidentiality arise when the information is sought or offered “to prove or disprove a 
claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice” filed against a mediator or a mediation 
party, nonparty participant, or representative of a party based on conduct occurring during a 
mediation. ORC 2710.05(A)(5)&(6). Query whether information needed to report misconduct 
qualifies as information necessary to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional 
misconduct. Further, the last exception applies only to misconduct charges “based on conduct during 
a mediation,” not on past conduct revealed in a mediation to which the privilege continues to attach. 
For a discussion of the national debate on this issue, see Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s 
Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 259, 
316-19 (2003). The issue is examined from the Ohio perspective in Daniel G. Zeiser, Reporting 
Professional Misconduct Learned in ADR, Clev. B.J., May 2007, at 8 (concluding, inter alia, that 
no privilege attaches to any form of ADR other than mediation). 
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The material in the following introductory paragraphs is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur 
F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 1.15 (1996). 
Misconduct in general: Because of their position in the legal system, lawyers have a special 
responsibility to comport themselves in ways that reflect well on themselves and on the legal 
profession as a whole; even minor violations may undercut public trust in lawyers and the legal 
system. This general philosophy was endorsed by the Ohio Supreme Court in the oft-cited case of 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Stein, 29 Ohio St.2d 77, 81, 278 N.E.2d 670, 673 (1972), where the Court 
stated: 
One of the fundamental tenets of the professional responsibility of a 
lawyer is that he should maintain a degree of personal and professional 
integrity that meets the highest standard. The integrity of the profession 
can be maintained only if the conduct of the individual attorney is 
above reproach. He should refrain from any illegal conduct. Anything 
short of this lessens public confidence in the legal profession -- because 
obedience to the law exemplifies respect for the law. 
Accord, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Hennekes, 110 Ohio St.3d 108, 2006 Ohio 3669, 850 N.E.2d 
1201 (quoting Stein with approval). 
On its face, Ohio Rule 8.4 (as was the case with former OH DR 1-102) applies to misconduct by “a 
lawyer.” Typically, misconduct engaged in prior to becoming a lawyer, and its effect on the 
individual’s right to practice law, is resolved by the processing of an individual’s application for 
admission to the bar. In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Clark, 40 Ohio St.3d 81, 531 N.E.2d 671 
(1988), the Ohio Supreme Court was asked to address whether pre-admission conduct could be 
sanctioned under DR 1-102 as well. 
The respondent in Clark was charged with violations of former 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal 
conduct involving moral turpitude) and (A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on one’s 
fitness to practice law), stemming from his significant participation in a major marijuana smuggling 
operation and from tax evasion, both of which resulted in felony convictions. The criminal activity 
took place before the lawyer was admitted to the bar, but he was convicted after admission. 
Respondent argued that the Disciplinary Rules are directed solely to misconduct occurring while a 
member of the bar. The Court expressly determined it was not necessary to resolve that issue, because 
he was a member of the Ohio Bar when convicted: 
Clearly, an attorney’s conviction of felony charges relating to drug 
smuggling and tax evasion reflects adversely of his fitness to practice 
law. Furthermore, we find respondent’s violation of DR 1-102(A)(6) so 
serious that it warrants severe disciplinary measures [indefinite 
suspension], regardless of whether he also violated DR 1-102(A)(3). 
40 Ohio St.3d at 83, 531 N.E.2d at 672. 
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8.4:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.4 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.4 
  
8.4:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 8.4 differs substantively from the Model Rule in the following respects: 
In division (b), “an illegal” has been substituted for “a criminal”; “or” has been added after “honesty”; 
and the phrase “or fitness as a lawyer in other respects” has been deleted after “trustworthiness”. 
In division (f), the words “the Ohio Rule of Professional Conduct, the” have been added after 
“violation of”. 
Divisions (g) (discriminatory conduct in professional capacity) and (h) (conduct adversely reflecting 
on fitness to practice) have been added. 
  
8.4:102  Ohio Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 8.4(a): DR 1-102(A)(1) & (2). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 8.4(b): DR 1-102(A)(3). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 8.4(c): DR 1-102(A)(4). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 8.4(d): DR 1-102(A)(5). 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 8.4(e): DR 1-102(A)(5) & 9-101(C). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 8.4(f): DR 1-102(A)(5). 
The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 8.4(g): DR 1-102(B). 
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The following section of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 8.4(h): DR 1-102(A)(6). 
  
8.4:200  Violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.4(a) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.4(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.16-1.18 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 101:101 
ALI-LGL § 2 
Wolfram § 3.3 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.16-1.18 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 8.4(a) provides that a lawyer shall not “violate or attempt to violate the Ohio Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of 
another.” An example of the third transgression is set forth in Comment [1] -- “as when [a lawyer] 
request[s] or instruct[s] an agent to do so on the lawyer’s behalf.” Rule 8.4 cmt. [1]. 
Direct violation: Technically, a breach of any Rule violates Ohio Rule 8.4(a) as well, but little is 
achieved by citing the latter as a disciplinary infraction, in addition to the more specific Rule 
allegedly violated, other than to make perfectly clear that violations of other Rules constitute 
“misconduct” under Rule 8.4. In a recent case in which this aspect of Rule 8.4(a) (and its predecessor, 
DR 1-102(A)(1)) were invoked, Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Mishler, 127 Ohio St.3d 336, 2010 
Ohio 5987, 939 N.E.2d 852, the Supreme Court accepted the recommendation to dismiss these 
charges “because they are redundant.” Id. at para. 17. And see Findlay/Hancock County Bar Ass’n 
v. Filkins, 90 Ohio St.3d 1, 734 N.E.2d 764 (2000), where, in a footnote, the Court pointed out that 
while the complaint also alleged violation of former 1-102(A)(1), this rule “merely precludes a 
lawyer from violating a Disciplinary Rule.”  Id. at 2, 734 N.E.2d at 766. Nevertheless, the rule is 
sometimes invoked as a ground for discipline. See, e.g., Akron Bar Ass’n v. Gibson, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 347, 2011 Ohio 628, 944 N.E.2d 228 (Rule 8.4(a)); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Slack, 88 Ohio 
St.3d 274, 725 N.E.2d 631 (2000) (violation of numerous disciplinary rules, including DR 
1-102(A)(1)); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Feneli, 86 Ohio St.3d 102, 712 N.E.2d 119 (1999) (DR 
1-102(A)(1) tacked on to 1-102(A)(6) violation). See also, under the Code, Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
McMahon, 114 Ohio St.3d 331, 2007 Ohio 3673, 872 N.E.2d 261, where the respondent was 
charged, inter alia, with violation of DR 7-102(A)(8), which, similar to 1-102(A)(1), prohibits a 
lawyer during representation of a client from knowingly engaging in illegal conduct or conduct 
contrary to a disciplinary rule.  In the words of the Court, the Board of Commissioners “dismiss[ed] 
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the DR 7-102(A)(8) violations as redundant,” id. at para. 3. 
In the 2012 case of Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Rozanc, 132 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012 Ohio 2408, 969 
N.E.2d 1187, a unanimous Court confirmed without comment the 8.4(a) violation recommended by 
the Board. Such a finding does indeed seem redundant, particularly when the respondent, who had 
two previous disciplinary actions on his record, committed fraud on the probate court by falsely 
stating that he had distributed funds to the estate beneficiary and backed this up with an affidavit from 
the beneficiary acknowledging receipt of the funds, to which affidavit respondent forged the 
beneficiary’s signature. For these substantial misdeeds, respondent was properly found to have 
violated 8.4(b), (c), and (d); why the need for the 8.4(a) throw-in? The sanction imposed, despite the 
6-to-1 disparity in aggravating over mitigating factors and the seriousness of the violations, was only 
an indefinite suspension. 
Indirect violation of a Rule: Rule 8.4(a) provides that a lawyer may be guilty of a disciplinary 
violation not only by his direct actions, but also when the lawyer knowingly assists or induces another 
to violate a Rule or when the actions are carried out on the lawyer’s behalf by another. In a 2011 
opinion, the Board of Commissioners opined that Rule 8.4(a) would be violated if a lawyer were to 
propose or require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer agree personally to indemnify 
the opposing party from third-party claims to the settlement funds. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances 
& Discipline Op. 2011-1, 2011 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Feb. 11, 2011).  
The first disciplinary case under the Rules to utilize the violation-through-the-acts-of-another 
language of 8.4(a) is Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Pheils, 129 Ohio St.3d 279, 2011 Ohio 2906, 951 N.E.2d 
758. In Pheils, the respondent had his wife loan money to one of his clients in violation of Rules 1.8(e) 
(providing financial assistance to a client in connection with pending litigation) and 8.4(a). The Court 
spent a good portion of its opinion justifying the finding that the wife’s act was a violation by the 
“lawyer” of Rule 1.8(e); there is little or no discussion of 8.4(a), presumably because the violation 
was self-evident on the facts presented. This aspect of Pheils is further discussed in section 1.8:600 
supra. 
Under the Code, a lawyer violated this aspect of the former disciplinary rule (1-102(A)(2)) when, at 
the direction of respondent, one of his nonlawyer employees sent solicitation letters to persons who 
had been named as defendants in divorce actions, but, contrary to DR 2-101(F)(4), some of the 
recipients received letters prior to verification that service had been made on them.  Akron Bar Ass’n 
v. Amourgis, 113 Ohio St.3d 32, 2007 Ohio 974, 862 N.E.2d 501.  Similarly, the disciplinary rule 
was violated when a nonlawyer engaged in in-person client solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf and 
defrauded a client in a joint scheme with the lawyer.  Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Protus, 53 
Ohio St.2d 43, 372 N.E.2d 344 (1978) (lawyer indefinitely suspended when nonlawyer solicited 
business on lawyer’s behalf and prepared on lawyer’s letterhead itemized proof of loss statements to 
be submitted to insurance companies to collect insurance proceeds, which statements were 
represented to clients as work of lawyer; lawyer also violated, inter alia, former OH DR 2-103(C) 
(restricting solicitation or referral of clients by another)). If a lawyer who is not representing an 
individual allows that person to mail documents pertaining to a legal matter in the lawyer’s business 
envelope, the conduct involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and is prohibited. 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 113 (Dec. 17, 1974) (forbidding this practice in situation where landlord 
used envelopes of attorney who was not representing him to send tenant five-day notice and 
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complaint in forcible entry and detainer action). The lawyer is not excused because the mailing was 
carried out by the individual, rather than the lawyer himself. Id. Securing a promise from a former 
client, as part of the settlement of a fee dispute, to keep the settlement strictly confidential and, if 
asked, to say no more to disciplinary authorities than that “the matters have been resolved,” 
constituted an attempt to circumvent the disciplinary rules through the act of another.  Cuyahoga 
County Bar Ass’n v. Berger, 64 Ohio St.3d 454, 597 N.E.2d 81 (1992) (attempting to suppress the 
bar association’s investigation violated former OH DR 1-102(A)(2), (5) & (6)). 
To the extent a supervisory lawyer ordered or ratified misconduct of a subordinate lawyer, Wolfram 
noted that a violation of former DR 1-102(A)(2) could be found. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern 
Legal Ethics § 16.2.2 (1986). This matter is now addressed directly in Ohio Rule 5.1(c). See section 
5.1:400. 
See also Carol K. Metz, Do You Know What Your PI Is Doing?, Clev. B.J., April 2007, at 14, 
which explores the ethical obligations, including those arising under Rule 8.4(a), that may be 
implicated in hiring a personal investigator to work on a matter. 
  
8.4:300  Commission of an Illegal Act Reflecting Adversely on Honesty or 
Trustworthiness 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.4(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.4(b) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.19-1.21 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 101:301 
ALI-LGL § 2 
Wolfram § 3.3.2 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.19-1.21 (1996). 
Illegal conduct reflecting adversely on honesty or trust: Ohio Rule 8.4(b) prohibits a lawyer from 
“commit[ing] an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness.” 
One hardly knows where to begin. First, Ohio Rule 8.4(b) is once again unique and doubly so here; to 
our knowledge, no other Model Rule jurisdiction has substituted “illegal” for “criminal,” and no other 
jurisdiction has deleted the “or fitness as a lawyer in other respects” language following 
“trustworthiness.” (Vermont uses a different approach -- it eliminates the “reflecting adversely” list 
altogether and confines itself to conduct constituting felonies and other lesser crimes involving 
interference with the administration of justice, perjury, fraud, etc.) Note, however, that in Ohio Rule 
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8.4 cmt. [2], dealing with Rule 8.4(b), the fitness concept, perhaps unintentionally, has been retained; 
the Ohio Comment [2] language tracks MR 8.4 cmt. [2] verbatim. In any event, the variation from the 
Model Rule in Ohio Rule 8.4(b)’s deletion of the fitness language can perhaps be explained 
(although the Task Force does not do so) by the retention of former OH DR 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in 
conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice) as Ohio Rule 8.4(h) (there is no MR 8.4(h)). 
While there will be more on Rule 8.4(h) in section 8.4:1000, it should be pointed out here that, 
insofar as fitness to practice is concerned, the conduct need not be criminal nor even illegal -- “any 
other conduct” reflecting adversely on fitness violates 8.4(h). 
With respect to the substitution of “illegal” for “criminal,” as has been stated previously in section 
1.2:600, the change raises problems that “criminal” does not. The parameters of “criminal” are 
generally well understood, and the term finds widespread acceptance in ethics law as a benchmark. 
“Illegal,” while a defined term, at a minimum greatly expands the universe that lawyers need to be 
concerned about. Even under the Code, the prohibition was directed toward illegal conduct 
“involving moral turpitude,” which, as the annotations to former 1-102(A)(3) reflect, almost 
invariably dealt with criminal conduct. E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 
2008 Ohio 91, 880 N.E.2d 467. Accord Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 3.3.2, at 92 
(1986) (“While the reference to ‘illegal’ [in DR 1-102(A)(3)] seems to encompass conduct that is not 
a crime, the criminal law is the virtually exclusive referent in the decisions.”). (Criminal conduct will 
of course continue to be an 8.4(b) violation under the Rules, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabroff, 
123 Ohio St.3d 182, 2009 Ohio 4205, 915 N.E.2d 307 (felony theft); Erie-Huron Counties Bar 
Ass’n v. Evans, 123 Ohio St.3d 103, 2009 Ohio 4146, 914 N.E.2d 381 (bank fraud).) The language 
of the Supreme Court in Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 106 Ohio St.3d 418, 2005 Ohio 541, 835 
N.E.2d 707, is consistent with the focus under the Code on criminal conduct. Thus, in rejecting 
respondent’s argument that her conduct (embezzlement from estates in her charge as guardian and 
trustee resulting in conviction for felony theft) did not involve “a crime of moral turpitude,” id. at 
para. 20, the Court stated that “an independent review of the circumstances underlying the illegal 
conduct” is required where the moral turpitude element is disputed, 
to determine whether the conduct manifests the requisite lack of social 
conscience and depravity beyond any established criminal intent. 
Id. at para. 24 (emphasis added). The bottom line is that Ohio Rule 8.4(b), which clearly reaches 
beyond criminal conduct, ends up being broader in scope than both the Model Rule and the former 
OHCPR analog, DR 1-102(A)(3). 
Indicative of the uncertainty of the reach of the illegality provision in Ohio Rule 8.4(b) is the case of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. McCord, 121 Ohio St.3d 497, 2009 Ohio 1517, 905 N.E.2d 1182. 
Respondent was found to have violated 8.4(b) in Count Three, in which relator asserted that the 
respondent had “improperly held himself out as a member of entities named . . . ‘McCord, Pryor & 
Associates Co., L.P.A.’ . . . .” Id. at para. 26. Although various other violations were involved 
concerning abuse of firm names (Rules 7.5(a), (d)), as we read the case the most serious charge under 
this count (“Misleading law firm name”) was that  
 [i]n 2005, respondent filed articles of incorporation . . . to form 
a professional corporation named “McCord, Pryor & Associates Co., 
L.P.A.” At the time he formed this organization, respondent’s license 
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was suspended under the interim child-support suspension discussed in 
Count Two, and Pryor had been dead for approximately two and half 
years. Respondent admits that he formed this organization solely to 
thwart his ex-wife’s attempts to garnish his bank accounts to pay for his 
outstanding child-support order. Respondent’s actions in this regard 
were plainly improper. 
Id. at para. 29. (Presumably the Rules of Professional Conduct were invoked because McCord not 
only formed this organization in 2005 but continued to operate under that name on and after February 
1, 2007, although the Court does not expressly so state. Footnote one does state that “Respondent’s 
actions under this count occurred both before and after the effective date of the … Rules … and thus 
both the former … and current set of ethical standards apply.” Curiously, however, although this 
conduct was found to have violated Rule 8.4(b), no mention is made of its former disciplinary rule 
counterpart, 1-102(A)(3).) 
While the court variously characterized McCord’s Count Three conduct as “improper,” 
“inappropriate,” and “deceptive,” was it “illegal”? Perhaps seeking to evade payments in this fashion 
violated one of the many statutory provisions dealing with child support, see, e.g., ORC 3109.05, but 
if so, why was that not made explicit by the Court? (Nor is it clear, if the thrust of the 8.4(b) violation 
was directed at the child-support aspect, why it was not included in Count Two, dealing with 
respondent’s failure to comply with his child-support obligations?) The case might also be made that 
McCord’s conduct was “illegal” because he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in filing the 
incorporation papers while under suspension, thereby violating ORC 4705.07(A)(3). But once again, 
the Court makes no mention of the statute, nor was McCord charged with or found to have violated 
the unauthorized practice provisions of Rule 5.5. The point here is that since the use of “illegal” rather 
than “criminal” makes the trigger for violation of 8.4(b) in Ohio less precise than elsewhere, this is all 
the more reason why the Court should make clear in the cases what conduct is “illegal.” This aspect of 
the McCord decision merely leaves the reader scratching his or her head over what the basis for the 
8.4(b) violation was. 
Another interesting 8.4(b) case is Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Newman, 127 Ohio St.3d 123, 2010 
Ohio 5034, 937 N.E.2d 81. In Newman the respondent was convicted of felony theft, which of 
course constituted an 8.4(b) violation. But the Court’s language in discussing the sanction to be 
imposed (indefinite suspension) seems to employ the 8.4(b) language to reach, not only the theft, but 
also respondent’s violation of Rule 8.1(b) in failing to respond to a disciplinary authority demand for 
information: 
 In this case, respondent has committed illegal acts that 
adversely reflect on his honesty and trustworthiness by stealing 
approximately $22,000 from three banks and by failing to respond to 
the resulting disciplinary investigation. 
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Id. at para. 11 (emphasis added). Such a tie-in seems unnecessary, inasmuch as a specific rule 
(8.1(b)) exists to police such conduct. The tie-in also raises the inference that any conduct violative of 
a rule of professional conduct is “illegal,” a reading that broadens the reach of 8.4(b) even further. 
The illegal/criminal problem is magnified by the corresponding Rule 8.3 duty to report any violation 
of the Rules implicating honesty or trustworthiness, whether by others or by the reporting lawyer. See 
section 8.3:200. This puts the reporting lawyer in a sticky position. Is he or she obligated to report (or 
self-report) a lawyer who ignores parking tickets? Does that bear on “trustworthiness,” if such legal 
obligations are routinely ignored? See Rule 8.4 cmt. [2], which states that a “pattern of repeated 
offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to 
legal obligation.” And cf. In re Application of Phelps, 116 Ohio St.3d 312, 2007 Ohio 6459, 878 
N.E.2d 1037, in which a bar applicant was rejected on character and fitness grounds because of 
“patterns of disregarding the law,” including her failure to pay “several parking tickets.” Id. at paras. 
2, 7. Both the reporting and the reported-on lawyer deserve, to paraphrase the Task Force (Report at 
8) in support of the future-crime exception in what is now Rule 1.6(b)(2)), a “bright[er] line” test than 
that provided by the use of the term “illegal.” 
The illegal/criminal issue was examined from the perspective of the (then-proposed) ABA Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct by Ronald D. Rotunda in his article Judicial Ethics, The Appearance of 
Impropriety, and the Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 1337 (2006). In the 
article Rotunda takes the ABA to task for making a judge subject to discipline for violating proposed 
Model Judicial Code Rule 1.02 [as adopted, Model Rule 1.2; Ohio Rule 1.2 is identical to the 
Model Rule] to the effect that a judge must avoid “impropriety,” and for the related comment [now 
Comment [5]] stating that “[a]ctual improprieties include violations of law, court rules, or provisions 
of this code.” Rotunda notes that under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers are subject 
to discipline for committing “crimes” reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects. MR 8.4(b). 
 In contrast, the proposed Judicial Code would subject a judge to 
discipline or removal or some other remedy if he breaks the law, no 
matter how unrelated it is to the practice of law [judging?]. It is unclear 
why a violation of any law, no matter how minor (not putting enough 
money in the parking meter, . . . driving 56 m.p.h. in an [sic] 55 m.p.h. 
zone) really merits judicial discipline. . . . One would think that the 
violation should have some functional relationship to the business of 
judging; violating a parking ordinance does not fit. 
34 Hofstra L. Rev. at 1358 (emphasis in original; bracketed material added). The same can be said of 
Ohio’s version of Rule 8.4(b) – it is difficult to see how a parking offense bears a functional 
relationship to the business of lawyering. But cf. Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Zimmer, 135 Ohio 
St.3d 462, 2013 Ohio 1962, 989 N.E.2d 51, where, in confirming respondent’s violation of Rule 
8.4(b) as a result of a number of driving mishaps – one of which was driving without a license – the 
Court tied this offense to the business of lawyering by pointing to Zimmer’s “multiple driving 
infractions, each of which shows his disregard for his obligations as both a citizen and a lawyer to 
respect and honor the law.” Id. at para. 5 (emphasis added). This neglect of “his legal obligations to 
respect and honor the law,” id. at para. 16, together with a number of much more serious driving 
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infractions (e.g., DUI, leaving scene of accident) and failure to cooperate in the disciplinary 
investigation, resulted in his indefinite suspension, even though “Zimmer has not been shown to have 
neglected or mishandled client matters entrusted to him . . . .” Id. 
As noted, virtually all of the cases decided under the former DR 1-102(A)(3) illegal conduct/moral 
turpitude standard involved criminal conduct. Moreover, as long as these two prongs were met, a 
violation was found, regardless of whether the lawyer’s conduct took place in the course of acting as 
an attorney or in a purely private capacity. Examples of the latter include Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Howard, 123 Ohio St.3d 97, 2009 Ohio 4173, 914 N.E.2d 377 (bizarre confrontation with police on 
respondent’s property, which escalated into armed stand off due to misunderstanding on both sides 
and resulted in guilty pleas to felony-assault charges; because of “unique circumstances of the 
underlying conduct,” id. at para. 24, and significant mitigating circumstances, the LoDico (see infra) 
sanction (indefinite suspension) was found to be too harsh and two years, with credit for time on 
interim suspension, was imposed); Disciplinary Counsel v. LoDico, 118 Ohio St.3d 316, 2008 
Ohio 2465, 888 N.E.2d 1097 (felony and misdemeanor convictions arising out of strip bar parking lot 
altercation in which respondent sighted .45-caliber pistol at six different people; conduct also violated 
1-102(A)(6)); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Neal, 113 Ohio St.3d 461, 2007 Ohio 2341, 866 N.E.2d 503 
(multiple felony convictions arising out of staging a series of burglaries at former residence; conduct 
also violated 1-102(A)(4) & (6)); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Linnen, 111 Ohio St.3d 507, 2006 Ohio 
5480, 857 N.E.2d 539 (the “Naked Photographer” case; respondent pleaded guilty to 53 
misdemeanor offenses arising from his accosting and photographing solitary women while wearing 
only a hat and gym shoes; see further discussion in section 8.4:1000); Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Zemba, 97 Ohio St.3d 489, 2002 Ohio 6725, 780 N.E.2d 576 (conviction for reckless 
homicide of infant while engaged in unlicensed childcare business); Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Ostheimer, 72 Ohio St.3d 304, 649 N.E.2d 1217 (1995) (conviction of sexual misconduct with 
adopted daughter, together with creating fabricated court documents designed to facilitate his sexual 
designs).  
Two cases invoking Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct for private criminal conduct of 
a sexual nature are Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Greenberg, 135 Ohio St.3d 430, 2013 Ohio 1723, 988 
N.E.2d 559, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Ridenbaugh, 122 Ohio St.3d 583, 2009 Ohio 4091, 913 
N.E.2d 443. In Greenberg, respondent was given a one-year suspension for pleading guilty to 
felonies set forth in an information charging him with possession of child pornography and 
transferring obscene materials to minors. As it turned out, the “minors” with whom respondent was 
interacting were undercover law-enforcement officers. Greenberg also reveals the pitfalls that can be 
found in the marvels of modern computer technology. In the words of the Court, “[a] series of 
sexually explicit [chat-room] conversations ensued between Greenberg and the undercover agents, 
during which Greenberg used his computer’s webcam to stream to the agents video and pictures of his 
exposed penis and of himself masturbating.” 135 Ohio St.3d 430, at para. 3. The Ridenbaugh case 
similarly involved use of child pornography, as well as voyeurism assisted by technology (placement 
of recording devices outside apartment windows to capture sounds of sexual activity within), leading 
to felony convictions and an interim suspension. 
The rationale for extending discipline to purely private conduct was articulated by the Ohio Supreme 
Court in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lowe: “Underlying all of our Disciplinary Rules is an 
attorney’s duty of care, not only to the affairs of specific clients, but also to the requirements of the 
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law.” 75 Ohio St.3d 427, 428, 662 N.E.2d 796, 797 (1996) (rejecting argument of lawyer convicted 
of eleven felonies relating to financial and banking matters that the felonies should not be grounds for 
discipline because they did not relate to practice of law).  
Despite the broad-based rationale of duty to the public and the legal system as set forth in Lowe, the 
Court has given some indication that the locus of the misbehavior also may be a factor. In Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Thomas, 76 Ohio St.3d 578, 669 N.E.2d 833 (1996), the Court adopted the 
finding of the panel and the Board that a conviction for possession of a controlled substance would 
not be treated as conduct involving moral turpitude as charged, because, inter alia, “the charged 
offense occurred [in Texas, on vacation] outside the community where respondent practiced law.”  Id. 
at 578, 669 N.E.2d at 834 (bracketed material added) (although OH DR 1-102(A)(3) charge dropped, 
lawyer sanctioned for violating DR 1-102(A)(6)). Why the “locus” should make a difference for 
purposes of 1-102(A)(3) moral turpitude went unexplained. 
A case in which the private criminal conduct blended into or reflected adversely on respondent’s 
professional activities is Disciplinary Counsel v. Asante, 133 Ohio St.3d 102, 2012 Ohio 3906, 976 
N.E.2d 843, where Asante pled guilty to entering into a fraudulent marriage to evade U.S. 
immigration law. As stressed by the Court, this private conduct was seen as a “stain” on the 
profession as well because 
Asante attempted to defraud the United States Bureau of Citizenship 
and Immigration Services while she herself was running an 
immigration-law practice. If a lawyer assisting people with the 
immigration process becomes enmeshed in immigration fraud herself, 
“ ‘it is a stain upon the profession and a detriment to the public’s view 
of lawyers.’” 
Id. at para. 11 (quoting from Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Hunter, 130 Ohio St.3d 355, 2011 Ohio 
5788, 958 N.E.2d 567, at para. 17). She was indefinitely suspended. 
Another instance of blended private/professional misconduct (resulting in disbarment) is 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Schwartz, 135 Ohio St.2d 127, 2012 Ohio 5850, 984 N.E.2d 1050, where 
the respondent was convicted of mail fraud as part of his scheme to misappropriate more than two 
million dollars from a client’s estate, of which he was trustee, thereby depriving his client’s 
beneficiary of its intended bequest; in conjunction therewith, Schwartz filed false tax returns with the 
IRS by omitting significant amounts of income, including amounts he misappropriated from his 
client’s trust funds. 
The illegal conduct requirement: Only illegal conduct is subject to sanction under Rule 8.4(b). If 
conduct is morally or otherwise reprehensible, but neither criminal nor in violation of noncriminal 
statutes or administrative regulations, it is not subject to sanction under this provision, although it 
could fall under 8.4(d), as conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, or under 8.4(h), as 
other conduct that adversely reflects on the attorney’s fitness to practice law. See, under the 
comparable Code provisions, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 68 Ohio St.3d 7, 11, 
623 N.E.2d 24, 27 (1993) (numerous unwelcome sexual comments and/or physical contacts by 
lawyer directed at employees while in private practice, and at court employees or lawyers appearing 
before him while judge, were described as “particularly intolerable by an attorney and abhorrent for a 
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member of the judiciary”; conduct was found to violate DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), as well as numerous 
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct). (Campbell was decided prior to the adoption of the 
anti-discrimination provisions of DR 1-102(B), as to which see section 8.4:800.) 
Although the overwhelming majority of the “illegal/moral turpitude” cases under the Code involved 
criminal conduct, that may no longer be the case under Rule 8.4(b)), given the expanded definition of 
“illegal” in Rule 1.0(e). But to the extent the conduct is criminal, there is no need that there be a 
conviction (or even a charge). See Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Kiesling, 125 Ohio St.3d 36, 2010 Ohio 
1555, 925 N.E.2d 970 (theft from clients; criminal complaints filed with police by clients); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Horan, 123 Ohio St.3d 60, 2009 Ohio 4177, 914 N.E.2d 175 (indicted on 
various felony charges arising from altering fee applications for court-appointed work; no indication 
of conviction; 8.4(b) violated); Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Lewis, 121 Ohio St.3d 596, 2009 
Ohio 1765, 906 N.E.2d 1102 (forging judge’s signature on time-stamped judgment entry; no 
criminal charges indicated; violation of 8.4(b)); ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 579 (6th ed. 2007) (commentary). This is consistent with the jurisprudence under former 
DR 1-102(A)(3). See, e.g., Kiesling supra; Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 
2008 Ohio 3340, 891 N.E.2d 749 (misappropriation of clients’ settlement funds and illegal drug use; 
lying to disciplinary authorities about both; no criminal charge indicated); Dayton Bar Ass’n v. 
Sams, 41 Ohio St.3d 11, 535 N.E.2d 298 (1989) (attorney’s agreement to waive attorney fees in 
exchange for sexual favors and his involvement in drug trafficking, involving sixty dollars’ worth of 
prescription diet pills, constituted violations of 1-102(A)(3) & (6) and warranted six-month 
suspension from practice of law, even where, based on police entrapment, defendant was found not 
guilty on drug charges and where soliciting for prostitution charge was reduced to charge of 
disorderly conduct). (But cf. Disciplinary Council v. Bowling, 127 Ohio St.3d 138, 2010 Ohio 
5040, 937 N.E.2d 95, where, in publicly reprimanding respondent judge for violating the Code of 
Judicial Conduct for his self-medication with marijuana to alleviate the effects of a stroke, which 
conduct resulted in his being cited for possession of an illegal substance and drug paraphernalia (both 
misdemeanors), the Court saw fit to note that respondent “did not plead guilty to, nor was he 
convicted of, any crime.” Id. at para. 3.) If conviction is entered, however, it becomes conclusive 
proof that the lawyer did engage in the conduct involved. See Gov Bar R V 5(B) (“A certified copy 
of a judgment entry of conviction of an offense shall be conclusive evidence of the commission of that 
offense in any disciplinary proceedings instituted . . . based upon the conviction.”). 
Presumably it will make no difference under Rule 8.4(b), as it did not under the Code, that the lawyer 
 still maintains innocence, see, e.g., Portage County Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 70 Ohio St.2d 162, 
436 N.E.2d 217 (1982) (rejecting as irrelevant attorney’s claim of innocence in light of 
criminal conviction for act of moral turpitude), 
 pleads guilty as part of a plea bargain, see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio 
St.3d 521, 2008 Ohio 91, 880 N.E.2d 467. Cf. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mesi, 72 
Ohio St.3d 45, 49, 647 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1995) (in response to lawyer’s attempt to minimize 
guilty plea to felony (misprision) that violated 1-102(A)(6), the Court responded: “a guilty 
plea is not a ceremony of innocence, nor can it be rationalized in a subsequent disciplinary 
proceeding.”). [For whatever reason, the respondent in Mesi was apparently not charged with 
violation of 1-102(A)(3).],  
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 enters a diversion program that, if successfully completed, would lead to dismissal of the 
criminal charges of felony theft from respondent’s employer, see Akron Bar Ass’n v. Carter, 
115 Ohio St.3d 18, 2007 Ohio 4262, 873 N.E.2d 824 (1-102(A)(3)), or 
 pleads nolo contendere, see, e.g., Greater Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Bogomolny, 10 Ohio 
St.3d 110, 461 N.E.2d 1294 (1984) (finding of guilty on two counts of Sherman Act 
violations constituted misconduct under DR 1-102(A)(3) & (4); fact that respondent-attorney 
entered plea of nolo contendere to allegations made it no less a violation under disciplinary 
rules). Accord, under 8.4(b), Disciplinary Counsel v. Brickley, 131 Ohio St.3d 228, 2012 
Ohio 872, 963 N.E.2d 818 (violations of 8.4(b), (c) and (h) after pleading no contest to counts 
of theft, forgery and receiving stolen property).   
One interesting take on the illegality aspect of former OH DR 1-102(A)(3) is found in the case of 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Liviola, 94 Ohio St.3d 408, 763 N.E.2d 588 (2002). In Liviola, 
respondent was disbarred for misleading a New York friend suffering from schizophrenia by offering 
to obtain legal assistance for his friend’s supposed legal problems from a nonexistent lawyer in New 
York City, accepting from the friend thousands of dollars supposedly to be forwarded to the fictional 
New York lawyer, and then failing to report a portion of the “fees” on his income tax return. Although 
Liviola was convicted of a misdemeanor for his tax misconduct, the panel’s finding of an OH DR 
102(A)(3) violation was premised, in the words of the Court, on respondent’s “lying to his college 
friend and taking advantage of his mental disability,” without any mention of the income tax violation.  
94 Ohio St.3d at 409, 763 N.E.2d at 589. This is one of the few cases under former 1-102(A)(3) 
seemingly grounded on noncriminal conduct. The only other candidate of which we are aware is 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 72 Ohio St.3d 21, 647 N.E.2d 152 (1995), where the 1-102(A)(3) 
violation resulted from respondent’s sexually suggestive language in the presence of his minor female 
office employee. This conduct was characterized in the complaint as sexual harassment, which, under 
ORC 4212.02(A), is illegal but not criminal.  Other than the reference in the complaint, the Court’s 
opinion does not speak to the issue. 
The honesty or trustworthiness requirement: The second requirement of 8.4(b) is no longer the 
Code’s “moral turpitude” element, but rather that the illegal act “reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 
honesty or trustworthiness.” Since conduct involving moral turpitude typically reflected adversely on 
the lawyer’s honesty and trustworthiness, we include below a resume of the moral turpitude decisions 
under the Code. A good summary of the case law under MR 8.4(b) is provided in ABA, Annotated 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 610-12 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). The litany of cases 
covered there (drug and alcohol offences, crimes involving dishonesty or fraud, sex offenses, violent 
crimes, tax-law violations) bears a striking similarity to the listing infra of types of conduct violative 
of former OH DR 1-102(A)(3), but one must keep in mind that the Model Rule test, while similar to 
Ohio’s, contains important differences -- only criminal conduct is covered, and, in addition to honesty 
or trustworthiness, the conduct covered includes that reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s “fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects.” 
The moral-turpitude requirement under former DR 1-102(A)(3): To be actionable under the former 
disciplinary rule, the illegal conduct had to involve moral turpitude. Some actions, although illegal, 
did not involve moral turpitude; lawyers were subject to sanction under this provision only for those 
that did. (Nevertheless, if a lawyer is convicted of a felony, whether by verdict or plea, the lawyer is 
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subject to an interim suspension, even if an appeal is still pending. Gov Bar R V 5(A).) 
The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that the term “moral turpitude” was not subject to exact 
definition.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. King, 37 Ohio St.3d 77, 523 N.E.2d 857 (1988). In an 
attempt to protect the public, however, the Court believed that it should be given a broad 
interpretation. As the Court stated in King, 
“[t]hat which constitutes moral turpitude for a lawyer is far different 
from that which constitutes moral turpitude for the layman. The lawyer, 
because of his training and position of public trust, must be held to a 
more strict standard than the layman.” 
Id. at 79, 523 N.E.2d at 860 (quoting from a pre-OHCPR case). 
In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Burkhart, 75 Ohio St.3d 188, 661 N.E.2d 1062 (1996), the 
Court provided additional guidance on what conduct evidenced moral turpitude, in the context of 
rejecting the relator’s argument that theft in public office necessarily constituted a crime of moral 
turpitude. The Court stressed that rather than applying a per se test, one must consider “all of the 
circumstances surrounding the illegal conduct” to determine if they manifest “the requisite lack of 
social conscience and depravity beyond any established criminal intent” on the actor’s part.  Id. at 
191, 661 N.E.2d at 1065. In Burkhart the Court concluded that such a showing had not been made 
where the lawyer’s theft in office was to gain reimbursement for expenses incurred on the job that had 
not been reimbursed, rather than for personal financial gain. The Court left open the possibility that a 
per se test might be appropriate where moral turpitude is an element of the underlying criminal 
offense. 
The Court also invoked the lack-of-social-conscience/depravity test in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
McAuliffe, 121 Ohio St.3d 315, 2009 Ohio 1151, 903 N.E.2d 1209 (felony convictions for arson, 
fraud, and conspiracy): “His greed and mendacity manifest the ‘lack of social conscience and 
depravity beyond any established criminal intent’ [quoting Burkhart], that establishes moral 
turpitude.” Id. at para. 26. Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 106 Ohio St.3d 418, 2005 
Ohio 5411, 835 N.E.2d 707. 
It is important to recognize that former DR 1-102(A)(3) spoke to “illegal conduct involving moral 
turpitude.” The significance of this language was illustrated by the King case, 37 Ohio St.3d 77, 523 
N.E.2d 857, where an attorney, who was having sexual relations with a fifteen-year-old neighbor, 
was convicted of contributing to the unruliness or delinquency of a child under ORC 2919.24(A)(1). 
While the conviction stemmed from an entire course of conduct, the lawyer argued that it resulted 
only from the act of speaking to the child on the telephone after the attorney had been forbidden to 
communicate with the child by the child’s mother. According to the lawyer, DR 1-102(A)(3) should 
have been read so that it was not violated “unless the illegal conduct itself was the act of moral 
turpitude.”  Id. at 78, 523 N.E.2d at 859. Here, the predicate act, talking to the minor against the 
mother’s wishes, was not an act of moral turpitude. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument 
in no uncertain terms: 
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The record does not support respondent’s argument that the charge 
against him was based solely on the May 31, 1986 telephone call. 
While the telephone call was the immediate cause for involving the 
authorities, it can hardly be considered an independent reason for the 
charge that was filed. . . . 
 Even if we subscribed to respondent’s version of the facts, 
however, we would not be inclined to construe DR 1-102(A)(3) as 
narrowly as respondent suggests. An examination of the plain language 
of DR 1-102(A)(3) reveals that the rule prohibits lawyers from 
engaging in illegal acts involving moral turpitude; it does not restrict its 
reach to illegal acts of moral turpitude. Accordingly, we hold that all 
the circumstances surrounding illegal conduct should be considered 
when determining whether a DR 1-102(A)(3) violation has occurred. 
Id. (emphasis by the Court). Applying this broader standard, the Court found a violation on these 
facts. 
Another opinion of the Supreme Court shedding light on the moral turpitude standard of DR 
1-102(A)(3) is Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Klaas, 91 Ohio St.3d 86, 742 N.E.2d 612 (2001); 
in Klaas the respondent tipped off a former client about an impending drug raid. Despite the tip, the 
former client was arrested in the raid and agreed to cooperate with the authorities and to testify against 
respondent. As a result, respondent was convicted of attempted obstruction of justice and was charged 
with violating a number of disciplinary provisions. The panel found insufficient evidence to support 
the 1-102(A)(3) charge, and the Board adopted the panel’s conclusions. The Supreme Court, however, 
concluded that respondent’s conduct involved moral turpitude and did violate DR 1-102(A)(3). 
Citing Burkhart, the Court rejected relator’s argument that the conviction for attempted obstruction 
of justice was a per se violation of the Rule. But, stressing the “status of an attorney in relation to the 
public at large,” the Court found that the 
circumstances in this case indicate that by her conduct respondent 
disregarded the standards of morality, honesty, and justice to which an 
attorney must adhere. Here, respondent attempted to undermine the 
effectiveness of a drug raid conducted by federal and local law 
enforcement officers by secretly informing a former client about the 
imminent raid. Respondent thereby disregarded her duty to faithfully 
uphold the law and attempted to use her status as an attorney to obstruct 
justice. This conduct did involve moral turpitude. 
91 Ohio St.3d at 87-88, 742 N.E.2d at 614 (one-year suspension with six months stayed). 
In sum, the moral-turpitude test is difficult to pin down. The “more strict standard” for lawyers set 
forth in King (1988), and implicitly in Klaas (2001), seems counterbalanced by the 
lack-of-social-conscience-and-depravity language of Burkhart (1996), Hunter (2005), and 
McAuliffe (2009), which sounds to us like a test allowing lawyers great leeway, so long as they do 
not act in a “depraved” manner. For other cases speaking to the moral-turpitude standard, see the 
following: 
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 Muskingum County Bar Ass’n v. Workman, 17 Ohio St.3d 95, 477 N.E.2d 632 (1985) 
(striking another person in response to verbal invective in victim’s home involved moral 
turpitude); 
 Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Bell, 15 Ohio St.3d 118, 472 N.E.2d 1069 (1984) 
(deliberate falsification of documents “immediately morally suspect”; for attorney to do so in 
judicial proceeding with obvious purpose to mislead court, in order to avoid disclosure of 
exorbitant fees and questionable payments, was “manifestly contrary to the professional 
qualities of honesty, justice, and good character.”). 
Illegal conduct involving moral turpitude - Common misconduct: Many activities gave rise to 
sanction under former DR 1-102(A)(3), among them: 
 drug-related offenses, such as cocaine possession, Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Resnick, 128 
Ohio St.3d 56, 2010 Ohio 6147, 941 N.E.2d 1175; cocaine abuse, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
White, 109 Ohio St.3d 402, 2006 Ohio 2709, 848 N.E.2d 504; obtaining controlled 
substance with forged prescriptions, Disciplinary Counsel v. May, 106 Ohio St.3d 385, 
2005 Ohio 5320, 835 N.E.2d 372; drug trafficking, Disciplinary Counsel v. Stern, 106 
Ohio St.3d 266, 2005 Ohio 4804, 834 N.E.2d 351; and theft of controlled substances, Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel v. Garrity, 98 Ohio St.3d 317, 2003 Ohio 740, 784 N.E.2d 691. 
 
Occasionally in disciplinary cases involving chemical-substance felonies, a violation of DR 
1-102(A)(3) was not charged.  One such case is Disciplinary Counsel v. Wolf, 110 Ohio 
St.3d 411, 2006 Ohio 4709, 853 N.E.2d 1169.  In Wolf, respondent, who was also a licensed 
nurse, had become addicted after a drug had been prescribed to treat her debilitating foot pain.  
She subsequently began illegally to authorize her own prescriptions and was thereafter 
convicted of two fifth-degree felonies.  Because of significant mitigating factors, including 
successful efforts to overcome her addiction, respondent was given a two-year suspension, 
stayed on conditions of continuing treatment and maintaining her OLAP contract.  Accord, as 
to the absence of a 1-102(A)(3) charge, Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 119 Ohio St.3d 47, 
2008 Ohio 3321, 891 N.E.2d 740 (guilty plea to possession of cocaine, fifth-degree felony; 
DR 1-102(A)(6) violated); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Lazzaro, 106 Ohio St.3d 379, 
2005 Ohio 5321, 835 N.E.2d 367 (felony conviction for cocaine possession and use; 
1-102(A)(6) violated). Accord, under the Rules of Professional Conduct, Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Rathburn, 126 Ohio St. 3d 502, 2010 Ohio 4467, 935 N.E.2d 413 (citing Wolf; 
violation of 8.4(c) and (h)). 
 sex-related offenses, such as pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor, 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Butler, 128 Ohio St.3d 319, 2011 Ohio 236, 943 N.E.2d 1025; 
seeking to arrange sex with a minor female, “the younger the better”; unfortunately for 
respondent, his telephone arrangements were made with an FBI undercover agent, 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Goldblatt, 118 Ohio St.3d 310, 2008 Ohio 2458, 888 N.E.2d 1091; 
sexual imposition involving a 21-year old male, while respondent was employed as an 
assistant county prosecutor, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Kenney, 110 Ohio St.3d 38, 2006 
Ohio 3458, 850 N.E.2d 60; corrupting a minor by engaging in a consensual sexual 
relationship with the minor, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Pansiera, 77 Ohio St.3d 436, 
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674 N.E.2d 1373 (1997). 
 misappropriation of client funds, see, e.g., Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Rogers, 116 Ohio St.3d 99, 
2007 Ohio 5544, 876 N.E.2d 923 (knowingly charging clients for work not done “‘is 
tantamount to misappropriation,’“ id.  at para. 19 (citation omitted)); Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Jones, 112 Ohio St.3d 46, 2006 Ohio 6367, 857 N.E.2d 1221 (stealing “large sums of 
money” from charitable foundation while executor of estate of his former client, who had 
established the charity; presumptive sanction for stealing client funds and failure to cooperate 
in investigation is disbarment); Akron Bar Ass’n v. Dietz, 108 Ohio St.3d 343, 2006 Ohio 
1067, 843 N.E.2d 786 (improper withdrawal for personal use of funds of estate for which 
respondent was executor, followed by improper use of funds from another estate for which he 
was acting as executor to replenish assets of first estate); Disciplinary Counsel v. Ross, 107 
Ohio St.3d 191, 2005 Ohio 6179, 837 N.E.2d 773 (“repeated misappropriation of client 
funds demonstrate[s] that he is not fit to practice law,” id. at para. 21; respondent 
permanently disbarred); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Rus, 106 Ohio St.3d 467, 2005 Ohio 5520, 
835 N.E.2d 1252 (misappropriation of client’s settlement funds; because of significant 
mitigating factors, including full restitution, indefinite suspension imposed instead of 
disbarment).  
 theft, see, e.g., Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Parrish, 121 Ohio St.3d 610, 2009 Ohio 
1969, 906 N.E.2d 1113 (felony theft conviction; respondent, attorney for estate and trust, 
embezzled more than $172,000 from trust; for this and numerous other violations, respondent 
was disbarred); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Zins, 116 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007-Ohio 5263, 875 
N.E.2d 941 (convicted on one count of identity theft growing out of scheme to steal money 
from customers of bank for whom he worked as customer-service representative; because of 
mitigating factors, two-year suspension without credit for time under interim suspension 
imposed upon notice of felony conviction); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Schwieterman, 115 
Ohio St.3d 1, 2007 Ohio 4266, 873 N.E.2d 810 (conversion for personal use of funds 
belonging to respondent’s law firm; indefinite suspension with no credit for interim 
suspension for felony conviction); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Blake, 100 Ohio St.3d 298, 2003 
Ohio 5755, 798 N.E.2d 610 (conviction on three counts of felony theft, one count of forgery, 
and two separate misdemeanors; violations of DR 1-102(A)(3)-(6); “[d]isbarment is 
warranted when an attorney turns to crime and is convicted of theft offenses.” Id. at para. 7); 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Heekin, 9 Ohio St.3d 84, 459 N.E.2d 495 (1984) (attorney, who as 
president of Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum directed purposeful and intentional tampering 
with meters that resulted in theft of utility services worth more than $775,000, violated, inter 
alia, 1-102(A)(3) and was permanently disbarred: “It is impossible for this court to reach any 
other decision than the one reached today. It is imperative that the members of the Ohio Bar 
avoid any conduct which reflects adversely on their fitness to practice law. In this case, 
respondent steps far beyond the threshold of bad judgment or questionable practices which are 
often the subject matter of proceedings which produce a lesser sanction. Respondent was a 
party to felony offenses.”  Id. at 85-86, 459 N.E.2d at 496.). The unanimous Court’s strong 
language in Heekin and its upping of the sanction recommended by a majority of the panel 
and by the Board (indefinite suspension) to permanent disbarment may have been in part a 
reaction to the slapped wrist that respondent received as a result of the criminal process: two 
suspended sentences, probation, and fines totaling the princely sum of $5,000.00. 
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A “theft” case decided under the Rules of Professional Conduct, Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v 
Wrentmore, ___ Ohio St.3d ___ 2013 Ohio 5041, ___ N.E.2d ___, involved instances of stealing, 
not from a client, but from the Ohio State Bar Association. This rather unusual state of affairs 
occurred when the respondent attended five CLE courses offered by the OSBA, either representing 
that he had prepaid or presenting checks in payment that were returned for insufficient funds. 
Wrentmore nevertheless reported at least part of the hours attended for CLE credit. The Court found 
that in doing so, respondent “committed theft of services when he deprived the OSBA, without its 
consent and by deception, of the money he should have paid for the CLE seminars, thereby 
committing illegal acts for purposes of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b).” Id. at para. 14. Wrentmore was 
indefinitely suspended. (The Court sees fit to add in the opinion that “[w]hen he attended the seminars, 
he was working as a golf caddy at a country club.” Id. at para. 11. The relevance of this fact is not 
readily apparent.) 
 forgery, see, e.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Rus, 106 Ohio St.3d 467, 2005 Ohio 5520, 835 
N.E.2d 1252 (forging client’s signature on release and on settlement-check endorsement; 
indefinite suspension imposed); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Herman, 99 Ohio St.3d 
362, 2003 Ohio 3932, 192 N.E.2d 1078 (forging signatures of opposing counsel and his client 
on substituted signature page of qualified-domestic-relations order; violation, inter alia, of 
DR 1-102(A)(3)-(5); because of significant mitigating factors, sanction limited to one-year 
suspension, with six months stayed). 
 
(One wonders why Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Shousher, 112 Ohio St.3d 533, 2007 Ohio 611, 861 
N.E.2d 536, failed to include a DR 1-102(A)(3) charge, since the respondent engaged in 
credit-card fraud in his ex-wife’s name.  He was charged with two counts of forgery and one 
count of identity theft and pleaded guilty, but was granted intervention instead of conviction 
and was placed on probation.) 
 fraudulent activity, see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Gittinger, 125 Ohio St.3d 467, 2010 
Ohio 1830, 929 N.E.2d 410 (federal bank fraud and money laundering); Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Powers, 119 Ohio St.3d 473, 2008 Ohio 4785, 895 N.E.2d 172 (as part of scheme 
to “flip” low value homes, respondent pled guilty to defrauding federally insured lenders by 
falsifying information about potential buyers and home appraisals, and by submitting to the 
lending institutions false HUD forms, all in support of loan applications; this, together with 
filing false income tax returns resulted in the Court’s ordering disbarment, rather than the 
indefinite suspension recommended by the Board); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Ulinksi, 106 Ohio St.3d 53, 2005 Ohio 3673, 831 N.E.2d 425 (conviction of conspiracy to 
commit securities, mail, and wire fraud in violation of federal law, resulting from 
respondent’s involvement in Ponzi scheme to defraud investors; despite mitigating evidence 
and Board recommendation of indefinite suspension, Court increased sanction to disbarment, 
finding indefinite suspension “far too lenient for misconduct of this magnitude,” the effect of 
which was “devastating,” and resulted in “financial havoc” for clients and others, id. at paras. 
18, 23-24). An interesting trio of cases decided by the Supreme Court arose out of a kickback 
scheme in which an in-house lawyer for Nationwide Insurance was selling inside information 
to lawyers for plaintiffs in litigation against Nationwide in exchange for a cut of the proceeds 
of settlements achieved with the information provided. Compare Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Hartsock, 94 Ohio St.3d 18, 759 N.E.2d 778 (2001) (in-house lawyer charged 
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with, and found to have violated, DR 1-102(A)(3)-(6); indefinite suspension imposed), and 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gambrel, 94 Ohio St. 10, 759 N.E.2d 771 (2001) (one of 
the outside lawyers; same violations, same sanction), with Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Dubyak, 92 Ohio St.3d 18, 748 N.E.2d 26 (2001) (another of the outside lawyers; charged 
with violations of OH DR 1-102(A) (3)-(6) but found not to have violated 1-102(A)(3); 
two-year suspension with six months stayed). See also Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. 
Garfield, 109 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006 Ohio 1935, 846 N.E.2d 45, where respondent pled 
guilty to bank fraud, but no 1-102(A)(3) charge was filed. 
 assault, see, e.g., Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Burkholder, 121 Ohio St.3d 262, 2009 Ohio 761, 
903 N.E.2d 630 (conviction for assault and battery on fiancée); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Harris, 1 Ohio St.3d 33, 437 N.E.2d 596 (1982) (conviction of aggravated assault against 
companion of attorney’s ex-wife violated DR 1-102(A)(3)). In Muskingum County Bar 
Ass’n v. Workman, 17 Ohio St.3d 95, 477 N.E.2d 632 (1985), a lawyer, who was convicted 
of assault and criminal trespass for actions he took against a woman he was dating and who 
sought to have the matter treated as a public reprimand, argued that his conduct was less 
egregious than that in Harris where a one-year suspension had been ordered. Rejecting this 
argument, the Court wrote: 
 Respondent attempts to distinguish Harris on the ground that 
the attorney in Harris committed the assault with a potentially deadly 
implement while respondent “only” struck Francis with his hand, and 
that respondent was convicted of misdemeanors as opposed to a felony. 
We do not find these to be material distinctions. There is no question 
that respondent’s conduct was illegal. That respondent’s conduct also 
involved moral turpitude is evident from respondent’s striking another 
person in response to a verbal invective and the violation of the sanctity 
of Francis’ home and property. With this in mind, the differences 
between Harris and the instant case become minimal. 
17 Ohio St.3d at 97-98, 477 N.E.2d at 634 (1985).  
 and many others. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kral, 90 Ohio St.3d 298, 737 
N.E.2d 956 (2000) (willfully concealing assets of estate that he represented, failure to provide 
timely accounting of assets to probate court, and refusal to turn over estate records to 
successor counsel warranted permanent disbarment); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Atkin, 84 Ohio St.3d 383, 704 N.E.2d 244 (1999) (respondent disbarred as result of 
conviction on numerous counts of violation of federal law, arising out of scheme to obtain 
$550,000 from client by asserting unfounded ability to bribe federal judge and failure to report 
payment as income); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kraig, 81 Ohio St.3d 187, 690 
N.E.2d 2 (1998) (lawyer convicted of conspiring to impede collection of client’s federal 
income taxes; indefinite suspension imposed for violation of, inter alia, DR 1-102(A)(3), 
based not on acts of commission in furtherance of scheme but on knowledge of it); Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. McCrae, 75 Ohio St.3d 511, 664 N.E.2d 523 (1996) (indefinite 
suspension imposed for lying to bank regarding his personal affairs and lying under oath to 
bankruptcy court in violation of provision of bankruptcy code). 
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Illegal conduct involving moral turpitude - Misconduct directed at the government: Illegal conduct 
involving moral turpitude often was directed at the government, thereby inhibiting the government’s 
proper functioning. This misconduct falls into a variety of categories. 
Obstruction of justice: One of these categories clearly is obstruction of justice. For example, an 
attorney who obtains and keeps a client’s contraband, which he knows is sought by authorities having 
a search warrant, commits the crime of obstruction of justice, warranting permanent disbarment for 
violation of DR 1-102(A)(3)-(6).  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Freedman, 49 Ohio St.3d 65, 551 
N.E.2d 143 (1990). Compare Disciplinary Counsel v. Young, 102 Ohio St.3d 113, 2004 Ohio 1809, 
807 N.E.2d 317, where respondent was convicted of the felony of conspiracy to obstruct justice, as a 
result of his conspiring with his client and others to fabricate a story that would exonerate the client on 
a charge of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. This included preparing a false affidavit 
and inducing witnesses to sign it. Despite these black marks (in addition to previous discipline), the 
Court was swayed by the countervailing mitigating factors -- aggressive dealing with substance abuse, 
cooperation in the disciplinary process, and remorse for his actions. Although “[w]e do not take 
respondent’s conduct lightly,” “[w]e must also take care not to deprive the public of attorneys who, 
through rehabilitation, may be able to ethically and competently serve in a professional capacity.” 
“[W]e believe that [respondent] may someday be able to demonstrate the ethical conduct required of 
attorneys licensed in this state. For that reason, we hold that an indefinite suspension [rather than the 
disbarment recommended by the Board] is the appropriate sanction . . . .” Id. at paras. 15, 17. See 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Smakula, 39 Ohio St.3d 143, 529 N.E.2d 1376 (1988) (Board 
determined that attorney, convicted of attempted tampering with records, falsification, and attempted 
obstruction of justice as part of traffic ticket-fixing scheme in violation of 1-102(A)(3)-(5), acted 
largely due to his naiveté and poor judgment; one-year suspension imposed). (See also former DR 
7-102(A)(3), which provided that a lawyer may not “[c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose that 
which he is required by law to reveal.” See section 3.4:200.) 
One might fairly place Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Hunter, 130 Ohio St.3d 355, 2011 Ohio 5788, 958 
N.E.2d 567, in the obstruction of justice category; the respondent in Hunter violated Rule 8.4(b) (as 
well as (c) and (h)) for felonious conduct in failing to report to the federal Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network, as required, the receipt of more than $10,000 in coin or currency from his law 
practice. Hunter was relied upon for imposition of the same sanction (indefinite suspension) in 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. McGowan, 135 Ohio St.3d 368, 2013 Ohio 1470, 987 N.E.2d 645, another 
instance of violation of Rules 8.4(b), (c) and (d) arising out of a federal felony conviction for breach 
of the $10,000 reporting requirement (and, in McGowan, money laundering as well). 
Bribery: Bribery of a government official by an attorney often is policed by DR 1-102(A)(3). See, e.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Zaccagnini, 130 Ohio St.3d 77, 2011 Ohio 4703, 955 N.E.2d 977 (entered 
into conspiracy to unlawfully gain contracts for one of his law partners to perform appraisals for 
Cuyahoga County Auditor, pursuant to which employees in auditor’s office received 1.4 million in 
kickbacks); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. McClenaghan, 57 Ohio St.3d 21, 565 N.E.2d 572 
(1991) (conviction of former Ohio Department of Commerce Division of Real Estate Superintendent, 
who was affiliated with real estate education enterprise at time of incident, for bribing of Division of 
Real Estate examiner by offering $500 for copies of present and future real estate examinations, 
violated 1-102(A)(3); respondent indefinitely suspended); Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. 
Italiano, 24 Ohio St.3d 204, 494 N.E.2d 1113 (1986) (attempted bribery of arresting officer; 
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Acceptance of a bribe by a lawyer/government official: See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Smith, 69 Ohio St.3d 475, 633 N.E.2d 1117 (1994) (assistant federal public defender who accepted 
a bribe in exchange for information but subsequently recanted, received two-year suspension for 
violating DR 1-102(A)(3), (4) & (6), with credit for time served under interim suspension, in light of 
other mitigating factors); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. DiCarlantonio, 68 Ohio St.3d 479, 628 
N.E.2d 1355 (1994) (city attorney permanently disbarred for agreeing to change city ordinance in 
exchange for bribe; conduct violated 1-102(A)(3), (4) & (6)). 
To the extent that the violation constituted an abuse of public office, some members of the Court took 
the position that the sanction imposed should be greater than if the underlying conduct involved a 
nonpublic lawyer. For example, in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Columbro, 66 Ohio St.3d 195, 
611 N.E.2d 302 (1993), where the Court reduced the disbarment sanction recommended by the Board 
to an indefinite suspension, Chief Justice Moyer and Justice Pfeifer argued that the theft of cocaine by 
an assistant prosecutor from the scientific investigation unit where it was being held as evidence in 
pending cases deserved a harsher sanction than that imposed in previous cases for the distribution of 
cocaine. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Moyer remarked: 
 The majority relies upon [Akron Bar Ass’n v. Chandler, 62 
Ohio St.3d 471, 584 N.E.2d 677 (1992)], in “tempering justice with 
mercy” because the majority has “difficulty finding that the situation 
here is more egregious, thereby warranting a greater sanction,” than 
that found in Chandler, supra.  
 In Chandler, respondent pleaded guilty in federal court to the 
fifth count of an indictment charging him with knowingly or 
intentionally distributing cocaine. The board found the respondent had 
become a substance abuser and had apparently engaged in a “low 
level” enterprise to distribute cocaine as a means of supporting his 
dependency. Relator, Akron Bar Association, and the board’s panel 
both recommended an indefinite suspension, but the board 
recommended a permanent disbarment. 
 The difference in the conduct of the attorney in Chandler and 
the attorney here is profound. Chandler engaged in the “low level” 
enterprise of distributing cocaine to maintain his addiction. Columbro 
used his access, his position of trust as an assistant prosecuting attorney, 
to remove cocaine from the place where evidence was held pending 
trial. The fact that the record reflects no actual impact on the 
prosecution of a case is hardly mitigating of respondent’s conduct in 
support of his personal drug dependency. Unlike Chandler’s plea to a 
single count, respondent here pled guilty to twenty counts of drug 
abuse and sixteen counts of theft in office. 
 The question is not, as the majority suggests, whether 
respondent can perhaps rehabilitate himself from his drug dependency. 
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The issue is whether this court should, as recommended by the board, 
draw a line on misuse of public office where there is a potential impact 
upon the evidence available for prosecution in pending cases. 
 The panel and the board offered a bright-line message; we 
should apply it and disbar respondent for his blatant abuse of his public 
office. 
66 Ohio St.3d at 98, 611 N.E.2d at 305 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). [Mr. Columbro is now and has 
been for a number of years one of the most active lecturers on substance abuse on the Ohio CLE 
circuit. He was reinstated in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Columbro, 75 Ohio St.3d 1216, 664 
N.E.2d 945 (1996). There were no dissents.] 
False statements to the government: In several instances, violations were premised on an attorney’s 
making false or fraudulent statements to a court, see, e.g., Akron Bar Ass’n v. Dietz, 108 Ohio St.3d 
343, 2006 Ohio 1067, 843 N.E.2d 786 (accounting filed with probate court falsely stated that no 
disbursements from estate had been made when in fact respondent/executor had disbursed estate 
funds and deposited them into his personal account), or to a government agency, see, e.g., Ohio State 
Bar Ass’n v. Wolfson, 102 Ohio St.3d 405, 2004 Ohio 3480, 811 N.E.2d 1113 (conviction of crime 
of tampering with evidence by giving police false written statement that acquaintance, who had 
arrived at respondent’s house the evening before in intoxicated state and subsequently died, had not 
arrived until the following morning); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Joseph, 60 Ohio St.3d 57, 572 
N.E.2d 681 (1991) (conviction for making false statements to Small Business Administration in 
regard to loan violated DR 1-102(A)(3)).  
Income tax violations: Income tax violations by an attorney often violated DR 1-102(A)(3) as 
conduct involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Crosby, 132 Ohio St.3d 387, 
2012 Ohio 2872, 972 N.E.2d 574 (guilty plea to felony charge of income-tax evasion for six years; 
other misconduct, including misappropriation, but the tax fraud count in and of itself “warrants 
disbarment,” id. at para. 26); Disciplinary Counsel v. Smith, 128 Ohio St.3d 390, 2011 Ohio 957, 
944 N.E.2d 1166 (conspiracy to defraud IRS, false tax returns, impeding and obstructing IRS 
investigation; indefinite suspension imposed); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Powers, 119 Ohio St.3d 473, 
2008 Ohio 4785, 895 N.E.2d 172 (willfully filing false individual income tax returns; this and other 
fraudulent acts violated DR 102(A)(3), (4) & (6); disbarment ordered); Cuyahoga County Bar 
Ass’n v. Freedman, 107 Ohio St.3d 25, 2005 Ohio 5831, 836 N.E.2d 559 (failure to file personal 
income tax returns for ten years and for his professional corporation since 1998; mitigating factors; 
one-year suspension imposed). Sometimes other disciplinary rules were invoked to deal with such 
violations, without mention of 1-102(A)(3) and the question of its applicability. Income tax violations 
were treated under 1-102(A)(4) as conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, 
under 1-102(A)(5) as conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and/or under 1-102(A)(6) as 
conduct reflecting adversely on fitness to practice law. Occasionally, however, the Ohio Supreme 
Court addressed more directly the issue of what types of income tax violation constituted moral 
turpitude. For example, in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Leroux, 16 Ohio St.2d 10, 242 N.E.2d 347 
(1968) (although the decision predates the OHCPR, the concern over lawyer conduct involving 
moral turpitude was addressed in the Canons of Professional Ethics then in force), the Court discussed 
whether convictions for willfully failing to file income tax returns constituted conduct involving 
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 The failure to file income tax returns is a misdemeanor . . . . 
While such classification does not control the determination of whether 
moral turpitude is involved, it does indicate that Congress did not 
consider the offense serious enough to be made a felony. 
More important is the evidence that there was no attempt on the part of 
the respondents to evade income taxes. Respondents Leroux and 
Weber, for example, filed accurate partnership returns during at least 
one of the years for which they failed to file personal returns, which 
would be inconsistent with a plan to defraud the government. All of the 
respondents co-operated fully with the Internal Revenue agents. There 
was no indication that the records maintained were either inadequate or 
deceptive. There was considerable evidence that the reputation and 
competence of respondents ranged from good to very good. 
 Whether a charge based upon a willful omission to file income 
tax returns (for which the explanations offered were so various as to 
include physical or emotional illness, family problems and economic 
problems) involves moral turpitude, must necessarily turn on the 
particular circumstances of each case. [citation omitted]. Certainly the 
inclusion of evidence negating an intention to defraud is such 
circumstance. 
 The lack of evidence from which such an intent might be 
inferred must be considered to distinguish such cases from those in 
which such evidence is affirmatively shown. Openness and remorse 
alone will not excuse an offense which is clearly reprehensible, but 
may be considered, with other mitigating circumstances, in evaluating 
a difficult borderline case. We agree with the board’s conclusions that 
the respondents’ offenses under the circumstances of the cases here in 
question did not involve moral turpitude. 
Id. at 11-12, 242 N.E.2d at 348 (although the conduct was not treated as conduct involving moral 
turpitude, it was still subject to sanction (public reprimand) under other disciplinary standards). 
A similar situation was posed in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Stichter, 17 Ohio St.3d 248, 478 N.E.2d 1322 
(1985). In that case the lawyer had been convicted of a misdemeanor for willful failure to file income 
tax returns for a number of years. The lawyer originally was charged with violating DR 1-102(A)(3), 
(4), and (6), but ultimately was convicted only of the latter two violations. While not stated explicitly, 
it appears that the 1-102(A)(3) violation was considered inappropriate because the conviction was 
only a misdemeanor, the lawyer had preserved the records necessary to complete the returns, and he 
was cooperating fully with the IRS.  Cf. Allen County Bar Ass’n v. King, 48 Ohio St.3d 8, 548 
N.E.2d 238 (1990) (although charged with violations of DR 1-102(A)(3), (4) & (6), respected 
attorney convicted of filing false federal income tax returns in unsuccessful attempt to save failing 
business, which conduct neither affected nor prejudiced any interests of his clients, was found to have 
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violated only 1-102(A)(4)). 
Compare, however, the markedly different result in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Smith, 102 Ohio St.3d 
10, 2004 Ohio 1582, 806 N.E.2d 495, where the Court unanimously found violation of DR 
1-102(A)(3) for failing to file timely federal tax returns for the years 1992 through 2002, even though 
“[b]y the time the instant complaint was filed, respondent had filed tax returns for the years in 
question” and even though “respondent has apparently not been convicted or even prosecuted for 
failing to file tax returns . . . .” Id. at paras. 6, 12. The Court did not refer to either Leroux or Stichter, 
cited above, and there is no discussion of the moral turpitude requirement. A stayed six-month 
suspension was imposed for this and a number of other violations. 
A variation on the failure-to-file-taxes theme occurred in Geauga County Bar Ass’n v. Bruner, 98 
Ohio St.3d 312, 2003 Ohio 736, 784 N.E.2d 687. In Bruner, respondent failed, for ten years, to 
make the required payments, not of his own taxes, but of federal payroll taxes of his legal secretary. 
Instead of reporting and paying these amounts, respondent “simply kept the amounts he withheld.” Id. 
at para. 2. He did the same with the employee’s Social Security and Medicare contributions, as well 
as amounts for state unemployment compensation coverage. Relator asked only for a stayed 
six-month suspension. But the panel, given that respondent’s had in essence converted more than 
$40,000 over a ten-year period and attempted to cover it up with false documentation, recommended 
an indefinite suspension for violation of DR 1-102(A)(3), (4) & (6), which the Board adopted and the 
Court approved. 
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 114 Ohio St.3d 108, 2007 Ohio 3253, 868 N.E.2d 973, is a case brimful 
of altered and backdated deeds, forgeries, and other byzantine transactions by respondent, who was 
disbarred for her appalling behavior relating to an elderly and ultimately incompetent client.  Among 
her many missteps, the one singled out as violative of DR 1-102(A)(3) was, in connection with taking 
charitable deductions on her personal federal tax return for donating what had been her client’s farm 
to the client’s church, “falsely claiming that she donated her client’s farm in 2000,” id. at para. 15.  
Respondent took the first charitable deduction in the year 2000, even though the Court ultimately 
concluded that the donation could not have taken place until sometime after May 8, 2001.  If this 
sounds complicated, it is.  There are four different deeds with respect to the farm property, most of 
which were either altered or falsely dated or both, and about which respondent had numerous and 
conflicting explanations.  Without going into the gruesome detail, the Court captures the flavor of the 
entire escapade by noting that “she gamed the system,” id. at para. 32; her explanations were 
“convoluted and far-fetched,” id. at para. 15; and her inconsistent accounts “show that, assuming she 
knows what the truth is, she is incapable of telling it.”  Id. 
Penalties for OH DR 1-102(A)(3) violations: The penalty imposed for violation of former OH DR 
1-102(A)(3) typically was either indefinite suspension or disbarment. As the Court stated in 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Gloeckner, 1 Ohio St.3d 83, 84, 437 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (1982), “The 
general rule [. . .] is that indefinite suspension or disbarment is the appropriate disciplinary sanction to 
be imposed on an attorney who has been convicted of felony crime involving moral turpitude” -- here 
bribery. Whether the different formulation under Rule 8.4(b) will make a difference in penalty 
patterns remains to be seen -- probably not (but see the Niles decision, discussed at the end of this 
section).  
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This sanction rule was applied under the Code to a variety of moral turpitude crime categories. Thus: 
 Murder. Needless to say, disbarment is the sanction of choice when the illegal conduct 
involved is murder; “[i]n fact, permanent disbarment is the only appropriate sanction 
for an attorney convicted of murder.” Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Rocker, 85 
Ohio St.3d 397, 709 N.E.2d 113 (1999). The respondent was likewise disbarred in 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zemba, 97 Ohio St.3d 489, 2002 Ohio 6725, 780 
N.E.2d 576; she had been convicted of the third-degree felony of reckless homicide of 
an infant while running an unlicensed childcare business in her home. 
 Rape. Just as “permanent disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for an attorney 
convicted of murder,” Rocker, it is likewise “the only appropriate sanction for an 
attorney convicted of raping a child.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams, 130 Ohio 
St.3d 341, 2011 Ohio 5163, 958 N.E.2d 555, at para. 11 (respondent convicted on 
two counts of raping his seven-year-old nephew). 
 Drug-related offenses. Here, the penalty imposed is often an indefinite suspension. 
See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. White, 106 Ohio St.3d 108, 2005 Ohio 3957, 832 
N.E.2d 51 (respondent, indicted on various drug trafficking counts, entered guilty plea 
to one; indefinite suspension imposed for violation of former DR 102(A)(3) and other 
provisions); Akron Bar Ass’n v. Chandler, 62 Ohio St.3d 471, 584 N.E.2d 677 
(1992) (lawyer, convicted of cocaine trafficking (characterized as a “low-level 
enterprise to distribute”) to support his dependency, received an indefinite suspension, 
as had been imposed in numerous other cited cases; conduct violated 1-102(A)(3), (5) 
& (6)). In the drug-related case of Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Neller, 98 Ohio St.3d 314, 
2003 Ohio 774, 784 N.E.2d 689, however, the Court unanimously disbarred 
respondent, who for many years represented a client whom he knew to be engaged in 
an organized drug distribution scheme. “During this time, respondent facilitated and 
promoted this conspiracy by advising Rodriquez on ways to avoid detection of his 
illegal activities and those of various co-conspirators.” Thus, “notwithstanding the 
outpouring of support from respondent’s colleagues and acquaintances, no mitigating 
circumstances can undo the harm of respondents’ integral role in this drug ring. 
Disbarment is the commensurate sanction.” Id. at paras. 9, 10. In Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Hennekes, 110 Ohio St.3d 108, 2006 Ohio 3669, 850 N.E.2d 1201, the 
Court distinguished Neller and imposed a two-year suspension, based on significant 
mitigating factors and on the fact that his felony offense of engaging in conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine was “not so nearly widespread or destructive,” id. at para. 14, and 
was a one-time offense, in contrast to the coaching of clients, one of whom had been 
selling illegal drugs in an organized drug ring for years, in Neller. 
 Bribery. With respect to the proper penalty to impose for offering a bribe, compare 
Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Haddad, 57 Ohio St.2d 11, 11-12, 385 N.E.2d 294, 
295 (1979), suggesting that permanent disbarment usually is appropriate since 
“[s]ociety’s confidence in those occupying positions of public trust, including 
members of the bar who are officers of the court, is seriously undermined when a 
person in that position either accepts or gives a bribe,” with Office of Disciplinary 
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Counsel v. McClenaghan, 57 Ohio St.3d 21, 565 N.E.2d 572 (1991), finding 
indefinite suspension to be in keeping with the penalty imposed in previous bribery 
cases.  
 Money-laundering. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Gittinger, 125 Ohio St.3d 467, 
2010 Ohio 1830, 929 N.E.2d 410, where the parties stipulated to an 18-month 
suspension, but the panel and Board recommended and the Court imposed an 
indefinite suspension for violation of DR 1-102(A)(3), (4) & (6), and Disciplinary 
Counsel v. White, 109 Ohio St.3d 402, 2006 Ohio 2709, 848 N.E.2d 504, in which 
respondent had previously been indefinitely suspended and then tested positively for 
cocaine use while criminal proceedings against him were stayed; disbarment ordered. 
The Gittinger indefinite suspension result was followed in another money-laundering 
case decided under the Code, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Kellogg, 126 Ohio St.3d 360, 
2010 Ohio 3285, 933 N.E.2d 1085, where relator had sought disbarment and the 
Board had recommended a two-year suspension with the last six months stayed.   
 Theft. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Muntean, 127 Ohio St.3d 427, 2010 Ohio 6133, 
940 N.E.2d 942. Respondent, who stole thousands of dollars from the charitable 
organization of which he was treasurer, was indefinitely suspended, with credit given 
for the time served under interim suspension for felony conviction, rather than 
disbarred; although there were three mitigating and aggravating factors, the Court 
stressed the mitigating factors in accepting the indefinite suspension recommendation 
of the Board. An indefinite suspension was also imposed in another theft case, 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly, 121 Ohio St.3d 39, 2009 Ohio 317, 901 N.E.2d 798, 
which the Court relied on in imposing the same sanction in Muntean. 
 Income tax fraud. As the Court summed the matter up in Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n 
v. Toohig, 133 Ohio St.3d 548, 2012 Ohio 5202, 979 N.E.2d 332, “[i]n the context of 
a conviction for federal tax evasion, we have sometimes imposed a sanction less than 
disbarment,” (citing two examples imposing sanctions of indefinite suspension and of 
one year, where mitigating factors were present), id. at para. 57, but “the disposition 
of this case should be commensurate with the multiple instances of dishonesty and 
misappropriation that we confront” and as in comparable prior cases resulting in 
disbarment, including a tax fraud case, “the same result is warranted here,” Id. at para. 
58. 
It also should be recognized that the penalty imposed for engaging in illegal conduct involving moral 
turpitude may well be more severe if the offender is a public official. As the Court commented in 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Norris, 76 Ohio St.3d 93, 666 N.E.2d 1087 (1996), where a 
prosecuting attorney had been found guilty of misdemeanor cocaine possession, 
we recognize that respondent committed this misdemeanor while 
serving as an elected public official whose sworn duty was to prosecute 
the very crime he was committing. Our previous decisions involving 
public officials [in which one-year and indefinite suspensions were 
entered] should have provided a warning to respondent. 
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Id. at 94, 666 N.E.2d at 1089 (bracketed material added) (two-year suspension, with one year stayed). 
Compare Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Head, 20 Ohio St.3d 16, 484 N.E.2d 702 (1985) 
(assistant county prosecutor’s taking of rings, which were evidence in criminal case, for appraisal for 
possible sale to a third party, and his subsequent loss of rings, leading to his theft conviction, violated 
OH DR 1-102(A)(3) and justified indefinite suspension). And disbarment, not the indefinite 
suspension recommended by the Board, was the sanction imposed on a sitting common pleas judge 
who was convicted of violating federal drug laws for trafficking in cocaine.  Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Gallagher, 82 Ohio St.3d 51, 693 N.E.2d 1078 (1998). While there were mitigating 
factors present, the fact that respondent was a judge rendered them of scant importance. In the Court’s 
words: 
 Permanent disbarment is even more advised here because 
respondent held judicial office at the time of his arrest. . . . 
. . . Mitigating factors have little relevance, however, when judges 
engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude. 
* * * 
 When a judge’s felonious conduct brings disrepute to the 
judicial system, the institution is irreparably harmed. . . . By this 
sanction we aim to protect both the public and the integrity of the 
judicial system itself. Mitigating factors relevant to this individual 
attorney pale when he is viewed in his institutional role as a judge. 
Id. at 52, 53, 693 N.E.2d at 1079. Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. McAuliffe, 121 Ohio St.3d 315, 
2009 Ohio 1151, 903 N.E.2d 1209 (quoting Gallagher language). 
Compare the different approach taken with respect to mitigating factors in Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. 
Johnson, 96 Ohio St.3d 192, 2002 Ohio 3998, 772 N.E.2d 1184, where the respondent had 
committed extortion while serving as a state senator (he induced grocers and others to contribute to 
his election campaigns in exchange for his efforts on their behalf before state agencies.) He was 
convicted of violating the Hobbs Act (18 USC § 1951) and sentenced to fifteen months in prison. The 
Board recommended disbarment, but the Court, while acknowledging “that permanent disbarment is 
the accepted sanction when attorneys in public office commit extortion,” id. at para. 6, concluded 
that an indefinite suspension was the appropriate sanction, given the mitigating factors present, 
including the fact that he had previously served the community effectively: 
 In executing our constitutional responsibility to oversee the 
practice of law in this state, our duty requires us to do more than just 
protect the public from those ethically unfit to represent them. We must 
also be careful not to deprive the public of those who, through 
sufficient rehabilitation, may be able to recover their ethical orientation 
and serve competently in a professional capacity. . . . 
* * * * 
 . . . Because this possibility exists [here], we find the sanction of 
indefinite suspension to be appropriate. 
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Id. at paras. 7, 9 (bracketed material added). 
While public officials are often subject to greater sanctions than private individuals for criminal 
conduct that reflects on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness, that is not always the case. This point 
is well-illustrated by the Court’s decisions under the Rules of Professional Conduct in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Niles, 126 Ohio St.3d 23, 2010 Ohio 2517, 929 N.E.2d 1064, and Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Kraemer, 126 Ohio St.3d 163, 2010 Ohio 3300, 931 N.E.2d 571. In Niles a municipal court clerk 
who was convicted of theft in office and record tampering received a two-year stayed suspension for 
violating Rule 8.4(b) (along with 8.4(c), (d) and (h). This sanction was motivated, in part, by the fact 
that the mitigating factors “overwhelmingly” outweighed the single aggravating factor present in the 
case, and that the clerk has already served almost two years on interim felony suspension for the 
criminal conduct. 
On its face, Kramer seems quite similar to Niles, except that Kramer’s theft (of funds from the 
respondent’s law firm) was not as a public official. In both cases the respondents had served nearly 
two years suspended from practice under an interim felony suspension. In both, the parties stipulated 
to a two-year suspension with one year stayed. In both, the Board recommended a two-year 
suspension all stayed. In Kraemer, the Board advanced the same cases (Carter, Brenner) in support 
of its recommendation as were cited in Niles. The similarities end there, however, with the Court 
rejecting the two-year stayed suspension imposed in Niles and imposing instead a two-year 
suspension with only one year stayed. Without even citing (and in fact ignoring, see quote below) 
Niles and while distinguishing the cases it relied on in that case, the Court in Kraemer took a 
different tack entirely: 
[W]e have consistently held that the misappropriation of law-firm 
funds warrants an actual suspension from the practice of law. [citing, 
among others, Brenner] . . . . Indeed, we are unaware of any 
disciplinary case involving a theft offense in which we have entirely 
stayed a respondent’s suspension. [The Court has a very short memory. 
Niles, a case that did just that, was decided 31 days before Kraemer.] 
Moreover, we have required attorneys to serve a period of actual 
suspension for engaging in a course of conduct that involves 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 
Id. at para. 13 (emphasis and bracketed material added). None of this was mentioned in Niles.  The 
Court’s failure even to recognize the conflict between the two decisions, much less attempt to 
reconcile them, is difficult to explain and leaves the practitioner guessing as to which approach might 
apply in the next case arising in a comparable context. 
 
For what it is worth, one of the quotations from Kraemer is perhaps worth repeating here. In seeking 
to explain the differences between the two sanctions, the Court had this to say: 
 
 At first, the distinction between a two-year suspension, all 
stayed on conditions, and a two-year suspension with one year stayed, 
and a credit for one year served under an interim suspension appears to 
be semantic, because under either sanction, respondent will not spend 
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any more actual time out of the practice of law, provided that he 
complies with the conditions of the stay. However, we have 
consistently held that the misappropriation of law-firm funds warrants 
an actual suspension from the practice of law [citing cases]. 
Id. at para. 13. Thus, in the Court’s mind, the difference is not just semantic but also symbolic, 
because of the actual-suspension principle underlying theft cases. This principle, however, did not 




8.4:400  Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit and Misrepresentation 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.4(c) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.4(c) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.22-1.27 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 101:401 
ALI-LGL § 2 
Wolfram § 3.3.1 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.22-1.27 (1996). 
In general: Ohio Rule 8.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” The identical OHCPR provision typically was invoked in its 
entirety; the case law evidenced little or no attempt by the Ohio Supreme Court to differentiate among 
the four types of conduct prohibited by the provision. One would expect precedent under the Code to 
be fully applicable in the interpretation of the same language in Rule 8.4(c).  
There was one, new, safe harbor added by the 2006 final revisions. Comment [2A] provides that 
division (c) “does not prohibit a lawyer from supervising or advising about lawful covert activity in 
the investigation of criminal activity or violations of constitutional or civil rights when authorized by 
law.” Ohio Rule 8.4 cmt. [2A]. In addition to the reference in the ABA Model Rules Comparison to 
Rule 8.4 to “involvement in lawful covert activities” as not being a violation of 8.4(c), the Summary 
of Post-Comment Revisions to Proposed Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct provides additional 
information regarding this change. After noting that Comment [2] is amended [in fact, Comment [2] 
was not amended; Comment [2A] was added] to permit lawyers to advise clients and others about 
covert investigations, the Summary goes on as follows: 
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This language would permit a prosecutor to advise police officers 
about an undercover operation or a private lawyer to provide advice 
about efforts to uncover discriminatory housing activities, without 
running afoul of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, Rule 
8.4(c) would continue to prohibit lawyers from engaging in misleading 
or deceitful conduct solely for the purpose of furthering a private cause 
of action. See Columbus Bar Ass’n v. King (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 174. 
Summary at 5. (The King case involved the attempt of respondent A, who conspired to have 
respondent B falsely represent to the former landlord of respondent A’s client that he was a lessor 
who had received a rental application from the client, to provoke the landlord to slander the client, so 
that respondent could add a defamation count to the slip-and-fall action to be filed against the 
landlord.) Ohio Comment [2A] is discussed in Lloyd Snyder, Lawyer Deception to Uncover 
Wrongdoing, Clev. B.J., Oct. 2007, at 10. 
The related topic of a lawyer’s surreptitious recording of telephone conversations with another or 
others was the subject of the advisory opinion Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievance & Discipline Op. 
2012-1, 2012 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (June 8, 2012). The Board opined that such a recording 
is not a per se violation of Rule 8.4(c) if the recording does not violate the law of the jurisdiction 
where the recording takes place. The acts associated with the recording, however, could violate 8.4(c) 
or other rules. Moreover, “[i]n general, Ohio lawyers should not record conversations with clients or 
prospective clients without their consent.” Id. at syllabus. In so opining, the Board made a number of 
points: First, that its new approach, based on ABA Formal Op. 01-422 (which had withdrawn ABA 
Formal Op. 337), provides better guidance for dealing with the issue than its earlier Board opinion, 
Op. 97-3, which itself had relied on ABA Op. 337 and which had opined that such recording, with 
law-enforcement exceptions, was unethical. Second, under Ohio law, (ORC 2933.52) “recording of 
wire, oral, and electronic communications is legal if the person instituting the recording is a party to 
the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent.” Op. 2012-1, 
at *4. Third, unethical conduct associated with the recording includes “lying about the recording, 
using deceitful tactics to become a party to the conversation, and using the recording to commit a 
crime or fraud.” Id. at *17. The opinion contains an extensive review of the precedent in Ohio and 
elsewhere dealing with the legality and ethics of surreptitious recording. 
In assessing lawyer conduct under the Rule 8.4(c)/ DR 1-102(A)(4) standard, at least one bar 
association opinion suggested that the lawyer’s subjective intent to deceive may not be a prerequisite 
to violation. In Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 76-4 (July 16, 1976), the inquiry was the 
propriety of an attorney sending a collection letter to a debtor and including within it a complaint, 
along with language in the letter that “If I do not hear from you by said date, I will assume that you are 
not interested in discussing this matter; and the enclosed complaint will be filed.” Id. at 1. The 
opinion criticized the inclusion of the complaint in the letter because of a fear that debtors might be 
misled into believing that judicial proceedings already had been commenced. The bar association felt 
that fostering such a misapprehension, regardless of the lawyer’s lack of intent to do so, violated 
former OH DR 1-102(A)(4). See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Bell, 15 Ohio St.3d 118, 472 
N.E.2d 1069 (1984), where the attorney argued that his conduct was not fraudulent because he lacked 
the intent to defraud. The Court rejected this argument in the following terms: 
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 Respondent next argues that his conduct was not fraudulent. 
The board found that “[r]espondent caused to be filed an account in the 
Summit County Probate Court which was false.” Respondent does not 
dispute that particular finding but insists that since he made a 
subsequent full disclosure to the probate court, he lacked the intent to 
defraud. Contrary to respondent’s position, the record amply supports 
the board’s finding that, in intentionally submitting two false 
accountings to the probate court, respondent’s conduct was fraudulent. 
Respondent’s argument in this regard is thus without merit. 
Id. at 119-20, 472 N.E.2d at 1071. 
An argument similar to that in Bell, but with a new twist, was made by the respondent in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Robinson, 126 Ohio St.3d 371, 2010 Ohio 3829, 933 N.E.2d 1095.  With regard to the 
Rule 8.4(c), (d) and (h) charges, Robinson argued that there was a failure of proof that he “willfully” 
violated the rule “and therefore, pursuant to Gov. Bar R IV(1), he cannot be punished for violating the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.”  Id. at para. 16. The Court did not directly address the 
willfulness-is-required issue, but rather concluded that the record “contains ample evidence from 
which we may infer respondent’s willful violation of these rules.” Id. (The “ample evidence” 
included his testifying at a hearing that he did not take confidential firm documents from his office, 
even though he was caught by a surveillance camera doing so; later that same day he went home and 
“placed several boxes of firm documents in his car. As he drove toward downtown Columbus, he 
stopped three or four times to tear up and dispose of confidential firm documents.” Id. at para. 11) 
More interesting, perhaps, is the question not directly addressed: whether willfulness or some other 
scienter requirement is in fact an element of violation of these, or any, of the ethical rules. On the one 
hand, Rule 8.4(c), (d) and (h) do not include a “willful” or comparable component, whereas 8.4(a) 
and (f) make acting “knowingly” an element of the violation. See also Rule 3.3(a) (“knowingly”), 
3.4(c) (“knowingly”) and 3.4(d) (“intentionally”).  See also, under the Code, e.g., Richland County 
Bar Ass’n v. Dans, 57 Ohio St.3d 196, 566 N.E.2d 678 (violation of DR 9-102 for failure to set up 
trust account even though respondent was ignorant of the Rule’s requirement to do so). On the other 
hand, Gov. Bar R IV(1) does indeed talk in terms of “willful breach of the Rules shall be punished by 
reprimand, suspension, disbarment, or probation as provided in Gov. Bar R V.” But Gov. Bar R V 
does not talk in terms of “willful” violation at all; see R V(6)(J), (L). Perhaps the answer lies in the 
particular offense charged: if “illegal” under 8.4(b) or fraudulent under 8.4(c), willful, intentional or 
knowing conduct may well be essential to some or all violations, whereas it seems unlikely that a 
willful element should be read into 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice) or 8.4(h) (engaging in any other conduct adversely reflecting on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice). 
The language of the Rule does not address the severity of conduct necessary to constitute an act of 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. It is possible that some conduct, although technically 
involving a misrepresentation, may not be substantial enough to warrant discipline. See, under the 
Code, Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 93-4, at 1 (n.d.) (misstatement of facts in a request for an advisory 
opinion from a local bar association may not “arise [sic] to the dignity of the wrongdoing envisioned 
by the Canon”). And see, in this regard, Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Ezzone, 102 Ohio St.3d 79, 
2004 Ohio 1774, 806 N.E.2d 991, where respondent’s conviction of a misdemeanor for failing to file 
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a federal income tax return violated DR 1-102(A)(4). In the course of deciding that a one-year 
suspension, all stayed on conditions, was appropriate, the Court noted that “respondent’s misconduct 
did not involve lies to a court or client, Dayton Bar Assn. v. Millonig (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 403, 704 
N.E.2d 568 (implying that the most serious violations of DR 1-102[A][4] involve dishonesty toward a 
client or court).” 102 Ohio St.3d 79, at para. 3 (bracketed form of disciplinary rule citation in 
original). 
Although neither Ezzone or Millonig was cited in Disciplinary Counsel v. Dockry, 133 Ohio St.3d 
527, 2012 Ohio 5014, 979 N.E.2d 313, the Court, in imposing a one-year suspension, all stayed on 
condition, used language that is somewhat reminiscent of these earlier cases when explaining why no 
actual suspension was imposed, even though one of the violations was of Rule 8.4(c): 
 Although Dockry did misappropriate client funds from his 
client trust account, as Harick and Reik [respondents in two earlier 
cases] did, he did not make affirmative misrepresentations to his clients, 
as Harick and Reik did. Nor did he issue checks to clients when there 
were not sufficient funds in the bank to cover them. Thus, even though 
Dockry engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation by 
taking an unauthorized loan from his client trust account, we find that 
his conduct is more comparable to [respondents in other cases where 
trust account violations were shown, one of which included a DR 
1-102(A)(4) violation as well]. 
Id. at para. 22. It can also fairly be said that the level of the severity of the 8.4(c) conduct by Dockry 
was at the lower end of the scale: his “unauthorized borrowing” of $2,000 in client funds was paid 
back in full to the trust account two days later with no harm to Dockry’s clients. Accord Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Edwards, 134 Ohio St.3d 271, 2012 Ohio 5643 981 N.E.2d 857 (two-year suspension 
all stayed; strong mitigating factors, including full restitution to trust account of funds appropriated). 
A further wrinkle might be noted in Edwards: In deciding that there was an 8.4(c) violation, the 
Court adopted the Board’s finding that unauthorized removal of funds from the trust account 
“necessarily involves dishonesty, regardless of whether he made any false representations regarding 
his conduct.” Id. at para. 8. (Compare this language with that language quoted above from Ezzone 
regarding dishonesty that includes lying to a client.) 
But where the misrepresentation is clear and significant, a major sanction is warranted. As the Ohio 
Supreme Court stated in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 187, 
658 N.E.2d 237, 237 (1995) (syllabus), involving a lawyer’s lying to and misleading the client: 
“When an attorney engages in a course of conduct that violates DR 1-102(A)(4), the attorney will be 
actually suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.” Accord, e.g., 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Hauk, 129 Ohio St.3d 209, 2011 Ohio 3281, 951 N.E.2d 83 (Fowerbaugh 
rule followed; strong evidence of good works and pro-bono activity do not excuse deceitful and 
deceptive conduct; reinstating panel’s recommendation of one-year suspension with six months 
stayed); Disciplinary Counsel v. Simmons, 120 Ohio St.3d 304, 2008 Ohio 6142, 898 N.E.2d 943 
(misrepresentations to Michigan courts while suspended from practice in Ohio; one-year suspension 
with six months stayed; Fowerbaugh rule applied); Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 119 Ohio 
St.3d 47, 2008 Ohio 3321, 891 N.E.2d 740 (Fowerbaugh followed; two-year suspension with 
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second year stayed on conditions); Disciplinary Counsel v. Rooney, 110 Ohio St.3d 349, 2006 
Ohio 4576, 853 N.E.2d 663 (even with number of mitigating factors and no aggravating factors, 
actual six-month suspension imposed, citing Fowerbaugh, for dishonest conduct designed to mislead 
client); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Caliman, 83 Ohio St.3d 461, 462, 700 N.E.2d 857, 857 (1998) 
(because Board’s recommended sanction for violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) (six-month suspension 
with entire suspension period stayed) did “not follow the Fowerbaugh prescription of ‘actual 
suspension,’“ stay eliminated). 
The Fowerbaugh Court justified this newly recognized per se standard in the following terms: 
We express our growing concern with the increase in the discipline 
matters referred to us by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances 
and Discipline in which members of the bar of Ohio have deceived 
their clients or a court. . . . Such conduct strikes at the very core of a 
lawyer’s relationship with the court and the client. Respect for our 
profession is diminished with every deceitful act of a lawyer. We 
cannot expect citizens to trust that lawyers are honest if we have not yet 
sanctioned those who are not. Therefore, recognizing that the sanctions 
that we have imposed heretofore against lawyers who have violated 
DR 1-102(A)(4) are apparently not causing some lawyers to 
understand the importance of being honest with courts and clients, we 
announce a rule that will be applied to this case and future cases. When 
an attorney engages in a course of conduct resulting in a finding that 
the attorney has violated DR 1-102(A)(4), the attorney will be actually 
suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time. 
74 Ohio St.3d at 190, 658 N.E.2d at 239-40.  
Invoking the Fowerbaugh rule in Disciplinary Counsel v. Manning, 111 Ohio St.3d 349, 2006 
5794, 856 N.E.2d 259, the Court had this to say: 
Respondent engaged in a methodical pattern of dishonest conduct over 
many months, lying to his clients repeatedly and even covering his 
tracks with a fraudulent settlement document that barred the clients 
from discussing the “settlement” with anyone else.  This conduct is 
unacceptable for a member of a profession in which loyalty, candor, 
and diligence are essential. 
Id. at para 14 (two-year actual suspension imposed). Additional precedent in accord includes 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Wolanin, 121 Ohio St.3d 390, 2009 1393, 904 N.E.2d 879 (misuse of 
settlement proceeds; indefinite suspension; lawyer violating 1-102(A)(4) will “ordinarily” be 
suspended, citing Fowerbaugh; respondent won no friends when he “booked a three-month trip to 
Poland to begin on the date of his scheduled disciplinary hearing,” id. at para. 14); Dayton Bar 
Ass’n v. Rogers, 116 Ohio St.3d 99, 2007 Ohio 5544, 876 N.E.2d 923 (actual suspension for 
1-102(A)(4) violation “‘particularly appropriate where an attorney’s dishonesty has been directed 
toward a client,’“ id. at para. 19; two-year suspension); accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Raso, 129 
Ohio St.3d 277, 2011 Ohio 2900, 951 N.E.2d 755 (using the “particularly appropriate” formation in 
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imposing six-month suspension). Judges are likewise subject to the Fowerbaugh rule. See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 104 Ohio St.3d 251, 2004 Ohio 6402, 819 N.E.2d 273 (“Because 
respondent misrepresented facts in a journal entry . . ., an actual suspension is warranted based solely 
on that conduct.” Id. at para. 40 (citing Fowerbaugh)). (See further discussion of this and a 
subsequent Medley decision at “Misconduct in the judicial process,” this section infra.) 
In other cases subsequent to Fowerbaugh, however, the Supreme Court has limited the reach of the 
standard, finding exceptions to its application in certain circumstances. One formulation is well 
illustrated in the Court’s opinion in Disciplinary Counsel v. Cuckler, 101 Ohio St.3d 318, 2004 
Ohio 784, 804 N.E.2d 966, where a unanimous Court stated, in approving a public-reprimand 
sanction: 
 When an attorney engages in a course of conduct that violates 
DR 1-102(A)(4), we will ordinarily suspend the attorney’s license to 
practice law for an appropriate period of time. [citing Fowerbaugh 
syllabus]. In that case, an attorney was suspended for six months for 
lying repeatedly to a client in an effort to conceal his neglect of the 
client’s case. However, because some violations of this Disciplinary 
Rule are more egregious than others, a lesser sanction may be justified 
where little or no harm resulted from the DR 1-102(A)(4) violation or 
where the violation represented an isolated incident in the attorney’s 
career.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cox, 98 Ohio St.3d 420, 2003 Ohio 
1553, 786 N.E.2d 454 (attorney publicly reprimanded for falsely 
denying his knowledge of certain information during a disciplinary 
investigation). An abundance of mitigating evidence may also warrant 
our lenience.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Markijohn, 99 Ohio St.3d 489, 
2003 Ohio 4129, 794 N.E.2d 24 (six-month suspension, all stayed, was 
warranted for attorney’s violation of OH DR 1-102[A][4] after taking 
into account his expressed remorse, lack of prior disciplinary record, 
restitution, report of his own misconduct, personal difficulties, and 
established professional competence and integrity apart from the 
misconduct). 
101 Ohio St.3d 318, at para. 10 (bracketed form of citation to rule in original). Accord Akron Bar 
Ass’n v. Gibson, 128 Ohio St.3d 347, 2011 Ohio 628, 944 N.E.2d 228 (substantial mitigating 
factors together with no evidence that client was harmed; therefore exception to Fowerbaugh 
justified; stayed one-year suspension); Disciplinary Counsel v. Potter, 126 Ohio St.3d 50, 2010 
Ohio 2521, 930 N.E.2d 307 (significant mitigating factors, including no prior record, full 
cooperation, and self-reporting resulted in exception to the actual suspension rule for violation of 
8.4(c); one-year stayed suspension imposed, even though one aggravating factor –dishonest or selfish 
motive – was present); Disciplinary Counsel v. Niermeyer, 119 Ohio St.3d 99, 2008 Ohio 3824, 
892 N.E.2d 434 (Fowerbaugh rule recognized but 12-month suspension stayed, based on significant 
mitigating factors and fact that misstep was “isolated incident in an otherwise unblemished legal 
career,” id. at para. 13); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Shea, 117 Ohio St.3d 55, 2008 Ohio 263, 881 
N.E.2d 847 (isolated incident; emphasis on absence of course of conduct such as that present in 
Fowerbaugh); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Stubbs, 109 Ohio St.3d 446, 2006 Ohio 2818, 848 N.E.2d 
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843 (isolated incident, significant mitigating factors; six-month suspension, all stayed, citing, inter 
alia, Markijohn); Portage County Bar Ass’n v. Mitchell, 101 Ohio St.3d 1, 2003 Ohio 6449, 800 
N.E.2d 1106 (isolated incident, no harm, citing, inter alia, Kramer and Eisenberg infra); Toledo 
Bar Ass’n v. Kramer, 89 Ohio St.3d 321, 731 N.E.2d 643 (2000) (exception to Fowerbaugh rule 
made for respondent, whose misconduct was isolated incident and occurred while he was being 
treated for depression brought about by his father’s death; one-year stayed suspension imposed); and 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Eisenberg, 81 Ohio St.3d 295, 690 N.E.2d 1282 (1998) (public 
reprimand for arranging for assistant to forge signatures of estate beneficiaries, where misconduct 
was isolated instance, had no adverse financial consequences, and signatures placed on legitimate 
estate documents for convenience of signers). See Akron Bar Ass’n v. DeLoach, 130 Ohio St.3d 
153, 2011 Ohio 4201, 956 N.E.2d 811 (six-month stayed suspension; Fowerbaugh principle 
recognized but not applied because of “significant mitigating factors.” Court also found that 
respondent’s actions caused no harm but did not explicitly tie this finding to the alternative “little or 
no harm” basis for exception articulated in Cuckler); Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Millonig, 84 Ohio St.3d 
403, 704 N.E.2d 568 (1999) (failure to file personal income tax returns; Court acknowledged 
Fowerbaugh but upheld sanction of public reprimand because “there is no evidence in the case that 
respondent ever lied to his clients or any court,”  id. at 405, 704 N.E.2d at 569). 
Another formulation justifying an exception from imposition of an actual suspension was set forth in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kimmins, 123 Ohio St.3d 207, 2009 Ohio 4943, 915 N.E.2d 330, where 
the Court recognized the Fowerbaugh rule (as restated in Disciplinary Counsel v. Rooney, 110 
Ohio St.3d 349, 2006 Ohio 4576, 853 N.E.2d 663), but concluded that the mitigating factors of no 
prior disciplinary record, full cooperation in the investigation, acceptance of responsibility for the 
conduct in question, and strong character references in respondent’s favor justified the imposition of a 
one-year suspension, all stayed. The direct precedent for this exception was the case of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006 Ohio 6510, 858 N.E.2d 368, which wasn’t a 
Fowerbaugh actual-suspension case at all, because the sanction issue was whether to impose a 
one-year stayed suspension (as recommended by the Board) or a public reprimand. The Court decided 
on the latter, since the faulty record-keeping for fee purposes did not, in the words of one panel 
member, turn one hour into three, but turned three hours into one. See 112 Ohio St.3d 103, at para. 6. 
The three Kimmins dissenters found Agopian less than persuasive on the sanction issue, given that it 
involved “sloppy record keeping,” rather than the dishonesty present in Kimmins. 
Despite the result in Kimmins, an abundance of mitigating evidence has not kept the Court from 
applying the Fowerbaugh actual-suspension rule for a violation of 1-102(A)(4) where the breach was 
a “deliberate effort to deceive”; “[i]ndeed, for the audacity of respondent’s ethical violations, the 
general rule requiring an actual suspension from the practice of law must apply.” Cleveland Bar 
Ass’n v. McMahon, 114 Ohio St.3d 331, 2007 Ohio 3673, 872 N.E.2d 261, at para. 28 (respondent 
fabricated letter supposedly recounting verbatim testimony at court hearing on traffic violation by 
client’s adversary in personal-injury suit, including an admission of guilt – none of which occurred – 
and sent it to defendant’s insurance company in effort to persuade insurer to enter into settlement 
negotiations; respondent cited other cases (e.g., Cuckler, Eisenberg) where significant mitigating 
evidence resulted in public reprimand, but “[i]n none of these cases, however, did the lawyers as 
deliberately exceed the bounds of our standard for truthfulness as has respondent.” Id. at para. 26.). 
And the presence of significant aggravating factors will increase the odds that the Fowerbaugh 
actual-suspension rule will be imposed. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Karris, 129 Ohio St.3d 499, 
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2011 Ohio 4243, 954 N.E.2d 118 (multiple improper notarizations resulting in violations of DR 
1-102(A)(4) and (6); Board recommended public reprimand but Court imposed six-month 
suspension). 
A troubling Fowerbaugh-rule case is Disciplinary Counsel v. Carroll, 106 Ohio St.3d 84, 2005 
Ohio 3805, 831 N.E.2d 1000, in which the respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by padding his hours 
as Ohio State Barber Board executive director, “a full-time position.” Eleven different times over a 
six-month period, respondent filled out timesheets that were inaccurate. Some of these inaccurate 
timesheets reflected a full day’s work as executive director, “when in fact he had spent part of the 
workday out of the office attending court proceedings for his private legal clients,” id. at para. 4. 
Despite these facts, the Board of Commissioners found that “he was not attempting to receive pay for 
work he did not perform,” and therefore did not act “with a selfish or dishonest motive.” Id. at para. 
10. This “logic,” however counterintuitive, redounded to respondent’s benefit in the form of a stayed 
six-month suspension. (Chief Justice Moyer, joined by Justice O’Connor, would have imposed an 
actual six-month suspension.) 
The Carroll “logic” was perpetuated in Disciplinary Counsel v. McNeal, 131 Ohio St.3d 224, 2012 
Ohio 785, 963 N.E.2d 815, where the Court used Carroll to distinguish the case at bar for sanction 
purposes. The respondent in McNeal was a former lieutenant colonel in the Army Judge Advocate 
Corps, who had resigned rather than face separation from the service while under investigation for 
having submitted false pay forms for hours not worked. Citing the Carroll decision, the Court 
reiterated that “[a]lthough Carroll’s recordkeeping was deficient, . . . the board found no evidence that 
he had acted with a dishonest or selfish motive. In contrast, McNeal’s resignation came after the Air 
Force conducted a three-month investigation and initiated a separation action against him.” Id. at 
para. 5. (Also, unlike Carroll, McNeal failed to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation and paid 
no restitution.) McNeal was given an actual one-year suspension. 
For an OH DR 1-102(A)(4) violation case in which the Fowerbaugh rule was neither applied nor 
acknowledged, see Columbus Bar Ass’n v. DiAlbert, 98 Ohio St.3d 386, 2003 Ohio 1091, 785 
N.E.2d 747 (six-month suspension, all stayed). Accord Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Ezzone, 102 
Ohio St.3d 79, 2004 Ohio 1774, 806 N.E.2d 991. See also Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Russell, 114 
Ohio St.3d 171, 2007 Ohio 3603, 870 N.E.2d 1164, Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Daugherty, 105 Ohio 
St.3d 307, 2005 Ohio 1825, 825 N.E.2d 1094, and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mezacapa, 
101 Ohio St.3d 156, 2004 Ohio 302, 803 N.E.2d 397, in each of which a public reprimand was 
issued under 1-102(A)(4) for respondent’s violation of notary-public duties. (In Mezacapa, the 
respondent signed his client’s name (with the client’s permission) to a document and then notarized it; 
Fowerbaugh not mentioned. In Russell and Dougherty, respondents notarized signature(s) that they 
did not witness, which signatures turned out to be forged; Fowerbaugh rule and exceptions 
discussed.) 
A lawyer who violates her obligations as a notary public does not always get off so easily, however. 
In Disciplinary Counsel v. Jones, 103 Ohio St.3d 590, 2004 Ohio 5697, 817 N.E.2d 841, the 
respondent pressed such violations over the edge, and, in conjunction with numerous other infractions, 
was disbarred: 
respondent notarized the signatures on the quitclaim deed by falsely 
certifying that . . . she had witnessed four members of the Miller family 
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sign the deed personally. Respondent also falsely certified in the 
notarization that . . . she had witnessed eight more members of the 
Miller family sign the deed. In addition, respondent forged the 
signature of a former paralegal, a purported witness, nine times on the 
quitclaim deed. 
Id. at para. 12. Another instance of disbarment resulting from multiple infractions, including a 
variety of notarization misdeeds (e.g., notarizing unsigned documents or those not signed by the 
purported signer) is Disciplinary Counsel v. Longino, 128 Ohio St.3d 426, 2011 Ohio 1524, 945 
N.E.2d 1040. See also Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Trivers, 123 Ohio St.3d 436, 2009 Ohio 5285, 917 
N.E.2d 261 (multiple instances of notary abuse resulted in actual suspension – one year, with six 
months stayed; the two dissenters would have stayed the suspension given respondent’s having 
“practice[ed] law for 49 years without a blemish,” id. at para. 11.). 
Given the breadth of actions covered by the language of Rule 8.4(c), examples of transgressions of 
that same standard under the Code are legion. Common instances in which this provision has been 
invoked are set forth in the subsections that follow. 
Private conduct: In some cases, violations of former DR 1-102(A)(4) stemmed from essentially 
private conduct. (Although arguments have sometimes been made to the contrary, there is no doubt 
that private misconduct can violate Rule 8.4. Disciplinary Counsel v. Character, 129 Ohio St.3d 
60, 2011 Ohio 2902, 950 N.E.2d 177, at paras. 67–68). For example, all of the following were 
sources of 1-102(A)(4) violations: 
 sexual misconduct, e.g., Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Williamson, 117 Ohio St.3d 399, 2008 
Ohio 1196, 884 N.E.2d 55 (lying to conceal sexual relationship with client; denying in 
correspondence with lawyer for client’s husband that he was representing her, “although he 
continued to assist her in secret,” id. at para. 5; because of his affair with client while 
continuing to represent her, “respondent risked his client’s legal and personal interests for his 
own advantage,” id. at para. 6, thereby violating 1-102(A)(5) & (6) as well); Akron Bar 
Ass’n v. Williams, 104 Ohio St.3d 317, 2004 Ohio 6588, 819 N.E.2d 677 (taking sexual 
advantage of vulnerable client and then lying under oath about relationship; violation of OH 
DR 1-102(A)(4) & (6)); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Randall, 43 Ohio St.3d 149, 539 
N.E.2d 160 (1989) (attorney convicted of gross sexual imposition and indecent exposure 
violated DR 1-102(A)(3)-(6)). 
 drug offenses, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. May, 106 Ohio St.3d 385, 2005 Ohio 5320, 835 
N.E.2d 372 (guilty plea to two counts of obtaining dangerous drug through deception; 
treatment in lieu of conviction; violation of DR 1-102(A)(3), (4) & (6); because of significant 
mitigating factors, including successful completion of treatment program, two-year stayed 
suspension imposed); Disciplinary Counsel v. Stern, 106 Ohio St.3d 266, 2005 Ohio 4804, 
834 N.E.2d 351 (guilty plea to, inter alia, charge of conspiracy to distribute heroin; violation 
of DR 1-102(A)(3), (4) & (6); disbarment imposed). 
 tax violations, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Large, 122 Ohio St.3d 35, 2009 Ohio 2022, 907 
N.E.2d 1162 (conviction for failure to file federal income tax returns); Geauga County Bar 
Ass’n v. Bruner, 98 Ohio St.3d 312, 2003 Ohio 736, 784 N.E.2d 687 (failure to pay 
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employee’s withholding taxes; instead, respondent kept the amount withheld and then “tried 
to conceal his theft with false documentation,” id. at para. 6). If the tax violations reach 
egregious proportions, disbarment can result. Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Schram, 122 Ohio St.3d 
8, 2009 Ohio 1931, 907 N.E.2d 311 (failure to file personal federal, state, and income tax 
returns for over 20 years; failure to withhold employees’ federal income taxes for same 
period). 
 petty theft, Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Lockhart, 84 Ohio St.3d 7, 701 N.E.2d 686 (1998) 
(shoplifting conviction violated DR 1-102(A)(4)). 
 identity theft, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Zins, 116 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007 Ohio 5263, 875 N.E.2d 
941 (while working as customer-service representative at bank, respondent conceived and 
executed plan to steal money from bank customers by means of identity theft, using bank 
records; two-year suspension, with no credit for time already served under interim suspension 
from felony conviction; three justices dissented and argued that respondent’s misuse of 
position of trust justified indefinite suspension). 
Overreaching in personal matters also has been disciplined under this provision. For example, in 
Akron Bar Ass’n v. Parker, 52 Ohio St.3d 262, 557 N.E.2d 116 (1990), the Court held that an 
attorney who caused his father to revoke a prior will and name the attorney trustee of the estate assets 
with unfettered discretion over them, and who arguably abused that discretion, violated several 
provisions, including DR 1-102(A)(4). See also Erie-Huron Counties Joint Certified Grievance 
Comm. v. Meyerhofer, 99 Ohio St.3d 62, 2003 Ohio 2467, 788 N.E.2d 1073 (in his capacity as 
successor trustee of deceased client’s trust, respondent failed to distribute trust assets until 16 months 
after client’s death and falsely advised one of beneficiaries prior to this time that distribution had 
already been made); Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Gross, 62 Ohio St.3d 224, 581 N.E.2d 520 (1991) 
(lawyer’s improper use of power of attorney to deplete his mother’s accounts for his personal use 
violated DR 1-102(A)(1), (3), (4) & (6)). 
Certainly one of the clearest demonstrations of how misconduct unrelated to the practice of law (even 
if not technically “private”) can bear on the lawyers’ qualifications to practice is found in Mahoning 
County Bar Ass’n v. Theisler, 125 Ohio St.3d 144, 2010 Ohio 1472, 926 N.E.2d 630. The 
respondent in Theisler was found guilty of 98 felonies and was given an indefinite suspension for 
violation of DR 1-102 (A) (4) & (6). He had engaged in writing pain-killer prescriptions on a doctor’s 
pre-signed blank prescription pads, while working for doctors at a pain management clinic. He did so, 
even though he was not a licensed physician or a certified medical assistant. These actions resulted in 
criminal charges of drug trafficking, engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, and practicing medicine 
without a license. 
With respect to sanctions, “[r]espondent makes much of the fact that he did not believe at the time 
what he was doing when working as a physician’s assistant . . . was wrong . . . .”  Id. at para. 20. At 
the hearing, respondent testified that he had researched the issue prior to taking the job and “[f]rom 
that research, he erroneously concluded that he could perform medical examinations, give injections, 
and undertake any other clinical work that the physicians might delegate to him under supervision.”  
Id. at para. 8.  This testimony came back to bite him: 
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We are compelled to agree with relator that “a lawyer who (allegedly) 
researches an issue and, in reliance on that research, is convicted of 98 
felonies, is as much of a threat to future potential clients as a lawyer 
who researches the law and knows his conduct is wrong but  
nevertheless commits the felonies.” 
Id. at para. 21. 
Fraudulent and dishonest schemes: Violations often arose from a lawyer’s participation in schemes 
involving fraud or dishonesty or both. Embezzlement or other misappropriation from  
 the lawyer’s firm, Disciplinary Counsel v. Kraemer , 126 Ohio St.3d 163, 2010 Ohio 3300, 
931 N.E.2d 571 (failure to remit to firm agreed amount of fees collected by respondent; 
two-year suspension with one year stayed on conditions); Disciplinary Counsel v. Brenner, 
122 Ohio St.3d 523, 2009 Ohio 3602, 912 N.E.2d 1116 (using settlement money belonging 
to firm to pay personal expenses; despite respondent’s “‘extended pattern of fraud and 
deception,’“ id. at para. 17, sanction imposed was only two-year suspension with one year 
stayed); Disciplinary Counsel v. Zigan, 118 Ohio St.3d 180, 2008 Ohio 1976, 887 N.E.2d 
334 (converting substantial amount of funds belonging to his law firm, plus preparing false 
documents on which he forged clients’ signatures, in attempt to conceal his theft from firm; 
disbarment ordered); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Schwieterman, 115 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007 Ohio 
4266, 873 N.E.2d 810 (numerous instances of converting law firm funds to his own use and 
on one occasion lying to firm that he never secured check from client; indefinite suspension); 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Washington, 109 Ohio St.3d 308, 2006 Ohio 2423, 847 N.E.2d 
435 (billing firm clients $91,000 in fees for work not performed; converting retainers to his 
personal use; all motivated by cocaine and alcohol dependency); Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Yajko, 77 Ohio St.3d 385, 674 N.E.2d 684 (1997) (twenty separate occasions on 
which respondent stole from his law firm violated DR 1-102(A)(4) & (6); indefinite 
suspension imposed despite (or perhaps because of) respondent’s evidence in mitigation that 
he was “barely getting by,” and yet elected to incur replacement and increased insurance costs 
for his boat, which had sunk,  id. at 387-88, 674 N.E.2d at 686), 
 his employer, Akron Bar Ass’n v. Carter, 115 Ohio St.3d 18, 2007 Ohio 4262, 873 N.E.2d 
824 (misuse of company’s credit card for personal expenses; two-year suspension with second 
year stayed on conditions); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Blankemeyer, 109 Ohio St.3d 156, 
2006 Ohio 2038, 846 N.E.2d 523 (embezzlement of over $184,000 to support prescription 
drug habit; permanent disbarment ordered), or 
 other business associates, Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Galvin, 11 Ohio St.3d 37, 462 N.E.2d 1383 
(1984) (attorney who diverted $37,000 from bank account of person with whom he had 
business relationship, but not attorney-client relationship, violated DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), & 
(6)), 
clearly falls within this category. 
More common in the reported cases were schemes or misrepresentations directed at others. Some 
illustrative examples include: 
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 participation in mail and wire fraud conspiracy to dupe real estate agents and appraisers to pay 
for membership in association in exchange for non-existent errors-and-omissions insurance, 
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Ritson, 127 Ohio St.3d 89, 2010 Ohio 4504, 936 N.E.2d 931,  
 failing to pay expert witness fee; “respondent’s order to stop payment and refusal to honor his 
debt to the expert witness is conduct that reflects at least deceit and misrepresentation,” 
Disciplinary Counsel v. McCord, 121 Ohio St.3d 497, 2009 Ohio 1517, 905 N.E.2d 1182, 
at para. 14, 
 placing personal funds in client trust account in effort to shield them from creditors was 
“dishonest and prejudicial to the administration of justice”; “a lawyer may not use his trust 
account . . . as a ‘safe haven’ for his money to avoid his personal financial responsibilities.” 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Vogtsberger, 119 Ohio St.3d 458, 2008 Ohio 4571, 895 N.E.2d 
158, at paras. 9, 10, 
 
 conviction of conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of Sherman Act, Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Margolis, 114 Ohio St.3d 165, 2007 Ohio 3607, 870 N.E.2d 1158, 
 pledging as collateral for personal loan $250,000 certificate of deposit of company of which 
respondent was managing director when bank thought it was on behalf of company, 
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Garfield, 109 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006 Ohio 1935, 846 
N.E.2d 45, 
 suggesting to client, after order of bankruptcy court allowing creditor to repossess car, that 
client hide car from creditors: “if they can’t find it, they can’t get it.” Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. 
Freedman, 107 Ohio St.3d 25, 2005 Ohio 5831, 836 N.E.2d 559, at para. 8, 
 knowingly altering odometer on vehicle, a federal crime, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Dragelevich, 106 Ohio St.3d 478, 2005 Ohio 5515, 835 N.E.2d 1261, 
 forging signatures of common pleas judge and magistrate on document purporting to be filed 
petition and consent judgment entry, which was then faxed by respondent to school officials 
as providing necessary documentation to allow client to obtain temporary custody of his 
cousin, thereby permitting the cousin to attend the preferred school without tuition.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Insley, 104 Ohio St.3d 424, 2004 Ohio 6564, 819 N.E.2d 1109 
(Court found Board’s recommended sanction of two years, with second year stayed, “not 
commensurate with the duplicity respondent demonstrated,” id. at para. 11; sanction 
increased to indefinite suspension), 
 wrongfully converting and selling shares pledged by debtor as security in loan transaction; 
falsely claiming that officer of debtor had authorized the sale, Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Johnson, 100 Ohio St.3d 291, 2003 Ohio 5753, 798 N.E.2d 604, 
 altering QDRO documents to increase client’s share of her ex-husband’s 401(k) and pension 
benefits, which documents were thereafter filed with domestic relations court by one of 
respondent’s employees, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Herman, 99 Ohio St.3d 362, 
2003 Ohio 3932, 792 N.E.2d 1078 (violation of, inter alia, 1-102(A)(3)-(5), 
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 falsely representing to client’s successor attorney that he had refunded $2,000 of his client’s 
money, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Treneff, 98 Ohio St.3d 348, 2003 Ohio 1011, 785 
N.E.2d 434, 
 knowingly creating certificate of authenticity that falsely represented the value of paintings 
shipped to clients of telemarketing scheme, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Harris, 84 
Ohio St.3d 3, 701 N.E.2d 682 (1998) (lawyer pled guilty to felony of conspiring to defraud 
the United States; violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) & (6) (but not (3), as charged), resulting in 
indefinite suspension), 
 general counsel’s tangential involvement in and tacit approval of a scheme by the company’s 
financial officer to submit a false payroll report in order to reduce worker’s compensation 
premiums, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Dukat, 79 Ohio St.3d 189, 680 N.E.2d 972 
(1997) (because of mitigating factors, respondent’s suspension was made coextensive with 
probation being served for federal felony conviction (mail fraud) based on involvement in 
scheme), 
 falsifying documents (a traffic accident report, doctor’s report, and civil action complaint) in 
an insurance claim file by inserting insured’s name into all three documents in an effort to 
make it appear that insured had lied when he stated that he had not been involved in any prior 
traffic accidents, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Spencer, 71 Ohio St.3d 316, 643 
N.E.2d 1086 (1994) (conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4)-(6), warranting one-year suspension). 
A more recent example is Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Farrell, 119 Ohio St.3d 529, 2008 Ohio 
4540, 895 N.E.2d 800, in which the respondent engaged in “multiple acts of duplicity,” 
including a forged power of attorney in order to obtain an increase in his and his wife’s line of 
credit from their bank, as well as fabricated multiple letters designed to deceive his wife as to 
his course of conduct, 
 participating in a scheme to submit fraudulent workers’ compensation claims to the Industrial 
Commission, Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Cassaro, 61 Ohio St.3d 62, 399 N.E.2d 
545 (1980) (such conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3)-(6) and 7-102); cf. Columbus Bar Ass’n 
v. Newsom, 59 Ohio St.2d 56, 391 N.E.2d 741 (1979) (filing fraudulent insurance claims 
violated 1-102(A)(3), (4) & (6)), 
 knowingly certifying false income data for an employee in order to secure a loan for them both, 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Wang, 59 Ohio St.3d 67, 570 N.E.2d 274 (1991) (conduct violated 
DR 1-102(A)(3), (4) & (6), but where attorney cooperated in investigation, lending institution 
suffered no financial harm, and attorney was involved in community and charitable causes, 
public reprimand was held to be sufficient punishment), 
 participation by an assistant prosecutor in a ticket-fixing operation, Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Smakula, 39 Ohio St.3d 143, 529 N.E.2d 1376 (1988) (see discussion of 
Smakula in section 8.4:300 at “Obstruction of Justice”), 
 taking part in a fraudulent scheme to sell back to the true owner or insurer a truck that the 
attorney knew to be stolen, Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Sandler, 51 Ohio St.2d 132, 
364 N.E.2d 1168 (1977) (such conduct warranted only public reprimand, despite 
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recommendation for indefinite suspension, where respondent was acquitted of criminal 
charges and ultimately took no fee), 
 adding a provision to agreed judgment entry without consent of opposing counsel or client, 
Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Walker, 17 Ohio St.3d 144, 478 N.E.2d 767 (1985), and 
 intentionally tampering with utility meters, resulting in the theft of utility services worth more 
than $775,000, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Heekin, 9 Ohio St.3d 84, 459 N.E.2d 495 (1984) 
(conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3), (4) & (6); lawyer disbarred). 
Misconduct in the judicial process: Another common cause for sanction under DR 1-102(A)(4) was 
behavior that undermined the judicial process. (Such conduct often involved a violation of DR 7-102 
as well; see sections 3.3:200-:310, :500, :610, 3.4:200-:300, :600. One such case involving violation 
of both provisions is Disciplinary Counsel v. Yeager, 123 Ohio St.3d 156, 2009 Ohio 4761, 914 
N.E.2d 1046, where respondent on three separate occasions made misrepresentations to the juvenile 
court. The DR 1-102(A)(4), 7-102(A)(5), and other violations resulted in her indefinite suspension. 
Accord, under the Rules, Disciplinary Counsel v. Rohrer, 124 Ohio St.3d 65, 2009 Ohio 5930, 919 
N.E.2d 191 (3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) violated by “knowingly telling the juvenile court judge . . . that 
[respondent’s] staff had ‘misconstrued’ his directions, when in fact he had told them to deliver motion 
to newspaper in defiance of court’s gag order. Id. at para. 20.) Inhibiting the investigation of a crime 
by knowingly keeping a client’s contraband from authorities violated 1-102(A)(4).  Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Freedman, 49 Ohio St.3d 65, 551 N.E.2d 143 (1990) (obstruction of justice). An assistant 
prosecutor’s theft of cocaine from the scientific investigation unit, where it was being held as 
evidence in pending cases, did as well.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Columbro, 66 Ohio St.3d 
195, 611 N.E.2d 302 (1993). So too did inducing an important witness in a case into the jurisdiction 
by the false assertion that the lawyer was representing the witness in another matter.  Toledo Bar 
Ass’n v. James, 28 Ohio St.3d 148, 502 N.E.2d 1023 (1986). Obtaining and serving a subpoena to 
take a deposition without giving notice to opposing counsel or proceeding by stipulated agreement 
also violated 1-102(A)(4). Toledo Bar Ass’n Op. 88-2 (n.d.). 
Misleading the court, by act or omission, likewise was ground for sanction under DR 1-102(A)(4). 
For example, before and then while he was a judge, the respondent in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008 Ohio 3194, 891 N.E.2d 324, was the attorney for two estates; for 
one of which he was the executor and the other, administrator. Over a period of 6-8 years, respondent 
basically used the assets of the estates as his own private bank account – he withdrew attorney fees 
without the required prior court approval; he paid personal debts with estate assets; he manipulated 
fees, expenses, and transactions to his personal advantage; and he kept completely inadequate records 
and refused to respond in timely fashion to inquiries by the probate court and successor counsel for 
information and documentation, all in an effort to cover up his wrongdoing. 
As stated by the Supreme Court, 
respondent’s acts were conscious and deliberate and committed with 
the intent of deceiving his clients, the probate court, and successor 
counsel. There can be no other reason for respondent’s repeated use of 
debit withdrawals, rather than the estate checkbook, to remove funds. 
The same is true with respect to respondent’s failure to file accounts 
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and timely comply with requests for further documentation. These 
actions furthered one purpose – to help respondent evade detection of 
his unauthorized use of estate assets. 
Id. at para. 68. For other examples of misleading the court, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 
126 Ohio St.3d 389, 2010 Ohio 3824, 934 N.E.2d 328 (failing to inform court, opposing counsel, or 
client at hearing that his license had been suspended one month earlier violated 8.4(c), (d) and (h)); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Horan, 123 Ohio St.3d 60, 2009 Ohio 4177, 914 N.E.2d 175 (violation of 
Rule 8.4(c), as well as 8.4(b) and (h), by altering fee applications for court-appointed work, thereby 
“deceiv[ing] and exploit[ing] Butler County by falsifying documents to receive compensation she did 
not earn.” Id. at para. 22.); Trumbull County Bar Ass’n v. Kastantaris, 121 Ohio St.3d 387, 2009 
Ohio 1389, 904 N.E.2d 875 (nondisclosure of assets to probate court; filing false affidavit with 
Supreme Court in connection with prior disciplinary action against respondent); Akron Bar Ass’n v. 
Markovich, 117 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008 Ohio 862, 883 N.E.2d 1046 (filing unapproved dismissal 
order misled court and opposing counsel); Disciplinary Counsel v. Lord, 114 Ohio St.3d 466, 2007 
Ohio 4260, 873 N.E.2d 273 (misrepresenting to court in order to obtain continuance that he had 
another hearing at same time; in fact respondent had already moved for continuance in other case); 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lukey, 110 Ohio St.3d 128, 2006 Ohio 3822, 851 N.E.2d 493 (respondent 
violated the disciplinary rule “in failing to disclose his dual representation to the court and purporting 
to represent the grandson while pursuing the grandparent’s interests,” id. at para. 13). 
One interesting, but troubling, decision in this regard is Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrenn, 
99 Ohio St.3d 222, 2003 Ohio 3288, 790 N.E.2d 1195. In Wrenn, respondent, an assistant county 
prosecutor, was representing the state in a child molestation and rape case. The twelve-year old 
alleged victim initially reported that the semen on his shirt was that of Derr, the accused. Prior to the 
pretrial, respondent was told orally by a detective working on the case that the state bureau of criminal 
investigation had concluded that the semen was the “victim’s,” not the accused’s. When Derr’s 
counsel reported at the pretrial that he believed the state was still waiting for test results, respondent 
stated that that was correct. He made no disclosure to either opposing counsel or the court that he had 
in fact been verbally informed of the results favorable to Derr. Later on the same day as the pretrial, 
respondent interviewed the victim, and the boy changed his story and admitted that the semen was his 
own. Respondent failed to disclose any of this information, and Derr was sentenced, after a guilty plea 
to one of the counts, to three years in prison. Relator charged respondent with violation of DR 
102(A)(4) & (5), 7-102(A)(3), and 7-103(B). In a 2-1 vote, the panel found no 1-102(A)(4) violation 
and recommended a public reprimand. The Board adopted the view of the dissenting panel member, 
found a violation of 1-102(A)(4) as well as the other violations charged, and recommended a 
six-month suspension, all stayed. 
Despite acknowledging that respondent’s 
failure to disclose the information before the first plea was inexcusable 
and undermined the integrity of the criminal justice system[,] 
id. at para. 23, the Supreme Court went along with the stayed suspension. In dissent, Chief Justice 
Moyer (joined by Justice Pfiefer) found this to be “inadequate punishment for such egregious 
behavior.” Id. at para. 27. A significant factor in the majority’s rationale for the minimal sanction 
imposed was the presence of mitigating evidence, with no aggravating factors. Yet, the 
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first-mentioned “mitigating” factor was evidence heard by the panel “that respondent, age 61, was 
also a clinical psychologist and school psychologist.” Id. at para. 17. In its sanction discussion, the 
Court asserted that “[w]ith his background in child psychology, [respondent] is well suited to 
prosecuting child abuse cases.” Id. at para. 25. Given the way he prosecuted the child-abuse case 
underlying Wrenn, that assessment seems strange indeed. 
The numerous other instances of violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) by lying to or otherwise misleading the 
court include: 
 forging a judge’s signature on a time-stamped proposed judgment entry, Medina County Bar 
Ass’n v. Lewis, 121 Ohio St.3d 596, 2009 Ohio 1765, 906 N.E.2d 1102, 
 
 testifying falsely under oath, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Tomlan, 118 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008 
Ohio 1471, 885 N.E.2d 895 (concealment of estate assets), 
 filing false statements with the court, Disciplinary Counsel v. Simonelli, 113 Ohio St.3d 
215, 2007 Ohio 1535, 864 N.E.2d 1039 (bankruptcy filings); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Carlson, 111 Ohio St.3d 281, 2006 Ohio 5707, 855 N.E.2d 1218 (material nondisclosures in 
final accounting with probate court), 
 filing inflated fee requests with Juvenile Court in connection with representation as appointed 
counsel, Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 106 Ohio St.3d 365, 2005 Ohio 5323, 835 
N.E.2d 354; accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Holland, 106 Ohio St.3d 372, 2005 Ohio 5322, 
835 N.E.2d 361 (repeatedly deceiving juvenile court by double billing, resulting in 
“outrageous fee charges,” id. at para. 8), 
 numerous misrepresentations -- to the bankruptcy court, a former client, relator’s investigators, 
and the hearing panel -- which, together with other violations, the Court characterized as 
egregious and prevalent, Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 105 Ohio St.3d 443, 2005 Ohio 2695, 
828 N.E.2d 621 (for further transgressions of 1-102(A)(4), respondent was disbarred in 
Akron Bar Ass’n v. Holder, 112 Ohio St.3d 90, 2006 Ohio 6506, 858 N.E.2d 356, 
discussed this section infra at “Dishonesty in dealing with client”), 
 writing checks to the clerk of courts for filing fee, which checks were returned for insufficient 
funds, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Weaver, 102 Ohio St.3d 264, 2004 Ohio 2683, 809 N.E.2d 
1113, 
 creation of a false journal entry by fabricating signatures of opposing counsel and judicial 
officer, Disciplinary Counsel v. Hutchins, 102 Ohio St.3d 97, 2004 Ohio 1805, 807 N.E.2d 
303 (Court agreed with assessment by Board that this conduct “is abhorrent to our legal 
system, id. at para. 31), 
 lying in the answer to a civil complaint filed against respondent for sexual harassment, in his 
deposition testimony in the case, and in his affidavit submitted to the court in that action, 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kafantaris, 99 Ohio St.3d 94, 2003 Ohio 2477, 789 
N.E.2d 192 (violation of, inter alia, 1-102(A)(4) & (5)), 
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 filing, in a bankruptcy case, an affidavit purportedly signed by the client, but in fact signed 
and notarized by the lawyer, Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Slack, 88 Ohio St.3d 274, 725 N.E.2d 631 
(2000). Compare Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Allen, 82 Ohio St. 3d 550, 697 N.E.2d 1989 
(1998), where the Court, sua sponte, dismissed a complaint against a lawyer who had dictated 
to and had the client sign an admittedly false affidavit in support of a criminal complaint; 
Chief Justice Moyer wrote a powerful dissent in which he stated, among other things, that the 
conduct “clearly” violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and that “[r]espect for and the fair administration 
of our justice system cannot be sustained if lawyers are permitted to encourage and actively 
participate in misrepresentations to the court in order to ‘serve’ the client.”  Id. at 553, 697 
N.E.2d at 191. 
An unlikely invocation of DR 1-102(A)(4) in connection with misconduct in the judicial process 
occurred in Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Ake, 111 Ohio St.3d 266, 2006 Ohio 5704, 855 N.E.2d 
1206. In Ake, respondent was representing himself in an acrimonious and protracted dissolution-of- 
marriage proceeding, and, during the course thereof, on five separate occasions he deliberately and 
consciously violated court orders, because he thought the orders were in error or because it was in his 
economic interest to do so.  These facts seem difficult to place in the 1-102(A)(4) slot; as Chief Justice 
Moyer, joined by two other justices,  persuasively pointed out in dissent, the more appropriate 
application would have been DR 7-106(A) (“A lawyer shall not disregard . . . a ruling of a tribunal 
made in the course of the proceeding”), which was not even charged. 
An attorney who added a provision to a judgment entry without the knowledge or consent of the 
opposing party or counsel and then, when the provision subsequently was stricken, failed to inform 
his own client prior to the expiration of the time for appeal, violated a number of provisions, including 
OH DR 1-102(A)(4).  Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Walker, 17 Ohio St.3d 144, 478 N.E.2d 767 
(1985). 
Misleading a bar association investigating alleged misconduct also was a basis for violation of DR 
1-102(A)(4). See, e.g., Akron Bar Ass’n v. Maher, 121 Ohio St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 356, 901 N.E.2d 
803 (falsely telling hearing panel in prior disciplinary proceeding that he had limited his practice and 
obtained liability insurance); Disciplinary Counsel v. Broschak, 118 Ohio St.3d 236, 2008 Ohio 
2224, 887 N.E.2d 1176 (misrepresenting to relator at deposition that he would take steps to rectify his 
misconduct concerning one client and to satisfy relator’s requests for additional information); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Lord, 111 Ohio St.3d 131, 2006 Ohio 5341, 855 N.E.2d 457 (lying to 
relator as to reason for failure to appear at agreed-upon meeting with relator); Akron Bar Ass’n v. 
Dietz, 108 Ohio St.3d 343, 2006 Ohio 1067, 843 N.E.2d 786 (falsely stating to bar investigators that 
he had not taken any funds from estate for which he was executor); Disciplinary Counsel v. Claflin, 
107 Ohio St.3d 31, 2005 Ohio 5827, 836 N.E.2d 564 (falsely assuring bar association that settlement 
funds had never been disbursed); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Spitz, 89 Ohio St.3d 117, 729 N.E.2d 
345 (2000) (lying to bar association about splitting fee with nonlawyer, submitting falsified invoice to 
bar association concerning payment to nonlawyer, and lying under oath about these matters at 
deposition). Cf. Disciplinary Counsel v. Watterson, 114 Ohio St.3d 159, 2007 Ohio 3615, 870 
N.E.2d 1153 (repeated tirades involving threats and false accusations against bar association 
grievance committee and Disciplinary Counsel, as well as clients, violated DR 1-102(A)(4), among 
others; indefinite suspension). And see Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Stern, 103 Ohio St.3d 491, 2004 
Ohio 5464, 817 N.E.2d 14, where the Court dismissed an OH DR 1-102(A)(4) charge against a 
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former prosecuting attorney, who had secretly videotaped a meeting with Disciplinary Counsel Office 
investigators (regarding a separate grievance that had been filed against the respondent) and who, 
when asked by the investigators, whether the meeting was being taped, answered “no.” The primary 
rationale behind the dismissal was the uncertainty concerning the extent to which a prior head injury 
suffered by respondent may have affected his actions (“the wild card that prevents us from reaching 
many firm certainties about what occurred,” id. at para. 37); as a result, the majority of the Court 
found that the Board had not met its burden in proving a violation of 1-102(A)(4). The majority 
conceded the existence of “understandable apprehension about allowing respondent to escape 
discipline for what can only be characterized as lying to ODC investigators,” id. at para. 25, and 
emphasizes that its determination “is limited exclusively to this situation.” Id. The three-justice 
dissent argued that “[s]uch situational ethics have no place in a lawyer discipline system.” Id. at para. 
41. 
Not surprisingly, misleading a bar association investigator or hearing panel also violates 8.4(c) under 
the Rules of Professional Conduct. Akron Bar Ass’n v. DeLoach, 130 Ohio St.2d 153, 2011 Ohio 
4201, 956 N.E.2d 811. In Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, 131 Ohio St.3d 302, 2012 Ohio 977, 
964 N.E.2d 427, the respondent argued that affidavits he had prepared could not have violated Rule 
8.4(c) because the Board found no evidence that they contained untrue statements. In response, the 
Court stated as follows: 
Respondent’s focus, however, is too narrow. Regardless of the 
truthfulness of the affidavits, much of respondent’s testimony about his 
actions after the affidavits were prepared cannot be reconciled with the 
actions themselves and are a deliberate misrepresentation of what 
actually occurred in this case. 
Id. at para. 17. 
Under the Code, if a lawyer conducted a public records search prior to litigation and thereby obtained 
a copy of an inadvertently disclosed memorandum containing confidential or privileged information, 
the lawyer could read the memorandum and disclose its contents to the client. However, the lawyer 
had to notify the source and return a copy of the memorandum upon request. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-11, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Dec. 3, 1993).  In the 
view of the Board, failure to provide notification to opposing counsel “is dishonest and misleading 
and would violate DR 1-102(A)(4).” Id. at *7. (The inadvertently-disclosed-document issue is now 
covered by Rule 4.4(b). See section 4.4:300 for further discussion of Opinion 93-11 in that context.) 
See also Good v. Krohn, 157 Ohio App.3d 832, 2002 Ohio 4001, 786 N.E.2d 480 (Allen), where in 
an automobile personal-injury case the court, in admonishing counsel for Lumbermens Insurance 
(which had issued a business auto policy containing uninsured/underinsured benefits to plaintiff’s 
employer) for affirmatively misrepresenting the contents of the policy, invoked OH DR 1-102(A)(4): 
 DR 1-102(A) directs that a lawyer . . . shall not engage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation or 
any other conduct that is otherwise prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. . . . The propriety of Lumbermen’s [sic] representations is 
questionable and raises grave concerns as to whether its conduct before 
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this court and the trial court constitutes a deliberate, malicious, 
bad-faith attempt to mislead the judiciary and opposing party or merely 
a fortuitous incident of inadvertent neglect. Because it appears from the 
record that the trial court was led to commit this error in reliance upon 
Lumbermens’ representations, on remand, the trial court may wish to 
consider whether Civ R 11 sanctions are appropriate. 
Id. at para. 14 (bracketed material and ellipsis added). 
Judges, too, could violate DR 1-102(A)(4), by both their private and professional conduct. DR 
1-102(A)(4) (as well as (A)(3) and (A)(5)-(6)) was violated in Disciplinary Counsel v. McAuliffe, 
121 Ohio St.3d 315, 2009 Ohio 1151, 903 N.E.2d 1209, where the respondent, a municipal court 
judge, burned down his house in an attempt to defraud his insurance company. Another judge-private 
conduct case in which DR 1-102(A)(4) was violated is Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 39, 2009 Ohio 317, 901 N.E.2d 798, where a domestic relations court magistrate, in her 
capacity as treasurer of the county humane society, embezzled more than $40,000 over a period of 
one and one-half years. In Disciplinary Counsel v. Ault, 110 Ohio St.3d 207, 2006 Ohio 4247, 852 
N.E.2d 725, another municipal court judge was found to have violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by deceitfully 
obtaining Schedule II, III, and IV narcotics from six different doctors, after having contracted with 
one of the doctors to obtain controlled-substance medications only from that doctor and no other.  
Respondent stipulated to having breached this promise repeatedly.  “Respondent’s duplicity resulted 
in his being prescribed medication far in excess of what any one of these physicians would have 
authorized.”  Id. at para. 8.  This conduct led to his pleading no contest to attempting to obtain 
dangerous drugs by deception, a first-degree misdemeanor.  Because of his successful completion of 
his contract with OLAP regarding his drug and alcohol problems, and because his addiction did not 
impair his performance on the bench, respondent received a two-year suspension, all stayed on 
conditions. 
In a bizarre aspect of a bizarre case involving yet another municipal court judge, there was a turf war 
between the local police chief and the sheriff as to whose duty it was to bring a criminal defendant to 
respondent’s courtroom from the jail.  Respondent’s solution, at a meeting in chambers with defense 
counsel and the prosecutor, was to contact the police station by dialing 911 and ordering the 
answering officer to transport the defendant to court.  After the news media publicized respondent’s 
use of the 911 emergency response system for this purpose, respondent thereafter offered a variety of 
conflicting stories as to what happened that day, 
including the categorically false explanation that he called 911 at the 
prosecutor’s direction and the preposterous claim that he called 911 to 
make a record of the in-chambers discussion, knowing that 911 calls 
are recorded. 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 116 Ohio St.3d 64, 2007 Ohio 5635, 876 N.E.2d 556, at para. 40 
(violation of CJC Canons 1, 2, 4 [now see CJC Rules 1.1 & 1.2], and DR 1-102(A)(4)-(6), together 
with six other counts; eighteen-month suspension with six months stayed on conditions). 
And see Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 104 Ohio St.3d 251, 2004 Ohio 6402, 819 N.E.2d 273, 
where a common pleas judge in a collection matter entered in the court’s journal that the defendant 
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had “appeared in open court and requested the opportunity to file an answer.” Id. at para. 24. 
This entry conveyed the false impression that Watson’s [the defendant] 
request had been made in a formal court proceeding. Watson testified 
that no mention of a hearing occurred at that meeting, which he stated 
occurred in respondent’s office rather than in court. 
 Similarly, the record supports the factual conclusion that the 
default-judgment creditor, Holzer, was not allowed an opportunity to 
be heard before the court entered the order, which, at best, constituted 
the grant of Civ. R. 60(B) relief made pursuant to an oral, out-of-court, 
ex parte motion to “[r]emove any Default judgments.” 
Id. at paras. 24-25. The sanction imposed on Judge Medley was an 18-month suspension with six 
months stayed, but it seemed to have little effect on the judge. While under suspension (not just from 
the bar but from his probate judgeship without pay), Medley cashed payroll warrants that the state 
erroneously sent him and he made false statements in connection with four expired warrants, all to the 
tune of $71,000. This time around he was indefinitely suspended. Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 
128 Ohio St.3d 317, 2011 Ohio 234, 943 N.E.2d 1023. 
In Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004 Ohio 4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, “the 
evidence established that respondent engaged in a pattern of misrepresentation in her interactions 
with judges, litigants, attorneys and court personnel,” id. at para. 23, including written and oral 
misrepresentations to her fellow common pleas judges and the administrative judge. The Court 
subsequently looked to and quoted at length from the O’Neill case in determining the proper sanction 
in Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 116 Ohio St.3d 110, 2007 Ohio 5588, 876 N.E.2d 933 (two 
instances of violation of 1-102(A)(4), consisting of respondent’s filing of an entry disqualifying 
herself from one of the cases pending before her, which entry contained “false and inflammatory 
statements,” id. at para. 59, and her entries of recusal, reinstatement, and second recusal in another 
case, the last such entry falsely stating that a lawyer was directed by another judge to write a letter 
describing respondent’s antics in exchange for the other judge’s signing an agreed entry transferring 
an abused child of Native American heritage to the tribe’s juvenile court in Oklahoma (such a transfer 
is mandatory under federal law; respondent nevertheless had refused to sign it). In imposing the same 
sanction as that in O’Neill (two years, with second year stayed on conditions), the Court had this to 
say: 
 Judge O’Neill, like respondent, engaged in “a pattern of rude, 
undignified, and unprofessional conduct that included verbal outbursts, 
unjustified expulsions from the courtroom, and berating or humiliating 
persons in the presence of others.” Id. at para. 30. Like respondent, 
Judge O’Neill claimed that she had sufficient justification for her 
actions or offered versions of facts that completely contradicted that of 
other witnesses. Id. at para. 32. 
Id. at para. 102. 
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The respondent in Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008 N.E.2d 3194, 891 
N.E.2d 324, owned an office building, a portion of which was rented to the Adult Parole Authority. 
Respondent was the only common pleas judge in Highland County, and APA witnesses regularly 
appeared in his court as witnesses in criminal cases to make sentencing recommendations. After 
being warned that this situation could involve a conflict of interest raising questions about his 
impartiality regarding those sentencing recommendations, respondent entered into a number of 
transactions, with the assistance of his wife, to make it appear that he had divested himself of 
ownership of the building, even though he retained de facto authority over it. As a part of this 
authority, despite having divested himself of ownership on paper, respondent negotiated for sale of 
the building to a convicted felon, who respondent thought would use illegally acquired funds for the 
purchase. Respondent sought to advise the would-be purchaser how to avoid money-laundering 
statutes. In the process, he grossly exaggerated the value of the building to the prospective purchaser. 
All of this, needless to say, the Court found in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) (as well as 1-102(A)(5) & 
(6) and the Judicial Canons). Judge Hoskins was also found to have violated 1-102(A)(4) in an 
unrelated count, where respondent suspended a criminal defendant’s sentence after lunching with the 
defendant’s cousin and then fabricated a “motion of defendant” that he purported to act on. 
Misconduct in other governmental settings: While much of the misconduct under this provision 
involving attorneys and their relationship with the government arose with respect to the courts, it 
occurs in other contexts as well. For example, Rule 8.4(c) was applied in Mahoning County Bar 
Ass’n v. DiMartino, 124 Ohio St.3d 360, 2010 Ohio 247, 922 N.E.2d 220, where the respondent 
had committed bigamy; he violated the rule by signing a marriage-license application in North 
Carolina in which he “falsely represented that it was his first marriage.”  Id. at para. 8.  And see 
Disciplinary Counsel v. McNeal, 131 Ohio St.3d 224, 2012 Ohio 785, 963 N.E.2d 815, where the 
respondent was a former lieutenant colonel in the Air Force judge advocate general corps who had 
violated the Code of Military Justice by submitting false pay forms for hours not worked. 
Under the Code, income-tax violations by lawyers and misleading conduct involving loans from the 
government already have been discussed. Other examples include: 
 unlawfully structuring financial transactions in attempted evasion of federal reporting 
requirements for transactions involving cash in excess of $10,000, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Bennett, 124 Ohio St.3d 314, 2010 Ohio 313, 921 N.E.2d 1064 (even though this conduct 
resulted in felony conviction, respondent was not charged with violation DR 1-102(A)(3)). 
 deceptively attempting to obtain Medicaid reimbursement for a client’s unsubstantiated 
health-care expenses, Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mitchell, 118 Ohio St.3d 98, 2008 Ohio 1822, 
886 N.E.2d 222. 
 among other acts of fraud and deceit, respondent backdated a deed by the client to make it 
appear that the property had not been in the client’s estate for the last three years, thereby 
seeking to qualify the client for Medicaid nursing-home care, Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 114 
Ohio St.3d 108, 2007 Ohio 3253, 868 N.E.2d 973. Another aspect of the case is discussed in 
section 8.4:300 at “Income tax violations.” 
 a public defender concealed from and falsely denied to her superiors the existence of an 
extended sexual relationship with her client, Disciplinary Counsel v. Krieger, 108 Ohio 
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St.3d 319, 2006 Ohio 1062, 843 N.E.2d 765. 
 bribery of government officials, e.g., Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Sinclair, 105 Ohio 
St.3d 65, 2004 Ohio 7014, 822 N.E.2d 360 (scheme to kick back a portion of his salary to U.S. 
Congressman Traficant in return for employment as member of Traficant’s staff; because of 
mitigating factors, imposition of indefinite suspension, the minimum sentence imposed 
“when lawyers have paid either a bribe or a gratuity to a public official,” id. at para. 25, found 
appropriate); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. McClenaghan, 57 Ohio St.3d 21, 565 
N.E.2d 572 (1991) (former Division of Real Estate of Ohio Department of Commerce 
Superintendent, who was affiliated with real-estate education enterprise, indefinitely 
suspended after conviction of bribery for paying examiner of Division of Real Estate $500 for 
copies of present and future examinations). 
 acceptance of a bribe by a government lawyer, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Smith, 
69 Ohio St.3d 475, 633 N.E.2d 1117 (1994); See section 8.4:300 at “Acceptance of bribe by 
a lawyer/government official.” 
 theft in office, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Pizzedaz, 68 Ohio St.3d 486, 628 
N.E.2d 1359 (1994) (executive director of Northeast Ohio Coordinating Agency disbarred for 
theft in office). In imposing this sanction, rather than the indefinite suspension that had been 
recommended, the Court remarked: 
Respondent’s misconduct manifests the public’s worst fear about 
lawyers. His crimes prove that he will take advantage of public trust if 
given the opportunity. Thus, unlike the board and panel, we are not 
impressed with respondent’s admission of guilt, remorse, full 
restitution, and efforts to comply with the terms of his probation. 
Rather, we find respondent’s dishonesty deserving of the full measure 
of our disciplinary authority. 
 Id. at 487, 628 N.E.2d at 1360. 
 misleading government agency officials, e.g., Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Callahan, 36 Ohio St.3d 
179, 522 N.E.2d 542 (1988) (filing INS forms in violation of federal law); Dayton Bar Ass’n 
v. Gross, 17 Ohio St.3d 206, 478 N.E.2d 792 (1985) (falsely reporting to Social Security 
Administration that client failed to receive checks when in fact checks had been sent to 
lawyer’s office and cashed). 
 
 other breach of duty by government lawyer, e.g., Bar Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Kless, 
17 Ohio St.3d 21, 476 N.E.2d 1035 (1985), where an assistant city law director who settled 
cases against the city without authorization from his superiors and in contravention of 
department policy, and then covered up his conduct, was found to have violated 1-102(A)(4) 
and 7-102(A)(3); a one-year suspension was imposed. 
For a misleading-the-government case under the Rules, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Ricketts, 128 
Ohio St.3d 271, 2010 Ohio 6240, 943 N.E.2d 981, discussed at the end of the next subsection. 
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Misleading the public: Former DR 1-102(A)(4) was used to control attorney conduct that was, or 
could be, misleading to the public. Falsely stating in his notary’s jurat that three witnesses had sworn 
to and signed affidavits in his presence violated this provision. Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. 
Melnick, 107 Ohio St.3d 240, 2005 Ohio 6265, 837 N.E.2d 1203 (noting harm caused to perception 
that official act of notary is worthy of public’s trust). Accord Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Kraus, 116 
Ohio St.3d 302, 2007 Ohio 6458, 878 N.E.2d 1028 (falsely representing in notarization that he had 
witnessed client’s signature on settlement agreement). In another, more serious breach of proper 
notarization procedures, respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (and (A)(6)) by causing his associate to 
improperly notarize his wife’s name (the associate failed to notice that the jurat on a mortgage and 
deed authenticated both signatures) and by adding his wife’s name after the notarization was effected. 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Freedman, 110 Ohio St.3d 284, 2006 Ohio 4480, 853 N.E.2d 291. In 
imposing a six-month stayed suspension, as opposed to the public-reprimand recommended by the 
Board, the Court expressly distinguished Melnick and a similar public-reprimand case as involving 
lawyers “who avoided for their convenience the requirements of proper notarization,” whereas in the 
case at bar “[r]espondent did not simply circumvent for convenience the notarization requirements[;] 
[h]e took advantage of [his associate’s] carelessness and consciously signed [his wife’s] name to the 
documents after they had been notarized.” Id. at paras. 15, 16 (bracketed material added).   
In Disciplinary Counsel v. Koehler, 132 Ohio St.3d 465, 2012 Ohio 3235, 973 N.E.2d 262, the 
respondent “circumvented, for convenience, the requirements for notarizing a document and thereby 
perpetuated a fraud upon all those who relied on the document he produced.” Id. at para. 9. The 
“document he produced” was a letter of authorization, purportedly from his client, for release of funds, 
to which Koehler signed the client’s name and notarized the document in his secretary’s name. He 
used his secretary’s notary stamp. His secretary filed the grievance against him, which resulted in a 
six-month stayed suspension. The opinion does not say whether the grievant is now Koehler’s 
ex-secretary. 
Practicing law while one’s license is suspended also fell in this category.  Akron Bar Ass’n v. 
Thorpe, 40 Ohio St.3d 174, 532 N.E.2d 752 (1988) (such conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4) & (5) 
and 3-101(B), and warranted permanent disbarment). Compare Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Noethlich, 94 Ohio St.3d 124, 760 N.E.2d 816 (2002) (practicing while under CLE suspension and 
while not registered with Supreme Court, together with filing of false affidavit that he had informed 
his clients of suspension, violated 1-102(A)(4) & (6); because of mitigating factors, six-month 
suspension imposed). 
The respondent in Disciplinary Counsel v. Hauser, 110 Ohio St.3d 203, 2006 Ohio 4246, 852 
N.E.2d 724, was disbarred for, among other reasons, violating 1-102(A)(4) when she misrepresented 
to an elderly couple that the annuities she was selling them in her role as an insurance agent had a 
fixed rate, when in fact the rate was variable.  “Respondent’s repeated dishonesty and deceit in 
dealing with the elderly couple and her employer seriously breached the professional duty to the 
public to maintain personal integrity.” Id. at para. 19. 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 95-14, 1995 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 1 (Dec. 
1, 1995), opined that participation in an “in-house law firm” created by an insurance company to 
handle cases for its insureds, staffed by the insurance company’s salaried attorneys, but operating 
under a separate firm name, was misleading because it implied the existence of a law firm that in fact 
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did not exist, and it disguised the relationship of the insurance company and the lawyers involved. But 
see Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. UPL 02-02 (Bd. of Comm’rs on Unauthorized 
Practice of Law Oct. 1, 2003), review denied, 100 Ohio St.3d 1514, 2003 Ohio 6460, 800 N.E.2d 
33, discussed in section 5.4:300, at “Formation of in-house law firms,” and section 5.5:300 at 
“Lawyer employees of corporation.”  
A lawyer’s allowing another to use his business envelopes for the purpose of mailing papers 
pertaining to a legal matter created the false impression that the lawyer was representing the party and 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4). Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 113 (Dec. 17, 1974) (condemning this practice 
where landlord used envelopes of attorney who was not representing him to send tenant five-day 
notice and complaint in forcible entry and detainer action). A comparable ploy was criticized in Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 76-4, at 1 (July 16, 1976), discussed this section supra at “In 
general.” 
In a case decided under the Rules of Professional Conduct, Disciplinary Counsel v. Ricketts, 128 
Ohio St.3d 271, 2010 Ohio 6240, 943 N.E.2d 981, respondent argued that only misrepresentations 
made to a client or to a court should result in a suspension from practice, citing, e.g., Fowerbaugh; 
the Court was not persuaded: 
Neither the ethical standards nor the cases cited by respondent, 
however, absolve an attorney of sanctions for ethical misconduct based 
on who was targeted or harmed by the attorney’s misrepresentations. In 
this case, the misrepresentations [in executing and releasing a 
mortgage] could have deceived a governmental body, potential 
opposing parties, and the public. 
Id. at para. 38. 
Dishonesty in dealing with client: Last, but certainly not least, Rule 8.4(c), and DR 1-102(A)(4) 
before it, have been invoked where the lawyer lied to or otherwise misled or defrauded his or her own 
client. E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Bursey, 124 Ohio St.3d 85, 2009 Ohio 6180, 919 N.E.2d 198 
(misappropriation of settlement proceeds belonging to clients violated 8.4(c), as well as 8.4(h)); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Schiller, 123 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009 Ohio 4909, 915 N.E.2d 324 
(misappropriating clients’ tax refunds and directing the money to personal purposes or to 
representation of other clients; timing of conduct resulted in violation of both DR 1-102(A)(4) and 
Rule 8.4(c)); Disciplinary Counsel v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 84, 2009 Ohio 500, 902 N.E.2d 25 
(lying to and otherwise misleading client over five-year period in attempt to conceal failure to obtain 
uninsured motorist coverage to which client had been entitled); Disciplinary Counsel v. Lentes, 120 
Ohio St.3d 431, 2008 Ohio 6355, 900 N.E.2d 167 (litany of lies, fictitious hearings, trials, forged 
judgment entries to cover up respondent’s incompetent representation of clients in three separate 
cases; disbarment ordered); Disciplinary Counsel v. Broschak, 118 Ohio St.3d 236, 2008 Ohio 
2224, 887 N.E.2d 1176 (telling client that he purposely allowed criminal appeal to be dismissed so 
that he could file judicial release motion, which he did not do; falsely telling another client that he was 
unaware that client’s criminal appeal had been dismissed with prejudice based on respondent’s failure 
to file appellate brief); Disciplinary Counsel v. Higgins, 117 Ohio St.3d 473, 2008 Ohio 1509, 884 
N.E.2d 1070 (failure to disclose to client that his law license was under suspension); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 2008 Ohio 91, 880 N.E.2d 467 (manipulation of funds in 
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IOLTA belonging to in-law clients, as part of scheme to defraud in-laws, as well as nursing homes 
providing for their care); Disciplinary Counsel v. McCauley, 114 Ohio St.3d 461, 2007 Ohio 4259, 
873 N.E.2d 269 (misappropriating entrusted client funds for personal use and for payment of firm’s 
creditors); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Shousher, 112 Ohio St.3d 533, 2007 Ohio 611, 861 N.E.2d 536 
(writing checks to clients that were dishonored); Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 106 Ohio St.3d 
418, 2005 Ohio 5411, 835 N.E.2d 707 (regarding violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) (and 9-102) 
“respondent treated [clients], to whom she owed a fiduciary duty [as guardian and trustee] with deceit 
and dishonesty.” Id. at para. 35.); Disciplinary Counsel v. King, 103 Ohio St.3d 438, 2004 Ohio 
5470, 816 N.E.2d 1040 (lying to client that trial date would be continued when in fact summary 
judgment had been granted to other side; surprisingly, even though this was the third violation of 
1-102(A)(4) by respondent since 1990, the Court saw fit to note as a mitigating factor that he had a 
“general reputation for good character in the legal community”; two-year suspension, with second 
year stayed); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Holzer, 78 Ohio St.3d 309, 677 N.E.2d 1186 (1997) 
(charging client for work done for different client); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Batt, 78 Ohio St.3d 189, 
677 N.E.349 (1997) (defrauding client by padding bill with hours not worked violated both DR 
1-102(A)(4) and 2-106(A)); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ewing, 75 Ohio St.3d 244, 251, 661 N.E.2d 
1109, 1114 (1996) (instigating scheme attempting to buy, for his own profit, farm of clients in 
financial distress. “We are appalled by respondent’s purchase scheme and by his coercive tactics to 
gain the Mowerys’ approval of it.”); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Kaigler, 57 Ohio St.3d 197, 566 
N.E.2d 673 (1991) (respondent transferred his ownership of property to his mother five days prior to 
settlement agreement with client, for purpose of avoiding debt to client; conduct also violated 
1-102(A)(5)-(6) and 7-102(A)(6)). 
That a conflict of interest can result in a DR 1-102(A)(4) (and (5) & (6)) violation is demonstrated by 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Gueli, 119 Ohio St.3d 434, 2008 Ohio 4768, 894 N.E.2d 1231. In Gueli, 
respondent represented the administrator of the estate of one Barnhill, killed in a one-vehicle 
automobile accident, and also acted as counsel for plaintiffs in the wrongful death action, which was 
brought against the driver of the car in which Barnhill was riding. The defendant was respondent’s 
half brother.  The decedent had three minor children.  Despite Gueli’s dual representation of the estate 
and the wrongful death plaintiffs, there was no appointment of a guardian to protect the interests of 
decedent’s children. As a result, at the expense of those he was representing in the wrongful death 
action, respondent engaged in a number of steps designed to minimize the potential exposure of his 
brother. As summed up by the Supreme Court, in addition to badly mishandling the estate, respondent  
despite a patent conflict of interest, undertook the Barnhill wrongful 
death claim, using his position to protect his brother at the expense of 
the decedent’s children. 
Id. at para. 21. (The Court’s discussion of the conflict issue is sometimes confusing. For example, at 
one point it states that respondent “concurrently represent[ed] the adverse interests of the decedent’s 
family and the respondent’s own brother.” Id. at para. 17. Since his brother clearly was not a client, 
presumably the Court was referring to Gueli’s looking out for his brother’s interests. If so, 
“concurrently represent” seems an unfortunate choice of words to convey that thought.) The count 
involving the Barnhill debacle resulted in violation not only of three subsections of DR 1-102, but 
also eight other disciplinary rules; the relator also proved its case against respondent in seven of the 
eight other counts, all involving other clients and three of which also involved 1-102(A)(4) violations 
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stemming from lying to clients about the status of their cases and funds. Against this background, the 
Court’s sanction discussion was short and to the point: 
 Repeated misconduct of this magnitude and variety demands 
only one result.  Respondent is permanently disbarred from the practice 
of law in Ohio. 
Id. at para. 48. Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Taylor, 120 Ohio St.3d 366, 2008 Ohio 6202, 899 
N.E.2d 955, where the Court described the respondent’s transgression of DR 1-102(A)(4) (and 
5-105(A) & (B)) in the following words regarding his actions in preparing a will, powers of attorney, 
and a quitclaim deed involving an elderly, infirm couple, one of whom (the wife) was in all likelihood 
mentally incompetent at the time: 
While purporting to act in a fiduciary capacity representing the 
potentially diverse interests of [his clients], respondent had [the wife] 
sign an instrument that gave away all her interest in the couple’s home. 
He did not have her knowing consent to the transfer. 
Id. at para. 11. 
A case well illustrating that “misrepresentations by omission,” as well as affirmative 
misrepresentations, are covered is Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Willette, 117 Ohio St.3d 433, 2008 Ohio 
1198, 884 N.E.2d 581, where, in rejecting respondent’s argument that there was no clear and 
convincing evidence of violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), the Court emphasized the numerous instances 
in which respondent “failed to disclose pertinent information to” his clients.  Among other 
nondisclosures were Willette’s failure to tell his clients that his contract with the out-of-state firm 
engaged in marketing living trusts (“EPLS”) “required him to use EPLS for trust-funding advice and 
document preparation,” id. at para. 16, and his arranging for his clients to meet with an EPLS agent 
“under the pretext that the agent would witness their signatures on the trust document and explain the 
financial aspects of funding the trust,” id. at para. 21; he did not disclose that the primary objective of 
the agent was to sell insurance on commission and that the clients would be subject to an insurance 
sales pitch. 
A rather unusual application of DR 1-102(A)(4) (in conjunction with, inter alia, 6-101(A)(1)) 
occurred in Warren County Bar Ass’n v. Marshall, 105 Ohio St.3d 59, 2004 Ohio 7011, 822 
N.E.2d 355, where the Court, in discussing the sanction (two-year suspension, stayed on conditions), 
noted that the Board 
concluded that respondent acted dishonestly and with a selfish motive 
in that respondent knew in both cases that he was unqualified to 
undertake representation but did so anyway because of either 
indifference or financial need. 
Id. at para. 8 (emphasis added). (A subsequent transgression of 1-102(A)(4) by respondent resulted 
in an unstayed two-year suspension.  Warren County Bar Ass’n v. Marshall, 113 Ohio St.3d 54, 
2007 Ohio 980, 862 N.E.2d 519. See this section supra at “Misconduct in the judicial process.”) 
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An Ohio lawyer’s improper solicitation of representation of an Arkansas juvenile involved in a school 
shooting incident and “false claims of specialization and expertise,” along with numerous other 
incidents of misconduct specified in ten other counts, resulted in an array of violations, including DR 
1-102(A)(4), in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth, 93 Ohio St.3d 173, 174, 754 N.E.2d 219, 
222 (2001). The Court found that respondent violated this rule by virtue of his unverifiable assertions 
and misrepresentations that “‘[y]ou will not find anyone in the United States that is more of an expert 
in this regard [representation of juveniles] than I am’ and that he has developed a national reputation 
for representing juveniles.”  Id. at 182, 754 N.E.2d at 229. The cumulative effect of this violation 
and the many others resulted in disbarment (even though the Board had recommended only a 
two-year suspension): 
 In only a few disciplinary cases has a lawyer violated so many 
rules of conduct as respondent has violated here. His myriad violations 
of express rules are not isolated incidents but form a distinct pattern of 
disregard for the courts, clients, other professionals, and for his own 
integrity. Because respondent has demonstrated blatant disregard for 
the most important standards by which members of the bar of Ohio are 
expected to conduct their professional activities, respondent is hereby 
permanently disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio. 
Id. at 187, 754 N.E.2d at 232. 
A series of acts violative of DR 1-102(A)(4) were present in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mishler, 118 
Ohio St.3d 109, 2008 Ohio 1810, 886 N.E.2d 818, where the respondent (1) entered into 
unauthorized settlement of state and federal employment discrimination cases for an amount that had 
been expressly rejected by the client, (2) negotiated the settlement check after endorsing the client’s 
name without his knowledge or approval, and (3) failed to inform his client about the settlement, who 
did not learn of it until more than six months after the cases were dismissed, at least one of which was 
dismissed with prejudice. (This pattern also violated 1-102(A)(5) & (6) and 7-101(A)(1) & (3).) 
The Cincinnati Bar Association warned that passing through cost mark-ups on client bills, such as 
marking up the fees charged to the firm by an outside attorney or an expert witness hired to work on a 
case, or the costs of deposition transcripts, without disclosure to the client, could violate 1-102(A)(4). 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Op. 95-96-02 (n.d.). 
In Disciplinary Counsel v. Avirov Stempler, 103 Ohio St.3d 104, 2004 Ohio 4656, 814 N.E.2d 
811, the lawyer engaged in deceit and misrepresentation, not only with her clients, but with her law 
firm as well.  Avirov Stempler, while under suspension and an obligation to notify her clients and 
opposing counsel of that fact, did not do so; instead, she continued to practice and hold herself out as 
a licensed attorney. “From October 1995 through June 2002, respondent appeared as counsel of 
record in over 40 cases pending in Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas.” Id. at para. 5. The 
Cincinnati law firm that had hired her also was not informed by respondent that her license was under 
suspension; when it found out, the firm fired her. For these and other violations, respondent was 
disbarred. Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Bowman, 110 Ohio St.3d 480, 2006 Ohio 4333, 854 
N.E.2d 480 (lying to law firm and clients). 
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Deceit, etc. coupled with other disciplinary violations: Conduct violative of DR 1-102(A)(4) often 
was subject to sanction under other disciplinary rules as well, such as DR 7-102(A)(5) (knowingly 
making false statements of law or fact). E.g., Bowman supra. Thus, a lawyer who continually lied to, 
among others, clients about the status of their cases was indefinitely suspended for violation of 
numerous provisions of the OHCPR, including 1-102(A)(4) and 7-102(A)(5).  Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Trumbo, 76 Ohio St.3d 369, 667 N.E.2d 1186 (1996). Another example 
occurred when a client received a letter on stationary from the Hamilton County Juvenile Court 
advising him of a continuance in a change-of-custody action; in fact, the action had never been filed 
and evidence showed that the letter was typed on a machine in the lawyer’s office.  Cincinnati Bar 
Ass’n v. Fennell, 63 Ohio St.3d 113, 406 N.E.2d 1129 (1980). DR 7-102(A)(5) and 1-102(A)(4) 
were also applied when, in a potential medical malpractice case, a lawyer told his client that he would 
have an expert review the client’s medical records. The lawyer later told the client that an expert had 
reviewed them and had advised him there was no claim. Actually, the lawyer had never referred the 
matter to an expert.  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lange, 57 Ohio St.3d 43, 564 N.E.2d 1069 (1991) 
(public reprimand imposed). (The same lawyer’s repetition of falsehoods to clients earned him an 
indefinite suspension in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lange, 71 Ohio St.3d 367, 653 N.E.2d 217 
(1995)).  
Many instances of “illegal conduct involving moral turpitude,” an OH DR 1-102(A)(3) offense, also 
involved the “dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” prohibited by OH DR 1-102(A)(4). See, 
e.g., Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Mason, 118 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 2704, 889 N.E.2d 539 
(misappropriation of client settlement funds, including purported “payment” of same by providing 
client with check drawn on nonexistent bank account); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Bozanich, 
95 Ohio St.3d 109, 766 N.E.2d 145 (2002) (paying money (at judge’s request) to judge before whom 
respondent appeared as counsel); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. DiCarlantonio, 68 Ohio St.3d 
479, 628 N.E.2d 1355 (1994) (city attorney’s agreement to change city ordinance in exchange for 
bribe). Not surprisingly a DR 1-102(A)(4) violation often involved conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and reflecting adversely on fitness to practice in violation of 1-102(A)(5) & 
(6). E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Wolanin, 121 Ohio St.3d 390, 2009 Ohio 1393, 904 N.E. 879 
(misappropriation).  
An instance of violation of Rules 8.4(b) and (c) (as well as (h)) occurred in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. 
Baker, 122 Ohio St.3d 45, 2009 Ohio 2371, 907 N.E.2d 1172, where the respondent faced criminal 
charges of conversion arising from his misappropriation of a client’s funds and then giving the client 
a check supposedly from an insurance company in settlement of a claim but in fact from respondent’s 
trust account. The icing on the cake was that the check bounced, causing the client further expense. 
Another case finding violation of each of these subsections of Rule 8.4 is Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Brickley, 131 Ohio St.3d 228, 2012 Ohio 872, 963 N.E.2d 818, where the respondent, suspended 
from practice for an earlier violation and working as a paralegal, was disbarred for felonious theft of 
funds from his employer’s client trust account. 
Neglecting a matter, coupled with hiding that neglect from a client, violated both former DR 
1-102(A)(4) and 6-101(A)(3). (As to neglect, see section 1.3:200-300.) E.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. 
Slavin, 121 Ohio St.3d 618, 2009 Ohio 2015, 906 N.E.2d 1121 (dishonesty with client concerning 
fictional “settlement” after missing statute of limitations; pre-2/1/07 neglect violated 6-101(A)(3); 
post-2/1/07 deceit violated Rule 8.4(c)); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Hickman, 119 Ohio St.3d 102, 2008 
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Ohio 3837, 892 N.E.2d 437 (lying to client about progress (or lack thereof) in case; failing to inform 
another client, contrary to his earlier representation, that he would not be reinstated); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007 Ohio 5251, 875 N.E.2d 935 (neglecting to 
appropriately advise client of developments in lawsuit and then fabricating one or more letters to 
conceal his neglect); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Helfgott, 109 Ohio St.3d 360, 2006 Ohio 2579, 847 
N.E.2d 1212 (neglect and dishonest assurances to client regarding status of matter; even though case 
involved conduct regarding two clients only and respondent had no prior disciplinary record during 
28 years of practice, he was disbarred. Three justices would have imposed indefinite suspension). 
Compare with Helfgott, a case decided one week earlier, Lake County Bar Ass’n v. Ryan, 109 
Ohio St.3d 301, 2006 Ohio 2422, 847 N.E.2d 430. Even though the fact pattern in Ryan involved, as 
did Helfgott, two instances of neglect in one case, coupled with misrepresentations to the client and 
even though the Court’s characterization of the mitigating/aggravating balance was virtually the same 
(actually there was one more aggravating factor in Ryan than in Helfgott and the mitigating factor 
was identical, an unblemished record in 27-28 years of practice), the respondent in Ryan was given a 
two-year suspension, with the second year stayed, as compared with the permanent disbarment 
imposed in Helfgott. In addition to the obviously disparate sanction imposed for essentially similar 
conduct, another striking difference between the two cases was the penalty sought by each relator; 
The Cleveland Bar Association recommended disbarment; the Lake County Bar Association 
recommended a six-month suspension plus full restitution. 
Other examples of neglect coupled with misrepresentation in cases decided under the Code include 
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Hickman, 107 Ohio St.3d 296, 2005 Ohio 6513, 839 N.E.2d 24 (respondent 
let statute of limitations run on wrongful-death and personal-injury actions on behalf of son of his 
clients; he then lied to his clients about pendency of both actions; for some reason relator joined with 
respondent in stipulating to one-year suspension with six months stayed for this egregious conduct, 
and the panel, the Board, and the Court bought it); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Deaton, 102 Ohio St.3d 
19, 2004 Ohio 1587, 806 N.E.2d 503 (neglect and misrepresentation directed toward respondent’s 
law firm, in contract case in which respondent was lead counsel representing his firm). 
This oft-recurring pattern of neglect and attempted cover up of that neglect by lying to clients as to the 
status of the case could result in violation of DR 7-102(A)(5) (knowingly making false statement of 
law or fact) in addition to 6-103(A)(3) and 1-102(A)(4). See, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Foster, 97 
Ohio St.3d 292, 2002 Ohio 6415, 779 N.E.2d 755 (violations of these and numerous other 
provisions “permeate[d]” respondent’s practice, resulting in disbarment); Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. 
Caywood, 62 Ohio St.3d 185, 580 N.E.2d 1076 (1991) (misrepresentation to court as well as client). 
Misuse of client funds, from commingling to outright theft, could constitute violation of both DR 
1-102(A)(4) and the provisions of DR 9-102, which were designed to protect client property. (As to 
which, see section 1.15:200.) E.g., Butler County Bar Ass’n v. Portman, 121 Ohio St.3d 518, 2009 
Ohio 1705, 905 N.E.2d 1203 (failure to return unearned fees (DR 9-102(B)(4)) and falsely stating 
that he had done so); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Mazanec, 114 Ohio St.3d 427, 2007 Ohio 
4268, 872 N.E.2d 1209 (stealing significant amounts from client’s trust fund, together with 
commingling personal funds with those held in client trust account); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Nagorny, 105 Ohio St.3d 97, 2004 Ohio 6899, 822 N.E.2d 1233 (both rules violated; 
misappropriation of funds from incompetent client’s estate while acting as guardian; sanction for 
such conduct would ordinarily be disbarment, but because of significant mitigating factors, indefinite 
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suspension imposed); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002 Ohio 2490, 769 
N.E.2d 816 (misappropriation of more than $250,000 of client’s money from joint and survivorship 
checking account established by respondent in her name and that of her client); Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Nasrallah, 94 Ohio St.3d 143, 148, 761 N.E.2d 11, 16 (2002) (“We have 
said on many occasions that taking client retainers and failing to carry out contracts of employment is 
tantamount to theft of the fee from the client”; both provisions, among others, violated; lawyer 
permanently disbarred). 
In the Dixon case, the panel and the Board had recommended an indefinite suspension. The Supreme 
Court, however, concluded differently: 
 Because misappropriation of client funds is among Dixon’s 
acts of admitted misconduct, we must begin our consideration with the 
presumptive sanction of disbarment. 
95 Ohio St.3d 490, at para. 15. After an extensive discussion of the mitigating/aggravating factors 
present in this case (as to which, see section 0.2:240 at “Supreme Court order - Sanctions for 
misconduct”), the Court determined that an indefinite suspension was insufficient: 
Misappropriation was but one form of Dixon’s misconduct. As the 
board correctly explained, Dixon “has committed disciplinary rule 
violations involving incompetence, neglect, dishonesty and 
misrepresentation involving commingling and misappropriation of a 
client’s funds, an attempt to charge an excessive fee, and failure to 
cooperate initially in the disciplinary process until she was advised to 
do so by retained counsel.” Dixon’s mitigating circumstances 
inadequately offset the more compelling interest of protecting the 
public. 
 
 This court hereby disbars Dixon from the practice of law. 
Id. at paras. 27-28 (emphasis by the Court). Accord Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Al’Uqdah, 99 Ohio 
St.3d 358, 2003 Ohio 3888, 792 N.E.2d 1074 (“myriad duties to his client” violated, in addition to 
1-102(A)(4), id. at para. 16; Dixon cited; respondent disbarred).  
But three 2010 cases suggest that the sanction of disbarment in client-theft cases may no longer be as 
“presumptive” as it once was.  See Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Thomas, 124 Ohio St.3d 498, 2010 
Ohio 604, 924 N.E.2d 352, in which the Court used the rationale of significant mitigating factors to 
justify the lesser sanction of indefinite suspension for violation of 8.4(c), (d), (h) and 1.15(a), (d), 
when there were six aggravating factors noted by the Board, as compared to two mitigating factors.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bandman, 125 Ohio St.3d 503, 2010 Ohio 2115, 929 N.E.2d 442, resulted 
in an indefinite suspension rather than disbarment, even though the mitigating factors were seemingly 
counterbalanced by four aggravating factors, including vulnerability of and harm to the client from 
whose family trust account respondent stole; in respondent’s words, the client was his “surrogate 
mom or grandmother” and at the time of the hearing was 96 years old. And in Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Cantrell, 125 Ohio St.3d 458, 2010 Ohio 2114, 928 N.E.2d 1100, despite aggravating factors of a 
pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses, and a 12/14/09 interim suspension for felony 
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convictions “unrelated” to conduct in the case at bar, a single mitigating factor (no prior violations in 
22 years of practice) was sufficient to reduce the presumptive disbarment sanction for 
misappropriation of client funds to an indefinite suspension. The Supreme Court similarly focused on 
respondent’s practicing “for 30 years without incident” in tempering the disbarment presumption and 
imposing an indefinite suspension in Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Gruttadaurio, 136 Ohio St.3d 
283, 2013 Ohio 3662, 995 N.E.2d 190. In doing so, the Court specified that “sufficient mitigating 
evidence” to temper the presumption “may include a substantial period of legal practice with no prior 
disciplinary offenses.” Id. at para. 48 (emphasis added). The Court likewise imposed an indefinite 
suspension in the 2011 case of Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 130 Ohio St.3d 368, 2011 Ohio 
5578, 958 N.E.2d 914, on facts reflecting, in addition to misappropriation, numerous other violations 
and aggravating factors that strongly outnumbered the two mitigating factors. (The three dissenters 
would have imposed the sanction recommended by the Board, a two-year suspension with one year 
stayed, citing, inter alia, a prior misappropriation case imposing the same penalty for violation of 
former DR 1-102(A)(4) and other disciplinary rules, Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mishler 118 Ohio 
St.3d 109, 2008 Ohio 1810, 886 N.E.2d 818). That this trend to more lenient sanctions in client-theft 
cases seems to be a continuing one is reflected in Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon-Seymour, 131 
Ohio St.3d 161, 2012 Ohio 114, 962 N.E.2d 309, where respondent committed ten violations, 
including misappropriation of estate funds over a period of years (as well as lying to the probate 
judge); there were an equal number of aggravating and mitigating factors. The sanction imposed on 
Simon-Seymour was a two-year suspension with the last six months stayed.  
The Dixon rule, however, is by no means moribund. See Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Toohig, 
133 Ohio St.3d 548, 2012 Ohio 5202, 979 N.E.2d 332 (multiple aggravating factors; single 
mitigating factor, Dixon “presumptive sanction” rule stated and followed; disbarment imposed); 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Sanz, 128 Ohio St.3d 373, 2011 Ohio 766, 944 N.E.2d 674 (multiple 
aggravating factors, no mitigating factors; Dixon rule followed; disbarment). And the presumptive 
sanction approach was followed and disbarment imposed in Stark County Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 
137 Ohio St.3d 112, 2013 Ohio 4006, 998 N.E.2d 427, despite the presence of four mitigating 
factors, which were outweighed by the seven aggravating factors. 
For cases in which a lawyer was found to have violated OH DR 1-102(A)(4) for misuse of nonclient 
funds, see Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Stidham, 87 Ohio St.3d 455, 721 N.E.2d 977 (2000) (in 
transaction involving transfer of ownership of bar, lawyer agreed to act as escrow agent for portion of 
purchase price paid by buyer (respondent’s client) and owing to seller; lawyer failed to set up escrow 
account on seller’s behalf, put the money in his IOLTA account instead, drew upon it for other 
purposes, and, when seller inquired as to status of escrow money, lawyer answered with misleading 
and threatening letter. Because the money was ultimately paid to the seller and for other mitigating 
reasons, respondent’s sanction was reduced by Court from Board’s recommended sanction of 
indefinite suspension to two-year suspension, with second year stayed). Accord Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Terbeek, 135 Ohio St.3d 458, 2013 Ohio 1912, 989 N.E.2d 55 (same basic factual 
scenario – respondent obligated to escrow client’s purchase money going to seller, but here, while 
Terbeek set up the escrow account and deposited the money, he then proceeded to misappropriate it; 
both DR 1-102(A)(4) and Rule 8.4(c) violated; respondent disbarred). Compare, under Rule 8.4(c), 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Brickley, 131 Ohio St.3d 228, 2012 Ohio 872, 963 N.E.2d 818, where 
respondent, working as a paralegal after having been indefinitely suspended, stole from his 
employer’s client trust account. The funds were client funds, but the clients were not clients of 
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8.4:500  Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.4(d) 
Background Reference 
ABA Model Rule 8.4(d) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.28-1.31 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 101:501 
ALI-LGL § 2 
Wolfram § 3.3.2 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.28-1.31 (1996). 
In general: Ohio Rule 8.4(d) provides, as did former OH DR 1-102(A)(5), that a lawyer shall not 
“engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” While lawyers occasionally are 
sanctioned for purely private conduct under these provisions – see, e.g., Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. 
Peskin, 125 Ohio St.3d 244, 2010 Ohio 1811, 927 N.E.2d 598 (possession and use of crack cocaine; 
8.4 (d)); Disciplinary Counsel v. McAuliffe, 121 Ohio St.3d 315, 2009 Ohio 1151, 903 N.E. 1209 
(burning down his house in order to defraud insurance company; DR 1-102(A)(5)); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Hiltbrand, 110 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006 Ohio 4250, 852 N.E.2d 733, (numerous scrapes 
with law over two-year period, most having to do with DUI or DUI-related offenses)) – its primary 
focus is on misconduct directed toward the justice system itself. Such misconduct usually falls into 
one of several broad categories, including: (1) misconduct directed at a tribunal, (2) misconduct by 
adjudicatory officials or other agents of the government, and (3) misconduct directed at clients. For a 
case involving misconduct directed at both tribunals and clients, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Lord, 
111 Ohio St.3d 131, 2006 Ohio 5341, 855 N.E.2d 457 (respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5)), 
among other provisions, because “he has shown disrespect to his clients and the courts by failing to 
attend court hearings and by failing to apprise his clients about the status of their cases,” as well as 
offering “misleading half-truths to clients, courts, and fellow lawyers,” id. at para. 28). Respondent’s 
“blatant neglect” of an estate likewise adversely affected both the probate court and the client in 
Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Gerren, 110 Ohio St.3d 297, 2006 Ohio 4482, 853 N.E.2d 302 (violation of 
1-102(A)(5), 6-101(A)(3) & 7-101(A)(2)). (In Disciplinary Counsel v. Brenner, 122 Ohio St.3d 
523, 2009 Ohio 3602, 912 N.E.2d 1116, the Court not surprisingly rejected without comment 
respondent’s argument that a DR 1-102(A)(5) violation requires that “the misconduct take place in an 
administrative or judicial proceeding.” Id. at para. 19.) 
Professional misconduct does not always fall within these three categories, however. For example, in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Chambers, 125 Ohio St.3d 414, 2010 Ohio 1809, 928, N.E.2d 1061, 
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respondent’s attempt to have his next door neighbor — with whom he had an altercation resulting in 
respondent’s pleading no contest to disorderly conduct charges and who had filed a grievance against 
him — dismiss the grievance as part of the settlement of the neighbor’s civil action against him, 
violated Rule 8.4 (d) and (h). The respondent in Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Hanni, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 367, 2010 Ohio 5771, 939 N.E.2d 1226, violated 8.4(d) when she appeared on a radio show 
while running for county prosecutor and made unfounded allegations of unethical conduct by the 
incumbent. And Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-22, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 7 (Oct. 18, 1991), declared that a criminal defense attorney, who was the sibling of a 
prosecutor, would violate DR-1-102(A)(5) by accepting criminal cases to be prosecuted by the 
sibling where the prosecutor had no assistant to appoint. The prosecutor would be called upon 
regularly to appoint special prosecutors to handle these matters, creating both a financial and 
administrative burden. Behavior by the criminal defense attorney necessitating such a burden would 
be prejudicial to the administration of justice. Compare Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 97-5 
(Sept. 22, 1997), opining that a law firm’s representation of respondents before a certified grievance 
committee of a bar association, when a partner of the firm is a member of the association’s board of 
trustees, does not violate DR 1-102(A)(5), because trustees are barred from serving on the grievance 
committee and because investigatory information gathered by the committee is confidential and may 
not be shared with board members. 
The latest of these non-private conduct cases falling outside the three principal categories is 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Engel, 132 Ohio St.3d 105, 2012 Ohio 2168, 969 N.E.2d 1178. The 
respondent in Engel was the chief legal counsel for the Ohio Department of Public Safety. His 
violation of 8.4(d) and (h) was premised on his use of an email filter to intercept confidential 
communications, “including investigatory materials belonging to the Ohio inspector general and 
Ohio Ethics Commission, the United States Attorney, and the United States Department of Justice.” 
Id. at para. 1. Engel did not intend to intercept confidential information, but after he discovered that 
he had unintentionally intercepted non-DPS confidential information, “he did nothing to stop it and 
left the filter in place for ‘a couple of months, maybe going on a year.’” Id. at para. 13. (His filter 
scheme was undertaken because the inspector general’s office had “developed a practice of 
cherry-picking DPS’s highway patrol employees – without the knowledge or consent of the DPS 
director – to conduct his investigations,” id. at para. 3; the filter system was designed to find out how 
confidential legal advice and information given to DPS employees was not being held in confidence, 
but because some DPS employees were working for the inspector general on other civil and criminal 
investigations, confidential information about those investigations got included in the filter.) Engel 
pled guilty to three misdemeanor offenses of recklessly disclosing inspector general confidential 
information, and stipulated to the 8.4(d) and (e) violations. 
Perhaps an even more interesting aspect of the Engel decision is the history of the sanction imposed, 
which ended up as an actual six-month suspension. First, the parties entered into a 
consent-to-discipline agreement recommending a public reprimand, which was adopted by the panel, 
but the Board rejected it. After hearing, the panel adopted Engel’s proposed sanction of public 
reprimand, and the Board adopted the panel’s report in toto. But the Court, in the course of 
distinguishing the public reprimand imposed on then Governor Taft in 112 Ohio St.2d 155, 2006 
Ohio 6525, 858 N.E.2d 414, stressed that Engel’s 
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distribution of confidential information about pending 
law-enforcement and ethics investigations to those who were not 
authorized to receive such information [including Engel] – while he 
served as chief legal counsel for DPS – worked to undermine public 
trust not only in the legal system, but in state government as a whole. . . . 
Engel acted recklessly and stipulated that his conduct reflected on his 
fitness to practice law and [unlike Taft] that it was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
Id. at para. 13 (emphasis by the Court). Justice Lundburg Stratton, dissenting with respect to the 
sanction imposed, stressed that there were no aggravating factors, five mitigating factors, and the 
penalty imposed exceeded the public reprimand recommended by the panel and the Board. 
Conduct policed under this provision often violated other disciplinary provisions as well. E.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Schiller, 123 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009 Ohio 4909, 915 N.E.2d 324 (pattern of 
violating court orders and neglecting client cases violated DR 1-102(A)(5) & (6) and Rule 8.4(d) & 
(h), among others; indefinite suspension); Disciplinary Counsel v. Zigan, 118 Ohio St.3d 180, 2008 
Ohio 1976, 887 N.E.2d 334 (seven counts of converting funds belonging to respondent’s law firm or 
his clients violated, inter alia, DR 1-102(A)(4)-(6); disbarment ordered); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 2008 Ohio 91, 880 N.E.2d 467 (scheme to defraud in-law clients and 
nursing homes caring for them violated DR 1-102(A)(3)-(6) and 9-102(B)(3)). Respondents 
occasionally complained that it was improper to predicate multiple disciplinary violations on the 
same alleged misconduct. This argument appeared strongest when a broad general provision like 
1-102(A)(5) was cited along with a specific provision in the OHCPR that appeared to speak more 
directly to the wrongdoing in question. Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court was unreceptive to 
such arguments. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Bell, 15 Ohio St.3d 118, 472 N.E.2d 1069 
(1984). In Bell, an attorney who charged exorbitant fees for arranging a private adoption and made a 
false accounting of them to the probate court was given an indefinite suspension. The attorney 
challenged the action in part on the ground that the numerous Code violations asserted against him 
(DR 1-102(A)(1)-(6), 2-106(A), and 7-102(A)(3)-(8)) arose from the same conduct and thus were 
merely cumulative in nature. The Supreme Court rejected the argument. 
Misconduct directed at a tribunal: Numerous decisions involving violation of former DR 1-102(A)(5) 
concerned misconduct before a tribunal. Indeed, one such was the first disciplinary case in which the 
Supreme Court applied the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Vogel, 117 
Ohio St.3d 108, 2008 Ohio 504, 881 N.E.2d 1244 (false accusations against one judge in 2005 
matter; lying to another judge in criminal matter in which respondent represented defendant in late 
January and early February 2007.  DR 1-102(A)(5) applied to first matter; both 1-102(A)(5) and Rule 
8.4(d) applied to second, inasmuch as conduct occurred both before and after February 1, 2007, the 
effective date of OHRPC. See Vogel at n.2.). Other examples of conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice under the Rules are Disciplinary Counsel v. Siehl, 123 Ohio St.3d 480, 
2009 Ohio 5936, 918 N.E.2d 143, where 8.4(d) (as well as 8.4(h)) was found to have been violated 
“because respondent failed to honor his court appointment” to represent an incarcerated client in 
postconviction proceedings, id. at para. 4, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Rohrer, 124 Ohio St.3d 65, 
2009 Ohio 5930, 919 N.E.2d 191, where the 8.4(d) violation was predicated on respondent’s 
“deliberately violating a court order and lying to the court about it.” Id. at para. 20. 
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Such misconduct takes many forms. In some it consisted of rude or inappropriate behavior toward the 
court. (Conduct of this sort can also violate Rule 3.5(a)(6), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in 
undignified or discourteous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal. The Court so held in Mahoning 
County Bar Ass’n v. Sakmar, 127 Ohio St.3d 244, 2010 Ohio 5720, 938 N.E.2d 355 (respondent 
missed or appeared late for hearings, and walked out of a hearing when the presiding judge directed 
him to remain in the courtroom; such conduct “impedes the efficient administration of justice.” Id. at 
para. 8. See section 3.5:400.) Under the Code, in Disciplinary Counsel v. LoDico, 106 Ohio St.3d 
229, 2005 Ohio 4630, 833 N.E.2d 1235, a respondent who consistently ignored the court’s rulings, 
used inappropriate facial and physical reactions, and generally behaved disrespectfully toward the 
court, witnesses, and jury, was found in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) & (6) and 7-106(C)(6). 
Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Cregan, 62 Ohio St.3d 444, 584 N.E.2d 656 (1992), involved a 
mentally ill lawyer, who was at times “completely out of control,” sanctioned under this provision for 
making insulting and demeaning racial remarks to other attorneys and to a counselor who appeared in 
court to assist a mentally handicapped client of the attorney, and for engaging in harassing and 
threatening telephone calls and conduct directed to employees of the counseling center helping the 
client. In Disciplinary Counsel v. Wineman, 121 Ohio St.3d 614, 2009 Ohio 2005, 906 N.E.2d 
1117, a lawyer, who on a number of occasions appeared in court and with clients while intoxicated, 
was found to have violated DR 1-102(A)(5) & (6). Unjust criticism of the court also falls into this 
category. E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009 Ohio 2870, 909 N.E.2d 
1271 (unfounded accusations of bias, corruption and other improprieties directed at various state 
court common pleas judges and federal district court judge violated 1-102(A)(5) & (6) and 8-102(B), 
among other disciplinary rules); For a somewhat unusual twist on the application of 1-102(A)(5) with 
respect to conduct directed at a tribunal, see Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cicero, 78 Ohio 
St.3d 351, 678 N.E.2d 517 (1997), where a lawyer, appointed by a judge to represent a criminal 
defendant in an action pending before her, was sanctioned under this rule for getting involved in a 
sexual relationship with the judge after she had recused herself from the case. 
Other misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice strikes more directly at the heart of the 
judicial process. Examples include: 
 attempted bribery of government officials, see, e.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Jurek, 62 Ohio 
St.3d 318, 581 N.E.2d 1356 (1991) (bribing common pleas bond commissioner, to 
circumvent court’s random-assignment process for criminal cases in order to assure that 
certain cases were not assigned to particular judges, violated DR 1-102(A)(3) & (5)); Bar 
Ass’n of Greater Cleveland v. Italiano, 24 Ohio St.3d 204, 494 N.E.2d 1113 (1986) 
(attempted bribe of police officer, in exchange for reduction of charge against his client, 
violated DR 1-102(A)(3) & (5) and 7-102(A)(5)), 
 altering judgment entries, see, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams, 51 Ohio 
St.3d 36, 553 N.E.2d 1082 (1990) (attorney, who unilaterally altered judgment entry by 
substituting his client for opposing party in provision granting benefit and who was found in 
contempt for doing so, was publicly reprimanded for violating DR 1-102(A)(5)), 
 seeking to defraud, improperly withholding information from, or otherwise misleading a 
tribunal, see, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Farrell, 129 Ohio St.3d 223, 2011 Ohio 2879, 
951 N.E.2d 390 (submission of false affidavit to court in response to motion for contempt 
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filed in domestic relations case to which he was a party and providing false answers at panel 
hearing in prior disciplinary proceedings: “Respondent’s submission of a false affidavit in his 
domestic proceeding and his false testimony in his prior disciplinary proceeding were 
prejudicial to the administration of justice and adversely reflected on his fitness to practice 
law. His actions impaired this court’s ability to determine the full scope of his misconduct and 
craft an appropriate sanction to protect the public.” Id. at para. 33.); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Yeager, 123 Ohio St.3d 156, 2009 Ohio 4761, 914 N.E.2d 1046 (multiple 
misrepresentations to juvenile court and abandoning client in middle of hearing violated, inter 
alia, DR 1-102(A)(4) & (5)); Trumbull County Bar Ass’n v. Kafantaris, 121 Ohio St.3d 
387, 2009 Ohio 1389, 904 N.E.2d 875 (nondisclosure of settlement proceeds to probate court; 
filing false affidavit with Supreme Court); Disciplinary Counsel v. Simmons, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 304, 2008 Ohio 6142, 898 N.E.2d 943 (purported representation of client in 
jurisdiction where not admitted, by means of false statements and nondisclosure of his status); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 119 Ohio St.3d 47, 2008 Ohio 3321, 891 N.E.2d 740 
(presenting forged deed during administration of former client’s estate; conduct violated DR 
1-102(A)(3), (4), and (6), as well as (5)); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kafantaris, 99 
Ohio St.3d 94, 2003 Ohio 2477, 789 N.E.2d 192 (lying in answer to sexual-harassment 
complaint filed against respondent by former employee; falsehoods repeated at deposition and 
in affidavit filed with trial court), 
 violating a court order, see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Stafford, 128 Ohio St.3d 446, 
2011 Ohio 1484, 946 N.E.2d 193 (evading discovery obligations, despite court orders to 
comply “is the equivalent of obstructing discovery” and is violative of Rule 8.4(d) and DR 
1-102(A)(5)); Disciplinary Counsel v. McCord, 121 Ohio St.3d 497, 2009 Ohio 1517, 905 
N.E.2d 1182 (failure to comply with child-support order); Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Randall, 118 
Ohio St.3d 408, 2008 Ohio 2709, 889 N.E.2d 535 (disregard of district court orders requiring 
respondent to show cause why his clients’ cases should not be dismissed for want of 
prosecution; conduct also violative of DR 1-102(A)(6)); Akron Bar Ass’n v. Markovich, 
117 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008 Ohio St.3d 862, 883 N.E.2d 1046 (civil protection order 
precluding his client or “any other person” from initiating contact with named persons or their 
“babysitters”; in violation thereof, respondent appeared at named person’s house and sought 
to intimidate her babysitter; conduct also violated 1-102(A)(6)); Stark County Bar Ass’n v. 
Ake, 111 Ohio St.3d 266, 2006 Ohio 5704, 855 N.E.2d 1206 (deliberately ignoring court 
orders while representing himself in acrimonious divorce action violated 1-102(A)(5), among 
other rules; three justices in dissent argued that disregard of court order should result in actual 
rather than stayed six-month suspension); and, 
 otherwise obstructing justice, see, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Freedman, 49 Ohio St.3d 
65, 551 N.E.2d 143 (1990); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Smakula, 39 Ohio St.3d 143, 
529 N.E.2d 1376 (1988). Both cases are discussed in section 8.4:300 at “Obstruction of 
justice.” 
Removal of information from court files and failing to return it on a timely basis violated this 
disciplinary rule. For example, in Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Boano, 46 Ohio St.3d 146, 545 
N.E.2d 896 (1989), Boano removed and accidentally discarded part of a client’s court file that 
showed the client’s prior convictions; as a result, the client was treated as a first-time offender. The 
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hearing panel of Board of Commissioners found as follows: 
[H]aving removed part of the criminal history from the court file, 
respondent had the highest duty to safeguard and return that history to 
the file, even though the removal may have followed the usual patterns 
of counsel in similar circumstances and even though the destruction of 
the history was negligence, rather than an intentional act calculated to 
prejudice the prosecution’s case. 
Id. at 146, 545 N.E.2d at 897. Further, the respondent had informed another assistant prosecutor 
about the prior convictions and did not intentionally hide the fact from the assistant prosecutor who 
appeared at the hearing. Nevertheless, it was due to the respondent’s conduct that the prosecutor did 
not have the record available to him in the case jacket at the time of the hearing. The Court found that 
this conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and warranted a public reprimand. 
In an interrelated series of cases, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed a common practice in the Toledo 
courts, where lawyers in traffic and criminal matters would remove affidavits from court files, and 
fail to return them promptly, often waiting until a request was made by the clerk of courts to do so. 
Each of the cases contained this common definition of the affidavits at issue: “Affidavits are official 
court papers that specify the alleged offense, contain a history of proceedings in the case, and play a 
vital role in the system used by the Toledo Municipal Court to administer its caseload.” While the 
affidavits were out of the file, the case would not proceed. Lawyers gave a variety of excuses for their 
conduct, including that they were attempting 
 to contact a client, e.g., Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Browarsky, 60 Ohio St.3d 100, 573 N.E.2d 72 
(1991), 
 to secure a continuance, Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Dow, 60 Ohio St.3d 103, 573 N.E.2d 646 
(1991), 
 to avoid the issuance of a bench warrant, Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Wittenberg, 60 Ohio St.3d 94, 
573 N.E.2d 641 (1991), 
 to avoid having the case assigned to a particular judge, e.g., Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Doyle, 60 
Ohio St.3d 106, 573 N.E.2d 648 (1991), 
 to allow tempers to cool in an emotionally charged case, Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Richardson, 
60 Ohio St.3d 98, 573 N.E.2d 645 (1991), 
 as well as blaming the general time constraints of practice, Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Wingate, 60 
Ohio St.3d 96, 573 N.E.2d 643 (1991). 
While the cases varied somewhat in terms of the disciplinary violations raised, the conduct was 
treated for the most part as a violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) and 7-102(A)(8). E.g., Doyle, 60 Ohio 
St.3d 106, 573 N.E.2d 648. In terms of punishment, most of the lawyers involved received a public 
reprimand, rather than a more severe penalty, presumably because the conduct was common practice 
at the time. E.g., Sweeney, 60 Ohio St.3d 104, 573 N.E.2d 647. Aggravating circumstances, such as 
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an excessive number of instances of the practice or use of the practice with respect to a case in which 
the lawyer was a defendant, warranted more severe penalties. See, e.g., Wittenberg, 60 Ohio St.3d 
94, 573 N.E.2d 641 (over 200 instances involved, resulting in two-year suspension with final 
eighteen months stayed on conditions). 
Another common ground for finding a Rule 8.4(d) or DR 1-102(A)(5) violation was the failure of an 
attorney to cooperate in the disciplinary proceeding itself. See, e.g., Akron Bar Ass’n v. Fink, 131 
Ohio St.3d 34, 2011 Ohio 6342, 959 N.E.2d 104 (non-cooperation violated 8.4(d) and Gov Bar R V 
4(G), even though underlying grievance dismissed; public reprimand imposed); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. McShane, 121 Ohio St.3d 169, 2009 Ohio 746, 902 N.E.2d 980 (ignoring relator’s letter 
of inquiry violated DR 1-102-(A)(5) & (6) and Gov Bar R V 4(G)); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Freeman, 119 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008 Ohio 3836, 894 N.E.2d 31 (violation of 1-102(A)(6) and Gov 
Bar R V 4(G), as well as 1-102(A)(5)). See also Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Beatty, 102 Ohio St.3d 
267, 2004 Ohio 2684, 809 N.E.2d 1117 (failure to comply with administrative requirements of 
contempt order arising out of prior disciplinary proceeding violated DR 1-102(A)(5)). Attempts to 
limit the participation of former clients in disciplinary proceedings also violated this provision.  
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Berger, 64 Ohio St.3d 454, 597 N.E.2d 81 (1992) (seeking to 
suppress bar association’s investigation by means of fee-dispute settlement agreement that purported 
to limit ability of former client to comment to disciplinary authorities on settlement and underlying 
dispute violated 1-102(A)(5) & (6)). It has even been suggested that, where a lawyer has proper 
grounds for serious complaint that a judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, the failure to file a 
grievance with the authorities may itself be grounds for discipline against the lawyer as conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 92-3 (Apr. 16, 1993). See also 
section 8.2:300. 
If failure to cooperate violates 1-102(A)(5), then it goes without saying that libelous verbal attacks on 
and threats directed at both former clients and disciplinary authorities, which misconduct was 
indicative of “intentional disregard of and open contempt for the disciplinary process,” will do so as 
well. Disciplinary Counsel v. Watterson, 114 Ohio St.3d 159, 2007 Ohio 3615, 870 N.E.2d 1153, 
at para. 30 (violation of DR 1-102(A)(4)-(6) and 8-102(B); indefinite suspension imposed in order, 
inter alia, “to ensure the orderly administration of justice,” id. at para. 30). 
Failure to comply with continuing-legal-education, bar-registration, or other requirements set forth in 
the Rules for the Government of the Bar could likewise result in a DR 1-102(A)(5) violation. E.g., 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Mitchell, 118 Ohio St.3d 98, 2008 Ohio 1822, 886 N.E.2d 222 (failure to 
keep Attorney Registration Section apprised of current residence and office address; see Gov Bar R 
VI 1(D); conduct violated 1-102(A)(6) as well); Disciplinary Counsel v. Redfield, 116 Ohio St.3d 
262, 2007 Ohio 6039, 878 N.E.2d 10 (failure to make child-support payments; see Gov Bar R V 5); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. MacLean, 106 Ohio St.3d 50, 2005 Ohio 3672, 831 N.E.2d 423 (CLE; see 
Gov Bar R X); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. DeLong, 98 Ohio St.3d 470, 2003 Ohio 1743, 
786 N.E.2d 1280 (registration and CLE; see Gov Bar R VI 1 and X). 
Finally, the unauthorized practice of law not only violated former Canon 3, but could also be 
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Cases in which both provisions (among others) were found 
to be violated by practicing law while under suspension, where not licensed, or while on inactive 
status include Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Good, 114 Ohio St.3d 204, 2007 Ohio 3602, 871 N.E.2d 
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542 (unauthorized practice in Florida); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Rose, 114 Ohio St.3d 177, 2007 
Ohio 3606, 870 N.E.2d 1168 (practicing while on inactive status); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Allison, 98 Ohio St.3d 322, 2003 Ohio 776, 784 N.E.2d 695 (practicing while under suspension). 
Absent significant mitigating circumstances, the penalty for practicing while under suspension is 
typically disbarment, as was ordered in Allison. See also Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Atkins, 58 Ohio 
St.2d 194, 389 N.E.2d 506 (1979) (accepting fee to represent client in federal court where lawyer 
was not admitted to practice violated DR 1-102(A)(5)). Regarding unauthorized practice, see section 
5.5:210. Not surprisingly, aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law can likewise result 
in a 1-102(A)(5) violation, as in Disciplinary Counsel v. Maley, 119 Ohio St.3d 217, 2008 Ohio 
3923, 893 N.E.2d 180 (inadequate supervision of secretary, who was performing legal work for 
respondent’s clients, violated, inter alia, DR 1-102(A)(5) & (6), as well as 3-101(A)). See section 
5.5:240. 
Misconduct by adjudicatory officials: Occasionally, misconduct by adjudicatory officials results in a 
violation of DR 1-102(A)(5). One of the more recent is Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoskins, 119 Ohio 
St.3d 17, 2008 Ohio 3194, 891 N.E.2d 324, where respondent, the common pleas judge in Highland 
County, violated the rule by issuing a press release implying that one of his court employees had 
passed a polygraph test, when he knew that deficiencies in the test rendered the results unreliable and 
meaningless. In a second count, respondent violated 1-102(A)(5) by failing to recuse himself in a 
criminal case involving someone whom he had defended in private practice and who happened to be 
the son of the employee. For his multiple violations of the Judicial Canons and six different 
disciplinary rules, Judge Hoskins was disbarred. Another is Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 104 
Ohio St.3d 251, 2004 Ohio 6402, 819 N.E.2d 273, where the respondent’s court, pursuant to 
procedures instituted by the judge, functioned as a free small-claims collection service, rather than a 
court of law. This, the Court found, “prejudiced the administration of justice, in violation of DR 
1-102(A)(5).” Id. at para. 37. A further example is Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Cleary, 93 Ohio St.3d 
191, 754 N.E.2d 235 (2001), where a former common pleas judge was suspended from the practice of 
law for six months for violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) (as well as CJC Canons 3(B)(5) and 3(E)(1) 
[now CJC Rules 2.2, 2.3(A), (B) & 2.11(A)]). The conduct involved: (1) offering a defendant, in the 
sentencing phase of a fifth-degree felony case, a quid pro quo -- if the defendant, who was pregnant, 
agreed to carry her child to term, she would be given probation; if she intended to terminate the 
pregnancy, she would go to prison; and (2) subsequently instructing her bailiff to prepare, sign her 
name, and file an order revoking an appellate bond granted by another judge sitting in Judge Cleary’s 
absence. The Supreme Court found that each of these actions violated 1-102(A)(5), pursuant to which 
a judge has a duty to deal fairly with attorneys and litigants who come before the court. This standard 
is not met “when the judge engages in conduct that would appear to an objective observer to be 
unjudicial and prejudicial to the public esteem for the judicial office.” 93 Ohio St.3d at 191, 754 
N.E.2d at 237 (syllabus). Applying this rule to the case before it, the Court concluded that 
Cleary took extraordinary action to countermand an entry of the acting 
administrative judge, despite having declared herself to be otherwise 
unavailable for judicial duty. To an objective observer, Cleary 
appeared to go out of her way to hamper [defendant’s] efforts to obtain 
legal relief, in the form of an appellate bond, which may have allowed 
[her] to terminate her pregnancy. 
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Id. at 206, 754 N.E.2d at 250. (The prejudicial-to-the-administration-of-justice standard as it is 
applied to judges, quoted above from Cleary, was also invoked in finding the respondent judge in 
violation of Rule 8.4(d) in Disciplinary Counsel v. Gaul, 127 Ohio St.3d 16, 2010 Ohio 4831, 936 
N.E.2d 28 (respondent’s treatment of defendant in criminal case found to be biased and unfair).) 
Accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Elum, 133 Ohio St.3d 500, 2012 Ohio 4700, 979 N.E.2d 289 (“By 
using vulgar and intemperate language, Judge Elum behaved in an undignified, unprofessional, and 
discourteous manner towards litigants in his courtroom. He also needlessly injected himself into an 
administrative investigation, impairing the independence of the judiciary. . . . Rather than promoting 
the evenhanded administration of justice, these actions have served to erode public confidence in the 
integrity of the judiciary.” Id. at para. 21.). 
Another case in which a judge exhibited unmistakable symptoms of “robe fever” is Disciplinary 
Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004 Ohio 4704, 815 N.E.2d 286. Respondent’s DR 
1-102(A)(5) transgressions included: repeatedly acting “in an unbecoming, unprofessional, and 
discourteous fashion towards her staff, other court personnel, visiting judges, law enforcement 
personnel, attorneys, probation officials, and members of the public,” id. at para. 29; attempting to 
force defendants in her courtroom to plead against their wishes; and misrepresenting judicial events to 
other judges, attorneys and court personnel, thereby “undermin[ing] public confidence in the integrity 
of the judicial system.” Id. at para. 27. Respondent was suspended for two years with one year stayed 
on conditions, including a mental health evaluation. 
Closely parallel to O’Neill in both misconduct and sanction is Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 116 
Ohio St.3d 110, 2007 Ohio 5588, 876 N.E.2d 933. Judge Squire was found guilty of ten DR 
1-102(A)(5) violations, among them, failing or refusing to follow Ohio law with respect to ex parte 
petitions for civil protection orders; refusing to consider the matters brought before her in the CPO 
and other cases; refusing timely to disqualify herself and proceeding with hearings in two different 
cases after the filing of affidavits of disqualification, which filing operates to stay all proceedings 
pending before the judge in question; and making various improper ex parte contacts. Also citing 
O’Neill (as well as Medley) is Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 116 Ohio St.3d 64, 2007 Ohio 5635, 
876 N.E.2d 556, where the respondent, a municipal court judge, was found to have violated 
1-102(A)(5) in all but one of the seven counts in the complaint against him. The charges including 
jailing a courtroom spectator without cause, attempting to coerce plea agreements in criminal cases, 
mistreatment of a victim of domestic violence, and telephoning a defendant’s alleged drug dealer 
from open court.  An eighteen-month suspension was imposed, with the last six months stayed on 
conditions involving mental-health measures. These cases are also discussed in section 8.4:400 supra, 
at “Misconduct in the judicial process.” Although violating many of the same provisions of the CJC 
and CPR as did Judges O’Neill and Squire, the respondent judge in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Campbell, 126 Ohio St.3d 150, 2010 Ohio 3265, 931 N.E.2d 558, received a lesser sanction 
(one-year suspension with six months stayed) because “his violations were neither as numerous nor as 
egregious as those committed by O’Neill and Squire.”  Id. at para. 62 (in addition to multiple 
violations of the Judicial Code, there were only two violations of the CPR (1-102(A)(5)), for injecting 
himself into a criminal investigation and attempting to try an indigent defendant without appointing 
him counsel to aid in his defense; in contrast, the respondent in Squire committed two violations of 
DR 1-102(A)(4) and ten violations of 1-102(A)(5). Citing Campbell, the one-year sanction with six 
months stayed was again imposed against the respondent judge in Disciplinary Counsel v. Plough, 
126 Ohio St.3d 167, 2010 Ohio 3298, 931 N.E.2d 575, who engaged in four instances of conduct 
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prejudicial to the administration of justice (1-102(A)(5) and 8.4(h)) as well as ten violations of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Other instances include a case in which a common pleas judge was found to have violated this rule (as 
well as OH CJC Canon 3(B)(7) [now CJC Rule 2.9(A)]) as a result of his unannounced visit to, and 
ex parte contact with, the legal administrator of a Cuyahoga County department, during which he 
asked that the department terminate its opposition to motions to consolidate cases pending before the 
judge. (The department was a party to some of the cases subject to the motion to consolidate.) Finding 
the Board’s recommendation of public reprimand inadequate, the Court suspended respondent from 
the practice of law, and, pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Rule for the Government of the 
Judiciary (Gov Jud R) III 7(A), from his judgeship without pay, for six months.  Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferreri, 88 Ohio St.3d 456, 727 N.E.2d 908 (2000). Similarly, a judge 
violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and CJC Canon 3(B)(7) (among others) in Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Karto, 94 Ohio St.3d 109, 760 N.E.2d 412 (2002), where, in addition to ex parte communication 
with juvenile-probation department employee, respondent abused his contempt power, held a 
juvenile-detention hearing without the juveniles’ attorney present, forcing juveniles to cross-examine 
the state’s witnesses themselves, and failing promptly to recuse himself from the proceedings after 
instructing the prosecutor to bring felony charges against the juveniles. The Court quoted the 
language from Cleary set forth above (conduct appearing to objective observer to be unjudicial and 
prejudicial to public esteem for judicial office) and imposed a six-month suspension, coupled with the 
automatic immediate suspension from judicial office without pay for the same period, per Gov Jud R 
III 7(A). 
The respondent in Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Katalinas, 90 Ohio St.3d 140, 735 N.E.2d 432 (2000), 
was permanently disbarred for his misconduct, which included practicing law while a sitting 
municipal court judge, refusing to return case files and unearned retainers, and abusing a durable 
power of attorney granted him by a childhood friend by appropriating the friend’s bank accounts for 
his own personal use, in violation of former DR 1-102(A)(3)-(6), among other rules. In Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mestemaker, 78 Ohio St.3d 92, 676 N.E.2d 870 (1997), a former 
municipal court judge was found to have violated 1-102(A)(5) by making derogatory remarks based 
on a litigant’s national origin and by engaging in other instances of poor judicial temperament. In 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Konet, 40 Ohio St.3d 256, 532 N.E.2d 1313 (1988), a referee 
was found in violation of this provision and given a public reprimand for accepting loans from 
attorneys who practiced law before him and for failing to disclose a loan of over $100 on his financial 
disclosure statement or judicial compensation report. And in Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Gibson, 55 
Ohio St.2d 99, 377 N.E.2d 751 (1978), an acting municipal judge was found to have violated DR 
1-102(A)(5), 9-101(A), and the CJC, and given a public reprimand for serving as both judge and 
counsel for an accused in different phases of the same criminal proceeding. A lawyer who made 
numerous unwelcome sexual comments and physical contacts directed at his employees while in 
private practice, and at court employees or lawyers appearing before him while a judge, was 
suspended from practice for one year.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 68 Ohio St.3d 
7, 623 N.E.2d 24 (1993) (conduct found to violate 1-102(A)(5) & (6), as well as several provisions of 
the CJC). In condemning this behavior, the Court wrote: 
 The Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of 
Judicial Conduct serve many purposes. Foremost among them are to 
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ensure a legal system of the highest caliber and to instill and maintain 
public confidence in that system. Respondent’s acts not only do not 
further these goals, they undermine them. Such conduct would be 
unacceptable by any member of society. We, however, find it 
particularly intolerable by an attorney and abhorrent for a member of 
the judiciary. 
Id. at 11, 623 N.E.2d at 27. 
The Supreme Court publicly reprimanded the respondent for violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) in 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Sauter, 96 Ohio St.3d 136, 2002 Ohio 3610, 772 N.E.2d 620. 
Demonstrating an appalling lack of judgment, the respondent, a law clerk to a state court of appeals 
judge, shortly before oral argument sent an email to an assistant city solicitor friend for forwarding 
(respondent didn’t have the ultimate recipient’s address) to an attorney representing the City of 
Cincinnati in a case pending before a panel that included her judge. In it she pointed out recent cases, 
decided by the three judges on the panel, in which the court had used a formulation for abuse of 
discretion (“not based on a sound reasoning process”) different from the traditional arbitrary and 
unreasonable standard. She noted that “this type of review is probably better for the city, so you might 
want to hammer on the lack of sound reasoning by the lower court. This message will self-destruct in 
two hours.” Id. at paras. 5-6. The intended recipient was out of town, so the intermediary forwarded 
it to co-counsel for the city, who reported it to his superiors, who reported it to the court administrator 
of the court of appeals and then informed opposing counsel of the incident. As a result of this debacle, 
respondent’s judge recused himself from the case. The judge “also questioned Sauter about her 
actions. Sauter resigned her clerkship effective October 13, 2000.” Id. at para. 18. The Sauter case is 
also discussed in section 3.5:300. 
Misconduct by a prosecutor also can be prejudicial to the administration of justice. At times, the 
misconduct involves mishandling of evidence. For example, in Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. 
Gerstenslager, 45 Ohio St.3d 88, 543 N.E.2d 491 (1989), the Court found that where a prosecuting 
attorney failed to provide full disclosure of exculpatory information as requested by defense counsel 
and failed to comply with a court order requiring full disclosure of hospital records to defense counsel 
due to gross negligence and “sloppiness,” a violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) was established and a public 
reprimand appropriate. Because a knowing failure to turn over evidence was not involved, a DR 
7-103(B) violation was not shown. Id. Compare Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrenn, 99 Ohio 
St.3d 222, 2003 Ohio 3288, 790 N.E.2d 1195, where both 1-102(A)(5) and 7-103(B) were found to 
have been violated. The assistant prosecutor received a six-month stayed suspension for failure to 
disclose material exculpatory information of which he had knowledge. The Wrenn case is further 
discussed in section 8.4:400 at “Misconduct in the judicial process.” Theft of cocaine by an assistant 
prosecutor from the scientific investigation unit where it was being held as evidence in pending cases 
also violated this provision.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Columbro, 66 Ohio St.3d 195, 611 
N.E.2d 302 (1993) (conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3)-(6) and warranted indefinite suspension). For a 
case in which the Court rejected the Board’s finding of prosecutor’s recusal a violation of 1-102(A)(5) 
by a part-time prosecutor, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, 123 Ohio St.3d 298, 2009 Ohio 
5286, 915 N.E.2d 1224 (no professional misconduct, “given unique circumstances at issue,” id. at 
para. 1, which involved issues of conflicts and timeliness of prosecutor’s deferring recusal, in action 
against son of friends of his wife, until after he had negotiated plea agreement and after he had told 
1326
Ohio Rule 8.4 
 
  
boy’s parents that he would provide son with future assistance). 
DR 1-102(A)(5) has been invoked where the prosecutor abused the power of his position. For 
example, a prosecutor’s conditioning the dismissal of a criminal charge, which the prosecutor knew 
lacked merit, on the defendant’s executing a release of all civil claims against the city and its 
employees arising from the arrest, was prejudicial to the administration of justice. In such an 
agreement, the quid pro quo is illusory -- it allows the prosecutor to secure the waiver of a citizen’s 
civil rights in exchange for the prosecutor fulfilling his preexisting ethical duty not to prosecute 
meritless criminal charges. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 94-10, 1994 Ohio 
Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (Aug. 12, 1994). See sections 3.8:200 and 8.4:900. The Board also found 
that it would violate DR 1-102(A)(5), among other provisions, for a prosecutor to negotiate a plea 
agreement that waives the defendant’s appellate or postconviction claims of prosecutorial misconduct. 
See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2001-6, 2001 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 7 
(Dec. 7, 2001): 
A prosecutor should not attempt through a plea agreement to excuse 
himself or herself from following the disciplinary rules governing a 
prosecutor’s behavior. A prosecutor does not serve justice by 
attempting to shield his or her past or future misconduct from scrutiny 
by obtaining a criminal defendant’s waiver of appellate or 
postconviction claims based on allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. 
This Board’s view is that [such a waiver] is an improper attempt to 
insulate the prosecutor from his or her duties under DR 7-102, 7-103, 
and DR 1-102(A)(5) of the [OHCPR]. 
Id. at *7. 
For a case in which a public defender attempted to use 1-102(A)(5) as a basis for refusing to turn over 
records under the Ohio Records Act, see State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ’g Co. v. Bodiker, 134 
Ohio App.3d 415, 731 N.E.2d 245 (Franklin 1999). The public defender argued that his ethical 
obligation to refrain from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice prohibited 
him from releasing the financial and time records relating to prior representation on appeal and in 
habeas proceedings in a capital-murder case. The court rejected the argument; it did not 
discern[] how the release of the requested information at this time, after 
all judicial proceedings involving [the defendant] have concluded, will 
prejudice the administration of justice . . . . 
Id. at 426, 731 N.E.2d at 253. 
Even private conduct may have special implications in this context. In Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Abookire, 63 Ohio St.3d 391, 588 N.E.2d 793 (1992), a lawyer convicted of shoplifting 
was sanctioned under DR 1-102(A)(3) & (4) for the underlying conduct. He was found in violation of 
1-102(A)(5) also, because the activity occurred while he was serving as a village prosecutor. For 
someone in that position to engage in shoplifting was determined to be prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
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While the problems that arise when a lawyer attempts to represent both the government (or a 
quasi-government entity) and private clients typically were addressed under other disciplinary rules 
(see sections 1.7:310-:320, 8.4:600), they occasionally were treated under DR 1-102(A)(5). Thus, in 
a 1993 opinion, the Board found it improper for a member of a certified grievance committee, or a 
partner or associate of the member, to represent private clients in matters in which the certified 
grievance committee was involved. Such conduct “erodes public confidence in the system [and thus] 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
93-6, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6, at *6 (Aug. 13, 1993) (but allowing representation before 
other bodies where the certified grievance committee of which the lawyer was a member was not 
involved). 
Misconduct directed at clients: Decisions dealing with Rule 8.4(d) and DR 1-102(A)(5) typically do 
not set forth any test to determine whether conduct violates the rule. An exception is a 2011 decision 
that does shine a bit of light on what might and might not constitute conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. In Disciplinary Counsel v. Doellman, 127 Ohio St.3d 411, 2010 Ohio 
5990, 940 N.E.2d 928, there were charges of violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) included in each of the 
three counts pertaining to various IOLTA and commingling violations. The Court found no violation 
of (A)(5) in Counts I and III, but found a violation with respect to Court II. In distinguishing these 
counts the Court stressed as to counts I and III that an (A)(5) violation had not been proven by clear 
and convincing evidence “because there was no proof of injury to the client and the respondent did not 
interfere with the administration of justice.” Id. at para. 22, 29 (emphasis added). The Court 
contrasted the IOLTA violations in count II (which in addition involved consciously withholding 
client funds and failing to notify the client about their receipt, all to the detriment of the client) 
because such conduct constitutes “interfering with the administration of justice.” Id. at para. 25 
(emphasis added). [It is unclear why this isn’t better treated under the “injury to the client” rubric.] 
Later in its opinion the Court noted that actions which “were intended to or did deceive the trial court 
or the client” would meet the (A)(5) standard as prejudicial to the administration of justice. Id. at 
para. 41. 
In the opinion the Court reviewed and attempted to rationalize its previous IOLTA cases and their 
(A)(5) implications. Id. at para. 39-42. The distinctions drawn by the Court in characterizing its 
precedents may prove helpful in future cases. 
Misconduct directed at clients often violated other more particular provisions of the OHCPR, but 
could constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice as well. Common overlapping 
provisions included: 
 acts of neglect, e.g., Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Johnson, 123 Ohio St.3d 65, 2009 
Ohio 4178, 914 N.E.2d 180 (failure to respond to discovery and summary judgment motion; 
violation, inter alia, of DR 6-101(A)(2) & (3) and 7-101(A)(1) & (2), in addition to 
1-102(A)(5)); Disciplinary Counsel v. Broschak, 118 Ohio St.3d 236, 2008 Ohio 2224, 887 
N.E.2d 1176 (multiple instances of failure to file transcript or brief in criminal appeals, 
resulting in dismissal of appeals; violation of DR 1-102(A)(6), as well as 1-102(A)(5) and 
6-101(A)(3)); Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabol, 118 Ohio St.3d 65, 2008 Ohio 1594, 886 
N.E.2d 191 (missing deadline to refile case violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and 6-101(A)(3)); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnson, 104 Ohio St.3d 313, 2004 Ohio 6555, 819 N.E.2d 674 
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(failure to appear at hearing on motion to hold client in contempt in domestic-relations case; 
respondent found in contempt for that failure to appear and then failed to appear at her own 
contempt hearing). Similarly, under the Rules, the abandonment of clients has been held to 
violate both Rule 8.4(d) and 1.3. Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Smith, 120 Ohio St.3d 298, 2008 
Ohio 6138, 898 N.E.2d 937. Violation of Rule 8.4(c)/DR 1-102(A)(4) is typically added to 
the mix when the lawyer also misleads the client about his neglect or incompetence. E.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Lentes, 120 Ohio St.3d 431, 2008 Ohio 6355, 900 N.E.2d 167 
(violation of 1.1, 1.3, and 8.4(c), (d), & (h)); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. McNally, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 560, 2006 Ohio 3258, 849 N.E.2d 1022 (failure to file divorce petition, and lying to 
client that it had been filed, violated 1-102(A)(4)-(6) and 6-101(A)(3), among other 
provisions). See sections 1.3:200-:300. 
 failure to fulfill the professional relationship, see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Lord, 114 
Ohio St.3d 466, 2007 Ohio 4260, 873 N.E.2d 273 (pattern of ignoring clients and 
abandoning their cases violated, inter alia, DR 1-102(A)(5) and 7-101(A); Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Russo, 21 Ohio St.3d 15, 487 N.E.2d 296 (1986) (failure to file 
personal-injury claim and to ask client for consent to settlement, misappropriation of 
settlement proceeds, and failure to cooperate in investigation violated numerous provisions, 
including 1-102(A)(5) and 7-101(A)). See section 1.2:250. 
 and misuse of client assets, see, e.g. Disciplinary Counsel v. Maley, 119 Ohio St.3d 217, 
2008 Ohio 3923, 893 N.E.2d 180 (commingling client funds in firm business account 
violated DR 1-102(A)(5) & (6) as well as 9-102(A) & (B)(3)); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
McCauley, 114 Ohio St.3d 461, 2007 Ohio 4259, 873 N.E.2d 269 (misuse of IOLTA 
account and misappropriation of client funds to pay creditors of respondent’s firm violated 
1-102(A)(4)-(6) and 9-102(B)). See sections 1.15:200, :220-:230, :300. 
A case in which the respondent violated the conflict-of-interest rules as well as 1-102(A)(5) is 
Disciplinary Counsel v. McNamee, 119 Ohio St.3d 269, 2008 Ohio 3883, 893 N.E.2d 490. As the 
Court summed it up, 
[r]espondent continued to represent all sides to the Summer Brooke 
development despite obvious conflicts of interest which he never 
disclosed to his clients and which they never waived, despite repeated 
calls for his disqualification, and despite the likelihood that he would 
be called as a witness. 
Id. at para. 32 (violations of DR 5-101(A)(1) & (B), 5-104(A), and 5-105(B), in addition to 
1-102(A)(5)). 
Basic overreaching of the client by counsel also may be sanctioned under this provision. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Sagen, 61 Ohio St.3d 62, 572 N.E.2d 658 (1991) (attorney who forged 
name of grantor on deed falsely alleging authority and who prepared quitclaim deed granting himself 
remainder interest in client’s property violated DR 1-102(A)(4)-(6); Akron Bar Ass’n v. Parker, 52 
Ohio St.3d 262, 557 N.E.2d 116 (1990) (attorney who caused his father to revoke prior will and 
name attorney trustee of estate assets with unfettered discretion and who arguably abused that 
discretion violated number of provisions, including 1-102(A)(4)-(6)). 
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Where a lawyer with a workers’ compensation and personal-injury practice also had an economic 
interest in a health facility to which he referred his clients, such referrals, if they subsequently 
compromised the clients’ interests, could be conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 90-1 (May 4, 1990). Depending on the nature of the relationship, 
lawyer-nonlawyer joint ventures can raise various other ethical issues, including improper solicitation 
and referrals (Rule 7.2; see section 7.2:400), aiding the unauthorized practice of law (Rule 5.5(a); 
see section 5.5:240), creation of a partnership with a nonlawyer (Rule 5.4(b); see section 5.4:300), 
improper fee sharing (Rule 5.4(a); see section 5.4:200), conflict of interest (Rule 1.7(a)(2); see 
section 1.7:500), and third-party influence concerns (Rule 1.8(f); see section 1.8:710). 
Entering into a settlement where authorization to settle is unclear and failing to communicate the 
terms of the settlement to the client also violated former DR 1-102(A)(5).  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Wilson, 65 Ohio St.3d 296, 603 N.E.2d 985 (1992). See section 1.2:320.  Similarly, in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Ita, 117 Ohio St.3d 477, 2008 Ohio 1508, 884 N.E.2d 1073, respondent was sanctioned 
under 1-102(A)(5) for filing an unauthorized claim on behalf of his client’s wife and then dismissing 
it with prejudice and without the wife’s consent.  Because of numerous mitigating factors and because 
“[n]o one has suggested . . . that these ill-advised actions resulted from anything other than 
carelessness.” id. at para. 10, respondent received a public reprimand. 
A decision in which DR 1-102(A)(5) (as well as 1-102(A)(6)) was invoked, where the victim may not 
have been a client, is Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Griffin, 112 Ohio St.3d 550, 2007 Ohio 810, 
862 N.E.2d 94. As stated by the Court, “[w]hether Dalton was in fact a client of respondent’s or not 
[respondent had a durable power of attorney from Dalton naming respondent as Dalton’s 
attorney-in-fact], respondent certainly had a duty as a member of the bar to cooperate and provide all 
relevant information when Dalton’s guardian questioned respondent’s expenditure of Dalton’s funds. 
Respondent’s actions show a lack of respect for the probate court, for other attorneys, and for the 
justice system as a whole.” Id. at para. 13. Fair enough, as a 102(A)(5) matter, but one wonders why 
the fact that “respondent had ‘conceal[ed] or convey[ed] away assets’ belonging to Charles Dalton,” 
and then “compounded that misconduct by failing to account for the funds that he withdrew from 
Dalton’s account” id. – in effect stealing – did not merit a charge under DR 1-102(A)(4), which also 
was not limited to misconduct directed at clients. A similar question can be asked about Columbus 
Bar Ass’n v. Gueli, 119 Ohio St.3d 434, 2008 Ohio 4786, 894 N.E.2d 1231, where one of the 
counts dealt with respondent’s “theft and flagrant disregard of clients’ interests,” id. at para. 7, 
resulting in violations of, inter alia, 1-102(A)(5) & (6), but not (4). Compare Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Tomlan, 118 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008 Ohio 1471, 885 N.E.2d 895, where the concealment of estate assets 
by respondent did result in a DR 1-102(A)(4) charge and violation.  The 1-102(A)(5) (and (A)(6)) 
violation in Tomlan was premised on his undue delay in performing his duties as executor – among 
other things, a 16-month delay in admitting the estate to probate. 
  
8.4:600  Implying Ability to Influence Public Officials 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.4(e) 
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ABA Model Rule 8.4(e) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 9.24 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 101:701 
ALI-LGL § 113(2) 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 9.24 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 8.4(e) prohibits lawyers from stating or implying an ability that they can improperly 
influence “a government agency or official or . . . achieve results by means that violate the Ohio Rules 
of Professional Conduct or other law.” Former OH EC 9-4 presented the rationale for the former 
disciplinary rule, OH DR 9-101(C), which is similar in import to Rule 8.4(e). It emphasized that our 
legal system is based on fair consideration of the merits of each matter through established procedures, 
and that any suggestion by an attorney that the attorney could circumvent that process undermines 
public confidence in the legal system. To properly understand the operation of Rule 8.4(e), several 
points must be highlighted. 
Stating or implying the ability to exert improper influence over a government agency or official:  To 
constitute a violation, the Rule does not require that a lawyer actually attempt to influence a 
government body improperly. If the lawyer merely states or even implies that he can do so, a violation 
occurs. For example, in Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 164, 2006 Ohio 550, 
842 N.E.2d 35, the Court expressly rejected respondent’s argument that he could not have violated 
DR 9-101(C) by threatening to talk with his “good friend” the county prosecutor and the Cleveland 
Safety Director 
because he was not in reality acquainted with the county prosecutor or 
city safety director. DR 9-101(C), however, prohibits a lawyer from 
implying that he is able to improperly influence a public official. 
Id. at para. 27 (emphasis by the Court). 
Similarly, in Dayton Bar Ass’n v. O’Brien, 103 Ohio St.3d 1, 2004 Ohio 3939, 812 N.E.2d 1263, 
respondent neither collected money from his client nor acted on his statements that a sufficient 
amount of cash might persuade the sentencing judge to allow the client to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Nevertheless, a violation of DR 9-101(C) was found. Most of the Court’s opinion was spent making 
clear that this was “egregious” conduct warranting indefinite suspension, a sanction far more severe 
than either the six-month suspension, all stayed, recommended by the panel or the even more lenient 
public reprimand recommended by the Board. Noting that lawyers “who engage in errant behavior do 
so at their own peril,”  id. at para. 15, and that in prior precedent “[w]e explicitly stated that a 
sanction of indefinite suspension did not constitute unduly harsh punishment in light of the 
seriousness of the conduct,  id. at para. 9 (citing Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Beris, 5 Ohio St.3d 199, 
499 N.E.2d 1305 (1983)), the Court elaborated that 
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we have repeatedly stressed our disdain for any statements by an 
attorney that imply the corruptibility of the judicial system or that the 
attorney can improperly influence a judicial officer. We have 
consistently imposed severe sanctions on attorneys who choose to 
engage in such conduct. This case warrants a similar sanction. 
103 Ohio St.3d 1, at para. 12. 
In Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Consoldane, 50 Ohio St.2d 337, 364 N.E.2d 279 (1977), the Supreme 
Court likewise ordered indefinite suspension, rather than the public reprimand suggested by the 
Board, of an attorney who told his client and the client’s family that they should give him $2,500 with 
which he would pay off government officials, who would use their influence to secure shock 
probation for the client. Severe punishment was warranted, even though the attorney never intended 
to make such payments, and apparently employed the suggestion of bribery only as a device to secure 
his fee from the client for past services. 
A more egregious instance occurred in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Atkin, 84 Ohio St.3d 383, 
704 N.E.2d 244 (1999). In Atkin, the respondent obtained $550,000 from his client by falsely 
representing that he could bribe a federal judge. He appropriated the money for his personal use and 
did not report it on his tax return. After respondent’s conviction of 29 counts of violation of federal 
law was affirmed, United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213 (6th Cir. 1997), the Ohio Supreme Court 
considered the disciplinary proceeding brought against him. Focusing on DR 9-101(C) (even though, 
amazingly, violation of this rule apparently was not charged in the complaint, see 84 Ohio St.3d at 
384, 704 N.E.2d at 245), the Court made clear that lack of intent to carry out the bribe is not a 
mitigating factor and minced no words in stating what it thought of such misconduct: 
We are particularly disturbed by respondent’s suggestion that he could 
bribe United States District Judge George W. White, Jr. 
Representations of this kind deserve the severest of sanctions. First, 
such statements violate DR 9-101(C) . . . . Suggestions by an attorney, 
however untrue, that a judge might be bribed weaken the public’s 
respect for the judicial system and the faith of the people in a rule of 
law over men, and are intolerable. 
Id. at 385, 704 N.E.2d at 245. The Court went on to emphasize that the claim, while totally false, 
caused Judge White serious inconvenience and hardship, and, however unfairly, inevitably had an 
adverse impact on his reputation in the community. Atkin was permanently disbarred by a unanimous 
Court. 
An interesting case in which an OH DR 9-101(C) violation was not found is Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Cicero, 78 Ohio St.3d 351, 678 N.E.2d 517 (1997). Cicero, who had been appointed by a 
common pleas judge to represent a criminal defendant in a case pending before the judge, 
led several members of the bar, including the opposing assistant 
prosecuting attorney, to believe that respondent had an ongoing sexual 
relationship with the judge. At one point, respondent indicated to the 
prosecutor that the judge would probably deny a continuance because 
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of her desire to get the case resolved so that she could engage 
respondent in sex over the Christmas holidays. . . . The evidence 
additionally suggests that respondent’s client became aware of 
respondent’s boasting and informed other inmates that they should 
retain respondent. 
Id. at 351, 678 N.E.2d at 518. Despite the fact that this evidence would seem to imply an ability to 
improperly influence the proceedings, the Court rebuffed relator’s claim of error in the Board’s 
failure to find a 9-101(C) violation, based on a “a lack of clear and convincing evidence to support 
[the] violation.”  Id. at 352, 678 N.E.2d at 518. 
While it is not per se improper for a lawyer who is a city council member to represent private clients 
in civil matters before a municipal court for which the city council has funding responsibilities, “[i]t 
would be particularly offensive for [the] lawyer through any words or conduct to suggest that a legal 
matter for which the attorney provides representation could be influenced by the attorney’s act of 
appropriating operating expenses for a court or compensation for the judges.” Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 96-6, 1996 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4, at *7 (Aug. 9, 1996). 
Conduct that constitutes improper influence of a government agency or official: Rule 8.4(e) speaks to 
the lawyer’s suggesting that he or she has the ability to influence a government agency or official 
“improperly.” (The disciplinary rule referred to ability to influence “improperly or upon irrelevant 
grounds.” Perhaps the drafters feared that “improper influence” might be limited to things like bribery 
and that the addition of “irrelevant grounds” would provide broader coverage.) In any event, the 
Rules do not define what falls into the category of “improper influence.” Presumably, it includes 
limitations found in criminal, civil, and administrative law. The broader language under the Code 
encompassed a case like Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Chacksfield, 50 Ohio St.2d 305, 364 N.E.2d 260 
(1977), where the lawyer, seeking to have criminal charges against himself dropped, wrote a letter to 
the judge handling the matter. In the letter, the lawyer reminded the judge of the help he had provided 
the judge on past political campaigns and, in a separate letter to the judge’s bailiff, “impl[ied] that 
there were certain influential persons who would not want [the lawyer] ‘destroyed.’“  Id. at 306, 364 
N.E.2d at 261. While the Court cited Canon 9 generally to support its imposition of an indefinite 
suspension, OH DR 9-101(C) appeared to be the operative provision. And of course both Rule 8.4(e) 
and DR 9-101(C) reach statements of supposed ability to wield improper influence when coupled 
with bribery of the supposed beneficiary. See, e.g., under the Code, Disciplinary Counsel v. Phillips, 
108 Ohio St.3d 331, 2006 Ohio 1064, 843 N.E.2d 775, where an assistant prosecutor was disbarred 
for, inter alia, violating 9-101(C) by accepting a $2,000 bribe from a criminal defendant in return for 
a promise to speak to the judge about the defendant’s case. He also told another “defendant” – 
actually an undercover informant – that he would “fix” his case and “[t]hat’s going to cost you.” Id. at 
para. 4. 
Types of relationships from which an inference of improper influence may arise: While Rule 8.4(e) 
appears to be addressed to specific actions by the lawyer that are intended to create the impression 
that the lawyer can improperly influence government officials, at times merely undertaking 
representation when there is a tie between the lawyer and the government official may create a public 
impression of improper influence. (These situations also can raise conflict-of-interest concerns. See 
sections 1.7:230, 1.7:310-:320.) A lawyer who has both a family and an employment relationship 
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with the judge should not appear before that judge, in part because their relationship raises the 
implication that the lawyer can improperly influence the tribunal. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 87-022, 1987 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 19 (June 22, 1987) (law 
partner and son of part-time judge could not practice in court on which his father sat, nor could son, as 
city law director, hire an assistant to appear in his place before his father). The Board predicated its 
response in part on former DR 9-101(C), although it cited the provision for the broader principle that 
lawyers “must avoid even the appearance of impropriety.”  
An employment relationship in and of itself may be sufficient to raise these concerns. Thus, while the 
statement in the syllabus of Opinion 87-022 that law partners or associates of a part-time judge cannot 
practice before the court on which the part-time judge serves has been disavowed by the Board in its 
Op. 2005-4, 2005 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Apr. 15, 2005), discussed below, the lawyer may 
not appear before the part-time judge who is the lawyer’s partner or associate. Id. Likewise, a lawyer 
who has an employment relationship with a government official should not handle a matter in which 
that official is involved, in part because of the implication arising from their relationship that the 
lawyer can improperly influence the individual. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 
93-6, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 6 (Aug. 13, 1993) (finding it improper, on these grounds 
(including implication of improper influence), for a member of a certified grievance committee, or a 
partner or associate of the member, to represent private clients in matters in which the certified 
grievance committee was involved). 
A similar concern arises when the relationship is that of family, although the Board did not expressly 
invoke DR 9-101(C) in these opinions. See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-7, 
1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 5 (Aug. 13, 1993) (county prosecutor and criminal-defense 
attorney who were spouses could not represent opposing parties in criminal matter, without client 
consent; such conduct could violate numerous provisions, including creation of appearance of 
impropriety); Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 91-22, 1991 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 7 (Oct. 18, 1991) (county prosecutor and criminal-defense attorney who were siblings could 
not represent opposing parties in criminal matter; such conduct would violate 5-101(A) and create 
appearance of impropriety, particularly where they also have continuing financial relationship 
stemming from former joint practice). 
As the family or employment relationship becomes more attenuated, the mere implication of 
influence stemming from the relationship itself was insufficient to trigger disciplinary concerns. 
Nevertheless, even in these circumstances, the lawyer had to remain sensitive to the underlying 
problem. See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 87-024, 1987 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 17 (June 22, 1987) (while acknowledging that spouse of common pleas judge could appear 
before other judges on the same court, the Board warned against engaging in conduct that might 
suggest an ability to improperly influence the tribunal); Ohio State Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 77-15 
(Sept. 8, 1977) (lawyer who served as part-time law clerk for one judge in multi-division court of 
common pleas could represent clients before other judges on court if lawyer had not worked on case 
for any judge, but lawyer had to be careful to comply with former EC 9-4 and DR 9-101(C)).  
The cautious approach to this problem was further illustrated in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 94-2, 1994 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 12 (Feb. 18, 1994). In addition to stating that 
a lawyer may not appear before a part-time judge with whom the lawyer was in practice as an 
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associate or partner (to do so would create an appearance of improper influence), the Board went on to 
consider whether practice before other judges on the same court would be prohibited and concluded 
that the result varies by the circumstances. If the court in which the part-time judge served was not 
divided into separate geographical areas of jurisdiction, then the prohibition extended to practice 
before any of the judges on the court. If the court was divided, the prohibition extended only to those 
judges who shared jurisdiction with the part-time judge. If a part-time judge sat by assignment on 
another court, the prohibition would extend to practice before that court as well until the assignment 
was terminated. Opinion 94-2, however, was modified in Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2005-4, 2005 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Apr. 15, 2005), to allow more leeway. 
Pursuant to Opinion 2005-4, not only was the separate-divisions distinction discarded, but also a 
lawyer who was an associate or partner of a part-time county judge could properly practice before any 
county court judge of the court upon which the part-time judge sits, other than the part-time judge 
himself. 
In another 1994 opinion, the Board addressed the propriety of a part-time prosecutor sharing office 
space and co-counseling on civil cases with a lawyer whose practice in part involved representation of 
criminal defendants. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 94-14, 1994 Ohio Griev. 
Discip. LEXIS 1 (Dec. 2, 1994). The Board acknowledged that the arrangement might “suggest to 
the public that the defense attorney is in a position to influence the conduct of the assistant 
prosecutor” on criminal matters. Id. at *4. Nevertheless, the Board found the possibility too remote to 
raise Canon 9 concerns, particularly when the office-sharing arrangement was undertaken in 
compliance with other protections in the former OHCPR pertaining to client confidences, fee 
divisions, and other practices to assure the public that the lawyers are practicing as separate firms. See 
sections 1.5:800 (at “Defining ‘lawyers’ and ‘same firm’“), 1.6:220, and 5.3:300-:400. 
As noted above, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-6, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. 
LEXIS 6 (Aug. 13, 1993), found it improper for a certified grievance committee member, or his 
partner or associate, to represent private clients before that grievance committee. The Board went on, 
however, to indicate that representation before other disciplinary bodies, where the certified 
grievance committee of which the lawyer is a member is not involved, would be permissible, since the 
implication of improper influence would no longer be present. For similar reasons, a lawyer in the 
same firm as a member of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline may represent 
private clients in disciplinary matters, provided the Board member recuses himself should the matter 
come before the Board. Id. at *11. 
The implication of an ability to wield improper influence also can arise from seemingly innocuous 
advertising. Statements by a former judge, on his letterhead, business cards, or other pronouncements 
directed to the general public, which statements identified the lawyer’s former judicial position, were 
deemed improper by the Board; they were found to imply that the lawyer might be able to influence 
government conduct on a client’s behalf because of his former position. Bd. of Comm’rs on 
Grievances & Discipline Op. 93-8, 1993 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 4 (Oct. 15, 1993) (conduct 
also violated DR 2-101(A) and 2-102(A)). In contrast, such statements directed to attorneys, through 
such devices as professional announcement cards and listings in professional law directories, were 
deemed permissible, presumably on the theory that lawyers, unlike members of the lay public, would 
be unlikely to draw the same inference of undue influence from factual statements about a lawyer’s 
prior service as a judge. Compare Cleveland Bar Ass’n Op. 89-6 (Mar. 30, 1990) (lawyer may list 
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former government position both on professional announcements and in advertising, provided 
reference is factual, not misleading, not likely to create unjustified expectations as to results possible, 
and does not state or imply specialization or that lawyer may obtain results not obtainable by one 
without such background). Although we predicted otherwise in earlier editions of this treatise, it is 
now clear—at least insofar as the Board of Commissioners is concerned— that the prior opinion of 
the Board in 93-8 regarding use of terms such as “former judge” will continue to be applied under the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. See Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline Op. 2013-3, 2013 
Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 3 (June 6, 2013), which is discussed in section 7.1:220, at “Misleading 
communications about competence or methods,” supra. 
Improper influence directed at a government agency or official: Rule 8.4(e) prohibits a lawyer from 
suggesting that he can exert improper influence over “a government agency or official.” This 
language would seem to encompass all government bodies and their agents. See, e.g., under the 
Code’s “any tribunal, legislative body, or public official” language, Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Benis, 5 
Ohio St.3d 199, 449 N.E.2d 1305 (1983) (misconduct involved suggesting an ability to improperly 
influence an employee in the governor’s office to aid in pursuing a clemency application); Cincinnati 
Bar Ass’n v. Chacksfield, 50 Ohio St.2d 305, 364 N.E.2d 260 (1977) (involving, in part, attempted 
improper influence directed toward a court bailiff). Indeed, in a subsequent opinion, the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that suggestions by the respondent that he could improperly influence the Board 
of Commissioners on Character and Fitness, through his evaluations of certain of his employees when 
they applied for admission to the bar, violated former DR 9-101(C).  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Young, 
89 Ohio St.3d 306, 731 N.E.2d 631 (2000). 
Stating or implying the ability to achieve results by improper means: In addition to concerns about 
suggesting or implying the ability to improperly influence government agencies and officials, Rule 
8.4(e) also prohibits suggesting or implying that the lawyer can “achieve results by means that violate 
the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.” Note that this provision is not limited to 
suggestions regarding improper interactions with government agencies or officials. The suggestion 
that the lawyer would violate the Rules or the law to achieve an outcome is sufficient.  This reflects a 
simple policy – that lawyers should not suggest to others that they will act outside the law to achieve 
desired ends. The quoted language, not found in former DR 9-101(C), was added by the ABA to MR 
8.4(e) by the 2002 amendments to the Model Rules (without the specific reference to “Ohio,” of 
course). It was formerly a part of MR 7.1(b) as one of the activities constituting a false or misleading 
communication, but was moved to MR 8.4 to make clear that “the prohibition is not limited to 
statements made in the context of advertisements.” ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 634 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). This alteration is reflected in Ohio’s transition to the 
Rules: Like former MR 7.1(b), OH DR 2-101(C)(2) contained the same provision under 
communication that was false or misleading; as has been done under the Model Rules, it is now a part 
of Ohio Rule 8.4(e). We found no Ohio opinions dealing with this language in former DR 
2-101(C)(2) or, thus far, in Rule 8.4(e). 
  
8.4:700  Assisting Judge or Official in Violation of Duty 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.4(f) 
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Model Rule 8.4(f) 
Commentary 
ALI-LGL § 113 
Under Ohio Rule 8.4(f), a lawyer may not “knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct 
that is a violation of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, the applicable rules of judicial conduct, 
or other law.” (There is no direct Code analog; cf. OH DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).) 
As their titles suggest, this section (“Assisting Judge or Official in Violation of Duty”) and section 
3.5:210 (“Improperly Influencing a Judge”) have significant overlap. The material dealing with Rule 
3.5(a)(2) (lending anything of value or giving anything of more than de minimis value to a judge, 
official, or employee of a tribunal) is set forth in section 3.5:210. The relatively few cases involving 
misconduct instigated or initiated by a judge or court official, which misconduct the lawyer assists, 
are treated here. Another related section is section 8.4:600 (“Implying Ability to Influence Public 
Officials”). 
The classic Ohio case of assisting a judge in the violation of his duty under the Code is Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bozanich, 95 Ohio St.3d 109, 766 N.E.2d 145 (2002). In Bozanich, 
respondent was disbarred for, inter alia, making payments to a judge (at the judge’s request) before 
whom the lawyer was appearing and failing to report the judge’s misconduct to the investigatory 
authorities. On one occasion, at a Christmas party, the judge asked the respondent for $1,000. In 
making this request, the judge reminded respondent that “[y]ou are appearing in my court next week,”  
id. at 109, 766 N.E.2d at 146. Respondent made the payment. Subsequently, pursuant to the judge’s 
instruction, respondent put $400 in the judge’s coat pocket in chambers, at a time when he was 
appearing before the judge. These two events occurred in 1992 and 1996. Respondent, however, did 
not report the judge’s conduct to disciplinary authorities until 1999, after the judge had pled guilty to 
extortion and obstruction-of-justice charges. Respondent’s acts of misconduct were found to have 
violated former DR 1-102(A)(3)-(6) and 1-103(A). 
Other cases in which a lawyer was sanctioned for assisting a judge or other court official in violation 
of her duty include the bribery case of Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Jurek, 62 Ohio St.3d 318, 581 
N.E.2d 1356 (1991) (at invitation of common pleas court bond commissioner who was in charge of 
randomly assigning cases to judges and who told respondent that he could “predict the future,”  id. at 
319, 581 N.E.2d at 1357, respondent made monetary payments to commissioner, who would then see 
to it that respondent’s criminal cases were assigned to judge of respondent’s choice, rather than going 
through random assignment process; violation of 1-102(A)(3) and (5) among other provisions; 
respondent disbarred); see Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Smakula, 39 Ohio St.3d 143, 529 
N.E.2d 1376 (1988) (assistant county prosecutor sanctioned for involvement in court of common 
pleas bailiff’s ticket-fixing scheme, in exchange for occasional case referrals for prosecutor’s private 
practice). See also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cox, 96 Ohio St.3d 47, 2002 Ohio 2989, 770 
N.E.2d 1007 (in order to obtain funds to support his gambling addiction, judge borrowed and 
accepted money over period of years from attorneys who appeared before him in court of appeals, 
resulting in indefinite suspension from practice of law; conduct termed “deplorable and egregious” by 
Court, id. at para. 9). (Two of the attorneys who made gifts/loans to the judge were identified in the 
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Cox opinion; disciplinary action was commenced against one of them but he resigned from the 
practice of law with the disciplinary action pending. See  In re Resignation of Banks, 88 Ohio St.3d 
1204, 723 N.E.2d 577 (2000). Disciplinary action was taken against an attorney having the same 
name as the second lawyer identified in Cox, but the complaint did not include any charges relating to 
the loans to the judge. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Goldberg, 94 Ohio St.3d 337, 763 
N.E.2d 119 (2002).)  
  
8.4:800  Discrimination in the Practice of Law 
Primary Ohio References 




Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 1.34 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 91:301 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 1.34 (1996). 
Ohio Rule 8.4(g), which tracks the first sentence of former OH DR 1-102(B) (added by amendment 
in 1994), prohibits a lawyer from engaging, in a professional capacity, in conduct involving unlawful 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, age, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, marital 
status, or disability. (The second sentence of 1-102(B) is now found in Rule 8.4 cmt. [3].) Several 
aspects of this Rule deserve further mention. 
It applies only to discriminatory conduct undertaken “in a professional capacity.” Purely personal acts 
of discrimination are not covered. Is the phrase “in a professional capacity” meant to involve all 
activities undertaken as a lawyer or only those in which professional service is being provided? In its 
first opinion dealing with the disciplinary rule, the Ohio Supreme Court applied it to acts of 
employment discrimination at a law firm.  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Young, 89 Ohio St.3d 306, 731 
N.E.2d 631 (2000). Thus, the “in a professional capacity” language encompasses all activities 
undertaken as a lawyer. 
The Young decision is instructive concerning DR 1-102(B) (and Rule 8.4(g)) in a number of other 
respects as well. The respondent in that case argued that an attorney could not be charged with a 
violation of the disciplinary rule unless a preliminary finding of discrimination has been made by a 
state or federal court or by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission or the federal EEOC. The Court had 
little difficulty rejecting this reading and held that such a finding is not a prerequisite to a finding of 
violation of former 1-102(B).  89 Ohio St.3d at 307, 731 N.E.2d at 633 (syllabus). The second 
argument addressed by the Court was that respondent’s conduct did not rise to a level of 
discrimination “prohibited by law.” In deciding that, with respect to one of his female employees, 
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respondent’s conduct did rise to that level, the Court looked to ORC Chapter 4112, the Ohio 
discrimination statute, and agreed with the Board that respondent had violated this provision of law 
by creating a hostile work environment for the employee in question. In so concluding, the Court 
invoked federal Title VII (42 USC § 2000e et seq. (2000)) precedents for the elements that must be 
shown: (1) the victim must have been subjected to “unwelcome harassment” (2) based on the victim’s 
sex, (3) which conduct was sufficiently severe to support a finding, both objectively and subjectively, 
that a hostile or abusive work environment existed. Respondent’s numerous sexual remarks to the 
employee in question (asking her if she was a virgin; suggesting that she had been hired to be his 
mistress, etc., etc.) were more than sufficient to meet the standard.  89 Ohio St.3d at 315-18, 731 
N.E.2d at 639-41. Finally, it is important to note that the sanction imposed for violation of DR 
1-102(B) (respondent also violated 1-102(A)(6) and 9-101(C)) was not a slap on the wrist; because 
the violations involved “appalling” and “egregious” conduct, respondent was suspended from the 
practice of law for two years, with the second year stayed in favor of a one-year probation period 
during which respondent was obligated to take at least six hours of professionalism instruction.  89 
Ohio St.3d 320-21, 731 N.E.2d at 643. 
As the Young case makes clear, the Rule speaks only to conduct “involving discrimination prohibited 
by law.” Discriminatory conduct that does not violate the substantive law is not governed by this 
provision. Such conduct (or conduct that may well have violated the substantive law but antedated the 
adoption of DR 1-102(B)) was, however, sanctioned under other provisions of the OHCPR, such as 
1-102(A)(5) and (6), and 7-106(C). See, e.g., Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Cregan, 62 Ohio 
St.3d 444, 584 N.E.2d 656 (1992), and other cases cited in sections 3.4:600, 8.4:500, and 8.4:1000. 
Rule 8.4 cmt. [3] exempts from the scope of Ohio Rule 8.4(g) otherwise offensive conduct arising in 
confidential communications to a client. (“Division (g) does not apply to a lawyer’s confidential 
communication to a client . . . .”) It also permits “legitimate advocacy” where race, color, religion, age, 
gender, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status, or disability issues are relevant to the 
proceeding in which the advocacy occurs. The comment does not define when, if ever, legitimate 
advocacy would allow a lawyer to engage in discrimination prohibited by law. The provision is better 
read simply as an acknowledgment that issues of race and the like are relevant at times and that 
nothing in the Rule prohibits a lawyer from addressing them. 
It should be further noted that the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct also contains detailed provisions 
dealing with discrimination. See OH CJC Rules 2.3(A), (B) & 3.6(A). 
Although the Model Rules do not contain a rule provision dealing expressly with discrimination, a 
comment states that knowingly manifesting bias or prejudice in the course of representing a client can 
violate MR 8.4(d) “when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice.” MR 8.4 cmt. 
[3]. 
Finally, in Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Winkfield, 107 Ohio St.3d 360, 2006 Ohio 6, 839 N.E.2d 924, 
the Court found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(B). We discovered no indication in the 
opinion of such a violation, unless the inappropriate and unwelcome sexual overtures made to the 
client were deemed “discriminatory.” There was no discussion of the issue. See id. at paras. 28-29. 
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8.4:900  Threatening Prosecution [see section 1.2:900] 
The rule on threatening to present criminal charges or allegations of professional misconduct is now 
set forth in Ohio Rule 1.2(e). See section 1.2:900. 
 
8.4:1000  Conduct That Adversely Reflects on Fitness to Practice Law 
Primary Ohio References 




Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.32-1.33 
(This section has been added in order to cover Ohio Rule 8.4(h), a provision not found in MR 8.4.) 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility §§ 1.32-1.33 (1996). 
The standard in general: Ohio Rule 8.4(h), as did its Code predecessor (OH DR 1-102(A)(6)), 
prohibits a lawyer from engaging “in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness 
to practice law.” Since the language of the Code and Rule provisions is identical, DR 1-102(A)(6) 
precedent, discussed below, should be fully applicable in applying Rule 8.4(h). 
As phrased, the provision appears to contain two limitations. First, it is intended to be a residual 
category, dealing with improper conduct not included under the seven other provisions of Rule 8.4; 
hence the language the lawyer shall not engage in “any other conduct” that adversely reflects on 
fitness to practice. (As will be seen in the next paragraph, it is now settled that this residual nature is 
not limited to “the seven other provisions” of 8.4.) Second, within this open-ended grant, the 
prohibition is limited to conduct that “reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.” That said, as 
the rest of this section attests, the Disciplinary Rule has been applied far more broadly. Despite this 
broad reading, DR 1-102(A)(6) still was upheld in the face of claims that the language was 
unconstitutionally vague.  Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Zarka, 24 Ohio St.3d 157, 493 N.E.2d 1363 
(1986). 
As of 2013, we now have a definitive determination of the scope and proper application of Rule 
8.4(h). In Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013 Ohio 3998, 997 N.E.2d 500, 
the panel and Board rejected the relator’s 8.4(h) charge. In objecting to that decision on appeal, 
relator argued that the “any other conduct” language should be read as necessarily proving an 8.4(h) 
violation if another violation has been shown. Bricker countered by arguing, persuasively, 
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that if this court were to adopt relator’s argument, every violation of a 
Rule of Professional Conduct will necessarily result in a violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), thereby depriving the rule of any purpose or effect. 
Instead he argues that the rule is a catchall provision that should be 
used in just two circumstances—(1) situations in which a lawyer’s 
conduct in violation of other more specific rules is so egregious that it 
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law and (2) cases in which 
there is no specific provision prohibiting the lawyer’s conduct, yet 
there is clear and convincing evidence that the conduct is unethical and 
that it adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice. We agree. 
Id. at para. 20 (emphasis added). The Court then proceeded to reiterate, in its own language, the 
Bricker interpretation of subdivision (h): 
 Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) is a catchall provision. In order to find a 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), there must be clear and convincing 
evidence that the lawyer has engaged in misconduct that adversely 
reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law, even though that 
conduct is not specifically prohibited by the rules, or there must be 
proof that the conduct giving rise to a specific rule violation is so 
egregious as to warrant an additional finding that it adversely reflects 
on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law. 
Id. at para. 21. 
Whether this bright-line rule is being applied in subsequent cases is unclear. In Disciplinary Counsel 
v Lehmkuhl, 137 Ohio St.3d 71, 2013 Ohio 4539, 997 N.E.2d 532, the 8.4(h) charge was initially 
sustained below, but then dismissed. Did the Bricker rule play a role in that dismissal? Neither the 
Court nor the Board recommendation so indicates, but it is clear that in Lehmkuhl 8.4(h) was not 
acting as a catchall where no other rule was applicable, and given the sanction meted out, a public 
reprimand, it seems difficult to argue that his conduct was “so egregious as to warrant an additional 
finding” of an 8.4(h) violation. 
The standard - Fitness to practice - Misconduct in the practice of law:  There are many decisions 
finding Rule 8.4(h) and/or DR 1-102(A)(6) violations stemming from practice misconduct. Some 
examples are: Akron Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 130 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011 Ohio 4412, 955 N.E.2d 359 
(sexually suggestive remarks to client during telephone conversation regarding client’s case; 8.4(h) 
violated); Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnston, 121 Ohio St.3d 403, 2009 Ohio 1432, 904 N.E.2d 
892 (commingling funds in client trust account, violation 1-102(A)(6) and, post 2/1/07, Rule 8.4(h)); 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Smith, 120 Ohio St.3d 298, 2008 Ohio 6138, 898 N.E.2d 937 (abandoning 
clients after accepting representations; such conduct post-2/1/07 also violated 8.4(h)); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Broschak, 118 Ohio St.3d 236, 2008 Ohio 2224, 887 N.E.2d 1176 (refusal to return 
client file on request); Disciplinary Counsel v. Scurry, 115 Ohio St.3d 201, 2007 Ohio 4796, 874 
N.E.2d 521 (intoxicated when meeting with clients and at other times while practicing); Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Moore, 101 Ohio St.3d 261, 2004 Ohio 734, 804 N.E.2d 423 (grossly 
unprofessional sexual remarks, concerning the size of his penis and preferred sexual positions, during 
consultations with young female client). 
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In a significant 2009 case, Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Allerding, 123 Ohio St.3d 382, 2009 Ohio 5589, 
916 N.E.2d 808, the Supreme Court rejected the Board’s finding (and respondent’s stipulation) that 
respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and Rule 8.4(h) by virtue of his alcohol-induced depression 
and addiction: 
Neither the Board’s finding nor relator’s complaint, however, specified 
in Count IV an act or omission by respondent. Both instead relied 
solely on the fact that respondent has a mental illness and is addicted to 
alcohol, conditions that often lead to ethical violations [as they did here; 
“alcoholism caused all of his misconduct” arising in the practice of law, 
as set forth in the other counts, id. at para. 15], but are not themselves 
ethical violations. As a result, we make no findings of misconduct 
relative to Count IV and dismiss that count of the complaint. 
Id. at para. 13 (emphasis added). 
Another interesting 2009 decision applying Rule 8.4(h) is Disciplinary Counsel v. Rohrer, 124 
Ohio St.3d 65, 2009 Ohio 5930, 919 N.E.2d 191, where the respondent argued that he did not violate 
Rule 8.4(h) because his conduct (violating a court order) was “impulsively” made. The Court then 
went on at some length to demonstrate that respondent’s violation of the order was not impulsive, but 
rather “a deliberately chosen action.” Id. at para. 24. The whole “impulsive” action idea seems to us 
to be something of a red herring; we would have thought that an “impulsive” breach of a court order 
raises fitness-to-practice concerns no less serious that a calculated decision to do so. (The closest the 
Court comes to embracing this view is its statement that “the ‘impulsiveness’ of respondent’s conduct 
(or lack thereof) is not the sole measure of whether his conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) . . . .” Id. 
at para. 23. 
The respondent in a 2010 case, Disciplinary Counsel v. Brueggeman, 128 Ohio St.3d 206, 2010 
Ohio 6149, 943 N.E.2d 509, contested each of the five findings that he violated Rule 8.4(h). In 
confirming the Board’s finding of violation, the court saw fit to specify the conduct that transgressed 
the rule in each instance. Thus, he violated 8.4(h) because: 
• “he filed the client’s petition for dissolution nearly one year 
after she retained him and after she filed the grievance against him.” 
• of “respondent’s loss of the client’s files and his failure to 
resolve the client’s case, which forced the client to resolve it without 
respondent’s help.” 
• “respondent did not return the client’s money until after the 
grievance had been filed.” 
• “he waited to contact the client until after the grievance had 
been filed.” 
• “when respondent could not resolve the time-share property 
and bank matters, he stopped communicating with the client.” 
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Id. at paras. 6, 10, 15, 17, 20. One of the obvious lessons to be learned from this list is that a lawyer 
risks violating Rule 8.4(h) if he defers doing what he should have done until after a grievance has 
been filed against him. 
The standard - Fitness to practice - Misconduct outside the practice of law:  While the provision 
focuses on conduct that “reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law,” it is not restricted to conduct 
undertaken in the practice of law. Illustrative cases include: Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Ritson, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 89, 2010 Ohio 4504, 936 N.E.2d 931 (pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud 
involving bogus insurance association scheme resulting in $3.7 million in losses to those who 
purchased memberships in the association, but “did not involve the use of his law license, lies to the 
tribunal, or harm to clients,” id. at para. 34; violation of DR 1-102(4) as well as (6)); Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n v. Peskin, 125 Ohio St.3d 244, 2010 Ohio 1811, 927 N.E.2d 598 (crack cocaine possession 
and use; Rule 8.4 (d) & (h) violated); Disciplinary Counsel v. Ridenbaugh, 122 Ohio St.3d 583, 
2009 Ohio 4091, 913 N.E.2d 443 (voyeurism and use of child pornography resulting in felony 
convictions; DR 1-102(A)(3) & (6) and Rule 8.4(b) & (h) violated); Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. 
Burkholder, 121 Ohio St.3d 262, 2009 Ohio 761, 908 N.E.2d 630 (violation of DR 1-102(A)(6) 
and Rule 8.4(h) for failing to comply with child-support order and attorney-registration requirements, 
as well as conviction for assault and battery against his fiancée); Disciplinary Counsel v. LoDico, 
118 Ohio St.3d 316, 2008 Ohio 2465, 888 N.E.2d 1097 (parking lot incident involving menacing 
with firearm); Disciplinary Counsel v. Margolis, 114 Ohio St.3d 165, 2007 Ohio 3607, 870 N.E.2d 
1158 (Sherman Act conviction for conspiracy in restraint of trade while running father-in-law’s 
business); Disciplinary Counsel v. Hiltbrand, 110 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006 Ohio 4250, 852 N.E.2d 
733 (multiple DUI charges, to which respondent pleaded no contest, together with other infractions 
unrelated to the practice of law; “respondent’s misconduct did not involve her work on behalf of 
clients, and there is no evidence that her actions harmed any clients, id. at para. 16); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Freeman, 106 Ohio St.3d 334, 2005 Ohio 5142, 835 N.E.2d 26 (soliciting former client 
to perform sex acts for money); Disciplinary Counsel v. Goodall, 103 Ohio St.3d 501, 2004 Ohio 
5583, 817 N.E.2d 23 (aggravated assault on husband during domestic dispute).  
DR 1-102(A)(6) was invoked in a rather bizarre private conduct case involving an armed standoff 
between respondent and Dayton police resulting from misunderstandings on both sides. Despite the 
fact that respondent was convicted of a felony as a result of the confrontation and thereby violated 
1-102(A)(3) as well, significant mitigating factors resulted in the imposition of a two-year suspension 
only. Disciplinary Counsel v. Howard, 123 Ohio St.3d 97, 2009 Ohio 4173, 914 N.E.2d 377. 
A unique application of DR 1-102(A)(6) to conduct outside the practice of law occurred in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Taft, 112 Ohio St.3d 155, 2006 Ohio 6525, 858 N.E.2d 414 – unique 
because the respondent was both on inactive status and serving as the Governor of Ohio when the 
misconduct occurred. Governor Taft pled no contest and was found guilty on four counts of violation 
of ORC 102.02(D), a first degree misdemeanor, for knowingly filing false disclosure statements 
regarding 59 gifts in excess of $75, most of which were golf outings paid for by someone else over a 
period of six years. Respondent conceded to the Ethics Commission that his filings had been deficient, 
but, despite the “knowingly” element of the misdemeanor to which he pled no contest, the Board 
“attributed respondent’s nondisclosures to oversight, rather than to a conscious effort to conceal 
certain relationships.” Id. at para. 11. Because of strong mitigating factors and no aggravating 
factors, the panel, Board, and Court accepted the consent-to-discipline sanction of a public reprimand. 
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(Another decision involving a well-known political figure who ran afoul of DR 1-102(A)(6) by 
violating ORC 102.02(D) is Disciplinary Counsel v. Forbes, 122 Ohio St.3d 171, 2009 Ohio 2623, 
909 N.E.2d 629 (ORC 102.03(E) also violated; six-month suspension, all stayed). 
And see the decisions cited under “Sexual misconduct or substance abuse,” this section infra. 
The standard - Fitness to practice - The nexus (or lack thereof) between misconduct and fitness to 
practice: The fitness limitation appears in many instances to be largely ignored. Indeed, in one case in 
which the respondent failed to pay federal income taxes and was sanctioned for violation of DR 
1-102(A)(6), the Court quoted the panel’s finding that respondent’s “problems were ‘of a financial 
nature, and deal exclusively with the IRS, not with his practice, or his capacity as an 
attorney.’“ Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Abood, 104 Ohio St.3d 655, 2004 Ohio 7015, 821 N.E.2d 560, at 
para. 10. Such an approach comes rather close to reading the fitness-to-practice requisite out of the 
rule. Another decision can be read in similar fashion.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Connor, 105 Ohio 
St.3d 100, 2004 Ohio 6902, 822 N.E.2d 1235, involved a sitting common pleas judge who had had 
multiple DUI convictions but had then gone into treatment and apparently effected full recovery. For 
the second time, the Court found this respondent in violation of former 1-102(A)(6). In the sanction 
phase, however, in the course of imposing a six-month stayed sentence, the Court went out of its way 
to state that respondent’s “performance on the bench remains above reproach,” id. at para. 20, and 
that “[t]here was no evidence that respondent’s alcoholism had compromised the performance of his 
duties on the bench.” Id. at para. 10. A comparable result obtained in a case involving a practicing 
lawyer who had been convicted of domestic violence involving his adult son.  Akron Bar Ass’n v. 
Gatskie, 105 Ohio St.3d 327, 2005 Ohio 1828, 825 N.E.2d 1111. Noting respondent’s rehabilitation 
from alcoholism, the Court again imposed a stayed six-month sentence for violation of DR 
1-102(A)(6) and in the course thereof quoted with approval a judge’s letter stating that respondent 
“‘continues to represent his clients with diligence without any complaints from the bench.’“ Id. at 
para. 8. (Perhaps the result in such cases can be explained by the fact that, while actual performance 
as a lawyer or judge was not affected, the conduct nevertheless “reflected” adversely on fitness.) 
As these decisions indicate, where 1-102(A)(6) was cited as an independent ground for discipline, 
often little if any explicit attention was given to linking the conduct involved to fitness-to-practice 
concerns; rather, it was simply presumed. Another example is Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Michaels, 38 Ohio St.3d 248, 527 N.E.2d 299 (1988), where an attorney was sanctioned under this 
provision after causing a fatal motor vehicle accident and pleading guilty to involuntary manslaughter, 
driving while intoxicated, reckless operation, and operating a motor vehicle without reasonable 
control. (The attorney was also charged with violating DR 1-102(A)(3) for engaging in illegal 
conduct involving moral turpitude, but that charge was dropped.) In defense, the attorney argued, in 
part, that this single instance of poor judgment, in light of an otherwise superlative record as a lawyer 
(ten character witnesses, including judges, prosecuting attorneys and the chief of police, all testified 
to this effect), did not reflect adversely on his fitness to practice law. While not addressing this 
argument directly, the Court pointed out that “misconduct based on criminal convictions for actions 
unrelated to the practice of law have frequently resulted in disciplinary sanctions.”  Id. at 250, 527 
N.E.2d at 301. The Court then concluded: 
 Although respondent’s illegal conduct was unintentional, the 
imposition of an appropriate sanction in this case must necessarily take 
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into account the fact that the life of another person ended as a result of 
respondent’s abuse of alcohol. 
Id. at 251, 527 N.E.2d at 301. Whether the Court meant to suggest that the implication of the conduct 
for fitness to practice law was irrelevant, or only that conduct arising outside the practice of law can 
reflect on fitness to practice, is unclear; probably the latter was intended. 
Another interesting “nexus” case is Disciplinary Counsel v O’Malley, 126 Ohio St.3d 443, 2010 
Ohio 3802, 935 N.E.2d 5.  O’Malley, who was the Cuyahoga County Recorder, pleaded guilty to and 
was convicted of transportation and importation of obscene matters, in violation of 18 USC §1462(a); 
he was sentenced to 15 months in prison and three years of supervised release.  The sole violation 
charged was 1-102(A)(6), and the offending conduct involved obscene material 
stored at his home on personal computers that he owned. Respondent 
testified that the obscene materials were erotic photographs of adults 
and erotic stories that he and his wife had viewed in the privacy of their 
home. 
Id. at para. 6. The parties stipulated to the violation, and perhaps for this reason the Court spent no 
time tying this “consenting adults” conduct to fitness to practice law.  The decision does indicate, in 
parsing the cases for the appropriate sanction, that offenses of a “sexual nature” are more serious than 
“financial” offenses.  See id. at para. 11. The further point is made (unconvincingly in our opinion) 
that “the severity of respondents’ crime as measured by the duration of his prison term,” is not all that 
different from cases involving voyeurism and child pornography (Ridenbaugh) and exposing oneself 
to women in public (Linnen) even though “[a]t first glance the misconduct at issue in Ridenbaugh 
and Linnen appears to be far more serious than respondent’s importation of obscenity depicting 
consenting adults.” Id. at paras. 13, 14. As a result, O’Malley received a sanction (two years) more 
lenient than the indefinite suspension imposed in Ridenbaugh and Linnen but more onerous than the 
suspensions (one year) meted out in the financial offense cases. The Court did make one general 
observation, applicable to any violation of law, sexual or otherwise, which can be read as bearing on 
fitness: 
[P]ermitting respondent to serve as an officer of the court while he 
remains on supervised release for violating the very laws he has been 
sworn to uphold would undermine the public’s perceptions of and 
confidence in our justice system. 
Id. at para. 14. 
On the other hand, there are decisions in which the link between fitness to practice and the misconduct 
involved is convincingly made. One of the more explicit is Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 114 Ohio 
St.3d 108, 2007 Ohio 3253, 868 N.E.2d 973. Although there were multiple violations in Cook, the 
Court analyzed each disciplinary rule separately; regarding DR 1-102(A)(6), it stated that 
respondent’s “acts of dishonesty and deceit”– involving a complicated scheme in which she took 
personal advantage of her 90-year old client – 
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violated 1-102(A)(6) because these acts reflect egregiously on a 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law. 
Id. at para. 37. 
The link was likewise found to exist in Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St.3d 68, 2012 
Ohio 5337, 979 N.E.2d 1263, in which the respondent was sanctioned for criminal misdemeanor 
conduct during his tenure as attorney general of the state. It goes without saying that criminal conduct 
does not reflect well on fitness, but Dann makes clear  that this is particularly so when engaged in by 
the attorney general. The Court laid great stress on Dann’s position as the chief legal officer of the 
state in deciding that an actual suspension of six months was appropriate; the language used explicitly 
focuses on the fitness aspects as one of the bases for this conclusion: 
 Like judges, the attorney general has a heightened duty to the 
public by virtue of his elected office. As the chief law officer for the 
state, the attorney general is charged with providing legal 
representation and advice to all officers, boards, heads of departments, 
and institutions of this state. See generally R.C. 109.02 and 109.12. For 
that reason, the work of the attorney general touches upon virtually all 
areas of our state government. Thus, Dann’s criminal and ethical 
violations reflect poorly on his fitness to practice law and the legal 
profession as a whole, but also causes incalculable harm to the public 
perception of the attorney general’s office and those government 
agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general 
advises and represents. 
Id. at para. 23. 
In another example, the respondent argued that the finding of violation of 1-102(A)(6) was based 
solely on his unwillingness to admit all charges and on his efforts to put forth a good-faith defense. 
Rejecting this challenge, the Court’s language sheds light on fitness requisites: 
Rather, it was respondent’s inability to recognize the inherent conflict 
between his business relationship with EPLS [the out-of-state law firm 
marketing living trusts, which, pursuant to their contract, respondent 
agreed would be his “sole and exclusive agent for marketing, sales, and 
estate-planning packages,” id. at para. 3] and his duty to [his clients] 
the Trotts. . . . Even now, respondent appears unable to grasp the true 
nature and extent of his misconduct or to fully comprehend his 
professional obligations.  Accordingly, we find that clear and 
convincing evidence exists to support a violation of DR 1-102(A)(6). 
Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Willette, 117 Ohio St.3d 433, 2008 Ohio 1198, 884 N.E.2d 581, at para. 
39. Similarly, in Akron Bar Ass’n v. Catanzarite, 119 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008 Ohio 4063, 893 
N.E.2d 835, the respondent sought to “derail” the disciplinary proceeding by attempting to intimidate 
relator’s counsel by means of a sham grievance that had supposedly been filed against counsel; by 
such conduct, in the words of the Court, respondent “violated his duty to assist in the process that 
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polices the legal profession,” id. at para. 38; these tactics violated Gov Bar R V 4(G), as well as 
1-102(A)(6). Another instance in which respondent’s deception in the disciplinary process (lying to 
relator’s investigator that he had never received notice from the court of the pretrial and trial settings 
in a case involving one of his clients) resulted in a violation of Rule 8.4 (h) is Cleveland Metro. Bar 
Ass’n v. Kealy, 125 Ohio St.3d 238, 2010 Ohio 1554, 927 N.E.2d 591 (conduct also violated Rule 
8.1 (a) and Gov Bar R V(4)(G)). Respondent’s “dishonesty” caused Chief Justice Moyer, in one of 
the last of his opinions before his untimely death in the spring of 2010, to complain in dissent (as he 
often did in disciplinary cases) that the sanction imposed was too lenient; he and two other justices 
would have suspended Kealy for 18 months with only six months stayed, rather than the 12-month 
stay granted by the majority. 
In Disciplinary Counsel v. Kimmins, 123 Ohio St.3d 207, 2009 Ohio 4943, 915 N.E.2d 330, there 
were multiple violations but, as in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Cook supra, the Court addressed separately 
the conduct violative of particular rules. Thus, with respect to DR 1-102(A)(6) (and 4-101(B)(2)), the 
focus was on respondent’s “misuse of Steiner’s [the client] confidential information to his 
disadvantage to solicit the support of Steiner’s children for the cleanup operation [of the client’s 
house], which he knew Steiner would oppose . . . .” Id. at para. 15. Likewise, “his failure to 
adequately and honestly account for Steiner’s property violated DR 9-102(B)(3) . . . and 
1-102(A)(6).” Id. 
A case involving a violation only of former 1-102(A)(6) is Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Lazzaro, 
106 Ohio St.3d 379, 2005 Ohio 5321, 835 N.E.2d 367, where the Supreme Court included in its 
opinion the Board’s finding that “respondent’s possession and use of cocaine violated his general 
duty to the legal profession and judicial system to comply with the law . . . .” Id. at para. 7. The Court 
stressed that “the sanction must also safeguard the legal profession and the judicial system from 
illegal conduct that adversely reflects on the practice of law.” Id. at para. 14. Rather than focusing on 
the abstract and general duty to comply with the law, as in Lazzaro, the Court in Columbus Bar 
Ass’n v. Hayes, 118 Ohio St.3d 336, 2008 Ohio 2466, 889 N.E.2d 109, found a direct link between 
respondent’s substance abuse and his inability to adequately serve his clients, based on respondent’s 
admission that his neglect of his clients was “a direct and proximate result of both his drug addiction 
and underlying psychological disorders.” Id. at para. 21. 
A rationale similar to that in Lazarro, this time expressly emphasizing the duties of honesty and 
integrity, appears in Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Blankemeyer, 109 Ohio St.3d 156, 2006 Ohio 2038, 
846 N.E.2d 523, where the Court justified its upping a recommended sanction of indefinite 
suspension to permanent disbarment in language relevant to the 1-102(A)(6) fitness standard: “An 
attorney who has been convicted of felony theft offenses has violated the basic professional duty to 
act with honesty and integrity.” Id. at para. 12. (DR 1-102(A)(3), (4) & (6) violated). The Supreme 
Court reached the same conclusion in a case also involving violation of 1-102(A)(3), (4) & (6) as the 
result of criminal activity (apparently private conduct unrelated to the practice of law), Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Stern, 106 Ohio St.3d 266, 2005 Ohio 4804, 834 N.E.2d 351: 
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A lawyer who engages in the kind of criminal conduct committed by 
respondent [drug trafficking, arson, bank fraud, money laundering] 
violates the duty to maintain personal honesty and integrity, which is 
one of the most basic professional obligations owed by lawyers to the 
public. 
Id. at para. 8. 
In Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Riebel, 69 Ohio St.2d 290, 432 N.E.2d 165 (1982), where, as in 
Lazarro, the only charge was violation of DR 1-102A(A)(6), the Ohio Supreme Court found that the 
use of obscenities in discussion and correspondence with another attorney breached the disciplinary 
rule and warranted a public reprimand. At the core of the Court’s decision is a belief in the law as a 
profession and that the conduct in question was not professional. In one of the relatively few decisions 
in which the Court actually discussed why the conduct at issue reflected adversely on one’s fitness to 
practice law, it stated as follows: 
 The conduct involved here is not that of improper 
representation of a client, nor a claimed infraction of rules of proper 
conduct in a courtroom; nor is there present here a claimed disrespect 
for a judge or other court officials. The charges here involve verbal and 
written statements to an adverse party to a divorce proceeding, which 
party was a long-time friend of respondent; and involved certain 
specific commentary stamped, or written, on correspondence to other 
attorneys involved in pending litigation. 
 Although the board, and now this court, is dealing only with 
certain language uttered and transmitted by the respondent, rather than 
misconduct of counsel to client or court, these acts must be reviewed as 
to whether they reflect upon the user’s fitness to practice law. 
 As stated in Cheatham, Cases and Materials on the Legal 
Profession, at page 32: 
 “Law, like medicine, teaching, and the ministry, is generally 
referred to as a profession, to set it apart from business and the ordinary 
run of callings. Professional activities are regarded in the community as 
carrying special prestige, privileges, and responsibilities, and from the 
status of the law as a profession conclusions are frequently drawn as to 
the conduct appropriate for lawyers. * * * [S]ome methods which are 
unobjectionable in a trade or business may still be open to criticism in 
an attorney because they detract from the objects for which his 
profession exists.” 
 It is within the real meaning and intent of our Code of 
Professional Responsibility that lawyers should always be cognizant of 
the necessity for good manners, courtesy and discourse, both to client 
and other practitioners, as being part of our professional ethics. 
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 The zeal employed by an attorney in guarding the interests of 
his clients must always be tempered so as not to inject his personal 
feelings or display a demeanor that subjects parties to a proceeding or 
opposing counsel to certain indignities. 
 We are in agreement with the conclusions of the board that 
since respondent appears to have adopted a volatile style of script and 
expression which manifests itself more than occasionally, the 
respondent has violated DR 1-102(A)(6) of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. 
Id. at 291-92, 432 N.E.2d at 166-67 (bracket and ellipsis supplied by the Court). 
A more recent decision in which the only violations charged were of DR 1-102(A)(6) and Rule 8.4(h) 
and where professionalism (or the lack of it) was noted is Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Nance, 
124 Ohio St.3d 57, 2009 Ohio 5957, 918 N.E.2d 1000. Respondent’s misconduct included 
repeatedly failing to comply with bankruptcy court filing requirements and orders; as a result he was 
twice cited for contempt. His further failure even to appear at his own contempt hearing was referred 
to as “professional irresponsibility.” Id. at para. 15. 
Although the Court did not couch its opinion in those terms, a lack of professionalism would also 
seem to underlie its decision in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Pollack, 100 Ohio St.3d 280, 
2003 Ohio 5752, 798 N.E.2d 594. Waging all-out legal war against numerous defendants, the 
respondent in Pollack filed, either on his clients’ behalf or pro se, more than 20 lawsuits, sought to 
have criminal charges brought against opposing counsel and against at least one of the defendants (a 
Cleveland police officer), and made unfounded accusations of high-level conspiracies by public 
officials, among other acts. While respondent conceded in the Supreme Court that his conduct 
violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (and two other rules) as charged, he insisted that he did not violate, inter 
alia, 1-102(A)(6). In rejecting a respondent’s argument, the Court concurred in the panel’s finding 
that 
respondent had “crossed the line” [in the panel’s words, id. at para. 43, 
“between zealous, but principled, advocacy and the zealousness that 
“comes from personalizing the litigation’“] and thereby violated DR . . . 
1-102(A)(6). 
Id. at para. 46. The Court referred to respondent’s representation in the various lawsuits as a 
“personal crusade no longer driven by his clients’ interests,” id., and chose to quote the description of 
respondent used by the Eighth District Court of Appeals in the course of affirming an award of 
sanctions against respondent and one of his clients in related litigation: “‘an obnoxious litigator bent 
on abusing the courts to further an illegitimate agenda.’“ Id. Respondent was suspended for one year, 
with six months stayed. 
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Another important decision under 1-102(A)(6) is Disciplinary Counsel v. Goldblatt, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 310, 2008 Ohio 2458, 888 N.E.2d 1091. The respondent in Goldblatt sought to arrange a 
sexual encounter with “a girl of about ‘nine or ten or eleven’ and ‘the younger the better’“; he agreed 
to pay $200 “to do as much sexually with the child as that amount would buy.” Id. at para. 12. These 
arrangements were made (in the Court’s word, “unwittingly”), not with a pimp, but with an 
undercover FBI agent. In condemning this conduct in the strongest possible terms (“reprehensible,” 
risk of “unspeakable harm”), the Court for purposes of 1-102(A)(6) drew heavily upon the analysis of 
the Maryland Court of Appeals in a similar case, Atty. Grievance Comm. v. Thompson, 367 Md. 
315, 327, 786 A.2d 763, 770-71 (2001): 
“Respondent’s behavior in pursuing the child/victim in this case 
grossly overstepped the boundaries of appropriate adult-child 
relationships. In so doing, Respondent demonstrated, and even 
acknowledged to himself, that he may not be trusted around children in 
general. Although adult-child interactions are not related directly to 
Respondent’s practice of law, the concept of trust is an inseparable 
element of any attorney’s practice.  It is inconceivable, therefore, how 
we may presently authorize and entrust Respondent with the 
enumerable confidential, fiduciary, and trust based relationships that 
attorneys, by their profession, are required to maintain in their dealings 
with their clients or the public.” 
Id. at para. 27 (bracketed material added). Echoing the further language of the Maryland court, our 
Supreme Court concluded as follows: 
 Respondent’s trustworthiness and fitness to practice law have 
been severely undermined by his criminal behavior. We are convinced 
that an indefinite suspension will help protect the public, deter other 
lawyers from similar wrongdoing, and preserve the public’s trust in the 
legal profession. 
Id. at para. 30. It seems fair to say that conduct putting trustworthiness into question, whether or not 
that conduct is related to the practice of law, raises fitness concerns under 1-102(A)(6), and 
undoubtedly will continue to do so under the identical language of Rule 8.4(h). 
Another case that seems fairly to fall within the ken of 1-102(A)(6) is Cuyahoga Bar Ass’n v. Kehn, 
112 Ohio St.3d 547, 2007 Ohio 809, 862 N.E.2d 92. There, respondent had a fee dispute with a 
client; the dispute ultimately went to binding arbitration in favor of the client. Respondent, however, 
not only failed to comply with the arbitration award, but also argued that an earlier investigation, 
which had been dropped because the Board determined that it could be more appropriately resolved 
by mediation or other ADR alternatives, was res judicata of the new investigation relating to the 
failure to comply with the arbitration award. Such an argument was, of course, meritless. Even though 
the Court did not expressly articulate why this conduct violated 1-102(A)(6) (the only disciplinary 
rule involved), both the conduct and the argument leave something to be desired in terms of fitness to 
practice.   
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Finally, a case shedding some light on the fitness-to-practice standard, by articulating why the 
conduct there at issue did not violate DR 1-102(A)(6), is Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Korte, 111 Ohio 
St.3d 273, 2006 Ohio 5705, 855 N.E.2d 1211. Thus, in Korte, “[b]ecause respondents had acted in 
accordance with their best, albeit misguided, professional judgment [in failing to provide medical 
reports to the other side in workers’ compensation matter], . . . the board rejected the stipulation that 
they had violated DR 1-102(A)(6).” Id. at para. 17. Korte supports the view that proceeding in 
accordance with one’s own best professional judgment, even if that judgment turns out to be wrong, 
does not constitute conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice. With Korte, compare 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Dawson, 124 Ohio St.3d 22, 2009 Ohio 5959, 918 N.E.2d 519, 
where respondent was found to have violated DR 1-102(A)(6) by failing to satisfy his former clients’ 
malpractice judgment, even though “respondent had entered into the settlements with his former 
clients in good faith and without any intent to avoid the obligation through bankruptcy.” Id.  at para. 
11. Good intentions, apparently, are not enough under 1-102(A)(6). 
In other cases, while there was no elaboration on the conduct’s tie to fitness-to-practice concerns, that 
linkage was obvious from the conduct itself. E.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Stridsberg, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 69, 2009 Ohio 4182, 914 N.E.2d 183 (taking contingent fee from BWC overpayment with 
knowledge that it was overpayment; DR 2-106(A) (excessive fees), as well as 1-102(A)(6), violated); 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Slavin, 121 Ohio St.3d 618, 2009 Ohio 2015, 906 N.E.2d 1121 (failure to 
inform client that her case had been dismissed); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Ellis, 120 Ohio St.3d 89, 
2008 Ohio 5278, 896 N.E.2d 703 (panoply of neglect, deceit, failing to return unearned retainers, etc.; 
respondent, a solo practitioner with no office support, became “overwhelmed”; he “shut down” and 
eventually stopped going to the office altogether); Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 
521, 2008 Ohio 91, 880 N.E.2d 467 (filing complaint asserting that one of respondent’s clients (his 
mother-in-law) was incompetent, with supporting affidavit from wife so stating; one month later 
respondent witnessed document signed by mother-in-law giving wife power of attorney to act for her 
mother); Disciplinary Counsel v. Scurry, 115 Ohio St.3d 201, 2007 Ohio 4796, 874 N.E.2d 521 
(four counts, all involving 1-102(A)(6) and all involving respondent’s intoxication – while attempting 
to meet with criminal-defendant clients (counts I and II), when telephoning various law enforcement 
agencies (count III), and when calling the municipal court clerk’s office about cases in which he had 
an interest (count IV)).  
In Disciplinary Counsel v. Lorenzon, 133 Ohio St.3d 332, 2012 Ohio 4713, 978 N.E.2d 183, the 
tie between the misconduct and fitness concerns lies in respondent’s delegation of use of his signature 
without retaining sufficient control, a practice that can harm both the lawyer and his clients. In 
Lorenzon, the respondent gave a Florida law firm, for which he was “of counsel” and which 
negotiated debt on behalf of consumers, “his electronic signature and attorney-registration number 
without placing restrictions on how they could be used” id. at para. 9; this violated Rule 8.4(h). The 
details of the arrangement were that Lorenzon would act as local counsel in Ohio for CLG, the Florida 
firm, and he would execute a contract with each Ohio client. 
To facilitate the execution of the contracts, the agreement required 
Lorenzon to provide CLG with his electronic signature and Ohio 
attorney-registration number. 
*    *    *    *  
1351
Ohio Rule 8.4 
 
  
 Lorenzon testified that he approved a blank form contract that 
CLG was to use for Ohio clients and explained that he thought he was 
to receive every contract by e-mail, approve it, and send it back to CLG, 
where his electronic signature would be affixed to the contract . . . . He 
admits, however, that his contract with CLG did not specify that he was 
to review each individual contract and that it authorized CLG to apply 
or use his signature on correspondence and forms that he had 
preapproved. 
Id. at paras. 7, 8. In the sanction section (imposing a stayed six-month suspension), the Court first 
noted that this was a case of first impression, but then drew an analogy with cases sanctioning 
attorneys for failing to properly supervise their employees, where comparable sanctions were 
imposed. Speaking further of the wrongdoing, the Court reasoned as follows: 
Lorenzon admitted that he had preapproved the blank form that was to 
be used for every Ohio client and acknowledged that the contract with 
CLG did not require his approval for every debt negotiation contract. 
Thus, Lorenzon provided his electronic signature without retaining any 
appreciable means to control or supervise its use . . . . One panel 
member likened this process to giving CLG “what amounts to your 
ATM identification and your pin number.” 
 Because an attorney’s signature, whether actual or electronic, 
affixed to a document along with an attorney-registration number 
reflects personal assent to or approval of a document, the attorney must 
jealously guard its use to protect innocent third parties as well as the 
attorney’s own reputation. 
Id. at paras. 17-18. 
The standard – the “any other conduct” criterion – A general caveat: The cases below, most of which 
were decided under the Code, must be read in light of the Court’s unanimous decision in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013 Ohio 3998, 997 N.E.2d 500, which was extensively 
discussed at the beginning of this section supra, at “The standard in general.” As there noted, Rule 
8.4(h) covers two kinds of misconduct—either conduct adversely reflecting on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice but not expressly covered by another rule, or violating another rule by conduct that is so 
egregious as to impact on fitness. 
The standard - The “any other conduct” criterion - Used as an end-around other rules: Even when DR 
1-102(A)(6) was employed as an independent standard, at times the provision appeared to be applied 
to conduct that implicated concerns in other rules, but did not violate them. For example, in Toledo 
Bar Ass’n v. Wood, 32 Ohio St.3d 166, 512 N.E.2d 671 (1987), the Court found that the attorney’s 
abrupt and unexplained termination of his law practice, without making any provision for entrusted 
legal matters, failed to protect his client’s interests and thus violated 1-102(A)(6). This conduct could 
have violated other provisions, such as DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting a legal matter), 7-101(A)(1) 
(failing to seek the lawful objectives of a client), and 7-101(A)(2) (failing to carry out the 
employment contract). Although violations of these provisions (among others) were alleged, the 
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panel that heard the case did not believe the burden of proof was met on these charges. Nevertheless, 
the totality of the circumstances was seen as supporting a violation of DR 1-102(A)(6). Accord 
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Perry, 87 Ohio St.3d 217, 718 N.E.2d 1276 (1999) (conduct consistent 
with neglect, failing to seek lawful objectives of client, etc., found to be violative only of DR 
1-102(A)(6), even though the complaint charged violation of “several [unidentified] Disciplinary 
Rules.”  Id. at 218, 718 N.E.2d at 1276); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Wallace, 83 Ohio St.3d 496, 500, 
700 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 (1998) (no clear and convincing evidence that misleading interrogatory 
response, technically correct when provided, violated 1-102(A)(4), 7-102(A)(3), (A)(5), or (A)(7), 
but conduct “shows a serious lack of professionalism” in violation of 1-102(A)(6), even though (A)(6) 
violation not charged; due process argument by respondent rejected because, according to the Court, 
(A)(6) was “in essence an included offense to the charged violations”). 
The standard - The “any other conduct” criterion - Applied to conduct not covered by another rule: As 
phrased, both the disciplinary rule and the professional conduct rule talk in terms of “any other 
conduct” adversely reflecting on fitness. Reasonably read, this would appear to make the fitness 
standard a catch-all, applicable to conduct not covered by any other of the misconduct provisions. 
Arguably the “end-around” cases supra, fall into this category. And perhaps Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Scurry, 115 Ohio St.3d 201, 2007 Ohio 4796, 874 N.E.2d 521, qualifies (dealing with clients, law 
enforcement agencies, and court personnel when in an intoxicated state), but even there an argument 
could be made that such conduct also was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Another 
candidate is Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Riebel, 69 Ohio St.2d 290, 432 N.E.2d 165 (1982) 
(obscenities in discussion and correspondence with opposing counsel). Finally, Cleveland Metro. 
Bar Ass’n v. McFaul, 120 Ohio St.3d 293, 2008 Ohio 6145, 898 N.E.2d 585, is worth considering 
in this context. The first 1-102(A)(6) violation (the second involved substance abuse) consisted of 
respondent’s visiting the juvenile detention center to visit his client; he was accompanied by the 
client’s girlfriend, whom he signed in as his “legal assistant” and “paralegal.” Misleading? Perhaps, 
but there was some semblance of truth to respondent’s characterization: Although not employed by 
him, the girlfriend had helped him with the investigations and respondent had given the client a $250 
credit for her services on the matter. In any event, this “misrepresentation” was found to have violated 
1-102(A)(6). If it was in fact a “misrepresentation” one wonders why a charged violation of DR 
1-102(A)(4) was dismissed by relator.  
The standard - The “any other conduct” criterion - Applied to conduct also sanctioned under another 
rule: Despite the supposed “any other conduct” limitation, in the vast majority of cases, DR 
1-102(A)(6) was invoked, not as an independent basis for discipline, but as a cumulative citation -- 
the conduct violated another standard and also adversely reflected on the lawyer’s fitness to practice. 
See, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Kizer, 123 Ohio St.3d 188, 2009 Ohio 4763, 915 N.E.2d 314 
(numerous failures to appear at hearings on behalf of clients, to file documents necessary to client’s 
case, to communicate with clients, to return unearned retainers, to account as promised; violations of, 
inter alia, Rules 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.15 and 8.4(h)); Akron Bar Ass’n v. Maher, 121 Ohio St.3d 45, 
2009 Ohio 356, 901 N.E.2d 803 (numerous other rules violated in misconduct involving three 
different representations; in each, respondent found to have violated 1-102(A)(6) and 8.4(h) because 
his conduct “reflected poorly on his fitness to practice law,” id. at paras. 30, 35, 41); Cuyahoga 
County Bar Ass’n v. Glaeser, 120 Ohio St.3d 350, 2008 Ohio 6199, 899 N.E.2d 140 (neglect and 
attempt to cover up with nonexistent settlement story; violation of 1-102(A)(4), 6-101(A), and 
9-102(B)(4), among others, in addition to 1-102(A)(6)); Toledo Bar Ass’n’ v. Hales, 120 Ohio St.3d 
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340, 2008 Ohio 6201, 889 N.E.2d 130 (lacked experience to competently litigate 
medical-malpractice case; violation of, inter alia, 6-101(A)(1) as well as 1-102(A)(6)); Cuyahoga 
County Bar Ass’n v. Jurczenko, 114 Ohio St.3d 229, 2007 Ohio 3675, 871 N.E.2d 564 (violation 
of many disciplinary rules, including 1-102(A)(6), by lying about and misappropriating client’s 
money, by failing to pay client’s creditors and mishandling that client’s bankruptcy, and by failing to 
pay another client’s creditors and then misappropriating that money); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Houser, 110 Ohio St.3d 203, 2006 Ohio 4246, 852 N.E.2d 724 (representing to elderly couple that 
variable-rate annuities were fixed-rate annuities, which couple bought to their prejudice, together 
with numerous other acts of dishonesty and deceit, violated 1-102(A)(4) & (6)); Columbus Bar 
Ass’n v. Mills, 109 Ohio St.3d 245, 2006 Ohio 2290, 846 N.E.2d 1253 (various sloppy and 
unprofessional acts of misconduct, including filing complaint in wrong court, double billing, and 
“questionable collection practices,” pursuant to which respondent requested and received from the 
client’s mother “authorization to charge various fees to the mother’s credit card.” Id. at para. 7); 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Spencer, 71 Ohio St.3d 316, 643 N.E.2d 1086 (1994) (falsifying 
documents in a civil action violated 1-102(A)(4)-(6)). 
Other multiple violation decisions in which the misconduct at issue reflected adversely on the 
respondent’s fitness to practice are Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Parrish, 121 Ohio St.3d 610, 
2009 Ohio 1969, 906 N.E.2d 1113 (while attorney for trust, respondent misappropriated more than 
$172,000; also neglect and damage to clients in separate matter); Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly, 121 
Ohio St.3d 39, 2009 Ohio 317, 901 N.E.2d 798 (misappropriation of funds from a county agency of 
which she was treasurer); Disciplinary Counsel v. Lentes, 120 Ohio St.3d 431 2008 Ohio 6355, 
900 N.E.2d 167 (neglecting and misleading clients about their cases, which deception included 
fictional hearings and trial as well as forging judge’s name on nonexistent court “order”). Akron Bar 
Ass’n v. Markovich, 117 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008 Ohio 862, 883 N.E.2d 1046 (misleading court and 
opposing counsel; violating terms of civil protection order); Disciplinary Counsel v. Roberts, 117 
Ohio St.3d 99, 2008 Ohio 505, 881 N.E.2d 1236 (forging and then notarizing the forged signatures 
on documents); Disciplinary Counsel v. LoDico, 106 Ohio St.3d 229, 2005 Ohio 4630, 833 N.E.2d 
1235 (unprofessional language and conduct during trial, disrespectful of court, jury, and witnesses). 
Compare Akron Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 130 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011 Ohio 4412, 955 N.E.2d 359, a case 
decided under the Rules, in which the relator, for whatever reason, chose to invoke only Rule 8.4(h), 
rather than or in addition to 1.8(j) (which precludes solicitation of sexual activity), even though the 
respondent stipulated to (and was recorded as) having suggested to his client during a telephone 
conversation that the client perform oral sex on him. 
Common misconduct: Many types of conduct were sanctioned under former OH DR 1-102(A)(6), 
both when used as an independent and as a cumulative source for discipline. Typical instances 
included those involving 
 Abusive conduct with a client: For example, threatening language toward a client, 
together with unfounded claims of fraud and dishonesty directed at the bar association 
grievance committee investigating charges against respondent, resulted in violation of 
multiple disciplinary and governing bar rules, including DR 1-102(A)(6), in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Watterson, 114 Ohio St.3d 159, 2007 Ohio 3615, 870 
N.E.2d 1153. In Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Pagac, 39 Ohio St.3d 1, 528 
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N.E.2d 948 (1988), the Court imposed a six-month suspension on a lawyer for 
intimidating a client into paying additional, excessive fees. While the fee itself was 
subject to sanction under former OH DR 2-106(A), the intimidation raised OH DR 
1-102(A)(6) concerns. This conduct included threatening “to make sure that other 
charges would be filed against her husband if she did not pay,” by asserting that the 
“prosecution’s deal was only good while he was the attorney of record,” and by 
making the fee request the last day a favorable plea bargain by the prosecution 
remained on the table.  Id. at 2, 528 N.E.2d at 949. Cf. Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Hayes, 118 Ohio St.3d 336, 2008 Ohio 2466, 889 N.E.2d 109, where respondent 
directed abusive and obscene language at his client’s mother. 
 
Abusive conduct in dealing with a client was also at issue in Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Dillon, 28 Ohio St.3d 114, 502 N.E.2d 637 (1986). In setting up and then 
exploiting for his own self-interest a power of attorney for an elderly, rest-home 
resident without immediate family, the attorney’s actions violated numerous 
disciplinary rules, including OH DR 1-102(A)(6), and resulted in an indefinite 
suspension. The portion of the opinion pertinent to DR 1-102(A)(6) is as follows: 
Relator further states that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(6), 
in that the respondent acknowledged the “great sensitivity” of 
his relationship with the elderly, widowed, rest home resident, a 
childless farmer, but took no special measures to assure that no 
criticism would be generated by his admittedly perilous 
conduct. Such knowing disregard adversely reflects on his 
fitness to practice law. 
Id. at 118, 502 N.E.2d at 640. 
A more recent case involving abusive conduct toward a client is Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel v. Liviola, 94 Ohio St.3d 408, 763 N.E.2d 
588 (2002). Liviola was disbarred for preying on a college “friend” 
from New York suffering from schizophrenia. The friend thought he 
needed legal help and met with respondent. Respondent recommended 
a nonexistent New York lawyer and proceeded to collect substantial 
sums from his friend, supposedly to be forwarded to the imaginary 
lawyer for legal services but not so used. In addition to DR 
1-102(A)(6), respondent was found to have violated 1-102(A)(3)-(5) as 
well.  
 Inappropriate language: In addition to the highly improper and unprofessional remarks 
at issue in Miller, 130 Ohio St.3d 1, 2011 Ohio 4412, 955 N.E.2d 359, and Moore, 
101 Ohio St.3d 261, 2004 Ohio 734, 804 N.E.2d 423, and those in Riebel, 69 Ohio 
St.2d 290, 432 N.E.2d 165 (1982), are discussed this section supra, the following 
cases fall into this category: calling sitting judge a “lying, cheating bitch” in 
conversation with court bailiff, Akron Bar Ass’n v. DeCato, 130 Ohio St.3d 394, 
2011 Ohio 5796, 958 N.E.2d 938; unfounded accusations of bias and prejudice 
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against judges and a county prosecutor, and refusal to abandon a baseless defamation 
claim against opposing counsel in underlying sexual-harassment suit, Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009 Ohio 2870, 909 N.E.2d 1271 
contemptuous conduct before two judges, including false accusations against one 
judge and lying in response to question by the other, Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Vogel, 
117 Ohio St.3d 108, 2008 Ohio 504, 881 N.E.2d 1244. The Vogel case also has the 
distinction of being the first Supreme Court disciplinary case to invoke and apply the 
Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct. Because of the difference in timing of his actions 
before the two judges, respondent was found to have violated DR 1-102(A)(6) in the 
first instance, and Rule 8.4(h) in the second, which took place in February 2007 after 
the effective date of the Rules. 
 
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Bell, 78 Ohio St.3d 88, 676 N.E.2d 527 (1997), concerned 
respondent’s screaming of epithets and racial slurs while attempting to recover a 
client’s pit bull from the dog warden, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(6). And in Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Grimes, 66 Ohio St.3d 607, 614 N.E.2d 740 (1993), a 
lawyer was found in violation of 1-102(A)(6) and publicly reprimanded for referring 
to a juvenile court judge as a “sonofabitch” in a conversation with a reporter who was 
interviewing him about a controversial local case. The comment subsequently 
appeared in the reporter’s published story. (It could be argued that the conduct would 
have been better treated under former EC 8-6 and DR 8-102(B), which dealt 
specifically with criticism of judges. But the Ethical Consideration, which warned 
against “intemperate statements” and advised the use of “appropriate language” in 
criticizing a judge, was aspirational only, and the disciplinary rule spoke only to false 
accusations against a judge. See Ohio Rule 8.2(a) and section 8.2:200.) Writing in 
dissent in Grimes, Justice Pfeifer observed: 
 I would dismiss the complaint against the respondent. 
The conduct at issue was not only out of character but was also 
inconsequential. 
 . . . [W]hich of us who have ever practiced law has not 
muttered a choice epithet about our favorite judge? More 
important, which of us who are judges has not done something 
to earn an occasional raspberry? It is obvious in this case that 
the respondent did not expect his mild outburst to be quoted in 
the newspaper. Respondent self-administered the appropriate 
disciplinary measure by publicly apologizing to Judge 
Heydinger. 
Id. at 610, 614 N.E.2d at 742. 
In Crawford County Bar Ass’n v. Nicholson, 66 Ohio St.3d 585, 
613 N.E.2d 1025 (1993), the lawyer was sanctioned under 1-102(A)(6) 
for making offensive sexual remarks to court personnel, 
notwithstanding his contention that the remarks were intended as jokes. 
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In one instance the lawyer, while in a telephone conversation with a 
female court official, commented that “he was sitting in his office with 
his girlfriend on his lap, caressing her thigh.” In another, he wrote to a 
female court employee to correct a notice of assignment erroneously 
listing a case as No. 269, rather than No. 500: 
“I appreciate your office appointing me as appellate counsel for 
Herb Taylor, however you have the wrong case # on the order. I 
thought Herb’s case # was 500! Of course if you foxy females 
who work for Judge Henson are trying to be coy, go ahead and 
throw this letter away as I would be glad to do case # two sixty 
nine with you! If you know what I mean.” 
Id. at 586-87, 613 N.E.2d at 1026. Accord Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Campbell, 68 Ohio St.3d 7, 623 N.E.2d 24 (1993) 
(numerous unwelcome and offensive sexual comments by lawyer 
directed at employees while in private practice, and at court employees 
or lawyers appearing before him as judge, violated DR 1-102(A)(6), as 
well as (A)(5), and numerous provisions of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct). Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 72 Ohio St.3d 21, 22, 647 
N.E.2d 152, 152 (1995), involved violation of 1-102(A)(6) (and 
1-102(A)(3)) where a lawyer sexually harassed a seventeen year-old 
high school student in his employ by using “inappropriate, vulgar, 
sexually explicit or sexually suggestive language” in her presence.  
 Lack of cooperation in disciplinary proceedings:  Failure to cooperate in disciplinary 
proceedings usually is treated as a violation of Gov Bar R V 4(G) or as an aggravating 
factor in assessing discipline, but it also has been cited as a violation of former OH DR 
1-102(A)(6), either in conjunction with V 4(G), e.g., Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Dice, 
120 Ohio St.3d 455, 2008 Ohio 6787, 900 N.E.2d 189; or independently, e.g., 
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Wood, 32 Ohio St.3d 166, 512 N.E.2d 671 (1987). In other 
instances, the conduct was treated as a violation of OH DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice; see section 8.4:500), or both (A)(5) and 
(A)(6). E.g., Allen County Bar Ass’n v. Linnon, 105 Ohio St.3d 189, 2004 Ohio 
6386, 819 N.E.2d 210 (both). Sometimes a violation of all three provisions results 
from failure to cooperate, as in Disciplinary Counsel v. McShane, 121 Ohio St.3d 
169, 2009 Ohio 746, 902 N.E.2d 980.  
 Failure to comply with other requirements of the Rules for the Government of the Bar 
also has been found to violate DR 1-102(A)(6). Akron Bar Ass’n v. McNerney, 122 
Ohio St.3d 40, 2009 Ohio 2374, 907 N.E.2d 1167 (failure to update registration 
record in accordance with Gov Bar R VI 1 (D); Disciplinary Counsel v. Redfield, 
116 Ohio St.3d 262, 2007 Ohio 6039, 878 N.E.2d 10 (failure to pay child support, 
resulting in noncompliance with Gov Bar R V 5(D)(1)(b) & (c)); Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Beane, 72 Ohio St.3d 480, 650 N.E.2d 1356 (1995) 
(repeated failures to register under Gov Bar R VI 1 or to meet CLE requirements of 
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Gov Bar R. X). See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Noethlich, 94 Ohio St.3d 124, 
760 N.E.2d 816 (2002) (practicing while under CLE suspension and while not 
registered with Supreme Court, together with filing with Court affidavit falsely stating 
that clients had been informed of suspension, violated OH DR 1-102(A)(4) & (6)). 
 Naming oneself as beneficiary in will: Where an attorney, on behalf of a client, 
prepared a will in which the lawyer was named as a beneficiary, the Court regularly 
applied former OH DR 1-102(A)(6), either independently, e.g., Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Galinas, 76 Ohio St.3d 87, 666 N.E.2d 1083 (1996), or in 
conjunction with other disciplinary rules, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Clark, 71 
Ohio St.3d 145, 642 N.E.2d 611 (1994). The sanction in these cases ranged from 
one-year to indefinite suspension. Such conduct is now expressly prohibited by Ohio 
Rule 1.8(c). See section 1.8:400.  
 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Tomlan, 118 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008 Ohio 1471, 885 N.E.2d 
895, is a case in which DR 1-102(A)(6) was violated, even though the respondent 
“properly advised his client that he could not ethically prepare a will that named him 
as a beneficiary and that she would have to hire another attorney,” id. at para. 7, 
because he then turned around and, without the ninety-year-old client’s consent, 
transferred assets of the client to joint and survivorship accounts, thereby ensuring that 
title to the assets would pass to respondent.  (A second violation of 1-102(A)(6) 
involved respondent’s undue delay in the performance of his duties as executor of his 
client’s estate.) 
 Sexual misconduct or substance abuse: Misconduct involving sex or substance abuse 
often was handled under DR 1-102(A)(3), which prohibited illegal conduct involving 
moral turpitude. See Ohio Rule 8.4(b) and section 8.4:300. However, where the 
conduct in question either was not illegal or, when taken in context, did not suggest 
moral turpitude, it fell outside that provision. Under those circumstances, the conduct 
could still be subject to sanction under DR 1-102(A)(6) as other conduct that 
adversely reflected on fitness to practice law. 
For example, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Quatman, 108 Ohio St.3d 
389, 2006 Ohio 1196, 843 N.E.2d 1205, in which the respondent, 
during an appointment with a client, made physical contact with the 
client’s breasts, which he judged as “nice.” 
The physical contact, coupled with the inappropriate remark 
about [the client’s] breasts, was unethical and unprofessional. 
Id. at paras. 14, 23 (stayed one-year suspension). Accord Toledo Bar 
Ass’n v. Burkholder, 109 Ohio St.3d 443, 2006 Ohio 2817, 848 
N.E.2d 840 (“relentless” pursuit of vulnerable client seeking to 
terminate her marriage, together with “recklessly unprofessional” 
physical contact and sexual remark violated this provision (and DR 
5-101(A)(1)), id. at para. 11); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Moore, 101 Ohio St.3d 261, 2004 Ohio 734, 804 N.E.2d 423 
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(respondent’s consensual sexual relations with client violated DR 
1-102(A)(6) and 5-101(A)(1)); Akron Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 104 
Ohio St.3d 317, 2004 Ohio 6588, 819 N.E.2d 677 (sex with 
vulnerable client, plus lying under oath to hide misdeeds, resulted in 
DR 1-102(A)(6) and (A)(4) violations; two-year suspension with 
eighteen months stayed; Moore (stayed one-year suspension) 
distinguished in terms of sanction because this case “more egregious.” 
id. at para. 15). Under the Rules of Professional Conduct, sexual 
“activity” with clients is prohibited, unless a consensual sexual 
relationship existed prior to the commencement of the attorney-client 
relationship. Ohio Rule 1.8(j). See section 1.8:210. 
Although accepting drugs and assaulting a police officer who 
witnessed the transaction could be considered illegal conduct involving 
moral turpitude, it was treated instead as a DR 1-102(A)(6) violation, 
warranting a six-month suspension, stayed on conditions, in Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Baker, 52 Ohio St.3d 142, 556 N.E.2d 466 
(1990), probably because of the surrounding circumstances. In Baker 
the attorney first refused the drugs but then accepted them after having 
had a few drinks at a concert. The attorney did not ingest the drugs and 
there was no evidence that he had ever taken drugs unlawfully. See 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gross, 11 Ohio St.3d 48, 463 
N.E.2d 382 (1984) (misdemeanor pleas for possession of marijuana 
and quaaludes as well as DUI conviction apparently not considered 
conduct involving moral turpitude, but still warranted discipline under 
OH DR 1-102(A)(6)); accord Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. 
McFaul, 120 Ohio St.3d 293, 2008 Ohio 6145, 898 N.E.2d 585 (drug 
misdemeanor conviction; no 1-102(A)(3) charge). For a case in which 
a felony conviction for presenting a false or forged prescription for a 
Schedule IV drug violated OH DR 1-102(A)(6) but, because of 
mitigating factors, resulted only in a public reprimand, see Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bell, 83 Ohio St.3d 310, 699 N.E.2d 925 
(1998). 
As the above decisions illustrate, DR 1-102(A)(6) was sometimes 
applied where DR 1-102(A)(3) was not, but conduct could violate both 
provisions. E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams, 130 Ohio St.3d 
341, 2011 Ohio 5163, 958 N.E.2d 555 (rape of seven-year-old nephew, 
disbarred); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Linnen, 111 Ohio St.3d 507, 
2006 Ohio 5480, 857 N.E.2d 539 (conduct of “Naked Photographer,” 
involving numerous instances of approaching solitary women and 
taking their pictures (and sometimes touching the victim and “maybe” 
masturbating in front of the first few victims), resulted in guilty plea to 
53 misdemeanors). Disciplinary Counsel v. White, 106 Ohio St.3d 
108, 2005 Ohio 3957, 832 N.E.2d 51 (violation of both, arising from 
guilty plea to drug-related felony). Respondent White repeated this 
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double violation in Disciplinary Counsel v. White, 109 Ohio St.3d 
402, 2006 Ohio 2709, 848 N.E.2d 504, for which he was permanently 
disbarred.  
 Tax violations: Former OH DR 1-102(A)(6) was occasionally invoked against a 
respondent who failed to pay income taxes, file returns, or comply with withholding 
obligations. “[O]ur precedent in such cases requires a one-year suspension from the 
practice of law.” Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Baker, 65 Ohio St.3d 302, 304, 
603 N.E.2d 990, 991 (1992) (willful failure to file; 1-102(A)(6) violated). The 
one-year standard was reiterated in Disciplinary Counsel v. Large, 122 Ohio St.3d 
35, 2009 Ohio 2022, 907 N.E.2d 1162 (failure to file personal income tax returns and 
failure to report employee wages, both over five-year period; Abood (cited this 
paragraph infra), distinguished on sanction point). A 2004 DR 1-102(A)(6) case, 
while acknowledging the one-year rule, found that a one-year suspension with six 
months stayed was appropriate where there were significant mitigating factors, even 
though the “sheer breadth of respondent’s default [failure to timely pay income taxes 
in nine different tax years] must be seen as an aggravating circumstance.” Toledo Bar 
Ass’n v. Abood, 104 Ohio St.3d 655, 2004 Ohio 7015, 821 N.E.2d 560, at para. 19. 
As Abood demonstrates, sanctions can vary from the one-year norm, depending on the 
facts of the individual case.  Sometimes, however, the facts do not adequately explain 
the disparity in treatment. Compare Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Smith, 102 Ohio St.3d 
10, 2004 Ohio 1582, 806 N.E.2d 495, where failure to file federal income tax returns 
for nine different tax years (there  were also additional violations in two separate 
counts) resulted in violations of 1-102(A)(3) and (5), as well as (6), but because of 
significant mitigating factors and none on the aggravation side (even though one might 
note, as did the Abood Court, the “sheer breadth of respondent’s default”), 
respondent’s sanction was a stayed six-month suspension, with Dayton Bar Ass’n v. 
Schram, 122 Ohio St.3d 8, 2009 Ohio 1931, 907 N.E.2d 311, where the respondent 
was disbarred for violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) & (6), based on her failure to file and 
pay federal, state and municipal income taxes over a twenty-year period and her 
failure to pay federal withholding for her employees over much of that time; as a result, 
she pled guilty to federal tax misdemeanor and felony charges. There were significant 
factors on both the mitigation and aggravation side of the ledger, but the Court 
concluded that “the mitigating factors are outweighed by the gravity of respondent’s 
misconduct and the aggravating features of her case.” Id. at para. 13. 
 
Another 1-102(A)(6) tax case, Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Veneziano, 120 
Ohio St.3d 451, 2008 Ohio 6789, 900 N.E.2d 185 (one-year stayed suspension; 
mitigating factors; citing, inter alia, Smith), is noteworthy on the issue whether 
respondent willfully failed to file returns and pay federal and state income taxes, and 
to pay federal and state withholding for her employees. With respect to withholding, 
the Court, noting that it is not bound by stipulations as to fact or misconduct, rejected 
respondent’s claim — based on the parties’ stipulation that the conduct was not 
deliberate — that her violations resulted from “excusable ignorance” rather than 
deliberate nonpayment. But in the sanctions portion of the opinion, the Court appears 
to rely on the stipulation of nonwillfullness to distinguish the case from decisions in 
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which a one-year actual suspension had been imposed, including Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Baker supra. (It is also interesting that respondent attempted 
to explain her withholding violations by arguing that “she had had no knowledge prior 
to 2002, when she consulted a tax attorney, of an employer’s obligation to withhold 
employee compensation . . . .” Id.  at para. 4. The Court found her “professed 
obliviousness” carried “little weight,” given her “advanced education and 
experience,” including her brief enrollment in a “master’s degree program in tax law.” 
Id. at para. 5.) 
 Other misconduct: OH DR 1-102(A)(6) was invoked in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Carroll, 106 Ohio St.3d 84, 2005 Ohio 3805, 831 N.E.2d 1000, where the 
respondent improperly claimed compensatory time on timesheets in connection with 
his position as executive director of Ohio State Barber Board. One rather implausible 
aspect of the sanction discussion (six months, all stayed) is that in which the Board 
found 
no evidence that respondent acted with a selfish or dishonest 
motive. His record-keeping was deficient, but he was not 
attempting to receive pay for work he did not perform, 
according to the board. 
Id. at para. 10. Compare the language in para. 4: “respondent claimed 
on some of his timesheets that he had put in full days working for the 
barber board when in fact he had spent part of the workday out of the 
office attending court proceedings for his private legal clients.” The 
contrast between this perceived lack of selfish or dishonest motive in 
Carroll was used to justify a more severe sanction in the cases of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St.3d 68, 2012 Ohio 5337, 
979 N.E.2d 1263, discussed in this section supra at “The standard - 
Fitness to practice - The nexus (or lack thereof) between misconduct 
and fitness to practice,” and Disciplinary Counsel v. McNeal, 131 
Ohio St.3d 224 2012 Ohio 785, 963 N.E.2d 815, discussed supra in 
section 8.4:400 at “In general.” See also Columbus Bar Ass’n v. 
Ashton, 108 Ohio St.3d 37, 2006 Ohio 78, 840 N.E.2d 618 (taking 
unauthorized expense-account advances from his law firm violated 
1-102(A)(6)). 
DR 1-102(A)(6) was violated, along with numerous other rules, by 
respondent’s scheme to defraud his in-laws and nursing homes that had 
provided them care. Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio 
St.3d 521, 2008 Ohio 91, 880 N.E.2d 467. And in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Hiltbrand, 110 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006 Ohio 4250, 852 
N.E.2d 733, respondent transgressed DR 1-102(A)(6) by violating a 
protective order barring respondent from discussing testimony outside 
a courtroom setting. 
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8.5:100  Comparative Analysis of Ohio Rule 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.5 
Gov Bar R V 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.5 
  
8.5:101  Model Rule Comparison 
Ohio Rule 8.5 is substantively identical to the Model Rule; the only differences are the substitution of 
“Ohio” for “this jurisdiction” each time those words appear in division (a). 
  
8.5:102  Model Code Comparison 
The following sections of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility are listed in the Correlation 
Table (Appendix A to the Rules) as related to Ohio Rule 8.5: None. 
  
8.5:200  Disciplinary Authority 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.5(a) 
Gov Bar R V 11(F) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.5(a) 
Ohio Commentary 
Greenbaum, Lawyer’s Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 10.39 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 101:2003 
ALI-LGL § 5 
Wolfram § 3.2 
The material in this section is, in part, excerpted and adapted from Arthur F. Greenbaum, Lawyer’s 
Guide to the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility § 10.39 (1996). 
“A lawyer admitted to practice in Ohio is subject to the disciplinary authority of Ohio, regardless of 
where the lawyer’s conduct occurs.” Ohio Rule 8.5(a). This was the “longstanding law” pre-Rules as 
well. Rule 8.5 cmt. [1]. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Scuro, 36 Ohio St.3d 205, 522 
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N.E.2d 572 (1988) (Ohio lawyer disciplined in Ohio for engaging in unauthorized practice of law in 
Texas). Lawyers admitted to practice pro hac vice in a tribunal in Ohio also are subject to the state’s 
disciplinary authority. See generally Royal Indem. Co. v. J. C. Penney Co., 27 Ohio St.3d 31, 501 
N.E.2d 617 (1986). In Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 4541, 
894 N.E.2d 1210, the Court sanctioned a Kentucky lawyer admitted in various Ohio courts pro hac 
vice by enjoining him from practicing in Ohio, pro hac vice or otherwise, for two years. 
As a related matter, Ohio imposes reciprocal discipline on Ohio lawyers disciplined for ethical 
misconduct by another jurisdiction. Gov Bar R V 11(F). Note that “another jurisdiction” may include 
a federal court, or federal department or agency. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Jewett, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 74, 2004 Ohio 4440, 814 N.E.2d 40 (tax court); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Harp, 101 
Ohio St. 3d 1241, 2004 Ohio 1210, 805 N.E.2d 98 (bankruptcy court); Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Porter, 97 Ohio St.3d 1221, 2002 Ohio 6774, 779 N.E.2d 1043 (district court); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Knuth, 119 Ohio St.3d 1201, 2008 Ohio 3810, 891 N.E.2d 343 (U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office); Disciplinary Counsel v. Gettman, 112 Ohio St.3d 1211, 2007 Ohio 
138, 860 N.E.2d 106 (Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review). 
A 2010 decision makes clear, however, that not every federal agency qualifies as “another 
jurisdiction” for reciprocal discipline purposes.  Thus, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Lapine, 128 Ohio 
St. 3d 87, 2010 Ohio 6151, 942 N.E.2d 328, a unanimous Court concluded that the SEC, which had 
entered a suspension order in which respondent voluntarily agreed not to practice before the agency 
for five years, was not such a jurisdiction “[b]ecause the SEC does not admit or supervise attorneys or 
specifically regulate the practice of law.” Id. at para. 20. The Court further found notable that, unlike 
the USPTO, the federal agency found to be a “jurisdiction” in Knuth supra, “the SEC Rules of 
Practice do not set forth or incorporate by reference any rules of professional conduct or provide for 
disciplinary hearings in which misconduct must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 
para. 15. Moreover, even if the SEC were “another jurisdiction,” the Court alternatively held that the 
matter against Lapine should be dismissed in any event because “the SEC suspension order is not the 
result of a disciplinary proceeding and is therefore not a ‘disciplinary order’ within the meaning of 
Gov. Bar R. V(11)(F)(1),” and “reflects neither an admission of wrongdoing by the attorney nor an 
affirmative finding of professional misconduct by the SEC . . . .” Id. at para. 1.  
Respondent therefore has not been disciplined by the SEC for 
professional misconduct as an attorney, but rather has voluntarily 
agreed not to practice before the SEC in order to settle a dispute with 
that agency. The suspension order thus cannot serve as a basis for 
imposing reciprocal discipline. 
Id. at para. 25. As a result, the purpose of reciprocal discipline – “to prevent relitigation of 
misconduct that has already been established in another jurisdiction” – is not served “if the other 
jurisdiction has not actually established the underlying conduct.” Id. at para. 24. 
Within thirty days of the issuance of the disciplinary order by another jurisdiction, the Ohio-licensed 
lawyer is to give notice of that fact to Disciplinary Counsel and the Clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court. 
Gov Bar R V 11(F)(1). Failure to do so may lead to a penalty enhancement. Gov Bar R V 11(F)(6). 
This notification then triggers the issuance of a show-cause order by the Court. Gov Bar R V 
11(F)(2). Thirty days after the notice issued pursuant to V 11(F)(2), Ohio will impose identical or 
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comparable discipline (see, e.g., Gettman supra (“public censure” by federal office; “public 
reprimand” imposed), unless the lawyer can show by clear and convincing evidence either that the 
original tribunal lacked jurisdiction or was compromised by fraud, Gov Bar R V 11(F)(4)(a)(i); or 
that the misconduct in question warrants substantially different discipline in Ohio. Gov Bar R V 
11(F)(4)(a)(ii). Without such proof, a final disciplinary order from another jurisdiction conclusively 
establishes the misconduct in Ohio reciprocal-discipline cases. Gov Bar R V 11(F)(5). See Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hine, 80 Ohio St.3d 448, 687 N.E.2d 420 (1997) (applying V 
11(F)(4)(a)(ii) standard). Further, the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction is treated as 
presumptively correct. Gov Bar R V 11(F)(2)(b). This is so even if the sanction imposed in the other 
jurisdiction is one not available under the Ohio sanction scheme. Jewett supra (three-year suspension 
(unavailable in Ohio) by U.S. Tax Court likewise imposed on respondent in Ohio). See Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Witt, 106 Ohio St.3d 1210, 2005 Ohio 4981, 834 N.E.2d 818 (lawyer suspended in 
Connecticut until payment of Client Security Fund fee; Ohio suspends until respondent reinstated in 
Connecticut). 
With respect to the imposition of “identical or comparable” discipline, compare Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Glover, 116 Ohio St.3d 1202, 2007, 116 Ohio St.3d 2007 Ohio 6031, 876 N.E.2d 576 
(no showing that different discipline warranted; respondent disbarred and “unconditionally excluded” 
from admission to practice in Delaware; permanent disbarment imposed in Ohio), and Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Meenen, 88 Ohio St.3d 268, 725 N.E.2d 626 (2000) (same; “‘New Jersey 
disbarment is final.’ Therefore, respondent is disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio.” Id. (citation 
omitted)), with Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Smith, 93 Ohio St. 3d 1221, 757 N.E. 2d 373 
(2001) (respondent “disbarred” in Missouri; comparable sanction in Ohio is indefinite suspension; 
“he will not be reinstated to the practice of law in Ohio until such time as he is reinstated to the 
practice of law in the State of Missouri.”  Id. at 1223, 757 N.E.2d at 373), and Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Bustamante, 78 Ohio St.3d 74, 676 N.E.2d 516 (1997) (imposing “indefinite 
suspension” rather than “disbarment” as Florida had done because Ohio indefinite suspension was 
sanction most comparable to Florida disbarment). Note, however, that in a more recent case in which 
Florida had disbarred respondent, Ohio likewise imposed disbarment.  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Kreiling, 105 Ohio St.3d 1201, 2005 Ohio 389, 822 N.E.2d 368. Perhaps the meaning of 
“disbarment” in Florida has changed since the Bustamonte case. (While the Ohio Supreme Court in 
Kreiling refers in its opinion to “permanent disbarment” by the Florida Supreme Court, the 
disposition stated in 864 So.2d 401 is one word: “Disbarred.”) See section 0.2:240 at “Special 
disciplinary provisions - Reciprocal discipline.” 
The other side of the coin is also reflected in Rule 8.5(a): 
A lawyer not admitted in Ohio is also subject to the disciplinary 
authority of Ohio if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal 
services in Ohio. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority 
of both Ohio and another jurisdiction for the same conduct. 
(Emphasis added.) As stated in Comment [1], this “[e]xtension of the disciplinary authority of Ohio to 
other lawyers who provide or offer legal services in Ohio is for the protection of the citizens of Ohio.” 
Rule 8.5 cmt. [1]. The comment notes that the reciprocal enforcement of disciplinary rulings under 
Gov Bar R V 11, as discussed above, “will further advance the purposes of this rule.” 
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Apart from the questions raised by the Court’s decision in the Harris case, discussed in this section 
infra, the scope of the Rule is somewhat uncertain. As stated, it proclaims disciplinary jurisdiction 
over any lawyer who “provides or offers to provide legal services in Ohio.” Ohio Rule 8.5(a). As to 
the actual provision of services, when are they provided “in” the state? Does this include not only the 
provision of legal services conducted physically in the state, but also the provision of legal services in 
Ohio via the mails, telephone and the internet? For example, if a non-Ohio lawyer represents an Ohio 
client on an Ohio matter solely by phone, email, and/or regular mail, is this providing legal services in 
the state? What if the out-of-state lawyer (who is licensed in State X) sends a letter from State X to an 
Ohio recipient on behalf of a State-X client. Does this constitute providing legal services in Ohio?  
With respect to “offers” to provide legal services in the state, the Rule is ambiguous in another way. Is 
the focus here on making “offers” in the state? Does any solicitation of business made within the state 
render the lawyer subject to Ohio’s disciplinary authority regardless of where the services are to be 
rendered? If so, is the mere accessibility of a firm web site to those within Ohio an implicit offer to 
provide services? Or is the focus not the place of the offer, but rather on the nexus of the services 
offered? Perhaps the Rule applies wherever a lawyer offers to provide services as long as those 
services are to be provided in part in Ohio. 
It would seem that guidance as to these questions under Rule 8.5(a) is provided by Rule 8.5(b)(2) -- 
Ohio’s Rules will be applied if Ohio is where the “conduct occurred” and where the “predominant 
effect” of that conduct is. If the predominant effect is in a jurisdiction other than where the conduct 
occurred, the jurisdiction of predominant effect (or that in which the lawyer reasonably believes the 
predominant effect will occur) is controlling. See further discussion in section 8.5:300 below.  For a 
pre-Rule case in which there would have been no uncertainty had Rule 8.5 been applicable, inasmuch 
as the conduct both occurred in Ohio and had its predominant effect there, (and also was directly 
related to matters pending before Ohio tribunals, see Rule 8.5(b)(1)), see Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. 
Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008 Ohio 4541, 894 N.E.2d 1210 (sanctioning non-Ohio lawyer 
defending clients before Ohio courts pro hac vice in foreclosure actions involving Ohio properties). 
While not related to lawyer disciplinary regulation, the comments point out that this new extension of 
the Court’s disciplinary authority to out-of-state lawyers who provide, or offer to provide, service in 
Ohio may have an impact on whether those lawyers are subjecting themselves by their conduct to 
personal jurisdiction in Ohio civil actions. Ohio Rule 8.5 cmt. [1]. 
Both Rules 8.5(a) and 8.5(b) were invoked for the first time in a disciplinary matter in Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Trieu, 132 Ohio St.3d 288, 2012 Ohio 2714, 971 N.E.2d 918, a case which presented 
facts that were essentially the mirror image of those in Mullany. Trieu was an admitted Ohio lawyer, 
but his misconduct occurred in Texas, where he was not admitted. (He limited his practice there to 
immigration law.) Interestingly, although the violations cited are violations of the Texas Disciplinary 
Rules of Professional Conduct, there is no indication that Trieu was charged by the Texas authorities. 
Since he was licensed in Ohio, the Court had no difficulty finding that “Trieu is subject to the 
disciplinary authority of this state regardless of where his conduct occurs,” id. at para. 3, citing Ohio 
Rule 8.5(a). And, since the misconduct did not involve a matter pending before a tribunal and 
occurred in Texas (where it also presumably had its predominant effect), “the rules of that jurisdiction 
shall be applied to the conduct,” id. in accordance with Ohio Rule 8.5(b)(2). For his violation of the 
Texas Rules, Trieu stipulated to an indefinite suspension of his Ohio license. 
1366
Ohio Legal Ethics 8.5  
 
  
The most recent (and enigmatic) decision involving Rule 8.5(a) is Disciplinary Counsel v. Harris, 
137 Ohio St.3d 1, 2013 Ohio 4026, 996 N.E.2d 921, where the respondent argued that 8.5 “does not 
authorize this court to enforce the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct against attorneys who are not 
licensed in Ohio,” id. at para. 6, and the Court agreed: “Because Harris is not a member of the Ohio 
bar, he is not subject to this court’s disciplinary authority,” id. at para. 22, and “never became subject 
to our disciplinary rules. . . .” Id. at para. 18. Instead, the Court referred the charges – that the 
out-of-state lawyer engaged in the unauthorized practice of law – to the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Board for further proceedings. All of this might make sense enough, if one ignores the language of the 
Supreme Court’s Rule 8.5(a), which states that such an out-of-state lawyer is “subject to the 
disciplinary authority of Ohio . . . .” How can these statements, directly contrary on their face, be 
reconciled?  As things now stand, the “disciplinary authority” in Rule 8.5(a) is somehow different 
from “this court’s disciplinary authority” in Harris. This stark conflict cries out for resolution or 
explanation; the Harris decision provides neither. 
The problem is compounded when Comment 19 of Rule 5.5 is brought into the equation. That 
provision reiterates that “[a] lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to [safe harbor] 
division (c) or (d) or otherwise is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. See Rule 
8.5(a).” (Emphasis added.) Harris is clearly in the “or otherwise” category; it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that what the Court has done in Harris is, sub silento, rewrite or repudiate its own rules of 
professional conduct.  
The Court further justifies its position that the Rules do not apply to out-of-state lawyers practicing in 
Ohio by the notion that the remedies discipline has to offer, suspension and disbarment, “are 
ineffective and meaningless” to one not a member of the bar. Id. at para. 13. In so concluding, the 
Court failed to acknowledge that reciprocal discipline could be entered by the jurisdictions where the 
lawyer is licensed – a mechanism expressly referenced in Rule 8.5 cmt. [1] as “further advanc[ing] 
the purposes of this rule.” 
These broad pronouncements have substantial implications. For example, if an out-of-state lawyer, 
practicing in Ohio, steals money from or discloses a confidence of an Ohio client, is the Ohio 
disciplinary system unable to act? Are criminal actions for theft, civil actions for conversion, or for 
breach of fiduciary duty the only mechanisms available in Ohio to handle the matter? When this 
conduct is brought to the attention of Ohio disciplinary authorities, are they left with referring the case 
to the licensing jurisdiction? Yet, that is the very problem 8.5 was meant to address.  
For a different and seemingly more rational resolution of this problem in Delaware, see, e.g., In re 
Nadel, ___ A. 3d ___ (Del. 2013). The Nadel result confirms a state’s disciplinary authority over 
lawyers practicing in that state but not licensed there. All of the cases cited on this issue in ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 641 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary), indicate that 
this is the prevailing view; Harris would appear to stand alone. As summarized by Hazard & Hodes: 
 
 Reading the two rules [5.5 and 8.5] together, it becomes clear 
that a lawyer is subject to discipline in every jurisdiction in which the 
lawyer is licensed to practice law and in every other jurisdiction in 
which the lawyer either provides or “offers to provide” any legal 
services – whether or not authorized to do so under one of the devices 
addressed in Rule 5.5. . . . Moreover, a lawyer who practices law in a 
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jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not licensed is not only subject to 
discipline there, but can still be prosecuted for engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law, or enjoined from doing so. 
2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., W. William Hodes & Peter R. Jarvis, The Law of Lawyering §66.2, 
at 66-4 (3d ed. Supp. 2010). (Bracketed material added; emphasis in original.) 
 
The subject of Comment [1A] is the granting of pro hac vice status and the revocation thereof. An 
out-of-state lawyer seeking to appear pro hac vice must, first, satisfy the registration requirements set 
forth in Gov Bar R XII, and, second, obtain the permission of the tribunal before which he wishes to 
appear. See discussion at sections 5.5:420 and 8.1:240. Revocation of such status is a part of the 
tribunal’s “inherent power to regulate the practice before the tribunal and protect the integrity of its 
proceedings.” Rule 8.5 cmt. [1A]. As that comment further states, 
[r]evocation of pro hac vice status and disciplinary proceedings are 
separate methods of addressing lawyer misconduct, and a lawyer may 
be subject to disciplinary proceedings for the same conduct that led to 
the revocation of pro hac vice status. 
Note that revocation can also be effected through disciplinary proceedings, as in the Mullaney case, 
discussed this section supra, where the respondent was enjoined from pro hac vice practice in Ohio 
for two years. 
  
8.5:300  Choice of Law 
Primary Ohio References 
Ohio Rule 8.5(b) 
Background References 
ABA Model Rule 8.5(b) 
Commentary 
ABA/BNA § 101:2101 
ALI-LGL § 5 
Wolfram § 2.6.1 
With respect to choice-of-law principles, Ohio Rule 8.5(b) provides that 
[i]n any exercise of the disciplinary authority of Ohio, the rules of 
professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows: 
 (1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a 
tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless 
the rules of the tribunal [“including its choice of law rule,” Rule 8.5 
cmt. [4]] provide otherwise; 
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 (2) for any other conduct [“including conduct in anticipation of 
a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal,” Rule 8.5 cmt. [4]], the 
rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred, or, if 
the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the 
rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. [Comment [4] 
notes that with regard to conduct in anticipation of a proceeding likely 
to be before a tribunal, “the predominant effect of such conduct could 
be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another 
jurisdiction.” Rule 8.5 cmt. [4].] A lawyer shall not be subject to 
discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction 
in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the 
lawyer’s conduct will occur. 
Comment [3] states that this “reasonable belief” provision provides “protection from discipline for 
lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty.” Rule 8.5 cmt. [3]. See also Rule 8.5 cmt. [5]. 
In cases where “two admitting jurisdictions” proceed against a lawyer for the same conduct, 
Comment [6] urges that the jurisdictions “should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply 
the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer on the 
basis of two inconsistent rules.” Rule 8.5 cmt. [6]. Two thoughts with respect to Comment [6]: First, 
the reference to “two admitting jurisdictions” seems overly restrictive, given that Rule 8.5(a) 
expressly allows a jurisdiction to exercise its disciplinary authority over a lawyer who provides or 
offers to provide legal services in that jurisdiction, “even if the lawyer is not licensed there.” ABA, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 641 (7th ed. 2011) (commentary). Second, the 
spectre of inconsistent rules being applied would seem to be considerably reduced by the provision in 
Rule 8.5(b) insulating from discipline any lawyer who conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction that the 
lawyer “reasonably believes” will be the jurisdiction of predominant effect.  See generally Thomas 
Spahn, Which State’s Ethics Rules Apply to Lawyers’ Conduct Outside Their Home State?, 
Experience, Spring 2008, at 45. 
One BCGD opinion that touches on choice-of-law issues is Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2004-11, 2004 Ohio Griev. Discip. LEXIS 9 (Oct. 8, 2004), in which the Board 
opined (1) that Ohio lawyers serving as “of counsel” to an out-of-state law firm may do so provided 
the “relationship does not violate the disciplinary rules or laws of the other state” and (2) that 
out-of-state lawyers can serve as “of counsel” to an Ohio firm, provided the “relationship complies 
with the disciplinary rules and laws of Ohio.” Id. at *1 (syllabus). 
The only Ohio disciplinary case to date invoking Rule 8.5(b) is Disciplinary Counsel v. Trieu, 132 
Ohio St.3d 288, 2012 Ohio 2714, 971 N.E.2d 918; it is discussed in Section 8.5:200 supra. 
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